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•PREFACE
I T is seldom that the last chapter of a volume is writtenseven years after the first has been finished; and
when this does happen, the author is generally to
blame. I must ask. however, for complete acquittal
on the charge of dilatoriness or want of energy. I was
writing the story of the Burgos Campaign in July 1914:
in August the Great War broke out: and like everyone
else I applied for service in any capacity in which a man
of fifty· four could be useful. By September 4th I was
hard at work in Whitehall, and by a queer chance was
the person who on September 12th drafted from very
inadequate material ~he long communique concerning
the battle of the Marne.. For four years and six months
I was busy in one office and another, and ended up my
service by writing the narrative of the Outbreak of the
War, which was published by the Foreign Office in
February 1919. My toils at tbe desk had just finished
when it happened that I was sent to the House of
Commons, as Burgess representing the Unive'rsity of
Oxford, after a by-election caused by the ele';,ation
of my predecessor, Rowland Prothero, to the Upper
Chamber. Two long official tours in the Rhineland and
in France combined with parliamentary work to prevent
me writing a word in 1919. But in the recess of 19~O
I was able to find time to recommence Peninsular War
studies, and this volume was finished in the autumn
and winter of 19~1 and sent to the press in January 1922.
It was fortunate that in the years immediately pre-
ce9ing the Great War I had been taking repeated turns
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round the Iberian Peninsula., so that the topography of
very nearly all the campaigns with which this volume
deals was familiar to me. I had marvelled at the
smallness of the citadel of Burgos, and the monotony of
the plains across which Wellington's retreat of 1812 was
conducted. I had watched the rapid flow of the Zadorra
beside Vittoria, marked the narrowness of the front of
attack at St. Sebastian, and admired the bold scenery of
the lower Didassoa. Moreover, on the East Coast I had
stood on the ramparts of 'farragona, and wondered
at the preposterous operations against them which
Sir John Murray directed. But there are two sections
of this volume in which I cannot speak as one who has
seen the land. My travels had never taken me to the
Alicante country, or the scene of the isolated and
obscure battle of Castalla. And-what is more impor-
tant-I have never trll.Dlped over Smut's route from
Roncesvalles to the gates of Pampeluna, or from
Sorauren to Echalar. Such an excursion I had planned
in company with my good friend Foster Cunliffe, our
All Souls Reader in Military History, who fell on the
Sonune in 1916, and] had no gl'eat desire to think of
making it without him. Moreover, the leisure of the
times before 1914 is now denied me. So for the greater
part 01 the ten-days' Campaign of the Pyrenees I have
been dependent for topography on the observations
of others-which I regret. But it would have been
absurd to delay the publication of this volume for
another year or more, on the chance of being able to
go over the ground in some uncovenanted scrap of
holiday.
I have, as in previous cases, to make due acknowledge-
ment of much kind help from friends in the completion
of this piece of work. First and foremost my thanks
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are due to my Oxford colleague in the History School,
Mr. C. T. Atkinson of Exeter College, who found time
during some particularly busy weeks to go over my
proofs with his accustomed accuracy. His critici~
was always valuable, and I made numerous changes in
the text in deference to his suggestions. As usual, his
wonderful knowledge of British regimental history
enabled me to correct many slips and solecisms, and to
make many statements clearer by an alteration of
words and phrases. I am filled with gratitude when
I think how he exerted himself to help me in the midst
his own absorbing duties.
In the preceding volumes of this work I had not the
advantage of being able to read the parts of the Hon.
John Fortescue's History of the British Army which
referred to the campaigns with which I was dealing.
For down to 1914 I was some way ahead of him in the
tale of years. But his volumes of 1921 took him past
me, even as far as Waterloo, so that I had the oppor-
tunity of reading his accounts of Vittoria and the
Pyrenees while I was writing my own version. This
was always profitable--I am glad to think that we agree
on all that is essential, though we may sometimes differ
on matters of detail. But this is not the most important
part of the aid that I owe to :Mr. Fortescue. He was
good enough to lend me the whole of his transcripts
from the French Archives dealing with the Campaign
of 1819, whereby I was saved a visit to Paris and much
tedious copying of statistics and excerpting from dis-
patches. My own work at the Archives Nationales and
the Ministry of War had only taken me down to the
cnd of 1812. This was a most friendly act, and saved
me many hours of transcription. There are few authors
who are so liberal and thoughtful for the benefit of their
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colleagues in study. It will be noted in the Appen~ix
that quite a large pmportion of my statistics come from
papers lent me by .Mr. Fortescue.
As to other sources now first utilized. in print, I have
to thank Mr. W. S. D'Urban of Newport Honse for the
loan of the diary of his ancestor Sir Benjamin D'Urban-
most valuable for the Durgos retreat, especially for the
operations of Hill's column. Another diary and corre-
spondence, which was all-important for my last volwne,
runs dry as a source after the first months of 1813.
These were the papers of Sir George Scovell, Welling-
ton's cypher-secretary, from which so many quotations
may be found in volume V. But after he left Head-
quarters and took charge of the newly formed Military
Police [' Stall Corps Cavalry'] in the spring before
Vittoria, he lost touch with the lines of information on
which he had hitherto been 50 valuable. I owe the
very useful reports of the Spanish Fourth Army, and
the Marching Orders or General Giron. to the kindness
or Colonel Juan Al'zadun, who caused them to be typed
and sent to me from lUadrid. By their aid I was able
to fill up all the daily etapes of the Galician corps,
and to throw some new light on its operations in
Biscay.
To Mr. Leonard Atkinson, M.C., of the Record Office,
I must give a special word of acknowledgement, which
I repeat on page 759, for discovering the long.lost
'morning states' of Wellington's army in 1813, which
his thorough acquaintance with the shelves of his
department enabled him to find for me, after they had
been divorced for at least three generations from the
dispatches to wlli<;h they had originally belonged. Tied
up unbound between two pieces of cardboard, they had
eluded all previous seekers. We can at last give
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accurately the strength of every British and Portuguese
brigade at Vittoria and in the Pyrenees.
I could have wished that the times permitted authors
to be as liberal with maps as they were before the advent
of post-war prices. I would gladly have added detailed
plans of the combats of Vents. del Pozo and Tolosa to
my illustrations. And I am sorry that for maps of
Tarragona, and Catalonia generally. I must refer
readers back to my fourth volume. But books of
research have now to be equipped with the lowest
possible minimum of plates. or their price becomes
prohibitive. I do not think that anything really
essential for the understanding of localities has been
left out. I ought perhaps to mention that my recan·
structions of the topography of Maya and Roncesvalles
owe much to the sketch-maps in General Beatson's
Wellington in the Pyrenees, the only modern plans
which have any value.
To conclude, I must express, now for the sixth time,
to the compiler of the Index my heartfelt gratitude. for
a laborious task executed with her usual untiring
patience and thoroughness.
CHARLES OMAN.
OXFORD,
June ]922.
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SECTION XXXIV
THE .BURGOS CAMPAIGN
CHAPTER I
WELLINGTON IN THE NORTH: BUaGOS INVESTED
AUGUST :naT-SEPTEl\ffiER 2OTIJ, 1812
THE year 1812 was packed with great events, and marked in
Spain no less than in Russia the fmal turn of the tide in the
history of Napoleon's domination..But the cnd was not yet:
when Wellington entered Madrid in triumph on Augu~t 12th,
the dcli vcrancc of the Peninsula was no more ccrtuill than was
the deliverance of Europe when the Freudl Emperor evacuated
Moscow all October 22nd. Vittoria and Leipzig were still
a year away. and it was not till they had been fought and won
that the victory of the Allies was secure. The resources of the
great enemy were so immense that it required more than Qnc
disaster to exhaust thqn. No onc was morc conscious of tlus
than Wellington. Reflecting on the relative numbers of his
own Anglo-Portuguese army and of the united strength of all
the French COrpS in Spain, he felt that the occupation of Madrid
was rather a tOUT de force, nn ndmirable piece of political propa-
ganda, tHan a decisive event. It would compel all the scattered
armies of thc enemy to unite against him, nnd he was more than
doubtful whether he could make head against them. • I still
hope,' he wrote to his brother Henry, the Ambassador at Cadiz,
• to maintain out position in Ca;>tille, and even to improve our
advantages. But I shudder when I reflect upon the enormity
of the task whieh I have undertaken, with inadequate powers
myself to do n.nything, and 'without assistance of any kind from
the Spaniards 1 •••• I am apprehensive that all this may turn
out hut ill for the Spanish cause. If, for any cause, I should be
overpowered, or should be obliged to retreat, what will th~
I August 28, from IIludrid, Dispalche:f, ix. p. 874.
356.8 D
2 THE MARCH TO BURGOS [Aue.31
world say? What will the people of England say? .. That we
made a great effort, attended by some glorious circumstances;
that from January 1st, 1812, we had gained more advantages
for the cause, and had acquired morc extent of territory by our
operations than any army ever gained in such a period of time
against so powerful all enemy; but that wlaided by the Spanish
army and government, we were finally overpowered, and com-
pelled to withdraw \\ithin our old frontier.'
It was 'with no light heart that Wellington faced the stra-
tegical problem. In outline it stood as follows. Soult was
now known to be evacuating Andalusia, and it was practically
certain that he would retire on Valencia, where he would join
King Joseph and Suchet. Their three armies would produce
a mass of veteran troops so great that even if every division
of the Anglo·Portuguese army were concentrated, if Hill came
up from Estrcmadura and Skerrett's small force from Cacliz, it
would be eminently doubtful whether Madrid could be held
and the enemy thrust back. The French might advance
85,000 strong, and 'Wellington could only rely on 60,000 men
of his own to face them-though he might scrape together th~
or four divisions of Spanish troops in addition 1. It was true
that Suchet might probably refuse to evacuate his Valencian
viceroynlty, and that occupntion for him might be found by
utilizing Maitland's cxpcditiQuary force at Alieantc, and Elio's
Murcian army. But cvcn if he did not join Soult and King
Joseph in a march on Madrid, the armies of the South and Centre
might put 65,000 men into the field.
But this was only hair the problem. There was Clausel's
Army of Portugal, not to speakofCa£Carelli's Army of the North,
to be taken into consideration. Clausel had some 40,000 men
behind the Douro-troops recently beaten it is true, and known
to be in bad order. But they had not been pursued since the
Allied army turned aside for the march on Madrid, and had now
been granted a month in which to pull themseh'cs together.
Nothing had been left in front of them save CHnton's 6th Divi·
sion at CueHar, and a division of the Galicians at Valladolid.
I Certainly Carlos deEspatl.aand Morillo, probably some of the GaliclaWl,
and even some of Elio's or Bnllast.eros'troGpa trom the South,if they proved
able to feed themselves and march.
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And now the vexatious news had ~ome that Clausel was on the
move, had chased the Galicians out of Valladolid, and was
sending flying columns into the plains of Lean. It was clear
that he must be deal~ with at once, and there was no way to
stop his annoying activity, save by detaching a considerable
force from Madrid. If unopposed, he might overrun all the
reeonquered lands along the Douro, a.nd even imperil the British
line of communication with Salamanca and Portugal. If, as was
possible, Caffarelli should lend him 0. couple of divisJons from
the Army of the North, he might become a real danger instead
of a mere nuisance.
This was the reason why Wellington depa.rtcd from 1tfadrid
on August 81st, and marched with the 1st, 5th and 7th Divisions.
Pack's and Bradford's Portuguese, and Bock's and Ponsonby's
dragoons-21,OOO sabres and ~ayonets-to join Clinton, and
thrust. back Clausel to the North, before he should have leisure
to do further mischief. There was, as he conceived, just time
enough to inflict 0. sharp eheck on the Army of Portugnl before
the danger from the side of Valencia would become pressiug.
It must be pushed out of the way, disabled again if possible,
and then he would return to Madrid for the greater game,
leaving as small a containing force as possible in front of the
Northern n.rm)l. He summed up his plan in n. confidential
letter ill the following terms: 'All the world [the I'rench world]
seems to be intending to mass itself in Valencia; while I am
waiting for their plans to develop, for General Hill to march up
from Estremadura, and for the Spanish armies to get together,
I shall hunt a.way the elements of l\Iarmont's [i. e. Clausel's]
army from the Douro. I shall push them as far off as I can,
I shall try to establish proper co-operation between the Anglo-
Portuguese detachment which I must leave on this side and
the Gnlician Army, and so I shall assure my IcCt flank. when
I shall be engaged on the Valeneian side 1.'
Here then, we havc a time-problem set. Will it be possible
to deal handsomely with the Army oC Portugal, to put it com-
pletely out of power to do harm, before Soult shall have reached
Valencia, reorganized his nrmy. and joined King Joseph in
• Dispalchu,lx. p. 424, toGenerol Dumouricz, to whom Wellington often
sent an illuminating note 00 the situation•
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wha.t Wellington considered the inevitable scheme of a march
on Madrid? The British general judged that thefe would be
sufficient time-ana probably there m.ight have been, if every-
thing had worked out in the best possible way. But he was
quite conscious that events might prove perverse-and he
shuddered at the thought-as he wfote to his brother in Cadiz.
The last prcCtlutiOllS taken befofe departing for the Douro
were to draw up three sets of instructions. One was for Charles
Alten, left in command of the fOUf divisions which remained
in and about :Madrid 1, foreseeing the chance ofSouIt's marching
OIl the cn.pital without turning aside to Vnlencia-' not at all
probable, but it is nccessn.ry to provide for all events.' The
second was for Hill, who was due to arrive at Toledo in about
three weeks. The third was for Generall'tlaitlalld at AlicRnte,
whose position would obviously be very unpleasant, now that
Soult was known to be evacuating Andalusia and marching on
Valencia to join Suehet and King Joseph. Soult's march altered
the whole situation on the East Coast: if 50,000 more
French were concentrated in that direction, the Alieante force
must be in some danger, and would have to observe great
caution, and if necessary to shut itself up in the maritime
fortreSSes. • As the allied forces in Valencia and Murcia ,-
wrote Wellington to Mnitland-' will necessarily be thrown
upon the defensive for a moment, while thc enemy will be
in great strength in those' parts, I conclude that the greater
part of those forces will be collected in Alicante, and it would
be desirable to strengthen our posts at Carthagena during this
crisis, which I hope will be only momentary 2,' Another
dispatch, dated four days later, adverts to the possibility that
Soult m,ay fall upon Alieante on his arrival in the kingdom oC
Valencia. Maitland is to defend the place, hut to take care that
all precautions as to the embarking his troops in the event of
ill-success are made. He is expected to maintain it as long as
possible; and with the sea open to him, and a safe harbour, the
defence should be long and stubborn, however great the numbers
of thc besiegers 3.
With these instructions drawn out for Maitiand, Wellington
• Dispalchel, ix. pp. 390-1. Alten had the ard, 4th, Light, and Espaiia's
divisions. I Dilpalc1ws, ix. p. 877. I Ibid., ix. pp. 883-4 aDd 886-7.
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finally marched for the North. His conception of the situation
in Valencia seems to have been that Soult, on his arrival, would
not meddle with Alicallte: it was more probable that he and
King Joseph would rather take up the much more important
task of endeavouring to rceonquer Madrid and New Castile.
They would leave Suehet behind them to contain MaitIand,
Elio and &lIasteros. It would be impossible for him to lend
them any troops for a march on Madrid, while such a large
expeditionary force was watching his flank. The net result
would be that < by keeping this detachment at Alieante, with
Whittingham's and Roche's Spaniards, I shall prevent too
many o[ the gentlemen now assembled in Valencia from
troubling me in the Upper Country [New Castile] 1.'
Travelling with his usual celerity, Wellington left Madrid
on August 31st, was at Villa Cnstin on the northern side o[ the,
Guadarrama pass on September 2nd, and hud reached Arevalo,
where he joined Clinton and the 6th Division on September Brd.
The divisions whieh he was bringing up from Madrid had been
started off some days before he himself left the capital. He
passed them between the Escurial and Villa Castin, but lhey
caught him up again at Arevalo early on the 4th, so that he
had his fighting force concentrated on that day, and was
prepared to deal with Clausel.
The situation of affairs on the Douro requires a word of
explanation. Clausel, it will be remembered, had retired from
Valladolid on July 80, unpursued. He was prepared to retreat
for any length---e\'en as far as Burgos-if he were pressed. But
no onc followed him save Julian Sanehcz's lancers and some
patrols o[ Anson's Light Cavalry brigade. Wherefore he halted
his main body on the line of the Arlallza, with two divisions at
Torquemada and two at Lcrma; some way to his left Foy, with
two divisions more, wus at Arandu, on the Upper Douro, where
he had maintained his forward position, because not even
a cavalry patrol from the side of the Allies had come forward
to disquiet him. In iront of Clausel himself there was soon
nothing left but the lightest o[ cavalry screens, lor Julial1"
Sancllcz was called oU by Wellington to New Castile: when he
was gone, there remained l\larquinC'L's gucrrilleros at Palencia,
, ibid., ix. p. 308.
o THE MARCH TO BURGOS {Aua.
and outposts of the 16th Light Dragoons at Vnltanas: the
main body of G. Anson's squadrons lay at ViUavanez, twenty
miles behind I, The only infantry force which the Allies had
north of the Douro was one of the divisions of the Army of
Gnlicin, which (with Santocildes himself in command) came
up to Vallndolid on August 6th, not much over 8,000 bayonets
strong. The second of the Galician divisions which had
descended into the plain of Lean was now blockading Toro.
The third and most numerous was still engaged in the intermin·
able siege of Astorga, which showed at last some signs of drawing
to its close-not beeause the battering of the place had been
effective, but simply because the garrison was growing famished.
They had been provisioncd only as far as August I, and alter
that date had been forccd upon balf and thcn quarter rations.
But the news of the disaster of Salamanca bad not, as many
bad hoped among the Allies, scared their commander into
capitulation.
Clausel on August 1 had not supposed it possible that he
would be tempted to take the offensive again within a fortnight.
His army was in a most dilapidated condition, and he was
prepared to give way whenever pressed. It was not that his
numbers were so very low, for on August 1st the Army of
Portugal only counted 10,000 less crfectives than 011 July 15th.
Tbough it had lost some 14,000 mcn in the Salamanca campaign,
it had picked up some 4,000 others from the dep8tat Valladolid.
from the many small garrisons which it had drawn in during
its retreat, and from drafts found at Burgos.z Its loss in cavalry
had been fully repaired by the arrival of Chauvcl's two regiments
from the Army of the North, and most of the fugitives and
marauders who had been scattercd over the eountry~sideafter
the battle of July 221ld gradually driltcd back to their colours.
It was not so much numbers as spirit that was wanting in the
, 'l'he best account of ull this is in the diary for August of Tomkinson
of the lOth Light Dragoons, who was in charge of the outlying party tJlat
wellt to VO]taIlUS•
• The actual numbers (us shown in the tables given in vol. v, Appendix xi
-which I owe to Mr. Fort~scuc's kindness) were July Hi, 49,080; August I,
89,801. The deficiency of about 600 cavalry lost had been more than
replaced by Chauvel's 750 sabres. There wus a shortage of twenty guns of
the Origilllll artillery, but Chauvc] had brought up six.
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Army of Portugal. On August 0 Clausel "Tote to the Minister
of War at Paris that he had halted in 0. position where he could
feed the troops, giye them some days of repose, and above all
re-establish their morale!. 'I must punish some of the men,
who are breaking out ill the most frightful outrages, and so
frighten the others by au example of severity; above aU I must
put an end to a desire. which they display too manifestly, to
recross the Ebro, nod get back nearer to the French frontier.
It is usual to see an army disheartened after a check: but it
would be hard to find one whose discouragement is greater than
that of these troops: and I cannot, and ought not, to conceal
from you that there has been· prevailing among them for some
time 0. very bad spirit. Disorders and revolting excesses have
marked every step of our retreat. I shall employ all the means
in my power to transform the dispositions of t~e soldiers. and
to put an end to the deplorable actions which daily take place
under the very eyes of officers of all grades-actions which the
latter fail to repress.'
Clausel was as good as his word, and made mnny nnd severe
examples, shooting (so he says) us many as fifty soldiers found
guilty of ml;lrdcrs, assaults on officers, and other excesses 2. It
is probable, however, that it wus not so much his strong punitive
measures which brought about an improved discipline in the
regiments, as the fortnight of absolutely undisturbed repose
which they enjoyed from the 1st to the 14th of August. The
feeling of demoralization caused by the headlong and disorderly
retreat from Salamanca died down, as it became more and more
eertain that the pursuit was over, and that there was no serious
hostile force left "ithin many miles of the line of the Arlanzo..
The obsession of being hunted by superior forces had been the
. ruinous thing: when tins terror was withdrawn, and when the
more shattered regiments had been re·formed into a smaller
number of battalions, nnd provided in this fashion with their
proper proportion of officers 3, the troops began to realize that
1 Dispatch printed in King JOM;ph'a Corrupondmce, ix. p. 04•
• Clause] to Clnrke, August 18th, 1812.
I 'l'he 2nd, 4th, 6th, and 25th Uger, the 1st, 15th, 36th, 50th, 62nd, 65th,
118th, 119th, 120th Line had to eut themselves down by a battalion each:
Ule Z2nd and Wlst, which had been the heaviest sufferers of all, llnd had
each loot Uleir eagle, were reduced frOlll three to onc ImtLalioll each. 'l'here
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they still formed a considerable army. and that they had been
routed, but not absolutely put out of action, by the Salamanca
disaster.
Yet their morale had been seriously shaken; there was still
a want of officers; a number of the rejoining fugitives had come
in without arms ·or equipment; while others had been heard
of, but had not yet reported themselves at their regimental
head-quarters. It therefore required considerable hardihood on
Clauscl's part to try an orrensivc move, even against a skeleton
enemy. His object was primarily to bring pressure upon the
allied rear, in order to relieve King Joseph from Wellington's
attentions. He had heard that the whole of the Angle-Portu-
guese army, save a negligible remnant, had marched on
Madrid; but he was not sure that the Army of the Centre
might not make some endeavour to save the capital, especially
if it had been reinforced from Estremadura by Drouet. Clausel
knew that the King had repeatedly called for succours from the
South; it was possible that they might hnve been sent at the
last moment. If they had come up, and if Wellington could
be induced to send back two or thrce divisions to the Domo,
Madrid might yet be saved. The experiment was worth risking,
but it must take the form of a demonstration rather than
a genuine attack upon Wellington's rear. The Army of Portugal
was still too fragile an instrument to be applied to heavy work.
Indeed, when he moved, ClauseIleft many shattered regiments
behind, and only brought 25,000 men to the front.
There was a second object in Clausel's advance: he hoped
to save the garrisons of Astorga, Toro, and Zamora, which
amounted in all to ovcr 8,000 men. Each of the first two wqs
being besiegedbya Spunish di vision, the third by Silveira's Portu-
guese militia. The FrencJ) general judged that nOlle of the in·-
vesting forces was equal to a fight in the open with a strong flying
column of his best troops. Even if all three eould get together,
he doubted if they dared face two French divisions. His scheme
was to mnrch on Valladolid with his mnin body, and drive out
of it the small Spanish force in possession, while FOY":,,",""his senior
division-commandcr-should move rapidly across country with
had been seventy.four battalions in the Army of Portugal on July 1st: on
August )8t there were only flfty.seven.
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someB,OOO men, and relieve by a circular sweep first Toro, then
Astorga, then Zamora. The garrisons were to be brought oH, the
places blown up: it was useless to dream of holding them, for
Wellington would probably come to the Douro again in force,
the sieges would recommence, and no second relic( would be
possible in face of the main British army.
On August 18th a strong French cavalry reconnaissance
crossed the Arlanza and drove in the guerrilleros from Zevico:,
on the following day infantry was coming up from the rear,
pushing forward on the high~road from Torquemada to Valla~
dolid. Thereupon Anson, on that evening, sent back the main
body of his light dragoons beyond the Donro, leaving only two
squadrons as a rearguard at Villavanez. The Galieian division
in Valladolid also retircd by the road of Torrelobaton and
Castronucvo .on Benaventc. Santocildes--to Wellington's dis-
gust when it reached his cars-abandoned in Valladolid not
only 400 French convalescents in hospital, hut many hundred
stand of small arms, which had been collected there from the
prisoners taken during thc retrcat of Clausel in the preceding
month. This was inexcusable carelessness, as there was ample
time-to destroy them, if not to carry them off. French infantry
entered Vallndolid on the 14th and 15th, apparently about
12,000 strong: their cavalry, a day's march ahead, had explored
the line of the Douro from Simaneas to Tudela, and found it
watchcd by G. Anson's pickets all along that front.
The orders left behind by Wellington on August 5th, had
been that if Clausel came forward-which he had not thought
likely-G. Anson was to fall back to the DOllro, and if pressed
again to join Clinton's division at Cuellar. The retreat of both
of them was to be on Segovia in the event of absolute necessity.
On the other hand, if the French should try to raise the sieges of
Astorga or Znmorn, Santocildes and Silveira were to go behind
the Esla 1. Clause! tried both these moves at once, for on the
same day that he entered Valladolid he had turned off Foy
with two divisions-his own and Taupin's (late Ferey's)-and
a brigade of Curto's cha.s8cur8, to march on Toro by the road
through Torrelohaton. The troops in Valladolid served to
1 See ' Memom'ndum lor Geneml Santocildes' of August 5. DispalchtB,
ix. pp. M4-5.
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cover this movement: they showed a division of infantry and
800 horse in front of Tudela all the 16th, and pushed back
Anson's light dragoons to Montemayor, a few miles beyond
the Douro. But this was only a demonstration: their cavalry
retired in the evening, and Anson reoccupied Tudela on the
20th. It soon became clear that Clausel was not about to cross
the Douro in force, and was only showing troops in front of
Valladolid in order to keep Anson and ClintoD anxious. He
remained there with some 12,000 or 15,000 men from August 14th
till September 7th, keeping very quiet, and making no second
attempt to reconnoitre beyond the DanTo. Anson, therefore,
watched the line of the river, with his hcad·quarters at Valde-
stillas, for all that time, while the guerrilleros of Saornil and
Prineipe went over to thc northern bank and hung around
Clausel's flank. Ctinton, on his own initiative, moved his
division from Cuellar to Arevalo, whieh placed him on the line
of the road to Madrid via the Guadarrama, instead of that by
Segovia. This Wellington afterwards declared to be a mistake:
he had intended to keep the 6th Division more to the right,
apparently in order that it might cross the Douro above Valla-
dolid it required I. It should not have moved farther southward
than Olmcdo.
Foy meanwhile, thus covered by Clausel, made a mareh of
surprising celerity. On the 17th he arrived at Toro, and learned
that the Galicians blockading that place had cleared off as early
as the 15th, and had taken the rood for Benavente. He blew
up the fort, and took on with him the garrison of 800 men. At
Toro he was much nearer to Zamora than to Astorga, but he
resolved to march first on the remoter place-it was known to be
hard pressed, and the French force there blockaded was double
that in Zamora. He therefore moved on Benavente with all
possible speed, and crossed the Esla there, driving away
a detachment of the Galician division (Cabrcra's) which had
come from Vallfldolid, when it made an ineffectual attempt,
to hold the fords. On the 20th August he reached La Ballcza,
somesixteen miles from Astorga, and there received the tiresomc
news that the garrison had surrendered only thirty-six hours
before to Castal\os. The three battalions there, worn down by
• lJilTpulc1lu, ix. pp. 389-DO.
1812] FOY'S RAID TO ZAMORA 11
famine to 1,200 men, had capitulated, because th~y had no
suspicion that any help was near. 'fhc Spanish general had
succeeded in concealing from them all knowledge of Fay's
march. They laid down their arms on the 18th, and were at
once marched oU to Galicia: Castaiios himself accompanied
them with all his force, being fully determined not to fight
Fay, even though his numbers were superior.
Tbe French cavalry pushed on to Astorga on the 21st, and
found the gates open and the place empty, save for seventy sick
of the late garrison, who had been left behind under the charge
of a surgcon. It was useless to think of pursuing Castaiios,
who had now two days' start, wherefore Fay turned his attention
. to Zamora. Here Silveira, though warned to make off when the
enemy reached Toro, had held on to the last moment, thinking
that he was safe when Fay swerved away toward Astorga. He
only drew off when he got news on the 22nd, from Sir Howard
Douglas, the British Commissioner with the Galician army, to
the effect that Foy, having failed to save Astorga, was marching
against him. He retired to Carvajales behind the Esla, but was
not safe there, for the French general, turning west from
llenaventc, had executed a forced march for Tabnra, and
was hnstening westward to cut in between Carvajales and
the rand to Miranda de Douro on the Portuguese frontier.
Warned only just in time of this move, Silveira hurried off
towards his own country, and was within one mile of its
border when Fay's advanced cavalry came up with his rear-
guard near Constantin, the last village in Spain. 'fhey
captured his baggage and some stragglers, but made no serious
endeavour to charge his infantry, which escaped unharmed
to Mirandn. Fay attributed this failure to Curto, the com-
mander of the light horse: • lc dCfaut de decision et )'inertic
coupnble clu general commandant la cavnlerie Cant perdre k"S
fruits d'une operation bicn combince' (August 23rd) I. This
pursuit had dra.wn Fay very far westward; his column turning
1 The best account of all this is not (as might have been elCpected) in
Fay's dispatches ro Clausel, but in a memorandum dra.wu up by him In
1817 at the request of Sir Howard Douglas, and printed in an appendix
at the end of Ula life of lhnt officer (pp. 420-.'10). Sir HOWllrd had nsked
Foy what he intcndL-d to do on the 23rd-27U. August, utld got u mon
interesting reply.
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back, only reached Zamorn on August 26th: here he drew
off the garrison and destroyed the works. He sU!-tes that his
next move would have been a raid on Salamanca, where lay not
only the British base hospital, but a vast accumulation of
stores, unprotected by any troops whatever. But he received at
7...amora, on the 27th, urgent orders from Clausel to return to
Valladolid, as Wellington was coming up against him from
Madrid with his whole army. Accordingly Foy abandoned his
plan, and rcached 'l'ordesillas, with his troops in n veryexhaustcd
condition from hard marching, on August 28th. Clausel had
miscalculated dates-warned of the first start of the 1st and
nh Divisions from Madrid, he had supposed that they would
be at Arcvalo some days berore they actually reached it on
Septcf!lber 4th. Fay was never in any real danger, and there
had been time to spare. His excursion undoubtedly raised the
spirit of the Army of Portugal: it was comforting to find that
the whole of the Galieians would not face 8,000 French troops,
and that the plains of Lean could be overrun \vithout opposition
by such a. small force. On his return to join the main body Fay
noted in his diary that Clausel had been very inert in face of
Anson and Clinton, and wrote that he himself would have tried
a more dashing policy-and might possibly have failed in it,
owing to the discouragement and apathy still prevailing among
many at the senior officers of the Army of Portugal!.
Wellington had received the news of Clausel's advance on
Valladolid as early as August 18th, and was little moved by it.
Indeed he expressed some pleasure at the fact. 'I think,' he
·'vrote to Lord Bathurst, 'that the French mean to enrry off
the garrisons from Zamora and 'foro, which I hope they will
effect, as otherwise I must go and take them. If I do not,
nobody else will, as is evident tram what has been passing for
the last two months at Astorga 2: He expressed his pleasure on
hearing that Santacitdes had retired behind the Esla without
fighting, for he had feared that he might try to stop Foy and
get beaten. It was only, as we have already seen, after he
obtained practical certainty that Soult had evacuated Andalusia,
so that no expedition to the South would be necessary, that.he
, Diary of Foy, in Girod de I'Ain's Vie milUaiu dll mntral Foy, p. 182.
• Wellington to Dathurst, August 18th.
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turned his mind to Clausel's doings. And his march to Arevalo
and Valladolid W3S intended to be Il mere excursion for a few
weeks, preparatory to a return to New Castile to face Soult and
King Joseph, when they should become dangerous. From
Arevalo he wrote to Castaiios to say that' it was necessary to
drive off Marmont's (Le. Clausel's) army without loss of time,
so as to make it possible to turn the whole of his forces' even·
tually against Soult.' He should press the movement so far
Corward as he could; perhaps he might even lay siege to Burgos.
But the Army of Galicia must come eastward again 'without
delay, and link up its ,operations with the Anglo·Portuguese.
He hoped to have retaken Valladolid by September 6th, and
wished to see Castanos there, with the largest possible force
that he could gather, on that date!. The Galician nrmy had
returned to Astorga on August 27th, and so far as distances
went, there was nothing to prevent it from being at Valladolid
eleven days aCter, if it took the obvious route by Benavente and
VilIalpando. .
The troops from Madrid having joined Clinton and the
6th Division at Arevalo, Wellington had there some 28,000 men
collected for the discomfiture of Clausel, a force not much more
numerous than that which the French general had concentrated
behind the Douro, for Fay was now back at Tordesillas, and the
whole Army of Portugal was in hand, save certain depleted
and disorganized regiments which had been left behind in the
province of Burgos. But having the advantage of confidence,
and knowing that his enemy must still be suffering from the
moral effects of Salamanca; the British general llUshcd on at
once, not waiting for thc arrival on the scene of the Galicians.
On the 4th the army marched to Olmedo; on thc 5th to Valde-
stillas, on the 6th to Boecillo, from whence it advanced to the
Douro and crossed it by various fords between Tudela and
Puente de Duero-the main body taking that of Herrera. The
French made no attempt to defend the line of the river, but-
rather to Wellington's surprise-were found drawn up as if for
battlc a few miles beyond it, their right wing holding the
city pf Valladolid, whose outskirts had peen put in a state
of defence, their left extending to thc ground about the village
• Wellinglon to CastmioB, September 2. Di8patchu, ix. p. 89••
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of La Cisterniga. No attempt was made to dislcxlgc them with
the first divisions that came up: Wellington preferred to wait
for his artillery and his reserves; the process of filing across
the fords had been tedious, and occupied the whole afternoon.
On this Clausel had calculated: he was only showi.ng a front
in order to give his train time to move to the rear, and to allow
his right wing (Foy) at Simancas and Tordcsillas to get away.
A prompt evacuation of Valludolid would have exposed it to be
cut off. 90 the following morning the French had disappeared
from La Cisterniga. but Valladolid was discovered to be still
held by an infantry rearguard. This, when pushed, retired and
blew up the bridge over the Pisuerga on the opposite side of
the city, before the British cavalry could seize it. The critics
thought that Clausel might have been hustled with advantage,
both on the 6th and on the morning of the 7th, and that l?oy
might have been cut off from the main body by rapid action on
the first day 1. Wellington's cautious movements may probably
be explained by the fact that an attack on Clausel on the 6th
would have involved fighting among the suburbs and houses
of Valladolid, which would have been costly, and he had no
wish to lose men at a moment whcn the battalion-strell!>rths
were vcry low all through thcarmy. Moreovcr, the capture of
ValIadolid would not have intercepted the retreat of the French
at Simancas, but only have forced them to retire by parallel
roads northward. At the same time it must be owned that
any loss of life involved in giving Clause} a thorough beating
on this day would have been justified later on. He had only
some 15,000 men in line, not having his right-wing troops with
him that day. If the Army of Portugal had been once more
attacked and scattered, it would not have been able to interfere
in the siege of Burgos, wherc WcUington was, during the next
few weeks, to lose as many men as a general action would have
cost. But this no prophet could have foreseen on September 6th.
It cannot be said that Wellington's pursuit of Clausel was
pressed with any earnestness. On the 8th his advanced cavalry
1 See especially Sir Howard Douglas's Memoirs, pp. 206-7, and Tomkin·
son's diary, p. 201. Napler is short and unsatisfactory at tlus point, and
says wrongly that C1ausel abandoned Volladolid on the night of the 6th.
His rearguard was certainly there on the 7th.
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werc no fart.her forward than Cabczon, seven miles in front. of
Volladolid, and it was not till the 9t.h that the 6t.h Division,
leading the infant.ry, passed that. same point. Wellington
himself, \\i.th the main body of his infantry, remained at Valla-
dolid till the 10th. His dispatches give no further explanation
for this delay than that the troops which had come from :Ptladrid
were fatigued, and sickly, from long travel in the hot weather,
and that he wished to have nssurance of the near approach of
the Army of Galicia, which was unn.ccountably slow il). moving
forward from Astorga 1• Meanwhile he took the opportunity
of his stay in Valla.dolid to command, and be present at,
a solemn proclnmation of the March Constitution. This was
a prudent act; for though the ceremony provoked no en-
thusiasm whatever in the city 2, where there were few Liberals
in existence, it was a. useful demonstration against calumnies
current in Cadi?:, to the effect that he so much disliked the
Constitution that he was conspiring with the serviles, and
especially v.i.th Castai'ios, to ignore or even to overthrow it.
While Wellington halted at VaUadolid, Clausel h"d established
himself at Duenas, fifteen miles up the Pisuerga. He retired
from thence, however, on the loth, when the 6th Division and
Anson's cavalry pressed in his advanced posts, and Wellington's
head-quarters were at Duel'ias next day. From thence recon
naissances were sent out both on the Burgos and the Palencia
roads. The latter city was found unoccupied and-what was
more surprising-not in the least dam~ged by the retreating
enemy. The whole of Clausel's army had marched on the
Burgos road, and its rearguard was discovered in front of
1'orquemada that evening. The British army followed, leaving
Palencia on its left, and head-quarters were at l'lfagaz on the
12th. Anson's light dragoons had the interesting spectacle
that afternoon of watching the whole French army defile across
the bridge of the Pisuerga at Torquemada, under cover of
a brigade of chasseurs drawn up on the near side. Critics
1 Castaiios's eJl..-planation was that Wellington's letter of August 30, tellin~
him to march on Valladolid, did not reach him till the 7th September, along
with another supplementary letter to the same cllcct fwm Arevalo of
September 3.
• • The proclamation was made from the town·hall in the square: lew
people of any respectability attended.' Tomkinson, p. 202.
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thought that the covering force might have been driven in.• and
jammed against the narrow roadway over the bridge!, But
the British brigadier waited -for artillery to come up. and before
it arrived the enemy had hastily decamped. He was pursued
as far as Quintana, where there was a trifling cavalry skirmish
at nightfall.
At Magaz, on the night of the 12th, Wellington got the
tiresome news that Santocildcs and Castaiios, with the main
body of the Army of Galicia, had passed his flank that day,
going southward, and had continued their way towards Valla-
doUd, i~stead of falling in,on the ,British line of march. Their
junction was thus deferred for several days. Wellington wrote
in anger, 'Santocildcs has been six days marching: he was
yesterday within three leagues of us, and knew it that night;
but he has this morning moved on to Valladolid, eight leagues
from us, and unless I halt two days fOl' him he will not join us
for four or five days more 2.' As a matter of fact the Galicill.ns
did not come up till the 16th, while if Santocildes had used
a little common sense they would have bccn in line on the
12th September.
The pursuit of Clausel continued to be a very slow and
uninteresting business: from the 11th to the 15th the army did
not advance more than two leagues a day. On the 13th the
British vanguard was at VilIajera, while the French main body
was at Pampliega: on the Bth Anson's cavalry was at VilIa-
drigo, on the 15th at Villapequeiin, on the 16th near Celadu,
where Clause! was seen in position. On this day the Galicians
at last came up-three weak divisions under Cabrera, Losadn,
and Barccna, with something over 11,000 infantry, but only
one field-battery and 350 horse. The melllooked fatigued with
much marching and very ragged: Wellington had hoped for
16,000 men, and considering that the total force of the Galician
army was supposed to be over 80,000 men, it seems that more
might have been up, even allowing for sick, recruits, and the
largc garrisons of FerroI and Corullna.
The 16th Septcmber was the only day on which ClauseI
• Tomkinson, p. 203.
, Wellington to Henry Wellesley, Magaz, september 12. Dispalclle" Ix.
p.422.
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showed any signs of making a stand: in the aftern~n he was
round in position, a league beyond Celada on favourable ground.
Wellington a'Tranged to turn his left flank next morning, with
the 6th Division and Pack's brigade; but at dawn he went off
in haste, and did not stop' till he reached Villa Buniel, near
Burgos. Here, late in the arternoon, Wellington again out-
flanked him with the 6th Division, and he retreated quite close
to the city. On the 18th he evacuated it, arter throwing
a garrison into the Castle, and went back several leagues on
the high-road toward the Ebro. The Allies entered Burgos, and
pushed their cavalry beyond it without meeting opposition.
On the 19th the Castle was invested by the bt Division and
Pack's brigade, while the rest of 'Wellington's army took
position across the road by which the French had retreated.
A cavalry reconnaissance showcd that Clausel had gone back
many milcs: the last outposts of his rear were at Quintanavides,
beyond the watershed which separates the basin of the Douro
from that 01 the Ebro. His head-quarters werc now at Briviesca,
and it appeared that, if oncc more pushed, he was prepared to
retreat ad infinitu1n. 'Wellington, however, pressed him no
farthcr: throwing Corward thrce oC his own divisions and the
Galieians to Monastcrio and other villages to the east of Burges,
where a good CQvering position was Cound, be procceded to turn
his attention to the Castle. .
This short series oC operations betwcen the lOth and the 19th
of September 1812 has in it (Ilueh that perplcxes the critical
historian. It is not Clauscl's poliey that is interesting-he
simply retired day alter day, whenever the enemy's pursuing
inrantry came within tcn miles of him. Sometimes he gave
way before thc mere cavalry oC Wellington's advanced guard.
There was nothing in his conduct to remind the observer or
Ney's skiUul retrent rrom Pombal to Ponte Mureella in 1811,
when a. rearguard action was Cought nearly every alternoon.
Clausel was determined 110t to allow himself to be caught, and
would not hold on, even in tempting positions or considerable
strength. As be '\Tote to Clarkc berorc the retreat had begun,
• Si l'ennemi revient avcc toute son armee vers moi, je me,
tiendrai cn position, quoique toujours a. peu de distance de lui,
afin de n'a-voir aueun echec a eprouver.' He suffered no check
356.6 c
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because he alwuys made oU bclare he was in the slightest danger
of being brought to action. It is difficult to understand Napicr's
enthusiasm for what he calls • beautiful movements' 1; to
abscond on the first approach of the enemy's infantry may
be a safe and sound policy, but it can hardly be called brilliant
or artistic. It is true that there would have been worse alterna-
tives to take-elausel might have retreated to the Ebro
without stopping, or he might have offered battle at the first
chance; hut the avoidance of such errors does not in itself
constitute a very high claim to praise. An examination of the
details of the march of the British army during this ten days
plainly fails to corroborate Napier's statement that the French
general < offered battle every day' nnd • baffled his great
adversary.' His halt for a few hours at Celada on September 16th
was the only one during which he allowed the allied main body
to get into toueh with him late in the day; and he absconded
before Wellington's first manceuvre to outflank him 2.
The thing that is truly astonishing in this ten days is the
extraordinary torpidity of Wellington's pursuit. Hc started by
waiting three days at Valladolid after expelling the French;
and he continued, when once he had put his hcad-quarters in
motion, by making a series of easy marchcs of six to tcn miles
a day, never showing the least wish to hustle his adversary or
to bring him to action 3. Now to manreuvre the French army.
to beyond Burgos, or even to the Ebro, was not the desired
cnd-it was necessary to put Clauscl out of action, if (as Welling-
ton kept repeating in all his letters) the main allied army was
to return to Madrid within n few weeks, to 'wntch lor Soult's
1 Napicr,lv. p. 335.
I Napicr wns not with the main anny during this march, thc Light
Division being left at Madrid. On ihc oUlcr hand Clauscl hlld been very
polite to him, and lent him some or his orders and dispatches (Napier, iv.
p. 827'). I {allcy he wns repaid in prillt tor his courtesy. The diaries or
Tomkinson, Burgoyne. D'Urban, and Sir IIoward Douglas do not givc thc
impression that tJle French ever stayed to manoouvre seriously, save on
UIC 16th•
• I-Iead.quarters wcre at Valladolid, September 0; Cigales, September 10;
DueiillS,Scptcmber 11; MagulI. September 12; Torquenmda., September 18;
Cordovilla, September 14; VilIajcra. Scptcmbcr 15; Pamplicga, Sep-
tember 10; TardajOl'l, September 17; Villa Toro, September 18. Tcn
stages in about 80 milcs I
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offensive. To escort the Army of Portugal with ceremonious
politeness to Briviesea, without the loss to pursuers or pursued
of fifty men, was clearly not sufficient. Clauscl's troops, being
not harassed in the least, but allowed a comfortable retreat,
remained an ' army in being': though moved back cighty miles
on the map, they were not disposed of, and could obviously
come forward again the moment that Wellington left the north
with the main body of his troops. Nothing, therefore, was
gained by the whole man<cuvre, save that CIauscl was six
marches farther from the DOUN than he had been on Sep-
tembel' Ist. To keep him in his new position Wellington must
have left an adequate containing army: it does not seem that
he could have provided onc from the 28,000 Anglo-Portuguese
and 11,000 Galicians who were at his disposition, and yet have
had any appreciable force to take baek to Madrid. Clausel had
conducted his raid 011 Valladolid with something under 25,000.
men; but this did not represent the whole strength of the
Army of Portugnl: after deducting the sick and the garrisons
there were some 39,000 men left--of these some were disarmed
. stragglers who had only just come back to their colours, others
belonged to shattered corps which were only just reorganizing
themselves in their new cadres. But in n. few weeks Clausel
would have at least 85,000 men under arms of his own troops,
without counting anything that the Army of the North might
possibly lend him. To contain him WeUington would have to
leave, in addition to the 11,000 Galicians, at least three Hrltish
divisions and the corresponding cavalry-say 16,000 or 18,000
men. He could only bring back some 10,000 bayonets to join
Hill near Madrid. This would not enable him to face Soult.
Dut if Clausel had been dealt with in a more drastic style, if
he had been hunted and harniscd, it is clear that he might
have been disabled for a long time from taking the offensive.
His army was still in a doubtlul condition as regards morale,
and there can be little reason to doubt, that if hard pressed, it
would have sunk again into the despondency nnd disorder which
had prevailed at the beginning of the month of August. The
process of driving him back with a firm hand might, no doubt,
have been more costly than the slow tactics actually adopted;
but undoubtedly such a policy would have paid in the end.
e,
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There is no explanation to be got out of Wellington'§ rather
numerous letters written between the lOth and the 21st. In one
of them he actually observes that' we have been pushing them,
but not very vigorously, till the 16th 1,' without saying why
the pressure was not applied more vigorously. From others it
might perhaps be deduced that Wellington was awaiting the
arrival of the Galician army, because when it came up he would
have a. very large instead of a small superiority of force over the
French. But this does not fully explain his slowness in pursuing
an enemy who was evidently on the run, and determined not
to fIght. 'Vc may, as has been already mentioned, speak of
his wish to avoid loss of life (not much practised•.durillg' the
Burgos operations a lew days later on !) and of thc difficulty
of providing for supplies in a country-side unvisited before by
the British army, and very distant from its base-magazines.
But when all has been said, no adequate explanation for his
policy has been provided. It remains inexplicable, and its
results were unhappy.
I WelJingtun to Sir E. Pa~t, September 20. Dispatches, Ix. p. 436.
SECTION x:XXIV: CHAPTER II
THE SIEGE OF BURGOS. SEPTErtIDER 19Tn-
,OCTOBER 2OTn, 1812
TIIE Cnstle of Burgos lies on an isolated hill which rises
straight out of the streets of the north-western corner of that
ancient city, and overtaps them by 200 feet or rather more.
Ere ever there were kings in Costile, it had been the residence
of Fcrnan Gonzn.lez, and the early counts who recovered the
land from the Moors. Rebuilt n dozen times in the l\Iiddle Ages,
and long a favourite palace of the Castilian kings, it had been
ruined by a great fire in 1780, and since then had not been
inhabited. There only remained an empty shell, of which the
most important part was the great Donjon which had defied
the flames. The summit of the hill is only 250 yards long: the
eastern section of it was occupied by the Donjon, the western
by a large church, Santa Maria la Dlanco.: between them were
more or less ruined buildings, which had suHered from the conf:la·
gration. Passing by Burgos in 1808, after the battle of Gamonal,
Napoleon had noted the commanding situation of the hill, and
had determined to make it one of the fortified bases upon which
the French domination in northern Spain was to be founded.
He had caused a plan to be drawn up for the conversion of the
ruined mediaeval stronghold into a modern citadel, which
should overawe the city below, and serve as a half~way house, an
arsenal, and a depOt for French troops moving between Bayonne
and Madrid. Considered as a fortress it had one prominent
defect: while its eastern, southern, and western sides look
down into the low ground around the Arlanzon river, there
lies on its northern side, only 800 yards away, a flnt·topped
plateau, called the hill of SilD Miguel, which rises to within
a few feet of the same height as the Donjon, nnd overlooks nIl
the lower slopes of the Castle mount. As this rising ground-
now occupied by the city reservoir of Burgos-commanded so
much of the defences, Napoleon held that it must be occupied,
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and a fort upon it formed part of his original plan. But the
Emperor passed on; the tide of wur swept far south of Madrid;
and the full scheme for the fortification of Burgos was never
cnrried out; money-the essential thing when building is in
hand-was never forthcoming in sufficient quantities, Rnd the
actual state of the place in 1812 was very different from what
it would have been if Napoleon's orders had been carried out in
detail. Enough was done to make the Castle impregnable
against guerrillcro bands-the only enemies who ever CllffiC
near it between 1800 and lS12-but it could not be described
as a complete or satisfactory piece or military engineering.
Against a besieger unprovided with sufficient artillery it was
formidnble enough: round tWQ*thirds of its circuit it had
a complete double enceinte, enclosing the Donjon and the
church 011 the summit which formed its nucleus. On the
western side. for about one-third of its circumference, it had
an outer or third line of defence, to take in the lowest slopes
of the hill on which it lies. For here the ground descended
gradually, while to the east it shelved very steeply down to the
town, and an external defence was unnecessary and indeed
impossible.
The outer line all round (i.e. the third line on the west. the
second line on the rest of the circum.[ercnec) had as its base the
old walls of the external enclosure of the mediaeval Castle,
modernized by shot-proof parapets and with tambours and
palisades added at the angles to give flank fire. It had a ditch
30 feet wide, and a counterscarp in masonry, while the inner
enceintes were only strong cllrthworks. like good ficld entrench-
ments; th~y were, however, both furnished with palisades in
front and were also' fraised ' abovc. The Donjon, which had
been strcngthened and built up, contained the powder magazine
in its lower,story. On its platform, whieh was most solid, was
established a battery for eight heavy guns (Batterie Napolt!cm),
whieh from its lofty position eommanded all the surrounding
ground, including the top of the ·hill of San Miguel. 'i'he
magazine of provisions, whieh was copiously supplied, was
in thc chureb of Santa Maria la Blanca. Food never failed-
but water was a more serious problem; thcrc was only onc
well, and the garrison had to be put on an allowanee for drinking
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from the commencement of the siege. The hornwork of Sau
Migncl, which covered the important plateau to the north,
had never been properly fmished. It was very large; its front
was composed of earthwork 23 feet high, covercd by a counter-
scarp of 10 feet deep. Here the work was formidable, thc
searp being steep und slippery; but the flanks were not so
strong, and the rear or gorge was only closed by a row of
palisades, erected within the last two days. The only outer
dcCenees consisted of three light jliches, or rednns, lying some
60 yards out in front of the hornwork, at projecting points oC the
plateau, which commanded the lower slopes. The artillery iu
Sau Miguel consisted of sev~n field-pieces, 4- and 6·pounders :
there were no heavy guns in it.
The garrison of Burgos belonged to the Army oC the North,
not to that of Portugal. CaClarelli himself paid 0. hasty visit
to the place just before the siege began, and thrcw in some
picked troops-two battalions of the 34th I, onc of the 130th ;
making 1,000 infantry. There were also 11 complluy of artillery,
another of pioneers, and detachments which brought up thc
whole to exactly 2,000 men-a very sufficient number for a place
of such small size. There were nine heavy guns (16- and
12·pounders), of which eight were placed in the Napolt;On
battery, eleven field-pieces (seven of them in Sall Miguel), and
six mortars or howitzers. This was none too great a provision,
and would havc been inadequate againstn besieger provided with
a proper battering-train: Wellington-as we shall sce-was not
so provided. The governor was 11 General of Brigade named
Dubrcton, onc of the most resourceful and enterprising officers
whom the British army ever'eneountcred. He earncd at Burgos
a rcputation evcn more brilliant than that whieh PhilliPOll
acquired at Badajoz.
The weak points oC the fortress were firstly the unfmished
condition of the San l\1igucl hornwork, which Dubreton had to
maintain as long as he could, in order that the British might
not use the hill on whieh it stood as vantage ground for battering
the Castle; secondly, the lack of cover within the works. The
Donjon and the church of Santa ~Iaria could not house a tithe
• Oue or tlle regiments withdrawn to the uorth after sutrering at Arro)'o
dOlI Ftloliuos. sce vol. iv. p. 003.
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of the garrison; the rest had to bivouac in the open, a trying
experience in the rain, which fell copiously on many days of the
siege. If the besiegers had possessed a provision of mortars,
to keep up a regular bombardment of the interior of the Cnstle,
it would not long have been tenable, owing to the losses that
must have been suUered. Thirdly must be mentioned the bad
construction'oC many of the works-part of them wen! mediaeval
structures, not originally intended to resist cannon, and hastily
adapted to modern necessities: some of them were not
furnished with parapets or embrasures-which had to be
extemporized with sandbags. Lastly. it must be remembered
that the conical shape of the hill exposed the inner no less than
the outer works to battering: the lower enceintes only partly
covered the inner ones, whose higher sections stood up visible
above them. The Donjon and Santa Maria were exposed from
·the fmt to such fIre as the encmy could turn against them,
no less than the walls oC the outer cireumCerenee. It Wellington
had owned the siege-train that he brought against Badajoz, the
place must have succumbed in ten days. But the commander
was able and determined, the troops willing, the supply of food
and of artillery munitions ample-Burgos had always been an
important dep6t. Dubreton's orders were to keep his enemy
detained as long as possible-and he succeeded, even beyond
all reasonable expectations.
Wellington had always been aware that Burgos was fortifIed,
but during his advance he had spoken freely of his intention to
capture it. On September Srd he had written, • I have some
heavy guns with me, and have an idea of Corcing the siege
of Burgos-but that still depends on circumstances 1.' Four
days later he wrote at Valladolid, • I am preparing to drive
away the detachments of the Army of Portugal Cram the Douro,
and I propose, if I have time, to take Burgos 2.' Yet at the
same moment he kept impressing on his correspondents that
his march to the North was a temporary expedient, a mere
parergQn; his real business would be with Soult, and he must
soon be back at Madrid with his main body. It is this that
makes so inexplicable his lingering for a month before Dubre-
1 Wellington to ClIJlWli09. Diltpalcht!, ix. p. 394.
• WellingtoD to George MUlTlly. DilJpalclltlJ, iJ:. p. 398.
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ton's eustle, when he had once discovered that it would not
fall, as he had hoped, in a few days. After his first failure before
the place, he acknowledged it might possibly foil him altogether.
Almost at the start he ventured the opinion that' As Car as I can
judge, I am apprehensive that the menns I have are not suffi-
cient to enable me to take the Castle.' Yet he thought it worth
while to try irregular methods: 'the enemy are ill-provided
with water; their magnzines of provisions are in a place
exposed to be set on fire. I think it possible, therefore, that
I have it in my power to force them to surrender, although
I may not be nble to lay the place open to assault 1.'
The enrdinal wcnkness oC Wellington's position was exnetly
the same as at the Salamanca forts, three months back. He
had no sufficient battering-trnin (or a regular siege: after the
Salamanca experience it is surprising that he allowed himself
to be found for n second time in this deficiency. There were
dozens of heavy guns in the arsenal at Madrid, dozens more
(Marmont's old siege-train) at Ciudnd Rodrigo and Almeidn.
But :Madrid was 180 miles away, Rodrigo 180. With the army
there was only Alexander Dickson's composite Anglo-Portu-
guese artillery reserve, commanded by :Major Ariaga, and
consisting of three iron IS-pounders, and five 24-pounder
howitzers, served by 150 gunners-OO British, 00 Portuguese.
The former were good battering-guns; the howitzers, however,
were not-they were merely short guns of position, very useless
for n sicge, and very inaccurate in thcir fire. They threw
a heavy ball, but with weak power-the charge was only two
pounds of powder: the shot whcn fired at a stout wall, from any
distance, had such weak impact that it regularly bounded off
without making any impression on the masonry. The only
real usc of these guns was for throwing case at short distances.
• In estimating the efficient ordnance used at the Spanish
sieges,' says the official historian of the Burgos failure, 'these
howitzers ought in fairness to be excluded Irom calculation, as
they. did little more than waste invaluable ammunition!,'
This was as well known to Wellingtol;l as to his subordinates,
and it is inexplicable that he did not in place of them bring up
• Wellington to Lord Batlmut. Di3potchell, hr. p. 442.
1 JollCll, lliaftJf'y of the Pnli'JsUlu,. Sicgu, i. p. 478.
26 THE SIEGE OF BURGOS {SRl'T.20
from Madrid real battering-guns: with ten more IS-pounders
he would undoubtedly have taken the Castle of Durgos. Dut
heavy guns require many draught CtLttle, and are hard to drag
over bad roads: the absolute minimum had been taken 'with
thc army, as in June. And it w.as impossible to bring up more
siege-guns in a hurry, as was done at the siege of the Salamanca
forts, for the nearest available pieces were not a mere sixty
miles away, as on the former occasion, but double and triple
that distance. Yet if, on the first day of doubt before Burgos,
Wellington had sent urgent orders for the dispatch of more
IS-pounders from Madrid, they would have been up in time;
though no doubt there would have been terrible difficulties in
providing for their transport. It WllS only when it had grown
too late that marc artillery was at last requisitioned-and had
to be turned back not long after it had started.
Other defects there were in the besieging army, especially
the same want of trained sappers and miners that had been
seen at Badajoz, and of engineer offieers l • Of this more
hereafter :-the first and foremost difficulty, without ,vhieh the
rest would have been comparatively unimportant, was the
lack of heavy artillery.
But to proceed to the chronicle of the siege. On the evening
on whieh the army arrived before Burgos the 6th Division
took post on the south bank of the Arlanzon: the 1st Division
and Pack's Portuguese brigade swept round the city and
formed an investing line about the Castle. It was drawn as
close llS possible, especially on the side of the hornwork of
San Mjguel, where the light companies of the first Division
. pushed up the hill, taking shelter in dead ground where they
could, and dislodged the French ou~posts lrom the three j/eche,
which lay upon its sky-line. Wellington, alter consulting his
chief engineer and artillery officers,' determined that his first
move must be to capture the hornwork, in order to use its
vantage-ground for battering the Castle. The same night
(September 19-20) an assault, without any preparation of
artillery ftre, was made upon it. The main body 01 the assailing
force was composed of Pack's Portuguese, who were assisted
1 There were eight tank and Die or tile Royal ~liIitary Artiftccrs only.
of whom seven were hit during the siege, and five R.E. officcrs ill all.
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by the whole of thc Ij42nd and by the flank-companies 1 of
Stirling's brigade of the 1st Division, to which thc Black Watch
belonged. The arrangement w~ that while a strong firing party
(300 men) of the lj42nd were to advance to the neighbourhood
of the hornwork, ' as near to the salient angle as p.ossible,' and
to endeavour to keep down the fire of the garrison, two columns
each composed of Portuguese, but with ladder parties and
forlorn hopes from the Highland battalion, should charge at the
two demi-bastions to right and left of the salient, and escalade
them. Meanwhile the ftank-companies of Stirling's brigade
(1/42nd, 1/2,J,th, lj79th) were to make a false attack upon the
rear, or gorge, of the hornwork, which might be turned into
a real one if it should be found weakly held. ~
The storm succeeded, but with vast and unnecessary loss of
life, and not in the way which Wellington had intended. It
was bright moonlight, and the firing party, when coming up
over the crest, were at once detected by the French, who opened
a very heavy fire upon them. The Highlanders commenced
to reply while still ISO yards away, and then advanced firing
till they came elose up to the work, where they remained for
a quarter of an hour, entirely exposed and suffering terribly.
Having lost half their numbers they finally dispersed, but not
till after the main attack had failed. On both their flanks the
assaulting columns were repulsed, though the advanced parties
duly laid their ladders: they were found somewhat short, and
after wavering for some minutes Pack's men retired, suffering
heavily. The whole aCfair would have been a failure, but for
the assault on the gorge. Here the three light companies-HO
men-were led by Somers Cocks, formerly one of 'Vellington's
most distinguished intelligence officers, the hero of many a
risky ride, but recently promoted to a majority in the 1/79th.
He made no demonstration, but a fierce attack from thc first.
He ran up the back slope of the hill of St. Migucl, under
a destroctive fire from the Castle, which detected his littlc
column at once, and shelled it from the rear all the time that
it was at work. The frontal assault, however, was engrossing
, By an odd misprint in Wellington's Stlppkmmlary Dispatches, xiv.
p. 120, the order is made to allot the flank·battali008 instead of the Hank-
ootnpaniu to the task.
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the attention of the garrison of the hornwork, and only a weak
guard had been left at the gorge. The light companies broke
tbrough the 1-foot palisades, partly by using axes, partly by
main force and climbing. Somers Cocks then divided his men
into two bodies, leaving the smaller to block the postern in the
gorge, while with the larger he got upon the parapet and
advanced firing towards the right demi-bastion. Suddenly
attacked in the rear, just os they found themselves victorious
in front, the French garrison-a battalion of the 84th, 500 strong
-made no attempt to drive out thc light companies, but ran in
a mass towards the postern, trampled dowmthe guard left there,
and escaped to the Castle-across the intervening ravine. They
lost 198 men, including 60 prisoners, and left behind their
seven field-pieces 1. 'fhe assailants suffered far more-they had
421 killed and wounded, of whom no less than 204 were in the
l/42nd, whieh had suffered terribly in the main assault. The
Portuguese lost 118 only, never having pushed their attack
home. This murderous business was the first serious fighting
in which the Black 'Watch were involved 'since their return to
Spain in April 1812 ; at Salamanca they had been little engaged,
and were the strongest British battalion in the field-over
1,000 bayonets. Wellington attributed their heavy casualties
to their inexperience-they exposed themselves over-much.
• If I had had some of the troops who have stormed so often
before [8rd and Light Divisions], I should .not have lost a fourth
of the number 2,'
The moment that the hornwork hud lullen into the power
of the British, the heavy guns of the Napoleon battery opened
such an appalling fire upon it, that the troops had to be 'with-
drawn, save 800 men, who with some difficulty formed a lodge-
ment in its interior, and a communication from its left front
to the' dead ground' on the north-west side of the hill, by
which relic!s could enter under cover.
The whole of the next day (September 20) the garrison kept
• This narrative of the assault, not very clearly worked out in Napier-
is drawn lrom the llCCounts or Burgoyne, JOIlCS, the anonymous' Private
Soldier of the 42nd' [London, 1821], and Tomklnson, the latter the special
rriend and oonfidant or Sorners Cooks.
I Wellington to Lord .l:Jllthurst. Di8patchea, ix. pp. 443-4.
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up sueh a searching fire upon the work that little eould be
done there, but ~)Il the following night the first battery of the
besiegers [battery 1 all the map] was begun on a spot on the
south-western side of the hill, a little way Cram the rear face of
the hornwol'k, whieh was sheltered by an inequality of the
ground from the guns oC the Napoleon battery. It was armed
on the night of the 23rd with two of the 1S-pounders and three
of the ho....itzcrs of the siege-train, with whieh it was intended to
batter the Castle in due time. They were not used however at
present, as Wellington, encouraged by his success at San
1tIiguel, had determined to try as a preliminary move a seeond
escalade, without help of artillery, on the outer enceinte of
the Castle. This was to prove the first, and not the least dis-
heartening, of the checks that he was to meet before Burgos.
The point of attack sek'Ctcd was on the north-western side
of the'lower wall, at a place where it was some 23 feet high.
The choice was determined by the existence of a hollow road
coming out of the suburb of San Pedro, lrom which access in
perfectly dead ground, unsearehed by any of the French guns,
could be got, to a point within 60 yards of the ditch. The
assault was to be made by 400 volunteers from the three
brigades o[ the 1st Division, and was to be supported and
flanked by a separate attack on another point on the south
side 01 the outer eru:eintc, to be delivered by a detachment of
the eayadores of the 6th Division. The force used was certainly
,too small for the purpose required, and it did not even get
a chance of success. The Portuguese, when issuing from the
rUined houses of the town, were detected at once, and be~llg
heavily fired on, retired without even approaching their goal.
At the main attack the ladder party and lorlorn hope reached
the cliteh in their fIrst rush, sprang in and planted four ladders
against the wall. The enemy had been taken somewhat by
surprise, but recovered himself before the supports got to the
front, which they did in a straggling fashion. A heavy musketry
fire was opened on the men in the ditch, and live shells were
rolled by hand upon them. Several attempts were made to
mount the ladders, but all who neared their top rungs werc
shot or bayoncted, and alter the officer in charge of the assault
(Major Lauric, 1/79th) had been killed, the stormers rall bnck
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to their cover in the hollow road. They had lost 158 officers
and men in all-76 from the Guards' brigade, 44 (rom the
German brigade. 9 from the Line brigade of the hi; Division,
while the ineffective Portuguese diversion had cost only
29 casualties. The French had 9 killed and 13 wounded.
This was a deplorable business .fr.om every point of view.
An escnlade directed against an intact line of defence, held by
a strong garrison, whose morale had not been shaken by any
previous artillery prepaJation, was unjustifiable. There was
not, as at Almaraz, any element of surprise involved; nor, as
at the taking of the Castle of Badajoz, were a great number of
stonners employed. Four hundred men with five ladders could
not hope to force a well-built waU and ditch, defended by an
enemy as numerous as themselves. 'I'he men murmured that
they had been sent on an impossible task; and the heavy loss,
added to that on San :rtliguel three days before, was discouraging.
Many angry comments were made on the behaviour of the
Portuguese on both occasions 1.
Irregular methods having failed, it remained to see what
could be done by more formal procedure, by battering and
sapping up towards the enemy's defences on the west side of the
Castle, the only one accessible for approach by po.rallcls and
trenches. The plan adopted was to wOl'k up from the hollow
road (from which the stormers had started on the last escalade)
in front of the suburb of San Pedro. The hollow road was
utilized as a first parallel; from it a fiying sap (b on the map) .
was pushed out up-hill towards the outer enceinte in a diagonal
line. The object was to arrive at it and to mine it (at the plaee
marked I on the map). 'When the working party had got well
forward, a point was chosen in the sap at a distance of 00 feet
from the wall, and the mine was started from thence. All this
was done under very heavy fire from the Castle, but it was
partly kept down by placing marksmen all along the parallel,
who pieked off many of the Frcnch gunners, and of the infantry
who lined the parapet of the outer enceinte. Somctimes thc
return fue of the place was nearly silenced, but mariy of the
I For a dispute between the ehier engineer, BUl'goyne, who blamed the
Porl.ugncse, and some officers in the Portuguese serVice who ~nt.cd his
words, sec Wellington, Supplemallary Dispatches, xiv. p. 123.
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British marksmen felL The work in the flying sap was made
very costly by the fact that the trench, being on vcry steep
ground, had to be' made abnormally deep [September 2~J.
Meanwhile, on the hill of San Miguel, a second battery (No. 2
on the map) was dug out behind the gorge of the dismantled
hornwork, and trenches for musketry (a.a on the map) were
constructed 011 the slope of ~he hill, so as to bring fire to bear
on the flank and rear of the lower defences of the Castle. The
French heavy guns of the Napoleon battery devoted themselves
to incommoding this work; thcir fire was accurate, many
casualties took place, and occasionally a.1I advance had to
cease. A deep trench of communication between the batteries
on San Miguel and the attack in front of San Pedro was also
started, in order to link up the two approaches by a short line:
the ground was all commanded by the Castle, and the digging
went slowly because of the intense fire directed on it.
Meanwhile battery No. 1 on San Miguel at last came into
operation, firing with five howitzers (the IS-pounders originally
placed there had been withdrawn) against the palisades and
Rank of the north-western angle of the outer enceinte of the
Castle. These inefficient guns had no good effect; it was
found that they shot so inaccurately and so weakly that little
harm was done. After firing 141 rounds they stopped, it being
evident that the damage done was wholly incommensurate
with the powder and shot expended [September 25). This
first interference of the British artillery in the contest was
not very cheering either to the troops, or to the engineers
engaged in planning the attack on the Castle. The guns in
battery 1 kept silence for the next five days, while battery 2,
where the IS-pounders had now been placed, had never yet
fired a single shot. Wellington was now staking his luck on
. the mine, which was being run forward from the head of the
flying sap.
This work, having to be cut very deep, as it was to go right
under the ditch, and being in the hands of untrained volunteers
from the infantry, who had no proper cutting tools, advanced
vcry slowly. The soil, fortunately, was favourable, being a stiff
argillaceous clay which showed no disposition to crumble up:
the gallery was cut as if in stone, with even and perpendicular
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sides and floof, and no props or timbering were found neces·
sary. The main hindrance to rapid work, over and above
the unskilfulness of the miners, wns the foul air which accumu·
lated at the farther cnd of the excavation: many times it was
necessary to withdraw the men lor some hours to allow it to
clear away. ~t noon on September 29 the miners declared that
they had reached the foundations of the wall, and this seemed
correct enough, for they had come to a course of large rough
blocks of stone, extending latemlly for as far as could be probed.
It is probable, however, that the masonry was really the
remains of some old advanced turret or outwork, projecting
in front of the modern enceinte. For when the cnd of the mine
was packed with twelve barrels, containing 90 lb. 01 powder
each, well tamped, and fired at midnight, the explosion brought
down many stones from the front of the wall, but did not
affect the earth 01 the rampart, whieh remained standing
perpendicular behind it. There seemed, however, to be places,
at the points where the broken lacing joined the intact part
of the wall, where men might scramble up. Accordingly the
storming-column of 300 volunteers who had been waiting for
the explosion, was let loose, under cover of n strong musketry
fire from the trenches. A sergeant and four men went straight
for one of the accessible points, mounted, and were cast down
again, three of them wounded. But the main body of the
{orlorn hope and its officer went a little farther along the wall,
reached lL section that was wholly impracticable for climbing,
Rnd raD bt:LCk to the trenches to report that the defences were
uninjured. The supports followed their example. The loss,
therelore, was small-only 29 killed and wounded-but the
moral effect of the repulse was very bad. The men, for the
most part, made up their minds that they had been sent to
n hopeless nnd impossible task by the errors of an incom-
petent' staff. The engineers declared that the stormers had
not done their best, or made any serious attempt to approach
the wall.
Wellington must by now have been growing much dis-
quieted about the event of the siege. He had spent ten days
before Durgos, but since the capture of the hornwork on the
first night bad accomplished absolutely nothing. There were
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rumours that the Army of Portugal was being heavily rein·
forced, and these were perfectly true. By the coming up from
the rear of drafts, convalescents, and stragglers, it had received
some 7,000 men of reinforcements, a.nd by October 1 had
38,000 men with the colours-more than \Vellington counte1d,
even including the Galicians. Souham was now in command:
he had been on Icave in Franee at the time of the battle of
Salamanca, but returned in the last days of September and
superseded Clausel. There had been in August some intention
of sending MasiCna back to the Peninsula, to replace the
disabled l\£armont. Clarkc. the Minister of War, dispatched
him to Bayonnc on his own responsibility, there being no time
to consult Napolcon, who was now nearing l\[oscow 1. When
the Emperor had thc quel>tioll put to him he nomi~atcdReille 2,
but by the time that his order got to Spain Souham was in full
charge of the army, and was not dil>placed till the campaign
was over. Masscna ncver crossed the frontier to rclieve him,
reporting himself indisposed, and unable to face the toils of
a campaign: his nomination by Clarke was nevcr confirmed,
and he presently returned to Paris. Hearing of the gathering
strength of the Army of Portugal, Wellington remarked that
he was lucky-the French were giving him more time than he
had any right to expect 11 to deal with Burgos. Meanwhile
he showed no intention, as yet, either of abandoning the siege
or of taking back to Madrid the main part of his army, as he
had repeatedly promised to do in his letters of early September.
SOlut and the King were not yet showing in any dangerous
combination on the Va.lencian side, and tiU they moved
Wellington made up his mind to persevere in his unlucky siege.
It is clear that he hated to admit a failure, so long as any
chance remained, and that he was set on showing that he could
• make bricks without straw.'
The mine explosion of the 29th-30th had been a disheartening
affair j but WeUington had now resolved to repeat this form of
attack, aiding it however this time by the fire of his insignifi-
cant siege-train. A second mine had already ~en begun,
• Clarke to Marmont of August 18, and to M~na of August 19.
I NapoleOIl to Clarke, Moscow, September 12.
• See Wellington to Hill of October 2. Dispakhe" ix. p. 4063.
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against a point of the outer enceinte (II in the map) som~what
to the south of that originally attacked by the first. This
was pushed with energy betwefn September 30 and October 4;
but at the same time an endeavour was made to utilize, for
what it was worth, the direct fire of artillery, at the shortest.
possible distance from the walls. On the night of September 30-
October 1 a battery for three guns (No. 8 in the map) was
commenced, slightly in advance of the 1st Parallel in the Hollow
Road, no more than some sixty-five yards from the French
defences. The garrison, not having been troubled with any
battery-building on this front before, suspected nothing, and
at dawn on October 1 the earthwork was completed, and the
carpenters were beginning to lay the wooden platforms' on
which the IS-pounders were to stand. With the coming of the
light the enemy discovered the new and threatening work, and
began to concentrate upon it every gun that he could bring to
bear. The platforms however were completed, and at 9 o'clock
the artillery hauled the three heavy guns, which were Welling-
ton's sole effective battering-tools, into their places. The
sight of them provoked the French to redoubled activity: shot
shell and musketry fire were directed upon the front of the
battery from many quarters, its parapet began to fly to pieces,
and the loss among the artillerymen was heavy. Before the
embrasures had been opened, or a single shot had been fired
from the three guns, the enemy's fire had become so rapid and
accurate that the work had become ruined and untenable.
Two of the IS-pounders had been cast down from their carriages
and put out of action-onc had a trunnion knocked off, the
other (which had been hit eleven times) was split in the muzzle.
Only one of the three remained in working order. Without
having fired even once, two of the three big guns were disabled !
It was a bad look out for the future [October I).
Wellington, however, ordered a second battery to be con-
structed, somewhat to the left renrof the first (No. 4 in the mnp),
and behind instead of before the parallel. The position chosen
was onc on to which many of the French guns could not be
trained, while it was equally good with battery No. 3 for playing
on the outer enceinte. After midnight [October 1-2) the two
disabled and one intact IS-pounders were dragged out of the
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abandoned battery and taken to the rear. Next morning,
however, a new disappointment was in store for Wellington:
the Freneh detected battery No. 4, and opened upon it, with
all guns that could reach it, such an accurate and effective fire
that the parapet, though revettcd with wool-packs, soon began
to crumble, and the workmen had ,to withdraw. 'It became
evident that under such a plunging fire no guns could ever be
served there 1.' All hopes of breaching the lower enceinte from
any point on its immediate front had to be abandoned....,....and
meanwhile the heavy artillery had been ruined.
The next order issued was that the solitary intact IS-pounder
and the other gun with the split lip-which had been mounted
on a new carriage-should be hauled back to the hill of San
l\1iguel and put into their original place, battery No. L The
night during which they were to be removed was one of
torrential rain, and the working parties charged with the duty
gradually dropped aside and sought shelter, with the exception
of those detailed from the Guards' brigade and the artillery.
At dawn on October 3 the guns had not reached their destina-
tion, and had to be shunted beside the salient of the hornwork,
to hide them from the enemy during the day. _ Wellington,
justly vexed with the shirking, ordered the defaulters'to be
put on for extra duty, and the names of their officers to be
formally noted. This day was lost for all work except that of
the mine, which ad\'anced steadily but slowly, long intervals·
of rcst having to be given in order to allow for the evaporation
of foul air in its inner depths (October 8). On the following
njght, however, the IS-pounders were got into battery No. I, and
about thc same time the engineer officers reported that the
mine (now eighty-three feet long) had got well under the wall
of the outer enceinte. The 4th of October was therefore destined
to be an eventful day.
At dawn, battery No. 1 opened all the wall, where it had
beCIl damaged by the Hrst mine on Septembcr 29th, using the
two IS-pounders and three howitzers. The effect was much
better than could have been expcctcd: thc 181h. round-shot
(of whieh about 350 were llSed) had good penetrating power,
and the already shaken wall crumbled rapidly, ~o that by
JOllCS, i. 1'. 320.
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four in the afternoon there was a practicable breach sixty feet,
long.
Wellington at once arranged for a third assault on the outer
ulceitlte, telling oft for it not details from many regiments,
8S on the previous occasion, but-what was much better-
s single compact battalion, the 2/24th. Only the supports were
mixed parties. At 5 p.m. the mine was fired, with excellent
eHeet, throwing down nearly 100 feet of the rampart, and killing
many of the. I'rench. Before the dust had cleared away, the
men or the 2/24th dashed forward toward both breaches, with
great spirit, and carried them with case, and with no excessive
loss, driving the French within the second or middle enceinte.
The total loss that day was. 224, of which the assault cost
about loo, the other casualties being in the batteries on San
.l\1iguel and in the trenches. But the curious point of the
figures is that the 2j24th, forming the actual stoqning-column,
lost only 68 killed and woundcd; thc supports, and thc work-
mcn who wcrc employed to form a lodgement within the
C<lnquered space, suffered far more heavily. Dubreton reports
the casualties of the garrison at 27 killed and 42 wounded
[Oelobe>- 4].
In the night after the storm the British, alter entrenching the
two breaches, began to make preparations to sap forward to
the second enceinte, which being ditchless and not faced with
masonry, looked less fomlidable than that which had already
been carried, though it was protected by a solid row of palisades.
Meanwhile the nrtillery officers proposed that battery No. 2
on San Migucl should be turned against a new objective, the
point where the walls of the second and the inner lines met,
immediately in front 01 the hornwork, in thc rc-entering angle
marked III in the map. Battery No. 1 was meanwhile to play
on the palisades of the second enceinte. This it did with some
success. At 5 o'clock in the evening, however, there was an
unexpected tumult in the newly-gained ground. Dubreton,
misliking the look of the npproo.ches which the asso.ilants were
beginning to run out from the breaches, ordered a sortie of
800 men, who dashed out most unexpectedly against the
lodgcments in front 01 thc northcrn breach (No. I), and drovc
away the workmen with heavy loss, seizing most of their tools,
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overthrowing the gnbions, and shovelling earth into the trench.
They gave way when the covering party came up, and retired,
having done immense mischief and disabled 142 of the besiegers,
while their own loss was only 17 killed and 21 wounded. This
was an unpleasant surprise, as showing the high spirit and
resolution of the garrison; but the damage was not so great
but that one good night's work sufficed to repair it: the loss of
tools was Uie most serious matter--the French had carried off
200 picks and shovels which could not be replaced, the stock
(as usual in Peninsular sieges) being very low I.
On the 6th and 7th the besiegers again began to sap forward
towards the second elueinte, with the object of establishing
a second parallel on its glaeis, but with no great success. There
was little or no effective fire from the batteries on San Miguel
to keep down the artillery of thc besieged, and the work at the
sap-head was so deadly that the engineers could hardly expect
the men to do much: however, the trench was driven forward to
within thirty yards of the palisades. So useless were the howitzers
in No. 2 battery that two of them were removed, and replaced
by two French field-pieces from those captured in tl)e hornwork
on September 20 j these, despite of their small calibre, worked
decidedly better. The heavy guns in the Napoleon Battery
devoted themselves to keeping down the fire of the two sur-
viving IB-pounders in battery No. 2, and on the 7th knocked
one from its carriage and broke off onc of its trunnions. This
left only one heavy piece in working order I But the artisans
of the artillery park, doing their best, rigged up both the gun
injured on this day and that disabled on October 1 upon block
carriages, with a sort of cradle arrangement to hold them up
on the side where a trunnion was gone; and it was found that
they could be fired, if a very reduced charge was used. 'When
anything like the full amount of powder was employed, they
jumped off their carriages, as was natural, considering that
they were only properly attached to them on onc side. Of
course, their battering power was hopelessly reduced by the
small charge. The artillery diarists ol the siege call them
1 Indeed Ule beliiegel'll had largely depended on a dl:p6t of French picks.
find shovels found by ehance in the town of BurgOll, after the siege had
begun.
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• the two lame guns' during the last fortnight of their
·employment.
On October 8 Dubreton, growing once more anxious at the
sight of the advance of the trenches toward the second enuinte.
ordered another sally, which was executed by 400 men three
hours after midnight. It was almost as successful as that or
October 5. The working party of Pack's Portuguese and the
covering party from the K.G.L. brigade of the 1st Division
were taken quite unawares, and driven out of the advanced
works with very heavy loss. The trench was completely
levelled, and many tools carried away, before the supports in
rescn"c, under SOlUcrs Cocks or the 1/79th-thc hero of the
assault 011 the Hornwork-eame up and drove the French back
to their palisades. Cooks himself was killed-he was an officer
of the highest promise who would have gone far if fate had
spared him, and was the centre of a large circle of friends who
have left enthusiastic appreciations of his greatness of spirit
and ready wit 1. The ~esiegers lost 184 men in this unhappy
business, of whom 133 belonged to the German Legion: 18 of
them were prisoners carried off into the Castle 2. The French
casualties were no more than 11 killed and 22 wounded---only
n sixth part of those of the Allies.
\Ve have now (October S) arrived at the most depressing
part of the chronicle of a sicge which had been from the first
a series of disappointments. Alter the storm of the lower
etu:eillte on October 4, the British made no further progress. The
main cause of failure was undoubtedly the weakness of their
artillery, which repea~ly opened again from one or other of
the two San Miguel batteries, only to be silenced after an hour
or two of conflict with the heavy guns on the Donjon. But it
was not only the small number of the IS·pounders which was
fatal to success-they had run out of powder and shot; a great
deal of the Hring was done with second·hand missiles-Freuch
16 lb. shot picked out of the works into which they had fallen.
• See especially Tomkinson, an old oomrBde of Cocks in the 16th Light
Dragoons, pp. 211-17.
• Wellington says 18 prisonel'!l in his return. Dubreton claimed to have
taken 2 officers l\nd 36 men in his report. POIlsilJly the difference WIIS
mortally wounded men, who were capture}1 but died.
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The infantry were offered a bonus for each onc brought to the
artillery park, and 420 were paid for. l\[orc than 2,000 French
8 lb. and 41b. shot were also bought from the men, though
these were less useful, being only available for field-guns, which
were of little use for battering. But in order not to discourage
thc hunting propcnsitics of the soldiers, evcrything brought in
was duly purchased. Shot of sorts never wholly failed, but
lack of powder was a far more serious problem-it cannot be
picked up second*hand. There would have been an absolute
deficiency but tor a stock got from a most unexpected quarter.
Sir Home Popham and his shil)S were still on the Cantabrian
coast, assisting the operations of Longa and Mendizabal against
the Army of the North. The squadron had made its head-
quarters at Santander, the chief port recovered from the
French, and communications with it had been opened up
through the mountains by the way of Ueynosa. On Sep*
tember 26 Wellington had written to Popham 1 to inquire
whether powder could not be brought from Santander to
Burgos, by means of mule trains to be hired at the port. The
Commodore, always helpful, fell in with the idea at once, and
succeeded in procuring the mules. On October 5th 40 barrels
of 90 lb. weight each were brought into camp: considering the
distance, the badness of the roads, and the disturbed state of the
country, it cannot be denied that Popham did very well in
delivering it only ten days after Wellington had written his
request, and eight days after he had received it. Other convoys
from Santander came later. It is a pity that 'Wellington did
not think of asking for heavy ship guns at the same time. But
he had written to the Commodore on October 2 that • the
means of transport required to move a train either from the
coast or from Madrid (where we have plenty) are so extensive
that the attempt would be impracticable 2,'
The idea of requisitioning ship guns had been started on the
very first day of the siege (September 20) by Sir Howard
Douglas, whO had lately come from Popham's I>ide, and main*
tuined that by the use of draught oxen, supplemented by
man-handling in difficult places, the thing could be done. But
Wellington would hear nothing of it, maintaining that matters
• Di1patdle1, ix. p. 450. • Ibid., ix. p. 465.
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would be settled one way or another before the guns could
possibly arrive. Alter the disaster to batteries 3 and 4 on
October 2nd hc-too late-altered his opinion, and consented
that an appeal should be made to Popham. The Commodore
rose to the occasion, and started off two 24-pounders on
October 9th, which by immense exertions were dragged asJar as
Reynosa, only 50 miles from Burgos, by October 18th, and had
passed the worst part of the road. But at Reynosa they were
turned back, for Wellington was just raising the siege and
preparing to retire on Valladolid. It is clear that if they had
been asked for on September 20 instead of October Srd-as
Howard Douglas had suggested-they and no doubt another
heavy gun or so, could have been brought forward in time for
the last bombardmcnt, and might have turned it into a succcss.
But guns might also have come from Madrid: Wcllington did
not think it wholly impossible to move artillery from thc Retiro
arsenal. For, ere he left it on August 31, he bad instructed
Carlos de Espafia that the best guns there should be evacuated
on to Ciudad Rodrigo, if ever Soult and King Joseph should draw
too close in 1. It is true that he observed that the transport
would be a difficult matter, and that much would have to be
destroyed, and not carried off. But it is clear that he thought
that some cannon could be moved. The strangcst part of the
story is that his own brother-in-law, Pakenham. wrote to him
horn Madrid offering to send him twelve heavy gUlls over the
Somosicrra, pledging himscU to manage the transport by
means of o::,cn got in the :Madrid district. His oCCcr was rejected 2.
It seems that the conviction that the Castle oC Burgos would
be a hard nut to erack came too late to Wellington. And when
he did reali7.e its strength, he did not reconsider the matter
of siege artillery at once, but proceeded to try t~e methods of
Badajoz and Almaraz, mere force majeure applied by escalade,
instead oC thinking oC bringing up more guns. He judgcd-
wrongly as it chanced-that he would either take the plaee by
sheer assault, or e1sc that the French field army would interCere
before October was far advanced. Neither hypothesis turned
1 See Wellington to Cnstal10s or 7 October. Dis'palchls, Ix. p. 4077.
I See Napier, iv. p. 4012, who had tile fact from Sir Edw/lrd P/lkenh/lln's
own mouth.
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out correct, and so he had the opportunity of a full month's
siege, and failed in it for want of means that might have been
procured, if only he had mude another resolve on August81st, or
even on September 20. But even the greatest generals cannot
be infallible prophets eoncerning what they will require a month
ahead. The mistake is explicable, and the critic who censures
it over-much would be presumptuous and unreasonable 1.
But to return to the chronicle of the unlucky days between
October 8th and October 21st. The working forward by sap
from the third enceinte towards the second practically stood
still, after the second destructive sally of the French against
the new approaches. This is largely accounted for by the
steepness of the ground, which made it necessary to dig trenches
of extraordinary depth, and by the setting in after October 7
of very rainy weather, which made thertrenches muddy rivers,
and the steep banks of earth and breaches so slippery that it was
with great difficulty that parties eould find their way about
'and move to their posts 2. But the unchecked powcr of the
French artillery fire counted for even marc, and not least of the
hindrances waS the growing sulkiness of the troops. • Siege
business was new to them, and they wanted confidence; some-
times they would tell you that you were taking them to be
butchered. 'The loss, to be sure, was sometimes heavy, but it
was chiefly occasioned by the confused und spiritless way in
which the men set nbout their work, added to the great depth
we were obliged to excavate in the trenches, to obtain cover
from the commanding fire of the enemy 3.'
Meanwhile the batteries on San Miguel, when they had
ammunition, and when they could put in a few hours' work
before being silenced by the fire from the Donjon, continued
to pound away at the re-entering angle in the second tllCeillte
I Howard Dougla,'a proposal to get up big guns at once on September 20
is detailed at length in his biography, pp. 216-11. Napier hM n. good deal
to say on it. JOllC!;: and Burgoyne tell nothing about it, but Uley were
evidently nettled at the idea that Dougla.'l, who had no ol1lcial JXlsitioll in
the army, should have raised a proposal aDd got Wellington to listen to it.
I fancy Ulnt Douglas is one or tioe officers alluded to by Burgoyne (Coru-
'pomlena. i. p. 234) ll.9 wllmthori~d PCrllOIIS, who volulltocred uselC.9ll
advice. Gomm, p. 287, &aya, 'we have let to work idl~' without having
the means we might have commanded.'
• nllrgo~'nr, i. p. 220. • Ibid.• i. p. 233.
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(Ill in the map), and with more cUcct than might have been
expected, for this section of the defences turned Qut la have
been built with bad material, and crumbled even under such
feeble shooting as that of Wellington's' lame' IS-pounders.
The French on several days had first to silence the English
battery, and then to rebuild the wall with sandbags and earth
under a musketry fire from the trenches (a-a in the map) upon
San Migucl. from which they could not drive the sharp-shooters
of the besiegers. It was thought later-an ex post facio judge-
ment-that the best chance of the Allies would have been to'
attempt a storm on this. breach when first it became morc or
less practicable. The delay enabled the besieged to execute
repairs, to scarp down the broken front, ;md to cut off the
damaged corner by interior retrenchments.
l\Ieanwhile, since doubts were felt as to the main operation
of storming the new breach, No. Ill, subsidiary efforts were
made to incommode the enemy in other ways. At intervals
on the 9th, 10th, and 11th roo-hot shot were fired at the church
of 'Santa Maria la Blanea, where it was known that the French
magazine of food lay. The experience of the Salamanca forts
had led the artillery offieers·to think that a general conflagration
might be caused. But the plan had no success; the building
proved"to be very incombustible, and one or two small fires
whieh burst out were easily extinguished. Another device
was to mine out from the end houses of the city towards the
church. of San Roman, an isolated structure lying close under
the south-east side of the Castle, which the Frcnch held as an
outwork. Nothing very decisive could be hoped from it<;
capture, as if taken it could only serve as a base for operations
against the two enceintes above it 1. But, as an eye-witness
.remarked, at this period of the siege any sort of irregular scheme
was tried, on thc off chance of success. By October 17 the
mine had got weU under the little church. A morc feasible plan,
which might have done some good if it had succeeded, was to
run out a small mine or fougasse from the sap-head of the trench
1 Alexander Dickson remarks in his diary, p. 772, • '.fhis was done to
please General Clinton, and had nothing to do with the attack.' Clinton's
troops were opposite this I;ide or the Cnstle, nnd hnd as )'et not bceo
entrusted with any impOrtant duty.
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in front of breach I to the palisudes of the seeond enceinte. It
was a petty business, no more than two barrels of powder being
used, and only slightly damaged an angle of the work in front
when fired on October 17. An attempt to push on the sap after
the explosion was frustrated by the musketry fire of the
besieged.
On the 18th the engineers reported that the church of San
Roman was completely undermined, and could be blown up
at any moment. On the same morning the one good and two
lame I8-pounders in battery 2 on San Miguel swept away.
not for the first time, the sandbag parapets and chevaux de J-ri.~e
with which the French hOO strengthened the breach Ill. They
were then turned against the third enceinte, immediately behind
that breach, partly demolished its • fraises,' and even did some
damage to its rampart. This was as much as could have been
expected, as the whole of the enemy's guns~were, as usual,
turned upon the battering-guns, and presently obtained the
mastery over them, blowing up an expense-magazine in No. 2,
and injuring a gun in No. 1. But in thc afternoon the delences
were in a more battered condition than usual, and Wellington
resolved to make his last attempt. Already the French army
outside was showing signs 01 activity; and, as a precaution, some
of the investing troops-two brigades of the 6th Division-
had been scnt forward to join the covering army. II this
assault failcd, thc sicge would have to be given up, or at the
hest turned into a blockade.
The plan of the assault was drawn up by Wellington himself,
who dictated the details to his military secretary, Fitzroy
Somerset, in three successive sections, alter inspecting irom
the nearest possible point caeh 01 the thrce fronts which he
intended to attack I.
Stated shortly the plan WtlS' as lollows : ,
(1) At 4.30 the mine at San Roman WtlS to be fired, and tbe
ruins of the church seized by Brown's ea~adores (9th battalion),
supported by a Spanish regiment (1st of Asturias) lent by
Castaf'ios. A brigade of the 6th Division was to be ready
in the streets behind, to support the assault, if its effect
looked promising, i.e. if the results of the explosion should
I Jones, i. p..357.
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injure the enceinte behind, or should so drive the enemy from
it that an escalade became possible.
(2) The detachments of the Guards'brigadc of the 1st Divisioll,
who were that day in charge of the trenches within the captured
outer enceinte, and facing the west frout of the second meallie,
were to make an attempt to escalade that line of defence, at the
point where most of its palisades had been destroyed, opposite
and above the original breach No. I in the lower enceinte.
(3) The detachments of the Gcrmanbrigadc of the 1st Division.
who were to take charge of the trenches for the evening in
succession to the Guards, were to attempt to storm the breach III
in the re·cntering angle, the only point where there was an
actual opening prepared into the inncr defences.
From nll the works, both thosc on St. Miguel and thosc to
the wcst of thc Castle, marksmen ldt in the trenches were to
kcep up as hot a musketry fire as possible on any of the enemy
who should show themsclves, so as to distract thcir attcntion
from the stormers.
The most notable point in these instructions was fhe small
number of men devoted to the two serious attacks. Provision
was made for the use of 300 men only in the attack to be made
by thc Guards: they were to move forward in successive
rushes-the first or forlorn hope consisting of an officcr and
twcnty men, thc supports or main assaulting forcc, of small
parties of 40 or 50 mcn, cach of which was to come forward only
when the onc in front of it had reached a given point in its
advance. Similarly the German Legion's assault was to be led
by a forlorn hope of 20, supported by 50 more, who were only
to move when thcir predecessors had reached the lip of the
breach, and by a reserve of 200 who were to charge out of
the trcnch only whcn thc support was wcll established 011 the
rampart.
Burgoyne, the senior engineer present, tells us that he pro-
tested all through the siege, at each successive assault, against
the paucity of the numbers employed, saying that the forlorn
hope had, in fact, to take the work by itself, since they had
no close and strong column in immediate support; and if the
forlorn hope failed, 'the next party, who from behind their
cover have seen them bayoneted, are expected to valiantly
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jump up and proceed to be served in the same way.' He
reminded Wellington, as he says, that the garrison at Burgos
was as large as that at Ciudad Rodrigo, where two whole
divisions instead of 500 or 600 men had been thrown into the
assault. The Commander-in-Chief, condescending to argument
for once, repli'ld, • why expose more men than can ascend the
ladders [as at thc Guards' attack) or enter the work [as at thc
breach in the K.G.L. attack] at one time, when by this mode
thc support is ordered to be up in time to lollow the tail 01 the
preceding party I ?' And his objection to the engineer's plea
was clinched by thc dictum, • if we fail we can't lose many
men.' This controversy originally arose on the details 01 the
abortivc storm 01 September 22, but Burgoync's criticism was
even more convincing lor the details 01 the final ussault on
October 18. The number of men risked was lar too small lor
the task that was set them. •
The melancholy story 01 the storm runs as follows. On the
explosion of the mine at San Roman, punctually nt 4.30, all
three of the sections of the assault were duly delivered. At
the breach the forlorn hope of the King's German Legion
charged at the rough slope with great speed, 'reached the crest,
and were immediately joined by the support, led most gallantly
by Major Wurmb of the 5th Line Battalion. The first rush
cleared a considerable length of the rampart of its defenders,
till it was checked against a stockade, part of the works which
the French had built to cut off the breach lrom the main body
of the place. Foiled here, on the flank, some 01 the Germans
turned, and made a dash at the injured rampart of the third
line, in their immediate front: three or lour actually reached
the parapet of this inmost defence of the enemy. But they
fell, and the main body, penned in the narrow space between
the two enceinte8, became exposed to sueh an overpowering
fire of musketry that, after losing nearly one man in three, they
finally had to give way, and retired most reluctantly down the
breach to the trenches they had left. The casualties out 01
800 mcn engaged were no less than 82 killed and wounded Z,
, For this dialogue, told at lengtb, tlCe Burgoyoc's Corre.llpomlence, cd.
Wrotteslcy, i. p. 235.
• So I make out from the returns, but Deamish', and Schwertfeger'lI
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among the former, Wurmq, who had led the assault, and among
the latter, Hesse, who commanded the forlorn hope, nnd was
onc of the few who scaled the inner wall as well as the outer.
The Guards in their attack, 100 yards to the right of the
breach, had an even harder task than the Germans, for their
storm was a mere escalade. It was executed with great decision:
issuing from the front trench they ran up to the line of broken
palisades, passed through gaps in it, and applied their ladders
to the face of the rampart of the second enceinte. Many of
them succeeded in mounting, and they established themselves
successfully on the parapet, and seized a long stretch of {to so
long that some of their left-hand men got into touch with the
Germans who had entered at the breach. But they could not
clcar thc enemy out of the terre·pkine of the sccond ellceinte,
whcre a solid body of the Frcnch kept up. a rolling fire upon
•them, while. the garrison of the upper line maintained a still
fiercer fusillade from thcir high·lying point of vantage. The
Gua.rds were for about ten minutes within the wall, and made
several attempts to get forward without success. At the end
of that tiine a French rcserve advanced from thcir left, and
charging in flank the disordered mass within the enceinte drove
them out again. The Guards retired as best they could to the
advanced trenches, having lost 85 officers and men out of the
800 engaged. The French returned their casualties at 11 killed
and 80 wounded.
Wellington's dispatch, narrating t~e disastcr, gives the most
handsome testimonial to the resolution of both the bodies of
stormers. • It is impossible to represent in adequate terms the
conduct of the Guards and the German Legion upon this
occasion. And I am quite satisfied that if it had been possible
to maintain the posts which they_gained with so much gallantry,
thesc troops would have maintained thcm 1.' But why were
600 men only sent forward, and no support givcn them during
the precious ten minutes when their first rush had carried
them within the walls? Where were the brigades to which
the stormers belonged? It is impossible not to subscribe to
Histories of the K.G.L. both give the lesser figure of 75-still sufficiently
high I
, Wellington to Lord Bathurst, October 26.
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Burgoync's angry comment that 'the miserable, doubting,
unmilitary policy of small storming-parties' caused the mis-
chief 1. He adds, 'large bodies encournge one another, and
carry with them confidence of success: if the Castlc of Badajoz
was stormed with ten or twelve ladders, and not more than
40 or 50 mcn could mount at once, I am convinced that it was
only carried because the whole ard Division was there, and the
emulation between the officers of the different regiments got
their men to mount j although we lost 600 or 700 men, it caused
suceess~which eventually sa\'cs men.'
The third section of the assault of October 18, the unim-
portant attack on the church of San Roman, had a certain
measurc of success. The mine, though it did not level the
whole building, as had becn hoped, blew up the terrace in front
01, and part of its wcst cnd. Thereupon the French evacuated
it," after exploding a mine of their own which brought down
the bell-tower and much more, and crushed a few of the
ca~adores and Spaniards 2 who were ahead of their comrades.
The besiegers were able to lodge themselves in the ruins, but
could make no attempt to approach the actual walls of the
second etWeinte. So the 6th Division remained behind, within the
streets of Burgos, and never came forward or showed themselves.
Such was the unhappy end of this most unlucky siege. All
through the day of the assault there had been hcavy skirmishing
going on at the outposts of the covering army; Souham was at
last on the move. On the 19th the Guards' brigade and the
K.G.L. brigade of the 1st Division marched to join the 5th and
7th Divisions at the Iront, leaving only the line brigade (Stir-
ling's) to hold the trenches on the north and west sides of the
Castle. Two-thirds or the 6th Division had already gone off
in the same direction belore the storm: now the rest followed,
handing over the eharge of Burgos city and the chain of piequets
on the east side of the Castle to Pack's Portugueie. There was
, Burgoyne's CQrreapondenu, i. p. 236.
• Dubreton ulld Behnll8 SI)Cl~k or a. 'gmnd nombre d'Anglais ecrasts,'
the latter says 300 I (Belmas, iv. pp. 501 and 548). l)utting aside the tact
that there were no Engli3JI here at all, we may remark that Burgoyne
(i. p. 226) says ttiat thrtt Spaniards were buried in the ruins, and that the
1088 of the Portuguese in the whole affair is put at 8 killed, 44 wounded,
and 2 missing in Wcllingtoo'll report.
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little doing in the lines this day-the French built up the oft-
destroyed parapet of breach III with sandbags, and made an
incursion into the church of San Roman, dri \'ing out the
Portuguese guard for a short time, and injuring the lodgement
which had been made in the ruins. But they withdrew when
the supports came up.
On the 20th, news being seriou!:! at the front-for Souham
showed signs of intending to attack in force, and it was ascer-
tained that he had been reinforced by great part of the Army
of the North, under Caffarelli in person-Wellington gave
orders to withdraw the guns from the batteries, leaving only
two of the captured French pieces to fire- an occasional shot.
All t.ransportable stores and ammunition were ordered to be
loaded up. There was some bickering in San Roman this day,
but at night the Portuguese were again in possession of the
n;1Uch-battered church.
On the 21st came the final orders for retreat. Thc artillery
were directed to burn all that eould not be carried off-
platforms, faseines, &e.-to blow up the works on San Miguel,
and to retire down the high-road to Valladolid. The three
IS-pounders were taken a few miles only. The roads being bad
from heavy rain, aI}d the bullocks weak, it was held that there
was no profit in dragging about the two guns which had lost
trunnions and were practically useless. The surviving intact
gun shared the fate of its two' lame' fellows: all three were
wrecked 1, their carriages were destroyed, and they were thrown
out on the side of the road. The artillery reserve, now reduced
to the five ineffe<:tive 24-lb. howitzers, then continued its
retreat.
On the night of the 21st-22nd, Pack's brigade and the other
troops left to hold the works retired, the covering army being
now in full retreat by various roads passing through or around
the city. The main column crossed at the town bridge-the
artillery with wheels muffled with straw to deaden their
rumbling-risking the danger of being shelled in the darkness
by the Castle, which had several guns that bore upon it, The
1 By knocking off their remaining trunnions, which made them perma-
nently useless. Some of the captured l"rcnch field-gullS from the lIornwork
were also destroyed.
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long series of mishaps which constituted the history of the
siege of Burgos ended by the failure of the plan for the
explosions on. San l\1iguel: the French found there next day
more than twenty barrels of powder intact. The arscnal in
the town was fired when the last troops had passed, but was
only partly consumed. Next morning (October 22) the advanced
guard of the Army of Portugal entered Burgos, and relieved
the garrison after thirty~five days of siege. Dubreton hnd still
pearly 1,200· effective men under arms: he had lost in his
admirable and obstinate defence 16 officers and 607 men, of
whom 304 were killed or dicd of their wounds. The correspond-
ing total British casualty 1.ist was no less thnu 24 officers and
48.5 mcu killed, 68 officers and 1,487 men wounded and missing
[the last item aceounting for 2 officers and 42 mcn]. Almost
the whole of the loss came from the ranks of the 1st Division
and Pack's Portuguese, the 6th Division troops having had
little to do with the trenches or assaults 1.
The cxternal causes of thc raising of the siege will be dealt
with in their proper place-the strategical narrative of the
general condition of artairs in both the Castiles ~·hich opens the
next chapter. Here it remains only to recapitulate the various
reasons which made thc siegc itself a failure. They have been
slUumed up by sevcral writers of weight and expericnce-John
JODes, thc official historian of the sieges of Spain, John Dur·
goyne the commanding engineer, WiUiam Napier, and Bclmas
the French author, who (using Jones as a primary authority)
told its story from the side of the besieged. Comparing all
their views with the detailed chronicle of the operations of
those thirty-five eventful days, the following results seem to
emerge.
(1) Burgos would not have been a strong fortress against an
army provided with a proper battering-train, sueh as that
which dealt with Ciudad Rodrigo or Badajoz. But Wellington
-by his own fault as it turned out in the·end-had practiCally
no such train at all: three 18-pound heavy guns were an absurd
provision for the siege of a place of even third-rate strength. If
Wellington had realized on September 20 that the siege was
to last till October 21, he might have had almost as many guns
• For dctailed losses lICC tablc ill Appendix I.
E
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as he pleased. But the strength of Burgos was underrated at
the first; and by the time that it was realized, Wellington
considered (wrongly, as it turned out) that it was too late to get
the necessary ordnance from the distant places where it lay.
(2) Encouraged by the experience of Badajoz and Almaraz,
Wellington and his staff considered that an imperfect fortifica-
tion like the Castle of Burgos might be dealt with by escalade
without artillery preparation. The Hornwork of San 1\Iiguel
was taken on this irregular system; but"the attempts agninst
the enceintes of the Castle failed. Burgoyne is probably right
in maintaining that the repeated failures were largely due to
the general's reluctance to put in large masses of men at once,
owing to his wish to spare the lives in units already worked
down to a low strength by long campaigning. The principle
, if we fail we can't lose many men' was ruinous. On October 18
the place must have fallen if 8,000 instead of 600 men had been
told off for the assault.
(8) Notwithstanding the lack of artillery, Burgos might have
been taken if Wellington had owned a largc and efficient body
of engineers. But (as at Badajoz, where he had made bitter
,complaints on this subject 1) the provision of trained men
was ludicrously small-there were just five officers of Royal
Engineers Z with the army, and eight' Royal Military Artificers'.
The volunteers from the Line, both officers and men, used as
auxiliaries, were not up to the work required of them. It was
a misfortune that none of the divisions before Burgos had
experience of siege-work, like that which thc Light, 3rd, and
4th Divisions (all left at Madrid) had been through.
(4) After the hcavy losses in the early assaults the rank
and file, both thc British and still more the Portuguese, were
much discouraged. As Burgoyne says, • the place might have
been, and ought to have been, taken if every one had done his
duty S.' In the actual assaults splendid courage was often
displayed, but in the trench-work there was much sulkiness,
apathy, and e....en shirking.• Our undertaking, every night that
• Sce vol. v. pp. 2M-6.
• Durgoyne commanding, John Jones the hi&torian, Captain WiIliams,
Ilnd Lieutenants Pitts and Reid.
• Burgoync, i. p. 230.
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we broke ground, appeared most pitiful: there was scarcely
a single instance where at least double the work was not pro-
jected, with sufficient men and tools collected, that was after-
wards executed, owing to the neglect and misconduct of the
working parties. It was seldom that the men could be induced
to take out their gabions and set to work, and I myself placed
at different times hundreds of gabions with my own hands,
and then e-nlreaied the men to go and fill them, to no purpose.'
The engineers blamed the men-the men blamed the engineers,
who, as they grumbled, were by unskilful direction' sending
them out to be butchered1: All this, in the end, was due to
the want of artillery for proper preparation, and of trained
sappers.
(5) Burgoyne, D'Urban, and otherobservers are probably right
in saying that the failure of the assaults was partly due to the
bad principle of composing the storming-parties of drafts from
many different corps, collected, under officers whom they did
not personally know, from the units that chanced to be on
duty that day. The onc case where a brilliant success was
scored with small loss, was seen whcn a whole battalion, the
2/24th, carried the outer encei.nle on Oetobcr 4.
(6) Wellington's doubts, expressed almost from the first, as
to the practicability of the affair that he had taken in hand,
were known to many officers, and affected the gencral morale.
(7) Dubrewn deserves unstinted praise. A general of more
ordinary type, such as Barrois at Ciudad Rodrigo, would have
lost Burgos for want of the extraordinary resourcefulness,
determination, and quick decision shown by this admirable
governor. His garrison must share his glory: the French 34th
certainly got in this siege a good revanche for their last military
experience, the surprise of AlToyo dos Molinos.
1 Ibid., i. p. 238. Thcre i.. much more in this interesting page 01
Burgoync's explanation of thc failure, which I havc not space to quote.
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SECTION XXXIV: CHAPTER In
WELL1NGTQN'S RETREAT FROM BURGOS: OCTOBER-
NOVEMBER ]812. (1) FROM THE ARLA..'iZON TO THE
DOURO: OCTOBER 22-0CTODER 30
HA vlxn completed the depressing chronicle of the leaguer
of the Castle of Burgos, it is necessary that we should turn back
for a week or two, to examine the changing aspect of external
nfCnirs, which had affected the general strategical position in
Spain while the siege lingered on. It will be remembered that
the original scheme for the campaign had been that, after the
Army of Portugal bad been pushed back to the Ebro. a great
part of Wellington's field force should retun! to Madrid, to
pick up the divisions left there, and the corps of Hill, before
Soult and King Joseph should begin to give trouble on the side
of Valencia. Only a containing force was to have been left
behind, to aid Castaiios and his Gnlicians in keeping Clausel
(or his successor Souham) out of mischief, whilc more im-
portant movcmcnts wcrc on foot ill Ncw Castile 1. As to the
command of this containing force there was a difficulty:
Wellington was not at all satisfied with the way in which
CHnton had handled the troops left on the Douro in August,
and it seems doubtful whether he wished to give him a far
more important commission in the first hnlf of October, when
he was the natural person to be chosen for it. For at this time
nOllC of thc other senior officers who had served in the recent
coonpaigns werc available: Bercsford, Stapleton Cotton, and
Picton were all three invalided at the moment. Grabam, the
best of them all, had returned to England. Hill could not be
removed from the charge of his old army in the South. Of the
five divisions before Burgos four were commanded by brigadiers
acting in the position of lOClu1t tenens 2: most of the brigades
• See above, pp. 3--4•
• l)ringle was commanding the 5th Division (Leith being wounded);
Dernewitz the 7th (Hope having gone home sick on Selltember 28): Camp·
bell, in charge of the 1st since Grnham waa invalided, was orr duty himself
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were, in a similar fashion, being worked by colonels for want of
a sufficient number of major-generals to go round. But after
October 11th the formal difficulty was solved: there was now
available an offieer whom it· was fitting to leave in charge against
Souham, viz. Sir Edward Paget. who came up to the front on
that day, after having been three years absent from the Penin-
sula j he had last served under Wellington at the Passage of the
Douro in 1800, where he lost an arm. He had now come out
nominally to s.uccecd Graham at the head of thc 1st Division.
but also with the commission to act. as second-in-command in
the· event of the illn.css or disabling of thc general-in-chief.
Paget was known as a good soldier, and had served with dis-
tinction during the Coruona retreat; but he had never been
trusted with the management of a large force, and had little
knowledge cither of the army which Wellington had trained,
or of the parts of Spain in which the campaign was now going
on. Moreover, Wellington disliked on principle the idea of
having a second-in-command, occupying to a certain extent
a position independent of his own.
The separate containing force never came into existence.
because Wellington never left the North or returned to Madrid,
though rumours were afloat after Paget's arrival that hc was
about to do so without delay. Why. contrary to his own ex-
pressed intentions did he never go South? The answer must
certainly be that down to a very late period of the siege he
continued to keep in his mind the idea of returning to Madrid I.
but that he was distracted from his purpose by several con.
siderations. The first was the abominable weather in October,
which made the prospect of a long forced march distasteful-the
army was sickly a~d would suffer. 'l'he second was his in-
sufficient realization of the nearness of the danger in the South.
he thought that Hill was in a less perilous position than was
actually the case. The third was that he was beginning to mark
the growing strength of the Army of Portugal, which lay in his
own front, and to see that he could not hope to ' contain' it by
any mere detachment. if he departed for the South with his
for illness when re.lievod by Paget. Book oomnw.nded the Cavalry Division
vice StupletoD Cotton, wounded a~ Sullunanca.
I Clearly e"pressed in lettel'8 as late as that to Bill or October 12.
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main body. Souham's host was no longer a spent force, which
eould be ignored as a source of danger; if Wellington took
away two or three divisions, the officer left in charge in the
North would be at once assailed by very superior numbers.
He did not like the idea of trusting either Clinton or Paget with
the conduct of a retreat before an enemy who would certainly
press him fiercely. In addition, there was the lingering hope that
Burgos might fall: if it were captured the situation would be
much improved, since the allies could use it as a sort of p<rint
d'appui-to use the terminology of the day-on which the con-
taining army could rest: and the enemy would be forced to
detach heavily for the investment of the place.
By the day of the last assault (October 18) Wellington had,
clearly lingered too long, for very large reinforcements had just
come up to join Souham, who on that morning was in a position
to evict from before Burgos not only any mere' covering for(.'e '
that might be left opposite him, hut the whole 85,000 men
which formed the total of the allied host. For by now the Army
of Portugal was recruited up to a strength of 88,000 men present
with the colours: it had also just received the disposable bat-
talions of the Bayonnc Reserve, 0. strong brigade of 8,500 men
under General Aussenae, and what was more important still-
Cafiarelli had appeared at Briviesca with the main field-force
of the Army of the North. The operations of Home Popham,
Me~di7.abal, Mina and Longa, which had detained and con-
fused the French troops in Biscay and Nava.rre for the whole
summer, had at last reached their limits of success, and having
patched up artairs on the coast, and left some 20,000 men to
hold the garrison places, and to curb the further raids of the
British eommod.ore and the Spanish bands, Caffarelli had come
southwards with the whole of his cavalry-l,600 snbres,-three
batteries, and nearly 10,000 infantry, forming the greater part
of the divisions of Vandermaesen and Dumoustier. There were
something like 50,000 French (.'Oncentra.ted between Pancorbo
and Briviesea on October 18th', while Wellington-allowing
, Viz. (ftgUre6 of the Imperinl Muster Rolls (or October 15) Anny of
Portugal 32,000 infantry, 3,400 cavalry: Army of the North: Chau,"c)'s
oovalry brigade (lent to the Army of Portugal since .July) 700 l;sbrelll,
LlIfcrri~re'8 clIvalry brigade 1,600 sabres, parts 01 AbW'9 IInd DumoUllticr's
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for his losses ill the siege-had not more than 24,000 Anglo-
Portuguese and 11,000 Spaniards in hand. The arrival of the
Army of the North not only made the further continuance of the
siege of Burgos impossible, but placed Wellington in 0. condition
of great danger. It is clear that his campaign in the North had
only been able to continue for so IOl)g as it did because Popho.m,
1\lina, and the Cantabrian bands had kept CaHarelli employed
for a timc that exceeded all reasonable expectation. It was
rcally surprising that a small squadron and 10,000 half-organ-
ized troops, of whom a large part were undisciplined gucrrillero
bands, and the rest not much better, should have held thc
87,000 men of the Army of the North in play for three months.
But thc combination of a mobile naval force, and of local levies
who knew every goat-path of their native mountains, had
proved cfficacious in the extreme. It had taken Ca{farelli the
whole summer and much of thc autumn to vindicate his
position, and recover the more important strategical points in
his wide domain. Even when he was marching on Burgos there
was fierce fighting going on rowld Pampc1una, on which 1\lilla
had pressed in morc closely whcn he heard of the departure
of the general-in-ehief. The Cantabrians and Navarrese did
marvels for Wellington, and their work has never been properly
acknowledged by British w.riters.
It is clear that the whole situation would have been different
if Wellington had brought up to the North in September the
16,000 veteran British troops left at 1Iladrid. For want of them
he was in a state of hopeless inferiority, to his immediate oppo-
nents. And yet at the same time they were useless at Madrid,
because I{ill--even with their aid-was not nearly strong enough
to keep Soult and King Joseph in check. Wellington had in all
at this time some 55,000 Anglo-Portuguese troops under arms
and at the front; but they wet;e so dispersed that on both
divisions 9,500 infantry. Allowing another 2,000 for artillery, sappel'll, &c.,
the wtaJ ffiUl:it have reached 53,000. Bclmas says that CatrareUi and
Souham had only 41,000 men. Napier glve!I them 44,000. 80th these
f1gure!l are faf too low. No one deniell that Caffarelii brought up about
10,000 mcn; and the Anny of Portugal, by the return of October 15, had
45,000 effective9, from whom there are only to be deducted the men of the
artillery park and the' equipages militaires.' It must have taken forward
40,000 of ullarms. See tablC!l of October 15 in Appendix 11.
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theatres of war he was inferior to his enemies. He had 24,000
himself in Old Castile-Hill some 81,000 in New Castile; each
of the two halves of the army could count on the help of some
10,000 or 12,000 Spaniards 1. But of what avail were the 35,000
men of all nations at Burgos against the 50,000 French under
Souham and Caltarclli, or the 48,000 men of all nations near
Madrid against the 60,000 of Soult and the King? The whole
situation would have been different if a superiority or even an
equality of numbers had been established against onc of the
two French armies j and it is clear that such a c.'Ombillation
could have been contrived, if Wellington had adopted other
plans.
There can be no doubt that the excessive tardiness of 50ult's
evacuation of Andalusia was the fact which caused the unlucky
distribution of Wellington's forces in October. The Marshal,
it will be remembered, only left Granada on September 16th,
and did not come into touch with the outlying cavalry of the
Valencian Army till September 29-80, or reach Almanza, where
he was in full connexion with Suchet and King Joseph, till
October 2, There was, thcrefore, no threatening combination
of enemies on the Valencia side till thirtccn days after the siege
of Burl,1Os had begun; and Wellil~gtondid not know that it had
L'Ome into existence till October 9th, when he received a dis-
patch from Hill informing him that the long foreseen, but long
deferred, junction had taken place. If it had oceurred--as it
well might have-three weeks earlier, there would have been
no sicge of Burgos, and Wellington would have been at Madrid,
after having contented himself with Kriving the army of P~rtu­
gal beyond the Douro. It is probable that he would have dOlle
well, even at so late a date as October 9th,'if he had recognized
that the danger in front of Madrid was now pressing, and had
abandoned the siege of Burgos, in order to make newarrange-
ments. Souham was not yet in a condition to press him, and
Caffarelli's 10,000 men had not arrived on the scene. But the
last twelve days spent before Burgos ruined his chances.
, Wellington on the 11,000 Galicians, Hill on C.arlos de ESpaU8 (4,000
men), Penile ViUemut and MuriIJo (3,500 men), and the l\Iuroilul remmmts
under Fleire and Elio, which got separated from the Alicante section 01
their Army nnd cnme unJcr Hill's charge, nbout 6,000. ,
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On getting Hill's dispatch Wellington pondered much-
but came to an unhappy decision. In his reply he wrote, • I
cannot believe that Soult and the King can venture to move
forward to attack you in the position on the Tagus, without
having possession of the fortresses in the province of Murein
[Cartagena and Chinchilla} and of Alicante ;-unless indeed they
propose to give up Valencia entirely. They would in that case 1
bring with them a most overwhelming force, and you would
probably have to retire in the direction given to General Alten
[i.e. by the Guadarrnma Pass, ViIlaCastin, and Arevalo] and I
should then join you on thc Adaja. If you retire in that direc-
tion, destroy the new bridge at Almaraz.... I write this, as
I always do, to provide for every evcnt, not believing that these
instructions arc at all nccessary 2.'
In a supplementary letter, dated two days later, Wellington
tells Hill that he imagines that the autumn rains, which ha ve
made the siege ofBurgos so diJneult, will probably have rendered
the rivers of the South impassable. 'I should think that you
will have the Tagus in such a state as to feel in no apprehension
in regard to the enemy's operations, be his numben what they
may 3: Y<;t though he does not consider the danger in the
South immediate or pressing, he acknowledges that he ought
to bring the siege of Burgos to an end, even though it be
necessary to raise it, and to give up the hope of its capture.
But the continual storms and rains induced him to delay his
departure toward the South; 'I shaH do so as soon as the
weather holds up a little.' On the same dny (October 12) he
wrote to Popham to say that ifhe had to march towards Madrid,
he expected that Souham would follow him, but that Caffnrelli
must on no account be allowed to accompany Souham. At all
costs more trouble must be made in Cantabria and Biscay, to
prevent the Army of the North from moving. Popham must
not withdraw his squadron, or cease from stimulating the
Northern insurgents '. Wellington was not aware that Carlo.-
I i. e. iC they brought up Suehet'lI troopll from Valencia, beaide their own
armies. '
• Wellington to Hill, October 10. Di$palchu, ix. p. 82,
• Wellington to Hill, Ocwber 12. Ibid., p. 485.
• Wellington to Poph,un, Octoller 12. Ibid., p. 486.
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relli was ab'eadyon the move, and that the diversion in the North
-through no fault of the officers in charge of it-had reached
its limit of success. .
The moment had now arrived at which it was necessary at
all costs 'to come to some decision as to the movements of the
Army at Durgos, for CallareUi (though Wellington knew it not)
had started for Briviesca, while Soult and King Joseph were
also getting ready for an immediate advance on Madrid, which
must bring matters in the South to a head. But relying on
letters from Hill, dated October 10th, which stated that there
was still no signs of movement opposite him, Wellington
resolved on October 14 to stay yet another week in the North,
and try his final assault on Burgos; it came off with no success
(as will be remembered) on the 18th of that month. He was
not blind to thc possible Consequences to Hill of a prompt
advance of the Freneh armies from Valencia, but he persuaded
himself that the weather would make it difficult, and that he
had means of detaining Soult and Joseph, if they should, after
all, begin the move which he doubted that they proposed to
make.
The scheme for stopping llny forward march on thc part of
the French had two sections. The first was to be executed by
the .Anglo-Spanish Army at AJicantc. Maitland had fallen
sick, and this force of some 16,000 men was now under the
eharge of General John Mackenzie. To this officer Wellington
wrote on October 18th: • In case the enemy should advance from
Valencia into La Mancha, with a view to attack our troops on
thc Tagus, you must endcavour to obtain possession of the town
and kingdom of Valencia.' He was given the option of march-
ing by land from Alieantc, or of putting his men on shipboard
and making a descent from the sea on Valencia J. The second
diversion was to be executed by Ballasteros and the Army of
Andalusia. Wellington wrote to him that he should advllnce from
Granada, cross the Sierra Morena with all. his available strength, '
and place himself at Alcaraz in La Mancha '. He ought to have
at least 12,000 men, as some of the Cndiz troops were coming up
I \Vellington to Mackenzie, October 13. Dispakhtl1, ix. p. 487.
• See Wellington to Hill of October H, and Wellington to Popham of
October 17. Ibid., pp. 400 and 405.
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to join him. Such a force, if placed on the flank of Soult and
the King, when they should move forward for Almanza and
Albacete, could not be ignored. And Wellington hoped to
reinforce Ballasteros with that part of the Murcian Army, under
Elio and Freire, which had got separated from the Alicante
force, and had fallen back into the inland. There we.re alflo
irregular bodies, such as the division of the Empecinado, which
could be called in to join, and if 20,000 men lay at Alearaz,
Soult could not go in full force to assail Hill in front of Madrid.
He must makc such a large dctachment to watch the Spaniards
that he would not have more than 80,000 or 85,000 men to
make the frontal attack on the Anglo-Portuguese force, which
would defend the line of the Tagus. Against sueh numbers Hill
could easily hold his ground.
It may be objected to these schemes that they did not allow
sufficient consideration to the power of Suchet in Valencia.
Mackenzic's forcc, of a very heterogeneous kind, was not capable
of driving in the detachments of the Army of Aragon, which
still lay cantoned along the Xucar, facing the Allies at Alicante.
Suchet was able to hold his own, without detaining any of the
troops of Soult or of King Joseph from their advance upon
Madrid. Mackenzie's projected expedition against the city of
Valencia had no chance of putting a check upon the main
manreuvre that the Freneh had in hand.
But thc use of Ballasteros, whose movement must certainly
have exercised an immensc restraining power upon Soult and
King Joseph, if only it had been carried out, was an experiment
of a kind which Wellington had tried before, nearly always with
disappointing results. To entrust to a Spanish general an essen-
tial part of a wide strategical plan had proved ere now a doubt·
ful expedient. And Ballasteros had always shown himself self·
willed if energetic; it was dangerous to reckon upon him as
a loyal and intelligent assistant in the great game. And at this
moment the captain-general of Andalusia was in the most per-
verse of moods. His ill temper was caused by the recent
appointment of Wellington as commander-in-chief of all the
Spanish armies, a measure to which the Cartes had at last
oonsented, after the consequences of the battle of Salamanca
and the occupation of Madrid had prepared public opinion for
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this momentous step. It had been bitterly opposed at the
secret session when it was brought forward, but there could no
longer be any valid excuse for putting oil the obviously neces-
sary policy of combining all military eUort in the Peninsula,
by placing the control of the whole of the Spanish armies in the
hands of one who had shown himself such a master of the art
of war.
Wellington's nomination as Generalissimo of the Spanish
armies had been voted by the Cartes 011 September 22nd, and
conveyed to him before Burgos on October 2nd. He had every
intention of accepting the offer, though (as he wrote to his
brother Henry I) the change in his position would not be so
great in reality as in form, since Cnstaiios and most of the
other Spanish ","Coccals had of late becn wont to consult him
01L their movemcnts, and generally to fall in with his views.
Thcre had bcen exceptions, evcn of late, such as Joseph
Q'Donnell's gratuitous forcing on of battle at Castalla, when he
had been specially asked to hold hack till the Anglo-Sicilian
expedition began to work upon the East Coast. But it would
certainly be advantageous that, for the future, he should be
able to issue orders instead of advice. Meanwhile he could
not formally aeeept the post ·of general-ill-chief without the
official leave of the Prin<.'C Regent, and prompt information of
the oUer and a request for pcrmission to acccpt it, were sent
to London. The Cortes, foreseeing the necessary delay, had
refrained from publishing the decree till it should be certain
that Wellington was prepared to assume the position that
was oUered him. But the fact soon became known in Cadiz,
and was opcnly spoken of in the public press. Wellington
continued to write only lctters of advice to the Spanish
generals, and did not assume the tone of a eommallder-in-
chief as yet, but his advice had already a more binding force.
There was no opposition made to him, save in onc quarter-
but that was the most important one. Ballnsteros, as Com-
mander of the 4th Army and Captain-Gencral of Andalusio.,
burst out into open revolt ago.inst the Cortes, the Regency, and
the commander-iu-chief elect.
This busy and ambitious man had taken up his abode in
, DifptJUhu, lx. p••07.
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Granada, a~ter SmIlt's departure on September 23rd, and since
then had not stirred, thongh Wellington had repeatedly Q.<;ked
him to advance into La P.rancha with his available force, and
to put himself in touch with Etio, Penne Villemur, and Hill.
But Bullasteros was suCCering from an acute attack of megalo-
mania: after years of skulking in the mountains and forced
marches, he was now in the position of a viceroy commanding
the resources. of a great province. Though Andalusia. bad
been cleared of the Frcneh ~y no merit of" his, but as a side·
effect of the. battle of Salamanca, he gave himself the airs of
a conqueror and delivcrer, and fully believed himself to be
the most important person in Spain. As an acute observer
remarked, •Ballasteros wanted to begin where Bonaparte ended,
by seizing supreme authority, though he had performed no
such services for his fatherland as thc Frcnch general. He
spared ilO errort to attach his army to his person, and to win
its favour sacrificed without hesitation the whole civil popula·
tion. The land was drained of all resources, but he found new
means of extorting money. His officers went from tovm to
town exacting a so-called .. voluntary contribution" for the
army. Those who gave much were put in his white book as
patriots-those who did not were enrolled in his black book
as supporters of King Joseph. He wanted to collect all the
troops in Andalusia into a great army, with himself as com·
mander. But the Regency directed him, in accordance with
Wellington's .adviee, to march nt once with the troops imme-
diately availnble and take post in La Mancha 1.'
Then came the news of Vt'ellington's nomination as com-
mander-in-chief. Ballastcros thought the momcnt fa....ourable
for. an open bid for the dictalorship. Instcad of obeying thc
orders sent, he issued on October 28rd a manifeslo directed to
the Regency, in whiehhe declared that Wcllingooll'sappointment
to supremc power was an insult to the Spanish nation, and
espccially to the Spanish Army. He openly contemned the
decree, as dishonourable and debasing-5paniards should never
bcCQmc like Portugucse the servants of the foreigner. If-
what he could not believe-the national army and the nation
itself should ratify such an appointment, he himself would
, Schcpdcr, pp. 67:H1.
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throw up his post and retire to his home. At the same time
there was an outburst of pamphlets and newspaper articles
inspired by him, stating that England was to be feared as an
oppressor no less than France; and all sorts of absurd rumours
were put about as to the intentions of the British Government
and the servility of the Cortes.
Ballasteros, however, had altogether mistaken his own
importance and popularity: budding Bonapartes must be able
to rely on their own troops, and he-as the event showed-
could not. The Cartes took prompt measures for his suppression:
one Colonel Rivera, a well-known Liberal, was sent secretly to
Granada to bear to Virues, the second in command of the
4th Army, orders to arrest his chief, and place him in con-
finement. And this was done without any difficulty, so
unfounded was the confidence which Ballasteros had placed
in his omnipotence with the army. Virues and the Prince of
Anglona, his two divisional generals, carried out the arrest in
the simplest fashion. On the morning of October 30th they
ordered out their troops for a field day on the Aleala road,
save a battalion of the Spanish Guards, who had not belonged
to Ballasteros's old army, and had no affection for him. This
regiment surrounded IUs residence, and when he issued out the
picquct refused him passage, and Colonel Rivera presented
him with the warrant for his arrest. There was some little
stir in Granada among the eivil population, but the army
made no movement when Virues read the decree of the Cortes
to them. BefOl:e he well understood what had happened,
Ballasteros was on his way under a guard to the African
fortress of Ceuta. lIe was afterwards given Fregcnal in
Estremadura as the place of his detention.
But all this happened on October 80th, and meanwhile the
Army of Andalusia had remained motionless, though Wellington
had believed that it had marched for La 1\lancha as early as
October 5th 1. Nearly a month had been lost by Ballasteros's
1 WeUington to Hill, October li. Di$patdiu, ix. p. 460: • I do not write
to General Ballasteros, because I do not know exactly where he is: but
I believe he is at Alcaraz. At least I understand he was ordered thcre
[by the Regency). Tell him to hang upon the leU Dank and rear ot the
enemy. ifthey move by Albacete toward the Tagus.'
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perversity, and whcn he was finally arrestcd and his troops
became available, it was too late; for Hill had been forced to
retreat, and Madrid was about to fall into the hands of the French,
who had advanced through La Mancha unmolested. The Fourth
Army WllS put under the command of the Duke del Parque,
the victor of Tamames, but the vanquished of Alba de Tormes
in the cnmpnign of 1809. It marched early in November to its
appointed position at Alcaraz; butit was of no use to haveit there
when the enemy had changed all his positions, and had driven Hill
beyond the Guadarrama into the valley of the Douro.
Wellington's arrangements for the defence of Madrid were
therefore insufficient as the event proved, for three reasons. The
diversion from Alicante was too weak-5uchet alone was able
to keep Maitland in check. The main Spanish force which was
to have co-operated. with Hill never put in an appearance,
thanks to the disloyal perversity of its general. And, thirdly,
the autumn mins, which had so incommoded Wellington before
Burgos, turned out to be late and scanty in New Castile. The
Tagus and its affIuents remained low and fordable almost
everywhere.
As late as the 17th October Wellington had no fears about
Hill's position. The probability that the enemy from Valencia
would advance upon Madrid, as he wrote on that morning,
seemed diminishing day by day-reinforcements were coming
up from the South to Hill, and Bnllasteros wus believed to be
already posted in La Mancha, 'which renders the enemy's
movement UpOll the Tagus very improbable ,,' On the 19th,
when llis last assault on the Castle of Burgos had just been
beaten ofr, and he was thinking of retreat, came much less
satisfactory news from Hill. The enemy seemed to be drawing
together: they had laid siege to the Castle of Chinchilla, and
it was not impossible that they were aiming at Madrid, perhaps
only with a view of forcing the abandonment of the siege of
Burgos, perhaps with serio';ls offensive intention. If so, Welling·
ton might be caught with not one but both of the halves of his
army exposed to immediate attack by a superior enemy, wbo
was just assuming the offensive. And the total force of the
French was appalling-50,OOO men on the Northern field of
1 Wellington 10 l'opluun. ~ht8, br. p. 4.94.
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operations, 60,000 on the other-while the united strength of
all the available troops under Wellington's orders was about
80,000, of whom 25,000 were Spaniards, whose previous record
was not in many cases reassuring. He had often warned the
ministers at home that if the French evacuated outlying pro-
vinces, and collected in great masses, they were too many Cor
him 1. But that ever-possible event had been so long delayed,
that Wellington had gone on, with a healthy and cheerful
opportunism, facing the actual situation of affairs without
taking too much thought for the morrow. Now the conjunction
least to be desired appeared to be at length coming into practical
existence and it remained 00 be seen what could be done.
As for his own army, there was no doubt that prompt retreat,
first beyond the Pisucrga, then beyond the Douro, was necessary.
Souharn had already made his first preliminary forward move-
ment. On the evening ofOetobcr 18th a strong advance guard,
consisting of a brigade of Maucune's division, pushed in upon
the front of the allied army at the village of Santa Olalla, and
surprised there the outlying picket of an officer and thirty men
of the Brunswiek·Oels, who were nearly all taken prisoners. The
heights abo\'e this place commanded the toWIl of 1'IIonasterio,
wherefore Wellington directed it to be evacuated, and drew
in its line to a position slightly nearer Burgos, for it was clear
that there were heavy forces behind thc brigade which had
formed the French attacking force 3.
On the 19th he was in order of battle with all his army except
the troops left before Burgos-Pack's Portuguese, a brigade
of the 6th Division, and three weak battalions from the 1st
Division. The position extended from lbeas on the Arlanzon,
. through Riobcna to Soto Palaeios, and was manned by the
1st, 5th, and nh Divisions, two brigades oC the 6th, Brad-
ford's Portuguese, Castafios's Galieians, and all the cavalry
-about 30,000 men. Wellington expected to be attacked on
the 20th, and was not prepared to give back till he had ascer-
tained what force was in his front. Be knew that the Army oC
I Sce above, pp. 1-2.
I Wellington says in his Dispatch to L<trd BathUM 01 October 26 that
the Brunswick officer disobeyed orders, and Wll8 !.liken because he did not
retire at once, IUl directed.
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Portugal had been reinforced, but was not sure whether the
report that Callu.relli had come up with a large portion of the
Army of the North was correct or no.
Souham's movement on the 18th had been intended as the
commencement of a general advance: he brought up his whole
force to Monnstcrio, and hc would have attacked on thc 20th
if be had not received, before daybreak, and long ere his troops
were under way, -a much·dclayed dispatch from King Joseph.
It informed him that the whole mass of troops from Valencia was
on the march for Madrid, that this movement would force
Wellington to abandon the siege of Burgos and to fall 'back,
Rnd that he was therefore not to risk a gencral action, but to
advancc with caution, and pursuc the allied force in front of him
so soon as it should begin to rctreat, when it might be pressed
with advantage.1 He was to be prepared to link his advance
with thatof thc armies frorn the South, which would havecolurnns
in the direction of Cuenea. 'Souham was discontented with the
gist of this dispatch, sinee he had his whole army assembled,
while Caffarelli was close behind, within supporting distance,
at Briviesc<'l.. He thought that he could have fought with advan-
tage, and was probably right, since he and Caffarelli had It
marked superiority of numbers, though Wellington's positions
were strong.
Balked of the battle that he desired, he resolved to make
a very stron.g reconnaissance agail!.st the allied centre, to see
whether the enemy might already be contemplating retreat,
and might consent to be pushed back, and to abandon Burgos.
This reconnaissance was conducted by Maucunc's and Chauvcl's
(late Bonnet's) divisions and a brigade of light cavalry: it was
directed against Wellington's centre, in front of the villages of
Quintana PaUa and Dlmos, where the 7th division was posted.
Maucune's troops, forming the front line of the French, were
hotly engaged in tllis direction, when Wellington, seeing that the
main body of thc encmy was very remote, and that the two
vanguard divisions had ventured far forward into his growld,
directed Sir Edward Paget with the 1st and 5th divisions-
fonning his own left wing-to swing forward by a diagonal
movement and take Maucune in flank. The French general
Souhll.ffi to Cla.rke, October 22.
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discovered the approaching force only just in time, and re·
treated in great haste across the fields, without calling in his
tirailleurs or forming any regular order of march. Each regi-
ment- made oll by its own way, just early enough to escape
Paget's turning movement. The British horse artillery arrived
only in time to shell the last battalions; the infantry was too
far orf to reach them. Dusk fell at this moment, and Pagct
halted: if there had been onc hour more of daylight l'tfaucune
and Chauvcl would have been in all evil case, for they were still
some distance from their own main body on the l\Ionasterio
position, and the British cavalry was coming up in haste. The
reconnaissance had been pushed recklessly and too far-in
p.ccordance with the usual conduct of :Maucune, who was (as
his conduct at Salamanca had proved) a gallant but a very
rash leader. The losses on both sides were trifling-apparently
about 80 in the French ranks 1,and 41 in the British 7th division.
Paget's troops did not come under fire.
On the morning of the 21st Wellington received a letter of
Hill's, written on the 17th, which made it clear to him that he
must delay no longer. It reported that the enemy were very
clearly on the move--the whole of Drouet's corps was coming
fonvard from Albaeete, the enstle of Chinchilla had follen into
the hands of the French on a.et. 9th, and-what was the most
discomposing to lcarn-Ballastcros had failcd to advancc into
La Maneha: by the last accounts hc was still at Granada.
He would certainly come too late, if he came at all. The only
compensating piece of good news was that Skettett's brigade
from Cndiz was at last near at hand, and would reach Talavcra
011 the 20th. Elio, from his forward position at ViIIllres,
reported that Suehet's troops opposite Alieante were drawing
baek towards Valencia; possibly they were about to join Soult
and King ,Toseph, who were evidently' coming forward. Hill
was inclined to sum up the news as follows: • The King, Soult,
and Suchet having united their armies are on the frontiers of
Mureia and Valencia, and appear to be moving this way. It is
I Thlsls the Ogure given by Colonel D~chaud in his interesting narrative
or the doings of Maucune's division (tludu Napolfonunnu, Il. p. 308),
Martinicn's lins show 3 casualties of officers only, all' in the 86th of
i\Iaucune's division.
18121 THE FIRST DAY'S RETREAT. 67
certain that a considerable force is advancing toward Madrid,
hut I think it doubtful whether they will attempt to force their
way to the capital.' Mean'\vhile he had, as a precautionary
measure, brought up the troops in cantonments round Madrid
to Aranjuez and its neighbourhood, and had ,thrown forward
a cavalry screen beyond the Tagus, to watch alike the roads
from Albacete and those from Cuenca.
The mere possibility that Soult and the King were advancing
on Madrid was enough to move We!lington to instant retreat:
if he waited for certainty, he might be too late. And his own
position in front of Souham and Caffarelli was dangerous enough,
even if no more bad news from the South should come to hand.
Accordingly on the afternoon of the 21st orders were sent to
Pack to prepare to raise the siege of Burgos, ~vhen thc main
army in its backward movement should have passed him. The
baggage was to be seut oU, the stores removed or burned in the
following night. The aivisiollS in line opposite Souham were to
mOveRway, after lighting eamp fires to delude the enemy, in two
main columns; one on cach side of the ArlanzOIl. The northern
column, composed of the 5th Division, two-thirds of the Galician
infantry, the heavy dragoons of Ponsonby (late Le Marehant's
brigade) and the handful of Spanish regular cavalry, was to
skirt the northern side of the city of Burgos, using the cross·
roads by Bivar and Quilltana Duenos, and to retire to Tardajos,
beside the Urbel river. The southern and larger column,
consisting of the 1st, 7th, and 6th Divisions (marching in that
order), of Bradford's Portuguese and the remainder of the
Galieians, was to move by the high road through Villa -Fria, to
cross thc town-bridge of Burgos (with special caution' that
silencc must be observed, so as not to alarm the garrison of the
Castle) to Frandovinez and Villa de Buniel. Here they would be
in touch with the other column, which was to be only two miles
away at Tardajos. Anson's cavalry brigade was to cover the rear
of this column, only abandoning the outposts when the infantry
should have got far forward. They were to keep the old picquet-
line tiD three in the morning. Bock's German dragoons and
the cavalry of JuIian Sanehez formed a flank guard for the
southern column: they were to cross thc Arlanzon at Ibeas,
five miles east of Burgos, and to retire parallel to the infantry
F'
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line of march, by a circuit on cross-roads south of Burgos, finally
joining the main body at Villa de Buniel 1•
All this complicated set of movements WilS carried out with
complete success: the army got away without arousing the
attention of the French of Souham, and the column which
crossed the bridge of.Burgos, Wldcr the cannon of the Castle!,
wus never dek'Ctcd, till a Spall.iS~l guerrilla. party galloped noisily
across the ~toncs and drew some harmless shots. Since the
enemy was alarmed, the rear of the column had to take a side-
path. Pack filed off the troops in the trenches. and got away
quietly from the investment line. In the morning the two
infantry columns were safely concentrated within two miles
of each other at Tardajos and Villa de Runicl. There being no
sign of pursuit, they were allowed some hours' rest in these
positions, and thpn resumed their retreat, the northern colwnn
leading, with the 5th Division at its head, the southern column
following, and falling into the main road by crossing the bridge
ofBnniel. The7th Division formed the rearguard of the infantry;
it was followed by Boek's dragoons, Anson and Julian Sanehez
bringing up the rear. On the night of the 22nd the army bivou-
acked along the road nboutCe1ada, Villapcquei'ia, and Homillos ;
the light cavalry, far behind, were still observing the passages
of the Arlanzon at BUlliel and of the Urbcl at Tardajos.
The Freneh pursuit was not urged with any vigour on this
day. The departure of Wellington had only been discovered
in the curly morning hours by the dying down of the cump fires
along his old position 3. At dawn Souham ndvaneed with
caution; finding nothing in front of it, his vanguard under
Maueune entered Burgos about 10 o'clock in the morning, and
exchanged congratulations with Dubreton and his gallant
garrison. The light cavalry of the Army of Portugal pw;hed out
along the roads north and south of the ArlanZOll: those on the
right bank found the three broken IS-pounders of Wellington's
battering train a few miles ouUiide of Burgos, and went as far
1 For d.ctaib see Wellington's Ordcr of Mareh in Supplel1W1tary DU·'
pauhu, xiv. pp. 144--5•
• The whccls of the artillery were all mumcd with straw. Tuc cavalry
went at a walk.
I So Coloncl Bc:ehaud's nnrrative, quoted above, and moot valuable for
all this retreat.
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as the Urbel, where they came on the rear vedettes of the Allies.
Those on the left bank obtained touch with Anson's ouUying
piequet at San Mames, and drove it back to the Bunicl bridge.
The 23rd October, however, was to be a day of a much more
lively sort. Souham and CalCarelli, having debouehed from
Burgos, brought all their numerous cavalry to the front, and at
dawn it was coming up for the pursuit, in immense strength.
There were present of the Army of Portugal Curto's light horse,
Boyer's dragoons, and the brigade formerly commanded by
Chauvel now under CoIOl~cl j\lcrlill of the 1st Hussars. These,
by the morning state of October 15th, made up 4,300 sabres.
The Army of the North contributed the bulk of its one-but
verypowerful-eavalry brigade, that of Laferrierc, 1,650 strong.!
Thus there were nearly 6,000 veteran horsemen hurrying on to
molest 'Wellington's renr, where the covering force only con·
sisted of Anson's and Bock's two brigades and of the lancers of
Julian Sanchez-l,SOO dragoons British and German 2, and
1,000 Spaniards admirnble for raids and ambushes but not fit
to be placed in battle line. Ponsonby's dragoons and the regular
squadrons of the Galician army were far away with the head of
the column. To support thc cavalry screen were the two horse-
artillery batteries of Downmall and Bull, and the two Light
Battalions of the German Legion from the 7th Division, under
Colonel Halkett, which were left behind us the extreme rear·
guard of the infantry.
All day the main marching column of the allied army
laboured forward unmolested along the muddy high road from
Celndo. del Camino to 'forquClllnda, a very long stage of some
26 miles: Wellington seldom asked his infantry to make such
an effort. What would have happened to Clausel's army if the
• The!1C figures look very large-and exceed Napier's estimate of
1>,000 sa.bres. Dut I can only give the strength of the French official
returos, viz. Curto's divisiou 2,163, Boycr's division 1,373, l\[erlin's
brigade 746, Laferrillre's brigade 1,002; total 5.944. All these units were
engaged that day, as the French narmtive shows,except that 4 only of the
o squndrons of gclldamlcrie in Lnferrillre'" brigade were at the front•
• OWing to losses at Garein Hernnndcz nnd Majndnhondn thc Gennall9
were only 4 squadrons, under 450 efl'ective sabres. The Light Dragoons
of Anson, nil three regimentll down to 2-squadron strength, made up
aoout 800.
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British had marched at this rate in the week that followed the
battle of Salamanca? Behind the infantry column, however,
the squadrons of the rearguard were fighting hard all day long, to
secure an unmolested retreat for their comrades. This was the
most harassing and onc of the most costly efforts that the
British cavalry was called upon to make during the Peninsular
War. The nearest parallel to it in .earlier years was the rear-
guard action of El Bodon in September 1811 J. But there the
forces engaged 011 both sides had been much smaller.
The French advanced guard consisted of Curto's light cavalry
division of the Army of Portugal, supported by Maucullc's
infantry division. It had started at dawn, and found the
British cavalry vcdctles where they had been marked down on
the preceding night, at the bridge of Villa Buniel. They retired
without giving trouble, being in no strength, and the morning
was wearing on when the French came upon Wellington's
rearguard, the horsemen of Anson and J ulian Snnchcz, nnd
Ha!kett's two German battalions, a mile or two east of Cclada,
holding the line of the H~mnazastrea.m. Anson was in position
bch~nd its ravine, with a battalion of the light infantry dis-
persed along the bushes above the water, and the cavalry in
support. Julian Sanehez was visible on the other side of the
Arlanzon, which is not here fordable, bCyond Anson's right:
on his left, hovering on hills above the road, was a small
irregular force, the guerrilla band of Marquinez 2. The ground
along the Horma7.a was strong, and the infantry fire surprised
the enemy, who were stopped for some time. 'fhey came on
presently in force, and engaged in a bickering fight: several
allempts to cross the ravine were foiled by partial charges of
some of Anson's squadrons. Wellington says in his. dispatch
that the skirmishing lasted nearly three hours, and that Staple-
ton Cotton, who had recently come up from the Salamanc.'l.
hospital eured of his wound, made excellent dispositions. But
the odds-more than two to one-were far too great to permit
the contest to be maintained for an indefinite period; and when,
• See vol. iv. pp. Ma-g .
• Who wus not himself any longer lit their head, having been killed in
a private quanel Borne weeks before. His mcn were this dny under his
lieutennnt Puente (Schepcler, p. 080).
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after much bickering, the French (O'Shee's brigade of Curto's
division) at last succeeded in gaining a footing beyond the
Hormaza, Anson's squadrons went ott in good order. The
ground for the next five or six miles was very unfnvourable for
a small detaining force, as the valley of the Arlanzon widened out
for 0. time, and allowed the enemy space to deploy his superior
numbers. Nevertheless the light dragoons turned again and
agnin, and charged with more or less success the pursuing
Chasseurs. While Curto's division was pressing' back the
British brigade in front, Merlin's brigade, pushing out on the
:Fl'ench right, ascended the hills beyond Ansan's left flank, and
there found and drovc ore the partida of Marquincz. Thc fugi-
tive guerrilleros, falling back for support towards the British,
came in upon the flank of the 16th Light Dragoons ·wi.th French
hussars in close pursuit, and mixed with them. The lcft
squadron of the 16th was thrown into confusion, and sureered
heavily, having some thirty casualties; and the commander
of the :regiment, Colonel PeUy, and seven of his men were taken
.prisoners. As Curto was pushing on at the same time, Anson's
brigade was much troubled, and was greatly relieved whcn it at
last came in sight of its support, Dock's German Heavy Dra-
goons and Dull's battery, posted behind a bridge spanning
a watercourse near the lonely house called the Venta del. Pozo.
The two battalions of Halkett, who had been retiring under
cover of Anson's stubborn resistance, were now some little way
behind Bock, near the village of VilIadrigo. On seeing the
obstacle of the watercourse in front of them, and the British
Teserves behind it, the cavalry of the Army of Portugal halted,
and bcgan to rc-form. Anson's harassed brigade was permitted
to cross the bridge and to join Back.
At this moment there came on the scene the French cavalry
reserves, Boyer's dragoons and the three regiments of the Army
of the North, which were commanded that day not by their
brigadier Laferriere (who had been injured by a fall from his
horse) but by Colonel Faverot of the 15th Chasseurs. Souham,
who had arrived in their company as had Cafiarelli also, gave
orders that the pursuit was not to slacken for a minute. While
the cavalry of Curto and Merlin were re-forming and resting,
the newly arrived squadrons were directed to drive in the
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Dritish rearguard from its new position. The brigade of Faverot
was to attack in front, the dragoons of Boyer were to turn the
hostile line, by crossing the watercourse some way to their right,
and to fall on its flank and rear. So great was the superiority
in nwnbcrs of the attacking party that they came on with
supreme confidence, ignoring all disadvantages of ground.
Favcrot's brigade undertook to pass the bridge in column, in
face of Back's two regiments drawn up at the head of the slope,
and of Bull's battery placed on the high road so as to command
the crossing. Boyer's dragoons trotted on to the right, to look
for the first nvaila.ble place where the water should allow them'
a practicable ford.
What followed was not in accordance with the designs of
either party. Souham had intended Boyer and Faverot to nd
simultaneously; but the former found the obstacle less and less
inviting the farther that he went on: he rode for more than
a mile without discovering a passage, and finally got out of
sight of Souham and the high road I, Meanwhile }~llverot had
advanced straight for the bridge, and had begun to cross it,
Of his three regiments the Berg lancers led, the 15th Chasscurs
eame next, the Legion of Gendarmerie brought up the rear,
They were ten squadrons in all, or some 1,200 sabres, As each
squadron got quit of the bridge it formed up in line, the
first to pass to the right of the road, while those which
followed successively took ground to the left, between the
chaussee and the bank of the Arlanzon. Eight squadrons had
got into position before the British Iiue gave any signs of move·
ment on the hillside above,
It is clear that to cross a bridge in .this fashion was a reckless
mauccuvre. If Boek had charged when two or three squadrons
only had passcd2, he must have crushed them in the act of de· .
ployment, and have jammed the rest of the l~rench column at
the bridgehead in a position of helpless immobility. l'hat no
such charge was made resulted from a curious chance. Staple-
tOll Cotton, who was still conducting the retreat, had placed
Bull's battery at a point on the slQpc where he judged that it
1 'l'o Cafl'arelli's higb disgust: see Ws dispatch to Chuke of October 30,
where he calls Doyer's action a ' fataliU! que I'on ne peut eon(,'evoir.'
• All LUll\ley did ut Usagre uguinst L'AllcnUUld, sce vol. iv. p.412.
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fully commanded the bridge, with Boek's four squadrons on its
right. Then Anson's brigade, not ill the best of order after its
long pursuit by the enemy, trotted over the bridf,'C and came up
the slope. Cotton intended that it should deploy on the left
of the gUllS, but the retreating regiments, before the directions
reached them, turned to the right and began to form up behind
Boek's line. The general at once sent them orders to cross to
the left and prolong the lilleon the other side of Bull's battery.
By some extraordinary blWlder the leading regiment (perhaps
to shorten its route) passed to the left in front of the guns,
instead of moving behind them. It was thus masking the
battery just at the moment that the French, to the surprise of
everyone, began to cross the bridge.' Therc was considerable
confusion in changing the march of the light dragoons, and be·
fore they were eleared ocr and the front of the battery was fTee,
several French squadrons were across the ravine and for,ming
up. The artillerymen then opened, but in their hurry they
misjudged the elevation, and not onc shot of the first discharge
,told. The second did hardly bett~r; more French were.passing
every moment, and Cotton then directed the cavalry to charge,
since the enemy was becoming stronger and stronger on the
near side of the bridge.
The charge was delivered in echelon of brigades; Bock's
two regiments, who had been awaiting orders for some time,
got away at oncc, and fell upon the lcft of the French-the
gendarmes and the left squadrons of the Chasseurs. Anson's six
squadrons started somewhat latcr, and having tired horscs-
after their long morning's figbt-came on at a much slowcr
pace. They found themselves opposed to the Lancers and the
rigbt squadrons of the Chasseurs. There was such a percep·
tible spaee between tbe two attacks, that some of the French
narrativcs si)Cak. of thc British charge as being made by a front
line and a reserve. The numbers engaged were not very unequal!
• Anson's brigade fougllt, it is said, with only (lOO sabres out of its
originnl 800, owing to heavy losses in the Illorlling, find to the dropping
behind of many men on exhausted horses, who did not get up in time to
form for the charge. Bock's brigade was intact, but only 400 strong. Of
thc French brigade 1,600 strong 011 October 16 by its • moming state'
two squadrons out of thc six of gendarmcs were not prescnt, so tbat the
total Wll!:I probably 1,250 or so engaged.
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-probably 1,200 French to ],000 British-hut the former were
all fresh, while the larger half of the latter (Anson's brigade)
were wearied out-man and horse-by long previous fighting.
All accounts-English and French-agree that this was olle
of the most furious cavalry mClccs c\'cr seen: the two sides
broke each other's lines at various points-the 1st K.G.L. Dra-
goons rode down their immediate opponents, the 2nd got to
a standing fight with theirs: Anson's regiments, coming on
more slowly on their jaded mounts, made no impression on the
Lancers and Chnsseurs opposite tllero. The whole ffillSS fell
into a heaving crowd' so completely mixed that f-ricnd could
hardly be distinguished from foe-the contest man to man
lasted probably a long minute, during which the ground was·
strewn with French, and our own loss was heavy in the extreme.'
General Boek was at one time seen defending himself against
six :Frenchmen, and was barely savcd by his mcn. Betcille, the
Colonel of thc French Gcndarme Legion, received, it is said,
twelve separate wounds, and was left for dead. The combat
was ended by the intervention of the two rear squadrons of the
Gendarmes, who had not crossed the bridge when the charge
began; they eame up late, and fell upon the flank and rear of
thc 2nd Dragoons of thc K.G.I.. This last push settled the
matter, and the British brigades broke and fell back t.
They were not so disheartened, however, but that they
rallied half a mile to the rear, and wcre showing fight when
Boyer's dragoons came tardily upon the scene-they had at
last found a passage over the ravine, and nppeared in full
strength on the flank. It was hopeless to oppose them, and
thc wrecks of the two British brigades fcll back hastily towards
their infantry support, Halkett's two Light Batta1i~ns of the
German Legion, which had been retreating meanwhile towards
Villadrigo, marching in column at quarter distance nod prepared
to form square when necessary. The need now came-the
leading regiment of Boyer's .Dragoons turned upon the rear
battalion-the 1st-and charged it: the square was formed
in good time, and the attaek was beaten oU. The bnttalion then
1 Most or thi6 <letal! i6 from the udmirll,ble account or VOIl Hodeobcrg,
aidc-de·camp to Bock, whose lettcf I prioted in Blackwood!of 1913. There
is It good narrative also in Mnrtin's Gendarmerie d'Es}Jugne, pp. 817-19.
1812] COMBAT OF VILLADRIGO 75
retired, falling back upon the 2nd, which had nearly reached
Villadrigo. Both then retreated together, covering the broken
cavalry, and had gone a short distnnce farther when the French
rene,;ed the attilek. Both battalions formed squnre, both were
charged, and both repulsed the attack of the dragoons with
loss. The enemy, who had still plenty of intact squadrons,
seemed to be contemplating a third charge, but hesitated, and
finally Dock's and Anson's men having got back into some
sort of order, and showing a front once more, the squa.res
retired unmolested, nnd marched orI in company with the
cavalry. The French followed cautiously and gave no further
trouble. It was now dark, and when the pursuit ceased the rear-
guard halted for two hours, and resuming· its march about
ten o'clock, finally reached the bridge of Quintana del Pueute,
outside Torquemada, at two o'clock next morning.
Thus ended a costly affair, which might have proved much
more perilous had the French been better managed. But
though their troopers fought well enough, thcir generals failed
to get such advantage as they should out of thcir superior
numbers. It is to be noted that both Curto and Boyer have
very poor records in the memoirs of Marmont, Foy, and other con-
temporary writers, who speak on other occasions of the' inertie
coupablc ' and' faute de decision' of thc one, and call the other
• bon manceuvrier, mais u'ayullt pas la reputation qui attirc la.
con6ance Rveugle du soldat': Nl\poleon once summed them
up as • mauvais ou med.iocres 2,' along with several other
generals. It seems clear, at any rate, that they should have
accomplished more, with the means at their disposal. The
damage inflicted on the Dritish rearguard was much smaller
than might have been expected-only 230 in all, including
ti officers and (iD men taken prisoners 2. It is probable indeed
• Details are worth giving. The 2nd Dragoons KG.L. bad 52 cnsualties,
the 1st 44. In Anson's brigade the 11th Ligllt Dragoons lost 41l, the 12th
only 20, the 16t1l47. The onlccrs taken prisoners WCIe Colonel Pelly and
Lieutenant Baker of the 16th, Major l"iseher (mortally wounded) of the
ht Dragoons K.G.L.• llnd Cnptaill Lenthe llnd Lieutenant Schaener of
the 2nd Dragoon.'! K.G.L. 'l'he two infantry battalions bad 18 casualties,
of whom 13 were men missing, apparently skirmlshers cut orr in the fight
earlier in the day on the Hormn.zn. or .footsore men who had fallen behind.
• In 11 converslltion with f'o;y (sce lile or the laUer, by Girod lIe rAin,
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that the pursuers suffered no less; for, though their official
report spoke of no morc than about n hundred and fifty casual-
ties, Favcrot's Brigade alone had almost as many bY.itself,
showing a list oC 7 killed and 18 officers and 116 men wounded.
But the regimental lists give 35 French cavalry officers in all
disabled that day, 5 in Curia's division, 5 in Merlin's Brigade,
!i in Boyer's Dragoons, and 2 on the staff, beside the 18 in
Fnverot's Brigade. This must indicate a total loss of nearly
300, applying the vcry moderate percentage of casualties of men
to officers that prevailed in Favcrot's regiments to the other
corps. The engagement had been most honourable to the two
cavalry brigades of Wellington's rearguard, and not less so to
the German Legion light infantry. An intelligent obser\'er-
not a soldier-who saw the whole of the fighting that day
remarked, • I twicc thought Anson's Brigade (which was weak in
numbers and much exhausted by constant service) would have
been annihilated; and I believe we owe the preservation of
that and of the heavy German brigade to the admirable steadi-
ness of Halkett's two Light Battalions.... We literally had to
fight our way for four miles, retiring, halting, charging, and
again retiring. I say wc because I was in the thick of it, and
never witnessed such a scene of anxiety, uproar, and confusion.
Throughout the whole of this trying occasion Stapleton Cotton
behaved with great coolness, judgement, and gallantry. I was
closc to him the whole time, and did not observc him for an
instant disturbed or confused 1.' At the cnd of the fight onc
officer in a jaded regiment observed to another that it had been
a bad day. His friend replied that it had been a most honour-
able day for the troops, for at nightfall every unwoullded mall
on an efficient horse was still in line and ready to charge again.
There had becn no Tout, no straggling, and no loss of morale.
p. 141) when he said that all the cavalry generals of the Army of l>ortugal
except Montbrun, FOllrnier, and Lamotte were' mauvam oumCdiocl'Cli ,-
these others being Curto, Boyer, Cavrols, Lorcet, and Card/!.
• H. Sydenham to Henry Wellesley, prinled in Welling/on SVP1llt-
nlttltar1j Diap,atellta, vii. pp. 464.-5. Sydcnham undcl'!itatcs, however, the
available force when he says that Ansan had only 400 sabre8 and Bock
only two squadrons. Hodcnberg i1imillishesless, but S\.ilI too much, when
he give8 Bock 300 sabres and Anson (i00. The real numbers are givcll
above.
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While the combat of Venta del Pozo was in progres.<; the
main body of the army had been resting in and about Tor-
quemada, undisturbed by any pursuit, so well had the rearguard
played its part. Next morning (October 24th) it marched off
and erossed the Carrion river by the bridges of Palencia,
VilIamuriel, and Duei'in!t. Behind this stream Wellington was
proposing to cheek the enemy for at least some days. He chose
it, rather than the Pisuerga, as his defensive line for tactical
reasons. If he had stayed behind the Pisuerga, he would have
had the Carrion and its bridges in his immediate rear, and he
was determined not to fight with bridge-defiles behind him. In
the rear of the Carrion there were no such dangerous passages,
and the way was clear to Valladolid. It was fortunate that,
after the lively day on the 28rd, the French made no serious
attempt at pursuit upon the 24th, for therc were mllny stragglers
that morning from the infantry. Torquemada was the centre
of a wiue-distriet and full of barrels, vats, and even cisterns of
the heady new vintage of 1812; many of the men had repaid
themselves for a twenty-six mile march by over-deep potations,
and it was very hard to get the battalions started next morning. l
Napier says that' twelve thousand men at onc time werc in a
statc of hclpless inebriety: ' this is no doubt an exaggeration,
but the diaries of eye-witnesses make it clear that there was
much drunkenness that day.
Wellington's new position extended from Palenein on thc
Carrion to Duenas on the Pisuerga, below its junction with
the first-named rivcr. He intended to have all the bridges
destroyed, viz. those of Paleneia, Villa :Muriel, and San Isidro
on the Carrion, and those of Duciias and 'l'ariego on the
Pisucrga. He' placed one of the Calieian divisions (Cabrera's)
in Paleneia and south of it, supported by the 3/1st from -the
5th Division. Another Galleinn division (Losada's) continued
the line southward to Villa Muriel, where it was taken up by
the 5th Division-now under General Oswald who had recently
joined. The 1st, 6th, and 7th Divisions prolonged the line
I Nnpier, Iv. p. 361. Corroboration may be had on p. 120 ofthe Journal
of Green of the 68th, who says that his colonel Wall much puzzled to know
how !IO many men had succeeded in getting liquor, ond that one soldier
was drowned in a vat, OVClOOllle by the fumes of new ..... ine.
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down the Pisuerga. Behind the rivers, all the way, there was
a second line of defence, formed by the dry bed of the Canal of
Castile, which runs for many miles through the valley: it was
out of oroer and waterless, but the depression of its course
made a deep trench running parallel with the Carrion and
Pisucrga, and·very tenable. It must be noted that 'Palencia
lay to the wrong side of the Carrion' for Wellington's purpose,
being on its left Or eastern bank. It had, therefore, either to
be held as a sort of tete de pont, or evacuated before the enemy
should attack. The Spanish officer in command resolved to
take the former course, though the town was indefensible, with.
a ruinous mediaeval wo.!l: he occupied it, nnd made arrange-
ments for the blowing up of the bridge only when his advanced
guard should have been driven out of Palencia and should have
reerossed the river.
Souham, who had pillihcd his head-quarters forward to
l\fagaz this day, resolved to try to force the line of the Carrion.
Two divisions under Foy-his own and that of Donte (late
Thomieres)---were to endeavour to carry Paleneia and its
bridge. Maueune, with the old advanced guard, his own
division and that of Gauthier 1, was to sce if anything could
be done at the bridges of Villa l\Iuricl and San !sidro.
Foy had Laferriere's cavalry brigade given him, Maueune
retained Curto's light horse. The main body of the anny
remained in a mass near Magaz, ready to support either
of the advanced columns, if it should succeed in Coreing
a passage.
Unfortwlatcly for Wellington, everything went "'Tong at
Palencia. Foy, marching rapidly on the city, drove away the
few squadrons of Galician cavalry which were observing his
front, and then burst open one of its rickety gates with artillery
fire, and stormed the entry with Chemincau's brigade. The
Galician battalions in the town, beatcn in a short street fight,
were evicted with such a furious rush that the British engineer
officer with the party of the 8/1st, who were working at the
I This wus Bonnet's old dh"ision: Chouvd hod been commanding it
8ince Bonnet was disabled at Salamancn. But he had been wounded by
R ehance shot at Ventn del POZO OD the 23rd. Bud Gauthier. !lis senior
brigadier, bad taken It over.
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bridge, failed 1 to fire the mine, whose fuse went wrong. Most
of them were taken prisoners. Colonel Campbell of the 8/lst,
who had been sent to support the Spaniards, fell back towards
Villa Uuriel, judging the cnemy too strong to be resisted, and
the routed Galicians had to be covered by Ponsonby's heavy
dragoons from the pursuit of the French cavalry, who spread
over the en....;rons of Palencia and captured some baggage
trains, British and Spamsh, with their escorts.
Thus Souham had secured a safe passage over the Carrion
and it mattered little to him that his other attack farther
south had less decisive success. Here Maucune, always a very
enterprising-not to say reckless-eommander had marched
against the two bridges of Villa Muriel and San Isidro. He
led his own division towards the former, and sent that of
Gauthier against the latter. The 5th Division had an infantry
screen of light troops beyond the river-this was pushed in,
with some loss, especially to the 8th Cayadores. Both bridges
were then attacked, but each was blown up when the heads
of the French columns approached, and a heavy fire, both of
artillery and of musketry, from thc other bank checked their
further advance. Cauthier then turned cast in search of a
passage, and went coasting along the bank of the Pisuerga for
some miles, as fur as the bridge of Taricgo (or Bai'l.os, as thc
British·aecounts call it). This had been prepared for dcstrue·
tion like the other bridges, but the mine whcn exploded only
broke the parapets and purt of the flooring. The F~neh
charged across, on the uninjured crown of the arch, and
captured some 40 of the working party 2: they established
themselves on the opposite bank, but advanced no farther;
here the British had still the lower course of the Pisuergn to
protect them, while Gauthier had no supports near, and halted,
content to have captured the bridge, which he began to repair.
Meanwhile, the bridge of Villa Muriel having been more
efficiently blown up, l\faucune dispersed his voltigeur companies
along the river-bank, brought his artillery up to a favourable
, Some 27 men of the 8/lst, taken prisonen here, represent this party
in the l)llRuo.lty list of Oetober 25. Tile battalion was not otherwise
scriouaJy engaged.
I 'Who were drawn from the 40th, 30th, and 44th.
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position, and entered on a long desultory skirmish with Oswald,
which lasted for some hours. During this time he was searching
for fords-several were found 1, but all were deep and danget:-
ous. About three o'clock in the afternoon a squadron of
cavolry forded onc of them, npparently unobserved, reached
the western bank, Md rolled up n company of the llOth which
it caught strung out along the river bickering with the skir-
mishcrs on the other side. An officer 1md 33 men were taken
prisoners 2. This passage was followed by that of eight volti·
geur companies, who established themselves on the other side,
hut clung to the bank of the river. the Dritish light troops
having only retired a few score of )'ards from it. Having thus
got n lodgement beyohd the Carrion, Maucunc resolved to
cross in forcc, in support of his voltigeurs. Arllauld's brigade
pussed at the ford which had first been used, Montfort's at
another, to the left of the broken bridge, farther do\\'Il the
stream. The Freneh seized the village of Villa 1\Iuricl, and
established themselves in force along thc dry bed of the canal,
a little to its front. Wellington lJad expected that Maueunc
would come on farther, and intended to charge him with the
whole 5th Division when he should begin to ascend the slope
above the canal. Dut when, after an hour or more, the enemy
made no advance, it became .necessary to assume the offensive
against him, since Foy wos now across the Carrion at Paleucia,
and, if he commenced to push forward, he might drive the
Spanish troops between him and Villa l\Iuriel into Maucune's
arms. The lattcr must be expelled before this danger should
arisc: wherefore at about 4 o'clock a brigade of Losnda's
Spaniards was sent against the right of the French division,
while Pringle's brigade attacked its front along the bed of the
canal. The Spaniards made no progress-they were indeed
driven back, and rallied with difficulty by Wellington's friend
General Alava, who was severely wounded. To replace them
the British brigade of Dames was brought up, and told toO
• For a romantie story of how one wa.s discovered sce Napier, iv. p. 363,
a tale which I have not found corroborated in any other authority.
I I had !lot been nble to make out how the I!Oth came to lose these
prisoners till I came on the whole story in the Autobiography of Hale of
the I/Oth, printed at CirenCC.$ter 1820, a. rare little book, with n good
account of this combat. He is my best source for it on the British side.
1812} CO~IBAT OF VILLA MUUIEL 81
storm Villa Muriel-5pry's Portuguese supporting. After a
stiff fight Pringle and Barnes swept all before them: the enemy
yielded first on the right, but held out for some time in the
village, where he lost a certain number of prisoners. He finally
repassed the fords, and sought safety in the plain on the
eastern bank, where the Frcnch reserves were now beginning
to appear in immense force. • Their numbers were so great
that the fields appeared to our view almost black 1.' Wellington
wrote home that he had hitherto under-estimated Souham's
force, and only now realized that the Army of the North had
brought up its infantry as well as its cavalry. He, naturally,
made no attempt to pursue the enemy beyond the Carrion, and
the fight died down into a distAnt cannonade across the water~.
TIle combat of Villa lIIuriel cost the 5th Division some
500 casualtics-not including 43 -men of thc 3/1st, hurt or
taken in thc scparatc fight at Palcncia, or a few casualties
in Ponsonby's dragoons in that same quarter. Maucune's
losses wcre probably not far different-they must certainly
ha,,'C exceeded the' 250 killed or wounded, 30 prisoners and
6 drowned' of the official report: for onc of Maucune's regi-
ments-the 15th Line-had 200 casualties by itsclO. Foy at
Palcneia lost very few men-though his statement of ' three
or four' as their total cau hardly be correct. He had takcn
100 prisoncrs (27 of thcm British), and killcd or wowlClcd
60 marc, mostly Calicians '. The balance of the day's losses
was ccrtainly against thc Allics.
Moreover, despite of Maucunc's repulse, the result of thc
day's fighting was much to 'Vcllington's detrimcnt, sinec
(though the loss of the bridge of Taricgo mattered little) thc
capture of Pnlencia ruincd his schclllc for defcnding tllC linc
of the Carrion. Souham's wholc' army eould follow Foy, and
turn the left flank of the Allies bchind that rivcr. Whcreforc
Wellington first threw back the left flank of the 5th Division
-' HaJe, p. 95, quoted above.
1 I have been using for the French .liide mainly thc elaborate aDd
interesting narrative of Colonel B~chaud of the OOth, recently published in
£tu,de8 NlljJQUo,lien1reJl, ii. Illl. 405--11•
• See Dcehaud, p. -no.
• These modest figures of Foy's report to Souham arc much~cxaggcrated
in most Frencb nnrmtivcs of the nffllir.
aae·e c
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en pOle-lice, to make a containing line against Foy, while its right
flank still held the line of the river about Villa Muric!. Under
cover of this rearguard; he remainder of the army evacuated
its positions on each side of Duefl8S at dawn on the 26th, and
marched down the Pisucrga to Cabczon, where it passed the
river at the bridge of that place and retired to the opposite
side. The 5th Division followed (unmolested by the enemy)
in the early morning: at night the entire allied army had
retired across the broad stream, and was lining its left bank
from Valladolid upward, with that city (held by the 7th Division)
as the supporting point of its southern flank, and its northern
resting on the Cubillas river. This was onc of the most sur-
prising and ingenious movements that Wellington ever carried
out. On the 28rd he was defcnding thc right bankof the Pisucrga
-on thc 20i0th he was 011 thl: other side and defending its left
bank in a much stronger position. He was in no way sacrificing
his communications with Portugal or Madrid, since he had
behind him two good bridges over the Douro, those of TudeJa
and Puente Duero, with excellent roads southward and west-
ward to Medina del Campo, Arevalo, and 01medo. The enemy
.might refuse to attack him, and march down the west bank of
tile Pisuerga- towards the Douro, but Wellington had already
provided for the destruction of the three bridges of Simancas,
1'0rdesillas,_ and Toro, and the Douro was now a very fierce
and broad barrier to further progress, twice as difficult to cross
as the Pisuerga. On the other hand, if Souham should make
up his mind to come down the Pisuergo. on its eastern bank, by
the restored bridge of Tariego, there was an excellent fighting
position along the CubilIas river. But the roads on this side
of the Pisuerga were bad, and the COWltry rough, while on thc
western bank the ground was Hat and fertile, and the line of
march easy.
Souham, therefore, advanced as was natural from Palencia
southward, on the right bank of the Pisuerga.; on the 26th he
v.ithdrew Maucune and Gauthier to that side, and on the 21th
felt the position of Cabe:oon, which he decided to be impregnable,
and left alone. He placed the infantry of. the Army of the
North opposite it, and moved southward with the rest of his
forces. On the 28th he tried the passage of VaUadolid, after
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driving out a battalion of Portuguese c~adores from the
suburb beyond the Pisuerga, and cannonading the 51st across
thc bridge. Here too the obstacles looked most formidable,
and the French, pursuing their march, came to the bridge of
Simancas, which was blown up in their faces by Colonel Hall~ett,
whose brigade of the 7th Division had been placed in this part
of the British line. Halkett then sent on one of his three
battalions (the Brunswick-Oels) to Tordesillas.
This was all quite satisfactory to Wellington, who had been
able to give his troops two days' rest, and who saw that the
enemy, despite of his superior numbers, seemed to be brought
to a nonplus by the position behind the Pisuerga. But the
next evening (October 29) brought very untoward ne\\"S. Foy's
division now formed the advance·guard of thc Army of Portugal:
it reached and occupied Tordesillas, where thc bridge (like that
of Simancas) had its main arch destroyed. A mediaeval tower
on the south bank of the ruined structure was held by a haJr-
company ofthe Brunswick-Oels infantry as an outlying picquet :
the rest of the battalion was encamped in a wood some hundreds
of yards behind. Considering that the river was broad and
swift, and that aU boats had been carefully destroyed, it was
considered that the passage was impossible. Foy thought,
however, that it was worth making the hazardous attempt to
cross: he called for volunteers, and collected 11 officers and
44 men, who undertook to attempt to ford the Douro by swim-
ming and wading. 'fheir leader was Captain Guingret of the
6th Uger, one of the minor historians of the war. They placed
their muskets and ammunition on a sort of raft formed of
planks hastily joined, which certain good swimmers undertook
to tow and guide. At 4 o'clock in the afternoon the 55 adven·
turers pushed off ~hc raft, and plunged into the water, striking
out in a diagonal direction. Meanwhile Foy brought down his
divisional battery to the shore, and began shelling the tower at
the bridge-cnd. The starting-point had been well chosen, and
the raft and swimmers were borne across the stream with
surprising speed, and came ashore a few yards from the tower,
which, all naked and with arms many of which had been soaked
in the water and would not fire, they proceeded to attack.
The lieutenant in charge of the Brunswick picquet and his meri.
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lost their heads in the most disgraceful faShion; perhaps they
were demoralized by the artillery playing on them-at any rate,
after firing some ill-directed shots, they ran orc-two were
captured in the tower, nine others outside it. The swimmers~
now shivering with cold, for the afternoon was bleak, took
possession of the bridgehead, and Foy's sappers at the other
end of the broken arch began to hurr}' forward ropes to establish
a communication with the captured tower 1.
The major in command of the Brunswick battalion, half a mile
orc, behaved as badly as the subaltern at the tower. He should
have come down in force and thrown the handful of naked men
into the river. Instead of doing so he put his corps under arms
in the edge of the wood, and sent information to his brigadier
asking for orders. By the time that Halkett heard of the
matter, a rough communication had been made across the
shattered bridge, and thc French were streaming over. Nothing
w~ done, save to move reinforcements from the 7th Division
to block the two roads that diverge from the bridgehead south
and west.
This extraordinary feat of Guingret's party, one of the most
dashing exploits of the Peninsular War, altered Wellington's
position, much for the worse. The enemy had now secured a
crossing on the Douro opposite his extreme left wing. Hc had
already begun to movc troops in tltis direction, when he saw
Foy pushing forward past Simaneas, and 011 the morning of
the 29th had resolved to leavc Valludolid und make a general
shift westward, parallel to the enemy. Soon after dawn the
bridge of Cabezon was blown up, and the British right wing
retired, under cover of the troops still holding Valladolid.
When the right wing (the 5th Division and the Calieians) had
passed to the rear of that city, and were nearing the Douro
bridges (Tudcla and Puente de Duero) behind it, the centre of
the British line (1st, 6th, and Pack's Portuguese) followed, and
finally the left (two brigades of the 7th Division) evacuated
Valladolid after destroying the Pisuerga bridge, und passed the
Douro in the wake of the ccntre. All this was donc with no
I There is a full aeoount of this business in Foy's dispnkh to Souham
of the next morning, in which occur nil the fnctll given by Guingret in
his own little book. That offiee"s flIumtive must be takeu as fully correct.
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molestation from the enemy, and at nightfall on the 29th every
man was on the south of the Douro, and its bridges had been
blown up after the rearguards had ptlSsed.
Wcllington had becn intending to hold the line of that great
river till he should have certain news of how Hill~of whose
operations the next chapter treats~was faring in the south.
Since he knew that the troops from Madrid were coming to
join him, he had purposed to maintain himself behind the
Douro till Hill came up to the Adaja. The news of the passage
of Foy at Tordesillas was therefore very vexatious; but his
counter-move was bold and crfeetive. Before the enemy had
fully repaired the bridge, or got any large foree across it, he
marched to Rueda with the 1St, 6th, and 7th Divisions, and
advanced from thence to the heights opposite Tordesillas,
where he formed line of battle only 1,200 yards from the Douro,
and threw up a line of redoubts, so strong that the enemy dared
not push on. The first brigade to move out from the bridge
would obviously be destroyed, and there was no room for large
forces to deploy and attack. The enemy saw this, and instead
of debouehing constructed a defensive bridgehead at Torde-
sillas 1.
Souham indeed, having occupied Valladolid and drawn up
to the line of the Douro, remained quiescent for six days. It
looked as if his ollensive movement had come to an end. The
main cause of his halt was that Cnffarelli, having assisted him
in driving Wellington back to the Douro, refused to follow him
further, declaring that he must go back at once to the North,
from whence the most unsatisfactory news was reaching him
day by day. Both about Pampeluna, and round Bilbao, whieh
the Spaniards had onee more seized, things were in a most
dangerous condition. After barely visiting Valladolid he
turned on his heel, and marching fast was back at Burgos lignin
on Novcmbcr 6th 2. Deprived of the strong cavalry brigade
and the two infantry divisions of the Army of the North,
Souhnm was no longer in a condition to prcss -Wellington
I All this from Burgoyne, i. p. 244. Napier does not mention the
eafthworks, whieh were batteries for six guns each.
• There he wrote his dispatch, concerning the late oombate, to Clnrke.
Nllplcr never mentions Catrarclll's dcpaftnrc--a curious omission.
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recklessly. He had now well under 40,000 men, instead of
nearly 50,000, with which to assail the Allies in their new and
strong position. Wherefore, he resolved to wait till he had
news that Soult and King Joscph were drawing near from the
South. The King's dispatches had told him to avoid a general
action, and to wait for the effect of the great diversion that
would soon be developing against Wellington's rear. Hence,
mainly, came the halt, which caused his adversary to think for
some days that he might be able to draw at the line of the
Douro the limit of the French advance.
The first half of the retreat from Burgos was now at an end.
To understand'the rnanreuvrcs of the second half, we must·
(irst explain the doings of Soult, King Joseph, and General Hill
in New Castile during the lust week of October.
SECTION XXXIV: CHAPTER IV
HILL'S RETREAT FROM MADRID
THE crisis in front of Madrid, where Hill stood exposed to
attack from the mass of FTench forces in the kingdom of
Valencia, developed late. We have already seen that the first
dispatch from the South which disquieted Wellington only'
reached him on the 19th October, and· that it was not till the
21st that he realized that all his plans for hindering a French
advance on Madrid were ineffective, Md that Hill was in serious
danger.
The long delay in Sault's evacuation of Andalusia was-as has
been already remarked-the ultimate cause of the late appear·
Qoce of the advancing columns of the enemy in front of Madrid.
It was not till September 80 that the advanced cavalry of the
Army oUhe South got into touch with the outlying vedettcs of
Trcillard's dragoons, at Tobarrn near Hellin. Four days later
Soult was in conference with King Joscph, and the Marshals
Jourdan and Suchet who had come out to meet him, at Fuente
la Higuern, some fifty miles farther on the road toward Valencia.
They met with various designs, though all were agreed that the
Allies must be driven out of the capital as soon as possible.
Suchet was mainly anxious to get the Army of the South, and the
King also, out of his own viceroyalty. Joseph's troops were
wasting his stores, and harrying the peasantry, whose shearing
he wished to reserve for himself. SOlut's men were notoriously
unruly, and at the present moment half famished, after their
long march through a barren land. The Duke of Albufera was
anxious to see them all started off for Madrid at the earliest
possible moment. His only personal demand was that he should
be allowed to borrow a division from one or the other army;
for, when they should be gone, he thought that he would have
barely enough men to hold olf Mackenzie and the Spaniards of
the Mureian army. He promised, and produced, large convoys
of food for the service of the Armie.s of the. South and Centre,
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but pleaded that in order to make his only base and arsenal-
the city of Valencia--quite safe, it was necessary that they
should leave him 5,000 extra. troops: in especial he pleaded for
Palombilli's division, which had originally been borrowed from
his own nrmyof Arngon. Jourdnn-as he tells us in his memoirs 1
-maintained that it was necessary to turn every possible man
upon Madrid, and that Suchet could defend himself against
his old enemies with his own army alone. He might, if hard
pressed, call down some troops from Catalonia,
Dut the feal quarrel was between Soultand KingJoseph. The
fIrst was in a sullen and cnptiOllS mood, because the King had
caused him to evacuate his much-prized viceroyalty in Anda-
lusia, by refusing to join him there iu September. But Joseph
was at a mueh higher pitch of passion; not only did he still
remember all Soult's disobedience in July and August, which
(as he thought) had led to the unnecessary loss of Madrid, but
he had a new and a much morc bitter grievance. Some time
before the Army of the South reached Valencia, he had become
possessed of the dispatch to the minister of war which Soult had
written on August 12th, in which he hinted that the King was
meditating treachery to his brother the Emperor, and had
opened up negotiations with the Cortcs in order to betray the
French cause 2. This document-as has been explained above--
had been given by Soult to a privateer captain bound from
Malaga to Toulon, who had been forced to run into the harbour
oC Valencia by the Dritish blockading squadron. Not knowing
the contents of the documcnt, the captain had handed it over
to the King, when he found him at Valencia. Thus Josel)h was
aware that the Marshal had accused him, on the most f1ims)'
c~'idenee, of betraying his brother. He was justly indignant,
and had contemplated, in his fll"St outburst of ragc, the arrest
and supersession of SouIt. His next impulse had been to send orf
his confidential aide-dc-camp Colonel Deprcz, to seck first the
minister of war at Paris, and then the Emperor himself in
Russia 3, with his petition for vengeance. 'Je demande 'justice.
I p.437. • Sce voJ. v. pp. 538-V.
• Depre:l, travelling with great speed, reached Paris and interviewed
Clarke on September 21. The Minister, who WM no friend of Soult'"
told him that neither he himself nor the Killg eould dare to depose the
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Que le Marechul Soult soit .rappeh~, entendu, et puni 1.' If his
enemy had appeared at Valencia earl)' in September, he would
probably have taken the most extreme measures against him.
But three weeks had gone by, his anger had had time to cool,
and he could realize the danger of attempting to seize and deport
a marshal whose army was double the size of his own and
Suehet's combined, and who had a powerful faction to support
him among his own generals. Joseph hoped that a mandate
for Soult's recull and disgrace would soon be on its way from
Russia, and meanwhile curbed his temper, ignored thc Marshal's
recent charges of treachery, and contented himself with treating
him wiUt coldness, and overruling many of his proposals, on
the mere formal ground of discipline. He was the commander-
in-chief, alld could accept or reject thc suggestions of a subor-
dinate as he pleased. Soult was no longer three hundrCd miles
.away, as he had been in June, and orders given by a superior
on the spot could bc enforced, unless the Marshal wcre prepared
to break out into open insubordinutiOll_
There was no dirIerence of opinion as to the necessity for
marching all Madrid. But wrangling arose as to the amount
of troops that would be needed for the operation. Soult said
that every possible man would be required, and wished to march
with the en~ire Army of the South on San Clcmente and Ocafia,
while he suggested that the King, with the Army of the Centre
and a large detachment taken from Suchet, should move by
Requefia and Cucllea. Suchet protested in the most vigorous
fa.<;hiou against being stripped of any of his divisions, and
maintained that it was rather necessary that he should be lent
5,000 men from the Armies of the Centre or the South. The
King and Jourdan refused to consider the latter proposition,
but agreed that Suchet would require all his own troops, and
that none should be taken from him.. Yet approving of the
double movement on Madrid, they declared that the Army of
Marshal without the Emperor's permission. Dcprcz then posted on to
MO/iCOw, and overtook the Emperor there on October 18. Napoleon in
his reply pmeticnlly ignored the quarrel, contented hill1l\Clf with ndminis·
tering 11 general scolding to all partiCll, and dircett.-d them to • unite, and
diminish £l!I far as possible the evils that a bad system had caused.' But
who had inaugumted Ule system? He himself I
• Josellh to CllIrke. September 7.
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the Centre was too small to operate by itself, and that Soult
should make over to it Barrois's division and 0. brigade of light
cavalry, to bring it up to the necessary strength. Soult pro-
tested loudly: the Emperor had entrusred the army of the
South to him; he was responsible for it; it was onc and indi·
visible, and so forth 1.
Joseph then put the matter to him in the form of a simple
order to set these troops on a certain route on a certain day.
The Marshal did not dare to disobey, but stated that he regarded
t~em ns still belonging to his army, and should continue to
expect reports from their commanders. This left him with·
a force of five infantry und three cavalry divisions, discncum·
bcrcd of his sick, and of 2,000 old, weakly, or time-expired men,
who marched to Valencia to join the next convoy that Suchet
should send to FrllJlce. Their total (omitting Barrois and the
cavalry tnken oU by Joseph) made up 30,000 infantry, 6,000
horse, and with engineers, artillery, train, &c., just 40,000 men.
The Army of the Centre on October 15th showed (including
Palombini, the King's Guard and the Spaniards) about 15,000
present under arms, to whieh must be added Barrois and the
two cavalry regiments that accompanied him 2, making 6,000
men between them. Thus the total force with which Joscph and
Soult marched on Madrid wa.s over 60,000 men 3.
The object of dividing the advancing army.into two columns
was not merely to make it more easy for the troops to find food
in a desolate country, but much more to carry out a strategical
plan. If the whole army had moved by the high road through
La Mancha, it would have had no power to communicate with
the Army of Portugal. The King's idea was that the northern
column, which marched by Cuenca, and which he himself
accompanied, would ultimately get into touch with Souham,
who had been directed-by dispatches which reached him too
late or not at all-to follow Wellington in such a way that he
would be able to outflank him on the Upper Douro, and open
up communications by the route of Aranda, the Somosierra Pass,
• See Soult to Joseph of October 11, and othcr days.
• Which were the 27th Ch8.'lseurs and 7th Polish Lancers.
• For details see Table of the Army of Spain of tile date October 15th,
In Appendix 11 to this volume.
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and Guadalajarn, with the main French Army. But Souham,
when he commenced his advance against Wellington on October
18th, had no order from the King later than !lletter of October
1st, l\7itten before Soult had arrived in the kingdom of Valencia.
He received no more dispatches while engaged in his pursuit
of Wellington, and was unaware of Joseph's Inter plans, so that
when he reached Valladolid he made no endeavour to feel to
his left, towards Aranda, but rather extended himself to his
right, in the direction of Tordesillas and Toro, a movement
which took him entirely away from the direction in which the
King hoped to find him. They did not get into touch, or com-
bine their operations in any way, till November had arrived.
At the same time the advance of a large body of troops by the
route of Cuenen turned out most profitable in the end to the
French strategy, for it was precisely this flanking column, of
great but unknown strength, which compelled Hill to abandon
his intention of defending the lines of the Tagus or the Tajuna.
However he might plaee himself opposite Soult's army coming
frotp the South, he had tllis threatening: force beyond his
eastern flank, turning his positions by roads too remote for llim
to guard.
King Joseph had proposed to commence his march upon
Madrid at the earliest possible moment-at the .interview with
the three marshals at Fuente la Higucra he had named the
9th October as the date for starting. But Soult declared, after
a few days, that this was impossible, owing to the necessity for
collecting the convoys that Sllchet was sending him, replenishing
his ammunition, and bringing up his rearmost troops. The
division of Conroux had picked up the ycllow fever, by plunder-
ing out of its route, during the mareh through Murcia. It had
been left in quarantine, some days behind the rest of the army,
and would take time to come up. It is probable that Soult was
not really wasting time of set purpose; but the King was cer-
tainly under the impression that he was doing so, and their
correspondence was most B,erimonious t. Special offence was
given by Joseph's withdrawing Drouet from the Army of the
South, and entrusting him with the command of that of the
Centre. But when Soult murmured at this and other things,
, Jooeph to Soult, Valencia, October 12.
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the King sent him a laconic letter of ten lines, telling him that if
he refused to obey orders he had better resign his command Rnd
go to Paris, where he would have to give accoWlt.for all his
doings. The ]'Carshal, as on previous occasions when the
question of his resignation had been pressed home 1, avoided
this simple solution of the problem, and yielded a grudging
obedience in the end.
Soult's army was at this time cantoned with its right wing
about Almanza, Yecla, and Fucnre la Higuern, and its left wing
-now about to become its advanced guard-in and around
the large town of Albacctc. A detachment from this wing bad
been for the last ten days attacking the isolated rock-fortress
of Chinchilla, the only inland stronghold which was held by the
Spaniards in the kingdom of Murein. It was l\ Gothic donjon
on an inaccessible cliff, only formidable because of its position,
and manned by a trifling garrison. It might have held out in-
definitely, having a resolu~ governor, a certain Colonel Cearra.
But on October 9th, in a frightful thunderstorm, lightning
struck the donjon, killed 15 soldiers, wounded many more, set
the place on fire, and disabled the governor s. The garrison
capitulated in sheer dismay, and the use by the Freneh of the
high road between Albaccte and Almanza was no longcr incom·
moded by the existence of this petty fortress.
King Joseph wi.th the Army of the Centre marched out from
Valencia on October 17th, and bad his head-quarters at Requefia
on the road to Cuenca on the 19th. On the 23rd he reached that
ancient and mueh dilapidatcd city, and fOWld it already in the
hands of Drouet, who had arrivcd therc on the 20th with
Barrois's division and the ea\'alry brigade of Avy from the
Army of the South: he had expelled from it Bassecourt's 3,000
Murcian troops. Soult had started on the 15th fTom Albacete,
and had sent of( Drouet's detachment from San Clemente to
Cuenca, while he himself marched by Bclmonte on 'l'arancon and
Santa Cruz de la Zarza, which he reached on October 25th. He
• See above, vol. v. p. 332.
I Nnpier and JOUrdUII lIay thut Ceurra was killed; but be ollly lIuIrered
concussion of the brain, and survived to tell Schepelex (p. 688) bow his
sword nlld itll sheath were mclled into one rod of metlll by the Hghtlling
which ran down the side of the couch on which be was lying lit the moment.
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had not got into real touch with the enemy till, on the last-
named day, the cavalry on the right of his advance came into
contact with Freirc's lIIurcian horse in front of Tarancon, and
those on his left rall into the vedettes of Long's British dragoons
in front of Ocana. During the time of his edvanee these troops
• had been retiring in front of him, from Consuegra, Toboso,
Almonacid, Bclmonte, and other places in La Maneha, where
they had been providing a. long screen of posts to observe his
movements. They had, by Hill's orders, retired from the 18th
onward before the French cavalry, without allowing themselves
to be caught up. It was only immediately in front of the Tagus
that they slackened down their pace, and allowed the French to
discover them. There was a smart skirmish in front of Ocana
on October 25th, iJctween Bonnemuin's brigade and the 9th and
13th Light Dragoons and lOth Portuguese cavalry. The allied
squadrons were pushed back towards Aranjuez with the loss
of some 80 men, ErskillC, who was in command of the cavalry
di\'ision, refusing to make a stand or to bring up his reserves.
His management of the troops was (not for the first time) much
criticized by eye-witnesses
'
, but it must be remembered that ~ill
had directed him not to commit himself to a serious action. On
the same day Freire's horse were turned out of Tarancon by
Perrcymond's ehasseurs.
Thc position of the commander of Wellington's detached
corps in front of Madrid had become a very responsible one
between the 15th, when Sou1t's advance began, and the 24th,
when the enemy came up to the line of the Tagus and developed
IllS attack. Fortunately Hill wus in close touch with IllS chief:
so well was the line of communication between them kept up.
that it only took two days for a letter from Burgos to rcaeh
Madrid-and vice versa. Whcn the army had come back from
the Arlanzon to the Douro. the time became even shorter.
Wellington rceeived at C~bczon on the evening of October 27th
dispatches that Hill had written on the morning of the 26th 2.
This contrasts wonderfully with.the slow travelling of Freneh
correspondenee-Souham got at Briviesca on October 17 1\ letter
written by King Joseph at Valencin on October 1st. It had been
• Sce, c. g., Schcpclcr (p. 680), who was present.
• Sce !Xspaltlles, ix. p. 518.
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obliged to travel by the absurdly circuitous route of Tortosa,
Saragossa and Tudela. Truly the guerrilleros made concerted
movements of French armies singularly difficult.
On the 17th October Hill had already got off his first letter
of alarm to Wellington, saying that Soult was certainly on the.
move; by the 19th he knew that there was a column moving
upon Cucnca. as well JlS the larger force which was advancing
by San Clernente and Belmonte. lie asked for orders. but
meanwhile had to issue his own, in consonance with earlier
directions received from Wellington. These presupposed two
conditions which had not been realized-that the fords of the
Tagus would be impo.ssable, nnd that Dnllastcros's Andalusiull
army would already have crossed the Sierra Morena to Alearaz
and be lying on Soult's ft,auk. But their general directions were
still practicable: the line of the Tagus was to be defended unless
the enemy were in overwhelming strength: if (contrary to
Wellington's expectation) the whole French force in Valencia
should advance, and its nwnbcrs prove greater than Hill could
hope to check, he had been directed to evacuate Madrid, and to'
fall back beyond the Guadarrama, in order to join his chief on
the Adaju, south of Valladolid, in Old Castile '. 'I'he first thing
necessary was to discover the strength of the enemy-all
accounts sent in by the Spaniards agreed that it was very great,
and in particular, that the column going by Cuehea was no
mere detachment, but a solid and considerable force. Mean-
while Wellington, even as late as October 12', had been informing
Hill that his design of marching down on Madrid with three
divisions, when the siege of Burgos should be either successfully
concluded or else abandoned, was still retained. Any morning
a dispatch might come to say that the commander-in-chief, wilh
15,000· men, was on his way to Valladolid; a!ld therefore the
army in front of Madrid must be ready for him, concentrated
and in marching order. For jf he came in person with such
a reinforcement, Soult and King Joscph could be fought and
beaten, whenever they made their appearance.
On October 15th, when the French advance had actually
begun, the allied troops in New Castile were disposed with an
• This is clearly stated in
DilJpuldJaJ, ix. p. 481.
Wellington's note to Hill of October 10.
o Ibid., p. 485.
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outer screen, mainly consisting of Spanish troops, and El central
nucleus of Hill's own Anglo-Portuguese placed in cantonments
between Madrid and the Tngus. Dassecourt was at Cuenea
with 3,000 men; Elio, with Freire's l'tIurcian horse and a weak
division of infantry-5,OOO men in all-was watching the high
roads from Albacete and Requei'la to Madrid, in front of Taran~
con. !'enne Villemur's cavalry with Morillo's infantry-3,500
men at the most-lay across the great chaussee from Andalusia,
about Herencia and Madridejos 1. These troops formed the
outer screen-not taking account of the Empecinado, who was
(as usual) on the borders of New Castile and Aragon, worrying
Suehet's garrisons in the latter kingdom. Behind Penne
ViIlemur, and south of the Tagus, were Long's British and
H. Campbell's Portuguese cavalry brigades, in La !\[aneha, at
Toboso, Villaeanas, and other places. All the rest of the
British troops were north of the Tagus, in the triangle Madrid-
Tolcdo-Fuenteduenas, as were also D'Urban's Portuguese
horse and Carlos de Espafia's Spanish infantry division. When
the advance of Soult and King Joseph developed itself, Hill
drew everything baek behind the Tagus, save Bassecourt's
division at Cuenea, which lx:iJlg evicted from that place by
Drouct on the 20th did not retire towards Madrid, but went
up into the mountaillS, and ultimately by circuitous routes
rejoined the Alieantc army.
On the 25th October, when Soult's advanced cavalry had
driven Long a.nd Freire from Oeana and Tarancon, Hill had his
whole force, British, Portuguese aud Spanish, arrayed in what
he intended to be his preliminary fighting position along the
Tagus. The extreme right was formed by Skerrett's 4,000 men
from Cndiz, who had got up to the front just in time to take their
share in the fighting. They lay at Toledo and Mover. Then
came the four brigades of the British 2nd Division, two of them at
Aranjuez----whieh was held as a sor't of Mtc de pont south of the
river-and two at Colmenar de Orija. 'fhe line beyond them
wa.s prolonged by Penne Villemur and Morillo about Belmonte
de Tajo and the fords of Villamanriquc. Elio and Frcire, ,who
1 When Penne Villemur moved in, and went behind the Tagus, I cannot
make out exactly. But it was before Oetober 25th, as at that time Erskine's
British cavalry bad no longcr any scrccn in front of tllem.
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had retired across the bridge of Fuenteduci'Jas after being
driven out of Tarancon, was in charge of the upper Tagus from
that point to Sacedon. Behind this front line ~ay the reserves-
the Srd and 4th Divisions close together at Valdemoro and
Cienpozuelos, behind Aranjuez; the Light Division at Arganda;
Carlos de Espat\a at Camporeal; Hamilton's Portuguese
division at Chinchon. Of the cavalry, Long and Campbe1I's
Portuguese, after being turned out of Ocana, had fallen back on
Aranjucz: D'Urban's Portuguese were at Arganda, Slade's
brigade at Moram, Victor Alten's at GctnCc 1. Onc march
would concentrate the whole of the Allies, horse and foot-save
Elio and Skerrett's detachment alone--to defend the passage
of the Tagus at either Aranjnez or Fuenteduenas, the two
crossing-places which Hill judged that Soult would take into
consideration, when he attempted to force the line of the river.
About 36,000 men would be available, of whom 28,000 were
Anglo-Portuguese and 8,000 Spaniards.
Soult, however, kept perfectly quiescent in front of Arani!lez
and Fuenteduenas on the 26th-27th. lIe had still his cavalry
to the front, but his infantry divisions were only coming up in
succession: Conroux's in especinJ., being still in quarant.ine
owing to the yellow fever, was very far behind. But it was not
merely the late arrival of his rear that kept 50ult motionless:
he was waiting for the Cucnea column to bring pressure to benr
upon Hill's flunk, and did not intend to commit himself to allY
important engagements until the whole French army was in
line. He expressed to King .Toseph his opinion t.hat the Allies
were drawn out upon too long a front, and that a bold thrust
at Aranjuez would probably succeed, when the attention of
Hill should be drawn away to the East by the appearance of the
Cuenca column in the direction of Fuentedueims. Meanwhile
he proceeded to make his preparations for attacking Arunjucz
on the 28th.
Such an attack was never delivered, because Hill, on the
evening of the 27th, made up his mind that he must not fight
upon the 'l'agus 2. For this determination there were three
• All tbcw dispositions come from a table or routes sent to D'Urball
by Juckson, Hill's clJid of the st.flff (Quartermaster-general), on the 2oUn.
• Jackson, Q.M.G., to D'Uroon, 27th night: 'Sir Rowhmd has deter-
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causes. The first was that the river still remained so low, the
autumn rains having been very scanty hitherto, that it was
fordable in many places. The mere breaking of the bridges at
Anmjuez and Fuente Duenas did not make it impassable, as
Wellington and Hill himself had expected would be the case
by the cnd of October. Secondly, if the line of the Tagns were
forced at any point, the troops strung out nlong it had 0. very
dangerous retreat before them, owing to the fact that the Tajuno.,
a strcam not much smaller than the Tagus itself in this part of
its course, runs behind it and parallcl to it at n distance of only
eight or tcn miles. Thc number oC spots where the Tnjuna
could be crossed, by fords, bridges, or ferrics, were very few,
and it was to bc feared thnt bodies of troops abandoning
positions on the Tagus, and retreating to the next line, might
find themselves pressed against the Tajuna at impassable
sections of its course, and so might. be destroyed or cnptured
if the enemy pursued with vigour. Thirdly-as Soult expeeted
-the movement of the King and the column from Cueneo. had
now begun to exercise pressure on Hill's mind. He had already
movcd two British brigades of the 2nd Division to Fucnte
Dueiins, replacing them at Aranjuez by Skerrett's force, which
lcft Toledo. Dut what if the King should cross the Tagus not at
Fuente Duenns but above it, where the river was only observed
by Elio's p..[urcians? They certn.i.nly could not stop him, and
the whole Tagus line would be turned.
Hill's resolve was now to defend not the Tagus ·but the line,
running North and South, of the Henares and the Jarama (the
river formed by the union of the 'fajuna and Manzanares), from
Guadalajara to the point near the Puente J~arga where the
Jarnmn falls into the Tagus. On the 28th Skerrett evacuated
Aranjuez, and all the" other troops fell back in similar fashion.
This position left the allied army still covering Madrid, nnd with
a safe retreat to the passes above it, should things go ill. The
new disposition of forces was as follows: Toledo had been
handed over to the partida of El Medico, since no Freneh
reconnaissances had come in this direction, and it was clear
that the enemy had no serious intentions on this flank. The
mined to oonoontrnte behind the Jaromn, on acoount of the state oC the
lords upon the Tagu.s. nnd their number,' &c.
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extreme right \'I'ing of the army was formed by the 4th Division,
now once more under General Cole, who had come up, cured of
his i,vannd, from the Salamanca hospital. It lay at Afiover,
behind the point where the Jarama flows into the Tagw;. with
its flank covered by the Gunten river and some of Long's
dragoons. Next in line, six miles to the North, was Skerrett's
force, holding the Puente Larga, the main passage over the
Jarama river, two miles north of Aranjuez. Beyond him were
the Brd Division and Hamilton's Portuguese about Valdcmoro
and St. Martin de la Vega. Then came the Light Division at
Aleal&. de Henares 1: Carlos de Espai'ia's and Marilla's Spaniards
were in their company. Elio's Murcians were directed to fall
back on Guudalajara. So much for the infantry: the cavalry
was kept out in front, with orders to keep a line of vedettes on
the Tagus till they should be driven in, and then to hold the
eourse of the'Tajuna in a similar fashion, before breaking its
bridges and falling back on to the Henares and J amma, the real
fighting line. But nothing was to be risked, and the main body
of eaeh brigade was to keep itself in front of a practicable cross-
ing, by which it could retreat when the enemy should have
shown himself in force. '.Sir Rowland,' wrote his Quarter-
master-General, 'wishes you to keep the posts on the Tajuna,
and those in front of it (on the Tagus), as long as you can 'with
safety. Cover the line of the Hcnares as long as you can.':
Slade's, Long's, and Campbell's Portuguese squadrons had the
right, eoveri!-lg the river bank from Aranjuez to Villamanrique
with their vedettes, D'Urban, Victor Alten, and Penne VilIemur
held the left, from Villamanrique up stream.
On Oet. 28th the Freneh cavalry, having detected the dis-
appearance of Hill's infantry, crossed the Tagus both at. Aran-
juez and Fuente Dueiias in force, whereupon the allied horse
retired behind the Tajuna and broke all of its hridges. Soultat
once commenced to repair the bridges of Aranjuez, and brought
• They had been at Arganda behind the Ta.julla on the previollS day,
when Hill was still thinking of defending the line of the Tagus. See Diary
0/ Leach, p. 287.
• JackSOIl to D'Urban, Oetober 27: 'Keep your patrols on the Tagus
8.!1 long as they can with prudence stay there, with orders to follow the
march of your maill body.' 011 the next day the order is vlltied to that
quoted above.
1812) WELLINGTON BIDS HILL TO RETREAT 99
an infantry division forward into the town on the 29th, but made
no serious effort to feel Hill's position behind the Jarama and
'fajuna, being determined not to involve himself in heavy
fighting till King Joseph and the column from CUCllea lvere up
ill line. The head of the Army of the Centre, however, reached
Fuente Ducllas tllis same day, and began to pass I, meeting (of
course) with no opposition. But the reconstruction of the bridge
took some timc, and D'Erlon's infantry was not acrossthc Tagus
in any force till the next day. Thc King himself rode to Oealla,
conferred there with Soult, nnd made arrangements for a general
forward movement upon the 30th. There would have been
heavy fighting upon the BOth-31st, if Hill had been permitted
to make et stand on his chosen position with the ,.I,Q,OOO mcn
whom hc had placed in line between Alcala and Allover. He
had now all his troops concentrated except Elio's Murcians, who
layout in the direction of Gu04aJajara with no enemy in front
of them. But on the morning of the 2Qth Hill received a dis-
patch from Wellington, dated from Cabezon on the night of the
27th, which upset all the arrangements made hitherto. The
important paragraph of it ran as follows: • The enemy are
infinitely superior to us in cavalry, and from what I saw to-day
very superior in infantry also. Wc must retire, and the Douro
is no barrier for us. Ifwe go, and cannot hold our ground beyond
the Douro, your situation will become delicate. We certainly
cannot stand against the numbers opposed to us in any situation,
and it appears to me to be necessary that you, as wcJl as wc,
should retire. The only doubt which I entertain is about thc
road which you should take, and that doubt originates in the
insufficiency of this army to stop the army opposed to it for
a sufficient time to allow you to rcach the Adaja. I proposc to
remain on the Pisuerga to-morrow (October 28) and as long as
I can upon the Douro, and then to retire by Arevalo. God
knows whether I shall be able to remain on either river!; and if
I cannot, your retreat should be by thc valley of thc Tagus.
I Owing to disgmedul carelessness on the part of IL brigadier of the
British 2nd Division much of the boat-bridge of Fuente Duetlas (which had
been brought over to the north bank) had not been burnt when the troops
retired. Mrwy boats were intact; some of the Freneh swam over. nlld
brought baek several ot them. (D'Urban MSS.)
H'
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If I can remain, we should join as arranged by previous letters.
If I cnn remain on the Pisuergll. to-morrow, I shall pass the
Douro on the 29th, and shall probably be able to prevent the
enemy from crossing in force till the 1st November, in which
case I shall reach Arcvalo on the Brd. You will not receive this
letter till the 29th. You will arrive at the Escurial, probably
on the 31st, at ViIlacastin on the 2nd, at Arevalo on the 4th...•
If I should not be able to hold my ground either on the Pisuerga
or the Douro, I shaH apprise you of it at the first moment, and
shall suggest your line of retreat.... Your march, as proposed
(i.e. via the Guadarrama) at least as far as Villacastin, would
be secure, whereas that by Talavcra, &c., would not, till you
shall cross the Tagus. Do not order the bridge at Almaraz to be
taken up or destroyed, till you are certain you do not want it.' 1
Thc dispatcb cnded by directing Hill to bring on with him Carlos
de Espttiia's, Morillo's, and Penne VilIemur's Spaniards, but to
order Freire, Elio, and Bassecourt to join Ballasteros by the
route of Toledo, while the Empecinado had better go to his old
haunts in the mountains beyond Guada.1ajara.
This was a most alarming dispatch for Hill. Just as he had
assumed his fighting position, and was expecting to be attacked
by Soult on the following day, he reeeived orders to retire with-
out a moment's delay. And what was worst of all, he was told
that the line of rctreat indicatcd to him would not improbably
prove dangerous or impossible, and that he might, within thc
next day or so, get a counter-order, directing him to retire by
the line of the Tagus and Almarnz,sinee a junction with Welling-
ton behind the Adaja might prove impossible. But a retreat
across the front of the encmy, on the route Navalearnero-
Talavcra-Almaraz, would clearly he most dangerous, sinee the
left wing of the Army (the Light Division, D'Urban, Alten and
the Spaniards) would have forty miles to march before they
were clear of the advancing columns of the French, debauching
from Aranjuez. And to make matters worse, the enemy was
terribly strong in cavalry, and the countryside south of Madrid
was vcry favourable to the mounted arm. If the army should
march at once for the road by the Guadarrama, and when it had
reached the neighbourhood of Madrid or the Escurial should get
• Wellington to Hill, Cabe,;on, October 27. DiJlpakher, ix. pp. 518-19.
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tbe news that the route to Villacll.stin and Arevalo had been
blocked, it would be almost impossible to turn off on to the
Tagus line or to make for Almaraz. The only chance left would
be to take the bad mountain-road to Avila, and thence to the
upper Tormcs, a choice that no offiecr could contemplate with-
out dismay in October.
There was one plea that might have been urged in favour of
an instant move toward Talavera and the Tagus route (the right
wing to march by IIlcscas and Fuensalida, the left by Madrid
and Navalearnero), but it was a plea of which neither Wellington
nor Hill seems to have thought. Supposing that Hill's 40,000
men after wlcovering and evacuating Madrid should place them-
selves behind theAlberchc, in and aboutTalavera, it was difficult
to believe that Soult and King Joseph would dare to march
north to join Souham and to trouble Wellington. They could
hardly leave 40,000 men behind them uncontained, and would
probably have to halt and to face toward Hill, so as to cover
the capital. 'fhis threat to their flank and their rear might force
the enemy to come to a stop, and might secure Wellington's
rear as effectually as a junction with him at Arevalo behind the
Adaja. Dut on the other hand there were two considerations
which tended to make any use of the Tagus route undesirable,
save on compulsion and as a pis alter. The first was that the
whole valley from Toledo to Almaraz was in a state of dreadful
exhaustion, with half it~ land untilled and its population living
on the edge of starvation. To subsist there would be difficult.
The SC(lond and more important was thnt the enemy might
conceivably leave Soult and the Army of the South to hold
Madrid and contain Hill's foree, and then would still possess
20,000 mcn----of the Cuenca column-who might be sent by the
Guadarrama and Villacastin to take Wellington in the rear.
n would be of little use to bring the enemy to a standstill in the
direction of Madrid, if he could still spare a detachment which
would make Wellington's position in Old Cai>tile hopelci>sly
untenable, and might even put him in grt\vc danger of being
overwhelmed.
But' sufficient for the day is the evil thereof' was no doubt
the reflection of Rowlalld Hill, a piollli man wcll acquainted with
his Bible. He had for the present a clear order to march for the
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Escurial, t.he Guadarrama, and ArevlIlo. That it might be can-
celled if certain circumstances, over which he had no control,
should OCCur on the Douro, was an unpleasant possibility, which
did not come into consideration on the 29th of October. Ac~
cordingly he gave orders for instant retreat. There was little
immediate danger to his left wing, since the French column in
front of it, at Fuente Dueilas, had to pass first the defiles of the
Tajuna and then those of the Jarama, and all the bridges on
both were destroyed or ready for destruction. The right wing
was in a much more delicate situation, since it WM sepamted
from Soult at Aranjucz only by the Jaramo.. The outposts of
the two armies were in close touch with each other at the Pueutc
Largo, with nothing but the river between; llnd the 4th
Division at Aiiovcr had to poss behind the force holding the
Puente Larga in order to get into thc Madrid road. Supposing
that bridge were forced too soon, Cole would bc driven oU in
an eccentric line of retreat toward Toledo and TaJavera.
While, therefore, all the rest of the army was set in motion
for the Eseurinl at dawn on the 80th, Skerrett was ordered to .
stand still ot the Puente Larga, and to hold it at nil eosts till
the rest of the allied right wing should havc got clear. Mean-
while the troops about A1cnla (the Light Division, Espaila and
l\foriJlo) marched round the north side of Madrid without
entering the city, and continuing their course all day and part
of the night, were on the upper Manzanares, about the palace
of El Pardo by 12 p.m. At the same time thc troops about
Valdemoro (3rd Division, Hamilton's Portuguese, and the bulk
of the cavalry) retired past the south side of Madrid, and reached
Arnvllcn, on its west side two miles out, by night. Here Hill
established his head-quarters. The 4th Division, from Ailover,
which had the longest march. of all, had been started of! before
the bulk of the army, on the night of the 29th, not at dawn on
the 30th like the rest. It fell into the main road at Valdemoro
before daybreak, much fatigued; while halting there the weary
men discovered more wine than WIIS good for them-the
population had fled and left their cellars exposed for the first
corner. There WllS a terrible amount of drunkenness, llnd so
much straggling, whcn thc division marched orc at noon, that
mnny hundreds of men, hidden in houses in a state of absolute
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incapacity to move, were left behind \ The division, minus
its drunkards, joined the rest of the right wing at Anwaca that
night. Colc remained behind himself-while his troops marched
on-to supervise the defence of the Puente Largo.. He had been
told to take 011 Skerrett's brigade as n part of his division till
further orders, and naturally stopped with the rearguard.
By the night of the 80th all the army was concentrated beyond
Madrid, without ~laving SCtln an enemy or sutrered any molesta-
tion, save Skerrett's detachment, which was fighting all day at
the Puente Largo. for the protection of the rest. Soult, as Hill
had expected, had resolved to force the line of the Jarama and
Tajuna that day. But while on the right his cavalry felt for-
ward only to the Tajuna and its broken bridges, on the left he
was already in touch wIth his enemy, for the Puente Largo. is
only two miles outside Aranjuez, from which the approach to it
lies along one of the great avenues of planes that form part of
the royal Park between the Tagus and Jarama.
The Pucntc Larga is an immensely long bridge of 16 arches,
for the Jamma in winter is ,a very broad river. Its southcrn
end is commanded by a sligh.t rising ground, its northern lies in
the flat and ends in a causeway, by which the road finally
mounts up on to the plateau ofValdemoro. Thus it would have
been easier to defend from the south than from the north, as
Skerrett had to do. An attempt had been made to blow up Olle
of the centre 'arches of the bridge, but though two mines had
been laid, their explosion on the morning of the 30th did not
make a complete breach, one parapet and a broad section of the
footway beside it remaining intact. The engineer officer in
charge, holding that there was no time to make another mine,
had a breastwork covered by an abattis throl\-TI up across the
northern end of the bridge. Here then was a sort of terrace
with balustra.des and stone seats, where the bridge and cause-
way met. Behind the breastwork and the terrace Skerrett
- p).aced his two companies of the 95th Rifles and part of the
1 Sce (or thill Wachholz (of the Fusilier brigade), Sehepeler, l'urdoo's
history of the 47th, &e. Waehholz's llnmswick Company straggled 50
that or 00 men he found only 7 with him nt night. Several were 1000t for
good. Wellington put the colonel of the 82nd under nrrcst, beenuse he
had loot 80 men this dny.
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2/47tb, while behind the nearer part of the causeway there W8!t
room for the supports, the rest of the 47th and the 2/87th in
close column. The ridge of the causeway almost completely
sheltered them from fire from the French side of the river, even
from the most elevated ground. Three guns of Braun's Portu-
guese battery :were prepared for action on the right end of the
terrace, behind the hastily extemporized breastwork. Half
a mile to the rear, at the north cnd of the causeway, was
Skerrett's reserve, composed. of the Srd bau. of the First Guards,
the 20th Portuguese, and the remaining three pieces of Braun's
battery. The whole defending force of five battalions and six
guns was somewhat under 4,000 strong.
Soult was not certain whether Hill was intending to fight on
the line of the Jarama, or whether he had merely to drive in
a rearguard. The day was very misty from dawn onward, and
at 9 o'clock in the morning rain began, and fell continuously
tilJ night. TIJus the Marshal could not see in the least what
sort of a force was opposed to him, and his cavalry, exploring
up and down the river bank, were unable to find any practicable
fords, or to give him any information as to whether there were
allied troops holding the entire course of the Jarama. After
some hours, therefore, Soult scnt forward Reymond's division 1
with orders to force the Puente Larga, as he had been ~nformed
that it was still passable owing to the failure of the mines. A
battery took post on the rising groWld at the south end of the
bridge, and shelled the breastwork and the Portuguese guns,
while the voltigeur companies of the 12th Ugcr strung them·
selves out along thc river bank, and commenced a long bickering
fWiillade with Skerrett's men across the water. The artillery
and musketry fight went 011 for somc hours, till Braun's three
pieces ceased firing for want of ammunition. Thinking this
a favourable moment, Soult sent part of the 12th Uger against
the bridge-the head of the eolwnn never reached the narrow
pass at the half-broken eighth arch, suttering so much from the
musketry that it fell back in disorder before getting holf-way
across. Another regiment, or the same reformed, attempted
a similar rush a few minutes later, and was repulsed in the same
fashion. Thereupon Soult ordered the attack to cease, 'seeing,'
I D'Erlon·s old division now commanded by this brigadier..
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as he says in his dispatch, • that we were wasting ammunition
to no efCect.' He drew off both his guns and his voltigeurs, and
the combat came to an end. A French oflicer appeared on to the
bridge with a white flag a little later, and got permission to
remove the many wounded lying at its south end. After dark
Skerrett withdrew very quietly, leaving dummy sentries 01\ the
bridge head and the causeway, who were only detected as straw-
stuffed greatcoats at da~vn next morning. The brigade, there-
fore, had an undisturbed mareh all night, and halted next
morning on thc Prado of Madrid, where it was allowed a few
hours of rest. Its loss had been about 3 officers and 60 men
killed and wounded, of whom 40 were in the 2/47th and 11 in
the rifle companies. The French had five officers and about
100 men killed ond wounded 1. The whole fight was much what
the combat of the Coo would have been in 1810, if CrauCurd had
fought behind and not before the bridge of Almeida.
Soult had deduced, from the stubborn way in which the
Puente Larga was defended, that Hill was standing to fight
a general action behind the Jarama. He made during the night
preparations for bringing up much artillery and constructing
bridges, but discovered at dawn that his exertions had been
unnecessary. Cavalry under Pierre 50ult wcrc pushed out as
far as Valdemoro, and captured there some 800 drunken
• stragglers belonging to the 4th Division, who had not thought tit
to follow Skerrett when he passed through. 'fhe day was one
of dense fog, and the younger Soult never got in touch with
Hill's rearguard, but picked up a rumour that Wellington was
exp~cted at :Madrid that day, with two divisions from Burgos,
and that the whole allied army was prepared to deliver battle
in a position outside the capital. In coIlsequence, his brother
the Marshal held back, and contented himself with bringing up
1 Always a recklel:ls falsifier of his own losses (he said"that he IJ!uJ only
lost 2,800 men at Albuera I), Soult wrote in ltis dispateh that he had
only about 25 wounded at the Puente Larga. The figure I give above is
thAt of the Bt1l.IT-officer d'Espinehel, whose memoirs lire useful for thiS
campaign. By far the best English aecouut is that of H. Bnubury of the
20th Portuguese (Reminucrnce$ of a Veteran, i. pp. 158-63). I can only
trllOO three of the five French officers in Martinien's lists-Pillioud, Caulet,
.·itZ·JUlllCS, lJut. do 1I0t doulJt d''&pilu:hcl's f1gur~ thougb his RC<:OUlll
of the combat is hard to fit in with lUIy English version. He speaks with
ndmirotion of the steoo'lle88 of the defence.
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the entire Army of the South to the Jarama, while he sent his
false news to lGng Joseph and Jourdan. He proposed that the
Cuenca column should make no attempt to force the higher
course of the Tajuna, where all the bridges were broken, and
behind which lay the equally tiresome ohsrocle of the Henares,
but should come round to Aranjuez and cross by the Pucute
Larga. Jourdan advised compliance, remarking that the
forcing of the lines of the TajuIlB. and Benares and the making
of bridges upon them might take many days. To save time
the right wing came round to join the left '.
This was a godsend to Hill, as it resulted in no pursuit being
made on the 31st j the French advanced cavalry only entered
Madrid on the 1st November, and the second of that month had
arrived before any infantry reached the capital. By that day
the allied army was over the Guadarrama, and well on its way
to Villaeastin and Arevalo. The evacuation of Madrid was
accompanied with many distressing incidents: the people were
in despair at seeing themselves about to fall back once more
into the power of the' Intrusive King'. Many of the notables
had committed themsehres so openly to the patriotic cause that
they thought it wise to depart in company with Hill's army.
An order to burn the considerable stores of provisions which
could not be bro.ught of{ led to a riot-the lower classes were
on ·the edge of starvation, and the sight of good food being
wasted led them to make a disorderly rush on the magazines,
to drive away the commissaries, and to carryorr the flour and
salt meat which was being destroyed. Probably it would have
been wise to permit them to do so without making difficulties;
as the stores, once dispersed, could hardly have been gathered
in again by the enemy. The explosion of the Arsenal in the
Retiro fort was a more absolute necessity, but the MadrileflOs
murmured grf!atly that the large building of La China, the
porcelain manufactory, was blown up along with the surround·
ing earthworks. The mines, it may be incidentally remarked,'
were so carelessly laid that two commissariat officers were killed
by the first of them that went oU, and the last nearly made an
cnd of Captain Clce~es, K.G.L., the artillery officer in charge
, AU this from Soult's dispatch to the King of October 31, from Valdc'
moro, and Jouwnn's lo Clarke from .Madrid of Novcmber anl.
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of the business. lie was severely scorched, and barely escaped
with his life"t.
The rearguard of thc British Army quittcd the mourning city
by noon on the 31st October: the head of thc column was
already on that day at the EscuriaL On November 1st the
passage of the GUlldarrama lJegan, and on the 3rd the last
cavalry brigade, bringing up the rear, was over the mountains.
Not a sign had been seen of the enemy, whose advanced light
cavalry only reached Galapagar, five miles south of the Escurial
upon the 2nd. The weather. however, was very bad, min falling
day after day, and this must serve as an inadequate excuse
for the fact that straggling had already begun. and that a certain
number of men dropped so far behind that they fell into the
hands of the tardily-appearing enemy. But the loss of these
laggards, for the most part the selected bad characters of each
battalion, was a small price to pay for an unmolested retreat.
Hill's spirits rose, hour by hour, as he received no letter from
Wellington to say that the retreat to Arevalo had become
impossible. or that the line of the Douro had been lost. These
terrible possibilities might-so far as he knew-have eome into
existence at a~y moment on the 1st, 2nd. or Srd of November.
On the 4th the whole army from l\:ladrid was concentrated at
VilIacnstin, so close to Wellington's position behind the Douro
at Rueda that dispatches eould now get through from him to
Hill in less than twelve hours•. The cavalry of the extreme rear-
guard-the 2nd Hussars K.G.L., who had left the Escurial only
on the Brd, had barely seen the enemy's advanped vcdcttes on
that day, and wcre not overtaken by them till late on the 4th.
The pursuit was slow, cautious, and not executed by any ycry
large body of horse. Hill. therefore, grantcd his troops a \'cry
necessary rest of twelve hours at ViIlac8stin.
At last, however. on the evening of November 4th, when the
worst possibilities seemed to have passed by. and nothing could
any longer prevent Hill from joining Wellington, discouraging
news, so long e:....pected. at last came to hand. A dispatch from
Rucd·a informed Hill that his chief had determined to retreat
from the line of the Domo, for reasons which will be cxplained
l See Diary of S'IOO1Jey, R.A., p. 428, in Journal of tilt Arlillffy l1ulillllion,
vol. "xii.
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in the next chapter, and that the position in which he intended
to fight was that in front of Salamanca, where he had faced and
beaten Marmont in July. This being 80, there was no reason to
bring up Hill's corps to Arevalo. Since a junction between the
two halves of the army was now secure, the troops from Madrid
should save themselves an unnecessary detour to the north, by
turning oH the chaussee to VaUadolid and taking the cross-road
by Bela.yos, Villanucva de Games', and Pciiaranda. This would
bring them to Alba de Tormcs, where they would find themselves
in touch with Wellington's own troops, which would move, by
La Navs and Cantalpino, to the San Cristobal position outside
Salamanca.
This march therefore Hill executed. On the 4th he had at
last heard of the appearance of Soult's cavalry, and that same
evening his extreme rearguard, the 2nd Hussars of the K.G.L.
had a slight engagement with French squadrons near VilIaeastin.
But nothing was known of the main body of the enemy's
infantry, nor was it even certain whether the Army of the South
and the Army of the Centre were both pursuing by the route
of the Guadarrama. Soult, as a matter of fact, hud only made
up his mind to cross the mountains by that route on the Srd, and
nothing but the light cavalry of his brother was near Hill's
rear. On the 4th, 5th, and 6th November his main body was
coming up, and he was in force at Arevalo on the last-named
day. Only the horse of his advanced guard had followed Hill
on the Pefiaranda road. The object of the move on Arevalo
was to seek for t~e Army of Portugal, of which no certain news
had yet been obtained. The Duke of Dalmatia supposed how-
c\'er that it had to be looked for on the side of Tordesillas, and
wished to communicate with it before he pressed Hill too closely.
For if the latter had united with Wcllington-as was very
possible-he might have found himself in face of more than
60,000 men, and he had but 40,000 of his own, since the Army of
the Centre wus not yet up in line. 'I'he King himself with his
Guards followed Soult after a short interval, but the three
infantry divisions (Barrois, Palombilli, Darmagnac) which had
formed the column that marched frolll Cucnca, were far behind.
Palomhini's division, which had been told of! to act as the rear-
guard, was observing the accumulation of Spanish troops near
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GuadaJajara, where Elio and Freire had now been joined by the
Empeeinado, who had eome in from the direction of Aragon.
They had united at the Puente de Aunion and Saccdon, a few
miles south-cast of Guadalajara, on the upper Tagus. There
were now 8,000 or 9,000 enemies in this quarter, still quite close
to Madrid, and Joseph and Jourdan had to eome to a difficult
decision. If a garrison were left in Madrid, and a strong column
sent to evict Elio from his position, the Army of the Centre
would have few troops left who could follow. Soult in the pursuit
of Wellington. But if the whole Army of the Centre marched
by thc Guadarrama, there was nothing to prevent Elio from
coming down to reoccupy Madrid, and thc political cUectof thc
evacuation of the capital would be detestable, for it would l09k
as if thc wholc French army was but a flying column incapable
of holding what it had won 1. After some hesitation the King
and Jouroan resolved that the military necessity of tuking
forward cvery available man to crush 'Vellington was all-
important. If Soult alone joined the Army of Portugal in Old
Castile the French in this direction would not ovtnumbcr the
combined forces of Wellington and Hill, and might be brought
to a stand-perhaps evcn beaten. Thc 20,000 mcn of thc
Cucllca column must be brought forward at all costs to sccurc
a numerical superiority for the French arms in thc North.
Madrid therefore must be abandoncd, and the infantry of the
King's army marched out of it on the 6th and 8th November,
Palombini bringing up the rear once more. Even the sick and
Joseph's Spanish courtiers had to be taken on, with a comfort-
less assurance that they might ill the cnd be dropped at VaIla-
dolid 2. On the 8th the leading division of the Army of the
• The importance of the second evacuation of Madrid is brought out
by no historian of the war eJ<ocpt Varoni, vi. pp. 188-tlO. Napier barely
mentions it. A curious story of the fate of oortnin English prisonerl:l of
Hill's anny, who were forgottell in prison, and came out again to liberty
when the French anny moved on, may be found in the autobiography of
Harley of the 47th Regiment.
• Napicr (iv. p. 313) says that Joscpb left a garrison and bia impedi-
menta in l\Iadrid-I can find no trace of it in the contemporary accounts,
e. g. or Roman08 (Memorias fk un Setmton) or of Harley who was about
tbe town during the second week of November. Vncnni distinctly says
that Joseph had to take on even his sick (vi. p. ItlO). Cf. also Artcehe,
xl. pp. 309-12.
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Centre reached Villacaslin by forced marches, the rear did not
g~t up till the 10th I, Thus it is clear that on ~ovcmbcr 5th,
when Hill executed his flank movement on Fontiveros and
Penaranda, there was nothing near him save Sault's advanced
cavalry, supported at an interval by the infantry of the Army
of the South, while the Army of the Centre had not even left
Madrid. If Wellington had but knowu this, it might have
brought about a change in his orders; but-as cannot too
often be repeated-the' fog of war' sometimes lies very thick
around a general at the moment when he has to make his crucial
decision, and on these two days the enemy might have been
closed up, instead of being strung out in detachments over
it hundred miles of mountain roads. A few days after the French
left Madrid the Empecinado came down to the capital and
occupied it-Elio had gonc off, according to Wellington's
original orders, to placc' himself in communication wit-It the
Army of Andalusia (now no longer under Ballasteros) and took
post in La Mancha. Bassecourt reoccupied Cuenca. Thcre was
not a French soldier left in New Castile, and all communication
between Soult and King Joseph on one side and Suchet in
Valencia on the other, were completely broken off.
, Napier, iv. p. 373, says that Joseph went by'the route of Segovia to
Castile. I cannot think where he picked up this extraordinary idea.
Jourdan's dispatch of November 10 from Pcf'ial'(Lllda givCll all the fllctS.
It was on the 5th, neatViUacastin, that Soult ~old Joscph that Hill was
about to be joined by Wellington nnd that the two might crush him. The
King at once scnt onlCI'll to Drouet to comc up by forced marclll:ll from
Madrid. The Army of the Ccntrc started next day. Palombini did not
gel oil till thc 8th (VuCf\ni, vi. p. lOO), but the hend ofthc column rcuelled
Villacastiu that same day.
SECTION XXXIV: CHAPTER V
'I'HE BURGOS RETREAT. THE OPERATIONS ROUND
SALAMANCA. NOVE!'ImER I-NOVEMBER 15, 1812
'VIIEN wc tucm;d aside to narrate the operations round
Madrid, and Hill's retreat across the Gundarrama. Pass, wc
left Wellington and his army on November 1st drawn up on the
south side of the Douro, with head·quarters at Rueda. Their
right flank was covered by the Adaja, the cavalry of their
left flank was opposite Toro, where the French were visible in
some force, and were known to be repairing the bridge which
had been destroyed on October 80th. It was evident that the
main body of the enemy still lay about TordcsiIJas, SimancflS.
and Valladolid, but its exact strength was not llSccrtainablc.
A rumour had crossed the river that CaHarelli and the Army
of the North were already returning to their own regions
beyond Burgos; it was a true rumour, but Wellington could
get no confirmation for it 1. Till the facts were ascertained,
he was bound to consider it probable that the whole body of
the enemy-nearly 50,000 strong-which had pursued him sinec
October 22nd was still in his front z. With such a force he
considered himself unable to cope, if once it crossed the river
whose line he was dcfcnding. 'They are infinitely superior to
us in cavalry, and from what I saw to·day (October 21) were
superior in infantry also. Wc must retire therefore, and the
Douro is no barrier for us.' Hc held on however in the
position that he had taken up on October 80 till November 5,
po.rtIy because he was wishing to cover as long as possible
Hill's march to join him from Madrid, partly because Souham
ma.de no attempt for some days to debouch in force ucross the
bridges of Tordcsillas or Toro.
Wellington to Hill, November 3. Di$patche8, ix. p. 532.
• His first defiuite information D.lI to this WIllI from n Spaniard who on
November' saw 3,000 :F"rench infantry marching through Torqucmnda
towards Burgos (Dispatche8, ix_ p. 5(4). Even so late as November 8th
lie 4id not rely OD this important news D.lI correct.
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Meanwhile the near approach of Hill and the force from
Madrid, with Smut's army in pursuit, was modifying the
position from day to day. By November 4th Hill, as we have
alrcndy secn, was at Villacastin with all his five infantry
divisions, and the 7,000 or 8,000 Spaniards of Morillo and
Carlos de Espana. He was being followed by the French,
hut reported that day that be had so far seen no more than
four regiments of cavalry and two battalions of infantry.
Was this the advanced guard of the whole 60,000 men whom
Soult and King Joscph had brought against l\Iadrid, or was
it a mere corps of observation? 'I do not think it clear,' wrote
Wellington tt) HiD, at 9 o'clock on the morning of November 5th,
'that the enemy is following you in force. I conceive these
foUl' regiments and two battalions to have been sent only to
see what you are doing.' 1 This day Wellington could have
united himself to Hill without any fear of being hindered by
either of the French nrmies, and could have had the whole
of his 65,000 men concentrated bctwccn Medina del Campo
and Are...·alo within thirty-six hours. The enemy, though their
two armies taken together outnumbered him by more than
25,000 men, could not possibly unite within a. similar time.
He had, therefore, the position which entet'prising generals
most desire, that of lying between the two fractions of a. hostile
force, which cannot combine easily, and of being able to bring
superior numbers against either one oftbem. One can speculate
without much difficulty as to what Napoleon would have
done in a similar posture of affairs.
But Wellington, after mature consideration, resolved that
it would not be prudent to unite the two halves of his army
and to march against one or other of his enemies. It is
fortunate that he has left a record of 'the reasons whieh prc·
vented him from doing so. They are contained in a dispatch to
Lord Bathurst dated November 8th, when he had already com-
mitted himself to a wholly different policy. If he were to march
with his o'wn army, he wrote, to join Hill about Arevalo, with
the object of falling upon the hends of Soult's columns as
they debauched on VilIacnstin, Souham could cross the Douro
unopposed behind him at Toro, whose bridge was now repaired,
• From Rued", November 5, morning. Disp4iches, ix. p. 537.
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and get behind his left flank. While he was engaged "'''ith
Soult and the King, who might conceivably have 50,000 men
at the front 1, and be able to offer a good resistance, Souham
could close in on his rear, and after cutting him orf from
Salamanca and his magazines, could attack him, while he
was committed to the contest with the army- from Madrid.
On the other hand, if he took the second alternative,
and brought Hill's column up to Medina del Campo and
'l'ordesiIlas, Souham 'Would keep north of the Douro, and
could not be assailed: 'the enemy would not attempt to
pass so long as we remained in our position.' But meanwhile
Soult and the King, ~eing unopposed by Hill, might cut him
off from his base and magazines, because the line VilIacastin-
Fontiveros-Salamanca is shorter than that from 'l'ordesillas to
Salamanca. ''fhe enemy would have had the shortest line to
the Tormes by Fontiveros, if they had preferred to march in
that direction rather than to foUow the march of Sir Rowland
I-Iill's troops.'
This last argument, it must be confessed, seems disputable,
for not only aTe the roads Rueda-Fuente Sauco-Salamanca
and Rucrla-Pitiegua-Salamanca as a mattel' of fact no longer
than the road VilIacastin-Fontivcros-Penaranda-Salamanca 2,
but they were in all rcspects better roads, through a level
country, while the route which Wellington assigns to the
enemy (and which Hill actually pursued) passes through much
more diffieuit and hilly rcgions, and was but a cross·country
line of communications. It would seem doubtful also whethcr
there was any probability that the enemy, granting that he
had his whole force concentrated at the front, would dare to
take this route, since it was the one which made a junction
1 They had really not the 00,000 on which W'ellington speculated .
(' 43,000 men I ~hould COllsider rather below the numocr' (Dispute/reil,
ix. p. 544» but 60,000 or vcry ncnrly that number. Hut, on the day
when Wellington Wall writing, their rcar had not even started from Madrid,
and Soult's 40,000 men were stnmg out all along the rond.
• As a matter or fact, UlIing the best map or 1812 available to me
(Nantiat's), it would seem that the line Rueda-Fuente Sauco-SaJamanca
ill about 50 miles, that by Ruedn.--Nava del Rey-Pitiegua-Salamnnca
noout 65 milCll, while the route suggested for the I'·rcnch, cin,uitou8 uud
running in ~morc than one place by country cross-paths, is over 65 milCli
long, not to speak of its being a worse route for topographical reasons.
356.6
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with Souham and the Army of Portugal most difficult to him.
Soult and Joseph were very badly informed as to the exact
situntion of their friends from the North, but it was clear
that they would have to be looked for rather in the direction
of TordesiIJas and Valladolid than in that of Salamanca. As
a matter of fact, even nfter Wellington's retreat, Soult took
the trouble to move on Arevalo, instead of marching on
Fontiveros and Penaranda, for the sole purpose oC getting
into communication with Souham, whose co-opiration was
all-important to him.
But putting this pnrticular objection aside, it seems certain
that if Wellington had concentrated opposite Souham, behind
the Doura, Soult and the King could not 11RVC been prevented
from getting into touch with the Army of Portugal by taking
the rout.e Villacastin, Segovia, Olmedo, keeping the Adaja
bet.ween them and the Allies, and making for the upper passages
of the Douro (Tudela, &c.), which Wellington had surrendered
to Souham on October 80th. This fact is conclusive against the
policy of drawing up Hill to Rueda and making a move against
the northern enemy. Though a march by Soult and Joseph
against Salamanca was improbable, there were perfectly sound
reasons for rejecting this particular combination.
As much cannot be said on purely strategical grounds for
Wellington's resolution to relreat on Salamanca instead of
making So blow at Soult-his old original plan of September
and October. Supposing t.hat he had left nothing more than
a screen along the Douro to 'contain' Souham - say the
Galicians and a little cavalry-he could have joined Hill at
or near Arevnlo on the 5th or 6th, and havc calculated on
a couple of days' .start before the Army of Portugal oould have
followed him-it had to concentrate from scattered canton-
ments and to cross on onc or other of two ill-repaired bridges.
Mcanwhile Soult would have becn caught on thc 6th with his
40,000 'mcn strung out on many miles of mountain road, and
with his supports (the Army of the Centre) still at Madrid-
they did not even start for the Guadarrama till that same day.
It is clear that thc Duke of Dalmatia would have had to
retreat in haste, under pain of suffering a disaster: his advance
guard might very possibly have been cut up and maltreated,
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and he would have had to fall baek Oil the passes, where food
was unobtainable, and long sojourn impossible.
This would have been the Napoloonie method of dealing with
the situation. But it would be absurd to blame Wellington
for not adopting such a plan. Now, as always, he had to play
the safer game, simply because he could not afford to take
risks. Napoleon could face with indifference the loss of 5,000
or 10,000 men from a forced march in bad weather, ending in
an operation that miscarried-such had becn his march
against Sir John Moore in December 1808. Wellington eould
not. The season at the moment was singularly unfavourable
for a sudden offensive stroke, involving rapid movement. The
troops were almost worn out: Hill's column had only just
terminated a fatiguing retreat, the troops from Burgos had
only been granted five days' rest since the end of a similar
march. The number of sick (about 17,000) was alarming, and
many battalions were already reduced to 250 or 300 bayonets.
What was worse, straggling had shown itself in the most
vexatious form, not only among the troops of W'eIlinglon's
own column, but among Hill's divisions, which ought to have
done better after their long sojourn in quiet cantonments
round Madrid. A sudden dash to surprise Soult by forced
marches upon ViIlacastin would have been very costly, even
before the fighting began. And if the Marshal refused to
stand, and simply retired in haste toward the Army of the
Centre, it would be impossible to push him far. 1.1ellnwhilc
Souham would be across the Douro, and threatening Salamanca,
or approaching Wcllington's own rear. After all t.here remained
the cardinal faet that the enemy had a great numerical
superiority: it was even over-estimated in Wellington's own
mind, sincc he thought that Caflarelli and the Army of the
North were still at Valladolid.
Hence came his final decision to retreat by easy marches
toward the strong positions about Salamanca, lea.ving the
offensive to the enemy, and granting them the opportunity
of uniting their two long-separated armies. Wellington's own
plea. in favour of this resolve must be quoted-' The two corps
of this army, particularly that which has been in the North,
are in want of rest. They have been continually in the field,
12
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and almost continually marching, since the month of January
last; their clothes and cquipmcnts arc much worn, and a period
in cantonments would be very useful to them. The cfLvalry
likewise are 'weak in numbers, and the horses rather low in
condition. I should wish to be able to canton the troops for
a short time. and I should prefer the cantonments on the
'formes to those farther in the rear. I do not know exactly
what the force of the enemy is. The Army of Portugal have
about 86,000 men, of which 4,000 is cavalry 1. The Army of
the North have l~,OOO men, of which 1,200 is cavalry. It is
hard to judge of the exact extent of Soult's force. It is reported
that the enemy brought from Valencia to the Tagus from
40,000 to 45,000 men, but I should consider this to be rather
below the number that the Armies of Andalusia and the
Centre could bring up, without any troops from the Armies of
Aragon and Valencio. 2• Soult is particularly strong in good
cavalry, llud there are several more regiments in the Army of
the Centre. It will remain to be seen what number of troops
can be brought to operute against our position (on the Tormcs):
as unless Madrid should be again abandoned to its fate by the
King, he must make arrau!.rcments to resist the attacks which
Elio and the guerrilleros (the Empccinado, El Medica, &c.) will
make on that city, even if General Ballastcros should not
move forward in La 1'I!ancha. I propose therefore to wait at
present on the Tormes, till I shall ascertain more exactly the
extent of the enemy's force. If they should l}love forward, [
cnn either bring the contest to a crisis on the positions of
San Christoval, or fall back to the Agucda, according to what
I shall at the time consider to be best for the eausc 3.'
Wellington's estimate of a total force for the enemy of rather
more than 90,000 men was not far out, for ifhe wrongly supposed
that CaUarelli might still be at the front with his 10,000 men,
1 An under.estimate by several tbousands. Wellington' did not know
of Aussenae's brigade from ,Bayonne, over 3,000 men, which had now
been attached prov~..ionully to the Army of Portugal.
• The total which marched WIIS 00,000, so Wellington was even more
correct thllll lie supposed ill his notion thut 45,000 was too slll.llll
a figure•
• Wellington to Lord Bathurst, PiUcguu, Novelllber 8. DispaJcJles.
ix. pp. 544-5.
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he underrated the total of the Armies of the South and Centre
very considerably. They had not merely the something over
45,000 men of which he wrote, but nearly 60,000. But he was
under the impression that IGng .Joseph would probably leave
a large detachment to defend Madrid; and if the enemy came
forward against the line of the Tormes with anything less than
70,000 men, he was prepared to defend it. His own force,
counting Hill, but allowing for the losses l)n the retreats from
Durgos and j\[adrid, which would amount to about 2,000 at the
most, would be not far below that same figure, including 18,000
Spaniards. But the strength of the position would compensate
for the inferior value of these auxiliaries in line of battle. Just
at this moment Wellington was not at all contented with the
Galicians, whose conduct at Palencia and Villa l\Iuricl had
irritated him. < I was sorry to observe,' he wrote to Lord
Bathurst, ' that in the affair of the 25th October, although the
Spanish soldiers showed no want of spirit or of disposition to
Cllgage thc enemy, they were totally unable to move with the
regularity and ordcr of a disciplined body-by which alone'
success can be hoped for in any contest with the French I,'
There were threc possibilities before Wellington when he
had made up his mind to retire to thc 'l'ormes. 'The French
might. be contented with having driven him out of New Castile
and away from the Douro, and press him no farther. This
would be quite probnble, if they had made up their minds to
detach n large force to hold Madrid. Or, secondly, they might
come up against him to Salamanca, with a force no greater
than his own. In tillS case he was prepared to fight, and hoped
to come well out of the business. Thirdly, there was the chance
that they might bring forward every available man, nnd try
to evict him from his chosen position: if they were in very
great strength he must yield, and go back to the Agueda and'
the shelter of Ciudad Rodrigo, much contrary to his desire.
But he was not intending to give way, and to involve himself
in the difficulties of a retreat during the cold and rainy month
of November, until he should be convinced that the French
were too strong for him and that a rearward move was inevitable.
In the Salamanca positions he could force them to show their
• Dispalchel, ix. p. G20.
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strength, and yet have the power to draw orf if that strength
proved to be overpowering.
The retreat towards Salamanca oommenced on November 5th,
when Wellington both directed Hill to move on Fontivcros and
Flares de Avila instead of on Are\·alo. and also began to shift
hi~ own troops south·westward from the position about Rueda.
On this day the 5th Division and Ponsonby's cavalry brigade
marched for Alaejos. The rest of the Army were warned that
their movement would begin next day I, It was well to keep
Souham beyond the Douro, by continuing to show great
strength in his front, till Hill should have got some way wcst·
ward. There was 110 sign of activity in the enemy's canton-
ments, save that troops seemed to be moving towards Toro
along the road on the north bank parallel with the river 2. 'fhe
retreat wos therefore carried out in a leisurely fashion on the
6th-7th-8th: on the 6th Wellington's head-quarters were at
Torrecilla de In Orden, on the 7th find 8th at Pitiegua. The
divisions, covered by a cavalry rearguard, and with other
cavalry on their flank, thrown out to observe the French at
Toro, marched by several converging roads, some going through
Alaejos, others tllrough Castrejon and Vallesa, others by Fr~sno
and Cantalpin0 3 • There was no hurry, as there was no pursuit,
and by the evening of the 8th all were safely placed in their
old positions of June, north of the 'formes, in a semicircle from
Aldea Lcngua to San Cristobal. The weather being still very
cold and rainy, as many of the troops were quartered in the
villages as possible, and some as far back as Salamanca town;
but many had to bivouac in the open. After several nights
spent in position, dysentery and rheumatism, which had already
been thinning the ranks, became more common than ever.
Hill's column, meanwhile, having left the main road at
ViIlacastin on the 4th and having followed the bad cross-paths
between Bclayos and Fontiveros, got into a better route at
1 Wellington to Hill, Rucda, November,5. Di$]Jatches, ix. p. 637•
• Ibid., p. 589•
• I Cll.nnot flnd the details of the marching orders of the divisions; but
from personal diaries I seem to deduce that the 5th and 7th Divisions
marched by AlaejOll, the 1st and 6th by Castrejon nnd Vallesa, while
the cavalry not only provided n rearguard but kept out lIank detachments
as far as Cantalapiedra on one side and the lower Guarcna on the otber.
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the latter place, which it reached roter a very fatiguing march
on the night of the 5th. D'Urban's Portuguese horse, covering
the north flank of the retreat, had a narrow escape of being
cut off from the main column, near Villanueva de Gomez, by
Soult's advanced cavalry, which was pushing up northward to
Arevalo, but D'Urban got across their front in time. Hill's
Spanish divisions did not follow the same road as the British,
but had moved from VilIacastin to Arevalo on the 4th, covered
by their own cavalry (Penne Villemur): on the 5th they
marched from Arevulo to Fontiveros and rejoined Hill's head-
quarters 1. They had moved along two sides of a triangle, the
British only along the base-but the advantage of a good road
as opposed to a very bad one compensated for the difference
of miles covered. Presumably the order to Hill to take the
wretched by-paths that he followed was dictated by the idea
that, if these routes were neglected, Soult might send a t.'OIUIIlIl
along them, and anticipate Hill on the upper Tormes. Nothing
of the kind was attempted; the Murshal's only preoccupation
at this time was that he must at all costs look for the Army of
Portugal, and his explorations were directed north, toward
Arevalo. Hill's rear was only followed by a vanguard of light
cavalry, which behaved with great caution, and contented itself
with gathering up stragglers, who fell behind the column by
their own fault or from exhaustion. Soult claims to have taken
some 600 of them z, a figure which English authorities reduce
by about half: some scores of drunkards were undoubtedly
captured in the wine vaults of Villacastin 3.
On the 6th Hill's column marched from Fontiveros to Pei'la-
randa, the Light Division and Morillo forming the infantry rear-
guard, covered at a distance by Long's and Victor Alten's
squadrons. On the 7th the stnge covered was from Pennranda
to Coca (not fnr from Gnrdn Hernandez) within easy rench of
the Tormes, whose passage it was evident would be made
without any interference by the enemy. On the 8th, the day
• All this l'rom the detailed routes of march in the diJpatcbes of Jack$on
(Hill's Q.M.G.) to D'Urbull 011 November 4-6-6.
• See his dispatch of November 8 from Flares de Avila.
I For an adventure with these rasca1lI, wbo threatened to shoot one of
Rill's aides-de·camll, see Schepeler, p. Gill,
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on which Wellington entered the Sun Cristobal position, JUlI
crossed the Tormcs at Alba, leaving HowaTd'li brigade of the
2nd Division and Hamilton's Portuguese to hold that town,
which lies on the east bank of the river. It was intended to
maintain Alba as a sort of We de pont to cover the bridge.
Though dominated by heights a· few hundred yards away I, it
was extremely suitable for defence against an enemy unprovided
with heavy artillery. It was surrounded by an old Moorish
wall, with gaps that could easily be blocked, and its castle,
11 solid donjon, completely commanded and protected the
bridge. Slade's cavalry brigade remained out as a screen in
front of Alba, to watch for the approach of the enemy. When
the rest of the troops had crossed the Tormes, Wellington
directed Hill to send him the Srd, 4th, and Light Divisions,
Espafm's Spaniards, and Victor Alten's and D'Urbun's cavalry.
The force left under his lieutenant was now to consist, as in
the early summer, of nothing more than the old Estremaduran
corps-the 2nd Division, Hamilton's Portuguese, the Britisl~
cavalry of Slade and Long, the Portuguese cavalry of Campbell
and the Spanish squadrons of Penile VilIemur':'-about 20,000
men of the three nations. These remained behind Alba, in
the woods above the Tormes. The troops requisitioned from
Hill moved up to Calvarisa de Arriba, Maehaeon, and other
villages in the angle of the Tormes facing Huerta, from whence
they could be drawn into the San Cristobal position, by the
fords of Aldea Lengua and Santa l\farta, if necessary. The
whole army, not much under 70,000 strong, was now formed
in line from San Cristobal to Alba, waiting to sce whethcr the
advance of the cnemy would be by the eastern or the northern
bend of the river.
The French were slow in making their appearance, and still
slower in developing their intentions. For some days there
was little more than cavalry seen in front of Wellington's
position. The reason of their tardy appearance was. that
Soult had carried out his design of uniting with the Army of
POltugul before attempting to press the Allies. On the 8th
he wus still at Arevalo in person, with the main body of his
1 The ground on which Del Pnrquc had rought his unlucky battle
in 1809.
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infantry: light cavalry alone had followed Hill. Only on the
preceding night had his scouts, pushing out in the direction of
Medina del Cnmpo, succeeded in discovering Souham, who
had crossed the bridge of Tordcsillas on the 6th, after Welling-
ton's departure from Hucdn, and had sent reconnaissances in
all directions to look for the Army of the South, whose approach
had come to his knowledge not by any dispatch reeeived but
only by the vague' rumours of the eountl'y-side. Meanwhile,
he had held back his infantry, being not too sure that Wellington
might not have evacuated Rueda only as a trick, to lure him
forward: it was possible that he had been joined by Hill, and
was waiting a few miles back from the DOUTO, with the objeet
of faJling upon the Army of Portugal with superior strength,
as it should be debauching from the bridge of Tordcsillas. But
the roads were found empty in every direction, and presently
Souham's cavalry came in touch ,vith 50ult's, and both sides
discovered the exact situation.
Soult, Jourclall, and the King agreed that their best policy
was to bring cvery man forward from all the three armies, and
to force Wellington to battle, if he could be induced to stand
his ground.· But matters mllst not be 'pressed till the Army
of the Centre, which had only started from Madrid on the 6th,
should CQme up into line; and some of the divisions of the
Army of the South were still far to the rear, having hnlted
about VilJaeastin and Arcvalo. ACCQrdingly, it was not till the
10th that 'Vcllington saw any serious force accumulating before
the Salamanca posil..ions, and even then it was the advanced
guard alone of the enemy which had arrived. On the 9th
Soult's head-quarters were at Penamnda, those of the King
at Florcs dc Avila, those of Soul~am at Villarucla. On the 10th
Soult was in person before Alba de Tormes, but had only his
cavalry and two infantry divisions ill hand; the rest were still
in the rear. The Army of the Centre had its vanguard at Maco-
tern; that of the Army of Portugal had reached Babilafuente 1.
The troops were much tried by the weather, and those of
Soult's army in particular were feeling their privations. They
had been almost continually on the march since September,
, These movements from JOllrdan to Clarke, of November 10, lllld 801llt
to Clnrke of November 12.
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having halted but a few days on the borders of Valencia.
'fhe bitter November cold of the plateau of Old Castile was felt
almost unbearable by men who had been for three years lodged
in Andalusia, whose climate is almost sub-t.ropical and never
surrers thc cxtremes that are usual in Northern Spain I. Soult's
Army, too, had thc worst roads during the last days of the
advance, and its commissariat arrangements had gone wrong,
while little could be gleaned from the country-side. The horses
began to fail, and stragglers to drop behind.
On the 10th Soult resolved to see whether Wellington was
disposed to hold Alba de Tormes, or whether the detachment
there would blow up the bridge and ·retire when attacked.
Operations began by the driving in of thc pickcts of Long's
Light Dragoons, who had becn kept as far forward as possible
till the last moment. They lost a few men in retiring. Soult
then plaeed three batteries on the hill to the east of the town,
and commenced to shell it at about two o'clock in the afternoon j
shortly afterwards twelve voltigeur companies of the Fifth
Division deployed in long lines, and began to press up towards
the place, taking every possible advantage of cover, while the
heavy columns of thc regiments to which they belonged. and of
Daricau's division in support, were visible in the rear.
Alba was held by Roward's brigade of the 2nd Division
(1/5oth, 1/71st, 1/92nd); on the other side of the water,
as a reserve, were Hamilton's Portuguese (2nd, 4th, loth, and
14th Line) and the batteries of Arriaga and Braun, placed in a
position from which they ..could flank any attacks on the
bridge. The town had been prepared for defence, the gaps in
its walls having been fUlcd up with rough palisading, and its
non-existent gates built up with barricades of stone and timber.
Each of the three British regiments held one-third of the
circumference of the wall, with half its companies in firing-line
and the others in reserve under shelter. From two till five,
when dusk fell, Soult continued to batter the town; but' not-
withstanding the shower of shot and shell which plunged and
danced about the streets in every direction t' the losses of
. ,
• See the Notes oftbc Badcn officer Riegel(vol. iii. p. 537), who complains
bitterly of the piercing north wind, and the lack of wood to bllild f1reti •
• D'Espinchcl (if. p. 71) Stl.y9 that the voltigcu19 got within thcwallll,
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the defenders were quite moderate: they had been given time
on the 9th to extemporize good shelter with barricades and
traverses, and kept under cover. Thrice during the afternoon
the lines of voltigeurs, who had thrown themselves into the
ravines and ditches around the walls, received orders to charge
in; but on each occasion the bickering fire which they had
hitherto received burst out into a blaze as they approached
the walls, and their losses were so great that they had to
run back into cover. Hamilton reinforced the garrison at
dusk with two of Da Costa's Portuguese battalions (of the 2nd
and 14th Line). At nightfall the F'rench had accomplished
absolutely nothing.
Next morning at dawn (about 6 o'clock) the cannonade
recommenced, and the French skirmishers once more pushed
up towards the walls. Da Costa's light companies were used
against them, as well as those of the three British battalions.
But the attack was not pressed home, and after a few hours
Soult desisted: thc guns were drawn off, the infantry retired.
The Marshal wrote to King Joseph that it was no use pressing
on: he had thrown 1,500 shot into the place without effect:
by persisting • '1WUS Y perdriQ1ls du 't1lunde .~aTUJ resultat 1.'
Wellington had to be attacked, but the way to reach him was
certainly-as it appeared-not to be over the bridge of Alba.
From the 11th to the 14th Howard's and do. Costa's brigades
held the place without further molestation. Their modest
casualty list, on the afternoon of the 10th and the morning hours
of the 11th, had been 21 men killed and 3 offieers and 89 men
wounded: 8 killed and 86 wounded were Portuguese. The
Ij92nd with 38 men hit was the battalion that suffered most 2.
The French loss had been a little greater-apparently 2 olBeers
killed and 43 wounded s, with some 150 casualties in thc rank
but were expelled on each occu.sioll. The English narratives deny that
they ever closed, or reached the barricades.
I Soult to Joseph, 8 n.m. on the 11th, ' bivouac sur la Imuteur en 8rri~re
l.I'Alba de TormC!:i.'
• General Hamilton's account of the business (Dispatch to Hill, Welling-
Ion Diapo./diM, ix. p. 558) is very clear. There is also a good aecount of
the Alba fighting in Colonel Gtlrdync's excellent history of the 92nd .
• All their names verifiable from Martinien's admirable lists of' 0J!ici~s
tuts tI blessts.' .
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and file: the 45th Ligne with 5 officers hurt contributed th~
largest total to the list. ..-
The cannonade ut Alba settled nothing: on its second day
the French commanders were taking counsel together, Sault,
the King, Jourdan, with Souham and Clauscl (representing the
Army of Portugal) were all riding up and down the eastern
brmk of the Tormes, and seeking for the facts which finst
determine their next move l. Fortunately for the historian,
after the debate, which was long and indecisive, Jourdan and
Soult each wrote a formal letter of advice to the lGng that
CVClllllg. On onc point only were they agreed; it would be
mad to attack Wellington on the position of San Cristobal,
whose strength was well known' to all the officers of the Army
of llortugal, and had been increased during the last two days
by the throwing up of a chain of redoubts armed with artillery.
There remained t~o plans-Jourdari's was a proposal to force
the line of thc Tormes between Huerta Md Alba, by a· frontal
attack across the numerous fords whieh Marmolll; had used in
the campaign of the previous July; Soult's was a plan for
turning \Yellingtoll's right by going some distance up-stream
south of Alba, and utilizing the fords of the Tormes between
Alba and Snlvatierra. In the main the question turned on the
practicability of the fords, and this was varying from hour to
hour. Thc rain, which had madc Hill's retreat and Sault's
advance so miserable to thc troops, had stopped for thc moment,
and the river was falling. Of the numerous passages about
Huerta, La Encina and Villa GOIl7:alo, Wellington had COIl-
sidered on the 9th that none wcre really practicable: on the
lOth hc wrote to Hill that' the river has certainly fallen since
yesterday evening, but I believe that no infantry soldicr can
pass yct, cven jf a cavalry soldier can, and small picqucts
guarding thc fords and charging resolutely the first mcn who
pass, will etrectually prevent the passage 2.' Hill was not so
certain that the enemy could not force his way over the river,
and on the 11th Wellington conccded that some of thc fords
had certainly become practicable for cavalry, if not for infa.ntry3.
1 See .Jourdan's 1I1t!mQirC8, p. 44t, for the meeJ;illg.
• Wellington to Hill, November to, 4.30 p.m. (Dispatcllca, b::. p. 549).
• Same to same, November 11 (ix. p. aW).
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Considering the immense superiority o.f the French in the
mounted arm, it was conceivable that they might attack many
fords at once, drive in the inferiot cavalry·sereen of the Allies,
and then throw bridges across and attack the British centre.
In that case the army would stand to fight, not behind the
river bank but in front of the position of the Arapiles. It
would be necessary to close in the flanks for a battle; all or
most of the troops on the San Cristobal position would cross
the Tormes, just as they had done in July, and at the same
time Hill would draw in from Alba and form the southern wing
of the line, in the woods which had sheltered l\[armont's beaten
army on the night of the great victory. But Alba wns not to
be abandoned 1: its castle was susceptible of a long defence,
and effectually blocked the best passage of the Tonnes. Welling·
ton selected a battalion of Galician infantry (l\Iontcrcy, under
j\fajor Jose Miranda) whieh was to be placed in the castle, and
to hold it as long as possible, even when it should (as was
inevitable) be cut off from the allied army by the advance of
the French. The position was explained to the Spanish major,
who (as we shall see) behaved most admirably, blocked the
Alba line of communication for many days, and finally escaped
by a sudden sally from what looked like an inevitable surrender.
The two plans whieh were submitted. to King Joseph on· the
evening ot' November 11 both presupposed the practicability
of the fords of the Tormcs. The river must evidently have
fallen considerably sinee Wellington surve)'ed it on the 9th,
and drew his conclusion that it was a barrier not to be crossed
by any body of troops, but at most passable by individual
horsemen.
Jourdall wrote: '\Vhen we arrived on the heights above
thc right bank o( the Almar, Your Majesty was struck with the
advantages that the ground presented. I myself at once
conceived the hope of forcing the English Army to a general
action which must involve its destruction. 'Vellington's
position is too long-cxtending from the heights of San Crista-
bal on the right bank of the Tormes as far as Alba. The
Imperial Army could pass the river at almost any spot between
Huerta and the point where the Almar flows into the Tormes.
I Same to same, pp. 550-1.
126 OPERATiONS ROUND SALAlIANCA [Nov. 12
The immense plain on the opposite bank would permit the
whole of our cavalry to cross and form up ill front, to protect
the passage of our infantry. After that, the Army would march
i~ mass against the English centre (which appears to be between
Calvarisa de Abaxo and Calvarisa de AtTiba), and would break
through the enemy's line. I do not disguise from myself that
the piercing of the hostilc ecntre has its difficulties, but I should
think that 80,000 French troops could surmount thcm. Your
Majesty must have remarked that Soult, who at first was all
for marching toward the upper Tormes, was struck with the
advantages which this ground offered, and came round tp my
opinion. But subsequently he got talking with General Clausel,
about the plan for marching up the river, and returned to his
first view, which hc induced Clausel to support. Both of them
arc acquainted with the localities over which they wish to move
the armies, which gives weight to their opinion. I do not wish
to deny that Soult's proposition is the more prudent, and if
we want to fight we ought to do so on ground which Wellington
has not chosen, and which is less advantageous to the enemy
than that which he now occupies. But I fear that wc should
not obtain from this movement so much advantage as Soult
appears to expect.
'For he seems to think that Wellington will be forced to
retreat on Ciudad Rodrigo, while it is quite possible that he
may ehoose to retreat on San Felices, in which case our move-
ment to the upper Tormes compels him to retire indeed, but
enables him to avoid a battle. For my part I think that our
superior numbers make a general nction desirable. I conclude,
then, that Your Majesty may adopt Soult's proposition so far
as the movement up the Tormes goes. If so, I believe that the
Army of Portugal must follow the Army of the South. The
enemy has all his forces united: it would be too dangerous for,
us to divide ours I.'
Soult's letter of the evening of the 12th, to the King, rUllS
as follows:
• The pnssage whieh we reconnoitred a little below Villa
Gonznlo wlitcs all the qualities whieh one could desire, and
I Jourdan to Joseph, head-quarten at Peftaranda: early on Novem-
ber 12.
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I should be in favour of it, were it not for the fact that after
debouc'1ing on this point we should have to form up for the
attack under the fire of the enemy, and should be compelled
immediately to assail his whole army, in a position which he
knows and hus thought out, and where very probably he has
entrenched himself. I think, therefore, that it would be more
prudent and more advantageous to force him to shift his
position, and to commit himself to an action on ground which
we and not he will have chosen-or else to retreat!. I have sent
threc omccrs along the uppcr Tormcs; they havc reconnoitred
and found practicable three fords between Exeme and Gali-
sancho '.'
From the comparison of these two interesting dispatches we
see that.Tourdan desired a battle in the style of 'Y.agram, where
the attacking anny crosses a river, and breaks .through the
over-long line of an enemy deployed nlong heights at some
distance from the water's edge. But Soult (to use an ana- .
chronism) feared a battle in thc style of Fredericksburg, where
the assailant, debouching from narrow fords or bridges, attacks
in heavy masses a well-prepared position, held by an enemy who
has had time to settle down comfortably into it, and to entrench
the most suitable points. Soult was eminently justified in his
criticism of Jourdan's plan; the most noteworthy remark to
be made upon it is that this was the battlc which Wellington
wanted. He wished to be attacked frontally by the fords
between Alba and Huerta, and had made all his arrangements.
On the other hand, Jourdan's criticism of Sou]t was equally
cogent. If the French armies, keeping in a mass, crossed the
upper 1'0rmes far above Alba, Wellington had the choice
between fighting in a new position (e. g. behind the river
Zurgain), and absconding, before his flank should be threatened
seriously. He could, indeed, move off, practically unmolested,
towards Ciudad Rodrigo, and not merely (us Jourdan suggested)
by the more northern line toward San Feliees and Almeida.
Joseph, as was perhaps natural, gave his rmal decision in
favour of Soult's plan. It was true that he had a marked
superiority in numbers, and that a defeat of a crushing sort
, Soult to Josc(lh, night of November 1\, from the bivouac behind Alba
de Tormes.
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inflicted on Wellington would go far to cnd the Peninsular War.
No such army on the French side had ever been in line on a
single field before in Spain••Jourda.u's estimate of 80,000 men
was a decided understatement, even allowing for the fact that
Soult's divisions had already many stragglers, and that Souham
had left n. • minimu,m ' garrison at Vnlladolid. Something much
morc like the 90,000 men at which Wellington estimated the
three united French armies must have been collected 1. Qn
the other hand there is a dreadful risk taken when an army
endeavours to cross a grOllP of fords, supplemented at the best
by some hastily constructed bridges, in face of an enemy known
to be wary, active, and determined. What might not happen
if Wellington fell upon the leading divisions, while the rest were
crowding down to their crossing points? Or who could guaran-
tee that sudden rain in the Sierra de Franeia might not cause the
Tormes to rise three feet on the battle day, and separate the
troops who had crossed from those still on the eastern bank?
Every onc at the French head-quarters must have remembered
Esslillg, and the narrow escape from supreme disaster there
suffered from the caprice of the Danube.
On the whole, the prospect of the enormous advantage to be
got by inflicting a complete disaster on Wellington did not
balance the possibility of loss that might follow an uilsueeessflll
frontal attack upon rus position. Joseph made his choice in
favour of Soult's plan for a flank march to the upper Tormcs.
This mana:uvre would take several days to execute, AS the
I As the table of the l<·~neh Armies of 81mhl for Oetober 15 In the
Appendix shows, the Army of the South had on that day 47,000 men
under arlllS (omitting' sick' uud 'dctllchcd 'j, the Army of the Centre
15,000, the Army of Portugal 45,000 (inel'uding Aussenae's brigade and
Merlin's Ct\.vlIlry, both i1tLnched to it provisionally). This gives u toud of
107,000, without sick or detached. '1'he Army of l'ortugal may have lost
1,000 men ia action at Villadrigo and Villa Muriel, &e.: the Army of the
South not morc tha.n 400 at the J'ucntc Larga, Alba de 'formcs, &c.
The Army of the Centre had not fought at all. A deduction has to be
mude for Sault's very large body ot mell attached la tile Artillery Park,
and for a smaller number in the Army of l'ortugal-say 3,000 men for the
two together. Souhllm had left a smnll garrison' lit VaIllldoli<!-perhaps
1,500 men. If we allow 5,000 men for sick and stragglers between Octo-
ber 20 and November 12 there must still have been a good 90,000 men
present. l'lliol (who wlla prC6ent) t'ulls the total U7,OOO (HLI'. 254), milking it
a little too high, 1 imagine.
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Army of the South had to be moved to its left from all its
cantonments facing Alba. while the Armies of the Centre and
Portugal had to wait till this flank march was finished, in order
to CQme up and take over the former positions of Soult's divi-
sions. For all the French chiefs were agreed that the armies
must keep closed up, and that llO gap must be allowed to come
into existence betwcen them. When the Army of the South
should begin to cross the Tormes, the Army of Portugal must
be in direct support of it, and must make no separate attack of
its own to the north of Alba, in the localities which Jourdan
had found so tempting. The whole of the 12th and 13th Novem-
ber was expended in making this shift of troops southward.
Soult moved his army up·stream nnd plnced his head-quarters
at Allaya, six miles south of Alba, above the fords of Galisancho,
where the: crossing was to take place. Thc K{ng moved to
Valdccarros, a little to Soult'sright, with the Army of the Centre.
The Army of Portugal,leaving' its cavalry and tWQ infantry
divisions 1 as a rearguard about Hucrta, moved the other six
to the heights above Alba, where it was hoped that it might
cross, when Soult's manomvre should force Hill to abandon
that plaee and draw back.
The King took two unexpected measures before passing the
Tonnes. The first was to supersede Souham as commander of
the Arm)' of Portugal-the excuse used was that he was indis-
posed, and not up to his task: the real cause was that he WllS
considered to have shown tardiness and over-caution in his
manccuvres since October 80th.2 Drouet was taken trom the
command of thc Army of the Centre, and given the more
important charge of that of Portugal. The other, and more
surprising, order was onc which made over-as a temporary
arrangement-the charge of thc Army oC thc Centre to Soult,
who thus had nearly 60,000 men put at his disposition. The
object was, apparently, to give him ample forces for the move
now about to beJnade at his request, and on his responsibility.
Wellington was evidently somewhat puzzled at the posture
oC the French OIl the 12th-18th November. He could not make
, Maucunc and Gauthler (late Cbauvcl)_ Sce Welling/on Dispatcher,
ix. p. 550•
• Souharn natumlly expressed his indignation. See Miot, Hi. p. 252-8.
358.6 K
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out any reduction of the French forces between Huerta. and
Alba, where indeed the whole Army of Portugal still lay, but
now with an accumulation of forces on its left and a weaker
right. Yet so long as the enemy was still in force at Huerta
he could not evacuate the San Cristobal position, in order
to send reinforcements to Hill. Reconnaissances by 1'"'rench
cavalry nbove Alba were reported each dny by outlying picquets
of Hamilton's Portuguese, who were watching tl~c course of
the upper Tormes 1. But no solid force was sent to back these
outlying posts: Wellington considered it unsafe to extend his
already lengthy froI'!t. The disposition of the troops on his
right wing was still that Rill lay in the woods behind Alba,
with the Srd and 4th Divisions at Calvarisa de Abaxo as no
reserve for him, while Long's and D'Urban's cavalry carefully
wntched the course of the river from Alba to opposite Huerta.
On the north of the Tormes Pack's and Bradford's Portuguese
were on the river-bank at AldeR Lcngua and Cabrcrims,
watching the two French divisions at Huerta. The 1st, 5th,
6th, 7th Divisions and the Galicians held ~he San CristoOOI
position, with Anson's, Victor Alten's, and Ponsonby's cavalry
far out in their front. Nothing hostile could be discovered in
this direction nearer than the two divisions of the Anny of
Portugal at Huerta. Yet Wellington did not like to weaken
his left flank: at any moment the enemy at Huerta might
come forward, and might prove to be the vanguard oC an
ndvancing army, not the rearguard of onc about to go off
southward. This hypothesis seemed all the more possible
because Maucunc, on the morning of the 12th. had made a
r~onnaissance in force against Pack's Portuguese, at Aldea
Lengua: he deployed three brigades, engaged in a lively
skirmish, and only retreated when British reinforcements began
to come up. On the following day Wellington, wishing to see
whether Maueune was on the move, beat up his quarters with
strong reconnaissances oC cavalry, and found him still in
• D'Urban reports on Novenlber 12th: • EnemY'6 troops in continual
movement, and he made a careful reconnaissance of the river from Huerta
to Exeme (above Alba].' On the 18th he writes: 'The enemy moved all
hill troopll between Huerta und Alba by IUs left into the woods behind
Exeme on the high road to Avila. From thence he can either go in that
direction or cross the TOfIT\es by fords above Alba bridge.'
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position 1. Till l'I[aueune should leave Huerta, in advance or
retreat, the situation was not clear. For these two days, it
seems, Wellington was still thinking 'it possible that he might
be attacked either on the San Cristobal position or by the
fords between Huerro nnd Alba. But he was quite aware that
the other possibility (a flank movement of Soult by the upper
Tormes) existed, and had sent a staff officer with a party of
the 18th Light Dragoons to cross the river at Salvatierro. and
ascertain the southernmost point to which the French had
moved 2. And he had given Hill elaborate orders as to what
should be done jf he were turned and driven in. Whether
there would be a battle to follow, or a retreat on Ciudad Rodrigo,
depended on the exact movements of the enemy, and the force
that he brought up to the crucial point. If the French split
themselves into many columns, with long gaps between them,
there was still a chance of administering a second lesson like
that of July 22nd on much the same ground.
On the early morning of the 14th the crisis came. At dawn
Pierre SouIt's Light Cavalry crossed the Tormes in force at
three fords between Galisancho and LuciDos, which were
perfectly passable, the watcr onJy coming up to the horses'
bellies. The Portuguese piequcts beyond the river gave the
alarm, but had to retire at once; some few were cut off by
the ehasseurs. Two divisions of dragoons followed Vinot's
and Avy's light horse, and when they had scoured the west
bank of the Tormes up and down and found no enemy in force,
the infantry began to pass, not only by the fords but by several
trestle bridges which were constructed in haste. As soon as
there were a couple of divisions across the river, they advanced
to a line of heights a couple of miles ahead, where there was a
fair defensive position above the village of Martin Amor. By
the afternoon the whole Army of the South was across the
water, a.nd had taken upamore advanced line towards }\[ozarbes,
1 Thia fact, very important in justification of Wellington's long stay on
San Crist,obal, is not mentioned in any of his dispatches. But there is a
tull aooountofthc skirmish ill the lIUtlloire oCColonel Bl!ch.audof Maucunc's
Division, printed in Etudes NapoUonknnes, Hi. pp. 98-9.
t The reoonnaiss.'\nce wo.s executed by Leith Hay, who· found the
French flank -at Galilancbo and reported ita cxact position. See his
Norrative, ii. pp. 99-100.
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whilc the Army of thc Centre waS beginning to follow. It had
been hoped that the Army of Portugal would be ablc to cross
at. or near Alba, for Soult supposed it likely that Hill would
evacuate that town, when he saw 40,000 men arrayed behind
his left flank. But though Hill did withdraw Howard's and
da Costa's brigades in the l1,ftenlOon, he left Miranda's Spanish
battalion in the castle, and blew up the bridge. As the cnstle
commanded the ruined structure and the ford near it, and
lircd furiously 011 both, there was no chance of passing here or
of repairing HlC ruined arch. Drouet found that he would have
to march up-stream, and made his crossing at TOI·rejoll, four
miles south of Alba and near the fords that 50ult had employed.
He had the bulk of his army over the river by the afternoon,
and his two rear divisions under l\Iaueune, which had arrived
late after a forced march from Huerta, crossed ut dusk 1. The
whole 90,000 men of the French Army were over the Tormcs
that night, bivouacking on the heights from Torradillos to
Valdenuerque, in front of Martin Amor. The operation had
been neatly carried out, and was quite successful.
Wellington had enrIy knowledge of the French movement
from two sources-his cavalry told him almost at daybreak
that the French camps ~bove Hucrta were empty, and soon
after eame Hill's news that Soult had begun to cross the Tormes
in force at GaliSlLneho. Quite early in the morning Wellington
rode out in haste, to take command in person on the threatened
front, after having issued orders that the whole of the troops
on the San Cristobal position should follow him. He himself
pushcd on with his staff, mct Hill in the wood south of the
Ampiles, and told him to watch the roads from Alba with the
4th Division and Hamilton's !lortuguese. Then, taking the
strong 2nd Division-8,OOO infantry-and all the cavalry
brigades that had been watching the middle Tormes (Slade's,
Long's, and D'Urbau's, and PelUle VilIemur's Sponiards) he
pushed on to •contain 'and possibly to attack Soult 2• But on
arriving in front of 1tlozarbcs a little before noon, he saw that
, Details fcom Foy's Vie miliJaire, ed. Girod de rAin, p. 118, and
Bechaud (quoted above), pp. 99-]00.
I His originBl intention to attul:k is dl:arly shted in Dispatches, ix. p. 550,
IInd the statement is corroborated by D'Uroon. .
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the enemy had already three or four divisions and 4,000 horse
drawn up in line to cover the passage of the 'formes by the
rest of his arm)'. He had arrived too late to eheek Soult's
leading columns, and if he sent for Hm and the other troops
whieh lay to his rear, he would, even when they arrived, have
only 25,000 men available to attack an enemy who had already
as great a force in line, and who was receiving fresh troops
every moment from the fords I. Nothing could be done till
the great reserve from the San Cristobal position came up, and
they were not due tilllatc in the day-the last of them indeed
did not cross the bridge of Salamanca till the following morning.
At dusk Wellington ordered Hill to fall back with his infantry
from the woods in front of Alba to the old position of the ArtL-
piles, but kept his cavalry to the front, to cover his own line of
battle as long as possible. Their screen of vedettes was placed in
the line of woods from J.liranda de Azan to Utrera, south of the
heights on which 1\Iarmont's army bad taken up its position
upon July 2211d. Till this cavalry was driven in, the F'reneh,
on the rising ground above Mozarbes, could not make out the
British position.
On thc morning of the 15th Wellington had all his troops in
hand, though the last divisions from San Cristobal did not
come up till some hours after daybreak. But the enemy had
also brought up every man to the front, being resolved to
sacrifice not even the smallest part of his numerical superiority.
Some critics, among them Jourdan 2, hold that Wellington,
since he wns determined not to light save at advantage, should
have commenced his retreat on Ciudad Rodrigo the moment
that he saw the whole of the three hostile armies massed ill his
, D'Urlmn, nn eye-witness, thinks that Wellington ought to have rolled
up Hill and attacked, despite of all difficulties. 'Lord Wellington arrived
upon the ground at aoout 12 noon, all(l at first appeared Inclined to attack
what or the enemy Iuld ulrclldy passed, with the divillioll3 und cavalry on
the spot. The success of such n measure appeared certain, and would
have frustruted all tile enemy's projects. However, his opinion changed:
they were aJ.lowcd to continue plUllllng unmolested.'
I Mbnoirt:8, p. 448. Ct. also Napier, iv. p. 381, who SCCJIl8 to share the
idea. 'Why, it may be asked, did the English eonllnander, havillg some-
what carelessly suffered Soult to P83ll the Tormcs and turn hill position;
wait so long on the Arapiles position ns to render a dangerous movement
(retreat in fuee of the el\cmy and to n nllllk) necessnry l' '
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front, and before they could begin to debouch from their
position on the heights of Mozarbes. And it is probable that
if he had directed the troops from San Cristohal to take the
roads towards the Agueda, instead of bringing them up to the
Arapilcs position, and if he had used Hill's corps and all his
cavalry as a rearguard only, he would have reached Ciudad
Rodrigo with a smaller loss of life than was actually to be spent.
The French would have had to srort their pursuit from tl more
distnnt and a less favourable point.
It seems, however, that Wellington was prepared to risk a
battle, even against the superior numbers opposed to him,
supposing that the enemy played his game badly. Hc resolved
to take up the excellent position along the Arapiles heights
which.he had held on July 22nd, Rnd to stand to fight against
any frontal assault-the advnnta.ge of the ground, with its
bold slopes, good cover for reserves, and favourable emplace·
ments for artillery, were evidently in his eyes so great that hc
was prepared to risk a general engagement with 20,000 men less
in line than had his adversaries. As the morning drew on, he
had his army formed up from Calvarisa de Arriba to a point not
far from Miranda de A7.an. The line was longer than in the
battle of July 22nd, for the troops were much more numerous.
The extreme left wing was formed by the 4th Division holding
the heights and village of Calvarisa de Arriba (which had been
in Fay's hands on July 22). The 2nd Division and Hamilton's
Portuguese were holding both the Arapiles-the Freneh as
well as the English-and the ground from thence as far as the
village of the same name. Westward of Hill's troops lay the
srd Division and Morillo's Spaniards. The second line, corn·
posed of troops which had come down from San Cristobal,
consisted of the Light Division (on the left), Paek and Bradford,
the GaJicians, and the 5th, 6th, and 7th Divisions. The 1st
Division was placed as a somewhat 'refused' right flank
protection for the whole army-much as Pakenham and the
8rd Division had been in July. It lay about Aldea Tcjada 011
the Zurgain river, several miles to the right rear of the srd
Division. The object for which it was detailed to this separate
duty was the same as that for which Pakenham had been told off
at the earlier crisis-to protect the Ciudad Rodrigo road, and
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to be ready to outflank and intercept any attempt which the
French might make to turn the British position in this direction.
The hulk of the cavalry was also placed on the right wing, to
cover the cnd of the infantry line. Only the Portuguese horse
of D'Urbal1 and Campbell, Penne VilIemur's Spaniards, and
Long's brigade were on the left beyond Calvarisa de Arriba. 'I'he
rest, five British brigades, layout in the direction of Miranda
de Azan and in front of Aldea Tejada. Boek's brigade on the
extreme right long remembered their position of this morning
because they were' placed on • Pakenluuu's Hill', the spot
wherc the 8rd Division had fallcn upon Thomieres in the old
battle. The ground was thickly strcwn with thc skeletons of
the French who had then fallen, still lying unhuried and in a
horrible state of complete preservation: the horses' hoofs
were continually setting the skulls rolling 1. Behind Bock were
Ponsollby's, Victor Alten's, Anson's, and Slade's brigades. a
formidable mass, yet far less in strength than the innumerable
cavalry of the Armies of the South and Centre. which lay
opposite them 7,000 strong 2. Nothing was more uncertain
than the move which the French would next make. If it should
turn out to be one which did not fit in with Wellington's plans,
there would be no alternative but a retreat on Ciudad Rodrigo.
Wherefore all the divisions were directed to send orf their
baggage half a march to the west, and preparations were made
to destroy so much of the magazines i.n Salamanca city as could
not be camed off. 'fhe commissariat officers were already
packing up all for which transport could be found, and sending
it forward. By an error of judgement on the part of the
Quartermaster-General, James Willoughby Gordon-not the
first of his blunders in this campaign-all this valuable store
was started on the road SallUnanca-Rollan-5an Feliccs, which
was the safest by far of all thosc open to the Army if a retreat
should become necessary, and thc farthest from any probable
line of advance that the French eould take. But it had the
• This horrid reminiscence I found in the unpublished letter8 ot Boden-
berg ot the 18t Heavy Dragoons ICG.L., whieh I reprinted in DlClCkwood',
Maegazim in the year 1913.
I Detaiw about the exact drawiug-up ot the second line and rC!lCrvCll
seem impossible to discover. I have only aecurate notes IL8 to the position
of the front line and some of the cavalry and the lilt Division.
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disadvantage of being far away from the other roads by which
the Allied Army might have to' move, and the unfortunate
result followed on the 16th-17th-18th that the food was
moving on the northern road, Rnd the troops-starving for
want of it-on three other roads pa.rallel to it at a. distance of
twenty miles to the south. Soldiers must be fed, or they
straggle and turn to marauding, and it is oC no profit to have
food if it be not in the right place at the right moment. These
simple facts were to cause dire trouble during the next three
days.
MeanwhiJe, from a comparatively early hour on the 15th it
became evident that Soult wns not going to play the gume that
Wellington desired. It was a miserable morning of drifting
rain, and reconnaissances had to be pushed far forward to get
any elear information. But the reports soon began to come in,
to the effect that the enemy was keeping closed up, that he was
constructing trenches nnd abattis on the heights of Mozarbes I,
and that he had pushed out un immense force of cavalry on his
left wing, under. cover of which infantry divisions were clearly
to be seen working westward. Evidently Soult was aiming at
the roads toward Ciudad Rodrigo; but he was not (like
Marmont on July 22) letting his army break up into uncon-
nected sections, and was keeping it in an unbroken line. The
entrenchments on the hills showed that be was prepared to
receive in position any frontal attack that Wellington might be
prepared to direct against him. His motions were slow, !lot
only because or his cautious method of procedure, but from the
badness of the country roads, already made deep and miry
from the rain, over whieh he was moving his left \\ing towards
the west. The Army of Portugal was now in line on his right,
and its cavalry was feeling its way forward towards Hill's
flank. But obviously the danger was not on tllis side, where
the bulk of the Freneh infantry wns standing fast in position:
it was the othet: wing, Soult's troops aloJle, which was in
decided motion, und tha.t for a flank march, not for anything
approaching a frontal attack.
, For doing this Jourdan criticized Soult for over-caution, Rnd wlISting
of time, describing this mellsure as timid and unnecessary. iJU1/u)jrtl,
p. 40"3.
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All this was most disappointing: Wellington at once made
up his mind that since the enemy was not about to attack his
position, and since it would be madness on his part to take the
offensive and assail the well-placed array of the French, there
was no alternative save instant retreat. It must not be delayed,
because, when Soult should have moved his left wing a little
farther on, he would be controlling the road that runs from
Mozarbcs to Tamames and Ciudad Rodrigo, parallel to that
via Matilla and San Munoz to the same destination, over which
Wellington's natural line of retreat lay.
At about two o'clock in the afternoon on the 15th the British
commander-in·chief made up his mind that he must delay no
longer, and ordered his army to march to its right, in the two
lines in .which it was already arranged. The mass of cavalry
in front of Aldea 'l'ejada remained stationary, to cover the
movement of the infantry behind its rear: the smaller body of
horse on the left held its ground about the Arapilcs, till all the
divisions had passed on, and then followed as a rearguard.
The entire army marched in fighting trim: if attacked at any
moment it had onl:r to front to its left flunk, and then would be
in order of battle. The movement had to be slow for the fiest
few miles, since neither the front nor the rear column was on
a good traek until it reached the river Zurgnin, and there fell
into onc of the three parallel roads wh.ich -run from Salamanca
to Ciudad Rodrigo. Moreover the rain, which had been a mere
drizzle in the morning, turned to a heavy torrential downpour
just as the army was starting. The country paths became
quagmires in a few minutes; and when the u!;ually insignificant
Zurgain came in sight it was already a roaring river, only to be
forded with care. The march was toilsome in the extreme, and
the troops, who had expected and desired a general action,
were sodden and sulky. < I never saw the men in such a bad
humour,' observes one intelligent eye-witness I. The march was
absolutely unmolested by the French, and the columns, having
crossed the Zurgain, fell into the three parallel roads which run
side by side for many miles from Salamanca-the southern one to
Matilla, the central one to M:aza de San l)edro and San l\Iunoz, the
northern one (the so-called Cn.Jzada de Don Diego) to Aldehuela
1 Donnhlsol\ or W.e !14th. Uecollu/ilm8, I', 179.
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de Ja Boveda I. Of these the second is the regular high· road
from Salamanca to the frontier, the other two secondary
lines of communication. They are extraordinarily convenient
for the retreat of an army which must be kept together, the
distance between the two side-roads and the central one being
seldom over five miles, and often no more than three. The only
misfortune was that the train of tran:-port had gone oCf, by
Colonel Gordon's error!, on an entirely different and divergent
route, towards Rollan and San Feliees. The army, after falling
into the designated roads, pursued its way till after dark and
bivouacked in the patches of forest on the farther side of the
Valmusa river, about 10 miles from Salamanca. The head-
quarters were at the viUagc of Carnero on the central road 3.
The night was miserable, no food was distributed, and though
wood was abundant it was hard to light fires, owing to the
incessant rain. The troops were tired and footsore, and
straggling had once more begun.
Meanwhile there was quite as much discontent in the French
ranks as in those of Wellington. There had been a general
feeling that since the whole force of the three armies of the
South, Centre, and Portugal had been successfully concentrated
on the Mozarbes position, and since the enemy was known to
be much inferior in numbers, something decisive ought to have
happened on the 15th November. That no collision whatever
took place must be attributed partly to the bad weather, but
I Thc 4th Division formcd the infantry rearguard on thc southerD roud,
the Light Division that on the central road.
I Coloncl Jamcs Willoughby Gordoll seems not to have been n success
as quartermaster.general. Very soon ufter his arrival we get notes in
the ev.rlier purt ofLhe Sp,llYIlllnca cnmpaign that intelligent officel'S' tbougllt
he would not stop long with thc Army.' ·Cf. Tomkinson. p. 224: • Nothing
could equal the bad ommgements of the Quartermaster-General-tile
cavalry all retired by onc road, allowing that of the encmy to follow our
infantry' [ofthe central column on Novembcr 18}-which was not coveroo,
all the hOl'lie }mving gOllc on thc western or Icl't road. Wcllinglon had a
wone accusation against him than mere incapacity (of this more will be
found in chap. Hi of sect. x.xxv)-tlmt of scnding letters home which
revealed military secreu which got Into the EngliBh papcn. 1n September
he made up his mind that Gordon must not see his dispatches, and must
be • kept at as great distance as possible' (Supplementary Dispatches,
vii. pp. 427-8). He wns sent home before the next campaign.
I D'Urllllll'S diary.
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much more to the caution of Soult, who was this day determined
above all things that he would not suffer the fate of :r.rnnnont
on tllis same ground, by allowing any dislocation to take place
between the various sections of his army.
At nine o'clock in the morning it had been reported that-so
far as the misty rain allowed of certain observation-Wellington
was in line of battle on the Arapiles position. Soult continued
to move his cavalry forward with caution, and to extend his
left towards Azan. A little before noon Joseph and Jourdan
joined Soult on the heights above Mozarbes, the Allies being
still stationary. Jourdnn suggested that the Army of Portugal
should move forward on the right and attacJ-. that flank of the
hostile line which rested on the Arapiles 1: this was tried in a
tentative way, apparently 'with the object of holding Hill's
divisions to their ground, and preventing them from moving
~ff. Blit it led to no morc than somc bickering between the
caA;o.dorcs of the 2nd Division and the advanced light cavalry
and voltigeurs of the French right, in the woods south of the
greater Arapile. The Army of Portugal made no real attempt
to close in. A partial attack on Wellington's line would,
indeed, have been unwise. The only chance would have been
for Soult to march in upon its right while D'Erlon was pressing
in with decision against its left. But Soult, though requested
by King Joseph to move forward in force, continued his
cautious flanking movement to the westward. and did not
carry out a precise and definite order to push out his cavalry
and drive in the British squadrons which lay in front of Welling-
ton's right. Then came the torrential rain which set in about
two o'clock, just as Wellington ordered his army to "move off,
still preserving its battle order, toward the river Zurgain. His
departure was only partially visible, and no attempt was made
to incommode it. A cavalry officer of the Army of the South
writes: •The rain falling in deluge soon rendcrcd tllC whole
field of operations one vast and deep quagmire. The smallest
, See Foy, Vu militaire, p. 190. He was a witness to the conven;nUon.
And cl. Eapinchel, Mbnoiru, 11. p. 73, who gets the hour too late and
exaggerates the contact of the armies. He says that 12 of Hill's gulUl
opened on the FrenC]1 light cnvalfy. Cf. nlso Joseph to Clnrke of Decem-
ber 20.
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dips in the ground became dangerous precipices. 'fhe dMkness,
continually growing blackcf, soon addcd to the horror of the
scene, and made us absolutely unable to act. The muskets of
the infantry were no longer capable of being discharged. The
cavalry was not only unable to manreuvre, but even to advance
on the slippery, soddcn, and slimy soil. . .. We Jay down on
the field drenchcd by the rain, with the mud up to our knees 1,'
Jourdan says that it was piteh dark by four o'clock, the
gloom of the terrible downpour melting early into the darkness
of the night. There was much recrimination between the
French leaders. Joseph wrote to the Minister of War that he
tried to bring on, decisive action between eleven o'clock and
two, and failed entirely by the fault of Soult. Hc accused him
of deliberately wasting two hours by vain excuses, and suggested
that the real explanation of his sluggishness was that he knew
the incapacity of his brother Pierre Soult, commanding the
light horse of the left wing, and thought that he would get
mattcrs into a mess if he were charged with the duty of pressing
VVcllington's cavalry in front of him 2. • Hc knows the extent
of his brother's capacity, and fears to compromise him. For
this reason his light horse is always kept close in to the rest
of the army, and never advances without being immediately
supported by the remainder of his cavalry, while the Duke of
Dalmatia always marches himself in his brothcr's company.'
Such a theory is, of course, quite insufficient to cxplain
Soult's reluctance to engage on this day. The simple fact was
that, after Albuera, he had n wholesome dread of attacking [l
British army in position, if it eould bc avoided, and preferred
to manreuvrc it from its chosen ground, evcn if he thereby
sacrificed the possibility of a great victory, and secured only
an illusory advantage.
On finding that Wellington had got off unmolested, and that
Soult had made no attempt to drive in the cavalry whieh was
covering his retreat, King Joseph, by Jourdall's advice, issued
orders whieh pro\'ed that both he and his mentor thought that
the game was up. Instead of sctting every man upon the traek
1 Espinchcl, ii. p. 78.
I J09Cllh to CJarkc~ in 11 long dispatch of December 20. Ducasse's
Corrtspl)1ldance dll Roi Josep/i, ix. pp. 111)-20.
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of the allied columns, Joseph ordered the whole Army of Portu-
gal, as well as his own Guard, to march upon the deserted town
of Salamanca, while Soult alone was permitted to pursuc the
retreating foe. Now since the King was as much convinced as
either of the Marshals that, if Wellington was to be brought to
book, every man of the 90,000 French troops must be ready to
attack him, it is clear that the order to the Army of Portugal
to desist from the pursuit meant that no general action was
now to be hoped for. Jourdan eould indulge in the malicious
satisfaction of the adviser who, having seen his counsel rejected,
is able to say' I told you so ! ' to his comrade, whcn bad luck
has supervened. Hc had prophesied that, if Soult were allowed
to try Ills Oank move to the upper Tormes, 'Vellington would
get of! without harm 1. This had now happened; it was
judged that a further pursuit by the whole army was useless,
and the 40,000 men of the Army of Portugal and the Royal
Guards were directed to seize Salamanca and halt there.
Clearly if Soult's 50,000 men went on, and Wellington suddenly
turned to bay, the pursuers could not dare to bring him to
action, since they would be much outnumbered. Evidently, all
that eould now be hoped was that Soult might worry the renr
of the retreating enemy, nnd pick up stragglers and baggage.
After dark the light cavalry of the Army of Portugal and
Fay's infantry division marched on Salamanca, and reached it
that night, after much toilsome trudging over inundntcd paths:
• The plain was under watcr: for half the way our infantry
were walking through water knee deep: if the moon had not
risen we should never have found our way there.' The bridge
of Salamanca was discovered to be unbroken, Aud some half-
emptied magazines of flour and rum were captured. A rear-
guard of British cavalry-half a troop of the 2nd Hussars of
the German Legion-evacuated the place on the arri val of the
French, covering a mass of stragglers, sutlers, and Spanish
refugees, who found their way to Lcdcsma and from thcnee
to the Portuguese frontier 2. Foy, following them forty-eight
I See above, p. 126.
• For the curious adventures of Captain v. Stolzenberg 'commnnding
tbis little party, and of tbc horde which he shepherded, see Schwertfeger's
History of the K.G.L., it pp. 26Z-8.
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hours later, moved to Ledesma., and then to Zamora, where he
took up cantonments. The cavalry of the Army of Portugal,
starting earlier, went to feel for Wellington's rear on the road
towards Aldehuela de la Doveda, leaving the pursuit on the
other two routes to Soult. The rest of the Army remained
cantoned at Salamanca, whieh had been well plundered by the
first division that arrived I. King' Joseph reviewed it, outside
the city, on November 17-all in the rain-a melancholy cere-
mony. The men and officers were alike weary and discontented.
'We had an army stronger by a third than 'Wellington's,
infinitely superior in cavalry and artillery. Confident expeda-
tion of victory was in every man's head. The chancc had
comc of bcating the English-perhaps of driving them from
the Peninsula. This fine opportunity, so splendid, so decisive,
with so few adverse chances, has been let slip 2,' So wrote
the disappointed Foy. He ndds, 'The King does not know how
to show to advantage ·before his troops; he can speak with
cltcct ncithcr to the officers nor to the rank and file: he got
absolutely wet through, rode home, and went to bed.'
• Mb/wires or BeChlu.d, quoted uoovc, p. 101.
I Foy, Vie militairt. pp. 189-90.
SECTION XXXIV: CHAPTER VI
FROM THE TOR!lIES TO THE AGU£'DA
THE last crisis of the campaign of 1812 was now over, and,
but for two unlucky circumstances, the four days ofoperations·
which still remained would have required little notice from
the annalist. But these two mishaps, the continuance of the
exceptionally severe and tempestuous weather which had set
in upon the 15th November, and the misdirection of the
supply column, which had got completely separated from the
marching troops, were to have most disastrous results. They
cost the army 3,000 men, much misery, and some humiliation,
and Wellington great vexation of spirit, leading to one of his
rare outbursts of violent rage-his angry words committed to
paper, and published abroad by misadventure, were always
remembered with a grudge by his officers and men.
It must be remembered that there was no really dangerous
pursuit. Soult was not strong enough to press Wellington to
a general action, and knew it. On the 16th he wrote to King
Joseph: • I think that your Majesty's intention is that the
enemy should only be followed up to the frontier. In two days
the campaign will probably be at an cnd in these parts, for if
the enemy's army goes behind the Agueda, I cannot think that
it would be at present possible to pursue it any further. I
await your orders for the future destination of the Army of
the South, which would be unable to stop two days in position
for wRnt of bread and forage. I propose to establish it on the
upper 'formes, below Salvatierra and El Barco, where I could
rest eight or ten days, to allow the men repose and to collect
food I.' Clearly there was no offensive spirit in the Marshal,
who only wished to see Wellington upon his way to Rodrigo,
and then contemplated turning back to the upper Tormes.
On the 16th there was little to record in the way of militnry
operations. 'fhe British Army started at dawn from its wet
, Soult to King Joocpb. Mlltillll, 16th November 1812.
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bivouack!> behind the Valmusa river, having received no
distribution of food. The side roads, on which the larger part
of the troops were moving, grew worse and worse as the rain
continued. The weakly men began to fnll behind, the shirkers
to slip away into the woods, to look for peasants to plunder and
roofs to shelter. them from the drenching rain. After the usual
mid-day halt the bad new!> went round that the supply column
had gone oU on the wrong road-via Ledcsrna-and that there
would again be no distribution of rations that evening. All
that the troops got was the carrion-like meat of over-driven
bullocks hastily slaughtered, and acorns gathered in the
oak woQ{Ii> through which the roads ran. These, wc are assured,
though bitter and hard, were better than nothing. It was only
in the evening, after the infantry had encamped behind the
brook that gets its name from the village of Matilla, that the
pursuing French cavalry eame up on the two southern roads,
and engaged in a bickering skirmish with the screen of allied
horse covering the rear. The Polish Lancers, 2nd Hussars, and
5th and 27th Chasseurs engaged in an interchange of partial
charges with the 14th Light Dragoons and K.G.L. HusslU'S of
Victor Alten's brigade, in front of thc camps of the 2nd Division.
It was brought to a sudden cnd by the light company of the
28th and two gunfO opening fire on the French from under the
cover of a woodside, on which the enemy went off, with a loss
of some 50 men, mostly wounded prisoners 1. Alten's brigade
suttered mueh less. The centre column saw very little of the
pursuing French-Digeon's Dragoons-who made no attempt
to press in. The eavalry of the Army of Portugal acted even
more feebly on the northernmost of the three parallel roads.
Yet the retreating army lost several hundred • missing' this
day, all stragglers or weakly mcn captured singly on the road,
, There is u good account ot the skirmish in the MtnlQircs or Espinehcl,
ii, p. 73, who frankly allows that the French light cavalry were both out-
mllolloouvred pod repuJscd wiU\ loss. The returlls of the three French
regiments show 22 killed, no wounded, and 25 missing-an odd proportion.
Apparently the woullded lUust ull have been enptul"(!d. The 1st Hussars
ICG.L. had 7 wounded and 7 missing, the rest of Alten's brigade under
20 casualties. This brigade WM now three regiments strong instead of
two, having had tile 2nd Hussa1'8 K.G.L. from Hill's Army attached to
it a.t Salamanca.
1812] HUNGER IN THE RAIN 145
.
or in villages at its sides, whither they had betoken themselves
for shelter or marauding. The rearguard cavalry vainly
attempted to whip them all into the tail of the retreating column
-some were really unable to movc-others escaped notice ill
hiding-places, and were takcn by the French when they emergcd
for a tardy attempt to follow the army. The camp-followers,
and the unfortunate women and children whom the evil custom
of the time allowed to remain with the regiments, suffered most
of all. Soult in his dispatch to King Joseph of the night of
the 16th says that he had gathered in 600 pri(>oners this day,
and is very probably correct.
The 17th November was an even worse day-the rain still
continued to fall, and stomachs were still morc empty than on
the preceding morning. The march of the retreating army was
still in three columns, but the 2nd Division replaced the 4th
as the rearguard of the southern column (2nd, Brd, 4th Divi·
sions; Hamilton's Portuguese; Morillo's Spaniards), which
marched unmolcsted from 1I1atilla by Villalha to Anaya on the
JIucbra, turning of( towards the cud of the day from tl~c high
ruad to Tamames 1, in order not to get too far from the central
column, which was marching on San Muiioz: for \Vellington
intended to have his whole army arrayed behind the JIuehra,
a good fighting position, that evening. This was a most
miserable journey. < The effects of hunger and fatigue were
even more visible than on the preceding day. A savage sort
of desperation had taken possession of our minds, and those
who lived on the most friendly terms in happier times now
quarrelled with each other, using the most frightful impreca·
tions, on the slightest orrence. A misanthropic spirit was in
possession of every bosom. The streams which fell from the
hills were swelled into rivers, whieh we had to wade, and
many fell out, including even officers. It was piteolls to see
some of the men, who had dragged their limbs after them with
determined spirit, fall down at last among the mud, unable to
• Napier says that the column went through Tamames, but no 2nd,
am, or 4th Division diqfy mentions that coll8ideroble town RS pa8llCd-
they all speak of solitudc5 and oak-woods alonc. Wellington's orders on
the night of November 16 (Suppkment011J Dispatches, xlv. p. 157) give
, La Neja ' as Hill's destination, and this oddly spelt place is undoubtedly
Anaya de Huebra.
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,
proceed further, and sure of beilig taken prisoners if they
escaped death. ·Towards night thc rain had somewhat abated,
but the cold was excessive, and 'numbers who had resisted the
effect of hunger and fatigue with a hardy spirit were now
obliged to give way, and sank to the ground praying for death
to deliver them from their misery. Some proyed not in vain,
for next morning before daylight, in passing from our halting-
ground to the road, I stumbled over several who had died in
the night 1,'
The only food that the southern marching column got this
day was procured from the celebrated raid upon the swine,
which so much enraged Wellington. It is recorded in many
8rd and 4th Division diaries. The main wc~lth of the peasantry
of this forest region lay in their pigs, which had been driven
into the heart of the woods, to hide them from the passing armies.
}~rom some unknown cause a stampede broke out in one vast
herd of the creatures, which ran aeross the road cutting through
the middle of the Srd Division. The starving soldiers opened
up a lively fusillade upon them, and whole battalions broke
their ranks and pursued them with the bayonet, cutting up
the creatures before they were dead, each man going off.with
a gory limb or rib. Many officers farther to the rear thought
from the firing that the French had cut into the head of the
column. Later in thc day thc samc or anothcr herd eharf,red
thc camp of a brigadc of the 2nd Di\'ision, and gave many a
hungrY man an unexpected meal 3.
The southern column had no enemy but hunger and cold on
the 17th, but the experiences of the centre column were morc
military. This corps, consisting of the 1st, 6th, 5th, 7th, Light
Divisions, moving in that order, had a tiresome alarm before
the rearguard had started in the morning from behind the
Matilla. brook. By some blundcr-on the part of Gordon the
Quartermaster-General as was said 3-the covering cavalry
• Memoirs of Ikmaldson of the 94th, pp. 181-2.
I Sce the Memoirs of Gmttan or the 88th, and Bell or the 34th.
I Sce Welliugton's lUurching Orders for the 17th in SU]Jplemcnlary
Dispatches, xiv. pp. 157-8, for the cavalry. A perverse reading of them
nlight mo.ke the cavalry sto.rt too early Cor' the brook whieh pll.85es by
La Maza and Aldeahuela', where they are told to be at dawn. 'I'heyarc
not actually directed. to wait for the infantry rearguard.
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marched oU before the Light Division, the rear of the infantry
column, had left its ground. There was nothing but the picquets
from the 95th IliAes between the camp, where the battalions
were just getting under arms, and two divisions of French
Dragoons, cautiously advancing along the road and with their
flanking parties out in the woods. There was barely time to
form close column and start oU before the enemy were riding
in from all sides. They did not attempt to close, but while
keeping their main body all the road, at a safe distance, sent
out mlLny detachcd squadrons, along by-paths in the woods,
which from time.to time came out unexpectedly not only upon
the Aank of the Light Division, acting as rearguard, but much
farther up the line" where the 7th Division, and the 5th in
front of them, were moving along the road to San l\Iui\oz.
Ha.rdly any of the allied cavalry appeared to curb these incur-
sions-the main body appears to ha\'e gone off too much to the
south, in the direction of Hill's column. Hence came the
extraordinary chance that small bodies of the French got into,
tlle interval between the Light Division and the 7th, and even
into that between the 7th Division and the 5th, thou.'th the
troops themselves were all closed up and perfectly safe in their
dense columns. Great part of the baggage of the 7th Division
was intercepted and plundered by one party. But the most
tiresome incident was that a patrol of three men from Vinot'~
light cavalry captured the onc-armed General Edward Paget,
the newly-arrived second-in-command of the Army, as he was
riding-accompanied by his Spanish servant alone-from the
rear brigade of the 5th Division to the front brigade of the 7th,
in order to bid the latter close up rapidl)'. The French pounced
011 him out of tl corner of thc wood, and as he could not defend
himself, tlnd had no escort, he was hurried off a prisoner, and
it was some time before his absence was noted 1. A good many
isolated soldiers were picked up in the same fashion by the
French eavtllry, before the central column emerged from the
woods and found itself above the broad ravine of the Huebra
river, and the town of San Mufioz, in the late afternoon!.
• There is a rull account or his capture in the memoirs 01 Espinehel. H.
p. 77, the offioor whose men took Pnget prisoner.
• The movements of this day are made very difficult to fqllow by the
L2
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The whole column had been ordered to encamp on the farther
side of the Hucbra, on the plateau in front of Doadilla and
Cabrillas, and each division lIS it passed the river made its way
to the ground allotted to it. There was wood to be had in
abundance, and fires were lit-the rain had abated in the,
afternoon-hut there was little to cook. Again there was no
distribution save of beef from the droves of half-starved oxen
which accompanied the divisions, and acorns which turned out
more palatable when roasted than when eatcn raw.
The 7th Division had just crossed the Huehra, and the Light
Division aod a fcw squadrons of cavalry alone were on the
farther bank, whcn a new turn was given to the day by the
appearance of infantry behind the French Dragoons, who had
been following the retreating ecntre column since dawn. Soult
had at lnst succeeded in getting his leading division, that of
Darieau, to the front. Hitherto the bad roads and the fatigue
of the long marches had prevented thcm from picking up the
cavalry of the advanced guard. The :Marshal by no means
intended to commit himself to a general action, but thought
that he had the chance of falling upon the rear of Wellington's
retreating central column, as it passed the defile of the Hucbra.
• I thought,' he wrote that evening to King Joseph, • that I
might bring off a combat of infantry, and a cavalry affair, to
advantage, but had to givc up the idea, and to linlit my efforts
to cannonading the masses of the English Army aeross the
Huebra. The enemy showed us 20,000 men in position,
including 3,000 horse, and more than 20 guns-we could see
other masses debouching across the bridge of Castillejo de
Huebra, and the glare of camp flres announced the presence of
more divisions on the plateau of Cabrillas 1.'
What happened at this rearguard action, whose dctuils Soult
slurs over, was that the Light Division, suddenly attackcd by
fact that Wellingtoa in his dispntches (ix.. 464-5) coIls Hill's columll the
right, and the Spanish column the left, of the three in .....hich the Army
mal'(lhed. Vere's Dlnnj DJ the lUarcha oJ Ille 41h Divjril17l does the same.
But these directions nre only correct when the army faced about and
stopped to check the French. On the march Hill's was the Idt column,
/lnd the Spaniards the right. For this reason I have culled them the
southern and northern columns respectively.
• Soult to .Toseph, November 17, Crom before Soo Mufloz.
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the French infantry as it was about to cross the Huebra, had
to throw out a strong skirmishing line to its rear, while the
main column plunged down the ravine and over the fords.
Three companies of the 43rd and one of the 95th 1 held baek
Darieau's voltigcurs till their comrades had waded across the
water, and then had the dangerous task of withdrawing from
the wood-side and rushing down to the fords sharply pursued.
Soult showed at first every sign of desiring to cross the Ruebra
in their wake, brought up four batteries to his side of the ravine,
and began to play upon the Light and 7th Divisions, which
had formed up to defend the passage. His skirmishers swarmed
down to the river bank, under cover of the fire of the guns,
engaged in a lively tiraillade across the rapid stretlJll, and
would certainly have attempted to cross if the return fire had
not been as strong and rapid as their own. The 7th Division,
drawn up in three lines of brigades on the higher slopes, was
much shelled by the Freneh artillery, and would have suffered
severely but for the fact that the rain-sodden ground' swallowed
the shot and smothered the shells 2.' It is all extraordinary fact
that after' four hours of standing up to the ankles in mud and
water, completely exposed, having nothing to shelter us 3 , the
regiments in the front brigade were hardly touched at all: the
68th had no loss whatever, the 51st had onc offlccr killed and
eight men wounded, and the total casualties in the division were
under 30. Soult's report that' notre feu d'artillerie a ele t;es
meurtrier pour I'ennemi ' was plausible enough to any French
officer watching the artillery practice, which was good-but
happened to be incorrect.
At dusk the firing ceased, and the French drew off from the
river and encamped in the woods behind them, as did the
Light and·7th Divisions on the opposite bank. The losses on
both sides in this skirmish-sometimes called the combat of
San Munoz, sometimes the combat of the Huebra-were very
moderate. Daricau's division had 226 casualties (mostly in
the 21st Uger and 100th Line), and the French cavalry a few
, So the regimental histories (both good) of these corps. Nnpier givCl:l
ODe more company of the 43rd.
I Nnpier, iv. p. 385•
• Autobiography of Green of the 68th, p. 127.
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more. On the British side the Light and 7th Divisions and
the ea.valry of the rearguard lost 865 men-but tlus included
178 prisoners not taken in action but individua.lIy as stragglers
during the long retreat through the woods since dawn 1. In
the actual fighting thc loss was only 2 officers and 9 men
killed, and 4 officers and 90 men wounded in the British
brigades, with 1 officer and 86 men killed and 2 officers and 43
men wounded in the Portuguese-a total of 187. Next morning
it was expected that the French, having now severo.1 more
infantry divisions at the front, would make an attempt to Coree
tile line of the Huebra at dawn. Nothing oC the kind happened.
• Daylight came at last,' writes the cavalry officer in charge
of the line of vedettes along the river, ' the French drums beat,
and the troops stood to arms. I took my place to observe their
movements, and expected every moment to sce the columns
leaving the camp for the different fords. Dut no I after having
had a. good opportunity to observe their strength, find to see
their cavalry water their horses, I witnessed with no small
satisfaction the whole, after remaining under arms about
two hours, disperse to their respective bivouaeks t.' The
pursuit was over.
Wellington, in short, had oCfercd battle on the Huebra, on
the evening of the 17th, and Soult had refuscd it, seeing that
the bulk of the allied army· was concentrated close bclund that
river, while his own infantry divisions were stiU straggling up
from the rear. Nor had he any intention of following next day
-he wrote,to King Joseph that' I told your Majesty that
seeing the retreat of the enemy upon the Agueda well pro-
nounced, and having no hope of being able to engage him in a
general action before he has terminated his movemcnt, I should
put a limit to my pursuit after passing the Huebra, imd should
move art towards the upper Tonnes, to enable the army to
collect the food which it Jacks.' The regret expressed at being
unable to force on a battle was of course insincere. All that
Soult did was to wait till the British rearguard had abandoned
the line of the Huebra, and then move his advanced cavalry
• British' missing' one officer (General Paget) aud III men, Portuguese
, missing' GO men.
I Remini!lccnces of Hay, 12th Light Dragoons, p. 86.
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to Cabrillas, from whieh some small reconnoitring parties
pushed as far as the Yeltes river 1, and then eame back, report-
ing that it was impossible to pass that flooded stream 'without
bridges, and that the British were all across it. On the morning
of the 19th the whole French army retired eastward, marching
by Tamames and Linares towards Salvatierra. The truth was
that the French were by now suffering almost as much from
fatigue and want of food as the British. They could not' live
on the country', and the diet of acorns, of which several
diarists speak, was as repugnant to the pursuers os to the
pursued.
On the 18th the British Army had an unmolested retreat.
This did not prevent many losses of men who dropped to the
rear and died of fatigue and starvation. The carcasses of dead
horses all along thc roud had been hacked up for food. One
observer saw thirteen corpses lying round a single fIre: another
counted so many as filty men sitting in a clump, who declared
their absolute incapacity to march a foot farther, and eould
1I0t be induecd to move. But the stragglers who did not perish
hobbled on to the camps in the evening for the most part.
The cavalry swept up large munbcrs of them into safety.
That night the column of Hill reached Tenebron and Moras
Verocs: the centre column lodged about Santi Espiritus and
Alba de Yeltes. The Galieians, forming the northern column,
were about CastiIIo de Yeltes and Fuenteroble. The mareh
of the centre column was accompanied by the curious case of
insubordination by three divisional generals (those commanding
the 1st, 5th, and 7th Divisions 2) of which Napier makes such
, Espinebel commanded that which went farthest, to the bridge in
front of Sll.nti EtJpiritUIJ: he sllya that the whole road WlUI lined with
broken-down carts uod carrluges, and strewn wiUl dead men. About
100 British stragglers were gathered in.
o The tute may be found with dettlils, told from Wellington's point of
view, in Suppkmmlary Di$palchu, vii. p. 494. The chief ottcndcr was
W. Stewart, who had succeeded to the command of the 1st Division on
Paget's capture the preeeding day. The others Wellington dCllCribcs lUI
• lleW-COillcn ' so they mUllt have been Oswald und Lonl Dnlhousie, for
the other divisional commandcn In this column. Clinton and C. Altcn,
were not in allY sense' new-eomera '. I thillk, therefore, that Mr. Fortescue
Is wrollg ill givillg the nll.iIlC9 of the culprits M Stcwart, Dnlhousic. and
Clinron.
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scathing notice. Their orders gave an itinerary involving a
march over fords in flooded fields; they consulted together,
judged the route hopeless, and turned off towards the bridge of
'Castillo de Yeltes, which they found blocked by the Army of
Galicia. Wellington, failing to find them on the prescribed path,
set out to seek them, and came upon them waiting miserably
in the mud. He is said to have given them no more rebuke than
a sarcastic' You sec, gentlemen, I know my own business best'
and allowed tlicm to cross after the Spaniards, many hours late I.
The insubordination was inexcusable-yet perhaps it would
not have been beneath Wellington's dignity to have prefaced
his original order with an explanatory note such as • the main
road by Castillo bridge being reserve~ for the Spanish divisions.'
But~this would not have been in his normal stylc. Like Stone-
wall Jaekson fIfty years after, he was not prone to give his
reasons to subordinates, even when his orders would appear to
them very inexplicable.
On the 19th n march of a few miles brought all the columns
within a short distnnee of Ciudad Rodrigo, and the com-
missariat transport having reached that place on the preceding
day, quite unmolested, arrangements had already been made
to send out food to meet the approaching columns. • About
dusk we took up our groWld on the face of the hill near Rodrigo
-the weather now changing to a severe frost was intensely cold.
We had not long been halted when the well·known summons of
.. turn out for biscuit" rang in our ears. The strongest went
for it, and received two days' rations for evcry man. It was
customary to make an orderly division, but that night it was
dispensed with, each man eagerly seized what he could get, and
endeavoured to allay the dreadful gnawing which had tormented
us during four days of unexampled cold and fatigue. In a
short time two more rations were delivered, and the inordinate
eating that ensued threatened to do more mischief than the
former want 2.'
On the 20th the army was distributed in quarters around
1 See Napler, iv. p. 380. But cl. Fitl.l'Oy SoIUCrsct'N vcrsion in GrcviUe
Memoirs, i, pp. 186-7•
• Don81dllon of the 94th, p. 184. Gmltan (p. 315) 1J8S 8 NtOry of 8
Connaught Ranger who ate, in addition to his ratioll8, six ox-heads on
six successive days, alld vied of inn3mmation of the bowels.
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and behind Rodrigo-Hill's column about Martiago, Zamorra,
Robledo, Cespedosa, and other villages on the Upper Agueda ;
the centre column about Gallegos, Carpio, Pastores, El Bodon,
Campillo, and other cantonments well known from ,the long
t"'l.rrying of the army there in 1811. The Galicians wcre left out
in the direction of San Felices and the Lower Agueda. Every
one was now undcr cover, and food was abundant-almost too
abundan't at first. Rest, warmth, and regular rations were
indeed necessary. 'Scarcely a man had.shDeS-not that they
hlld not been properly supplied with them beforc the retreat
began, but the statc of thc roads had been such that as soon
8S n shoe fell oll or stuck in the mud, in place of picking it up,
the man kicked its fellow-companion after it. Yct the infantry
was still efficient and fit to do its duty. But the cavalry and
artillery were in a wretched state: the batteries of the 3rd,
6th, and 7th Divisions, the heavy cavalry, with the 11th and
12th Light Dragoons were nearly a wreck-the artillery of the
Brd Division lost 70 horses between Salamanca and Rodrigo.
. . . The cavalry was half dismounted, the artillery without the
proper number of horses to draw thc guns, much less the
ammunition cars-many died from cold and famine under
the harness of the artillery and the saddles of the dragoons....
i'he batteries could with difficulty show three horses in place
of eight to a gun 1:
Stragglers continued to come in for several. days. Julian
Sanchez was sent out with his lancers to search the woods for
them, ltnd brought in 800 mounted on the horses of his men.
Dut when the divisional returns were prepared on Novem-
ber 29th, it was found that besides killed and wounded in
action and sick in hospital, there was a melancholy deficit of
49~1 'missing' since October 23rd. The killed and wounded
in action, as opposed to the missing, were very few considering
the dangers which the Army had gone through: some 160 at
Villadrigo, 440 at Villamuricl and Plllencia, 70 at the Puente
Larga, 118 at Alba de Tonnes, 187 at the combat of the Huebra
-smaller fights such as the skirmishes at Tordesillas, A1dea
Lengua, and l\fatilla can hardly account for 200 more between
them-the total cannot have exceeded 1,200 casualties in
• Grattan, pp. 303 and 305-0.
154 FROM THE TORMES TO THE AGUEDA INoY.27
action. But nearly 5,000 missing was a sad record. How
many of them were dead, how many had deserted, and how
mnny were prisoners in the hands of the French, it is hard to
determinc. The losses in missing before Salamanca had becn
insignificant-perhaps 500 in each of the two columns of
Wellington. and HiII-thcre had been mnny drunkards and
malingerers taken both at Torquemada and at Valdemoro.
Dut the main loss WllS suHered between the 16th and the 18th
of November, in the woods and mires between Salamanca und
the Yeltes river. Soul!;, in his daily letters to King Joseph,
claims to have taken 600 prisoners on the 16th, 1,000 to 1,200
on the 17th, and 100 on the 18th. These figures do not appesr
incredible, and :would nllow in addition for well over a thousand
men dead, and some hundreds oC deserters. Thc latter were
certainly numerous in the foreign corps-thc Brunswick-Oels
und Chasseurs Britanniques show losses in 'mis.~ing· out of
proportion to all the other regiments I. It is noteworthy, when
comparing the lists of the • missing' in the various divisions, to
sce that the Portuguese units suffered Car more severely in
proportion to their numbers than the British. They showed
the total of 2,469 as against 2,477. but this was out of 22,000
men only, while the simila.r British figure was out of a total of
32,000 or thercabouts-i. c. their loss was about 10-8 per cent,
as against about 8 per ecnt. Several observcrs of the retreat
note that the eold and perpetual rain told much more heavily
upon the stamina of the Portuguese, whose native climate is
far more mild than that of the plateaux of Lean, They simply'
sank by the waysidc, and died, or suffered themselves to be
taken prisoners without attempting to get away. The unit in
the whole army whieh suffered most heavily in the way of
• missing' was Bradford's Portuguese brigade, which lost
514 men out of 1,645. In thc Light and srd Divisions the
Portuguese battalions were little more than a third of the
British in numbers, but had morc missing than their comrades
in the proportion of 168 to 92 in one case and 230 to 184 in
the other, The worst divisional records were those of the 5th
I Seventccn or the ChasseurlI Dritauniques were tried all together for
desertion in October 1812 I They were mostly Ilnlinns. And for onc man
rC(:i1ptured lIull trietJ. how InEW)' Hot lIWIlY ~ufcly?
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and 7th Divisions, which lost 800 and 600 men respectively:
the best those of the ]st, 6th, and Light Divisions with only
288, 170, and 255. Individual British regiments differed much:
the most unsatisfactory figures were those of a battalion which
had only landed at Lisbon that summer, and had not been
present at Salamanca. The IJ82nd distinguished itselfby leaving
more drunken stragglers at Valdcmoro than any other corps,
and had dropped a terrible proportion of its men between
Salamanca and Rodrigo. Wellington put the colonel under
arrest, and proposed to try him before a court martial for
• gross neglect of duty,' but in the end did not press matters
to a formal prosecution I.
For the first few days after the arrival of the army at Ciudad
Rodrigo Wellington was no~ quite certain that the enemy,
after resting on the Tormcs for a few days, might not resume
his advance 2. This was unlikely, owing to the weather
and the obvious difficulty of fmding" food for 90,000 men in
a devastated country-side. Still, it was conceivable, and a
further advance on Soult's part would have been very tiresome,
when the allied troops so much required rest, and when. some
dangerous cracks seemed to threaten the stability of parts of
the newly repaired sections of the walls of Ciudad Rodrigo 3.
For six days tht? army was held together, till on November 26th
arrived certain news that Soult was on his way to the province
of Avila, and that the greater part of the Army of Portugal was
leaving Salamanca for the rear, and distributing itself in its
old cantonments in the direction of Toro and ValIadolid <I,
while King Joseph with the Army of the Centre was on his
march for Madrid. Since the F:rench were certainly dispersing,
there was no longer any necessity for keeping the allied army
concentrated. On the 27th Wellington ordered a general
dislocation of the divisions into winter quartcrs. Only the
Light Division and Victor Alren's cavalry _remained about
• 1 See DUpakhu, ix. pp. 601-2.
• See Dispatcllu, ix. pp. 1I62 and 670.
• See the Lite of Burgo)·ne. who was scnt to look after tbe threatening
symptoD18. vol. I. p. 246.
• The troops of the Army of ~ort\lgnl hegnn to march ensL liS early as
Novcmber 20. long before &lult got bllCk into touch with thcm. Jourdllll
to Clarke, from Salamanca, No\-ember 20.
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Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida. Of the rest of the army, Hill,
with his old corps-the 2ud Division, Hamilton's Portuguese
and Erskine's cavalry-marched for Coria and Zarza, being_
directed to canton themselves in the valley of the Alagon with
an advanced post at Beja.r. Campbcll's !)ortugucse cavolry
wellt to their old haunts about Elvas in the Alcmtcjo, and
Peonc ViIlemur and lItIorillo. with the Estremaduran Divisions,
returned to their native regiolls. Casta-nos and the Galici!ln
army retired also to their own province, marching through the
Tras-os-Montes by way of Draganza. D'Urban's Portuguese
horse were cantoned for the winter north of the Doura, but the
rest of the allied cavalry (Bock, Ponsonby, and Anson) were
sent far to the rcar, to look for comfortable quarters in the
.Mondego valley and the villages south of Oporto. The remain-
ing British infantry divisions (the 1st, 8rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, and
nh) were distributed about the province of Beira, in various
quarters from Lamego to Guarda, at distances of thirty or
fifty miles from the frontier 1. The general disposition of the
cantonments of the army was not much different from what
it had been ill the first days of 1812, before the long cleven
mouths' campaign began. Only Hill was no longer on the
Guadiana, but north of the Tagns, since there was no enemy
left in Andalusia to require his attention.
While thc dispersion was in progress Wellington issued
(November 28) the Memorandum to Officas commanding Divisions
and Brigacks which caused so many heart-burnings among his
subordinates. It was intended to go no further than those
officers; but some of them dispatched copies to the colonels
of the regiments under their charge, and so it became public
property. Written in a moment of intense irritation, it con-
mined much rebuke that was merited, but was unjust from
the sweeping and gencral character of the blame that it distri·
I The 1st Division seems to have been quartered about Ule upper
Mondego between Celorico nnd Mnngunlde, the 3rt! In villogcs between
Moimenta and Lamego, the 4th about Sio Jo1io de Pesqueira, the 5th,
Pnck and Bradford, in the direction of Lamego, the 6th and 7th 011 the
lower Mondego and the Ah·a under the Sena do. Estrella, as fur as I ean
make out from regimental diaries. There is no genernl notice 88 to cnnton'
menu in the Wellington Di8patehea to help. But see General Ordcrs for
December 1, 1812,88 to thc post·towns for each dh':ision.
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butcd to the whole army, and most eerroinly failed to takc
account of the exceptional conditions of the 15th to the 19th
of November. Wellington wrote:
• I am concerned to have to observe that the army under my
command hus fallen oU in the respect of discipline in the late
campaign, to n greater degree than any army with which I have
ever served. or of which I have ever rend. Yet this army has
met with no disaster: it has suffered no privations which but
trilling attention on the part oC the officers could not have
prevented, and for which thcre existed no reason in the nature
oC the service. Nor has it suffered any hardships, excepting
those resulting from the necessity of being exposed to the
inclemeneies of the weather at a time when they were most
severe. It must be obvious to every officer that from the
moment the troops commenced their retreat from the neigh-
bourhood of Burgos on the one hand, and of :Madrid on the
other, the officers lost all control over their men. Irregularities
and outrages were committed with impunity. Yet the neces·
sity for retreat existing, none was ever made on which the
troops had such short marches; none on which they made
such long and repeated halts; and none on which the retreating
army was so little pressed on their rear by the enemy.... I
have no hesitation in attributing these evils to the habitual
inattention of the officers of the regiments to their duty, llS
prescribed by the standing regulations of the service, nnd the
orders of this army.... The commanding offieers of regiments
must enforce the order of .the army regarding the constant
inspection and superintendence of the ofHccrs ovcr the conduct
of thc men in their companies. and they must endeavour to
inspire the non-commissioned officcrs with a scnsc of their
situation and authority. Dy these means the frequent and
disc.rediroble resort to the authority of the Provost, and to
punishments by courts martial, will be prevented, and the
soldiers will not dare to commit the offences nnd outrages of
which there arc so many complaints, when they well know
thnt their officers and non-commissioned officers have their
eyes on them.
• In regard to the food of the soldier, I have frequently
observed and lamented in the late campaign the facility and
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celerity with which the French cooked in comparison with our
army. The cause of this disadvantage is the same with that
of every other-want of attention of the officers to the orders
of the army and the conduct of their men.... Generals and
field officers must get the captains and subalterns of their
regiments to understand and perform the duties required ot
them, as the only mode by which the discipline and efficiency
of the army can be restored and maintained during the next
campaign.'
There was undoubtedly much to justify the strong language
which Wellington used as to the grievous relaxation of discipline
in some of the regiments. Unfortunately he made no excep-
tions to his general statement, and wrote as if the whole army
had been guilty of straggling, drunkenness, and marauding in
the same degree. There was not the slightest hint that there
were many eorps which had gone through the retreat with
small loss of men and none of credit. But Wellington had seen
with his own eyes the disgraceful scenes at Torqucmada, had
been roused from his uneasy slumbers by the sound of the
pig·shooting on the night of November 17, and he had witnessed
the devastation of San Jl,[ui'ioz and other villages by men who
were tearing whole houses to pieces to get firewood. He had
ordered the Provost-Marshal to hang on the spot two soldiers
caugl:lt red-handed in plunder, and sent three officers whose
men had pulled down cottages. when collecting fuel, to be
court-martialled 1. The figures of the' missing' "in some
regiments had rightly provoked his indignation. But he might
at the same time have noticed that there were not only batta-
lions but whole brigades where their number was insignificant.
In onc division of 5,000 men therc were but 170-in the five
British battalions of the Light Division no more thon 06. In
both these cases the deficiency represented only weakly men
who had fallen by the way from fatigue and disease, and
cannot afford any margin for stragglers aud marauders.
, Their ellSCs arc in General Orders for 1813, pp.' 51-3. Each was
condemned to six months' suspension, but the members of the court martial
petitioned fur their IlardoJl, 011 account of the privations of the time.
Wellington grudgingly granted the request • 1I0t concurring in any way
ill the opinion of the court, that their co.scs in allY way dC6crved this
indulgence.'
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The general feeling in the army was that nearly all the loss
and mischief had happened in the inclement days of Novem-
ber 15-18, previous disorders having been comparatively
insiguificant; Bnd as regards those days they questioned the
justice oC Wellington's indictment oC the troops. To >$ay that
• the army had suffered no priva.tions which but trilling attention
011 the part of the omcers could not have prevented' was simply
not true. What' trifling attention' on the part of the regi-
mental officers could have made up Cor the fact that some
divisions had received absolutely no distribution of food of any
sort for four continuous days, and others in the same four days
nothing but two rations of beef, and no biscuit or other food
at all ? l It was useless to tell them that they had suUered no
privations, or that they could by care have avoided them. As
an intelligent general officer wrote on November 20: 'During
the whole of this retreat Crom the 15th inclusive, not only has
the wea.ther been dreadCully severe, but the commissariat
arrangements having failed, the troops have been mostly
without any issue of rations, and have suffered the extremity
of privation, having lived upon acorns and hogs killed oeca·
sionally in the woods. The natural result of this has been great
disorder and confusion, and thc ronds in the rear of the columns
of march are covered with exhausted stragglers left to the
enemy. In fact, by some inconceivable blunder, which
the Quartermaster·General's department attribute to that
of the Commissary-Genernl. and which the latter throw back on
the former, the supplies of the army, which were adequate for
much larger numbers, on the morning that we broke up from
the Arapiles were sent down the Tormes, by Lcdesma toward
Almeida, while the army marched on Ciudad Rodrigo-hinc
illae lachrymae 2.'
There is no doubt that sheer lack of food during inclement
weather, and in a desolate and thinly peopled forest-country
did most of the mischief. As an indignant subaltern writes:
, Bunbury, aide·de·camp to General Hamiltoll, refcrring to Wcllington's
mcmorandum, makes solcmn :l.SSCveration that llis troop!! goL no distribu-
tion wlUltcvCt' ror those rour du.ys. 'nle gt:nct'ul hilnsell hu.u no bread.
Acorns wcre the solc diet.
I Privatc and unpublished diary or General D'Urbao.
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, The officers asked each other, and nsked themselves. how or
in what manner they were to blame for the privations of the
retreat. The answer uniformly was-in no way whatever.
Their business was to keep the men together, and if possible
to keep up with their men themselves-and this was the most
difficult duty-many of these o~cers were young lads bndly
clothed, with scarcely a shoe or a boot left-some attacked with
dysentery, others with ague, more with a burning fever raging
through their system; they had scarce strength to hobble along
in company with their more hardy comrades, the rank and file I,'
Wellington'S memorandum stated that the marches were
short ill miles, and tills was generally true, though on October 28
the infantry had to do 29 miles. But mileage is not the only
thing to be considered in calculating the day's work-the time
spent on the. miry roods, where every step was ankle deep in
slime that tore the shocs from the feet, was inordinate: several
of the marches were from 4 o'clock, before dawn, to the same
hour in the afternoon. This on an empty stomach and v.;th
the regulation 60 lb. of weight on thc soldier's back was no
mean task. And sometimes the journey ended, as for the
Light and 7th Divisions on November 17th, in the troops being
deployed in battle order in the drifting rain, and kept for some
honrs more under arms, to resist a possible advance of the
French. The strain was too much for many willing men whose
constitution was not over robust. It was not only shirkers who
fcll out and collapsed.
As to the matter of the cooking, one capable subaltern
remarked in his diary, ' if we were allowed to tear down doors,
&c., in every village, as the encmy do, without having to go
miles for wood, we could cook in as short a. time as they 2.'
And another remarks with justice that when the companies
had to prepare their food in the vast Flanders cauldrons, carried
on mules which dragged at the tail of thc regimental baggage
train, they eould never be sure of getting them up to their
bivouacs in good time. There was an immense improvement
in 1813, when light tin camp-kettles carried alternately by the
men of eae~ squad, were intr~dueed. These were always at
hand, and could be got to boil ' without needing a whole tree
1 Grattan of the 88th, p. 307. • TOnlkinSOll, p. 227.
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or half a church door to warm them.' 'Vellington might have
spared this criticism on his soldiers' cooking when he had already,
as his dispatches show, askcd for the small kettles to be made,
precisely because the cauldrons were too heavy, and seldom
got up in good time 1. He did well to lament the slow cooking,
but knowing its cause, and having been in command of the
army' since April 1809, might he not have indented for portable
kettles before May 18I2 'l
The real truth with regard to much of the objurgatory
language of the • Memorandum' is that, loth though one
may be to confess it, the staff officer-commander-in-chief
or whatever his rank-who has slept under cover and had
adequate food during such awful days as those of NovemJjer I5
to November I9, IS12, may easily underrate the privations of
the man in the ranks, who has faced the weather unsheltered
and with no rations at all. This observation does not in the
least affect the points on which Wellington did well to be angry
-the disgraceful scenes of drunkenness at 'l'orquemada and
Valdemoro, the plundering of villages at more points than one,
and the excessive straggling from some ill-commanded batta-
lions. And, as we have had occasion to point out before, there·
was a residuum of bad soldiers in well-nigh every regiment-
Colborne estimates it at 50 or 100 men on the average-and
exceptional circumstances like the storm of Badajoz or the
hardships of the Salamanca retreat brought this ruffianly
element to the surface, and led to deplorable incidents. Presu-
mably many corps got rid of the majority of their mauvais sujet8
by straggling and desertion on those wretched November days
upon the Valmusa, the Huebra, and the Yeltes.
Here we may leave the main armies at the end of the cam-
paign. It remains only to speak of Suchet and his opponents
on the eoast of thc Mediterranean. After the departure of
Soult and King Joseph from Valencia in the middle of October,
it might have been supposed that the Duke of Albufera, now
left to his own resources, would have been' in some danger.
For not only had he in front of him the Anglo-Sieilian troops
who had landed under l\faitland at Alicante, and his old
1 l.'hey had been ordered in May 1812, but Ilad not been distributed
by November. See DUpatchu, ix. p. 603.
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adversaries of Joseph O'Donnell's Army, but-since there were
now no French left in Andalusia-all the Spanish detachments
which had formerly watched the eastern flank of that kingdom
were available against him. After Soult had occupied Madrid.
Elio, Freire, and Bassccourt all came down to A1bacete and
Chinchilla, to linkthernscIvcs with the AlicantctroOps. Leaving
out the Empecinado and Duran, who did not move southward
from their mountains on the borders of Aragon and Castile,
there were still 25,000 Spanish troops of the •second' and
•third' armies-the old Valencio.nand Murcian corps, disposable
for use against Suchct in November I, And what was still more
ominous for the French on the East Coast, a second reinforce-
ment was getting together at Palermo to strengthen the Anglo·
Sicilian corps at Alicante. General Campbell with about
4,000 men sailed on November Hth j this foree consisted of
two British battalions 2, a foreign battalion of light companies,
1,500 Italians, and some miscellaneous details. Though the
Italians (as their conduct proved next spring 3) were eminently
untrustworthy material, the rest were an appreciable addition
to the strength of the expeditionary force, which was now
swelled to an army corps rather than a large division. They
only came to hand on December 2, however, and the best
opportunity for attacking Suehet had passed before their
landing, sinee obviously he was most vulnerable when all the
rest of the French annies had passed on to Salamanca, after
November 6th, and before King Joseph had come back to
Madrid and Soult to Toledo in the early days of December.
The four weeks between those dates, however, were wasted by
the British and Spanish generals on the East Coast.
Suchet had recognized his danger, and had taken up a defen·
sive position in front of the Xucar, with Harispe's division at
Almanza, Fucnte la Higucra, and Moxcnte, Habcrt's at Albayda
• The flgures may be found on pp. 170-1 of the Statistical' Ejmitos
Espatloles' of 1822, referred to in other plaoes.
• Scc 'rabIes in Appendix. Thc British battalio~ were 1f27th and a
grenadier battalion formed of companies of the regiments left in Sicily.
The light battalion was formed of companies from the 3rd, 7UI, 8th Line
of the K.G.L. and from de Roll and Dillon. The Italians were' 2nd Anglo·
Itaiilln Levy'. There WII8 lJ, fIeld battery (Britiah), but only 18 CRvalry
(2()th Light Dragoons). • Sce p. 279, beloW'.
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across the high-road from Valencia to Alicante, and Musnier's
in reserve, at Alcira and Xativa. Here he waited on events,
having lost touch completely with Soult and the King, from
whom he received no dispatch for eighty days after their
departure from Albacete and Cuenca in October. It was only
by way of Saragossa that he learnt, some weeks later, that they
had recaptured Madrid and then marched for the Tormes J.
He had only 15,000 men in line beyond the Xucar, ·and knew
that in front of him there were 7,000 Anglo-Sicilians, &,000 of
Roche and Whittingham's men, and more than that number
of the Murcians, all grouped round Alicante, while Elio, Freire,
and Basseoourt, with 8,000 or 9,000 men, were coming in from
the direction of Madrid, and Villacampa with 3,000 more might
appear from Southern Aragon. This was a fonnidable combina-
tion, though the Spanish troops were badly organized, and had
a long record of defent behind them. The disaster of Castalla
had shown a few months before the incapacity of the leaders
and the unsteadiness of the men of the Mureian army. Yet
the number of troops Iwnilnble was large, and the 5,000 English
and German Legionary infantry of the Alicante Army provided
a nucleus of trustworthy material, such as in finn hands might
have accomplished much.
Unity and continuity of command, however, was completely
wanting. On September 25th Maitlllnd had fallen sick, and
the charge of the troops at Alicnnte passed to his second·in-
command, General Mackenzie. This officer showed signs of
wishing to adopt n timid offensive attitude against Suchet.
He pushed his own and Whittingham's divisions out as far as
Alcoy, opposite Habert's position at Albayda, and contrived
some petty naval demonstration against the Valencian coast.
Of these the most important was an expedition which tried on
October 5th to cn.pture the town of Denia, the southernmost
place in the possession of the l~rench. It was composed of 0.
wing of the 1/81st, nnd a oompany each of De RoU's regiment
and of marines-about 600 men-under General Donkin.
l'hese troops, carried on the Fame and Cephalus, landed near
Denia, and drove the small French garrison into the castle.
This was found to be a more formidable work than had been
• See Suchet, Mtnwirt8, if. p. 269.
'"
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expected, and to require battering by heavy guns. Some
cannons were, with difficulty, landed from the ships, and n siege
would have been commenced hut for the news that Habert was
sending up a relieving force. Whereupon the little expedition
re-embarked. men and guns being reshipped wit~ much diffi·
culty under the fire of the French on a. rocky beach 1. The loss
was trifling, but the whole plnn was obviously feeble and
useless. To have turned Suchcl;'s sea-ward flank with 5,000
men, while threatening his front with the rest of the British
and Spanish troops available might have been a conceivable
operation. But what could 600 men, entirely isolated, hope to
accomplish?
It must have been long after this fruitless demonstration that
Mackenzie received a formal order from Wellington dated from
before Burgos on October 18th 2, bidding him attack Valencia,
either by land or by sca, if Soult and King Joscph should havc
marched their armies against Madrid. Be was instructed not
to accept a general action with Suchet, unless he was very
superior in numbers, and to beware of fighting in ground
favourable to cavalry. His own mOlUlted foree consisted only
of 280 sabrcs 3, and 500 belonging to Whittingham and to tllC
Murcian army were of doubtful efficiency. But it was thought
. that Suchet was very weak, and a little while later Wellington
received false information that the Marshal had lent a consider-
able part of his army to King Joscph for the march Oil :Madrid 4.
Be thercfore hoped that a bold advance against Valencia might
shake the hold of the French on the Mediterranean coast.
The letter directed to Mackenzie was received not by him
but by General William Clinton (the brother of H. CHnton of
the 6th Division), who had arrived at Alieante and taken
command-superseding Mackenzie-on October 25th. Lord
William Bcntinck had sent him out from Palcrmo on hearing
of Maitlalld's illness. The change of generals had no good
results-Clinton fell at once into a fierce quarrel with CNZ the
Spanish governor of Alicante. He opined that he ought not
I The best account is in Gildea's IIislory of the 81st Regimttlt, pp. 104-8.
• DUputcllU, ix. p. 487.
• 161 01 the 20th Light Dragoons, and 71 of the' Foreign Hussars,' II
Ilewly raised corps, mainly German, Wl1ich di(l very creditably in 1818.
• Wellington to Lord Bathurst. Dispal<:hts, i~. p. 535.
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to start to attack Suchet without receiving over control oC thc
Alicantc forts, and placing them in the charge of a British
garrison. The Governor refused to give up the keys, and much
friction ensued, causing an angry interchange oC lettcrs which
wastcd many days. Wellington, when he heard oC it, dcclared
that Clinton scemed to have been wholly unreasonable in his
demand I. Mcanwhilc Clinton drcw in Maekcnzie's troops from
the front, instead of making an advance toward Valencia.
Suchet, hearing that there were no red-coated battalions left
opposite Habert, resolved to try the effect of a reconnaissance
in force, and moved forward against Roche and Whittingham,
who still lay at Alcoy. The English and Spanish divisions at
once drew back to Xixona, twenty miles nearer to Alicante.
[mpressed by this activity on the part of the enemy, Clinton wrote
to Wellington that Suchet was too strong to be meddled with,
and that he dared attempt no offensive move toward Valencia 2.
Yet counting Roche, Whittingham, and the Mureinn troops at
Alicante, he must have outnumbered the li'rench by neatly two
to one. And on November 22 the Governor of Alicante actually
surrcndered the keys of the citadel-the point on which Clinton
had insisted as the necessary preliminary for active operations.
.Nothing had yet been done on the East Coast when on Decem-
ber 2 General Campbell landed at Alicante with the 4,000
Sicilian troops already mentioned a few pages back. He was
senior to Clinton, and relieved him of the command. Thus in
the 70 days sincc Septcmber 28rd there had been four general
• officers in successive charge of the foree which was intended
to keep Suchet in check. It would havc been difficult to
contrive a more inconvcnient arrangement-both Clinton and
Campbcll were new to the army and the district, and eaeh
took many days to make out his situation, and arrive at a
conelusion as to what could and what could not be done.
Campbcll, immediately on his arrival, was solicitcd by Elio to
attack Suehet, in combination with his own army, which should
strike in from Albacetc on the Marshal's flank. He offered to
bring up 10,000 men of his own (Frcire, Bassccourt, and Villa-
, Di$pal.c1It8, ix. p. 545•
• See Wellington to H. Clinton (W. Clintoll's blOther) on December 9
. (Dispmchu, ix:. p. 614), and to Lord Ballium (ibid., p. 6W).
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campa) and said-apparently without authorization-that
Del Parquc would assist, at the head of the Army oC Andalusia.
But Campbell refused to stir, and possibly was right, when
such cases as Barroon and Talavera are taken into consideration.
Yet Wellington, his commander-in-chief, had ordered the offen-
sive to be taken in no hesitating terms, and the force available
was undoubtedly too large to be wasted. As Wellington himself
remarked, most British generals oftht day, though bold enough
in action, and capable of acting ns efficient lieutenants, seemed
stricken witrl a mental paralysis when placed in an independent
position, where the responsibility of taking the initiative was
thrown upon them. It was only exceptional men like Craufurd
and Graham who welcomed it. The general effect of the Anglo-
Sicilian expedition was disappointing in the extreme. Suehct
had thought, and with reason, that it w,oul9. be ruinous to him,
both in July and again in November. It turned out to be a
negligible quantity in the game, except so far as it prevented
the French Army of Valencia from moving any of its 15,000 men
to co-operate with Soult or King Joscph. Wellington had hoped
for much greater profit from the diversion.
After all, a much larger body of French troops than Suchet's
field force in front of Valencia was being at this time kept
complctely employed, by enemies who owned afar less numerous
following than Campbell or Elio. The little Army of Catalonia,
not' 8,000 strong, was finding employment all through the
autumn and winter for Decnen's 20,000 men; and Duran and
VilIacampa in Aragon-aided occasionally by Mina from the
side of Navarre, and Sarsficld from the side of Catalonia'-wcrc
keeping the strong force lUldcr Reillc, Scveroli, and Caffarelli
in constant movement, and occasionally inflicting severe loss
on its flying columns. Their co-operation in the general cause
was useful and effective-that of the Alicante Army was not.
To sum up all the operations on the eastern side of Spain we
may say that there had been practically no change in the
situation of the adversaries since February. The amount of
territory occupied by the French was unchanged-they had
made no progress in the pacification of Aragon or Catalonia;
but on the other hand Suchet's hold on Valencia still remained
entirely unshaken.
SECTION XXXIV: CHAPTER VII
CRITICAL SUMMARY OF THE CAft'lPAIGNS OF 1812
TIIOUGH Wellington's divisions took up in December 1812
almost the Sllffie cantonments that they had occupied in
December 1811, ere they marched out at mid-winter to the
leaguer of Ciudad Rodrigo, the aspect of aHairs in the Peninsula
had been completely transformed during the intervening
twelve months. It was not merely that Andalusia, Estrcmadura,
and Asturias had been freed from the presence of the French
armies, who were never to return. Nor was it merely that-
to use Wellington's own words 1-' we have sent to England
little less than 20,000 prisoncrs,2 have taken and destroyed, or
have now ourselves the use of, the enemy's arsenals in Ciudad
Rodrigo, Badajoz. Salamanca, Valladolid, Madrid, Astorga.
Seville, and the lines before Cadiz, and upon the whole have
taken or destroyed, or now possess, Iittlc short of 8,000 pieces
of thcir cannon 3,' Nor was it the all-important thing that the
Armies of Portugal, the Centre, and the South, Wellington's
immediate enemies, were in November weaker by 80,000 men
than they had becn in March, and this though they had received
10,000 men in drafts since the summer ended. The fact that
really counted was that the whole Freneh system in Spain had
been shaken to its foundations. It was useless to pretend any
longer that King Joseph was a legitimate sovereign, and the
, Wellington to Lord Liverpool, Di8JIokhu, ix. p. 573.
t These figures seem to represent about 1,400 prisoners at Rodrigo,
4,000 at Badajoz, SOO at the Almaraz lorts, 600 at the Salamanca forts,
7,000 at the battle ot Salamllllca, 2,000 althe Retiro. 1,800 at Astorga,
700 at Guadalajarn. with 2,000 more tuken in smllUC!r affairs, such RS the
surrenders 91 Consuegra and Tordesillas, the combat on the Guarena, the
pUl1IUit after Salaffianoo, and Hill's operations in Estremndurn.
• 'l'his looks a large llgurc, but over 150 guns were taken at Rodrigo,
more than that number at Badajoz, IICveral hundred in the Retiro, and
infinite numbers in the Cadiz lines and the arsenal of Seville, not to speak
of the captures nt Astorgn, Gundalajarn, Almnrnz. and in tile field at
Salamanca, &c.
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Cadiz government 11 mere knot of rebels driven into their last
and remotest place of refuge. The dream of complete conquest,
which had lingered on down to the moment of Suchet's capture
of Valencia, was gone for ever. The prestige of the French arms
was shattered: the confidence of the officers i,n the marshals,
that oC the men in their officers, had disappeared. As Foy, the
most intelligent of the French observers, sums up the matter,
what hope was there for the future when the whole available
field force of the French armies of Spain, superior in number
by a third to Wellington's army, had been collected on a single
field, and had allowed the enemy to march away practically
unmolested? •Wellington goes off unbeaten, with the 'glory
of his laurels of the Arapiles untarnished, after having restored
to the Spaniards all the lands south of the Tagus, after having
forced us to destroy our own magazines and fortifications, Bnd
deprived us of all the resources that resulted from our former
conquests snd ought to have secured their retention 1,' There
was a profound dissatisfaction throughout the French Army;
and as the winter drew on, and the ill news from Russia began
slowly to drift in, it became evident that the old remedy for
all ills so often suggested in 181o-11-the personal appearance
of the Erpperor in Spain with large reinforcements-was never
likely to come to pass. Indeed, troops would probably bc with-
drawn from Spain rather than sent thither, and the extra
subsidies in money, for whieh King J oseph was always clamour-
ing, were never likely to be forthcoming from the Imperial
Exchequer.
As to the past campaign, belated recriminations continued
to fly about: Clarke-thc ~Iinister of War at Paris-was the
central point round which they revolved, sinee it was through
him that the reports went to the Emperor from Spain, and to
him that the rare answers came back from some Russian
bivouac, when the mastcr had a moment's leisure from his own
troubles. Generally he "'Tote in a very discouraging strain: 'vons
sentcz qn'eloigne comme ie suis, ie ne puis rien faire pour les
armecs d'Espagne 2.' His occasional comments were scatliing-
I Foy, Vu militairt, p. 193. Napoleon to Clarke, October 19, 1812.
• Report of Colonel Desprez to .Joseph of his intel'View with the Emperor
at MosCQw 011 October 19th. Corrtspmldance dll Roi Jouph. ix. p. 178.
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Marmont's reports were all lies, he was to be interrogated in
u. formal series of questions, as to why he had dared to fight ut
Salamanca. Thc quarrels of Joseph and Soult were wlworthy
of serious attention: 'il ne pouvait pas s'oeeuper de semblables
pauvretl'S dans un moment OU il Ctait t\ la tcte dc 500,000
hommes;et faisaitdes ehoses imffienscs.' Considering the way
in which Soult had wrecked all the plans of the King and
Joseph in June-July, by deliberate disobedience to a long
series of orders sent by his hierarchic superior, it was poor
comfort to Joseph to be told that hc must continue to put up
with him. 'Le Marechal Soult est la seule tete militaire qu'il y
co.t e~ Espagne: on ne pouvait l'en rctirer sans compromettre
I'armee 1,' • 'Why had the King ever returned to Spain in
1811 ?' said the Emperor-though a reference to the corre-
spondence between them in that year tends to show that Joseph
had olIered to abdicate, or take any other step prescribed to
him, and that it was his brother who preferred to keep him at
~[adrid as a figure-head. Napoleon, it is clear, was vexed at
being worried by the affairs of the Peninsula at a moment when
he required all his time for the contemplation of his own
problems, and discharged his wrath, deserved or undeserved,
in all directions. It may be doubted whether he ever thought
of himself as perhaps the greatest olIender of all; but it was-
as we have already shown at great length 2-precisely his own
elaborate orders which led first to the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo
and then to that of Dadajoz. Dut for these initial strokes
Wellington's task in the later spring would have been far more
difficult. And it is certainly the fact that if Marmont had been
allowed to follow his own i.nspiration in February and March,
Badajoz at least might have been saved. As to what-followed
in June and July, Soult must take the main share of the blame.
Wellington's game would have been far harder if the Army of
the South had obeyed the King's orders, and come up to the
l'agus in June. Soult would have had to evacuate Andalusia,
it is true; but he none the less bad to abandon it in the end,
and it would have made all the difference in the world to the
fate of the campaign if he had come northward while l.fannont's
Army was still intact, and not after it had reeeived th.e crushing
, Ibid., p. 179. 1 See above, voJ. v. pp. 19"-5.
(
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blow oC July 22nd at Salamanca. No rational student of the
events of that summer can fail to recognize that Jourdan and
the King had found the right conclusion, and issued the riglit
orders, and that Sault's dctennination to hang on to Andalusia
till the last moment showed as much mental perversity as
military insubordination. His counter·plan for inducing the
King to come to Seville, abandoning Madrid before l\tarmont
had even tried the fortune of battle, was simply the wild project
of a viceroy loth to abandoll his realm, and convinced tbat
every onc else ought to give way for his own personal profit 1.
To surrender Central and Northern Spain to Wellington, and
•to allow all communications between Andalusia and l?rance to
be cut would h8.\'c been insane. The King would only have
brought 15,000 men with him: Soult could not have added a
greater field force than 25,000 men more-as was repeatedly
shown when he tried to concentrate in Estremoourll. Their
joint 40,000 would have neither been enough to face 'Wellington
nor to threaten Portugal. Meanwhile Spain from the Ebro to
the Sierra l\Iorena would have passed into the hands of the
Allies. It is unnecessary to dilate further on the topic.
A ~ore interesting problem, and one into which Napier
went at great length, is the criticism of the campaigns of 1812
from the other point of view, that of Wellington. It is clear
that there is nothing but praise to be bestowed on the masterly
strategical combination of January and March, which brought
about the captures of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz. Each fell
before a blow delivered at the preeise moment when it must be
most effective. The position of the enemy had been carefully
calculated, and every adverse possibility taken into considera-
tion. It is obvious that Rodrigo was doomed without fail from
the first, because Wellington had realized and demonstrated
to himself the inability of the French to hinder his enterprise,
after the Imperial orders had sent ~Iontbrunoff to the borders
of Valencia. And Badajoz w~ destined to fall also,. unless
l\Iarmont should help Soult at the earliest possible moment
I Napier's statement that Napoleon was thinking of this project when
he deehved Soult to be the' only military head in Spain' is entirely
unJustilled by the context from wWch he ill quoting. The Emperor therein
makes no allusion to the Seville project. See Ducasse's CorrMpotUlOIlU,
ix. pp. 178-9. '
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and with the greatest possible force. There wns in this case
an adverse chance, though not n. very great one: that it never
came near to occurring was due to the Emperor's removal of
Marmont's southern divisions fTom the Tagus valley. Dut
even if this fortunate intervention of Napoleon had. not simpli-
fied the task of the Allied Army, it was still improbable that
!trarmont would appear in time; and the improbability had
been ascertained by careful study of the state of the magazines
and the distribution of the cantonments of the Army of Portu-
gal. Soult without flfarmont could nccomplish nothing, and on
this fact Wellington based his plan; If the Duke of Dalmntia
•had brought up 10,000 men more than he actually did, his
advance would still have been insufficient to save Badajoz.
As to the details of the siege of that fortress, we have seen
that things by no means went ns Wellington desired. He himself
threw the blnme on the want of trained sappers, and the
inexpertness of his engineer officers 1. The engineers' reply was
that they were directed to work' against time " and not given
sufficient days or means to carry out their operations according
to the regular methods of their craft. 'The project of attack
adopted would not stand the test of criticism us a scientific
operation, but possessed merit as a bold experiment to reduce
in an unusually short time n considerable fortress, well armed
and well countermined, by the agency of unskilled sappers,
no miners, and insufficient ordnance 2.' Probably the verdict
of the historian must be that the time-prOblem was the domi-
nating fact, and that had there been no relieving armies in the
field other methods would bave been pursued 3. It is at least
certain that the rapidity with which the place was taken
disconcerted Soult 4, and upset all the plans of th_e French in
Spain.
After the fnll of Badajoz Wellington had his choice between
the invasion of Andalusia and that of the valley of the Douro.
It can hardly be doubted that he was right in choosing the latter,
I See hiB letter quoted above, vol. v, pp. 255-6.
I JOIlCll, Siegell of u~ Prnirt$llla, H. p. 430.
, Jones remarkB that' we had to leave It to the valour of the troopB to
surmount intermediate obstacleB which in a properly conducted Biege
would be removed by art and labour (Siegu, i. p. 168).
• See above, vol. v, p. 270.
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not only on the ground which he himself stated, that Marmont's
was the' operating army' 1 and the more dangerous of the two,
but because (as l\Iarmont put it) ,8. disaster in the North would
compel the French to evacuate the South, while a disaster i.1l
the South would have no such crreet in the North. The victory
of Salamanca liberated Andalusia and Madrid as well as the
Douro valley-a similar victory somewhere in front of Seville
WQuld have cleared Andalusia, no doubt, but would not have
sufficed to deliver the Castiles and Loon.' The Northern opera-
tion was the most decisive. The well-timed storm of the
Almaraz forts &e(lured for that ollcration a reasonable amount
of time.. during which it could notbe disturbed bytbe appearance
of reinforcements for the Army of Portugal.
The irruption into Lean in June, for whieh such careful
subsidiary operations had been made on all sides-in Andalusia
and Catalonia, on the Bay of Discay and in Navarre-had at
first all the results that could have been expected. Blit it can.
hardly be denied that a grave mistake was made when no
adequate preparations were made for. the siege of the Salamanca
forts-and this was 0. mistake that was to be repeated under
very similar circumstances before Burgos in September. There
was nothing to prevent a proper battering-train from being
brought out from Rodrigo or Almcida. Yet a worsc slip, most
certainly, was made when on June 21st Wellington refused the
battle that Marmont most rashly altered. He could have fought
with the advantage of numbers, position, and superiority in
cavalry, in a measurc that he was not to enjoy again during
the Salamanca campaign. Why he held back we now know-
he thought (and not without good reason) that if he did not
attack Marmont, the presumptuous Marshal would attack him.
Such a project indeed was in his adversary's mind, and if it
had been carried out the result would lmdoubtedly have been
a second Bussaco. But ltInrmont hesitated-and was saved
for the moment. That hc was ablc to retire with an intact army
behind the Douro was a terrible disappointment to Wellington;
for, during the deadlock that ensued for nearly three weeks, the
French Armies of the North, South, and Ccntre might have
spared reinforcements for the Army of Portugal. Soult's per-
I See above, vol. v, P: 310.
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versity, Cllffarclli's want of perception of the relative importance
of things, and King Joscph's tardiness prevcnted thesc possible
reinforcements from getting up in time. But fills Wellington
could not foresee, and he was under the impression that npthing
was more possible than the arrival of Marmont's expected_
succours. If the French should play the right game, Wellington
thou&,ht it probable that he might have had to evacuate Sala·
mancaand his other recent conquests, and to retire to the Agueda
and the protection of Ciudad Rodrigo. Fortunately there
turned out to be no necessity for this heart-breaking move.
Marmont came forward on July 15th, without having received
any of thc assistance that he had expected from the other armics,
and involved himself in the mam:cuvres that were to end in
complete disaster. By his first movement, the ingenious demon-
stration on the side of Toro, ending by the passage of the whole
French army over the Douro at the distant Tordesillas, he
distinctly scored a point over his adversary. Wellington was
only prepared to nght a defensive battle at this moment; and
when the Duke of Ragusa refused, on the Guarena (July 18),
to indulge him in such a fashion, and continued to turn his
right flank on severnl successive days, he always gave back,
awaiting an opportunity that seemed never about to arrive.
The head·quarters staff of the allied army marvelled at their
leader's caution, on the days (July 19-20) whcn thc two armies
wcre executing thcir parallel marches about VaUesa and Canta-
lapiedra. At any moment a battle on equal terms could have
been brought about, but it was refused. Y:et Wellington had
recently acquired the knowledge that King Joseph was just
starting from Madrid to join Marmont with 15,000 men; and
a victory over the Army of Portugal before it should be rein-
rorced was the only way out of the dangerous situation. He
would not commit himself to the chance of nn oHensive battle,
and-as his dispatches show-made up his mind to abandon
Salamanca nnd rnIl back upon the Agueda, unless his adversary
should oblige him by making some obvious blunder.
The psychology of the momcnt---as has been sho'\\'11 above-
was that he considered that an indecisive victory, entailing
heavy loss in his own ranks, would have availed him little.
Unless he could put Marmont completely out of action by a
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very crushing blow, the Marshal would be joined by the Army
of the Centre and other reinforcements, and would still be able
to make head against him. At the bottom of his mind, it is
clear, lay the consideration that he had in his hands the only
field-army that Great Britain possessed, that in risking it he
would risk everything--even the loss of Portugal,-and that
the total force of the French iIf'the Peninsula was so great that
he must not fight save at a marked advantage. His own
50,000 men were the sole hope of the allied cause-Marrnont's
Army WM but one of severn! bodies whose existence he had to
bear in mind. As long as he kept his army intact, the enemy
could do no more than push him back to the Agucda: when
they had got him thus far, they would have to disperse again,
for they could not feed on the country-side, nor invade Portugal
with less than 100,000 men. But if he were to wreck his army
by suffering a check, or even by winning a bloody and indecisive
success, he could not calculate where his retreat might end, or
how great the diswster might be.
Wellington's caution was rewarded on the 22nd July, when
his adversary at last fell into reckless over-confidence, and
invited defeat, by stringing out his army along an arc of
six miles opposite the strong and concentrated line of the Allie:>.
The punishment was prompt and crushing-the sudden advance
of Wellington was a beautiful piece of tactics, • a battle in the
style of Frederic the Great' as the sagacious Foy observed, in
a fit of enthusiasm wherein the admiration of the skilled soldier
prevailed over the national pride of the Frenchman. l\Iarmont's
host was not merely beaten, but scattered and demoralized: it
was put out of action for some time, and if CarIos de Espana
had only maintained the castle of Alba de Tormes there would
have been nothing left worth mentioning of the Army of
Portugal. Even as things actually fell out, the victory was
absolutely complete, and placed all the valley of the Douro and
Central Spain in Wellington's hands.
After Salamanca he had it in his power to choose between
thrusting Clause! and the battered Army of Portugal behind
the Ebro, and marching on Madrid to deal with King Joscph
and Soult. His choicc of thc second alternative has often been
criticized, and ascribed to motives which were far from his
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mind. The real causc of his turn to the South was his belief
that Soult must now evacuate Andalusia, and that he would
therefore have all his army concentrated, and no longer frittered
away in garrisons, as it had been for the last two years. Instead
of being able to collect 25,000 men only for the field, the Duke
of Dalmatia would have 50,000 available, and when joined by
the King and perhaps by Suchet, he would need to be faced
by the whole allied army. Wellington therefore intended that
Hill should join him; together they could deal with the largest
block of French troops still left in the Peninsula. His intention
was to force matters to a decision in the South, and he thought
it likely that he might find Soult already marching upon Toledo
with his whole army. In this expectation he was entirely
disappointed; the Marshal-as we have seen-refused for a
month to evacuate his viceroyalty, and stayed there so long
that Wellington began to think that he would have to go down
to Andalusia to eviet him. 'I suspect,' he wrote at last on
August 18, ' that he will not stir, till I force him out, by a direct
movement upon him, and I think of making that movement
as soon as I can take the troops to the South without injuring
their health.'
This was an unexpected development: • any other but
a modem French Army would now leave the province (Anda-
lusia), as they have absolutely no communication of any kind
with France, or with any other French army, and arc pressed
on all sides,' wrote Wellington. Yct Soult lingered, and mean-
while the Army of Portugal, rallied in a shorter time than could
have been expected, returned to Valladolid, and assumed the
offensive in the valley of the Douro. The trouble in that direc-
tion became so acute that Wellington resolved to march against
Clausel, with a force sufficient to drive him back to the Ebro,
intending afterwards to return to Madrid to pick up the other
half of hij; own army, to join with Hill, and then to deal with
Soult, whose tardy resolve to evacuate Andalusia was only
just becoming evident.
The march against Clausel was necessary; and it seems a
misfortune that Wellington left three of his best divisions at
Madrid-which was obviously in no danger for the present,
and where Hill was expected to arrive ere long. It turned out
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that the force put in motion against Valladolid and Burgos
was too small-even after it had been joined by Clinton and
the Galicians-to secme the complete predominance in the
North which was necessary. Clausel retreated, but was pursued
in a somewhat cautious fashion, and only as far as Burgos. rt
would appear that if Wellington had brought 10,000 men more
with him from Madrid, and if he had invested Burgos with the
Galieian Army, and followed hard upon Clausel with all his
Anglo·Portuguese, he might have driven the French not only
beyond the Ebro, but as much farther as he pleased. For
Clausel could not have stood for a moment if Wellington's
power had been a little greater, and Caffarelli was in September
so entirely taken up 'with the operations of Home Popham,
Mina, and Mendizabal that he had not a man to spare.
But Wellingt~madvanced no farther than Burgos, and allowed
Clausel to lie opposite him at Briviesca unmolested, till he had
drawn great reinforcements from France, and had at last
induced CaC!arelli to come to his aid with 10,000 mcn. Meall-
while, he was devoting himself to the siege of Burgos, where,
by his own fault, he had no sufficient artillery resources to
subdue an improvised fortress of the third class. .The fault
was exactly the same as that which had been committed before
the Salamanca Forts in June. And-as has been demonstrated
above-Wellington had been pressed to take more heavy guns
with him, both by Sir Home Popham and by officers at Madrid.
And if he had called for them, even after the siege began, they
could have reaehed him in time. His own curious comments
on the facts are not convincing:
• I see that a disposition exists to blame the Government for
the failure of the siege of Burgos. The Government had nothing
to say to the siege: it was entirely my own act. In regard to
means, there were ample means, both at Madrid and at San·
tander, for the siege of the strongest fortress. That which was
wanting at both places was the means of transporting ordnance
and military stores. . .. I could not find means for moving
even onc gun from Madrid. Popham is a gentleman who
picques himself on overcoming nil difficulties. He knows the
time it took to find transport even for about ioo barrels of
powdcr and a few hundred thousand rounds of musket ammuni·
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tion that he sent me. As for the two guns that he endeavoured
to send me, I was obliged to send my own cattle to draw them,
and felt great inconvenience from the want of those cattle in
subsequent movements oC the Army I.'
The answcr that must bc made to these allegations is that
when matters came to a crisis at Madrid, on Soult's approach,
enough transport was found there to send off to Ciudad Rodrigo
great part of the Retiro stores-though much of the material
thcre had to be blown up. If there were not draught animals
for even half a dozen guns to be got at Madrid, why did Welling-
ton write on August 31st that' if the enemy shall advance, all
arrangements must be made for the evacuation of Madrid, such
as sending away sick, stores, &c., and eventually for the destruc-
tion oC whnt cannot be carried oU 2.' Considerable convoys
marched with Hill when the Spanish capital was evacuated,
and it is impossible to believe that the 822 draught mules
which, by Diekson's estimate, were the proper allowance for
a 24-pound battcry of six guns with 180 rounds per gun, could
not have been procured at Madrid in September. A requisition
on the batteries and transport train of the four divisions left
round Madrid could have been made to supplement local
resources. But-Wellington had made up his mind to risk thc
Durgos campaign with no more than Dickson's trifling' artillery
reserve '--of which the only efficient part was precisely three
iron IS-pounders. As to the allusions to Home Popham,
they must-with all regret-be described as ungrateful. And
they conceal the fact that the two heavy ship-guns which
Popham had sent forward were only brought jr(J1n Reynosa by
Wellington's own draught beasts. Popham got them across
.the mountains from Santander by his own exertions, and would
have sent them some weeks earlier but for Wellington's rcfusal
to ask for thcm. And it was the ammunition sent by Popbam
which alone enabled the siege to go on for as long us it did.
The calculations-miscalculations rather-which kept the
main Army in front of Burgos to such a late day in the season
as October 20th, have been dealt with in a previous chapter.
The united force of Souham and Caftarelli was undervalued ;
1 Wellington to Lord Liverpool, Didpatd&es, ix. p. 574.
~ Memorandum for Baron Alten, Madrid; 31st August 1812.
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it was not till Wellington saw their two armies deployed that
he recognized that they had 20,000 men morc in hand than he
had supposed. And on the other front he relied too much on
the strength of the line of the Tagus for defence. Wc must
concede that if the weather had been the same in New Castile
as it was in Wellington's own region, if the Tagus had been in
flood like the Arlanzon and the Pisuerga., and the desperate
rains that prevailed at Burgos had prevailed also at Toledo
and Aranjuez, his plan would probably have been successful.
Dut who dares make the weather a fixed point in military
calculations? The season disappointed him, and Soult was
lucky enough to find bright days and hard roads and streams
half dry as he advanced on Madrid 1, though Wellington was
almost emboggcd and moved among perpetual fogs in the
North.
Still, the cardinal fact at thc bottom of "the unfortunate
Burgos campaign was that the Anglo~PortugueseArmy was not
strong enough for the task in hand, when Soult's whole force,
and great part of the Army of the North also, came into the
field to aid the armies of Portugal and the Centre. The perma-
nent evacuation of Andalusia and the temporary evacuation
of Biscay put into movement 00,000 men who had hitherto
been for the most part locked up in the occupation of those
regions. When they became an • operating army' Wellington
was hopelessly outnumbered. He himself thought that he
might yet have pulled through the crisis, ",'1thout being com-
pelled to evacuate Madrid and the two Castiles, if only Ballas-
teros had obeyed orders, and distracted Soult by an irruption
into La Maneha against the .flank of the advancing enemy.
Undoubtedly that General was most perverse and disloyal;
but it seems quite possible that if he had I,!odvaneed, as ordered,
he would only have let himself in for onc of those crushing
defeats which commanders of his type so often suffered during
the war. The fact was that the French armies, when once
concentrated, were too numerous to be held in check. Welling-
ton'~ only real chance of success would have been to concentrate
every ma.n either against Souham and Caffarelli on the one side,
or against Soult and the King on the other. This was made
I The bad weather on the TlIgus only began October 30th.
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difficult by the initial division of his army into two nearly
cqual halvcs-which resulted in his own force being too weak
to deal with the French Northcrn Army, and Hill's similarly
too weak to deal with the Southern Army. He had intended,
whcn hc lcft Madrid on August 8Lst, to rcturn thither with the
bulk of his marching force, after disposing of the northern
enemy, and (as we have seen) this.idea was still in his head
even as late as early October. But he failed to carry out his
intention, partly because he had allowed himself to get
entangled in the siege of Durgos, partly because the French
army in front of him proved much stronger than he had
originally calculated.
The only occasion on which it was actuallY'in his power for
a few days to combine Hill's force and his own for a blow at
one of the two hostile armies, while the other was still far off,
was on the Srd-5th of Novembcr. Hc saw thc chance, but
deliberately refused to take it, for reasons which we ha'.'c scen
set forth 1, and which \verc perfectly convincing. If he had
concentrated against eithcr of the French annies, it might
have refused to fight and drawn back, while the other was in
a position to cut off his line of communication with Salamanca
and Portugal.
He resolved, and at this moment the resolve was wise, not
to attempt any such blow, but to fall back on the well-known
and formidable positions round Salamanca. Here he thought
that he could d~end the line of the 'I'ormes, even against a
combined force that outnumbered him by 25,000 men. Prob-
ably he would have succeeded if the enemy had delivered a
frontal attack, as J ourdan and the majority of the French
generals desired. But Soult's safe but indeeish'e policy of
refusing to make such an attack, and turning the Allied flank
by the fords of the uppcr Tormes, was adoptcd. Thc only
counter to this move would have bccn to assail the French
while they werc in thc midst of their manreuvrc, even as
Marmont hud been nssuiled at the battle of the Arapiles. But
the disparity of numbers was on this occasion too gJ;Cat for
such a stroke to be prudent, and Wellington was forced, most
unwillingly, to retreat to the fronticr of Portugal.
• See lIbove, pp. 112-18.
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But for two mishaps-the coming on of absolutely abominable
weather and the misdirection of the food-supplies by Colonel
Gardon-this retreat would have been u~l;ventful, and would
have been attended with little or no loss. For the French
pursuit was timid and ineffective, and only carried out by a frac-
tion of the enemy's army-nearly halfof it halted at Salamanca,
and the remaining part was not strong enough to attack
Wellington. As it chanced, Garden's errors and the plague of
immoderate rains not only cost Wellington several thousand
men, but produced an impression of disaster both on the minds
of those who took part in the miserable march and on those of
the captious critics in London. What should have been' a good
clean retreat' became a rather disastrous affair. But this was
not due to the enemy, and the }~reneh observers got small
comfort from it-as we have already shown by quoting Foy's
perspicuous and angry comments on the operations aroun'd
Salamanca 1. Wellington got off with • an army in being,'
and ifit was tired out, so was that of his opponents. A hundred
thousand men had been scraped together from every corner of
the Peninsula to _ovenvhelm him, but had failed to do so.
l\Ieanwhile he had cleared all Spain south of the Tagus valley
from the enemy, had broken their prestige, and had shaken to
pieces the pretension of King Joseph to be taken seriously as
the monarch of the greatest vassal-kingdom of his brother's
empire.
I See above, p. 142.
SECTION XXXV
CHAPTER I
WINTER QUARTERS. DECEMBER 1812--JANUARY 1813
WHEN the Anglo-Portuguese Army halted at Ciudad Rodrigo,
and came hack once more to regular rations and marches that
were no longer forced, it was of course in v~ry bad condition.
The cold and wet of the last ten days' retreat from Salamanca
had caused many a Tnnll to drop dead by the way. and had sent
thousands of sick to the hospitals, riddled with dysentery and
rheumatism. And the hospitals and dep6ts were even before
this last influx loaded up with convalescents not fit for service,
from the casualties of Salamanca. and Burgos. The December
morning states were enough to fill Wellington with dismay;
of his 64 1 British battalions there were only 30,897 men
present with the colours-an average of much less than 500
bayonets to the battalion. There were no less than 18,000 men
in hospital-more than a third of the ·total strength of the
infantry arm. Thirteen regiments had more men' siek ' than
•effective' ; twelve were down to under 300 strong 2. The cavalry
had not lost so many in proportion-they had 5,700 present
under arms to 1,486 sick, but could not mount more than 5,000,
owing to the loss of horses during the retreat, and the surviving
horses were for the most part in bad condition.
The first thing necessary was to get the troops under cover
and well fed: a very long rest was obviously necessary to allow
the wayworn and exhausted men time to recover their strength,
I Not including 2j5l:nh at Cadiz, but inclUding the Ij6th. 20th. and
91st which only landed in November. and the butluHonB or the 1st Foot
Gunrds which had only just joined dUring the Burgos retreat.
• The Portuguese inrantry had suffered quite as heavily-eold being
very trying to them. though swnmcr beat nD'cctcd them Icss than the
British. The 20th Portuguese. starting on the retreat from Madrid with
1100 men, only brought 350 to Hodrigo.
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and the convalescents to rejoin from the hospitals. With the
winter drafts known to be ready und starting from England,
to the number of some 5,000 1, beside onc o~ two morc complete
battalions promised "for the Peninsula, there might be an army
in April 1818 no less strong than that which had opened the
campaign of 1812. But clearly the only movement to be
thought of at present was that of getting the divisions into
comfortable winter quarters. Accordingly the army broke up
a few days after reaching Ciudad Rodrigo, and spread itself out
in dispositions not unlike those of the December previous, save
that nothing was left so far to the South as had been the custom
in other years. For Soult was no longer in Andalusin, and the
right wing of the Allied army had no reason to descend as far as
the Guadiana.
By December the 1st Division had distributed itself on the
upper Mondego around Guarda and Vizeu 2; the Srd Division
was farther north, about Moimento de Beira; the 4th, with head-
quarters at S. Joao de Pesquiera, occupied cantonments along
the Dauro; the 5th was a little lower do\\'ll the same river in
Lamego and the neighbouring villages: The 6th Division lay
somewhat farther back on the northern slope of the Serra de
Estrella, along the high road parallel with the middle Mondego,
with head-quarters at Cea; the 7th at Moimento da Scrra and
Santa Marinha, also under the Estrella. Pack's and Bradford's
Portuguese went north of the Douro, to Pcnaficl and Villa Real
respectively. Only thc much-enduring Light Division was left
in rather cold and bare quarters on the frontier, occupying
familiar billets at Fuentes de Oiloro, Alameda, Gallegos, and
other villages between the Coa and the Agueda. The cavaJry
was all sent back to the rear, even so far as the coast-plain at
the mouths of the Vouga and the P,rondego, save V. Alten's
brigade, which remained on the Agueda in company with the
Light Division, and D'Urban's Portuguese, who went back to
Draganza, in the far north-east of the Tras-os-Montes, on the
Spanish frontier. Any observer noting these dispositions as
, 4,400 tor the intantry, 850 for cavalry, plus drafU:! for artillery. &C.
I Where the new Second Guard.'l Brigade had a dreadful epidemic of
fever and dysentery, and buried 700 men. It WAI!lj() thinned that it could
not mnrch even in Ma.y, nnd missed the Vittorin e4mpaign.
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It. whole could not but conclude that they were most easily
explained by an intention to resume in the next spring the old
line of the Allied advance of 181'2; since all the British troops
were conveniently placed for a concentration on the Ague.da,
and a march on Salamanca. The fact that the three small
Portuguese units had been sent north of the Douro would
attract little attention. And this no doubt was the impression
which Wellington wished to produce on any secret agents of
the French who might report the location of his winter quarters.
~leanwhile, ~ in earlier years, Hill took the old Army of
Estremadura, the British 2nd Division, Hamilton's Portuguese
division, and Erskine's two cavalry brigades, back to the South,
but only as far as the Tagus and the Alagon, not to the Guadiana.
He fixed his head-quarters at Coria, and distributed the brigades
of the 2nd Division in the mountain villages above, covering
the great passes of the Sierra de Franeia and the Sierra de Gata,
the Puerto de Baiios and the Puerto de Perales I. Hamilton's
division lay inside its own country, at Moraleja, Idanha, and
Penamacor. The cavalry head-quarters were at Brozas in the
valley of the Tagus, near Alcantara and its E.oman bridge.
Here Erskine, the cavalry divisional general, committed suicide
by jumping out of a high window in a state of frenzy. Welling-
ton had long wanted to get rid of him-though not in this sad
way-and for good reason, as is explained by several incidents
of 1811'and 1812 which have been noticed in previous volumes.
Yet he had never been able to obtain his departure-political
influences at homestood in the way. Erskipe being thus removed,
the Commander-in-Chief at once dissolved the 2nd Cavalry
Division, and its two British brigades (Long's and Fane's) ceased
to have any other connexion with each other, beyond that of
being both attached to Hill's Corps.
i'he disposition for Hill's winter quarters was obviously
intended J.1ot merely to 'Cover the great passes between the
valleys of the DouM and the Tagus, but also to give the enemy
cause to think that Wellington might some day attack on the
southern front, either by a sudden advan~e up the Tagus on
• Brigades were Dot always kept together, the regiments being' a little
scattered. Individual battalion!! were in BaftOfl, Bejar, Bohoyo, Monte-
bermoso, &c.
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Talavera and Madrid, or by a blow at Avila across the Puente
de Collgosto defile. Either operation would be equally possible
to a force based on Coria. And repeatedly during the spring
rumours ran through the French lines that Hill had advanced
to Plasencia or the bridge of Almarnz.
Behind the long front that lay between D'Vrban's horse at
Braganza and Erskillc's horse at Brozas, the British army
settled down for a very protracted period of rest and reorganiza-
tion-it was to be much longer than Wellington had intended,
owing to unforeseen chances. The Spanish auxiliary forces
which had marched with the Allies in the autumn also dispersed:
CastailOs led the Army of Calicia back from the Agucda to its
own country, by a long march through the Tras-os-l\Iontcs.
Carlos de Espaiia put part of his division as a garrison in Ciudad
Rodrigo, and lay with the rest in the mountain villages of the
Sierra de Francia. Morillo, sticking close to Hill's side, as he
had done all through ]812, went back with him to the South,
and wintered once more in Estremadura, at C~eres and the
neighbouring places.
On the other side, King Joseph and Marshal 50ult had also
to place their n.nnies-ns worn out as were those of their
enemy-in winter quarters. And the choice of theirs was a
m,i'ch more difficult problem than that whieh lay before Welling-
ton, since King Joseph had to settle not only a military but
a political problem. The whole fabric of the French occupation
of Spain had bccn dashed to pieces in the preceding summer
by the loss of Andalusia, the temporary occupation of Madrid
by the Allies, and the advance of the Anglo·Porluguese Army
as far as Burgos. I t, had now to be reconstructed-but on what
lines? There was clearly no possibility of reoccupying Anda-
lusia or Estremadura; to do so would have involved a winter
campaign-which was unthinkable-and an intolerable dis-
persion of the army which had been collected with so much
difficulty for the repression of Wellington. The real alternatives
possible were either (1) to reconstruct King Joseph's Spanish
kingdom, as it hod existed in the spring of 1812, minus Anda-
lusia, making Madrid the political capital and the military base
of operations, or (2) to recognize that the total strength of the
Fl'encb armies no longer sufficed for such an ambitious scheme,
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and to occupy in strength only Old Castile and Loon, with the
provinces beyond the Ebro, making Valladolid both the political
and the military centre of operations, and abandoning Madrid
altogether, or only holding it os an advanced post towards the
south, 011 the extreme limit of French occupation.
After much debate Joseph and Jourdan chose the former
plan, influenced mainly, as the Marshal writes in his Memoirs,
by the fact that to give up Madrid as the capital, and to remove
to VaUadolid. would be a death-blow to the prestige of the
Fronco-Spanish monarchy. It would matter little whether
Madrid were actually abandoned, or held as a precarious out-
post: in either case Joseph could no longer pretcnd to be King
of Spain t. In addition it must be remembered that to give up
New Castile and La Mancha would leavc Suchet in a position
of isolation at Valencia, far too much advanced, and quite out of
touch with the other armies, and also that from the adminis-
trative point of view Joseph had always regarded the revenues
which hc drew from Madrid and Ncw Castile as the only solid
part of his very mooest and irregular ~udget, That a great
error of choice was made is undoubted; but its ruinous nature
was only to be revealed by circumstances which the King and
the Marshal could not possibly have foreseen on November 20,
1812. When they made their decision neither they nor anyone
at Paris, or elsewhere in Western Europe, had a notion of the
awful debacle which was in progress in Russia. Napoleon had
evacuated Moscow a month back; he was now in disustrous
retrcat from Smolcnsk toward the Derezina, with an army that
was olready crumbling under his hands. But that the whole of
it wns destined. to perish during the next few days, and that
Francc was to be left unguarded by any Grande Anllec whell the
new year came, seemed an inCredible contingency. Joseph
and Jourdan expected to draw from the Emperor drafts and
reinforcements in 1813, as they had even in 1812. If they had
guessed that, instead, he would be drawing drafts and reinforce-
mcnts from them, they would have adopted a different policy.
But the celebrated' 29th Bulletin' was published in Paris only
on December Brd, and did not get to :Madrid till .Tanuary 6th,!
, JourdAn, Mtmulrt, p. 449.
• See COrTtlporuJance du Roi Joseph, ix. p, 462,
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and even that dismal document did not revenl the full ·extent
oC the ruin. It was not, indeed, till pl'ivate letters from sur-
vivors of the Moscow retreat began to drift in, three weeks later,
that the French head-quarters in Spain realized what the month
of November had meant in Russia.
It was quite natural, then, that King Joscph should have
made up his mind, at the end of the Burgos retreat, that he would
occupy so much of the regained regions as was possible, and
would make Madrid once more his residence and the centre of
his operations. He was right in believing that he had at least
four months before him for reorgani7.ation and reconstruction:
Wellington was too hard hit to be able to move before April at
the earliest.
It was ~ome weeks before the King was able to spread the
three French armies in the final positions which he had chosen
for them. He left Salamanca himself at the head of his Guard
on November 28rd, and moved on Madrid by way of Pcnaranda,
Arevalo and the Guadarrama Pass. He reached the capital on
December 2nd, to find that it had been occupied a few days
after he had left it on' his march to Salamanca by the Empeci.
nado and his partida I. The guerrillero chief had administered
the city with the aid of an extemporized junta for more than
three weeks 2. On the approach of the King he retired, taking
with him some citizens who had compromised themselves in
the patriotic cause. Joseph, however, showed himself particu-
larly gracious on his return, and endeavoured to produce an
impression of the restored solidity of his regime, by holding
court functions, rcopening thc theatres, and visiting hospitals
and public institutions. The demonstration had little effect, all
the more because it was accompanied by increased market-dues
and the collection of arrears of taxation. It was impossible to
persuade the ~fadrileiios that the King's return was for good,
and confidence in his power was never restored.
, For a curious narrath'C of advcntures in Madrid, Novcmber 4-10. by
a party of English prisoners who escaped in the confusion thaf:'-followcd
the outmarch of the French, see the Memoil'll of Captain Harley of the
47th, 11. pp. 42-50.
• Fortunately for themselves most of King Joseph's Spanish partisal1ll,
who Ded from Madrid in July to Valcncia, werc still under·Suchet'8 charge
lInd had not returned, or their lot would btlvc been a hard onc.
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Meanwhile t!le Army of the Centre reoccupied the provi.nces
oC Segovi.a and Gundalajara with the northern part of that of
Toledo. While crossing the Guadarrama a few days after the
King, its leading division was caught in a blizzard similar to
that which, on the same spot, had qnpeded Napoleon on Decem-
ber 22nd, 1808, and lost a hundred men frozen or buried in the
snow 1. Soult was directed to place his head-quarters at Toledo,
and to occupy that province andAvila, with so muchofLa l\fancha
as he thought proper. The Army of Portugal was allotted
the provinces of Zamora, Leon, Salamanca, Palencia, and
Valladolid, with hend-quarters at the last-named city. The
front towards Portugal and Galieia'was held by one division
at L~on, another at Zamora, and two at Salamanca, the rest
of the eight divisions of this army being echeloned in reserve at
various points in Old Castile. But at the end of Deeember the
King determined that there must be a shifting of cantonments,
in order to tighten up his connexion with Suchet at Valencia.
He ordered Soul,t tO,send a division to Cuenca, as a half-way
house to the East Coast. To enable him to spare these troops
he was relieved of the charge of the province of Avila, w.hich was
taken ovcr by Foy, with the lstDivuion ofthc Army oC Portugal.
The extent of the French occupation in central and northern
Spain at the commencemcnt of thc new year, 1818, may best
be defined by a list of the Divisional hcad-quarters of the
qnnies, which were, on January 15, Army of the South,
1st Division (Leval), Toledo!; 8rd Division (Villatte), Talavera;
4th Division (Conroux), Madridejos; 5th Division .(pecheux),
Daymicl in La Mancha; 6th Division (Daricau), San Clemente
in the province of Cuenca. Of the cllvalry Pierre Soult's light
horse and Digcon's dragoons were in a Corwa.rd position in
La J.fancha, TilIy's dragoons in reserve at Toledo. The effectivc
total of Soult's army was on this day 86,000 officers and men
eltective, beside men in hospital or detached.
Of the Army of the Centre, Dannagnac's Division, as also the
Royal Guard, '\...~S at Madrid, Cassagllc's Division at Arganda
1 Miot de Melilo, iii. p. 258.
I Tbe 2nd Dlviilioll (8ce ubove, p. 00) had been taken from Soult
alld lent to the Anny of the Centre during the operation of November. It
WII8 never given back.
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(twenty miles farther east), the Franco-Spa'l!sh Division of
Casapalacios at Segovia, the cavalry dispersed at various points
in a circle round Madrid. This army had just lost Palombini's
Italian Division, which had served with it during the autumn
campaign of 1812. It was on its way to Burgos. to join the
Army of the North, to which it properly belonged. With this
deduction the Army of the Centre had still 12,000 French troops,
plus Joseph's Guards and Spaniards, who must have made up
at least 5,000 more. .
The Army of Portugal was much more widely dispersed. It
showed the 1st Division (Foy) at Avila, 2nd Division (Blll'bot)
at Valladolid, ar<! Division (Sarrut) at Leon, 4th Division
(Fririon) at Saldana. 5th Division (Maucune) and 8th Division
(Chauvel) at Salamanca, with detachments at Ledesma and
Zamora. The 6th and 7th Divisions, both weak, were in
process of being cut up to strengthen the others, as will be
explained later, when reorganization is in question. Of the two
cavalry divisions of the Army of Portugal both Boyer's drage:ons,
with head-quarters at Mo.yorga, nnd Curto's light horse, with
head-quarters at Medina de Rio Seco, were keeping a line of ad-
vanced poots on the Esla, to watch the Spanish army of Galicia.
'rhe total effective strength, omitting sick, was 42,000 men.
The three armies had thus about 95,000 men under arms to
cover the enormous block of territory which they occupied.
The distance from Salamanca to San Clemente is 250 miles j
that from Leon to Daymiel 280 miles. It is clear that a concen-
tration on Madrid or Valladolid would be comparatively easy.
On the other hand there would bc an intolerable distance for
the Army of the South to cover, if Salamanca were the point
choscn by.an enemy for assault, or for the remoter divisions of
the Army of Portugal to traverse, if Talavera were selected.
But, as was obvious, there was no chance of any such blow
being delivered at present, since Wellington could not possibly
stir till the spring, while the Spanish regular forces in Andalusia
and :Murcia were negligible quantities until the Anglo-
Portuguese army should be able to move.
All found the position of the French there was at this moment
1\ broad • no man's land 'j for their farthest outposts were
nowhere in direct touch with the enemy, but separated from
..
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him by many miles of unoccupied ground, III which neither
party kept permanent posts. Between Astorga-the farthest
advanced post of the Galicians-and the line of the Esla,
between Salamanca and Ciudad Rodrigo, between Avila and
Dejar, between Talavera. and Coria, between Daymiel and
San Clemente nnd the northern foothills of the Sierra Morena,
this broad debatable land was in possession neither of the
French nor of the regular armies of their enemy, but of the
guerrillero bands, under a score of leaders small and great.
And the difficulty of the situation for King Joseph was that,
while Wellington and Castaiios and Del Parque and Elio were
quiet perforce at midwinter, the gucrrilleros were not. Having
ample spaces oC unoccupied border, in which they could take
refuge when pursued, and many mountain recesses, even within
the zone of French occupation, where they could lie safe against
anything less than a considerable flying column, they seemed
to defy extermination. Even in King Joseph's most prosperous
days, when the final triumph of the French seemed probable,
there had always been guerrilleros; but since Wellington's
march to Madrid and Soult's evacuation of Andalusia, it no
longer looked as if the national cause was hopeless. To collect
the army which drove Wellington bac~ to Portugal in November
every district in Spain, from Biscay to La Mancha, had been
stripped for a time of its army of occupation. Regions long
tamed had been out of hand for four or five months, enjoying
an unruly and uncomfortable freedom, in which local juntas
and guerriUero chiefs, who took the pose of military governors,
contended for authority. And when the French came back
they found that their old prestige was gone and that it could
only be restored, if it could be restored at all, by ceaseless aets
of repression of the most drastic sort. For if any town or village
showed any signs of willing submission, the guerriUeros descended
upon it when its garrison was absent, and hung or arrested
, Afrancesooos': while if the population (as was more usual)
showed ill-will and offered passive resistance, the French
imprisoned or shot the magistrates, and imposed heavy fmcs
for disloyalty 1.
, A good picture of the state of Central Spain In January and February
1818 may be got from the Memoirs of d'Espinchel, of the 2nd lIuMaI1l, an
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But while the whole of northern and central Spain was full
of punitory raids and executions, there was onc region where
the trouble passed the limit of unrest, and could only be called
insurrection, where the French garrisons were practically
blockaded in their cantonments, and where the open country
was completely out of hand. This was the .sub·Pyrenean
district comprising Navarre, the three Basque provinces, and
the mountainous lands between Santander and Burgos. And
from the strategical point of view this was the most important
tract in all Spain, since the main communication with Frunc.c
lay through its midst, by the great road from Madrid to Bayonne
through Valladolid, Vittoria, and Tolosa. We have seen in
earlier pages that trouble had been endemic in these lands ever
since Mina's appearance in 1810, and the permanent establish-
ment of those active IXlrtisans, Portier and Longa, on the Can-
tabrian coast-line. The creation of Reille's ' Army of the Ebro '
in 1811 for the speciul purpose of making an end of the northern
bands had failed in its purpose. But things only came to
a crisis in thc summer of 1812, when Sir Home Popham's
operations 011 the Biscay coast cleared the French out of most
of the smaller ports, and gave the insurgents for the first time
free communication with the sea, and the inexhaustible supplies
ofBritain. We have seen in the last volume 1 how the co-opera-
tion of Caffarelli with Marmont in the Salamanca campaign was
completely prevented by this diversion, how Longa and
l\Iendizabal retook Santander and for a space Bilbao, and how
Mina held the Governor of Pampelunn blockaded in the strongest
fortress of northern Spain. CaffareUi had recovered Bilbao in
August; but when \Yellington marched on Burgos in Septem-
ber, and the Army of the North was compelled to abandon all
other operations, in order to succour the- retreating Army of
Portugal, the ca.pital of Biscay and all the surrounding district
passed back into the power of the Spaniards. In the whole
region nothing remained in the hands o(the Freneh save the
officer I!harged with the raising of rontributions ID La Maneha-a melan·
choly record or violence nod treachery, llIlS3Ssination by guerrillerOll and
reprisals by the French, of villages plundered and magisb'ates shot.
D'E8pinehel had mainly to deal with the bands of El Medioo and the
Etnpceiuooo. See his Souvtllirs milita,r~, pp. 86-110.
1 Vidc v. pp. 550-8.
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ports of SantOil.a., GuetAria., and San Sebastian, and a. line of
fortified posts along the high road from the Bidassoa to the
Ebro. And in Navarre Mina held full possession of the open
country, raised the taxes, established courts of justice, and
(what appears more strange) set np custom-houses on the
French frontier, at which he allowed non-military goods to pass
into Spain on the payment of regular dues 1. He had raised
his original partida to a strength of nine battalions of infantry
and two regiments of cavalry, possessed cannon, and had
a munition factory working at the head of the Pyrenean valley
of Honcal.
Before Wellington commenced his retreat from the Douro to
the Portuguese frontier, or the armies of Soult and of Souham
had joined, to bring their overpowering force against the Anglo-
Portuguese, SOllham, as we have already seen, had released
the troops of the Army of the North, and sent them back by
Burgos to the Ebro, in order that Caffarelli might reoccupy
the lost districts, and make safe once more the high fond from
the Bayonne to Miranda, and the almost equally important
route along the Ebro from l\Iiranda to Saragossa, by which he
had to keep up his conncxion with Suchet and the East Coast.
Turning back from Valladolid on November 1st, the commander
of the Army of the North spent some time in opening up the
high road,oll which many convoys werc lying blockaded in thc
garrisons and unable to move, and 110t till December was come
did he clear Bilbao, and drive the coast~land gucrrilleros out of
all the Biseayan harlxmr towns save Castro-Urdiales, which
had been fortified and was firmly hcld. Putting orr its siege for
a time, he;: then pushed along the coast to relieve Santoi'ia, which
had been blockaded for many months by Mendizabal and Longa.
He cut his way .thither, and threw in a convoy and reinforce-
ments; but as soon as he was gone the Cantabri~llscame back
arid resumed thcir former positions around the place. By the
cnd of the year Caffarelli had done nothing conclusive-some
shadow of occupation had been restored in Biscay, but when
this was completed the new garrisons had reduced his troops
I See Mina's Lite or himseIr. pp. 39-43. He declares that the French
custom-house at Yrun paid him 100 oll%asde ora (£800) l\ month, ror lenve
w pass goods acl'()lJS thc Hidaasotl.
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available for active service to a very modest figure. And on
January 7 he had to part with the best unit of them-the
brigade of the Young Guard under Dumoustier, which had 'been
left in Spain when all the rest of· the Guards went orf for the
Russian campaign in the preceding year. He was also directed
to give up to their proper owners three provisional regiments
composed of drafts for the armies of Portugal and the South,
which had been intercepted on their way to Valladolid, and used
to stop gaps in the line of communication. In return for these
deductions he was told that he should be given Palombini's
Italian Division, taken from the Anny of the Centre, three
depleted regiments from the Army of Portugal,l and onc from
Sault's Army,! which he might fill up with drafts from the
Bayonne reserve. But it took some time to move these units
northward, and meanwhile Caffarclli was left with no more
than 10,000 movable troops-though the Army of the North
was theoretically about 40,000 strong. The Bayonne chaussee
was again out of control-so much so that in January and
February there were two complete breaks of some weeks,
during which neither convoys nor couriers could get through
from Tolosa. to Burgos. Bitter complaints about this interrup-
tion of communications are to be found in the correspondence
of Napoleon and King Joscph. The famous' 29th Bulletin'
sent off from Paris on December 4th only reached Madrid on
January 6th-the Emperor's order for the reorganization of the
Spanish armies, dispatched on January 4th, came to hand only
on February 16th; and the reply acknowledging its receipt
was not received in Paris till March 18th 13 It had travelled by
the circuitous route of Valencia and Barcelona.
This was intolerable to both parties, and they joined in
placing the blame for .delay on the shoulders of Carrarelli, who
was denoun~ as dilatory and wanting in energy. Jourdan
accused him of deliberate disregard of all military obedience.
< He was ostensibly under the orders of the King, but rarely
corresponded with Madrid. When he did send a report,. he
seemed to do so rather as a matter of politeness than as the
• The remains of Thomi~res' unlucky division, cut to pieces at Sala·
manc.'\-the ht, 05th, and lOlst Line. • 64th Line•
• COTftspOm!am:e du JWj JWCpll, i:x. p. 224.
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duty of a subordinate towards his hierarchical superior 1: On
January 14th the Emperor ordered him to quit the command
of the Army of the North and return to Paris. Transmitting
this welcome picce of news to Joseph, the Minister of War
remarked that Caffarelli had insufficient numbers, but that
• with morc activity, continuity, and method in his opera-
tions he might have been much more suecessful 2.' In his
placc the Emperor nominated Clauscl, who was on sick·leave
in France, but was able to rejoin almost at once. This
choice was generally approved, as his operations with the
Army of Portugal after the battle of Salamanca had won
him a well-deserved reputation. But all concerned, from
Paris to Madrid, were destined to discover that it was not
CaUarelli's incapacity, but the difficulty of the problem, that
was responsible for the unsatisfactory condition of arIairs in
Biscay and Navarre. Thc capable Clausel madc little more of
the game than the short-sighted and mediocre officer whom he
superseded. But tillS could hardly have been foreseen at mid-
winter; the fact was 1I0t obvious till May, whcn (as wc shall
sec) Clauscl, though he had been lcnt many thousands of troops
much wantcd elsewhere, had to confess that his task was not
<.'omplctcd, despite of four months of energetic eilort, countless
marches and counter-marches, and a dozen bloody but incon-
clusive defeats inflicted on the Northern insurgents.
1 Jourdan, Mtnwires, p. 452.
I Clarke to King J05Cph, Correspandance du Roi, ix. p. 186.
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SECTION XXXV: CHAPTER Il
THE 'l'HQUBLES OF A GENERALISSIM:O. WELLINGTON AT
CADIZ AND FRENEDA
HAVING sent his war-worn divisions into wintcr quarters,
where they were to remain with little change of billets till the
next April, Wellington could turn to the consideration of many
political and military problems for which he hOO been granted
little leisure during the long stress of the autumn campaign.
Hc fixed himself down at his old frontier head-quarters of 1811
and 1812, the village of Frcncrla near the Coa, between Almcida
and Fucntcs de Quora. It was a small and bleak place;
observers often wondered why, with the whole of Portugal
before him, he chose it for month.long residence in the worst
time of the year. But in the wintcr of ]812-]3 he remained
stationary there from the end of November to the latter half
of l\fay~sa"e for one rapid excursion to Cadiz and Lisbon,
which took him away from December 12th to January 25th-
an odd time for cross-country travelling in the Peninsula.
Frcncda had no amcnities of any kind-save indeed that it was
in the midst of II good fox-hunting cOWltry, a rare thing in
Purtugal. The Commander-in-Chicf, on returning to his old
base of operations, picked up his paek of hounds, and treated
himself not infrequently to thc onc sort of field-sport in which
he had a real delight. In other respects the village was dull
and inconvenient-it could only just house Ius very small
general staff; it was by no means a central point among the
cantonments of his army; and its remoteness from Lisbon
caused a delay of two or three days in all his correspondence
to and from home_ The only things to be said in its favour were
that it was so close to the front line of the army on the Agueda
that there would be no possibility of missing any information
as to hostile movements, and that its remoteness and inacces-
sibilitypreserved theCommander-in-Chieffrom many interviews
with useless and inconvenient visitors, who would have thronged
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around him if he had lodged in Lisbon. The intriguer, the man
with a grievance, or the man with a job in hand, could not easily
get to windy Frelleda.
Only a steady perusal of Wellington's Original and Supple-
mentary Dispatches can give the ehronieler an idea of the varied
nature of his troubles and worries, during the winter that
followed the Salamanca campaign. They were not mcrely
those of an ordinary general in command of an army: his
political position had now grown so important that not only
did all happenings in the Peninsula fall within his sphere, but
the Cabinet at home was continually consulting him on questions
of general European importance. And in the months after
Napoleon's Russian diEbi1cle the politics of Europe eame to a
crisis, sueh as had never been seen since first he assumed the
Imperial crown. His domination was breaking up: his prestige
had received a mortal wound: allianccs were shifting: the
wildest enterprises were advocated. There were those at home
who proposed that Wellington should take his Peninsula army
to Germany-or to La Velld6c-and others who wanted to
saddle him with a large Russian auxiliary force 00 be brought
by sea from Reval or Odessa. On every scheme, however wild,
he had to give his opinion.
But, placing in order of importancc the many worries that
beset Head-Quarters at Frelleda, it would secm that the most
constant and prolific source of trouble was a circumstancc
which ought rather to havc lessened than inercased Welling-
ton's military difficulties-if only men had been other than they
were. It will be rememhcred that as early as 1809 the project
of making him G<:ncralissimo of all the Spanish armies had been
mooted and rejected 1. He had expressed his opinion that
Spanish national pride made it impossible. 'I am much
flattered,' he had written to the British Minister, • by the
notion entertained by some of the peoplc in authority at
Seville of appointing me to the command of the Spanish Armies.
I believe it was considered an object of great importance in
England that the Commander-in-Chief of the British troops
should havc that situation. But it is onc more likely to be
attained by refraining from pressing it, and leaving it to the
• Sce vol. ii, pp. 46541.
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Spaniards themselves to discover the expediency of the arrange-
ment, than by any suggestion on our parts.'
Much water Jlad flowed under the bridge since 1809. The
appointment had not come after Talavera. or Bw;sal.'O, nor after
the horrible disasters of Ocana. the Sierra Morena, and the
surrender of Valencia. But the summer campaign of 1812 had
at last convinced the Cortes that the British general, who had
so often been criticized and accused of selllshnessand reluctance
to risk anything for the common cause of the Allies, was the
inevitable man. In the full flush of joy llnd oonfidence that
followed the battle of Salamanca and the triumphal entry into
Madrid, a bill was laid before the Assembly to appoint Welling.
ton generalissimo of all the Spanish forces. It was supported
by most of the leading men of the 'Liberal' party, introduced
by the ex-regent Cisgar, and barely opposed by the 'Serviles',
though onc clerical member-Creux, afterwards Archbishop of
Tarragona-raised objections to giving such a command to any
foreigner, and expatiated on the selfish charaeter of Dritish
commercial policy. Despite of sueh murmurs, the motion was
carried by an immense majorit)" and the President of the Cortes
was authorized to direct the Council of Uegeney to make the
offer to Wellington. The form of words ran that considering
the advantages of unity in command, and the urgent necessity
for utilizing to the full the recent glorious triumphs of the allied
arms, it was decreed that as long as the allied forces were
co-operating in the defence of the Peninsula' Captain-General
the Duke of Ciudad Rodrigo' should have conferred upon him
the supreme command of all of them, to be exercised in accor·
dance with general orders, his authority to extend over all the
provinces of the Peninsula. And the' illustrious chief' was
directed to correspond with thc National Governmcnt through
the Secretary of the War Office 1.
This decree rcaehed Wcllington on October 2, while he lay
at ViIlatoro, conducting the siege of Burgos. He resolved. to
take up the long-delayed commission, provided that he should
receive the permission of the Prince Regent to do so, and sent,
through his brother at Cndiz, a letter of conditional aCl.'Cptance.
His consent to serve was not couched in very enthusiastic
J Por text see Torcno, Hi. p. 14D.
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terms: being anxious to do all that could be done to support
the legitimate quarrel of the Spanish nation with France, he
had no objection to taking upon himself the additional labour
and responsibility of commanding the Spanish armies. The \
delay which must be required, for getting leave from the Prince
Regent to make a formal acceptance of thc offer, seemed to him
of secondary importance, because he was already in the habit
of communicating his general views on operations to the
Spanish generals, and of making suggestions to them, which
always received the utmost attention. 'I am convinced thcy
will continue the same practice, even though I am not invested
with the supreme command.' These phrases look like deliberate
sarcasm, considering 'Vellington's former relations with Cuesta,
Del Parque, Blake, and Mendizabal. But they probably mean
no more than that the present commanders of the forces which
were actually co-operating with him in 1812, Castafl.os, Morillo,
and Carlos de Espai'ia, had been loyal and obliging. Finally,
• he hopes that in the new and prominent situation in which he
is to be placed, he will hn.ve not only the full support but the
confidence of the Spanish Government, Cartes, and nation 1:
'rhe inner meaning of these somewhat double-edged phrases
is explained in a memorandum for Lord Bathurst, the British
Secretary of State for War, which was sent home under the
same cover as the Cadiz documenV. It was eminently not a
letter to be shown to Spaniards, and contained some of the
most bitter expressions concerning them which Wellington
ever penned. No use could be got out of their armies, he wrote,
unless they were under his control. They had lost nearly nil
their guns and cayalry, and generally could not act in bodies
separate from the ALlied Army. Their discipline, equipment,
and organi'l.ation was as bad as ever: yet if put in line with his
own troops they might behave quite well. Be would prevent
by good managcment repetitions of those terrible disasters to in-
dividual armies which had so often happened in past years.
But his power over thcm must be made real, and for that
purpose he intended to apply the financial screw. All subsidies
advanced by the British Government to Spain must for the
future be expended wholly on such Spanish troops as were
, Welling/on Dispa/chu, Ix. p. 467. • Ibid., pp. 474-5, October S.
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actually employed in co-operation with the Anglo-Portuguese
army, or else those troops would become a fresh burden on the
military chest. And in his letter to Cadiz he bad been careful
to show that he did not intend to allow the Spanish Government
to dictate 0. military policy to him, beca.use they had placed
their troops at bis disposition.
These letters, sent oU from the camp before Burgos on Octo-
ber 5, got to London 'on October 20, and the Prince Regent's
approbation of Wellington's acceptance of the offer from the
Cortes was granted at once 1. The dispatch conveying it was
delivered at Cadiz on the 17th of November, and on the 20th
the Cortes confirmed its former decree, and sent off a formal
warrant of appointment to the new generalissimo, which
reached him at Freneda on December 4th. The confirmation
was not Il1!Lde with such general approval as the original appoint-
ment-and for good reason. By this time it had become
evident that Wellington was not about to drive the French
over the Pyrenees: he had raised the siege of Burgos, and
when the Cortes repeated their vote, was known to be in full
retreat for Salamanca. Hopes from his success were no longer
60 high as they had been in September, and a nasty jar had
been given to the whole arrangement by the mutinous conduct
of Ballnsteros, who (as hus been shown in an earlier chapter)
had issued a manifesto against ull submission to foreign generals,
and had refused to obey Wellington's dirc<:tions at a critical
moment. It is true that Ballasteros had been arrested and
imprisoned, without any consequent trouble 2; but it was
known that there were other Spanish generals who were not
without sympathy with his views.
Having received his formal nomination as generalissimo,
Wellington wrote to Carvajal, the :M.inister of War, on Decem-
ber 4th, one of the most stringent letters that any secretnry of
stnte has ever received. It reminds the reader of one of
Napoleon's epistles to Clarke or King Joscph. The Spanish
Government, he said, had now a right to expect from him an
accurate representation of facts, and he was going to perform
tlus duty. The discipline of the Spanish armies was in the
• Bathurst
vii. p. 402.
to Wellington, October 21. Supplememury Dispalcllts,
• See above, pp. 01-2.
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very lowest state; their efficiency was much deteriorated. HQ"'"
could any army be expected to keep order when neither officers
nor men had received any pay for~months-oreven for years ?
But it wns not financial arrears that explained all defects:
even in corps-like those of the Galician and Estremaduran
armies-which had recently been reclothed and regularly
paid by Wellington's own exertions, insubordination and
indiscipline were rife: they were as little to be depended upon
in the field ns the rest. The officers, with some few exceptions,
were absolutely slack and careless: the desertion from the
ranks immense. He had hesitated at accepting the command,
when he thought of what he had seen of the Spanish troops of
late. But having undertaken it, he would not relinquish the
task because it was laborious and of doubtful success. There
were four demands which he must make as a preliminary con-
dition: the Government must give him powcr-
(1) To have under his control all promotions and appoint-
ments to command;
(2) To dismiss from the service any officer whom he thought
deserving of such punishment;
(3) '],'0 apply the whole war-budget to such services as he
might choose;
(4) To appoint to his head-quarters a Spanish chief-of-the-
stafr, to wbom all military reports from the whole kingdom
should be sent: so that nothing should take place without
his knowledge. Through this officer he would correspond with
the Regency, and send them regular reports.
He then procee,ded to definite demands as to administration.
The present state of military organization was absurd, burden-
some, and expensive. The realm was overrun with unnecessary
army-commanders and captain-generals, with immense and
useless staffs. • For example, General Castaj)os is most usefully
employed as commander of the 5th Army, whose territory
consists of Estremadura and Castille. But there is a captnin-
general and a large stafr in each of these provin~s, though the
troops in the former arc not enough to make a full garrison for
Badajoz, or those in the latter to make a full garrison for Ciudad
Rodrigo 1.' The captain-generals and their staffs have nothing
, Roughly correct: the joint force of UlC Cll8tilian !lnd Estremadurl.ll1
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to administer, arc quite useless, and absorb money which
should go to the army. In the same way the 2nd (Valcncian)
and aro (Murcian) Armies, together have a strength equivalent
to two divisions, yet have each the full military and civil staff
of a complete army!. So has the 9th (Cantabrian) Army, which
is composed entirely of guerrilJcro bands. Only the Andalusian
nod Galician troops are sufficiently numerous to be worth
calling armies at all.
The first thing to do is to cut down unnecessary commanders-
in.~hicf and stalls. The Galician, Castilian, and Estrcmaduran
commands should be at once amalgamated, and put under
Castafios, with one single staff for all three. •Probably the
same should be done with the Andalusian, Murcian, and
Valencian commands. An immense body of superfluous staff-
officers must be sent back to Cadiz at once. As a second step
he would have to revise the organization of the country into
captain-gcncralships and intendancies. Captain-gencrals often
hampered army-commanders; intendants must probably be
put under military authority. This was no doubt wrong in
principle. But the civil intendant was powerless, in a country
just liberated from the enemy and full of trouble and disorder.
He could not exert authority unless he were lent military
assistance: yet he would probably fall out with the military
chief, because their ends would be divergent 2. • When the
enemy is still in the COWltry that must be done whieh tends
most directly to drive him out-whatever constitutional
principles may be violated in the process 3.'
Finally, Wellington resolved that hc must come down to
Cadiz in person to urge his schcmes of reorgani7.ation on the
Regency and the Cortes----obviously a most invidious task, sinee
no nation likes to have administrative reforms thrust upon it
divisions in October 1812 was 8,000 men "ith the colours-there were
lIome 7,000 men in dl:rMs llnd gurrillOllll.
I In November the ani Anny bud o.bout 5,000 men with the coloul'9,
3,000 in depOt: the 2nd, 7,000, excluding the guerrillcrOll of the
Empccinado nnd Duran.
• Tv."O days later Wellington sent Carvajal a definite instance of this
friction. The Civil [ntendant of Old Castile had collected a magazine for
the benefit of the garrison of Rodrigo. The Cnplnin-Generol had sei7.ed it,
and used it to support his own staff. DispaJcheB, ix. p. 623•
• Wellington to Carvajal. Dis]Jalches, ix. pp. 00.1-5.
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by a foreigncx-more especially by a foreigner whose tone is
dictatorial and whose phrases seem almost deliberately worded
so as to wound national pride.
../' On December 12th he started out to deal with the. Cadiz
bureaucrats, planning to cover the whole 800 miles from~
in six days. l""As a matter of fact he took eleven, partly because
he was smitten with lumbago, which made riding painful,
partly because he was delayed one night in the Pass of Perales,
and two at Albuquerque, by floods, which made mountnin-
streams impassable for many hours. Immediately on reaching
the seat of government, where he was received with great state
if with little reo.! cordiality, he started on his campaign against
the Regency, the Cortes, and the Minister of War. It is much
to the credit of the Spaniards that, though many of his demands
were unpalatable, the greater part of them were conceded with
slight variation of terms. It is curious to note the points on
which the Regency proved recalcitrant and started argument.
Of the four great preliminary conditions which Wellington
exacted, they granted at once that which seemed the most
important of all-the creation of a Spanish chief-of-the-staff
to be attached to Wellington's head-quarters, and conceded
thnt all military correspondencc should pass through his hands.
The person selccted was General WimpUen, a Spanish-Swiss
officer, of whom we havc had to speak occasionally in dealing
with Catnloninn n.llairs-he had been Henry O'Donnell's
adjutant-general in 1810. He was a non-politicnl soldier of
good abilities, and Wellington found him laborious and obliging:
there seems never to have been any friction between them.
Secondly, the Regency granted the great point that the whole
British subsidy should be applied to such military expenses as
Wellington should designate: and they nftcrwards went so far
as to order that in the recovered provinces nine-tenths of the
taxes raised should be devoted to military purposes. But they
haggled on the two conditions dealing with military patronage.
Instead of giving the generalissimo power to revise all appoint-
ments, they proposed that • no officer should be promoted to
a chief command, or the command of a. division, or any extra-
ordinary command. except at the recommendation of the
general-ill-chief. With regard to other promotions the rules
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of the Spanish service shall be strictly observed.' This left all
patronage from the rank of brigadier-general downward in the
hands of the Minister of War and the Cartes. And whereas
Wellington had proposed, as his second condition, that he should
have power to cashier any officer whom he considered deserving
of such punishment. the Regents offered him only the right of
suspending and sending away from the army in the field
officers guilty of grove misconduct I,
It is clear that these variations on the original proposals
had two main objects. The Spaniards evidently thought that
if 'Vellington had every officer down to the lowest under his
thumb, liable to be cashiered without any appeal, he migbt
use tllis tremendous power to stock the whole army with men
of onc political colour, and make it into a machine quite inde-
pendent of the Government. Md capable of being turned
against it. And similarly there was a great dHIerence between
the right to send an officer away from the Cront, and the right
to drive him out of thc army. To he put on half-pay, or on
administrative duty in some office at Cadiz, was a mueh less
terrible fate than eashiering.
It must be remembered that many Spaniards thought
Wcllington capable of aiming at a military dictatorship, to
whieh he might be helped by generals who were considered
Anglophils, such as Castaiios, his nephew and ehicf-of·thc-staff
Giron, or I'Iforillo. And othcrs believed that British policy
secretly desired thc seizure of Cadiz and :M:inorea and thc
reduction of Spain to a Protectorate. Now if there had been
any truth in these absurd suspicions, there is no doubt that
the powers which Wellington demanded would have given him
the chance of carrying out such designs. And there were an
infinite number of Spanish officers, from generals like La Peria
down to petty governors and members of provincial staffs, who
had eome into direct contact with Wellington, and knew his
unflattering opinion of them. All these men in disgrace, or
disgruntled placcmen, thought that the new generalissimo
would start his en.reer by a gcncral eashicring of thosc against
whom he had an old grudge.
I For tJle exact text oC the reply see the Sprmish Minister of Wnr'sletter.
SuppfementanJ Dispute/wl. xiv. pp. 17'0-1.
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Henee pressure was brought to bear upon the Regents and
the Cortes from many and diverse quarters, with thc common
plea that there must be no British military dictatorship, and
that Spanish officers must be protected from possible persecu-
tion and oppression. The underlying idea wns that if the mass
of the middle and lower grades in thc army were out of Welling-
ton's supervision, it did not matter so much who held the post
of army-commandcr or captain-gcneral. For the chiefs,
though in influential posts, were few, and would not be able
to carry thcir subordinatcs with thcm in any unpopular
movement dictated to thcm by the gencralissimo.
After much discussion, and with reluctance 1, Wellington
accepted thc modifications-thinking that the other things
conccded gave him praeticnlly all that he needed. He was to
find out his error in the year that followed. He had not
guarded himself against seeing officers with whom he wns
satisfied removed from his field-army under the pretencc of
promotion, or of transference to other duties, or of political
or[ellccs. Hc had forgotten to demand that he should have the
power of retaini1lg us much us that of dismissing generals. In
this way he wus deprived of the sCf\'iccs of Castanos and after-
wards of Giron, both of whom he was anxious to keep. Succes-
sors technically unobjectionable, whom he had no wish to
• blackball,' were substituted for them, to Iris deep regret.
And another evasion of his intention wus that officers whom
he had intended to disgrace, nnd had removed from the front,
were given posts elsewhere which could not be cnlled •divisional'
or' separatc' commands, but were quite desirable; and so while
thc letter of the bargain was kept, the purpose of inflicting
punislunent on such people was foiled.
Another long controvers)' was provoked by \Vellillb>1;on's
proposal that the small armies should be amulgamated, and
that unnecessary captain-gencrals with thcir staUs should be
got rid of. Much but not all of what he asked was conceded.
Thc i\lurcian und Valcllcian armies wcre consolidated, tUld
givcn the new name of the' Second Army'-the Catalan
army being still the' First Army'. But they were not amalga-
mated wjth the Andalusian (:ommand (uow the' Third Army'),
, See SlIppl.,luJlllflry Displllcllel'l, vii. pp. 529-30 and 1l4O.
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88 Wellington suggested. And similarly the Estremaduran,
Castilian, and Galleinn armies, with the outlying Cantnbriall
division, ceased to be the 5th, 6th, and 7th Armies, and took
the new name of the Fourth. And 0. great reduction ofstaffs and
removal of contending military authorities was procured. by
nominating Elio, commander of the new 2nd Army. to be
Captain-General of Murein und Valencia, Del Parquc of the
ard Army to be Captain-General of Granada and Jaen, and
Castai\os to be Captain-General alike of Estremadura, Galicia,
and Castile. This was all to the good, but the Cortes refused
Wellington's other proposal, that the civil government in each
province should be placed under the control of the arm)',
commanders. Declaring that it was constitutionally impossible
to nbolish the independence of the civil power, the Cortes )'et
conceded that the jefe politico (or provincial prefect) and the
Intendant should obey the Captain-General 'in all matters
relating to the Army 1,' also that nine-tenths of the revenue
in each province should be allocated to the military budget.
This would have worked if all parties concerned had been
both willing and competent; but it remained a melancholy
fact throughout the next campaign that the army-commanders
could seldom get either money or food from the eivil authorities,
and that most essential operations were delayed by the absolute
impossibility of moving large bodies of men without adequate
mabttlunes or a fair supply of money. The only regular income
of the army waS that drawn from the British subsidy.
But the worst of Wellington's troubles were yet some months
ahead. The Regency with which he had made his bargain 2
was displaced in March 1813, and succeeded by another. The
Cortes was jealous of the Executive, and had determined to
make for itself a supreme authority which should have neither
brains nor energy. The subject of quarrel chosen was the old
Regency's o.lIeged slackness in carrying out a recent Act which
had abolished that moribund abuse thc Inquisition s. After
, Wellesley to Castlereagh. Supplementary Dispalcllell, vii. p. 530.
• They were the Duke of Infantado, Admiral VilIavicieneio, and Sedon
Ignacio Rivus, MOl:KJ.uertl. and VUlumU. The lust two were reputed vcr)'
anti-British.
, This Act hnd been a great demonstration of the ' LibemICll', and they
were desirous of punishing certain canons und bishops who hud rcfUBed
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Ull all-night sitting and a vote of censure, the Regents were
dismissed, Md replaced by a group appointed under an absurd
principle borrowed from the old regime, which was applied
because it suited the desires of the assembly for the moment.
It was composed of the three senior members of the Council of
State-senility and weakness being desired. These were the
Cardinal Bourbon-Archbishop of Toledo-an aged scion of the
royal house, and the Councillors 1)edro Agar and Gabriel Cisgar,
who had been Hegents before, but had been got rid of for incom-
petence. Thus all real power went to the Chamber itself-the
llegency having become a negligible quantity. Wellington's
position was decidedly impaired by the change-largely because
a new minister-of·war had come into office, General Juan
O'Donoju, of whom he had an evil memory as Cuesm's chief-
of·the-staff during the Talavcra campaign. This clever, shifty,
and contentious Irish-Spanish officer broached the theory that
the agreement of December 1812 did not bind the new Re~cnts,
because they had never assented to it, and because it was
contrary to the spirit of the Constitution that a foreigner should
have the power to appoint or dismiss Spanish generals.
When Henry Wellesley at Cadiz, instructed by his brother,
turned his heaviest diplomatic batteries 1 upon the Regents,
and privately warned the leading members of the Cortes of the
awkward results that would follow the repudiation of the
agreement, O'Donoju was disavowed hut not displaced. He con-
tinued to give perpetual trouble through the following summer
by his persistent intrigues. Wellington was by no means
satisfied with the attempts that were made to propitiate him,
by the formal recognition of his status as generalissimo by the
new Regents, and the gift of a great estate in Granada, the royal
domain of Soto de Roma, which had been usurped by GOOoy.
Hc did not want grants but real authority. Of his future
troublcs wc I>hall have to speak in their proper place.
The most enduring of thcm was provincial maladministration.
to rend it publicly in their cnthedmls; an odd parollel 10 the CBSC 01
Jamcs 11 and the Seven Bishops in English history.
, ]nc!uding the presentation 01 a thundering letter from the British
Prince·Regent l ace H. Wellealey to Wellington, July 28, Supplementary
Di8patches, viii. p. 160 and ibid., p. 188.
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which rendered so many of his orders futile. For usually when
he directed 0. division to move, he was informed that it wus
destitute of both munitions and trnnsport I, And changes of
organization were often made against his protcsts-e. g. a. new
army regulation cut down all regimental formations to a single
battalion of very heavy strength (1,200 bayonets). Wellington
would have preferred a two-battalion formation, i.n which the
second unit should act as a depot and feeder to the ftrst 2, Hc
complained that if a regiment was badly cut up in action, there
would be no machinery Cor keeping it up to a decent aycrngc.
The experience of the British army with regard to single-
battalion corps had been conclusive against the system for the
last fi vc years of Peninsular service. But his protei>ts were
vain-internal organization of units did not come within the
wording of his powers as generalissimo, and the llew organization
continued, dozens of second battalions being scraPlled.
The net result was that, when Wellington took the field in
May 1813, he only had with him two of Castai'ios's divisions and
three of those of the· Army of Galicia-Iess than 25,000 men.
The Andalusian 'Army of Reserve,' which had been promised
to him, started late for want of organization, moved slowly for
want of magazines, and only reached the front when the battle
of Vittoria had been won and the Freneh had been expelled
from Spain a. The Cortes had at least 160,000 men under
arms; not a sixth part of them were available during the
decisive operations. But of this more in its proper place.
Portugal, as usual, contributed its share to the troubles of
the Commander-in-Chief, though they were but triHing com-
pared to the Spanish problems. The Prince Regent at Rio de
Janeiro was an expensive person, who actually at the worst of
the war drew money out of Portugal (rom the Braganm private
domains, though he had aU the revenues of 13razil to play with d.
1 See espcciaUy below the dimeulties with the GlI.licilln IIrmy as to
ammunition, and the AndalUllian reserve as to transport alld magazinC8.
• Di8palches, x. pp. 211-12.
• See Di8potcliu, x. p.181, when Wellington writes in March: • There ill
not a single battalion or squadron fit to take the llcld, not in thc whole
kingdom of Spain Il. depot of provision" that would keep one buttalion
Cor onc day-not a shilling of moncy in any military chest:
• Wellington Dispalchc$, x. I). 100.
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Moreover, he had a tiresome habit of sending incompetent
hangers-on to Europe, with a request that berths might be
found for them. But he was not actively noxious-the same
could not be said of his wife, the Spanish princess Carlotta,
who was still harping on her natural claim to be Regent of Spain
on behalf of her imprisoned brother Ferdinand, and still inter-
fered from time to time at Cadiz, by ordering the small knot
of deputies who depended on her to attack the existing regency,
or to vote in inca.lculo.ble ways on questions of domestic politics.
l~ortuna.tely she was so great 0. clerical and reactionary that the
, Liberal' majority in the Cartes had secretly resolved that she
should never get into power. Wheu the old regency was evicted
in March 1813, it was suspected that the Cardinal Bourbon was
put at thc head of the succeeding body mainly because the
presence of a prince of the blood in the Executive seemed to
make it unneccssary to import another member of the royal
house. For this small mercy Henry Wellesley wrote a letter
of thanksgiving to his brother at the front. It was fortunate
that the Prince Regent himself gave no encouragement to his
wife's ambitions, being as indolent as she was active, and
very jealous of her secret intrigues with foreigners. At one
time during the 'winter of 1812-13 she showed an intention
of departing for Europe, but with the assistance of the
British ambassador Joiio succeeded in frustrating her scheme
for appearing at Cadiz in person to claim her supposed
rights.
Meanwhile the civil government of Portugal continued to
be directed by the e,,:isting Council of Regency, of whom the
majority were honest if not always well-advised. It is true
that Wellington's old enemies 1 the Patriarch of Lisbon and
the Principal Sousa still remained members of it: the deter-
mination to evict them which he had declared in 1810 was
never carried out-the one was so powerful from his l~ition
in the Church, the other from the influence of the widespread
Sousa family, that in the end he left them undisturbed. They
I Sce above, vol. Hi. pp. 193, 415-17,lI.ud iv. p. 71. The best sketch of
the personalities of the Portuguese regency is tbat in Lord Wellesley's
MellwrundwlI respecling Pl1rtugal. in JVellillglon Di'Pal.ches, Suppf., vii.
pp. 199-204, a very interesting document.
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were perhaps less dangerous in the Regency than out of it,
with their hysterical appeals to narrow national sentiment,
protests against the doings of their colleagues, and perpetual
intrigues. A fr(mdeur is partly muzzled when he holds office.
Aud in practical administration they were steadily voted down
by the majority of the Regency, consisting of the Marquis
of Olhao, the Condc de Redondo 1, Dr. Nogucira, and last but
not least the British Minister Sir Charles Stuart, whose presence
on the board was perhaps necessary. but certainly very trying
to Portuguese u11UJUr-prapre. The three nativc regents were
genuine patriots, and good friends of the alliance, but a little
antiquated in their views as to administration and finance.
The Secretary of State, Miguel Forjaz, to whom so many of
\Vellington's letters are addressed, was a much more modern
personage with a broader intelligence: indeed, Wellington
considered him on the whole the most capable statesman in
the Peninsula.
There were two standing sources of friction between the
British Mmy Md the Portuguese Regency-both inevitable, and
both tiresome from the point of view of the necessary entente
between two allied nations. The more irritating but less impor-
tant was trouble caused by the daily movement of troops,
especially troops in small bodies, or individual offiOCl's. A perusal
of the records of many scores of courts martial, as wcll as of
the eorrespondcnee of Wellington and Bercsford, leads to the
conclusion that there were grave faults on both sides. Parties
of British soldiers on the march, when unaccompanied by an
offiecr, were given to the illegal' embargoing' of carts or mules,
to thc extortion of food by force or threats, to mishandling of
the peasantry when denied what t.hey asked: occasionally
they went so far as acts of murder Or arson 2. And it cannot
be denied that individual officers of unsatisfactory type were
occasionally guilty of gross misconduct--drunken orgies,
wanton disregard of legal authority in requisitions, even acts
of insult or assault on local magistrates 3. On the other hand.
, Now Marquis de Borba by his father's death iD 1812.
'See e. g. Wellinglon Dilpafthu, x. pp. 87 and 106-7.
I See e. g. the ClLSC8 dcnlt with in WeUinglo'J DispatdlU, SJ.lppl., vii.
pp. 240 and 316.
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the provocation was often considerable-there were plenty of
cases established of the denial of legaL billets, which kept
parties waiting in the rain for hours, of wanton incivility, of
attempts at extortion in prices, of actual highway robbery I,
and false accusations brought up to cover neglect of duty.
One of Wellington's main complaints was that he had to waste
time in investigating imaginary outrages, which, on inquiry.
turned out to have been invented to serve as countercharges
against accusntions of slackness or misfeasance. He was
determined that outrages by the army should cease-indeed,
he hanged, first nnd last, some fifty soldiers for plunder accom-
plUlicd with violence, an offcnce which hc would nevcr pa.rdon.
But the Portuguese mngistrates were prone to make accusa-
tions, and then to protest against having to support them by
evidence. By a 'curious turn of official pridc many of them
refused to testify before courts martial, or even to send
witnesses to appear before such bodies, standing to the theory
that it was beneath the dignity of a magistrate to come with
evidence before a foreign military tribunal 2. The result of
this was that offenders brought up for trial, and often probably
guilty, had to be acquitted for lack of proof. On the other
hand, accusations, made and supported, were sometimes found
to be entirely groundless-in one supposed murder case, the
alleged corpse was discovered in perfect health; in another, a
magistrate who accused a British officer of assault was found to
have been dining with him and frequenting his quarters, long
after the supposed olfence 3.
The Portuguese Hegeney was bound to stand up in defence
er its magistrates-Wellington, though always rea.dy to punish
proved crimes, was determined not to take accusation as
equivalent to conviction, merely because it was preferred by
a constituted authority. Hence came perpetual friction and
recrimination; that things were no worse was certainly due to
the fact that the commander-in-chiefs iron discipline, and
rigorous dealing with his own people, could not fail to impress
1 e. g. Wellington DUpalchu. ". p. 129. and another case accompanied
by thc murdcr or a soldier, ". P' 117.
• Sce Wellington Dispatche9. x. pp. 13], ]Dl, And 20] •
• See Wellington Dispatchu, x. p. 88 alld ix. p. 6]5,
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the Portuguese with the fact that he was always trying to
be just.
The other and morc fundamentally dangerous source of
wrangling in Portugal was finance. There could be no disputing
the fact that the pa.rt of the army which was not directly
maintained from the British subsidy was often six months in
arrears of par. and still more often on the edge of starva.tion.
Portuguese paper money, in which many transactions had to
take place, and which could be legally used for 0. certain
percentage of all army payments, was not only at a habituoJ
discountor at least 25 percent., but also fluctuating in cxchangc-
value from day to day. Ilencc came all manner of illicit
speculations by merchants, both British and Portuguese, who
were always trying to buy Government paper at under its
quotation for the day, u.nd to put it otf on others at an exag-
gerated estimate. The same took place with Commissariat
Warrants, whieh unscrupulous brokers bought from the ignorant
peasantry for a mere song, after setting rumours about concern-
ing impending bankruptcy of the state, und then cashed at full
face-value in Lisbon or London.
The Regency maintained that all the trouble came from the
simple fact that the war had placed upon the back of Portugal,
a small eOUlltry, half of whose territory had been wasted by
Soult and Massena in 1809 and 1810, a much greater burden
than could be borne. The armed forces alone-some 50,000
regular troops, and often as many militia in the garrisons-were
so many hands taken away from agriculture, the only staple
industry of the land. Money was going out of the realm year
by year to purchase wheat, because the people could not produce
enough to maintain their existence. Prices had risen to heights
that tcrrified those who remembered pre-war days: the pay
of the army was enormous compared to the rates before 1808,
and much of it was going, under Marshal Bercsford's system, to
the British officers who were now holding a clear majority of
all the senior ranks and commands. All available money went
to the army, and the civil administration was starved. The
Regency acknowledged the deplorable state of its finances, but
could only suggest remedies which had grave inconveniences.
Another British loan was asked for; but considering the heavy
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subsidy that Portugal was receiving already, thc British
Govemment gave little encouragement to such an idea 1. The
Portuguese minister in London (the Conde de Funehal, one of
the Sousas) suggested o.lnrge measure of confiscation of Church
and Crown lands-which could then be sold. Dut this would in-
volve a quarrel with the Church party in l)ortugal, who had been
loyal supporters of the British nllianee, and probably with the
Prince Regent also, since he was drawing a privo.te income from
the Bmgo.nm estates. It might also produce 0. generBI shock
to nationBI credit, for it would deal 0. blow to thegeneml stability
of society, Bud terrify nil landholders. Moreover, it appeared
doubtful if purchnsers of Church lands would present themselves:
and Crown lands were largely uncultivated and worthless tracts
in the Alemtcjo 2. The measure wus carried out, indeed, many
years later, during the civil wars of Miguelaud Maria; but then
it came as a consequence of a purely domestic struggle, in which
the Church party had taken the beaten side. The circumstances
oC 1818 were entirely different. A third expedient suggested
was thc establishment oC a National Bank, after the model of
the Bank of England, which should take over thc management
of thc public debt ·and currency. But credit and guarantces
must be at the back of any such association, and unless the
British Government were ready to become thc guarantor
(which was impossible) it was hard to see what new securities
could be found.
Wellington's panacea for financial distress was not heroic
measures but careful and honest administration of details.
He held that there was great slackness and partiality in the
raising and collection of taxes, and that the amount received
could be very largely increased by thc abolition of abuses. In
a very long memorandum, addressed to the Prince Regent Joiio
in April ]813, he launched out into an indictment of the whole
financial system of the realm. • The gre."\t cities and even some
of the smaller places of the kingdom have gained by the war:
the mercantile class generally has enriched itself by the great
disbursementS which the army makes' in cash: there arc
individuals in Lisbon and Oporto who have amassed immense
• See Wellington to Forjaz, Dispatches, ix. p. 353.
• Sec Wellington to Bathunt, ibi~., ix. pp. 461-2.
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sums. The fact is not denied that the .. tributes" regularly
established at Lisbon and Oporto, and the contribution of ten
pcr cent. on the profits of the mercantile class are not really
paid to the state.'. .. I ha.ve recommended the adoption of
methods by which the taxes might be renlly and actually
collected, and merchants and capitalists really pay the tenth
of their annual profits as an extraordinary <.'ontribution for
the war. . .. It remains for the Government to explain to
your Royal Highness the reasons why it will not put them in
practice-or some other expedient whic4 might render the
revenue of the state equal to its expenses.' He then proceeds
to urge supervision of a Custom House notorious for letting off
powerful importers ovcrlightly, and of the .collectors of land-
revenue, who were allowed to keep state balances in their
hands for months without paying them in to the Treasury 1_
In letters to Charles Stuart 2 as a member of the Regency
Wellington let out in much more unguarded terms. The root
of corruption was in the mercantile community, who bad
squared the minor bureaucracy. The army and state would
have been ruined long ago, but for his own protests and
insistence, by the jobbers of Lisbon, not only Portuguese, Jews,
cosmopolitans of 0.11 sorts, but • sharks calling themselves
British merchants.' The Government is 'teased into dis-
approbation of good measures by the merchants, who are
interested in their being discontinued. But when it is neees-
sary to carry on an expensive system of war with onc-sixth
of the moncy in specie neccssary, wc must consider questions
and adopt measures of this description, and wc ought to have
the support and confidence of your Government in adopting
them.'
Making allowance alike for the difficulties of the Regency,
and the irritation of the much-worried general, it seems fair
to say that on the onc hand Wellington was right in dcnouncing
jobbery and urging administrative reforms, but that on the
othcr hand no sueh reforms, howcver sweeping, would have
sufficed to make both ends balance in the revenue of the
exhausted kingdom of Portugal. The task was too heavy-
• Wellinglon to the Prince-Regent of Portugal, DYpalclU'.s. x. pp. 28"-7.
• Wellington to Stuart, ibid., x. pp. U42, &C.
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but the eighteenth-century slackness and corruption, which still
survived iu too many corners of the bureaucracy, made it even
heavier than it need have been. It is probable that Wellington's
palliativcs would have failed to make receipts meet expenditure,
however hardly thc screw might have been turned. But a levy
of 10 per cent. on commercial profits does not look very hcavy
to the taxpayer of 19211
This is a military not an economic or a financial history; it
is unnecessary to go further into Portuguese problems. The
main thing to be remembered is that they bulked large in the
C<lrrespondence of the harassed chief, who sat writing minutes
on all topics, civil no}ess than strategical, in hL~ desolate head-
quarters at FrenecJa.
SECTION XXXV: CHAPTER III
WELLINGTON AND WHITEHALL
THE position which Wellington had won himself by five years
of successful campaigning in the Peninsuln was such us no
Dritish commander since Mo.rlborough had enjoyed. His
reputation was now European; his views, not merely on the
Spanish struggle but on the general politics of the Continent,
had to be taken into consideration b)' the Ministry. He was
no longer an officer to whom orders could be sent, to be carried
out whether he liked them or not. He had become a political
personage, whose views must be ascertained before any wide-
reaching decision as to the struggle with Napoleon was taken.
In 1813 it is not too much to say that he exercised a determining
influence not only on the military policy of Britain, but on the
whole course of the Great \Var: as we shall presently see, the
triumph of Vittoria had the most marked and direct effect on
the action of Russia, Prussia, and Austria. Dut even before
Vittoria he had asserted his will in many ways-he had stopped
some projects and approved others. The factious resignation
of his brother Lord Wellesley from the Percevol Cabinet had
not impaired his position, nor had the coming into office of
Lord Liverpool, when Perceval perished by the bullet of a crazy
assassin a month after the fall of Badajoz. Wellington's
correspondence with the War )finister, Lord Bathurst, in 1813,
is as confidential and amicable on both sides as bad been the
case when the domineering WeUesley had been in power: with
the new Prime Minister. Liverpool, there is no trace of any
friction whatever-rather cvery sign of reciprocal respect.
But the position which Wellington had achieved had its
drawbacks as well as its advantages. Since it had become
habitual for the Cabinet to ask his opinion on high military
matters not connected with the Peninsula, an endless vista of
troubles was opened up before him, for (as always happens in
times of exceptional crisis) the Ministry at home was being
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plagued with all manner of solicitations from every quarter of
Europe, to which answers were required.
While Wellington had been trailing back reluctantly from
Burgos to Ciudad Rodrigo, Napoleon had been conducting a
retreat of a very different kind from Moscow to the Berczina,
n retreat whose character and consequences were not known in
London or in Spain for some weeks later. He had left Moscow
on October 19th, had dictated the famous 29th BuUetin, acknow-
ledging the wreck of his project and the ruin of his army, at
Molodetchno on December Srd, and had started on his headlong
flight to Paris on December 5th, leaving the small remnant of hili
host to perish in the snow. lIe reached the Tuileries on the
night of December 18th, on the heels of the disastrous bulletin,
which his ministers hnd only received thirty-six hours before,
on the preceding day 1. In London the fact that the Russian
expedition had failed was well known by the end of November,
but the extent of the failure was only realized when the
20th Bulletin got to Lord Liverpool's hands, by the usual
smugglers' route, on December 21st, rather less than five days
after its arrival in Paris 2.
The Prime Minister sat down next morning to communicate
the fact to Wellington, and to consult him upon the logical
consequences. • There has been,' he wrote, • no example
within the last twenty years, among all the extraordinary
events of the Freneh Revolution, of such a change of fortWle
as Bonaparte has experienced during the last five months. The
most formidable army ever collected by Bonaparte has been
substantially destroyed. It only remains to be ascertained
whether he will succeed in escaping himself-and with what
remnant of an army. . .. Under these circumstances the
question naturally occurs whether he will leave the French
army in Spain? We have a report that he has already ordered
40,000 men from that country to rejoin him-but it is only a
report. I am inclined, however, to be of opinion that he will
withdraw the greater part of his forces from Spain. 'fhe only
efficient French Army at the present moment in existence is
• See Meneval'8 Mhnmres, W. p. 317.
o It was generally known in London next duy. Sce Sir G. Jack.'Jon'8
Memoir", m. p. 447.
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that under Soult; and whatever it may cost Bonaparte to
abandon Spain, I think he will prefer that alternative to the
loss of Germany. I may be wrong in this speculation, but give
you my reasons, and I am particularly desirous of calling yOUf
Il.ttcntion to this view of the subject, in order that you may
take the necessary means for obtaining early information of
the movements of any French divisions toward the frontier,
and that you may consider what measures may be proper to
be adopted if my conjecture should be realized 1.'
Thus on the first day after the arrival of the epoch-making
bulletin, and before it was known that Napoleon himself had
reached Paris, the great strategical question of the winter of
1812-13 was formulated, and put before Wellington. Will the
French evacuate Spain? and, if so, what should be done ,,<ith
the British Army in the Peninsula? There were three possible
eontingencies-{1) the Emperor might abandon Spainaltogether,
in order to have the nucleus of an army ready for the campaign
oJ' 1818 in Germany, or (2) he might not evacuate Spain alto-
gether, but might cut down his forces there, and order them to
stand on the defensive only, or (3) he might value his prestige
so higWy that he would take little or nothing in the way of
troops from the Peninsula, and endenvour to make head against
the ltussians with whatevcr remnant of an army might bc left
him in the North, with the conscripts of 1813, and the levies of
the German States-if the latter should remain obedient to
him 2.
At fll'St it seemed as if the third and least likely of thcse thrce
hypotheses wus the corrcet onc. For strange as it might appear,
considering what had happened in Russia, Wellington (:Quld
detect no signs of allY great body of French troops being movcd
towards the Pyrenees. So far was this from bcing the case, that
the cantonments adopted by the enemy in December were so
widely spread to the South, that the only possible deduction
that could be made Wall that the whole of the anmes of 1812
were being kept in Spain. Wc now know that the reason for
t' LiverpoOl to Wellington. Supplemrntary Dispatches, vii. pp. (lQ2-.{l •
• Lord Liverpool doubted whether Pn1sI>ia or Austria would move.
l'l'WlSill might mir, if only she WWl sure that Austria would lIupport her.
Dut • the councils of Vienna at this time are abject.'
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this was that the communications between Madrid and Paris
were so bad, that Napoleon's orders to his brother to draw in
towards the North, and send large draftc; and detachments to
France, only reached their destination in February. For
many weeks 'Wellington could report no such movements as
Lord Liverpool had expected.
It was not till March 10th that the much-desired news began
to come to hand1, time having elapsed sufficient to allow of King
Jo!>eph beginning to carry out the Emperor's orders. On that
day Wellington was able to send Lord Bathurst intelligence
which seemed to prove that the second hypothesis, not the
third, was going to prove the correct one: i. e. there was about
to be a certain deduction from the }i'rench armies in Spain, which
would make it unlikely that they would take the offensive, but
nevertheless the main body of them was stiU to be Jeft in the
Peninsula. Though thc enemy had made no move of importance,
it was certain that Soult and CafIarelli had been recaUed to
France-the latter taking with him the troops of the Imperial
Guard, which had hitherto formed part of the Army of the
North. To replace the latter Palombini's division had bcen
moved from near Madrid to Biscuy. A large dmIt of artiUcry
had been sent buck to France, and twelvc (it Wlls really twcnLy~
five) picked mcn for thc Imperial Guard from cach battalion
of the Army of Spain. On the other hand, a body of 4,000 mcn
-probably convalescents or conscripts-had come down from
Bayonne to Burgos 2. Seven days later a more important
general move could be detected: not only had Soult gone
towards France with a heavy column of drafts, but the French
had evacuated La Mancha, the troops formerly there having
retired north to the province of Avila 8. Again, a week later,
on March 24th, it became knovm 4 that the Army of the Centre
had moved ,up towards the Douro, and that King Joseph and
, 'I'hough on February 17 Wellington henrd of thc dcpurture northwonl
of thc 7th (Polish) Lancel'll. nod $Omc lIquadrons of Gendnnncrie belonging
to the Army or the North. But this was too small Il move to scrve ll.S
the base of 8. dcduction. Diapatclu:s, x. p. 125.
• Wellington to Bathurst. Di8patch~s, x. p. 177.
I Ibid., p. 207, l'oIareh 17•
• By an interooptcd letter Crom UIC King to Reille, duted Murch ]4, now
ill the' ScoveJl Cyphers,' which mentions both facts.
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his Court were about to quit Madrid. A little later this move
was found to have taken place: the enemy had evacuated n
broad stretch of territory, and 'concentrated very much
toward the Danro 1.' On the same day o.n intercepted letter,
from General Lucottc at Paris to King Joseph, let Wellington
into the main secrets of the enemy: the General reported to
I}is master that the Emperor's aUairs were in a bad way, that
there would be no men and very little money Cor Spain, and
that he must make the best of what resources he had. His
Imperial Majesty was in a captious and petulant mood, blaming
everything done by everybody beyond the Pyrenees. but more
especially his brother's neglect to keep open the communication
with France and to hunt down the northern insurgents 2.
This useful glimpse into the mentality of the enemy made
it abundantly clear that Lord Liverpool's original theory, that
Napoleon would withdraw his whole army from Spain in order
to hold down Germany, was perfectly erroneous. At the same
time, Lucotte's report coincided with all the other indications,
in showing that the enemy had been perceptibly weakened,
could eount on no further reinforcements, and must stand on
the defensive during the campaign that was to come.
But while it was still thought in Whitehall that the Emperor
might evacuate Spain altogether, various projects for turning
the Russian debacle to account began to be laid before Welling·
ton. The first was a scheme for fostering n possible iosUIrection
in Holland. where grave discontent was said to be brewing.
Would it be wise for the Prince of Orange, now serving as an
aide-de-camp on the head·quarters stall, to be sent home, so
that he might put himself at the head of a rising? Wellington
replied that he no marc believed in an immediate insurrection
in Holland than in one in France. • Unless I should hear of an
insurrection in France or in Holland, or should receive an order
to send him, I shall say nothing on thc subject to the Prinee 3,'
Hc was undoubtedly right in his dccision: the Dutch required
the news of Leipzig, still nine months ahead, to make them stir:
• Wellington w Graham, April 1. Di$pCl~hu.x. p. 270.
I In the' Sl,llJVell Cyphers,' like the tlillputch quoted ubove.
I Wellington ~ Bathurst. January 2G. Dispa~he$, x. p. 39; cf. ibid.,
p.250.
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an expedition to Holland in the early spring would have been
hopelessly premature.
A little later came a much more plausible proposition, which
met with an equally strong negative from Wellington. The
ever·loyal Electorate of Hanover was prepared to rise: to start
the movement it would be only necessary to land a nucleus of
British·German troops spmewhere on the Frisian coast. Could
Wellington spare the three cavalry regiments, five infantry
battalions, and one battery of the King's German Legion which
were serving with him? After 1'ettenborn's March raid to
Hamburg the insurrection actually broke out, and Bathurst
suggested 1 that the time had come to throw a considerable force
ashore in the electorate. He asked whether the Hanoverian
officers in Spain were beginning to chafe at being kept so far
from their homes at the critical moment. Again Wellington
put in a strong negative. He had been to consult General
Charles AIten, ' by far the best of the Hanoverian officers,' as
to the expedience of sending the Legion to Germany. AIten
held that' the best thing for England, for Germany, and the
world, is to make the greatest possible effort here:' the services
of a few thousand veteran troops would be important in the
narrower field in Spain-they would be lost in the multitudes
assembling on the Elbe. If a large body of loyal levies were
collected in Hanover it might ultimately be well to send a part
of the Legion thither: but not, at present 2. This was the
policy which the Ministry followed: in the spring they dis-
patched to North Germany only cadres from the depots of the
Legion at Bcx.hill-500 men in all, including some experienced
cavalry and artillery officers. In July the Brd Hussars went
across to Stralsund. in August two batteries of Horse Artillery,
all from England 3. But no deduction of units was made from
Wellington's Spanish armY----Quly-a few officers weJ:C permitted
to sail, at ~heir own request. The senior of them, General Back
of the Heavy Dragoons, unfortunately perished by shipwreck
with his three aides-de-camp off the coast of Brittany in the
winter that followed Vittoria.
, Supplemenlary Di8pattlltJ, vii. pp. 601~2, Apri17.
• Wellington to Bathurst. DispatcheB,:X. p. 307.
I For details see Schwerlfeger'sllialory of /he K.G.L., vol. i, pp. 6()()-..5().
220 WELLINGTON AND WHITEHALL [MARCH
Bathurst was 60 far right that many of the Banoverian
officers regretted their stny in the Peninsula: on the other
band, Wellington was not merely trying to keep his own army
strong, when he refused to listen to the suggestions made him.
It was perfectly true that 4,000 good soldiers were an o.ppre-
ciable unit in 0. Spanish battle-while they would be • entirely
thrown away: as he put it, in Germany. The margin ofstrength
was SO narrow in the Peninsular Army that it was not safe to
decrease it.
The Sllme question that arose about the King's German
Legion also came up during the spring of 1818 with regard to
the Brullswickcrs. Many officers of the Brunswick-Oels·
battalion in the 7th Division were fired with the idea of liberat·
ing Germany-they wrote to their duke, then in England,
begging him to have the battalion ordered home. He replied
that he had tried to get the War Office to let him go to theElbe,
even with a small cadre, n few hundred men, but had been
refused 1. It is much more surprising that this corps was not
spared from the Peninsula: Wellington had a bad mark against
it, for its terrible propensity to desertion, and a worse for the
behaviour of one of its companies at 'l'ordesillas in the recent
campaign. Probably he thought that, if he surrendered the
Brunswickcrs, he would ha.ve to give up the German Legion also.
It is odd to find that among Wellington's troubles were not
only the proposed subtraction of troops whom he did not want
to lose, but the proposed addition of troops whom he was not
at all anxious to sce in the Peninsula. The story is onc which
illustrates the eusual methods of Russian officers. In February
there came to Frcneda a well-known Britis.h secret agent,
Mackenzie, the man who had organized the successful evasion
of La Romana's Spaniards from Denmark in 1808 2. He
brought letters from Admiral Greig, commanding the Russian
Black Sea fleet, to the effect that there was a surplus of troops
from Tehitchagoff's Army of the Danube, which could not be
uWized in Germany for want of transport and supplies. There
were 15,000 men who could be collected at Odessa and shipped
• See letters in von Wncholr;'s Diary, pp. 311-12. It is doubtful if the
men, lurgely wnifs nlld prisoners of oil natiOilS, relt the snme ",eal Il8 the
officers. • See vol. I, pp. 871, &c.
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to Spain, to be placed in the Allied Army, if Wellington would
accept them. The memory of Russian eo-opera.tion in Holland
in 1799 was not a very happy onc: but it seemed unwise 'to
orlend the Tsar, on whose goodwill the future of Europe now
depended. Wherefore the answer givcn was that they might
comc if the British Cabinet approved, and if the Spanish and
Portuguese governments saw no objection. • One would think
that the Emperor had demands enough for his men,' wrote
Wellington to Charles Stuart, • but Mackenzie says that they
have more men than they can support in the field, which is not
improbable. The admission of Russians into the Peninsula,
however, is quite a new feature of the war: and it is absolutely
necessary that the allied Governments should consent to the
measure 1.' The correspondence with Cadiz and London ended
in the most. tiresome and ridiculous fashion-the Spanish
Regency was at the moment in a state of diplomatic tension
",ith Russia, on some questions of precedence and courtesy.
It answered in the most dovmright fashion that the presence of
Russian troops in Spain would be neither helpful nor welcome.
The British a.mbassador at Cadiz was shocked at the language
used, which would be most offensive to the Tsar 2. But the
whole project suddenly collapsed on news received from London.
Count Licven, the Russinn representative at the Court of
St. James's, declared that he had never heard of the offer, that
he was sure that no sueh scheme would be approved by the
Tsar, and that there was certainly no Russian corps now
available for service in the Mediterrancan. Admiral Grcig had
once communicated to him [l. scheme for a Russian auxiliary
force to be used in Italy-but this was a plan completely out
of date, when the whole Russian army was wanted for Cermany 3.
Wellington had therefore to explain to thc Spanish and Portu-
guese Governmcnts that his proposals to them had becn madc
under a complete misapprehension: his amour-proprc was
naturally hurt-Greig and Mackenzie had put him in an
absurd position.
I Suppkmen/llnJ Di8patches, vii. pp. 44.o--so•
• HenryWclIcslcy to Wellington. b'upplcmtnlary Dil1pQlcheB,x.pp.571-3•
• Bathurst to Wellington, Sflpplemm/llry Dispatche$, vii. 577, and
CasUcreagh to Sir Charles Stuurt, ibid., p. 586, Murch 3, 1813.
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Prince Lieven's mention of Italy takes us to another of
Wcllington's worrics. It has been mentioned in the preceding
volume that Lord William Bentinek, commanding the British
Army in Sicily, had already in 1812 been planning descents on
Italy, where he rightly thought the French military strength
was low, nfter the departure of the whole of the Viceroy's con-
tingent for the Russian War, and of many of l\Iumt's Neapoli-
tans also. So sct had he been on expeditions to Calabria or
Tuscany, that he had madc grcat difficultics whcn ordcred to
send out the Alicante expedition to favour Wellington's Sala-
manca campaign 1. Thc news of the Russian disastcr had
filled Bentillck's mind with lIew Italian schcmcs-the conditions
wcrc evcn more favourable than in 1812. Hc was IIOW drcaming
of invading Italy with all the men he could muster, and proposed
on February 24th to the British War Minister that he should be
allowed to withdraw all or some of the Anglo-Sicilian troops
from Alicante_ He had also seen Admiral Greig, and put in a
elaim for the hypothetical 15,000 Russians who had caused
Wellington so much trouble. Knowing how much importance
the latter attached w the Alicante Army, us the real nucleus
of resistance to Suchet in Eastern Spain, he had the grnce to
send copies of his February dispatch to Frencda.
This was a most irritating. interruption to Wellington's
arrangements for the neXt campaign: the Aliealltc force was
a valuable pieee in the great game which he was working out.
'1'0 see it tnken off the board would disarrange all his plan.
Accordingly he made the strongest protest to Lord Bathurst
against the Italian expedition being permitted. 1'0 make any
head in Italy, he said, at least 80,000 or 40.000 men would be
needed. No doubt many Italians were discontented with the
Napolconie regime, but they would not <.'Qmmit themselves to
rebellion unless a very large foree eame to their help. If only
a small army were landed, tbcy would show passive or even
active loyalty to their existing govCTlilllcnt. They might
prefer a British to a Freneh or an Austrian domination in their
peninsula, because it would be more liberal and less extortionate.
But they would want everything found for them-arms,
equipment, a subsidy. Unless the Government were prepared
, See above, vol. v, pp. 342-7.
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to start a new war on a very large scale. to raise, clothe. nnd
equip a great mass of Italian tro0PSj and to persevere to the
last in a venture as big as that in Spain, the plan would fnil,
and any landing force would be compelled to re-embark wiLh
loss and disgrace 1.
On the whole Wellington's protest proved successful: Lord
WilIiam was forced to leave a large body of his Anglo-Sicilians
in Spain, though hc withdrew 2,000 men from Alicantc early in
April. when it was most needful that the Allied force on the
East Coast' should he strong. The rcmainder, despite (as wc
shall scc) of vcry bad handling by Sir John Murray, proved
• sufficient to k<.:cp Suehct employed. No Italian expedition was
permitted during the call1pa!gning season of 1813, though
Lord William sent out a small foreign expeditionary forcc for a
raid on Tuscany, which much terrified tlle Grand Duchess
Eliza 2. Next year only, whell the whole Napoleonic system
was crumbling, did be collect a heterogeneous army of doubtful
value, invade Liguria, and capture Genoa from a skeleton
enemy. But by that time the French were out of Spain, and
Wellington's plans could not be ruined by the distraction of
troops on such an escapade. In May 1813 the Italian expedi-
tion, if permitted, might have wrecked the whole campaign of
Vittoria, by leaving Suehet free to join the main French army_
How it would have fared may be judged from the fact that the
Viceroy Eugene made head all through the autumn against
80,000 men of the Austrian Army of Italy.
So much may suffice to explain Wellington's dealings during
the winter and spring of 1813 with the British Cabinet. His
advice, as we have seen, was always asked, and generally
settled the problem in the way that he desired. So much
cannot be said for his dealings with t.he Commander-in-Chief
at the Horse Guards: the Duke of York seems to have been
the last person in Whitehall to reeogni7.c the commanding
intellect of the great general. Though he always wrote with
perfect courtesy, he evidently considered that his own views
OIl the organization, personnel, and management of the British
I Wellington to Bathurst. Disp~8, x. pp. 38oJ-5•
• FOf this forgotten raid ill &cccl1locr 1813, lICe Etudes Napolroniennu,
1014, p. 191. For the Genoa affair sce C. T. Atkinson in the R.U.S.l.
Jour-lid. 1015.
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Army were far more important than those of the victor of
Salamanca. The correspondence of Wellington with the Duke
and his Military Secretary, Colonel Henry'forrens, occupies an
enormous number of pages in the volumes of Dispatches and
Supplementary Dispatches. Torrens, an obliging man, seems
to have tried to make himself a buffer between the two contend-
ing wills, and Wellington was conscious of the fact that he was
no enemy. The subjects of contention were many.
Onc of the most important was patronage. Now that he
had reached the fifth ycur of his command in the Peninsula,
Wellington considered that he had won the right to choose his
own chief subordinates. But still he oould 'not get officers of
tried incapacity removed Crom the front, nor prevent others,
against whom he had a bad mark, from being sent out to him.
When he asked for removals, he was told of ' the difficulty of
setting aside general officers who have creditably risen to high
rank' on the mere ground that they have been proved incapable,
and unfit for their situations. Dut it was far worse that when
he had requested that certain generals should not be sent out,
they came to him nevertheless, despite of his definite protest;
and then, when he requested that they might be removed, he
was told that he would incur odium and responsibility for their
removal. 'What a situation then is mine! It is impossible to
prevent incapable men from being sent to the army; and then
whcn I complain that they have been sent, I am to be respon-
sible! Surely the" odium" ought not to attuch to the person
who olIicially represents that they arc not cnpo.ble of filling
their situations '-but (the aposiopesis may be filled up) to
the Horse Guards for sending thcm out. Yet Wcllington's peu
did not add the words which are necessary to complete the sense.
Thc most tircsome casc in 1812-13 was that of Colonel Jmncs
WiIlougbby Cordon, who had eome out as Quartermaster-
Gcneral in 1812, when 'Wellint,rWn's first and most trusted
quartermaster, Ccorgc l\Iurray, was removed (quite without
his dcsire) to a post in Ireland. Cordon was sent by the Duke
of York's personal choice 1, without any previous consultation
1 See Wellington to Torrens, May 28, 1812. DispaldlU, ix, p.182. Yet
WeUinglon, unoonsulted though he had been, expresses his thanks to the
Duke (or fixing upon a successor to Murmy.
with the Commander-in-Chief in Spain as to whether he would
be acceptable. The atrocity of this appoinbnent was not only
that Gordon WtlS incapable, but that he was a political intriguer,
who was in close touch with the Whig Opposition at home, and
Wore he went out ho,d promised to send confidential letters on
the campaign to Lord Grey. This he actually did: the malicious
Creevey had a privileged peep at them, and found that' his
accounts are of the most desponding cast. He considers our
ultimate discomfiture as a question purely of time, and that
it may happen any day, however early: and that our pecuniary
resources are utterly exhaustcd. The skill of the French in
recovering from their difficulties is inexhaustible: Lord W.
himself owns that the resurrection of Marmont's broken troops
after Salamanca was an absolute miracle of war. In short,
GordOIl considers that Lord W. is in very considerable danger 1.'
The writer was holding the most important post on "rellington's
stafC, and using the information that he obtained for the benefit
of the Parliamentary Opposition; he should have been eourt-
martialled for the abuse of his position for personal ends.
Wellington at last detected his mischief-making, by the appear-
ance in the Whig papers of definite facts that could only have
been known to three people-Wellington himself, his secretary
Fitzroy Somerset, and the Quartermaster-General. • I showed
him,' ",-rites WeUingtou to Bathurst, 'my dispatch to your
Lordship of August 3, as the shortest way of milking him
acquainted with the sta.te of a.ffairs. . .. The topics of this
dispatch find their way into the MQrni'"g Chronicle, distorted
into arguments agllinst the Government. I am quite eertain
that the arguments in the Morni1lg Chronicle are drawn from
a perusal of my dispatches, und that no one saw them here
excepting the Quartermaster-General and Lord Fitzroy. Even
your Lordship had not yet received this dispntch, when the
topics it contained were used against the Government in the
newspapers. . .. For the future he shall not sce what I write-
it would be no great loss to the Army if he were recalled to
England. I cypher part of this letter in the eypher you sent
me to be used for General Mnitland 2.'
,
18131
356.6
JAl\IES WILLOUGI-tBy GORDON
I Creevey Papers, i. p. 173•
• Supplel1U:flklnJ Dispatches, vii. pp. 427-8.
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It was four months before this traitor was got rid of, though
Lord Bathurst had been shocked by the news, and corroborated
it by his own observation: he had seen mischievous letters
from Gordon to the Horse Guards, and if he wrote such stuf(
to the Duke it was easy to guess what he might write to
Lord Grey or Whitbread. Certain of the newspaper para-
graphs must have come' from some intelligent person with
you 1.' 'fhe strange way in which the removal was accomplished
was not by a demand for his degradation for misuse of his
office 2, but by a formal report to the Horse Guards that
'Colonel Cordon does not turn his mind to the duties to be
, performed by the Quartermaster-General of an Army such as
tlus, actively employed in the field: notwithstanding his zcal
and acknowledged talent, he has never performed. them, and
I do not believe he ever will or can perform them. I give this
opinion with regret, and I hope His Royal Highness will
believe that I have not formed it hastily of an oJfieer respecting
whose talents I, equally with His Royal Highness, had enter-
wnerl a favourable opinion 3.' Three weeks later the Military
Secretary at the Horse Guards writes that Wellington shall
have back his old Quartermaster~GeneralGeorge Murray-and
Gordon is recalled 4. But why had Gordon ever been sent?
The Duke of York alolle could say. The impression which he
bad left as a soldier upon men at the front, who knew nothing
of his political intrigues, was exceedingly poor 5.
This was the worst trick which was played on Wellington
from the Horse Guards. Another was the refusal to relieve
him of the gallant but muddle-headed and disobedient William
Stewart, who despite of his awful error at Albuera was allowed to
come out to the Peninsula again in 1812, and committed other
terrible blunders: it was he who got the three divisions into
a marshy deadlock on the retreat from Salamanca, by deliberate
and wilful neglect of directions 6. 'With the utmost zeal and
• StlJllJlC~lllary Di8J1aJcltCS, vii. p. 457.
I Oddly em:mgh, Wellington wanted the .Duke of York to take the
initiative aod odium. by appointing Cordon to a home post. The Duke
reflllled, holding that Wellington must take the responsibility.
* StlJlplemcnlary Di8putch s, VII. p. 49fl. • Ibid., p. 527.
I See examples on page 138. above.
I See above, pp. 151-2.
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good intentions he cannot obey an order,' wrote Wellington on
December 6, 1812-yet Stewart was still commanding the
Second Division in 1814 1• In letters sent to the Horse Guards
in December 1812 the Commander-in-Chief in Spain petitioned
for the departure of five out of his seven cavalry generals-
which seems a large clearance-and of ten infantry divisional
and brigade commanders. About half of them were ultimately
brought home, but several were left with him for another
campaign. He had also asked that he might have no more
generals who were new to the Peninsula inflicted upon him,
because their arrival blocked promotion for deserving colonels,
to whom he was anxious to give brigades. • I hope I shall
have 110 more new Generals: they really do but little good,
and they take the places of offieers who would be of real use.
And then they are all desirous of returning to England 2.' The
appeal was in vain-several raw major-generals were sent out
for the spring campaign of 1813, and we have letters of Welling-
ton making apologies to Peninsula veterans, to whom he had
promised promotion, for the fact that the commands which
he had been intending for them had been mled up against his
wishes by the nominees of the Horse Guards. Things went a
little better after Vittoria, when several undesired offleers went
home, and several deferred promotions took place-the news
of that victory. had had its effect even in Whitehall.
It is more difficult to sympathize with Wellington's judge·
ment-though not with his grievance-in another matter
of high debate during this winter. Like most men he disliked
talking about his own coffin, i. e. making elaborate arrange-
ments for what was to happen in the event of his becoming
a casualty, like Sir John l\foore. He loathed the idea of
, seconds in command', arguing that they were either useless
or tiresome. He did not want an officer at his elbow who
would have a sort of right to be consulted, as in the bad old
days of ' councils of war'; nor did he wish to have to find 8
separate command for such a person to keep him employed 3.
It was true that he often trusted Hill with an independent
corps in Estremadura j but frequently he called in Hill's
• Sec Wellington 10 Torrens, Supplemelltary 1Mpakh~, vii. pp. 404-5•
• Ibid., p. 486. I IVdlillglml njllp(Jlch~, ix. p. 502.
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column and it became part of thc main army-as all the Caya
in 1811, in the Salamanca retreat in 1812, and at Vittoria in
1818. In the winter of 1812-18 a point which might have been
of high importance was raised: who would be his successor in
case of l\ regrettable accident? Wellington decided that
Beresford was the proper choiee--dcspitc of Albucra. 'All
that I can tell you is that the ablest man I have yet seen with
the army, and the one having the largest views, is Beresford.
They tell me that, when I am not present, he wants decision:
and he certainly embarrassed me a little with his doubts when
he commanded in Estremadura: but I am quite eertain that
he is the only person capable of conducting a large concern 1.'
He also held that Beresford's position as a marshal in the
Portuguese Army gave him a seniority in the Allied Army over
British lieutenant-generals.
This judgement of Wellington's is surprising: Be.resford wm;
<..'ouragcous, a good organizer, a terror to shirkers and jobbers,
and aecustomed to command. Yet onc would have thought
that his record of 1811, when he displayed almost every possible
fault alike of strategy and of morale in Estremadura, would have
ruled him out. Wellington thought,asit would appear, that he had
a better conception of the war as a wholc-' the large <..'onccrn ,-
than any of the other generals in the Peninsula, and had every
opportunity of knowing. On this most critical point Wellington
and the Duke of York fell out at once: it was .not that the
Duke wanted to rule out Beresford becanse he was undecided
in the field, unpopular with his colleagues, self-assertive or
arrogant. He had a simple Horse Guards rule which in his
view excluded Bercsford from consideration at once. 'Accord-
ing to the general received opinion of the Service no officer in
the British Army above the rank of lieutenant-colonel is ever
expected to serve under an officer junior to himself, even
though he may possess a superior local commission.' He then
proceeded to recall the fact that in 1794, when Lord Moira. came
to Flanders with the loeal rank of general, Sir RaJph Aber-
crombie, and a number of other general officers with commis-
sions of senior date, refused to serve under him: in consequence
of which Lord Moira had to resign and to return to England.
I Wellington to BH.thurst, SIIJlplcmentarg Di.lqJalcho;, vii. p. 484.
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There were many similar examples in the past. The right of
officers to refuse to serve under a junior being established, it
could not be argued that higher rank acquired by that junior
in a foreign service had any weight. Bercsford might be a
Portuguese field-marshal, but from the British point of view
he was junior to Sir Thomas Graharn, Sir Sroplcton Cotton,
and Sir Rowland Hill. If by some deplorable accident Lord
Wellington were incapacitated from command at the present
moment, Sir Thomas Graham, if with the Army, would succeed.
If Sir Thomas were on sick leave, Sir Staplcton Cotton would be
the senior officer in the Peninsula, and the command of the
Army would automatically devolve on him: if Sir Stapleton
were also on leave, it would go to General Hill.
• It appears impossible to expect that British generals senior
to Marshal Beresford will submit to serve undcr him. It appears
to thc Commandcr-in-Chief, therefore, that there remains but
onc of two alternatives-the onc to recall Marshal Beresford
from the Peninsula in case he should persist in his claim; the
other, in case Lord Wellington still prefers that officer as his
second in command, to recall all the British lieutenant-generals
senior to him in our own Army 1.'
This wns l\ maddening reply, for though Wcllington liked
Stapleton Cotton he had no delusions about his intellectual
capacity. The best he could say about him during the contro-
versy was that' he commands our cavalry very well; I am
certain much better thnn mnny who might be sent out to us,
and who might be supposed much cleverer than he is.' As a
matter of fact, Graham was on sick leave, with an affiietion of
eyesight, which was supposed to be likely to result in permanent
incapacity. Cotton was also on short leave to England on
I urgent personal aflairs 2,' but expected back shortly. There-
fore the Duke's letter was u proposal to consign the fate of the
British Army in the Peninsula to a gallant onicer with the
mental capacity of a cavalry brigadier, who had never com-
manded a force of all arms, and who was the cause of much
• Duke of York to BuUlUrlit, Sllpple'lllellfaTlJ Di8pa1cllcs, vii. pp. 5HI...,.17.
• He Wllll bothering Lord BlIthurst for a peerngc, which he was not yet
destined to obtain. Supplemrnlary Dispaldle8, vii. p. 515. He was put off
with the oolonelcy of a cavalry regiment.
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quiet amusement to his commdcs, from his ostentatious dress
and uncom.'calcd admiration for his own perfections.
Lord Bathurst tried to smooth matters, by asking Graham
whether he felt inclined to surrender any claim to take over
the Peninsular Army on account of his bad health. Sir Thomas
replied that he should decline the responsibility for that
reason: that he hoped to cause no difficulties, but that he
could not agree that Bcresford had any claim, ' his obligation
to the service bound him not to sacrifice the rights of British
officers from a purely personal spirit of accommodation.' '1'0
which Bathurst replied that if he waived his rights as a conse-
quence of his ill health, while making no concession on grounds
of principle, perhaps Hill and Cotton might do thesnme. '1'0 this
the victor of Bnrrosn answered that he might OO)lSent, on the
distinct understanding that no precedent was created, and
that thc arrangemcnt was·tcmporary I,
His compliance proved useful: Stapleton Cotton arrived in
London shortly after and' expressed himself decidedly against
Sir William Bcrcsfonl's claims, and with some warmth.' Lord·
Balhurst explained to him that Graham's consent to the
, temporary arrangement' must govern his own, and tried to
put him ott the idea that he himself would undoubtedly become
Wellington's destined successor, if Graham refused the post,
by hinting that after all Graham might recover his eye-
sight, and be able to take over the command. After showing
much soreness, Cotton reluctantly acquiesced. Thc War
Minister, writing an aceount of the interview to Wellington,
ends with' I think it necessary to have this explained before-
hand, that you might not have any doubt whether you were,
after what has passed, to consider Sir Thomas Gmham or
Sir Stapleton Cotton as the person who was to exercise thc
command in easeof your personal indisposition 2.' So Beresford's
nomination was passed, as Wellington desired, and' contrary
to the Duke of York's views as to the inevitable power of old
precedent. But it W!\S only pnssed by the consent of the other
parties concerned, however reluctantly given. Fortunately
Wellington preserved his usua18plendid health, and the experi·
I Bathurst to Wellington, SUppkme1lltlry Dis-paldJe8, vii. pp. 53S-D•
• Ibid., vii. pp. 577-8,
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ment of trusting the whole AlJicd Army in thc Pcninsula to the
victor of Albucra was ncver made.
On another great controversy which (since Wellington never
wcnt off duty for a day) was of more practical importance than
that of the right of succession, the Duke of York was partly
successful in discomfiting the Commander-in-Chief in Spain.
This was a question on whieh there had been much argument
at thc end of each Peninsular campaign, but ncver so much as
in 1812-18. The exceptionally heavy casualty lists of the
storming of BadajO'.l, the battle of Salamanca, and the retreat
from Burgos had brought a great number of units, both cavalry
and infantry, to very low figures. There were (as has been
mentioned in a previous chapter) twelve battalions which had
at thc cnd of the retreat less than 800 bayonets effective,
thirteen which had more sick than men present with the
colours. l<~or some of these the difficulty was only u momentary
one-there was a large draft on the way to reinforce the unit,
or at least a good number of trained recruits in Great Britain
ready to be sent out. But this was not the case with all of them;
the reason of this was to be sought in the organization of the
Army in 1812; the majority of infantry regiments had two
battalions; if the second unit was on homc service, it regularly
found drafts for the one at the front. Dut if the regiment was
a single-battalion corps (and there were seven such with
Wellington 1), or if it chanced to have both units abroad and
none at home (as was the case with fifteen other corps 2), there
was only a depot in Great Britain, and this had to feed two
battalions both on aetive service overseas, and often eould not
discharge the double task effectively. There were of course
regiments so popular, or recruited with such zeal and efficiency,
that they succeeded in keeping two units abroad with ndequate
numbers; but this was exceptional.
What was to be done if a Peninsular battalion had got very
low in numbers, had no sister-unit at home to feed it, and had
few or no recruits at its British depot ready to be sent out?
This was the case in December 1812 with twelve good old batta-
, The 2nd, 20th, 51st, 68th, 74th, 77th, 94th Regimenta.
• The 9th. 11th. 24th. 27th, llOth, 34th, ::lOth, 4.4th, 47th, li8rd, 58UI.
66th. 81st, 83rd. 87th. u.'I Illso ChuneuTII Britufllliqllea lino Brunllwick-Ods.
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lions of the Peninsular Army 1. 'l'he Duke of York maintained
that since they all showed under 850 cffectivcs present (one
was Si:! low us 149 rank and file), and since there was no imme-
diate prospect of working them up to even a low battalion
strength of 450 or 500 men, they must come home at once, and
take a long turn of British service. in which they could be
brought up gradually to their prOper establishment. He bad
carried out this plan in earlier years with some very fine but
wasted battalions, such as the 29th and 97th. To replace the
depleted veteran corps, there should come out new battalions
from home, recently brought up to full strength. The same
ought to be done with four or five cavalry regiments, which
could show only about. 250 horses effective.
But Wellington had other viev.'S, and had begun to carry
theJ1l out on his own responsibility. He held that a well·tried
battalion acdimatizcd to Peninsular service was such a precious
thing, and a raw battalion such a comparatively worthless one,
that it would be best to combine the wasted units in pairs as
'Provisional Battalions' of 600 or 100 bayonets, each sending
home the cadres of four or five companies to its dep6t, and
keeping six or five at the front. The returning cadres would
work up to full strength by degrees, and could then come out
again to join the service companies. On December 6th, 1912,
he issued orders to constitute three Provisional Battalions 2 :
he intended to carry out the same system for several more
pairs of battalions~, and it was put into practice for the 2 J31st
and 2 J66th as from December 20. So with the cavalry, he
intended to reduce four regiments to a two-squadron establish-
ment, sending home the cadres of their other squadrons to be
filled up at leisure.
On January 18th the Duke of York sent out a memorandum
ent.irely disapproving of the system. He regretted to differ in
principle from the Commander-ill-Chief in Spain, but could not
possibly coneur in the arrangement. All depleted battalions
, 2nd, 2/24th, 2/3mh, 2/3151, 2/44tl1, 5]st, 2/!l3rd, 2/58th, 2/66th,
68th, 2/83rd, 94th.
• 1st Pro\·. But. = 2/81st and 2/00th; 2nd = 2nd and 2/53rd; 3w =
2/24tb and 2/58tb; 4th = 2/30th and 2/44th•
• e.g. the tilf;t o.nl168th. lVelli'lgton Dispolc1Ie3, ix. p. 009.
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for which no drafts could bc found must comc home at once.
• Experience has shown that a skeleton battalion composed of
officers, non-commissioned oUicers, and a certain foundation of
old and experienced soldiers can be reformed for any service in
a short time: but if a corps reduced in numbers be broken up
by the division of its establishment, such an interruption is
occasioned in its interior ~onomy and esprit de corps, that its
speedy recompletion and reorganization for foreign service is
effectually prevented. The experiment now suggested has
once been tried, and has resulted in a dcgree of irregularit)"
contention, and indiscipline in the regiment concerned; which
had made necessary the strongest measures.' (.Many court
martinis, and the removal of the whole of the officers into other
battalions.) It was justly urged that seasoned men are more
valuable than men fresh from England, but for the sake of a
present and comparatively trifling advantage the general
efficiency of the whole British Army must not be impaired.
All the depleted battalions should he sent home :\t once!.
Wellington was deeply vexed at this decision. He replied
that orders, if defini~elygiven, would of COlll'Se be obeyed; but
if left to act on his own responsibility, he could only say that
the scn'ice in America or Sicily or at home was not his concern,
and that he was bound to state what was best for the l>eninsular
Army. One old soldier who has served two years in Spain was
more eCfective thnn two, or even three, who had not. Rnw
hattnlions flll the hospitnls, straggle, maraud, nnd starve. He
never would part with the Provisional Bnttnlions as long as it
was left to his discretioll: and the same with cnvalry. lIe had
four depleted cavalry regiments much under-horsed: he would
like to have the horses of the four hussar regiments which were
being sent to him from England to give to his old Peninsula
troopers, rather than the regiments themselves. But orders
are orders and must be obeyed 2.
The Duke replied that for his part he had to take iuto COIl-
sideration not only the Peninsula but the British service all
over the world. Drafting of one corps into another was hurtful
to the service and depressed the spirits of corps: it was even
1 The Duke to Wellington, Supplementary Di,pakhes, vii. pp. 524-5•
• Wellington to Torrens, DjlfJJuklU!8, x. pp. 77-8.
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deemed illegal. Though the last person in the world to wish
to diminish the Army in Spain or cripple its general's exertions,
he was compelled to persevere in his direction from necessity 1.
On March 13th Wellington reluctantly carried out the orders
from the Horse Guards as regards his depleted cavalry regi-
ments: the 4th Dragoon Guards, 9th and 11th Light Dragoons,
and 2nd Hussars of the German Legion were ordered to make
over their effective horses to other regiments, and to prepare
to embark at Lisbon. A paragraph in the General Orders
expressed Wellington's regret at losing llnyof his brave old
troops, and his hope that he might yet sce them again at the
front 2.
As to the infantry, the Duke repeating his general precept
that depicted battalions must come home, but not giving
dcfmitc orders for them by name and number, a curious com-
promise took place. Wellinf:,rton sent back to England the two
weakest units, which were still in April well under 800 bayonets
apiece 3: he had already drafted a third into the senior
battalion of its own regiment, whieh was alsd in the Peninsula.
Four more of the war-worn battalions had been worked up to
about 400 of all ranks, by the return of convalescents and the
arrival of small drafts-Wellington ventured to keep them,
and to report them as efficient battalions, if small ones 4. The
challenge to Home authority lay with the remaining six 6 :
though five of them were well under 400 strong he nevertheless
stuck to his original plan and formed three provisional battalions
out of them. If the Duke of York wanted them, he must ask
for them by name: he did not, and they kept the field till the
end of the war, and were repeatedly mentioned by Wellington
as among the most efficient units that he owned. Presumably
Vittoria put his arrangements beyond criticism-at any rate,
the controversy was dropped at the Duke's end. The net result
was that Wellington lost three depleted infantry units and
four depleted cavalry units of the old stock-about 2,000
I The Duke to Wellington, Supplemtntary Di8patchtlJ, vii. p. 558,
cbrUllty 11.
• Ibid., vii. pp. 581-3.
• The 2/30th and 2/44th. • The SIst, 08th, 2/83td. and 94th.
• 2nd, 2/24th, :!/81st, :!/58nl. 2/58th. 2//lflth.
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veteran sabres and bayonets. In return he received before or
during the campaign of 1818 four new cavalry regiments
-all hussars l-a.nd six new infantry battalions 2 all much
stronger than the units they r~placed, and making up about
1,600 sabres and 8,000 bayonets. He would probably have
said that his real strength was not appreciably changed by
getting 4,500 new hands instead of 2,000 old ones. Certainly,
considering the cffort that was required from the Pcninsula
Army in 1818, it is sufficiently surprising that its strength was,
on balance, only four infantry units to the good-thc cavalry
regiments remaining the same in number as in 1812.
Therc wefe plenty of small administrative problems to be
settled during the ,winter-rest of 1812-18, whieh worried
Wellington but need not worry the modern student of history,
being in themselves trivial. It is well, however, to note that
in the spring of 1813 his old complaint about the impossibility
of extracting hard cash from the Government, instead of the
bank-notes and bills which the Spanish and Portuguese
peasantry refused~to regard as real money, eame practically
to an end. By heroic exertions the Chancellqr of the Exchequer
was scraping together gold enough to send £100,000 a month
to Lisbon. A large sum in pagodas had been brought all the
way from Madras, and the Mint was busy all the year in melting
them down and recoining them as guineas. It was the first
time since the" Suspension of Cash Payments Act' of 1797
that any gold of this size had been struck and.issued. As the
whole output went straight to the Peninsula for the Army, the
new coin was generally known as the' milit.'u'y guinea.' Con·
sidering that gold was ~o much sought for in England at the
time that a guinea could command 278. in paper, it was no
small feat to procure the Indian gold, and to see that the much
wanted commodity went abroad ",ithout diminution. Welling-
ton could have done with much more gold-six times os much
he once observed-but at least he was no longer in the state of
absolute bankruptcy in which he hod opened the campaign of
the preceding year-nor obliged to depend for a few thousand
, 7th, lOth, 15th, 18th Hussars.
• 2/59th (from Cadiz), 2/62nd, 70th, 77th (from Lisbon garrison),
2/84tll, 85th.
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dollars on profits to be made on Egyptian corn which he sold in
Lisbon, or impositions of doubtful legality made upon specu-
lators in Commissariat Bonds. The Portuguese troops had their
paystill in arrears-but that was not Wellington's responsibility.
The muleteers of the transport train were suffering from being
paid in vales, which they sold to Lisbon sharks, rather than in
the cruzados novos or Pillar Dollars which they craved•. and
sometimes deserted in not unnatural disgust. But, at the
worst, it couJd not be denied that finance looked a good deaJ
more promising than it had in 1812 1.
'fhere had been much reorganizat.ion since the end of the
Burgos retreat. In uniforms especiolly the change WQS greater
than in any other year of the war: tltis was the first campaign
in which the British heavy cavalry showed the new bruss helmet,
discarding the antiquated eocked hat-the light dragoons had
gone into 1'lhakos, relinquishing the black japanned leather
helmct with bearskin crest. Infantry officers for the first time
appeared in shakos resembling those of the rank and file-the
unwise custom by which they had up till now worn <.'Ocked hats,
which made them easy marks for the enemy's snipers, being
at last officially condemned. Another much needed improve-
ment was the substitution of small tin camp kettles, to be
carried by the men, for the large iron Flanders cooking-pots,
four to each company and carried on mules, which had hitherto
been employed. They had always been a nuisance; partly
because the mules could never be relied upon to keep up with
the unit, partly because their capacity was so large that it
took much firewood and a long space of time to cook their
contents. Nothing is more common in personal diarie1'l of
1808-12 than complaints about rations that had to be eaten
half-cooked, or were not eaten at all, because the order to move
on arrived before the cauldrons had even begun to,get warm.
A more doubtful expedient was that of putting the great..coats
of the whole of the infantry into store before the march began.
Wellington opined that the weight of coat and blanket combined
was more than the soldier could be expected to carry. Due or
, On ull this the reader intert'llted in military llmmcc will find excellent
commentaries in chap. i of vol. ix or Mr. Forteseue's lIisttny of tIle Drilisli
Army, which appeared three montlUlafler this clmpter of mine WflS written.
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other must be abandoned, and after much consideration it was
concluded that the blanket was more essential. 'Soldiers while
in exercise during the day 'seldom wear their great-coats, which
arc worn by thcm only at night, together with the blanket:
but as the Commander of the forces has now caused the army
to be provided with tents, the necessity for the great-coat for
night use is superseded 1.' And tents. as a matter of fact, were
provided for the first time during this campai.gn. The expedient
worked well enough during the summer and autumn, when the
weather was usually fine, in spite of some spells of rainy weather
in June. Dut in the Pyrenees. from October onward. the tents
proved inadequate protection both from sudden hurricancs and
from continuous snowfall. And bad though the plight of men
huddled in tents frozen stiff by the north wind might be, it
was nothing to that of the sentry on some mountain dctile.
trying to keep a blanket round his shoulders in December
bliu·.ards. Yet the tents, with all their defects, were n decided
boon-it would have been impossible indeed to hold the Pyre-
Ilcun passes at nll, if some shelter had not been provided for the
battalions of the front line. Villages available for billeting were
few and always in the hollows to the rear, not 011 the crcsts
whcre the line of defence lay. It would secm that the experi-
ment of dispensing with the grco.t-coats wus dropped, and that
thcy were brought round by sea to Pasages or St;. Sebastian,
for personal diaries mention them as in use again, in at least
some rCl:,timcnts, by December. Oddly enough, thcre appears
to be no official record of the rcvCK:ation of the order given in
May.
Anot;her innovation of the period was the introduction of a
new unit into the British Army-called (after the idiotic system
of nomenclature used at the Horse Guards) the' Staff Corps
Cavalry.' They were really military mounted police. picked
from the best and steadiest men in the cavalry regiments, and
placed under the command of Major Scovell, the cypher-
secretary on Wellington's head-quarters staff, of whose activities
much has been said in the last volume. There were two troops
of them, soon raised to four, with a totlll strength of about
300 of all ranks 2. 'fhe object of the creation of the l.'orps was
, ~ Suppfermn/ary Di8p(llche$, xiv. p. 212. • Ibid., vii. Jlp. 63ll--41.
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to make more effectual the restraint on marauding. aud other
crimes with which the Provost-Marshal and his assistants were
too few to deal. Wellington had rai.1ed with almost exaggerated
emphasis on the straggling, disorder, and looting which had
distinguished the Burgos retreat, and the Duke of York had
licensed the formation of this police-cavalry as the best remedy
for the disease. They had plenty to do after Vittoria, when
the British Army had the greatest orgy of plunder that ever
fell to its lot during the war. Wellington's own view was that
the slo.ckness of discipline in certain regiments, rather than
privations or casual opportunity, was the mtUll source of all evil.
But he welcomed any machinery that would deal with the
symptoms of illdisciplinc, even if it did not strike at the roots
of the disease. Over-leniency by eourts martial was another
cause of misconduct according to his theory-with this he
strove to cope by getting from home a civilian Judge-Advocate-
General, whose task was to revise the proceedings ofsuch bodies,
and disallow illegal pr~eedings and decisions. The first and
only holder of this office, Franci~ Larpent, has left an interesting
and not always discreet accountof his busy life at Head-Quarters,.
which included a strange episode of captivity in the French lines
on the Bidassoa ].
• He was captured by a raiding party, while watehing the enemy from
too short a distance, on August 31.
SECTION XXXV: CHAPTER IV
THE PERPLEXITIES OF KING JOSEPH. :FEBRUARY-
MARCH 1818
WE have seen, when dealing ",ith the last month of 1812
and the distribution of the French army into winter quarters,
that all the arrangements made by King Joseph, Jourdan,
and Soult were settled before any knowledge of the meaning
of the Moscow Hetreat had oome to hand. The famous • 29th
Bulletin' did not reach Madrid till January 6th, 1813; this
was a long delay: but the Emperor's return to Paris on Decem-
ber 16th, though he arrived at the Tuileries only thirty-six
hours after the Bulletin had come to hand, was not known to
Joseph or Jourdan till February 14th-which was· a vastly
longer delay. 'fhe road had been blocked between Vittoria and
llurgos for over five weeks-and couriers and dispatches were
accumulating at both these places--one set unable to get south,
the other to get north. The Minister of War at Paris received
Joseph's dispatches of the 9th, 20th, and 24th of Deeember
all in one delivery on January 29th 1. The King, still more
unlucky, got the Paris dispatches of a.1I the dates between
December 18th and January 4th on February 14th to 16th by
several couriers who came through almost simultaneously 2.
It was not till Palombini's Italian division-in a series of
fights lasting from Janunry 25 to February 18-had cleared
away Longa and Mendizabal from the high-road between Burgos
and Vittoria, that quicker communication bctween those cities
becamc possible.
Long as it had taken in 1812 to get a letter Crom Paris to
Madrid, there had never been such a monstrous gap in corre-
spondence as that whieh took place in January 1818. Hence
came the strange fact that when Napoleon had returned to
France, and started on his old system of giving strategical orders
I So Chlrkc to the King. CorrC$J1. du Roi JOIieplt, vol. ix. p. 180.
I Jourdan, Mtmoiru, p. 452.
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for the Army of Spain once more, these orders l-onc on top of
another----accumulated at Vittoria, and came in onc overwhelm-
ing mass, to upset nil the plans which Joseph and Jourdau had
been carrying out since the New Year.
The King had received the 20th Bulletin on J aouary 6th:
he had gathered from it that matters were going badly with the
army in Russia, but had 110 conception of the absolute ruin
that had befallen his brother's host. Hence he had kept his
troops spread in the wide cantonments taken in December, and
had sent Daricau's to the provim:c of encneat to rcopen the
way to Suchet at Valencia.. The great convoy of Spanish and
French administrators, courtiers, and refugees, which had been
left in Suchct's care, retraced its way to Madrid under eseort of
some of Darieau's troops in the last days of January. Mean-
while Pierre Soult's cavalry continued to sweep La l\Ianeha,
imposing contributions and shooting guerrilleros, and the Army
of the Centre cleared the greater part of the country east and
north of Madrid of strong parties of the Medico's and the
Empecinado's men. Caffarelli. as Jourdan complained, ought
to have been making more head in the North-but his dispatches
were so infrequent that his position could not be fully judged-
it was only certain that he could not keep the Burgos-Bn.yonne
road open for eomicrs.
There was only onc touch during the winter with Wellington's
army, whosc cantonments, save those of the Light Division,
were far back, behind the' no man's land' which encircled the
French armies. This single l.'Ontact was due to all adventurous
reconnaissance by Foy, who at his head-quarters at Avila bad
conceived a project for surprising Hill's most outlying detach-
ment. the 50th regiment, which was billeted at Bejar. in the
passes in front or Coria. On false nev,;s that no good look-out was
being kept around Bejar. he started on the 19th February from
Piedrahita with a column of three very weak infantry battalions
and 80 horse-about 1.500 men in all. and marching day and
night fell upon the cantonments of the 50th at dawn on the
morning of the 20th. The surprise did not come off. Colonel
Harrison of the 50th was a cautious officer, who had barricaded
the ruined gates of the town, and patched its crumbling walls-
• Scc OJrresp. du RQi Joseph, ix. p. 187.
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He had piCqllcts fa.r out, and was accustomed tQ keep several
companies under arms from 2 o'clock till daylight every night.
Moreover Hill, thinking the position exposed, had lately
reinforced him with the 6th Cac;adores, from Ashworth's
brigade. Foy, charging in on thc town in the dusk, dislodged
the outlying picquets after a sharp skirmish; but his advanced
guard of 300 voltigcurs mct such a storm of flrc from thc gatc
and walls, which were fully manned, that it swerved off when
30 yards from the entrance. Foy ordered a general retreat,
since he saw the enemy ready for him, and marched off as
quickly as he had come, pursucd for some distance by the
Cac;adorcs 1. He says in his dispatch to Reille that he only lost
two men killed and five wounded, that he could have carried
the town had he pleased, and that he only retired because he
was warned that the 71st and 92nd, the other regiments of
Cadogan's brigade, were marching up from Baf\.os, f>even miles
away 2. 'fhis those may believe who please: it is certain that
he made off the moment that he saw that his surprise had
failed, and that he was committed to an attack on a barricaded
to\\'Il. Hill expected more raids of this sort, but the nttempt
was never repeated.
It was on the 14th of February, five days before Foy's
adventure, that King Joseph received his first Paris mail. Its
portentous and appalling contents were far worse than anything
that he had expected. The most illuminating item was a letter
from Colonel Desprez, his aide-dc-camp, who had made the
1t(oscow retreat, nnd was able to give him the whole truth
concerning Russia. • We lost prisoners by the tens of thousands
-but, however ma.ny the prisoners, the dead are many more.
Every nightly bivouac left hWldreds of frozen corpses behind.
The situation may be summed up by saying that the army is
dead. The Young Guard, to which I was attached, quitted
Moscow 8,000 strong; there were 400 left at Wilna.. All the
other corps havc suffered on the same scale; I a.m convinced
• see account in the Merooil'll of Plltten;oD of the 50th, pp. 303-5.
1 see dispatch in Girod'l< Vie militaire du Gtlltrul Fay, pp. 386-7. The
whole is written in 11 boastful llnd Imconvineingstyle, unworthy of sueh a
good soldier. Colonel Hanison's report is singularly vague and short.
He only says that the enemy made ofT,leaving their dead behind.
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that not 20,000 men recrossed the Vistula. If your Majesty
asks me where the retreat will stop, I can only reply that the
Russians will settle that point. ] cannot think that the
Prussians will resist: the King and his ministers are favourably
disposed-not so the people-riots arc breaking out in Berlin:
crossing Prussia I had evidence that we can hardly count on
these -allies. And it seems that in the Austrian army the
officers arc making public demonstrations against continuing
the war. This is a. sad picture-but I think there is no exaggera-
tion in it. On returning to Paris and thinking all over in cold
blood, my judgement on the situation is as gloomy as it was
at the theatre of war 1,'
Napoleon had spent several days at the Tuilcrics,
busy with grandiose schemes for the organization of a new
Grande Armee, to replace that which he had sacrificed in Russia,
and with financial and diplomatic problems of absorbing
interest, before he found a moment in which to dictate to Clarkc
his orders for the King of Spain. The note was vcry short and
full of retieences 2: it left much unsaid that had to be supplied
by the recipient's intelligence. < The King must have received
by now the 29th Bulletin, which would show him the state of
affairs in the North; they were absorbing the Emperor's care
and attention. Things being as they were, he ought to move
his head.quarters to Valladolid, holding Madrid only as the
extreme point of occupation of his southern wing. lIe should
turn his attention to the pacification of Biscay and Navarre
while the English were inactive. Soult had been sent orders to
come back to France-as the King had repeatedly requested j
his Army of the South might be given over to Marshal Jourdan
or to Ga1.an,' If Joscph had owned no independent sources of
information such a statement would have left him much in the
dark, both as to the actual state of the Emperor's resources,
and as to his intentions with regard to Spain. The Emperor
did not say that he had lost his army and must create another,
nor did he intimate how far he intended to give up his Spanish
venture. But the order w draw back w Valladolid and hold
Madrid lightly, could only be interpreted as a warning that
• Desprczto JoseJlh, from Paris, Jalluary a, CQrrup. n. J. ix. pp. ]80-2.
I Nap. Cur;up. xxiv, 110. 19411.
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there would be no more reinforcements available for Spain, so
that the area of occupation would have to be contracted.
The recall of Soult was what Joseph had eagerly petitioned
for in 1812, when he had come upon the curious letter'in which
the Marshal accused him before the Emperor of treason to the
French cause 1. But the Marshal was not brought home in
disgrace; rather he was sent for in the hour of danger, as one
who could be useful to the new Grande Armte. It must have been
irritating to the King to know, fl'(lffi a passage in the already-
cited letter of Colonel Desprcz, that Napoleon had called the
Duke of Dalmatia' the only military brain in the Peninsula "
that he stigmatized the King's denunciations of him as des
paurm:Us to which he attached no importance, and that he had
added that half the generals in Spain had shared Soult's
suspicions. The Marshal left, in triumph rather than in dis-
grace, with a large staff and escort, and a long train ofJourgons
carrying his Andalusian plunder, more especially his splendid
gallery of Murillos robbed from Seville churches 2.
Dated one day later than the Emperor's first rough notes,
we find the formal dispatch from the war-minister Clarke,
which made things a little clearer. Setting forth his master's
ideas in 0. more verbose style, Clo.rke explained that the affairs
of Spain must be subordinated to those of the North. The
move to Valladolid would make communication 'with Paris
shorter and safer, and provide a larger fOrce to hold down
Northern Spain. Caffarelli was not strong enough both to hunt
down the guerrilleros and at the same time to provide garrisons
on the great roads and the const. The King would have to lend
him a hand in the task.
There were otber dispatches for Joseph and Jourdan dnted
on the 4th of January, but only one more of importance: this
was an order for wholesale drafts to be made from the Army
of Spain, for the benefit of the ncw Army of Germany. But
large as they were, the limited scale of them showed that the
Emperor had not the least intention of surrendC1'ing his hold
on the Peninsula, or of drawing back to the line of the Ebro or
the Pyrenees, as Lord Liverpool had expected 3. All the six
, Sce vol. v, pp.53S-D.
• Miot de Mclito, Hi. pp, 263-4.
.,
• Sce above, PI}. 215-16.
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Armies of Spain-those of the North, Portugal, the Centre, the
South, Aragon. and Catalonia-were to continue in existence,
and the total number of men to be drawn from anyone of them
did not amount to a fourth of its numbers. There were still
to be 200,000 men left in the Peninsula.
The first demand was for twenty-five picked men from each
battalion of infantry or regiment of cavalry, and ten from each
battery of artillery, to reconstitute the Imperial Guard, reduced
practically to nothing in Russia.. llutting aside foreign regi-
ments (Italian, Neapolitan, German, Swiss) there were some
220 French battalions in Spain in January 1813, and some
85 regiments of cavalry. The eaU wns therefore for 5,500
bayonets and 875 sabres-no great amount from an army which
had 260,000 men on its rolls, and 212,000 actually under the
colours.
But this was only a commencement. It was more important
that the Armies of the South and Catalonia were to contribute
a large number of cadres to the new Grande Arrnte. Those of
Portugal, Aragon, the Centre, and the North were at first less
in question, because their regiments were, on the average, not
so strong as those of the other two. The Army of the South
was specially affected, because its units were (and always had
been) very large regiments. In ]812 Soult's infantry corps
nearly all had three battalions-a few four. Similarly with the
cavalry, many regiments had four squadrons, none less than
three. 'rhe edict of January 4th ordered that each infantry
regiment should send back to Franee the full cadre of officers
and non-commissioned officers for one battalion, with a skeleton
cadre of men, eutting down the number of battalions present
with the eagle by one, and drafting the surplus rank and file of
the subtracted battalion into those remaining in Spain. The
cadre was roughly calculated out to 120 of all ranks. When,
therefore, the system was applied to the Army of the South, it
was cut down from 57 battalions to 36 in its 19 regiments 1.
The 21 cadrcs took DU to France 2,500 officers and mcn. Simi~
lady 15 cavalry rcgiments, in 50 squadrons, were to send 12
squadron-cadres to France, some 600 sabres.
I Two regiments which had only two battaliolUl in February 1818 got
cut down to one apiece.
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The small Army of Catalonia was to contribute a battalion-
cadre from each of those of its regiments which had three or
more battalions-which would givesix more cadres for Germany.
The Armies of Portugal, Aragon, and the Centre were mainly
composed of regiments having only two battalions-they were
therefore for the present left comparatively untouched. The
first named was only ordered to give up one battalion-cadre,
the second two, the third three (all from Palombini's Italian
division). Of cavalry the Army of Portugal only gave up one
squadron-cadre, the Army of the Centre three.
In addition, the small number of foreign auxiliary troops still
left in Spain were ordered ba.ck to France, save the remnant of
Palombini's and Severoli's Italians and the Rheinbund units 1
in the Army of the Centre, viz. the 7th Polish Laneers (the last
regiment of troops of this nationality left south of the Pyrenees),
the Wcstphalisn horse in the Army of the Centre, and the Berg
and Westphulilill infantry in Catalonia. Moreover, the brigade
of the Young Guard in the Army of the North (that of Dumous-
tier) and the three naval battalions from Cawz, which had
served so long in the Army of the South, were to come home,
also four batteries of Frcnch horsc-artillery and two of Wcst-
phaliall field artillery. Lastly, cadres being as necessary for
the military train as for any other branch of the service, all the
armies were to send home every disml;mllted man of this corps.
The same rule was applied to the Equipages militaires and the
Artillery Park. This whole deduction from the Army of Spain
under these heads came to nearly 12,000 soldiers of all arms,
over and above these cadres.
There was an elaborate clause as to reorganizing the Army
of the North: in return for giving up four provisional regi-
ments of drafts to the Armies of Portugal and the South, it
was to get three regiments made over to it from the fonner,
and one from the latter. Napoleon calculated that it would
lose nothing in numbers from the exchange, but as a matter of
fact it did. The drafts to be returned to their proper corps ran
to over 8,000 men. llut General lleille, being told to contri-
bute three regiments to the Army of the North, selected the
three depleted units which had composed 'l'homit!res' unlucky
I A brigade nota division, 6ince"tlleHessian regiment peridled atBadajoz.
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division at the bnttle of SnlarnnnCB (the 1st, 62nd, and 101st),
which together did not make up 8,000 bayonets 1, though Gazan
ehose to make over the 64th, a three-battalion regiment with
1,600 men. The Anny of the North, therefore, lost nearly
3,000 men on the balancc of the exchange, though the Emperor
was aware that it was already too weak for the task set it.
But he probably considered that Palombini's Italians, detached
(as we have already sccn 2) from the Army of the Centre, would
make up the difference.
In addition to the squadron-cadres which he requisitioned
on January 4th, the Emperor had a further intention of bringing
back to Central Europe some complete units of heavy cavalry,
to furnish the host now collecting in Germany with the horse-
men in which it was so notoriously deficient. The whole of
the dragoon-division of Boyer in the Army of Portugal is
marked in the March returns, with ordre de rentrer en Ii'rance ;
so are several dragoon regiments in the Army of the South.
But as a matter of fnet hardly onc of them had stnrted for thc
Pyrcnees by May 3, so that both in'the Army of Portugal and
the Army of thc South the cavalry total wrn; only 11 few hundreds
smaller at thc time of thc opening of the campaign of Vittoria
than it had been at the New Year-the shrinkage amounting to
no more than the squadron-cadres and the few men for the
Imperial Guard.
The Emperor's intentions, therefore, as they became known
to King Joseph and Jourdan on February 16th, left the three
annies opposed to Wellington some 15,000 men smaller than they
had been at the time of the Burgos retreat; but this was a very
modest deduction considering their size, and still kept nearly
100,000 men in Castile and Lean, over and above the Army of
the North, which might be considered as tied down to its own
duty of suppressing the rising in Biscay and Navarre, and
incapable of sparing any help to its neighbours. When we
reflect on the scale of the Russia!} disaster, the demand made
upon the Army of Spain seems very moderate. But there were
• He had also later to give up the 22nd, 0. weak one·battalion regiment
or 700 bnyonetll. • See ubove, p. 188•
• Even the 2nd Dragoons, the flrst regiment scheduled, though it started
in Ptfarcl:i, shows casualties at Vittoria, so did not get away.
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two ominous doubts. Would the Emperor be content with his
original requisitions in men and horses from the armies of
Spain? And what exactly did he mean by the phrase that the
King would have to lend appui et secours to the Army of the
North, for the destruction of the rebels beyond the Ebro? If this
signified the distraction of any large body of men from the forces
left opposed toWellington, the situation would be uncomfortable.
Both these doubts soon developed into sinister certainties.
On receiving the Emperor's original orders King Joseph
hllftened to obey, though the removal of his court from Madrid
to Valladolid looked to him like the abandonment of his pose
as King of Spain. lIe ordered Soult's successor, Ga:r.an, to
evn.cuate La Mancha, and to draw back to the neighbourhood
of Madrid, leaving a small detachment of light troops about
Toledo. The Army of the South also took over the province
of Avila from the Army of Portugal, and it was intended that it
should soon relieve the Army of the Centre in the province of
Segovia. For Joseph had made up his mind that any help which
he must give against the northern rebels should be furnished
by D'Erlon's little army, which he would stretch out from
Segovia towards Burgos and the Ebro 1, and so take Mina and
the insurgents of Navarre in the rear. Early in March 0.11 these
movements were in progress, and (as we have seen in the last
chapter) were beginning to be reported to Wellington, who made
many deductions from them. .Joseph himself transferred his
head-quarters to Vnlladolid on March 23rd, by which time the
greater part of the other changes had been carried out. The
Emperor afterwards critici:r.ed his brother's delay of a whole
month between the receipt of his orders to decamp and his actual
arrival at Vulladolid. To this Jourdan made the reply that it
was useless to move the head-quarters till the drawing in of the
Army of the South had been completed, and that the bringing
in of such outlying units as Daricau's division from the province
of Cllenca, and the transference of the Army of the Centre
northward, took mueh time 2. Evacuations cannot be carried
out at a day's notice, when they involve the moving of maga·
zines and the calling in of a civil administration .
• See Joseph to Suchct. Ccrnlsporldana, ix. p. 200.
• Sec Mblloiftil dUo Roi JO!JelJII, i". 11. 134.
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On March 12th, while all the movements were in progress,
another batch of orders from Paris came to hand. They con-
tained details which upset the arrangements which the King
was carrying out, for the Emperor decided that the succour
which was to be given to the Army of the North was to be
drawn from Reille's Army, and not from D'Erlon's, so that
a new series of counter-marches would have to be carried out.
And-what was more ominous for the future-Napoleon had
dropped once more into his old habit of sending orders directly
to subordinate generals, without passing them through the
head-quarters of the Army of Spain. For Clarke, in his dispatch
of February Srd. informed the King that the Emperor had sent
Reille directions to detach a division to Navll.rre at once,
, a disposition which cannot oonllict with any orders which your
Majesty may give to the Army of Portugal, for the common
end of reducing to submission the provinces of the North 1.'
Unfortunately this was precisely what such an order did
accomplish, for Joseph had sent D'Erlon in the direction to
which he now found that Reille had simultaneously detached
Barbot's division of the Army of Portugal, without any know-
ledge that D'Erlon had already bee~ detailed for the job.
The Emperor was faDing back into the practice by which
he had in the preceding year ruined Marmont-the issuing of
detailed orders for the movement of troops, based on information
a month old, it being certain thCLt the execution of these orders
would tCLke place an additional three weeks after they had been
formulCLted. As we shall presently see, the initial successes of
Wellington in his Vittorio. campo.ign were entirely due to the
position in which the Army of l>ortugal hoo placed itself, in
obedience to No.poleon's direct instructions.
Meanwhile Clarke's dispatch of February 2nd, convcyingthese
orders, ll.rrived at the same moment as two others dated ten
days later 2, which were most unpleasant reading. The fIrst
contained an absolutely insulting message to the lGllg from his
brother: 'his Imperial Majesty bids me say,' wrote Clarke,
, with regard to the money for which you have asked in several
recent letters, that all funds necessary for the armies of Spain
• Clll.rke to Joseph, C{JT'TUfKJfldalla. ix. p. 103 (Februury 2).
I Ibid. (.l<'cbnmry 12). pp. lD4-!i.
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could have been got out of the rich and fertile provinces which
are being devastated by the insurgent bands. By employing
the activity and vigour needed to establish order and tranquil-
lity, the resources which they still possess can be utilized. This
is an additional motive for inducing your Majesty to put an
end to titis war in the interior, which troubles peaceful inhabi-
tants, ruins the cOWltryside, exhausts your armies, and deprives
them of the resources which they could enjoy if these fine regions
were in a peaceful state. Aragon and Navarrc arc to-day under
Mina's law, and maintain this disastrous struggle with their food
and money. It is time to put an cnd to this state of affairs.'
Written apparently a few hours latcr than the dispatch
quoted ahove eame another 1, setting forth the policy which was
to be the ruin of the French cause in Spain three months later.
It is composed of a series of wild miscalculations. When the
head-quarters of the Army of Spain should have been moved
to Valladolid, it would be possible to -send the whole Army of
Portugal to help the Army of the North beyond the Ebro. 'The
Armies of the Centre and South, occupying Salamanca and
Valladolid, have sufficient strength to keep the English in
check, while waiting on events. Madrid and even Valencia are
of secondary importance. Valladolid and Salamanca have
become the essential points, between which there should be
distributed forces ready to take the offensive against the
English, and to ,""reek their plans. The Emperor is informed
that they have been reinforced in Portugal, and that they seem
to have two alternative schemes--either to make a push into
Spain, or to send out from the port of Lisbon an expedition
of 25,000 men, partly English, partly Spanish, which is to land
somewhere on the French coast, when the campaign shall
have begun in Germany. To prevent them engaging in this
expedition, you must always be in a position to march forward
and to threaten to overrull Portugal and take Lisbon. At the
same time you must make the communications with France
safe and easy, by using the timc of the English inactivity to
subdue Biscay and Navarre.... If the French armies in Spain
remain idle, and permit the English to send expeditions against
our coast, the tranquillity of France will be compromised, And
the ruin of our cause in Spain will infallibly follow.'
, Clurke to Joscph. February 12. Ibid., pp. 197-9.
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A supplementary letter to Jourdan of the same day recapitu-
lates all the above points, adding that the Army of Portugal
must send to Clausel, now Caffarelli's successor in the North, as
many troops as are needed there, but that the King at the same
time must menace Portugal, so that Wellington shall not he
able to detach men from his Peninsular Army.
The fundamental error in all this is that, underrating Welling4
ton's strength, Napoleon judged that the Annies of the South
and Centre could keep him in check. They were at this moment
under 60,000 of 0.11 lums: if the Army of Portugal were out of
the way, they were absolutely insufficient for the tusk set them.
As to their menacing Lisbon, Wellington would have liked
nothing better than an advance by them into Portugal, where
he would have outnumbered them hopelessly. The hypothesis
that Wellington was about to send 25,000 men by sea for
a landing inside the French Empire, on which Napoleon lays so
much stress, seems to have been fermed on erroneous informa-
tion from French spies in London, who had heard the rumour
that a raid on Holland or Hanover was likely, or perhaps even
one aimed at L~ Vendee. For the royalist emigres in England
had certainly been talking of such 0. plan, o.nd pressing it upon
Lord ,Liverpool, o.s the dispatches of the latter to Wellington
show 1. The Emperor did not know tho.t all such schemes
would be scouted by the British Commander in Spain, and that he
now possessed influence enough wi'th the Cabinet to stop them.
It would appco.r that the Emperor's intelligence from England
misled him in other ways: he was duly informed of the depar-
ture from Lisbon of thc depletcd cavalry and infantry units,
about whieh Wellington disputed so much with the Duke of
York, and thc dcdu<:tion drawn was that the Peninsular Army
was being decreased. Thc cxaggerated impression of the losses
in the Burgos retreat, which could bc gathered from the Whig
newspapers, led to an underrating of the strength that the
British Army would have in the spring. Traitors from Cadiz
wrote to Madrid that thc friction betwecn the Regency and
Wellington was so great, that it was doubtful whether the new
Generalissimo would have any real control over the Spanish
armies. And the sickness in both the British and the Portu-
guese armies-bad as it was-was exaggerated by spies, so
1 See Ilbove, p. 219.
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wildly that the Emperor was wIder the delusion that Wellington
could not count on more than 80,000 British or 20,000 Portu-
guese troops in the coming campaign. It may be worth while
to quote at this point the official view at Paris of the British
army in Portugal, though the words were written some time
later, and only just before the news of Wellington's sudden
advance on the Douro had oome to hand:
• In the position in which the enemy found himself there was
no reason to fear that he would take the offensive: his remote-
ness, his lack of transport, his constant and timid caution in
all operations out of the ordinary line, all announced that we
had oomplete liberty to act as suited us best, without worry or
inconvenience. I may add that the ill feeling between English
and Spaniards, thc voyagc of Lord Wellington to Cadiz, the
changes in his army, of which many regiments have been sent
back to England, were all favourable circumstances allowing
us to carry out fearlessly every movement that the Emperor's
orders might dietate 1.'
It is only necessary to observe that Wellington was not more
remote from the French than they were from him: that he had
excellent transport-far better than his enemies ever enjoyed:
that timid caution was hardly the policy whieh stormed
Badajoz or won Salamanca: that his rapid and triumphant
oUcnsive was just starting when the Minister of War wrote the
egregious paragraph whieh we have just cited. Persistent
undervaluing of the resources and energy of Wellington by
Head-quarters at Paris-i. e. by the Emperor when present, by
the Minister of War in his absence-was at the roots of the
impending disaster.
Leaving the King newly established at Valladolid, the Army
of the South redistributing itself between Madrid and the
Douro, the Army of the Centre turning back from its projected
march to Burgos in order to reoccupy thc province or Segovia,
and the Army of Portugal beginning to draw oft from in front
of Wellington troops to be sent to the North, wc must turn for
0. moment to explain the crisis in Navarre and Biscay which was
engrossing so much of Napoleon's attention.
• CurrupmltW.7IQJ du lltli Joseph, ix. p. 290, written just before Clarke
got news of Wellington's start.
SECTION XXXV,.. CHAPTER V
THE NOR1'HERN INSURREC'fION, FEBRUARY-
1l1AY 1813
IT has been explained in an earlier chapter that ever since
General Caffarelli concentrated all the available troops of the
Army of the North, in order to join Sou ham in driving away
Wellington from the siege of Burgos, the three Basque provinces,
Navurre, and the coastlnnd of Santallrler had been out of hand 1.
The outward and visible sign of thnt fact was the intermittent
stoppage of communication between Bayonne and Madrid,
which had so much irritated Napoleon on his return from
Russia. It was undoubtedly 8 just cause of anger that impor-
tant dispatches should be !twig up at Tolosa. or Vittoria. or
Burgos, because the bands of l\filla or Mcndizubal or Longa
were holding the defile of Salill8S-thc grave of so many convoy·
cscorts-or thc pass of Pancorbo. It had bccn calculated in
1811 that it might often require a small column of 250 men to
bring an imperial courier safely through either of those perilous
nanows. But in the winter of 1812-13 things had grown far
worse. • The insurgents of Guipuzcoa, Navarre, and Aragon,'
~ Clarke wrote to Jourdan with perfect truth 2, • have had six
months to organize and train themselves: their progress has
heen prodigious: they have formed many formidable corps,
which no longer fear to face our troops when numbers are equal.
They have called in the English, and receive every day arms,
munitions, and even cannon on the coast. 'I'hey have actually
.begun to conduct regular sicges.' Yet it was three months
and more since the King had sent back Caffarelli and the field-
force of the Army of the North from Valladolid, to restore order
.in the regions which had slipped out of hand during the great
concentration of the l'rench armies in November.
If it be asked why the North had become so far morc unquiet
. , Sce aoovc, pp. 190--91.
• Dispatch of February 20, Correspond!mce du Roi JOSl!pIl, ix. p. 206.
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than it had been in previous years, the answer must be that the
cause WAS moral and not material. It was not merely that
many small places had been evacuated for a time by the French
during the Burgos campaign, nor that the BTitish fleet was
throwing in arms and supplies at Castro-Urdiales or Santander.
The important thing was that for the first time since 1808 the
whole people had got a glimpse of hope: the French had been
driven out of Madrid; they had evacuated Biscay; Old Castile
and Leon had been in the power of Wellington for several
months. It WllS true that Madrid had been recovered, that
Wellington had been forced to retreat. But it was weU known
that the general result of the campaign of 1812 had been to free
all Southern Spain, and that the French had been on the verge
of min in the early autumn. 'fhe prestige of the Imperial
armies had rcx:eived at Salamanca a blow from which it never
recovered. Wherefore the insurgents of the North put forth
during the winter of 1812-18 an energy such as they had never
before displayed, and the French generals gradually discovered
that they had no longer to do ",.jtb mere guerrillero bands, half-
armed, half-fed wanderers in the hills, recruited only from the
desperate and the reckless, but with a whole people in arms.
WhenCaffarelli returned from Burgos, he found that theSpnnish
authorities had re-established themselves in every town whieh
had been left WlgarriSOllcd, that taxes and requisitions were
being levied in a regular fashion, and that new regiments were
being formed and trained in Biscay and Guipuzcoa. The
nominal Spanish commander in this region was Mcndizabal.
theoretically Chief of the • Seventh Army '-but he was an
officer of little resource and no authority. The real figh·ting
man was Longa, originally a guerrillcro chief. but now gazctted
a colonel in the regular army. He was a gunsmith from the
Riojs, a very resolute and persistent man, who, had taken to the
hills early, and had outlived most of his rivals and colIeagucs-
a clear instance of the' survival of thc fittest.' His useful
co-operation with Sir Home Popham in the last autumn has
been mentioned above: his band, now reorganized as four
infantry battalions, was raised from the mountaineers of thc
provincc of Sllntander Md the region of the upper Ebro. His
usual beat lay between the sca and Burgos, and he was as
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frequently to be found on the, Cantabrian coast as at the defile
of Paneorbo, where the great Bayonne chaussee crosses from the
watershed of the Ebro to that of the Doum. His force never
much exceeded 3,000 men, but they were tough material-great
marchers and (as they proved when serving under Wellington)
very staunch fighters on their own ground. West of Longa's
hunting grounds were those of Porlier, in the Eastern Asturias:
the star of the' Marquesito,' as he. was called, had paled some-
what of late, as the reputation of Longn had increased. He
had never had ngain such [l. stroke of luck as his celebrated
surprise of Santandcr in 1811 1, and the long French occupation
of thc Asturias in the days of Bonnet had worn down his band
to little over 2,000 men. At this moment he was mainly
engaged, under the nOfl}inal command of Mendizahal, in kceprng
Santoi\a hloekaded. To besiege it in form he had neither
enough men nor a battering train: but if driven away once
and again by Caffarelli, he never allowed himself to be caught,
and was back again to stop the roads, the moment that the
relieving column had marched off. In Biscay the leading spirit
was Jauregui (El Pastor), another old ally of Sir Home Popham,
but in addition to his band there was now on foot a new organiza·
tion of a more regular sort, three Biscayan nnd three Guipuzcoan
battalions, who had received arms from the English cruisers.
They held all the interior of the country, had fortified the old
citadel of Castro·Urdiales on the coast, with gWIS lent them
from the fleet, and eo·operated with Mendizabal and Longa
whenever occasion offered. They had held Bilbao for a time
in the autumn, but were ehased out of it when CaITarelli
returned from Burgos. In January they made another attempt
upon it, but were repulsed by General Rouget, in command of
the garrison.
Between the fields of operation of the Biseayans and Longa
and that of- the Nava.rrese insurgents, there was the line of the
great Bayonne ChaUSSftJ, held by a series of French garrisons at
Tolosa, Bergara, Mondragon, Vittoria, l\firanda del Ebro, and
the castle of Pancorbo. This line of fortified places was a sore
hindrance to the Spaniards, but on many occasious they
erossed it. Mina's raiding battalions from Navarre were
I See vol. iv. p. 472.
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frequently seen in the Basque provinces. And they had made
communication between onc garrison and another so dangerous
that the post-commanders often refused to risk men on cseorts
between onc place and the next, and had long ceased to attempt
requisitions on the countryside. They were fed by "convoys
pushed up the high road, with heavy forces to guard them, at
infrequcnt intervals. In Navarre, as has bcen already explained.
:Mina held the whole countryside, and had set up an orderly
form of government. He had at the most 8,000 or 9,000 men,
but they spread everywhere, sometimes operating in one column,
sometimes in many, seldom to be caught when sought after,
and capable of turning on any rash pursuing force and over-
whelming it, if its strength was seen to be over-small. l\lina's
sphere of action extended far into Aragon, as far as Huesea, so
•that he was as much a plague to Paris, the Governor of Sara-
gossa, as to Thouvcnot, Govcrnorof Vittoria, or Abbe, Governor
of Pampcluna. His strategical purpose, jf we may ascribc such
a thingtoone who was, after all, butagucrrilleroof special talent
and energy, was to break the line of (.'ommunication down the
Ebro from l\liranda to Saragossa, the route by which the King
and the Army of the North kept up their touch with Suchet's
troops in Aragon. It was a tempting objective, since all down
the river there were French garrisons at short distances
in Haro, Logrono, Viana, Calahorra, l\1ilagro, TudcIa, and
other places, none of thcm vcry large, and each capable of
being isolated, and attacked for some days, before the Governor
of Navarre could come to its aid with a strong relieving column.
And there were other garrisons, such as those at Tafalla and
Huesea, covering outlying road-centres, whieh were far from
sueoour and liable to surprise-attacks at any moment.
Nor was Mina destitute of the power to call in help for onc of
his greater raids-he sometimes shifted towards the coast, and
got in touch with the Guipuzcoans and Biscayans, while he had
also communication with Duran, south of the Ebro, "This officer
who was theoretically a division-commander in the Valencian
Anny, 'was really the leader of a band of four or five thousand
irregulars, who hung about the mountains of Soria, and kept
the roads from Madrid to Saragossa and the Ebro blocked.
And Duran was again in touch with the Empeeinado, whose
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heat lay on the east side of New Castile. and whose main object
was to molest the French garrisons of Guadalajara, Segovia. and
Aleala. Temporary combinations of formidable strength could
be made, when several of these irregular forces joined for
a common raid: but the chiefs generally worked apart, each
disliking to move very far from his own district, where he was
acquainted with the roads and the inhabitants. For in a
country of chaotic sierras. like Northern Spain, local knowledge
was all·important: to be aware of exactly what path.:; and
passes were practicable in .January snow, or what torrents were
-fordable in March rain, was the advantage which the guerrillero
had over his enemy. It is probable that in March or April
1813 the total force of all the insurgent bands was no gl'eater
than that of the French garrisons and movable columns with
which they had to contend. But the Army of the North was
forced to tie down the larger half of its strength to holding
strategical points and long lines of communication, while the
gucrrillcros could evacuate onc whole rq,oion for weeks at a time,
in ordcrto mass in anothcr. They could be unexpectedly strong
in one district, yet lose nothing by temporary abandonment of
another. They were admirably served for intelligence, since
thc whole population was by goodwill or by fear at their service:
the :French could only depend on afrancesadas for information,
and these were timid and few; they grew fewer as :l\1ina
gradually discovered and hanged traitors. When the French
columns had gone by, it was easily to be guessed who had
guided them or given them news-and such people perished, or
had to migrate to the nearest garrison. But local knowledge
was the real strength of the gucrdlleros: a French column-
commander, guiding his steps from the abominable maps of
Lopez-the atlas whieh was universally used for want of
a better-was always finding his enemy escape by a path unindi-
cated on the map, or appear in his rear over some lUlknown
cross-road, which eould not have been suspeeted to exist.
Hence the local Spanish traitor was absolutely necessary as
a guide, and often he could not be found-treachery having
been discovered to be a path that led inevitably to the gallows.
The Army of the North had acquired, from old and painful
experience of counter-marches, some general knowledge of thc
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cross-roads between the Ebro and the Pyrenees. But when
troops from 0. distanee-seetions of the Bayonne Reserve, or
reinforcements from the Army of Portugal-were turned on to
the game of guerrillero-hunting, they found themselves very
helpless. As a rule, the most promising march ended in finding
the lair still warm, but the quarry invisible.
Napoleon and his mouthpiece, the War Minister Clarke,
refused to the end, as. Marshal l\larmont remarked. 1, to see that
the War of Spain was uuli,ke any other war that the French
armies had waged. since 1792. The nearest parallels to it were
the fighting in Swit7..crland in 1798 and against Hofer's Tyrolesc
in 1809. But both of these earlier insurrectionary wars had
been fought on a very limited area, against an enemy of no great
numerical strength, practicaUy unhelped from without. In
Spain the distances were very great, the mountains-if less
high than the Alps-were almost as tiresome, for in the Alps
there were vast tracts completely inaccessible to both sides,
but the Sierras, if rugged, arc less lofty and better furnished
with goat-tracks and smugglers' by-ways, where the heavily
laden infantryman cannot follow the evasive mountaineer.
Moreover, the EngHsh cruisers continued to drop in the arms
and munitions without which the insurgents could not have
kept the field.
There can be no doubt that Napoleon undervalued the power
of the Spanish gucrrilleros, just as he undervalued the resources
o.nd the enterprise of Wellington. From the first moment of
his return from Hussia he had continued to impress on Joseph
and Jourdan the necessity for pacifying the North, before the
season for regular cnmpaigning should have arrived, and
Wellington should have taken the field. But his theory that
the winter wus the best time for dealing with the bo.nds was
rather specious than correct. For although the short days, the
snow in the passes, and the swollen torrents were, no doubt,
great hindrances to that freedom of movement which was the
main strength of the guerrilleros, they were even greater hin-
drances to combined operations by bodies of regular troops.
Rapid marches a.re impossible off the high roods in Northern
Spain, during the midwinter months; and it was only by
~ Ml!moires, Iv. p. 202.
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combined operations and the use of large forces that the
insurgents (,'Ould be dealt with. Indeed, the country roads were
practically impassable for any regular troops in many regions.
What officer would risk detachments in upland valleys that
might be found to be blocked with snow, or eut oil from their
IIsual communication by furious streams that had overflowed
the roads and made fords impracticable? Winter marches in
unexplored hills a.re the most deadly expedients: llll the
weakly soldiers faU by the way-had not Drouet lost 150 men
in passing the Guadarrama during the early days of Dccember-
and the Guadnrrama was erossed by one of the few great royal
roads of Spain? What would be the losses of columns sent out
on cross-roads and caught in blizzards, or in those weeks of
continuous rain whieh are not uncommon in the sub·Pyrenean
region?
The Emperor's view was that Carrarclli had failed in his task
from want of resourcefulness. He was always trying to parry
blows rather than to strike himself: he allowed the insurgents
to take the initiative, and when they had executed some tire-
some raid would set out in a pursuit which was seldom useful,
since they naturally outran him 1. He was always marching to
deliver or revietual some threatened garrison, anywhere between
Santofia and Pampcluna, instead of setting himself to destroy
the main agglomeration of hostile forces. Now CafIarclli, it is
true, was no great general, and may have been on occasion
wanting in vigour. But the best reply to the criticism of him
sent from Paris is to observc that his successor, Clausel, uni·
versally acknowledged to be the most active officer in Spain,
failed in exactly the same way as his predecessor, even when
he had been lent 20,000 veteran troops to aid him in his task.
Napoleon wanted a great general movement pour balayer
tout le NQrd. He granted that Calfarelli had not enough troops
both to furnish garrisons for every important point, and to hunt
down the guerrilleros with a large field-forcc. Therefore he
ordered ReilIe to furnish Cailarelli's successor with every man
, 'Au lieu de les poul'tmivrc, de Ics inquieter. d'llller au dcvant de Icurs
entrepriscs, on attendait la nouvelle de leurs tentativell lIur un point pour
lI'y porter flOi·mcme: 011 ugissuit loujours alll:o()l$ I'cvenement: Clarke
to Clausel, CorrUp<llllWFlce du Roi Joscph, ix. p. 210.
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that be asked for. If necessary, the whole Army of Portug~1
might be requisitioned, since those of the South and Centre
would be enough to keep Wellington in cheek. The letter of
instructions which Clarke was directed to give to Clausel, when
the latter took up his appointment, explruns the Emperor's
views. • By a continual taJ..--ing of the offensive it ought to be
possible to reach a prompt and happy result. 'fhe moment
that the reinforcements to be furnished by General Reillc arrive
(and possibly they have already put themselves at your disposi-
tion) in Navarre and Biscay, 1 am convinced that your usual
activity will change the face of affairs. Rapid pursuits, well
directed, und above all properly adapted to the topographical
configuration of the district; raids made without warning on
the insurgents' depots of provisions, their hospitals, their
stores of arms, and in general on all their magazincs, will
infallibly curry confusion into their operations. Aftcr you have
had some successful engagements with them, it will only require
politic measurcsto complete the.ir disorganization. WhcIl you
have scattered their juntas, all the young men they havc
enrolled by compulsion will melt home. If you leave them no
rest, and surprise them in their remotest places of refuge, the
matter should cnd by their going wholly to pieces.... Ai> to
the keeping open your communication with France, one
particular device, to whose utility all the generals who have
served in that region bear witness, is to establish at regular
distances and in well chosen positions, especially where roads
meet, small palisaded forts, or blockhouses, which will form
a chain of posts and support each other. Owing to the wooded
nature of the country they will not cost much to build-the
estimate for such a system of blockhouses has been calculated
to me at no more than 300,000 francs.
'Santona and Pampcluna must be held-the latter because
its capture is Mina's main ambition, the former because it is
a terror to the English, who recently tried to have it besieged:
General CaffarelJi had to lead an expedition to relieve it.
Pampeluna is the morc important for the moment: when a
division of the Army of Portugal reaches Navarre you ought to
be able to make Mina change his tonc. Santoiia can wait-it
may be reprovisioned by sea from the small ports of Biscay.
52
260 THE NORTHEHN INSURHEC'l'ION [F~Il. 10
As General Caflarelli has inconsiderately evacuated most of
them, you should reoccupy them all, especially Dermeo and
Castro·Urdialcs. The latter is said to have been fortified with
the help of the English. For the sake of the safety of Santoiia
all these places mllst be retaken at once: from the mouth of
the Didassoa to Santander every mn.ritimc position should be
in French hands. Santandcr especially is, by the Emperor's
express orders, to be permanently occupied by an adequate
garrison.
•It is necessary that all these operations should be carried out
simultaneously. The pursuit of I'IIina in Navarrc should
synchronize with the operations in Biscay. The insurgents
should be hunted in the inland, at the same time that they arc
attacked on the coast. This is the only way to disorganize
them, to make them weak and divided at all points.... It
seems preferable to use every available man for a general
simultaneous attack, than to undertake each necessary opera·
tion in succession, with a smaller force alld more leisure-all the
more so because the reinforecmcnts, whieh are to co·operate ill
your scheme, may be called elsewhere by somc ullforesecn
developmellt of affairs 1.'
Clausel, in obedience to his instructions, tried to carry out
the whole of this scheme, and had small luck therewith. He
built the chain of blockhouses from Irun to Burgos, thereby
tying up many battalions to sedentary duty. He hunted l'!1ina
right and left, drove the insurrcctionary Junta of Biscay from
its abode, occupied all the little ports from Santander to San
Sebastian, stormed the well-fortified Castro-Urdiales, revic-
tualled Pampeluna and Santona, and at the end of three
months had to report that his task was unfinished, that the
insurrection was still unsubdued, and that although he had
borrowed 20,000 infantry from the Army of Portugal, he must
ask for another 20,000 men [where were they to be got 1] in
. order to finish the campaign. And by this time-the end of
May-Wellington was loose, and the King was falling back on
the Ebro, vainly calling for the five divisions that his brother
had made over to the Army of the North. But we must
1 Clarkc to Clauscl, March I), Ctm'cspondana du &i Joseph, ix. 20l>-1Z--
a very loog and interesting dispatch, of which this is only a short prkis.
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resume the chronicle of the Northern campaign, before com-
menting on its inadequate and unhappy conclusion.
The operations may be said to have begun in January, when
Palomhini's Italian division marched from Old Custileto join the
Army of the North, in order to replace Dumoustier's brigade of
the Young Guard, which was being recalled to France. After
eros.~ing the GUlldarrama Pass in a bliz7.ard, which eost some
Iives,.thcy got to Durgos on the 28th, driving away the Cura
Merino and his band, .who bn.d been blocking the road from
Valladolid. From Durgos Palombini marched to Vittoria,
escorting a convoy of drafts returning to France, couriers,
ollicials, and convalescents. Therc he heard that Longa and
Mcndizabal had eut in behind him, and had again stopped
communications. Wherefore he turned back, and swept the
Dureba, where they were reported to bc. Not finding them, he
marched as 'far as Poza de la Sal, not far from Briviesca, but
some leagues ott the great chaussee. In tills town his head-
quarters were fixed, while the bulk of his division was sent out
in flying eolumns to collect food. He had only 500 men with
him, when on the night of February 10-11 he found himself
surrounded by three Spanish columns, which had slipped
through the intervals of the outlying Italian regiments, and
ran in on the town from different quarlcrs. The surprise,
contrived hy Longa, was complete; but Palombini, collecting
his mcn in a clump, held out till daylight, when his battalions
enme flocking in to the sound of the musketry and relieved
him. The Spaniards disappcared, taking with them some
baggage and prisoners captured in the first rush, and were soon
lost to sight in the mountains.
The Italians, lueky to havc escaped so ~hcaply, marehed
baek to the Ebro by way of Domingo Co.lzu.da, where there was
n Frcnch garrison in imminent danger of starvation, as it had
long been blockaded by local bands 1. Palombini took it on
with him, and blew up the castle, as the place was inconveniently
rcmote from any other Frcnch post. He then returned to'
Vittoria by way of Haro (February 18) and next pushed on to
Bilbao, where he relieved Dumoustier's brigade oC the Imperial
1 For n long account of the Combat of Poza, scc Vacani, vol. vi.
Ill'- 228-33.
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Guard, which was at last able to obey the Emperor's order to
return to France (February 21). Caffarelli used tIlls force as
his escort back to Bayonne, and returned in some disgrace to
Paris. Clausel assumed command in his sread on the next day.
Pampeluna. had bcen declarcd by the new commander's letter
of instructions to be the place of which he should be most
careful. Dut seeing no chance of visiting and relieving it till
his reinforcements from the Army of Portugal should have
come up, ClauseJ, while waiting for their arrival, came to Bilbao,
where he began to make preparations for the siege of Castro·
Urdiales, by far the most important, for the moment, of the
ports nlong the coost whieh the Emperor hOO commendcd to
him for destruction.
Meanwlllle the Biscayan insurgents collected opposite Bilbao,
on the Eastern side, and Mcndizabal brought up Longa's
troops and some of the smaller bands to threaten it from the
West. The idea was to give Clausel so much trouble about
his bead-quarters that he would be unable to march away
against Castro. The days slipped by, and farther East Mina
was more active than ever in Nnvarre. He had at last become
the happy possessor of two siege guns, landed at Deha on the
Biscay coast, and dragged by incredible exertions across
mountain paths to the farthest inland. When they came to
hand he set to work to beleaguer the French garrison of Tafalla,
an outlying place, but less than thirty miles from Pampeluna.
This was a challenge to General Abbe, the Governor of Navarre :
a force which has dug trenches and brought up heavy guns is
obviously nsking for a fight, and not intending to abscond.
Abbe marched with 3,000 infantry and 150 ehasseurs to mise
the siege, and found l\lina with four of his battalions and his
regiment of cavnJry drawn up across the high road, in a mountain
position at Tiebas, ten miles north of Tafalla. After a hard
day's fighting, Abbe foiled to break through, and bad to foil
back on Pampeluna 1 (February 9). The news of his repulse
disheartened the garrison, whose walls were crumbling under
the fire of Mina's heavy guns, and they surrendered ou Feb·
, Murtinien's lists show cllsuultics in the 3nl, 52nd, and IOStll Line and
10th Uger or Abbe's division on this day, so.he bad clearly gone out in
roree.
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ruary 11th to the number of 11 officers and 817 men-the post-
oommlUlder and many others had been killed during the siege.
This 6UceesS of :l'llina's meant nothing less than that the
whole open country of Navarre was at his mercy, since Abbe
had been beaten in the field; wherefore Clausel hastened to
dispatch the first reinforcements from the Army of Portugnl
which renched him-Barbot's division-to tlus qunrter. But
the nffair created less excitement than n.n exploit of' reckless
courage carried out by one of Mina's detachments in the follow-
iug month. The old castle of Fuenterrabia commn.nds the
passage of the Bidassoa, and looks across its estuary into
France: on March 11 it was surprised by escalade by a handful
of gucrriUeros, the garrison taken prisoner, the guns thrown into
the water, lUld the wbole building destroyed by fire. The flames
were visible far into France-troops hurried up from Irun and
Hendayc, but of coursc found the guerrilleros gone 1.
This exploit was rather spectacular than harmful to the
French---quite other.....ise W1l.'> the last event of the month of
],Iarch. Barbol's division, on entering Navarre, was directed
to help Abbe to clear the country between Pampeluna and the
Ebro. Having reached Lodosa on March 30, Barbot sent out
two battalions to raise requisitions in the neighbouring town of
Lerin. The place was being sacked, when the scattered French
were suddenly attacked by two of Mina's battalions, while two
more a.nd 200 Navarresc lancers cut in between the enemy and
Lodosa. The French, thoroughly surprised, lost heavily in the
first shock, but rallied and started to cut their way back to their
division, only eight miles away. In a running fight they were
much mauled, and finally had to form square to receive the
cnvalry. In this inconvenient formation they WCi'e forced to
a long musketry fight with the Navarrese, which so shook the
square that it finally broke when Mina's lancers charged. 'l'he
two battalions were annihilated, 28 officers and 685 men taken
prisoners-the rest cut down. Caudin, the colonel commanding
the detachment, escaped with a few mounted oiflcers 2. The
, The interestillg dispatch of Leguill, the captor of Fucuterrabia. will be
found in the Appendix to Arteche, vol. xiii.
• Mina's claim to havc o.rmihiJatcd these unfortunate troopll is suBto.ined
by !I1urtinicll'S lists, which ~how 8 officers killed !lnu 23 WOUllUCU in tIle
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extraordinary part of the affair was that its last crisis took
plaee at only two miles from Lodosa, where Barbot was lying
with his remaining six battalions. The French general never
stirred, but only put himself in a posture of defence, thereby
provoking Mina's surprise 1, for be could have saved the column
by going out to its help. After the iHsaster he retired to
Pampeluna, with a division reduced to little over 3,000 men.
But not long after Taupin's division of the Army of Portugal
also entered Navarre, and joined Abbe. This gave the latter
a very heavy f<orcc-at least 13,000 men, and when Clausel had
finished his own operations in the direction of Bilbao; and
marched from Biscay to encircle Mill3. on one side, while Abbe
was to hold him on the other, the great guerrillero was in grave
danger. But this wns only in late April and 1t-[ay, and before
the chronicle of these weeks is reaehed wc have to turn back
westward for a space.
Napoleon's orders had told Clauscl to attack at all points at
once, and to lose no time in setting to work. But it was quite
clear that no general synchronized move could be made, until
the divisions borrowed from Reillc hud all arrived. What
active operations meant, before the reinforcements had come
up, had been sufficiently proved by AbbC'sdefcat atTicbas: and
Clausel's own doings in l\larch were equally dist.'ouraging, if lIot
so disastrous. He had resolved to carry outolle of the Emperor's
urgent orders by capturing C~tro-Urdiales, the touching-place
of British cruisers and the one fortified port which the Allies
possessed on the Biscay coast. Undervaluing its strength, he
marched out on March 21 with the bulk of Palombini's Italian
division and a single French battalion, intending to take it by
escalade. For he had been told that its ancient walls had been
indifferently repaired, and were almost without guns. When,
however, he had reached the neighbourhood of Castro on the
22nd, he had to own on inspection that the enterprise would be
~opeless-his commandjng engineer, the historian Vaeani L-
25th Uger and 27th Line, at Lcrill, Murch 31. 'l'here would not be more
tban 40 or 45 officers present with two battalions.
• ExpreSllCd (l.t some length in the great guerrillero's ~lemoir8.
• Who has a long and interesting narrative of the expedition in his
vol. vi. pp. 240-50.
..
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maintai.ned that it would take 0,000 men and a siege train of
~t least six heavy guns to deal with the place. And, as subse-
quent events showed, this was quite true. Cnstro is built on
a. rocky spit· projecting into the sen, with l\ stout wall 20 feet
high drown across the isthmus which joins the headland to the
eonst. The narrow front of this wall, from water to water, hail
been well repaired; there were some 20 guns mounted, and an
old eastle on the extreme seaward point of the spit served as
a citadel or inner fortification. Mendizabal uud his lieutenant,
Campillo, had come down from the interior with three or four
thousand men, 'tI.nd were visible on the flank, ready to fall upon
the Italian column if it should approach the town, through the
labyrinth of vineyanJs and stone fences which covered its
outskirts.
Clauscl, always venturesome, was inclined at fust to go on with
his enterprise, when news reaehed him that Bilbao, which he
had left rather weakly garrisoned, was threatened by the
guerrillero .Tauregui, and the batt:llions of the volunteers of
Biscay and Guipuzcoa. He returned hastily to his head-quarters
with his French battalion, but found that the danger had been
exaggerated for the moment, so sent out General Rouget with
two battalions to join Palombini, who had meanwhile on the
24th fought a severe action with Mcndizabal. The Spaniard
had tried to surround him in his camp at San Vclayo, with
severa.l outflanking columns-the Italian sallied o~t and drove
him off with loss-but suHered himself no less 1. ClauseJ, on
reaching the front, came to the conclusion that Castro must not
be attacked without heavy guns and n larger field-force. He
direeted Pa.lombini to burn the ladders, faseines, &c., prepared
for the assault, and to go oH instead to raise the blockade of
Santoila, while he himself returned to Bilbao. The Italian
division thereCore marched westward on Colindres, on the othel'
side of the bny on which Santofia stands, thrusting aside the
Spanish blockading Corees, and communicated with the governor,
General Lameth. A supply of small arms and ammunition,
I Vncani's st8tement that the Itnlinn division lost this da.y only 110
men, ill made llbsurd by the lists ill Martinil'n, which l:Ihow that thc 4th.
6th, and 2nd Ligeros lost that day 3 officcl'll killed Dnd 16 woundcd-
which implies II total casualty list or at Ica.st 850.
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money, and food was thrown· into the place. On the other
hand, Lamcth was ordered to get six heavy guns on shipboard,
and to be prepared to run them down the coast, when next
a French force should appear in front of Castro-Urdiales, along
with a provision of round shot, shells, and entrenching tools.
Lameth got the siege material ready, but was not asked for it
till another full month had gone by, for Clause! had other
business pressed upon him.
Palombilli thereupon turned back. and regained Bilboo in
three !orced marches, unmolested by the Spaniards, for they
had gone ort in the direction of Ba.lmaseda., not expecting him
to retum so quickly. He had only been in Bilbno for two days
when Clausel sent him out again, eastward this time and 110t
westward, with two of his regiments, for a surprise attack on
Guerllica, the head-quarters of the Biseayan insurgents and the
seat of their Junta. A French column of two battalions of
the 40th Line from Durango was to co-operate and to assail the
enemy in the rear. This expedition was quite in consonance
with Napoleon's orders to strike at tbe enemy's central depots
in front and rear by unexpected rlloids. But it also showed the
difficulty of carrying out such plans. Pnlombini reached
Guernica, driving before him bands which gave way, but were
always growing stronger: behind Guerniea they mnde a stand
-the Freneh flanking column failed to appear-having found
troubles of its own-and Palomhini was repulsed and forced
to cut his way hack out of thc hills. Hc reported his loss us
only 80 men-hut it was probably somewhat more 1 (April 2).
Having picked up the stray French column, and replenished his
ammunition from Bilbao, Palombini, with a laudable perse-
verance, attacked the Gucrniea position again on April 5, and
this time forced it. Thence pushing east, he tried to drive the
enemy before him along the coast road, on which, in the neigh-
bourhood of St. Sebastian, a brigade from the Bayonne reserve
had been set to block their flight. Dut the Biscayans and
El Pastor evaded him and slipped south into the hills: the
Guipuzcoan battalions, instinctively falling back on their own
• In MlIrtinien's lists there nre live omcer-oosunlties given lor this fight,
but thcy do not include all the names of offiecrs mentioned as killed by
Vacani in his narrative.
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province, were in more danger. Dut warned in time that the
coost road was stopped, some of them took refuge in the boats
of English warships at Lequeytio and Motrico, and were
shipped off to Castro-Urdiales in safety, while others simply
dispersed. No prisoners were taken, bnt Palombini captured
the petty magazines of the Guipuzcoans at Aspeytia nnd
Azcoytin, o.nd thinking that the insurrection was scotched
returned to the Bayonne CJlaUSaee at Bergara (April 9).
So fur was tlus from cnding the campaign, that while Palombini
was devastating Guipuzeoa, the Biseayans and El Pastor had
concerted a new attack on Bilbao with Longa and Mendizabal,
who had been left with no containing force in front of them
when the cnemy had retired from before Castro-Urdialcs.
Clausel had gone of( from Bilbao on March 30, with a large
escort, to join at Vittoria the newly arrived divisions of the
Army of Portugal, those of Taupin and Foy, and was set on
organizing a new attack on l\'lina. In the absence of both
the Commander-in-Chief o.nd of Palombini, Bilbao was very
weakly garrisoned-not more than 2,000 men were left to
General Rouget to defend n rather extensive system of out-
·works. On April 10th the Spaniards attncked him on both
sides oUhe Nervion river, and would probably have broken into
Bilbao but for the incapacity of Mendiwbn.1, whose main body
did not come up in time to assist the attack of the Biscayans
on the other bank of the river. Rouget WQS still holding out
when Palombini eame to his rescue from Bergara via Durango.
in two forced marches. The Spaluards thereupon dispersed,
after their usual fashion, Mendi~bal disappearing to the east,
the Biscayans falling back on their old head-quarters at
Guernica. Palombini was strong at the moment, having been
joined by the brigade from Bayonne, under General Aussenac,
which had been blocking the coast road. He therefore tried to
surround the Biseayans with converging columns-but when
he thought that he had cut them oll from the inland, and was
about to drive them into the water, the bulk of them were
picked up at Bermeo by English cruisers, and landed farther
down the coast. Only some baggage and a store of munitions
feU into the pursuer's hands (April 14).
On this, Palombini, • convinced,' says his admiring chronicler
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Vacani, 'of the uselessness of trying to envelop or destroy
local bands nmong mountains which they knew too well, when
he could only dispose of columns of 0. few battalions for the
pursuit,' :resolved to halt at Bilbu.o, and prepare for the siege
of Castro. He put the brigade f.rom Bayonne in charge of the
high road to San Sebastian, and waited for the arrival of Foy
from Vittoria. For he had been informed that this general, with
his division of the Army of Portugal, was to he detailed to
help him in the subjection of Biscay. Meanwhile April was
half over, the insurgents had been often hunted but never
caught, and Wellington might be expected to be on the move
any morning: it was strange that he had not been heard of
already.
Leaving Biscay to Palombini and Foy, Cllluse! had collected
at Vittoria onc of his own divisions, hitherto scattered in small
detachments, hut relieved by the reinforcements sent him from
the Army of Portugal. For beside the four divisions lent for
active service, he had taken over the whole Province of
Durgos, to which Rcille had sent the division of Lamartiniere.
With his own newly-collected division, under Vundermaesen,
and Til.upin's of the Army of Portugal, Clausel set out faT
Nnvarre on April llth, to combine his operations with those of
Abbe and to hunt down Mina. As he had already sent forward
to the Governor of Navarrc the division of Darbot, there was
now a field-force of 20,000 men available for the chase, without
taking into consideration the troops tiro down in garrisons.
This was more than double the strength that Mina (.'ould com-
mand, and the next month was· one of severe trial for the great
guerrillero.
Clausel's first idea was to eateh Mina by a sweeping move·
ment of all his four divisions, which he collected at Puente la
Reyna in the valley of the Arga (April 24). Mina answered this
move by dispersion, and his battalions escaped through inter-
vals in the cordon with no great loss, and cut up more than
once small detachments of their pursuers. Clausel perceiving
that this system was useless, then tried another, one of those
recommended by the Emperor in his letter of instmction of
March 9, viz. a resolute stroke at the enemy's maga7'jnes and
depots. Mina kept his hospitals, some rough munition factories
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which he bad set up, and his store of provisions, in the remote
Pyrcnean valley of Roneal, where Navarrc and Aragon meet: it
was most inaccessible and far from any high road. Nevertheless
Clause! marched upon it with the divisions of Abbe, Vander-
maCl:ien, and Barbot, leaving Taupin alone at Estclla to
contain Western Navarre. He calculated that I\1ina would be
forced to concentrate and fight, in order to savc his stores and
arsenal, and that so he might bc destroyed. He was partly
correct in his hypothesis-but only partly. !'llina. left four of
his battalions in Western Navarre, in the valleys of the Ameseoas,
to worry Taupill, and hurried with the remaining five to cover
the Roneal. There was heavy fighting in the passes leading to
it on May 12 and 13, which ended in the Navarrese being beaten
and dispersed with the loss of a thousand men. Clausel eap~
tured and destroyed the factories and magazines, and made
prisoners of the sick in the hospitals, whom he treated with
une",;pected humanity. Some of the broken battalions fled
south by Sanguesa into lower Navarre, others castward into
Aragon. Among these last was Mina himself with a small party
of cavalry-he tried to fetch a compass round the pursuing
:Frenehand to return to his own country, but hewtlS twiee headed
oIl, and finally forced to fly far into Eastern Arn.gon, as far as
Barbastro. This region was practically open to him for flight,
for the French garrison of Saragossa was too weak to cover the
whole country, or to stop possible bolt-holes. ~Mina was there-
fore able to rally part of his men there, and called in the help of
scattered partidas. Clauscl swept all North~Western Aragon
with his thrce divisions, making arrests and destroying villages
which had harboured the insurgents. But he did not wish to
pursue Mina to thc borders of Catalonia, wherc he would have
been quite out of his own beat, and inconvenicntly remote
from Pampcluna and Vittoria.
But meanwhile the division which he had left under Taupin
in Navarre was having much trouble with l\fina's four battalions
in the Amescoas, and parties drifting baek from the rout in
the Roncal vexed the northern bank of the Ebro, while Longa
and Mendizabal, ·abandoning their old positions in front of
Bilbao, had descended on to thc Bayonne chaussee, and exe-
cuted many raids upon it, from the pass of Salinas above
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Vittoria as far as the Ebro (April 25-May 10). The communica-
tions between Bayonne and Burgos were once more cut, and
the situation grew so bad that Lamartinierc's division of the
Army of Portugal had to bemoved eastward, to clear the road
from Burgas to l\firanda, Sarrut's to do the same between
Miranda and Bilbao, while Maueune detached a brigade to
relieve Lrnnartiniere at Burgas. Of the whole Army of Portugal
there was left on May 20th only one single infantry brigade at
Palcneia which was still at Rcille's disposition. Five and a half
divisions had been lent to Clauscl, and were dispersed in the
north. And 'Wellington was now just about to move! The
worst thing of all for the French cause was that the communica-
tions of the North were as bad in May as they had been in
January: after Clausel had taken off the main field-army to the
Uoneal, and had led it from thence far into Aragon, the roods
behind him were absolutely useless. Only on the line Bayonlle-
Vittoria, where the new blockhouses were beginning to arise,
was any regular passing to and fro possible. Clausel himself
was absolutely lost to sight, so far as King Joseph was concerned
-it took a fortnight or twenty days to get a dispatch through
to him.
Meanwhile, before turning to the great campaign of Welling-
ton on thc Douro, it is necessary to dispose of the chronicle of
affairs in Biscay,. Foy and his division, as we have seen, had
marched from Vittoria to Bilbao and reached the latter pla.cc 011
April 21st 1. On the way thcy had nearly caught :Ptlcndizabal at
Ordufia, whcrc he chanced to be present with a. guard of only
200 mcn ; but, warncd just in timc, he had the luck to escape,
and wcnt back to pick up his subordinates Longa and Campillo
nearer the coast.
Soon after Foy's arrival at Bilbao he was joined by Sarrut's
division of the ArIllY of Portugal, which had followed him from
Vittoria. He had therefore, counting Palombini's Italians, the
brigade of Aussenac, and the regular garrison of Bilbao, at least
16,000 men-ample for the task that Clausel had commended
to him, the capture of Castro-Urdiales, with it.'l patched-Up
mediaeval wall. The only thing presenting any difficulty was
I Not the 24th liS ill VIlClllli tllld Bclmlls. Sec Girod de I'Ain's Life DJ l"oy,
p.2oo.
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getting a siege train to this remote headland: Lameth, the
Governor of SantOliar, as it will be remembered, had been
ordered to provideone, and there were four heavy guns in Bilbao:
-the roads on both sides, however, were impracticable, and the
artillcry had to come by water, running the chance of falling in
with British cruisers.
On April 25th Foy marched out of Bilbao with his own,
Sarrut's, and Palombini's divisions, more than 11,000 men, l
lellving Aussenne on the Deba, to guard the road from San
Sebastian, and Rouget in garrison as usual. On the same
evening he reached the environs of Castro, and left Palombini
there to shut in the place, while he went on himself to look for
Mcndizabal, who was known to be watching aUairs from the
hills, and to be blocking the rood to Santofia, as he had so often
done before. Foy then moved on to Cerdigo where he established
his head-quarters Cor the siege, on a strong position between the
sea and the river Agacra. Mcndizabal was rcputed to be holding
the lille of thc AsOII, tCII miles farther on, but in weak force: hc
had only the partidas of CampilIo and Herrcro with him, Longa
being absent in the direction oC Vittorill. On the 29th Foy
drove off these bands at Ampuero, and conununicated with
Santona, into whieh he introduced a drove of 500 oxen and
other victuals. The governor Lameth was ordered to ship thc
siege train that he had collected to Islares, under the camp at
Ccrdigo, on the first day when he should flod the bay c1ear-
for three English sloops, the Lyra, Royalist, ond SparrW). under
Captain Bloye, were lying off Castro and watching the coast.
Foy then established Sarrut's division to cover the siege at
Trucios, and sent two Italian battalions to Portugalete to guard
the road to Bilbao, keeping his own division and the three other
Italian battalions Cor the actual trench work. l'he heavy guns
were the difficulty-those expected from Dilbao were stopped
at the mouth of the Nervion by the English squadron, which
was watching for them-but in the absence of the sloops on this
quest, the governor of Santofia succeeded in rwmiug his convoy
1 Figures in Bclmas are (in detail) Foy's own divisioll (10 bllttllliolls)
5,5Hi men, Pnlom!Jini's (5 bllttulions) 2,474, l,rLillcry 4011, Surnlt's division
about 4,500. l"oy left behind Ausscnac'ij brigade about 1,500. alld the
garrison or Bilboa llbout2,OOO.
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across the bay on :May 4th. Thc guns from Bilbao were aCter-
wards brought up by land, with much toil.
Fay then commenced three batteries on the high slopes which
dominate the town: two were completed on the 6th, despite
much long-distance fire from the Dritish ships, and from a heavy
gun which Captain Bloye had mounted on the rocky islet oC
Santa Anna outside the harbour. On the 7th fire was begun from
two batteries again~t the mediaeval curtain wall, but was
ineffective--one battery was silenced by thc British. On the
10th, howevcr, the third battery-much closer in-was ready,
and opened with dcvastating rcsults on the Hth, two hours' fire
making a breach 30 fcet widc and destroying 11 large convent
behind it.
The Governor, Pedro Alvarez, one oC Longa's colonels, had
a garrison of no mare than 1,000 men-all likc himselC from
Longa's regiments of Iberia; he made a resolute defence, kept
up a continuous counter-fire, and prepared to hold the breach.
Dut it was obvious toot the old wall was no protection from
modern artillery, and that I.·oy could blow down as much of it
as he pleased at leisure. On the afternoon of the 11th part of
the civil population went on board the British ships: the
governor made preparations for holding the castle, on the sea-
side of the town projecting into thc water, as a last strong·
hold: but it was only protected by the steepness of the rock 011
which it stood-its walls were ruined and worthless. Late in the
day the British took off the heavy gun which they had placed
on the islet-it could not have been removed after the town
had fallen, and the fall was clearly inevitable.
Fay, seeing the curtain-wall continuing to erumblo, and
a 60-foot breach established, resolved to storm tlmt night,
and sent in at 7.20 three columns composed of eight Jtrench and
eight Italian f1alU:: companies for the assault-the former to thc
breach, the latter to try to escalade a low angle near the Bilbao
gate. Both attacks succeeded, despite a heavy but ill-aimed
fire from the defenders, and the Spaniards were driven through
the town and into the castle, where they maintained themselves.
Alvarez had made preparations for evacuation-while two
companies held the steep steps which were the only way up to
the castle, the rest of the garrison embarked at its back on the
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boats of the British squadron. Some were killed in the water
by the French fire, some drowned, hut the large majority got
off. Dy three in the morning there were only 100 men left in
the castle: Alvarez had detailed them to throw the guns into
the sea, and to fire the magazines, both of which duties they
accomplished, before theearly dawn. 'When, by meafiSofladders,
the French made their way into an embrasure of the defences,
some'of this desperate band were killed. But it is surprising to
hear that most of them got away by boat from the small jetty
at the back of the castle. 'I'hey probably owed their escape to
the fact that the stormers had spent the night in riotous
atrocities vying with those of lladajoz on a small scale. Instead
of finishing off their job by taking the castle, they had spent the
night in rape and plunder in the town 1.
The Spaniards declared that the total loss of their garrison
was only 100 men, and the statement is borne out by the
dispatch of Captain Bloye of the Lyra. Fay wrote to Clausel
that the whole business had only cost him fifty men. The two
statements seem cqU311y improbable, for the siege had lasted
for six days of open trenches, and both sides had fought with
great resolution 2.
But the really important thing to note about this little aUair
is that it absorbed three French divisions for sixteen days in
the most critical month of 1818. Eleven thousand men were
tied down in a remote oonler of Biscay, before a patched·up
mediaeval wall, while Longs. was running riot in Alava and
breaking the line of communication with France-and (what
is morc important) whilc Wellington's columns werc silently
gliding into plaee for ~he great stroke on the Douro. Colonel
Alvarez could boast that his thousand men had served a very
useful and honourable end during the great campaign. He
and they were landed by Captain Bloye at Dermeo, and wcnt
off over the hills to join Longa: the majority of them must
1 For horrid detnils of mislll\ndlings or both sexes see l'tlarccl (of the
6th Ugcr) in his Campagntll d' Espagnt, IIp. 193-4. Ml1rccl hi a raconteur,
but Dclmas bears him out (iv. p. aGO).
• Nnpier says the Spnnish IOl:ill WI\S IsO-which seems more probable.
Thc Britiih ships lost onc omccr Bnd sixteen men wounded, by Bloyc's
report. As to tile French loss, we have the names of 3 offiec1'9 killcd and
6 woundell dUring the operation-which looks like 150 to 180 casualties,
356.6 T
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have been present at the battle oCVittoria, some six weeks after
their escape by sea.
Having discharged the first duty set him by Clausel, Foy left
the Italians at Castro, to guard the roast and keep up communi·
cations with Santofia. He sent Saunt southward to hunt for,
Longs., by way of Orduiia; but the Spaniard crossed the Ebro
and moved into the province of Durgos, evading pursuit.
Then, finding that Lamartinierc's division was guarding the
great road in this direction, he turned oll north-westward, and
escaped by Espinosa to the mountains of Santandcr. Sarrut,
baving lost him, turued back to Biscay.
Meanwhile Foy himself, after retiring to Bilbao to give a few
days of rest to his division, started out again on May 27th for
a circular tour in Biscay. His object was to destroy the three
Discayan volunteer battalions which had given his predecessor
so much trouble. Two he dispersed, but could not destroy, and
they ultimately got together again in somewhat diminished
numbers. The third was more unlucky: caught between three
converging columns Ilear Lcqueytio, it was drivcn against the
seashore and nearly annihilated-360 mcn were taken, 200
killed, only two companies got orr into the hills (May 30th).
But to achieve this result Fay had collected three brigades-
5,000 men-who would have been better employed that day
on the Esla, for ·Wellington was crossing that river at the
moment-and where were the infantry of the Army of Portugal,
who should have stood in his way?
So while the British Army was streaming by tens of thousands
into the undefended plains of Leon, Foy and Sarrut were
guerrillero-hunting in Biscay, and Taupin and Barhat had just
failed in the great chase after l\1illa in Aragon und Navarrc.
Such wcre the results of the Emperor's orders for the pacification
of the North.
, ,
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SECTION XXXV: CHAPTER VI
AN EPISODE ON THE EAST COAST. CASTALLA, APIUL181:J
Dunnw the winter months, from November to }~ebruary.
affairs hoo. been quiet on the ~Iediterrnnennside of the Penin·
suln. The transient sojourn of the Armies of Soult and King
Joseph in the kingdom of Valenein, which had so much troubled
the mind of General Maitland, had lasted no more than a few
weeks. After they had marched off to retake Madrid, no traces
remained of them, in the end of October, J>tl\'C the mass of'sick,
convalescents, and Spanish refugees which they had left behind
-guests most undesired-m charge of Suchct. There was no
longer any fear of a siege of Alicante, or of the expulsion of
the Anglo-Sicilian expeditionary corps from Spain.
When the shadow of this fear had passed, the Allied forces
resumed something like their old position. The Anglo-Sieilians
had passed under many commanders since the autumn:
Maitland had resigned owing to ill-health before October 1st:
he was succeeded tor six weeks by Jobn Mackenzie, the senior
Major-General at Alica.nte, who was superseded about Novem-
ber 20th by Williarn CHnton (brother of Henry Ctinton of the
6th Division). But Clinton was only in charge of the expedi.
tionary force for twelve days, being out-ranked by James
Campbell, Adjutant-General of the Army of Sicily, who turned
up with a large body of reinforcements 011 December 2nd.
Campbell, however, only bore rule at Alieante for a period of
three months, giving place to Sir John Murray on February 25th.
It was therefore on the last-named officer that the stress of
co-operating with Wellington in the campaign of 1813 was to
fall. The unlucky man was quite unequnl to the position, being
singularly infirm of purpose and liable to lose his head at
critical moments, as he had shown at Oporto on May 12th,l80G 1.
It is surprising that Wellington, knowing his record, should
have acquiesced in thc appointment-perhaps he though,t that
• Sce lI00VC. vol. i;. p. :141-
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here at least was EL general who would take no risks, and have
no dangerous inspirations of initiative.
The strength of the Alicantc anny had risen by January 1818
to something like 14,000 men, but it remained (as it had been
from the first) a most heterogeneous {oree. consisting in the
early spring of 1818 of six British 1, three German!, and two
foreign battalions belonging to the regular forces of the Crown 3,
with four Italian units 4 of various sorts. The cavalry consisted
of. one British and onc Sicilian regiment and an odd squadron
of • Foreign Hussars.' The artillery was partly British, partly
Sicilian, and partly Portuguese. In addition to these troops the
commander at AliCllnte had complete control over General
Whittingluun's' Majorcan division,' a Spanish corps which had
been reorganized in the Balearic Islands by thnt officer, and
which had been clothed, armed, and paid from the British
subsidy. It consisted of six infantry battalions and two weak
cavalry regiments, and was in the spring about 4,500 strong.
They were rightly esteemed the best Spanish troops on the
Eastern front, and justified their reputation in the subsequent
campaign. There was a second Spanish division in the neigh-
bourhood, that of General Roche, which, likc Whittingham's,
had been taken on to the British subsidy, and reclothed and
re-armed. But this unit was not reckoned part of the Alicante
force, but belonged theoretically to Elio's Murcia.n army, in
which it was numbered as the 4th Division. It counted only
five battalions and was at this time not more than 3,500
strong. But though it was registered as part of the Army of
l\Iurcia., it often acted with Murray's Anglo-Sicilian troops.
being ca.ntoned alongside of them in the Alicante region.
When Wellington became Generalissimo of the Spanish armies,
he not infrequently gave orders to Roche to join Murray rather
t.han Elio---apparently conceiving that the fact that the
I 1(10th, 1/27tll, 1/58th, If81rt, llnd 2/27th which callle in timc for
Castalla, also a battalion of grenadier companiC!l of units in Sicily.
• 4th und 6th Line batmlions, 011(1 u light lmttnlioll composed of the
light companies of 3rd, 4th, 6th, 7th, 8th, and of De Roll and Dillon.
• Three companies of De Roli and four of DiIlon-the whole making
up 1Io battalion 800 bayonets and t.he Culnbrecs Free Olrps.
• 1st and 2nd Italian Levy, and two battalions of Sicilian Eatcro
Regiment.
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division lived on the British subsidy had placed it on a some-
what different footing from the rest of the Murcians.
If we count Whittingham and Roche as attached to the
Expeditionary Army at Alicante, the strength of that hetero-
geneous host would have been rather over 21,000 men-a total
perceptibly greater than Suchet's field-force encamped over
against it on the Xucar. And in addition there lay close behind,
within the borders of the kingdom of Murcia, Elio and his
• Second Army,' which, even after deducting Roche's division,
was a considerable accumulation of troops. But the Murcian
army's record was more unhappy than that of any other
Spanish unit, and it had been dashed to pieces once more in
the preceding July, at the discreditable battle of Castalla.
Though it nominally counted 80,000 men in its six divisions,
only three of them were available I, for two were really no
more than the old guerrillero bands of the Empecinndo and
Duran, who hung about in Southern Aragon, and shifted for
themselves. 'fhey were both remote and disorganized. Since
Roche's division was also often out of Elio's control, he really
had no more than lS,OOO infantry and 2,000 horse in hand.
Thcre were facing Suchet, of allied troops of one sort and
another, some S5,OOO men, a fact which the Marshal never
ceased to utilize in his correspondence with Madrid, when he
wished to exeuse himself from lending aid to his neighbours.
But the l\Iurcian army had sl:.ilI not recovered from the demorali-
zation eaused by the battle of Castalla, and the Alicantc army
was suUering from two evils which reduced its value as a
campaigning force to a very low level. The first was a terrible
deficiency of transport. When Lord William Bentinek sent
out the first expeditionary force from Sicily, he intended it to
equip itself with mules, horses, and carts in Spain. But in
the swnmcr of 1812 the Kingdom of Murein was the only
unoccupied region on the east side of the Peninsula, and all its
not too copious resources were wanted for its own army.
Successive captains-general refused, not unnaturally, to help
Maitland or Murray in the task of colleetingsumpter-belUits, and
suggested that thcy ought to draw both animals and food from
I Those of Villacampa. Mijart9, BDd Sarstlcld.
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Sicily. Food was indeed procured from thence, and even from
Algeria and the Levant, so that the army did not starve. But
there was insufficient means to move that food from the
water's edge. A certain number of mules were collected by
paying very heavy hire-not at all to the gratification of the
Spanish authorities, who wanted them for their own use. Dut
they were so few that the Army could make no long generaJ
marches, and could count on little more than what the men
carried in their haversacks. The best that could be done was to
move it forward from the immediate neighbourhood of Alicante,
so that it could Jive upon the resources of the inland, where
there were many fertile and well-peopled valleys. The main
object, indeed, of Jo.mes Campbell's forward move was to get
food for Whittinghum's nnd Roehe's divisions, which were
(though paid by the British subsidy) dependent for their rations
011 the Spanish Covernment, and seldom received them. Local
food for these troops had to be sought, as the only possible
means of keeping them allve. In February the line ofoceupation
reached as far as Biar, Castalla, mid Xixona, all held by
Whittingham's division, while Rocbe and the Anglo-Sicilians
were mostly in second line, at Elda, Monforte, and Aliellntc.
But the problem of making the Anglo-Sicilian army a mobile
force was not much further advanced in March ]813 than it
had been in October 1812.
'rhe second weak point of the Alicante army was the
extremely doubtful quality of some of its foreign elements.
I t is true that the German Legion battnlions were as steady us
those of the same corps in Wellington's own army. But all
the others were crammed with deserters from the enemy's ranks,
or prisoners of war who had enlistcd in order to eseape the
miseries of the prison-camp or the hulks. The' Calabrese Free
Corps' was a trifle bctter·thM the rest, being mostly composed-
of genuine exiles. But the only diUcrenee between the
recent reeruits·oC Dillon's cosmopolitan regiment in the British
service and of the' Italian Levy' and' Estcro regiment' was
that the formereorpseontaincd more Frelleh and Swiss dcserters,
and the latter pair more Italians. All had the usual sprinkling
of Poles, Dutch, Croats, and other miscellaneous adventurers. A
lurid light was thrown upon their possibilities on February 11th,
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when 80 men of the 2nd Italian Levy deserted to the
French lines, bringing over their officer as a prisoner. It was
discovered that the rest of the battalion were in u. plot to betray
Xixona to Suchet, and with it onc of Whittingham's Spanish
regiments, which was encamped beside them. There was just
time to march in the 1/27th and a second Spanish battalion,
who surrounded and disarmcd the Italians, bcfore a French
column appeared at da'Wll. It directed itself to the quarters
from which the traitors had just been drawn oU, was surprised
to be received with a hcavy fire, and rapidly withdrew t. Such
an incident was certainly not calculated to inspire a timid
general, like SirJolm Murray, with any great craving for a bold
offensive.
On the other hand, l\Iurray had a formidable force on paper,
and when Suchet reflected that there lay close behind him, first
RHo's army in :p'Iurcia-at least 13,000 men without countillg
the Empeeinado's and Duran's bands-and farther back Del
Parque's Andnlusian • srd Army,' which had also some 13,000
efrectives, he could not but sce that 50,000 men might march
against his comparatively weak force in Valencin nt nny
moment. His strengthon the Xucar was very modest-not much
over 15,000 buyonets and sabres: for though he had 60,000 men
or all arms cU~tivc, and 75,000 on his rolls, including sick and
detached, yct such a force was not cnough to control the
whole of the ancient lands of the Aragoncse crown-Aragon
Proper, Catalonia, and Valencia. He was in possession of all·
of them save the Catalan inland, where the' First Army' still
maintained itself, the extreme southern region of the Valencian
kingdom round Alicante, and the mountains between Aragon
and Castile, which were the hunting ground of the guerrilleros
of Duran and the Empecinado. 'I'he galTison was small for
such a widespread occupation, and the only thing that made
the Marshal's position tolerable was the fact that (unlike
Catalonia) Aragon and Valencia had shown themselves very
1 For details see'letter of February 22nd in Sir Sllmuel Whittinghnm'$
Memoirs, 1)1). 172-4. He sny~ that Colonel Grant, commanding the 2nd
Italian Levy, had made himself cordilllly detested by his men by •employ-
ing thc minute 'worry of the old British School,' nnd that Dourkc of the
1st Italian Levy had mueh more control over his men.
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, quiet' regions. Suchct's rule had been severe, but at least
orderly; there had been little of the casual plWlder and
requisitioning which made French rule detested under other
commanders. The coast-pla.in of Valencia and the broad
stretch of the Ebro valley in Central Aragon were districts
less suitable for the operations of guerrilleros than almost any
other part of Spain. On the Vo.lcncian frontier there was only
onc active parlida, that of the' Fraile • (Agostin Ncbot), whose
welcome gift of 60 captured French transport mules to the
Alicantcnrmyis acknowledged in onc ofWcllington'sdispntchcs.
It is true that the sub·Pyrcncan parts of Aragon were exposed
to Mina's raids, and that the solid block of sierras round Molioa
and Albaracin was always the refuge of Duran and Villacampa,
but these were not essential regions for the maintenance of the
hold on the Mediterranean coast. With the exception of these
tracts the land was fairly quiet: there was a general submission
to the French yoke, and an appreciable proportion of afrance·
80MS. The blow inflicted on public opinion by the fall of
Valencia in January 1812 was still a recent thing. Wellington's
army had been heard of, hut never seen; and the operations of
the Alienntc expeditionary force had hitherto served to depress
rather than to cncourage insurrection. Hcnce it was possiblc
that 85,000 men could hold the broad lands that lay between
Tudela and Saragossa and Lerida on the North, and Denia and
Xativa on the South-though Decaen's 28,000 had a much
more precarious grip on Catalonia. But the occupation was
a tOUT de force after all, and was liable to be upset at any
moment by an active and capable enemy. Fortunately for
Suehet his opponent on the East Coast during the spring of 1813
was neither active nor capable.
As long as King Joseph kept his head-quarters at Madrid
and occupied the province of La :Mancha, extending his line
eastward to San Clemente, he had been in toueh with Suchet's
front, and communications were open. Indeed Daricau's
division marched to the borders of Valencia in the end of
January, and took over from the Marshal the large body of
Spanish refugees and convalescents of the Army of the South,
who bad been under his charge sinee October. Dut the whole
situation was changed. when the orders of the Emperor compelled
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Joseph to draw back his head-quarters to Valladolid, and to
hold Toledo as his extreme post towards the South. When this
change was made, the touch between Valencia and Madrid was
lost-the Spanish cavalry of the Army of Andalusia advanced
across the Sierra l'tIorena into La l\lancha : ViIlacampa's division
descended from the hills to occupy the more lcvel parts of the
province of Cuenca. For the future the King and Suchet could
only keep touch with each other by the circuitous route through
Saragossa. The situation of the French Army of Valencia was
rendered far more isolated and dangerous-it was in a very
advanced position, with no communication whatever with any
friendly foree saVe through Aragon. And its inland flank was
exposed to all manner of possible molestation-if ViUacampa,
Durnn, and the Empecinado had represented a serious fighting
force, capable of regular action in the field, Suehet would have
been bound to retire at once to the line of the Ebro, on pain of
finding himself surrounded and cut orr. But these irregular
, divisions' of the Army of Mureia were, as a matter of fact,
good for raids and the cutting of' communications, but useless
for battle. They were local in their operations, seldom com-
bined, and only obeyed their nominal commander, Elio, when
it pleased them. It was very hnrd for anyone of them to move
fo.r from its accustomed' beat,' because they had no magazines,
and lived each on their own region.
Suchet accordingly resolved to try the hnzardous experiment
of preserving his old positions, even when commwlication with
Madrid had been cut off. He left on his inland Hank only a
flying brigade or two, and the normal garrisons of the small
fortified towns of upper Aragon, llnd kept his main striking
force still concentrated on the line of the Xucar, in order to
cover the plain of Valencia from the one serious enemy, the
Alicante army. The available troops consisted of the three
small infantry divisions of Habcrt, Barispc, and Musnicr (tills
last temporarily WIder Robert), and the cavalry division of
Bpussard, the whole amounting to about 12,500 foot and
1,500 horse. or a gross total oC all arms of some 15,000 men.
They were disposed so as to cover the front of 50 miles from
AIoxente, at the foot of the Murdan mowltains, to the mouth
of the Xucar, and were not scattered in small parties, but
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concentrated in four groups which could casily unite. The right
wing was covered by an entrenched camp at Moxentc, the centre
by another at San Felipe de Xll.tiva. Denia on the sea-ooast was
held ns a cover to the left wing. Cavalry was out in front, and
in a rather exposed position a brigade of Habert's division held
Alcoy, a considerable town in a fertile upland valley, whose
resources Suchet was anxious to retain as long as possible.
Soon after he had taken over command at Alicantc on
February 25th, Murrayobtained accurate local information as
to the exact distribution and numbers of the French, and
noting the very exposed position of the brigade at Alooy, made
an attempt to cut it off by the concentric advance of four
columns. The scheme failed, partly because of the late atl"ival
of the right-hand column (a brigade of Whittinghnm's division),
partly because Murray, having got engaged with the French
in front, refused to support his advanced troops until the
flanking detachments should appear, and so allowed the en~my
to slip away (March 6th) 1. He then hultcd, tbough his move-
ment must obviously have roused Suchct's attention, and
rendered a counter-attack possible. But after a week, finding
the enemy still passive, he sent forward Whittingbam to driver
the French outposts from Ctmscntaina, and tllC pass of
Albeyda, in thc mountain range which separates the valley
of Alcoy from the lowland. This was to ask for trouble, and
should only have been done if Murray was proposing to
challenge Suchet to n decisive general action: Whittingham
indeed thought that this was the object of his commandhw
officer 2. At the same time two British bnttalions under
General Donkin made a demonstration against the French right,
ten miles fnrther east, in the direction of Ontemente. Habert,
whose whole division was holding the line of hills. gave way
after n sharp skirmish, and allowed Whittingham to seize the
pnss of Albeyda (March 15th). Everyone supposed that the
Alieante army was now about to attack the French main
position between Moxente and Xativa.
, MUlTl1y to Wellington. Supplemenlary DUpare/leB, xiv. p. 191.
• Sce his letter of Mnreh 19th, written after the skimlish: 'Our army
is concentrating itself, and a few days I hope will bring on a general actioll.
ilL which f hope to Illny my pllrt ' (Memoirs, p. 188).
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But Murray's plan was different: having, as he supposed,
attracted Suehet's full notice, by his forward movement, 'he was
proposing to send out an expedition by sea, to make a dash
at the town of Valencia, which (ns he calculated) must be
under-garrisoned whcn heavy fighting wns expected on the
Xuear. He told off for the purpose Roche's Spanish division,
strengthencd by the British provisiono.1 battalion of grenadier
companies and a rcgimcnt borrowcd from Elio. The orders
were to land on the beach south of the city, make a dnsh for it,
and if that failed to seize Cullera at the mouth of the Xuear,
or Denia, farther down thc coast. The projcct looked hazardous,
for to throw 5,000 meIl ashore in the enemy's country, far from
their own main body, was to risk their bcing cut up, or forced
to a rc-embarkation on a bare beach, which could not fail to be
costly. Unless l\[urray at the same moment attacked Suchet,
so that he should not be able to send a man to the rear towards
Valencia, the force embarked was altogcthertoo small. l\Iurray's
calculation was that the Marshal would make a heavy detach-
ment, and that he would then attaek the line of the Xucar
himself. With this object be invited Elio to co-operate, by
turning the French right on the inland on the side of Almam.a.
The Spanish General, though he had been quarrelling with
Murray of late, was now in an obliging frame of mind 1 and so
fo.r consented that he brought up one infantry division to
Ycclo., a place which would make a good starting·point for t\
flank march round the extreme right of Suehet's positions.
:Meanwhile, for ten days after tile combat of Albeyda
nothing happened on the main front. WhittinghtlJ.n waS stiJlleft
in an advanced position north of Alcoy, while the rest of thc
Alieantc army was concentrated at Castalla fifteen miles
farther baek. The marvel is that Suehet did not makc u
pounce upon the isolated Spanish division pushed up so elQsc
to his front. He had not yet takcn thc measure of his opponent,
whose funing (us the whole campaign shows) was to start
schemes, and then to abandon them from irresolution, at tile
critical moment when a decisive move became necessary.
. Meanwhile, on March 26th Rochc'l> divilOion and the attached
British battalion wcre actually embarking at Alicante, for' the
I J\turray to Wellington. Supplementary Di&palche$, xiv. p. ~>otJ.
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dash at Valencia, when Murray received a dispatch from Lord
William Bcntinck at Palcrmo, informing him that a political
crisis had broken out in Sicily, that civil strife there had become
probable. and that he was therefore compelled to order the
immediate recall of two regiments of trustworthy troops from
Spain. The fuet was that the new Sicilian constitution, pro-
claimed as the solution of all discontent in the island in 1812,
hOO failed to achieve its purpose. The old King Fcrdinund had
carried out a sort of mild coup eNtal, and proclaimed bis own
restoration to absolute power (March 18th, 1813) : the Neapoli-
tan troops who formed the majority of the armed force in the
island had accepted the position. The Sicilian constitutional
party seemed helpless, and the attitude of the local battalions
under their control was doubtful. Nothing could save the
situation but a display of overpowering force. Wherefore
Bentinek directed Murray to send back to Palermo, without
delay, the 6th Line battalion K.G.L. and the battalion of
grenadier companies belonging to British regiments still
quartered in Sicily. This was not a very large order, so far us
mere numbers went-the force requisitioned being under
2,000 bayonets. But the prospect of the outbreak of civil war
in Sicily scared l\Iurray-if the strife once began, would not
more of his best troops be requisitioned, and the Alicante force
be reduced to a residuum of disloyal foreign levies? Moreover,
one of the units requisitioned by name was the battalion of
grenadiers just about to sail for Valencia. Perhaps not without
seeret satisfaction, for he hated making decisions of any sort,
Murray declared that Bentinek's orders rendered the naval
expedition impossible, and countermanded it. He sCDt off, on
the transports ready i.n harbour, the grenadier battalion
ordered to Sicily, and returned the Spa.nish contingent to its
old cantonments 1. The K.G.L. ba.ttalion was just embarking
a Nupier blames the British Government for llfl,viug got thiugs inw such
a position 01 double command that Bcntinek could withdraw lrom Spain
troops which he had &ent there, and which had passed under Wellington's
l\uthority (v. I). 54). Wellington seems to have nmde 110 objection to this
particula~ recall (Dispatche,. vii. p. 260), thinking (I suppose) that the risk
of losing Sicily was much more &erious than the deduction of 2,000 men
froan the Alicallte side-show. He wrote at nny rote t-o Murrny to &end them
or! at once, it he had not done so alread)·. 'I'he fault, 01 COUl'lIC. Iny with
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when news a.rrived (April 1st) that the Sicilian crisis Wns now
over, wherefore 1tIurray retained it for 1\ few marc days 1.
For the counter-revolution at Palermo had only msted for
four days I Finding Lord WilIiam Bentinck firm, and prepared
to use force, King Ferdinand withdrew his proclamation, and
resigned the administration inw the hands of his eldest son,
the Prince Royal. The Queen, whose strong wi.ll had set the
whole affair on foot, promised to return to her native Austria"
and actually sailed for the Levant, to the intense satisfaction
of every one save the knot of intriguers in her Court. The
scare was soon over-its only result was the abandonment of
the raid on Vnlencia. l\1urray had now received orders from
Wellingwn to await the arrival of a detailed scheme for the
way in which his anny was to be employed. Pending the
receipt of these 2 directions he lapsed into absolute torpidity-
the only rccord of his doings in the last days of March and
early April being that he set the troops concentrated at Castolll\
to entrenching the hillsides around that formidable position-
a clear sign that he had no further intention of taking the
oUensive on his own account.
Suehet had been much puzzled by the advance of his enemy
10 Alcoy and Albeyda, followed by subsequent inactivity for
a whole month. When he found that cven the movcmcnt of
Elio's troops to Yecla did not foreshadow a gencral assault upon
his lines, he concluded that there must be some unexplained
reason for the quiescence of the Allies, and that the opportunity
was a good onc for a bold blow, while they remained inexplicably
waiting in a disjointed and unconcentratcd line opposite his
positions. The obvious and easy thing would have been to fall
upon Whittingham at Alcoy, but probably for that very reason
the Marshal tried another scheme. He secretly passed all his
available troops to Fuente la Higuera, on his extreme right
flank, leaving only a triAing screen in front of Murray's army,
and on April loth marched in two columns against the allied
Bcntinek, for denuding Sicily before he was SUl'c of the stability of the new
Constitution.
, Murray to Wellington, April 2. SUPl)1emtmtary Di$palclte8, vii. p. 605.
The 6th K.G.L. was prescnt at Castalla on April 13th.
, Wellington, Di8palclle8, x. p. 1112.
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left. One consisting of six battalions of Harispc's division an~
two cavalry regiments aimed at the isolated Mureian division
at Yeela, the other and larger eolumn four battalions of Habert's
division, and seven of Musnier's (under Robert during the
absence of its proper chief),with his cuirassier regiment, marched
by Caudete on ViUena, to cut in between the Spaniards and
Murray, and intercept any aid which the latter might send from
Castalla towards the Spaniards.
The blow was unexpected and delivered with great vigour:
Harispe surprised General Mijares' Murcians at Yec1a at dawn;
they were hopelessly outnumbered, only fOUf battalions being
present-the fifth unit of the division was at Villena. And
there was but a single squa.dron with them, Elio's cavalry being
in its cantonments thirty miles away in the Albacete-Chinchilla
country. Mijares, on finding himself assailed by superior
numbers, tried to march ort towardsJumilla and thc mountains.
Harispe pursued, and seeing the Spaniards likely to get away,
for the retreat was rapid and in good order, flung his hussars
and dragoons at them. TheSpaniards turned up on to l\ hillside,
and tried a running fight. The two leading bnttalions of the
column made good their escape-the two rear battalions were
cut off: they formed square, beat back two charges with
resolution, but were broken by the third, and absolutely
exterminated: 400 werc cut dOVi"ll, about 1,000 captured.
or these two unlucky regiments, lst of Burgos and Cadiz,
hardly a. man got away-the other two, Jaen and Cuenca,
took little harm 1. The French lost only 18 killed and 61
wounded, mostly in the two cavalry regiments, for Harispe's
infantry were but slightly engaged.
III news "ies quickly-the fighting had been in the early
dawn, by noon mounted fugitives had brought the tidings to
Villena, fifteen miles away. Here there chanced to be present
both Elio and Sir John Murray, who had ridden over to consult
with his eollengue on a rumour that Suehet was concentrating
at Fuente la Higuera. Hc had brought with him the' light
I Tile best Recount of all this from the Spllllish point of view Is a dispatch
written by Colonel Potons y lIIoxiea, BHo's chief of the staff, in the Record
OJnoo, • East COMt of Spain' file. It is equally vahmule for the b<'\ttle of
Castalla.
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brigade,' under Colonel Adam, which he hadrcccntJyorganizcd I,
and 400 horse 2. The Gcnernls soon learned that beside the
force which had cut up Mijares, there was a larger column
marelting on their own position. They were in no condition
to offer battle, Elio having with him only a single battalion,
Uurray about 2,500 men of all arms. They agreed that they
must quit ViIlena nnd concentrate their troops for a defensive
action. Elio sent orders to his cavalry to come in from the
North and join thc wrecks of JUjjarcs' division, and for the
reserves which hc had got in the neighbourhood of Murein to
murch up to the front 3. But it would obviously tu.ke some
days to collect these scattered items. Meanwhile he threw the
single battalion that he had with him (Vclez Malaga) into the
castle of VilIena, which had becn patehcd up and put into a
state of defence, promising that it should bc relieved when hi~
army was concentrated.
:Murray, on the other hand, retired towards his main body at
Castalla, but ordered Adam's 'light brigade' to defend the
pass of Biar for as long as prudence permitted, so as to alIow
the rest of the army to get into position. Whittingham was
directed to fall back from Aleoy, Roche to comc up from the
rear, and by the next evening the whole Alicantc army would
be concentrated, in a position whieh had been partly entrenched
during the last three weeks, and was very strong even without
fortification. l\Iurray refuscd (very wisely) to send back Adam
to pick up the Spanish battalion left in ViUena, which Elio
(seized with doubts when it was too late) now wished to with-
draw.
Suchct reachcd ViIlena on the evening of the 11th, and got
in touch with the cavalry screen covering Adam's retrent.
Finding the castle held, he started to bombard it with his field
artiUery, aud on the morning of the 12th blcw in its gates and
, Consisting of 2j27th British, Calabresc Frec Corpll, 1st Itnlhm Levy,
llntl the riOe companies of around 8th K.G.L.
• Two squadrons 20tb Light Drngoollll, the troop of Foreign Hussars,
and. some of WhittinglUlm's Spaniards, two 6l1uadrons of Olivenza.
• I dn 1I0t know who WlU:l commanding this division (ard of the l'tIurcillll
army) in April: its divisional gellcral, Sanslkld, was absent. It included
Bailen, Dadajoz, America, Alpujarras, Corollll, and Guadix : O'Ronan had
it iD the preceding autumn.
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offered to storm. He scnt in II parlementaire to summon the
garrison, and to his surprise it capitulated without firing a shot
-a mutiny having broken out among the men I, who considered
that they had bccn deserted by their General. Suchct now
intended to fall all Murray at Castalla, reckoning that Elio'l;
concentration had been prevented by the blows at Yecla. and
Villena, and that he would have the AJicante army alone to
deal with. He ordered the troops that were with him to drive
in without delay Adam's light brigade, which his cavalry had
discovered holding the village of Biar and the pass above it.
His other column, that of Un-rispe, was not far off, being 011
the march from Yccm. Finding that it was gone, Mijarcs
cautiously rcoccupi<..-d that place with his two surviving
battalions.
The combat of Biar, which filled thc midday hours of
April 12th, was onc of the most creditable rearguard actions
fought during the whole Peninsular War. Colonel Adam had
only one British and two Italian battalions, with two Gennan
Legion rifle companies, four mountain guns, and one squadron
of the' Foreign Husstu'S '-about 2,200 men in all. He had
prepared 0. series of positions on which he intended to faU back
in succession, as cach was forced. At the commencement of
the action hc occupied Biar village with the Calabrcse Free
Corps, Oanked by the light companies of the 2/27th and
Srd K.G.L. The rest of the brigade was above, on the hills
. Oanking thc pass, with the guns on the high road. The leading
French battalion assaulted the barricaded village, and was
repulsed with heavy loss. Then, as was expected, the enemy
turned Biar on both flanks: its garrison retired unharmed,
but the turning columns came under the accurate fire of the
troops on the slopes above, and the attack was again checked.
Suchet, angered at the waste of time, then threw in no less than
, Potorn y l\Ioxica's dispatch sa)1i that 'la entwga del castillo provino
dc una especic de scdiclon cn la trolla de Velcz Malaga,' which is conclusive.
Why Nllpicr (v. 57) cullll Vclez ~lulugu 'the finest regimClit ill \he Spunillh
army' I cannot conccive. It was one of O'OonnclI's old regiments, cut to
!lieeesat Castnlla in the preceding July, and hastily filled up with dmfts.
I suspect Umt Nupier is parllllhrnsing Suchet.'s dCti(lription of this corps all
'mille hommcs dc belles troupes.' Except that thcy had been recentJy
reelothed from the British subsidy, there was nothing' fine' about them.
•
U1I3] COMBAT OF ElAll 289
nine battalions 1 intending to sweep away all opposition, and
turning Adam's lcft flank with swarms of voltigcurs. The
Light Brigade had, of course, to retire; but Adam conducted
his retreat with great deliberation and in perfect order, fending
otI thc turning attaek with his German and British light
companies, and making the eolumn on the high road pay very
dearly for eaeh furlong gained. His four mountain guns, on
the erest of the pass, were worked with good effect to the last
moment-two which had each lost a. wheel were abandoned
on the btI'ound. When the erc~t had been passed, Suchet sent
a squadron of euirassier~ to charge down the road on the
retreating infantry. Foreseeing this, when the cavalry had
been noted on the ascent, Adam had hidden three companies
of the 2/27th in rocks .where the road made a sharp angle:
the cuirassicrs, as they trotted past, received a flank volley at
ten paces distance, whieh knocked over man.y, !\nd sent the
rest reeling back in disorder on to their own infantry. After
this the pursuit slackened; • the enemy seemed glad to be
rid of us,' and after five hours' fighting the Light Brigade
marched back in perfect order to the position beside Castalla
whieh had been assigned to it 2. Its final retirement was
covered by three battalions which Murray had sent out to
meet it, at the exit from the pass 3. ,
So ended a very pretty fight. Whittingham, who had
witnessed the later phases of it from the hill on the left of
Castalla, describes it as • a beautiful field-day, by alternate
battalions: the volleys were admirable, and the successive
passage of several ravines condueted with perfect order and
steadiness. From the heights occupied by my troops it was
one of the most delightful paDoramns that I ever beheld.' The
I In his own nurrative he >laYS that he liCnt ill the ht Iilld 3rd Uger,
14th, 114th, and 12bt Line-a big deployment of foroe/; .
• The best account of the eombat of Biar is that of the auonymous offioor
of the 2f27th, quoted at length by 'frimble ill his I14wry fJ! tJui. blfli8/,:iUill8
Re8imrn" pp. 61-2. See also the less trustworthy Lsndllheit (of the' l?oreign
Hussars '), ii. pp. 86-1).
• De RoIl·Dillon, 8ht. IlDd one of WhitLingham'll SplLllish battalions.
They had some casualties-the Spaniards 20, De RoIl-DilIon probably 25 :
its total casualty list for the days April 12-13 of 34 cannot be divided
between the two actions.
u
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allied loss was about 300 1, including Colonel Adam wounded
in the arm, yet not so much hurt but that he kept the command
and gavc directions to the cnd. On the ground cvacuated
41 • missing' and two disabled mountain guns were left in the
cncmy's hands. Thc Frcnch must havc suffered much the
same casualties-Suchet gives no estimate, but Martinien's
invaluable lists show two officers killcd and twelve wounded,
which at the usual r~te between officers and men implies about
800 rank and file hit.
On emerging from the pass of Biar in the late afternoon
Suehet could see Murray's army occupying a long front of
high ground as far as the town of CastaUa, but eould descry
neither its encampment, behind the heights, nor the end of its
right wing, which was thrown back and hidden, by the high
conical hill on which the castle and church of Castalla stand.
Seeing the enemy ready, and apparently resolved to fight, the
Marshal put off serious operations to the next day. He had to
wait for Harispe's column, which was still coming up many
miles in his rear.
Murray had long surveyed his ground, and had (as we have
seen) thrown up barricades and entrenchments on the hill of
Castalla and the ground immediately to its right and left.
He had very nearly every available man of his army in hand,
only a minimum garrison having been left in Alicante 2. The
total cannot have been less than 18,000 men; he had divided
his own troops into the Light Brigade of Adam, and the two
divisions of l\Iackenzie and CHnton. The first named had
three and a quarter battalions-not quite 2,000 men after its
I It is impossible to disentangle the losses of Adam's brigade on April 12
Knd April 18, given togetJler in Murruy's report. But on the second day
the 2/27th regiment WaIJ the only unit seriously engaged. The rotal for
both days was killed I officer and !iG men, wounded 10 olliocrs lIond 231 men,
mi!:lSing 152 men: or a rotal of 330. If we dedud 40 for assumed losses of
the 2j27th on the !lCcond day, and 30 more for casuallO!lllCs of the other
units on April lS-they were engaged but not seriously_nd add 29 for
1000ses in Whittingham's buttulioll (he gives the figure llimseln and 25
(including 9 missing) for those in Dc UolI-DilIon (which was barely under
fire on the seoond day and lost Mo altogether), we must conclude that the
total W\l.8 very clO/lC to 800.
• The light CQmpany 7th K.G.L., two newly arrived squadrons of
Brunswick Hussars, lIond two batteries.
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losses at Biar on the previous afternoon 1. Mackenzie seems
to have had one British, two German Legion, and two Sicilian
battalions 2: CHnton three British, one composite Foreign, and
one Italian battalion 3. Whittingham had six Spanish hatta-
lions with him 4.-Roche only five 5. The cavalry consisted of
three squadrons of the 20th Light Dragoons, two of Sicilian
cavalry, one of' Foreign Hussars,' and about 400 of Whitting-
ham's Spanish horse 8, under 1,000 sabres in all. There were
two British, two Portuguese, and a Sicilian battery on the ground.
The sierra on the left, known as the heights of Guerra. was
held by Whittillgham's Spaniards for a mile, next them came
Adam's brigade, above a jutting iipur whieh projects from the
sierra towards the plain, then Mackenzie's division, whieh
extended as far as the hill on which the castle of Castalla
stands: this was occupied by the 1/58th of Clillton's division,
and two batteries had been thrown up on the slope. With this
hill the sierra ends suddenly j but a depression and stream
running southward furnished a good protection for Murray's
right, which was held by thc rest of CtintoD's division. The
stream had been dammed up, and formed a broad morass covering
a considerable portion of the front. Behind it Clinton's troops
were deployed, with three of Roche's battalions as a reserve
in their rear: two batteries were placed on commanding knolls
in this part of the line, which was so far thrown back en potence
that it was almost at right angles to the front occupied by
Mackenzie, Adam, and Whittingham. The Spanish and Sicilian
cavalry was thrown out as a screen in front of Castalla. with two
of Roche's battalions in support. The 20th Light Dragoons were
in reserve behind the town. The east end of the sierra, near
Castalla, was covered by vineyards in step-cultivation, each en-
1 2f27th, Calubn::se }<'rce Corpli, 1st Italian Levy, two light companies
K.G.L.
• If27th,4th and 6th K.G.L., • Estero' regiment (two ulltt:llions).
I IflOth, lj58th, 1/81~t British, composite battalion or Dc RoII-Dillon,
2nd Italian Levy.
• Cordoba, lUallorca, Guadalajara, 2nd or Burgos, 2nd or lUurcia,
5th Grenadiel'll.
I Chinchilla, Canari~, Alicantc, Cazadon::s de Valencia, Voluntarios de
Aragon.
• T....o squadrons each or Qlive/1,.,a and Almlln7.a.
U2
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closure a few feet higher than the next below it. Farther west
there was only rough hillside, below Whittingham's front. The
wholc position was excellent-yet Murray is said by his
Quartermaster-General, Donkin, to have felt so ull(''OlUfortab1e
that he thrice contemplated issuing orders for a retreat,
though he could see the whole lrench army, and judge that
its strength was much less than his own 1. But he distrusted
both himself and many battalions of his miscellaneous l~rmy.
Suchet, contrary to his wont, was slow to net. It is said
that he disliked the look of the position, and doubted the
wisdom of attacking, but was over-persuaded by some of his
generals, who urged that the enemy was a mixed multitude,
and that thc Spaniards and Sicilians would never stand against
a resolute attack. It was not till noon that the Freneh army
moved-the first manceuvre was that the whole 01' the cavalry
rode out eastward, took position opposite the Mgle en potena
of l\1urray's position, and sent exploring parties towards
CUnton's front. Evidently thc report was that it was inacces-
sible. While tltis was happening the infantry deployed, and
Habcrt's and Robert's division advanced and occupied a low
ridge, called the Cerro dcl Doncel, in the plain facing Murray's
left and left-centre. Harispe's division, minus a detachment
left behind the pass ofBiar to watch for any possible appearance
of Elio's troops on the road from Sax, formed in reserve. l'he
whole of Suchet's infantry was only 18 battalions, individually
weaker than Murray's 24; he was outnumbered in guns also
-24 to 80 apparently-but his 1,250 cavalry were superior
in numbers and quality to Murray's. He had certainly not
more than lS,OOO men on the ground to the Allics' 18,000.
His game was to leave Clinton's division and Castl:l.lla alone,
watched only by his cavalry; to contain Mackenzie by demon-
strations, which wcrc not to be pushed home; but to strike
heavily with Robert's division at the Spaniards on the left.
If he could break down Whittingham's defcnce, and drive him
of! the sierra, he would attack the allied centre from flank and
front alike-but meanwhile it was not to be pressed. When,
therefore, Habert faced Mackenzie nothing serious happened,
• Napier, v. 58, quoting Donkill I\JSS., which are unllublished und
unfindable.
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the French sent out swarms of tirailleurs, brought up eight
guns and shelled the position with grape. Mackenzie's light
companies and guns replied, • but there was nothing more than
a skirmish: the columns shifted their ground indeed more
than once, but they did not deploy, and their officers took good
care not to bring them under the fire of our line].'
On the left, however, there was hard fighting. Suehet first
sent out five light companies to endeavour to turn the extreme
western end of Whittingham's line, and, when they were far
up the slope, delivered a frontCLl attack on the heights of Guerra
with six battalions of Uobert's division: the Srd Leger and
114th and 121st Line 2: of these the left-hand battalions
(belonging to the 121st) came up the projecting spur mentioncd
above, o.nd faced the 2/21th on the left of Adam's brigade.
The other four were opposed to the Spaniards.
Whittingham was caught in a rather dangerous position, for
a little while before the attack developed, he had received an
order from hcad·quarters bidding him execute against Robcrt's
division precisely the same manceuvre that Suehct was trying
against himself, viz. to send troops to outflank the extreme
FI"cneh right. He was told by the bearer of thc orders, a Sicilian
colonel, that this was preliminary to a general attack downhill
upon the French line, which ]\{urray was intending to carry out.
The Spanish division was to turn its flank, whilc Adam and
Mackenzie went straight at its front. There is some mystery
here-Murray afterwards denied to Whittingham that he had
given any such order 3, and Donkin, his Chief of the Staff,
maintaincd that his general was thinking of a. retreat all that
morning rather than of an attack. Yet Colonel Catanelli was
a respectable officer, who was thanked in dispatches both by
Murray and Whittingham for his services I Three hypotheses
suggest themflelves: (1) that Morray at one moment meditated
an attack, because he flaw Suchet holding back, and then (with
his usual infirmity of purpose) dropped the idea, and denied
, Landslldt, H. p. 91.
t Suehetsays that to support the Yoltigeurs he sent in only four batt3Jions
of the ard U-ger allll 121st-bllt ffi(lf;t undOUbtedly the 114tll attacked also.
for it lost four olllccl'll killed nnd nine wounded, as many 119 the ard Uger.
and this means 200 casualties at leMt in the rank and me.
• Whittingharo, Memoir,. p. ]07.
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having made any such plan to Whittingham, whose position
had been gravely imperilled by its execution. This is quite in
accordance with his mentality, and he often tampered with
the truth-as we shall see when telling the tale of Tarragona.
(2) That Donkin and the head·quarters staff, enraged with
Murray's timidity, were resolved to commit him to a fight, and
gave unauthorjzed orders which must bring it on. (3) That
Catanelli, from lack of a good command of English, misunder-
stood the General's language, and gave complete misdirections
to Whittingham. I must confess that I incline to the first
solution I.
Whatever the source of these orders may have been, Whitting-
ham began to carry them out, though they seemed to him very
ill-advised. But noting that if he completely evacuated the
heights of Guerra there would be a broad gap in the allied
line, he left his picquets in position and two battalions on the
crest of the hill 2, with another in support behind 3, while
with the remaining three 4 he moved off to the left. The
march was executed, out of sight of the enemy, by a mountain
path which ran along the rear of the heights.
Whittingnam had been moving for some half an hour, and
slowly, for the path was steep and narrow, when the sound
of muske1;ry on the other side of the crest reached his ears, and
soon after a message that the cnemy was attacking the whole
of the front of his old position. On its left the voltigeur com-
panies had got very near the top of the hill-farther east the
assault was only developing. It was lucky that the marching
column had not gone far-Whittingham was able to send his
hindmost battalion straight up the hill against the voltigeurs,
to strengthen his flank-with the other two he counter-marched
to the rear of the heights of Guerm, and fed the fighting line
which he had left there, as each point needed succour.
The contest all along the heights was protracted and fierce.
At several points the French reached the crest, but were never
I .Mr. Forte1'cue (British Army, ix. p. 4..'l) seems rather to lean to the idea
that tbe staff, or at (my rate Catrmelli, resolved to force l'IIurl'lly to. fight
despite or himself. This may have been the case.
1 Cordoba Ilnd 2nd· or Burgos. • Guadalajara•
• Murcia, Majorcn, and 5th Grenadiers.
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able to maintain themselves there, as Whittingham had always
a reserve of a few companies ready for a counterstroke. 'fhe
troops of the Army of Aragon had never before met with such
opposi~on from Spaniards, and for a long time refused to own
themselves beaten. There was still one regiment of Robert's
division in reserve I, hut evidently Suchet shrank from com-
mitting the last fraction of his right wing to the attack, which
was obviously not making any decisive headway.
Meanwhile the easternmost column of the French advance
suffered a complete defeat: this body, composed of two battalions
of the 121st regiment, had mounted the heights, not at their
steepest, but at the point where a long projecting spur falls
down from them into the plain. But even so there was a
sudden rise in the last stage of the ascent, before the crest was
reached. On coming to it the French colonel (l\lillet by name)
began to deploy his leading companies, which found themselves
opposite the 2/27th, on the left of Adam's brigade. This
manreuvre had always failed when tried against British
infantry-notably at Albuera, for deployment at close quarters
under the deadly fire of a British line was impracticable, and
always led to confusion. There was a pause 2, many casualties,
and much wavering; then, seeing the enemy stationary and
discouraged, Colonel Reeves flung his battalion at them in
a downhill bayonet charge-like Crauford at Bussaoo. The
effect was instantaneous and conclusive-the French column
broke and raced headlong down the slopes, arriving in the
valley as a disorganized mob. It had lost 19 officers and
probably 350 men in five minutes.
Either in consequence of this rout, or by mere chance at the
'Ist Uger, in reserve on the Cerro del Donee!.
• During which oceun:ed the dromntic duel in front of tile line between
Captain Waldron and a Freneh Grenadier offie'er mentioned in Napier,
v. p. 59. The picturesqueness of the story induced some critics to doubt
it. But there Is no getting over the fact that Waldron gave his opponent's
weapon, which was a sword of honour presented by the Emperor, to the
Quartermaster-General (Donkin), who forwarded it to the Duke of York,
and the Commander-in-Chie! gazetted Waldron to a brevet-majority in
consequence. (Sce Trimble's Historirol &rord of tM 27th, p. M.) It .i8
extremely odd (as Arteche remarks) that Suehet in his short and insincere
account of Castnlla tells a story of a Frtmh officcr who killed an English
officer in single combat (Mbm»TU, ii. p. 308).
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same moment 1, the columns which had been assailing 'Vhitting.
ham so long and ineffectively, also recoiled in disorder before
a charge of the last four companies of the Spanish reserve.
The whole of the French right wing had suffered complete
and disastrous defeat. The left division, I-Iabert's, was still
intact and had never committed itself to any serious approach
to Mackenzie's front. But six of the eighteen French battalions
in the field were in absolute rout at half-past fOUf o'clock, and
Suchct's right wing was completely exposed-his cavalry were
two miles away to the left, and out of reach for the moment.
All eye-witnesses agree that ifMurrayhad ordered an immediate
general advance of the line from Castalla westward. the Marshal
would have been lost, and cut oU from his sole line of retreat
on the pass of Biar. l'tlurray, however, refused to move till
he had brought up his unengo.ged right wing to act as a reserve,
and only when they had rued up through the streets of Castalla,
gave the order for the whole army to descend from the heights
and push forward.
It was far too late: Suchet had retreated from the Cerro del
Doncel the moment that he saw his attack repulsed, Habert's
division and the guns covering Robert's routed wing. The
cavalry cnme galloping back from the east, and long before
Mortay was deployed, Suehct took up a new and narrow front
covering. the entry of the pass of Biar. The only touch with
his retreating force was kept by lIIackenzie, who (contrary to
Murray's intention) pushed forward with four of his battalions
in front of the main body, and got engaged with Suchet's rear-
guard. He might probably have beaten it in upon the disordered
troops behind, if he had not received stringent orders to
draw back and fall in to the general front of advance. By the
time that the whole allied army was deployed, the French, save
a long line of guns across the mouth of the pass, with infantry
on thc slopes on each side, had got off. Thereupon, after
making a feeble demonstration with somc light companies
against the cnemy's left Oank, Murray halted for the night.
The enemy used the hours of darkness to make a forced march
for Fuente la Higuera, and were invisible next day.
1 I am inclined to think the latter. llS it is doubtful whether, ....ith the
spur bet....een. Adflln's flghting.ground was visible from \Vhittingham's.
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Suchet declared that he had lost no more than 800 men in
the three' combats of Yecla, Biar, and Castalla, an incredible
statement, as the French casualty rolls show 65 officers killed
and wounded on the llth-12th-13th of April; and such a loss
implies 1,300 rank and file hit-possibly more, certainly not
many less. It is certain that his 800 casualties will not suffice
even for Castalla alone, where with 47 officers hws de combat he
must have lost more probably 950 than 800 men. But the
14 officer-casualties at Biar imply another 280 at the least, and
we know from his own narrative that he lost 4 officers and
80 men in destroying Mijares' unfortunate battalions at. Yeela 1.
Murray, writing a most magniloquent and insincere dispatch
for Wellington's eye, declared that Suehet had lost 2,500 or
even 8,000 men, and that he had buried 800 French corpses.
But l\Iurray had apparently been taking lessons in the school
of Soult and 1\lassena, those great manipulators of casualty
lists! His dispatch was so absurd that Wellington rcfused to
be impressed, and sent on thc document to Lord Bathurst
with the most formal request that the attention of the Prince
Regent should be drawn to the conduct of the Gelleral and his
troops, but no word of praise of his own 2. The allied loss,
indeed, was so moderate that l\1urray's 2,500 French casualties
appeared incredible to everyone. After we have deducted the
heavy losses to Adam's brigade at Biar on the preceding day,
we find that Whittingham's Spaniards had 283 casualties,
.Mackenzie's division 47, Clinton's about 20, Adam's brigade
perhaps 70, the cavalry and artillery 10 altogether~thc total
making some 400 in all 3.
Having discovered that the Alicante army was formidable,
if its general was not, Suchet was in some fear that he might
find himself pursued and attacked, for the enemy seemed to
1 'faking Murray'lI casualty list tor comparison with Suchct's, wc Dnd
that he had 4 officers kiUed and 16 wounded to 640 men at Diar and
Casto.lla, i.e. 1 oiflcer to }l2 mell. But this WOS Oil eXCCIJtiollally low
proportion of olllceI'li Io>st. At such a mte Suchet might have lost 2,000
men I I tuke 1,300 3S 3 rllir estimute.
• cr. Wellington, Dispmclles, x. pp. ;I,"l.---5, in which Wellington llsks
what sort of a vi(..otQry was it, if Suehet WlIS able to hold the pass of Biar,
only two miles from the battle.field, till nightfall ?
• See Appendix on Castulla losses, English and French, at t.he end of
the volume.
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be concentrating against him. Murray advanced once more
to Alcoy, Elio brought up his reserve division Md his cavalry
to join the wrecks of Mijarcs' column, u.nd extended himself
on l\:[urray's left. ViIlacarnpa, called down from the hills,
appeared on the Upper Guadalllviar on the sidc of Rcquciia.
But all this meant nothing-Murray was well satisfied to ha"e
won a success capable of being well' written up' at Ca.stalla,
and covered his want of initiative by complaining that he was
short of transport, and weakened in numbers-for after the
battle he had sent off the 6th K.G.L. to Sicily, in belated obedi-
ence to Dentinck's old orders. He asked 'Wellington for more
men and more guns, and was given both, for he was told that
he might draw the 2j01th from the garrison of Cartagena J, and
was sent tl field battcry from Portugal. But his true purpose
was now to wait for thc arrival of the promiscd • plan of
campaign' from Freneda, and thereby to shirk all personal
responsibility. Anything was better than to risk a eheck-or
a reprimand from the caustic pen of the Commander-in-Chief.
Sucbet, then, drew down Paunetier's brigade from Aragon
to strengthen his position on the Xuear, and waited, not alto-
gether confidently, for the next move 011 the part of the enemy.
But for a month no such move came. He had time to recover
his equanimity, and to write dispatches to Paris which described
hi"s late campaign as a successful attempt to check the enemy's
initiative, which had brought him 2,000 Spanish prisoners at
Yecla and ViIlena, and two British guns at the pass of Biar.
Castalla was represented as a partial attack by light troops,
which had been discontinued when the enemy's fnIl strength
had been discovered, and the losses there were unscrupulously
minimized. And, above all, good cause had been shown that
the Army of Aragon and Valencia could not spare one mnn to
help King Joseph in the North.
But the' plan of campaign' was on its way, and we shall
see how, even in Murray's incompetent hands, it gave the
Marshal Duke of Albufera full employment for May and
June.
• Six companies or Dilton came rrom Sicily, to replace the 2/07tlt at
Cartllgcllll.
SECTION XXXVI
THE MARCH TO VITTORIA
CHAPTER I
WELLINGTON'S PLAN OF CAMPAIGN
GOOD generals arc very properly averse to putting on paper,
even for the benefit of premiers or war ministers, the plan of
their next campaign. Points of leakage are so inscrutable, and
so hard to detect, that the less that is written the better is it
for the projected enterprise. And Wellington was the most
reticent of men-evcn going to the length of hiding from his
own responsible subordinates intent{ous that they much
desired to learn, and of giving orders that seemed eccentric
while the secret reason for them was kept concealed. He
never wrote au~obiographicalmemoirs-the idea was repulsive
to him-nor consented to open up (even to WiIliam Napicr,
who much desired it) his full confidence. For the genesis of
the plan of the Vittoria Campaign wc arc compelled to rely
mainly on the careful collection of hints from his contemporary
dispatches, supplemented by certain rare confidential letters.
and some obiter dicta of his later years, which mayor may not
have been reproduced with perfect accuracy by admirers like
Croker or Lord Stanhope.
One thing is clear-he was oonscious of the mistakes of 1812,
and was not going to see them repeated in 1815. 'When the
Burgos campaign was just over he wrote two short comments 1
on it, for the benefit of persons whom he judged capable of
appreciating his difficulties. He owned up to his errors-he
acknowledged four. The first was that he hud tried to take
Burgos by irregular means, without a proper battering train:
the scooll.d that he had under-estimated the strength of the
, Wellingtoll to Dmnouricz, S1tpJllellli!nlary Di8'paJ.che8, vii. 482-3, and
to Cooke, ibid. pp. 477-8.
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united French armies of Portugal and the North: the third
that he had kept his army in two equal halves o....er·long-HilI
should have been called in from Madrid to join the main body
much sooner than he actually was: the fourth and most notable
was that be had entrusted a crucial part of his plan of campaign
to a Spanish general. over whom he had no formal authority-
Ballastcros, who should have advanced from Andalusia to
distract and hinder Soult. 'If the game had been well played
it would have answered my purpose. Had I any reason to
suppose that it would be well played? Certainly not. I have
never yet known the Spaniards do anything, much less do
anything well . ... But 1 played a game which might succeed
(the only onc that could succeed) and pushed it to the last.
The parts having failed-as I admit was to be expected-I at
least made a handsome retreat to the Agueda, with some
labour and inconvenience but without materio.lloss.'
The interest of these confcssions is that we find Wcllington
in his next campaign making a clear eUod to avoid precisely
these four mistakes. He made elaborate preparations long
beforehand for getting up a battering train: he rather over-
than under-estimated his adversary's numbe.rs hy way of
caution: he never divided his army at all during his great
advance of May-June 1818; after the first six days it marched
in close parallel columns all in one mass, till Vittoria had been
reached: aud. last but not least, he entrusted no important
part of the scheme to any Spanish general, and indeed used
0. much smaller proportion of Spanish troops than he need
have done, although he had now become Generalissimo of all
the allied armies, and could command where he could formerly
only give advice.
Immediately after thc termination of the Burgos retreat
Wellington's views for the future do not seem to have been
very optimistic. He wrote to thc Prime Minister that at
present he could do nothing s!,rainst an enemy whose numbers
had proved too great for him to contend with 1. Next spring
he hoped to take the field with a larger force than he had ever
had before, but unless the Spaniards could display a discipline
and efficicncy which it seemed impossible to tcaeh them, he
• Wellington to Liverpool, November za, 1812. .lJikpalcJlt$, ix. p. !.i72.
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saw no prospect of ever obliging the French to quit the }Jellillsula
by force of arms. To Lord Bathurst he wrote in much the
same terms-the French, he thought, would canton their army
ill Old Castile and wait for the arrival of fresh reinforcements
from France.
But the whole aspect of affairs was changed when the news
of Napoleon's Russian dtbliclc eamc to hand. It soon becamc
clear that SO far from any French reinforcements coming
to Spain, it would be King Joseph who would be asked to
send reinforcements to Germany. Lord Liverpool's letter,
enclosing the 29th Bulletin, reached Wellington at Lisbon on
January 18th, and put him in a more cheerful mood. More-
over, he thought that his visit to Cndiz to accept the position
of Generalissimo had been a success, and that he would get
more help out of thc Spaniards now that he had the formal
power of issuing orders to their genernls, < though I am not
sanguinc enough to hope that wc shall dcrivc much advantage
from Spanish troops early in the campaign.' But he intended
to start bctimcs, • and at least to put myself in Fortune's
way I.' The French would be compelled to stand on the
defensive; if they continued to hold the immense line that they
were still occupying in January, they must be weak somewhere,
and it was impossible that they should be reinforced.
It is on February loth! that we get the first hint that
Wellington's scheme for the campaign of 1813 was going to
be a vcry ambitious one-aiming not at local successes in
Castile, or on recovering Madrid, but at driving the French
right up to the Pyrenees. On that day he wrote to Lord
Bathurst to say that < the e\'ents of the ne.xt campaign may
render it necessary for the army to undertake onc or more
sieges in the North of Spain,' wherefore he wished ccrtain
heavy guns and munitions to be scnt by sea to Corunna, to be
at his disposal, as soon as might be convenient, and twice the
qUaJl.tity of each to be prepared in England to be shipped when
asked for.
The mention of' onc or more sieges in the North of Spain' for
which guns had better be sent by sea to Corunna, can only
I 'Vcllington to Gmlmm, January 31. Di$patches, x. p. 67•
• Wellington to Dathurst. Ibid., p. 10.•.
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mean that Wellington was thinking of Burgos and St. Sebastian
-perhaps Bloo of Santoun and Pampeluna. There were no
other fortresses needing the attention of a heavy battering
train in that direction. It is clear that, even in February,
Wellington's mind was travelling far afield; and on June 26th,
Vittoria having been now won, he wrote to remind Lord
Bathmst of his demand, and to point out that his forecast
had come true 1.
In March, as was shown in an earlier chapter, Wellington
began to get the news which proved that the French were
making large drafts from Spain for the new Army of Germany,
and that Soult, CaUarelli, and other generals were summoned to
Paris. He knew,a few days later,that the enemy was e....acuating
La Maneha, and that the King was moving his head-quarters
from Madrid to Valladolid. Everything indicated conscious
weakness on the part of the enemy-it would be well to take
instant advantage of it: Wellington wrote to his brother on
March 28 that he hoped to start out in force on :May 1st ~­
giving no hint where that force would be employed. At the
same time he expressed his doubt as to whether any of the
Spanish corps which were to join him could be ready by that
date. But he was depending so much on the sole exertions of
the Anglo-Portuguese army, that the tardiness of the Spaniards
would not put a complcte stop to his projected operations. Two
other practical hindrances .....ere a late spring, which made grecn
forage for the horses harder to procure than it normally was in
April, and accidents from bad roads and bad weather to his
pontoon train, which he was secretly bringing up from the
Tagus to the Douro, as it was to pla.y a most essential part in
the commencementofthe campaign3• These mishaps appea.r mere
matters of detail, but (as we shall see) there were immense con-
sequences depending upon them-the presence ofa large pontoon
train on the Esla and the Douro, when its normal habitat was
on the lowerTagus, was one of the first surprises in the wonderful
• Dispau:hes, x. p. 464..
I Wellington to Henry Wellesley. Dispati:hu, x.I). 230.
I Wellington to Stupleton O;lttoll, ibid., p. 268. and to Batlmrst,
ibid. 295, speaking or the extraordinary dry spring. Dickson notes in his
Dio.ry that lor two months before April 4. there had been no min.
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campaign of May-June 1813. Starting from Abrnntes in the
end of April. it did not reach Miranda de Douro till the 20th of
:May 1.
The first definite revelation as to what Wellington's plan was
to be. is contained in 0. letter to Beresford of April 24th. • I
propose to put the troops in motion in the first days of May:
my intention is to make them cross the Douro. in general within
the Portuguese frontier, covering the movement of the left by
that of the right of the Army toward the Tormes, which right
shall then cross the Douro, over the pontoons, in such situation
as may be convenient. ] then propose to seize Zamora and
Toro, which will make all future operations easy to us 2.'
Here the first hnlf of the great movement is accurately set
forth, just as it was executed, though m·ving to the delays spoken
of above. the general orders for the marching out of 0.11 the
nllied divisions were issued on May 13th instead of on May
1st-2nd. But in all other respects we have the exact analysis
of the scheme: the' Left '-Graham with the equivalent of
six divisions-crossed the Domo far inside Portugal at various
points, and was in and about Braganza and lIfiranda by
May 21st-24th: meanwhile the 'Right '-Hill with three
divisions-moved forward from the Agueda to the 'l'ormes,
attracting the main attentiou of the French between the 20th
and the 26th, till it reached Salamanca, from whence it
swerved off to the left. and joined Graham's wing by the bridge
of Toro, thus establishing the whole army in one mass north
of the Douro, and completely turning the western flank of the
entire French front of defence. On May 12 only, three weeks
after he had communicated the secret to Beresford, did Welling-
ton divulge it to the ~linisters at home: evidently he dreaded
leakage somewhere in London, such as he had discovered in the
preceding autumn 3. For Lord Bathurst's benefit he descends
a little more into detail:
'I propose to commence our operations by turning the
enemy's position on the Douro, by passing the left of our army
over that river within the Portuguese frontier. ] should cross
• See Di8pauhu, x. pp. 372-3.
• Wellington to Beresford, April 24. DisjJa/dlelf, X. p. 8Z'~.
• See above, pp. 224-5.
804 WELLINGTON'S PLAN OF CAMPAIGN (APRIL
the Right in the same manner, only that I have been obliged to
throw the Right very forward during the winter, in order to
cover and connect our cantonments, and I could not well draw
them back without exposing a good deal of country, and risking
a counter-movement on the part of the enemy. I therefore
propose to strengthen the Right, Md move with it myself across
the Tonnes, and to establish a bridge on the DanTo below
ZalDoru.. The two wiu.b"S of the army will thus be connected,
and the cnemy's position on the Douro will be turned. The
Spanish Army of Calicia will be on the Esla, to the left of our
army, at the same time that our army reaches that river.
'Having turned the enemy's position on the DonTa, and
es.tablished our communications across it, our next operation
will depend on circumstances. I do not know whether I am
now stronger than the enemy, even including the Army of
Galieia. But of this I am very certain, that I shall never be
stronger throughout the campaign, or more cfficicnt, than I
alll now: and the cnemy willncver be weaker. I cannot have
a better opportunity for trying the fate of a battle, which if
the enemy should be unsuccessful, must oblige him to withdraw
entirely. We have been sadly delayed by the pontoon bridge,
v.'ithout which it is obvi.ous we can do nothing I.'
Neither in the letter to Beresford nor in that to Bathurst
does Wellington make 11 forecast bcyon"d the first stage of his
advanee---obviously it would be impossible to do so till it was
seen how the French would act. If they should be tempted to
fight-say in front of Valladolid-when their flank was turned,
in order to keep their hold on Castile, Wellington would welcome
the decisive engagement. But of coursc they might refuse to
fight, as indeed did they. They retired on Burgos, us we shall
see, without taking any risks.
But that Wellington already foresaw the possibility of a
victorious march to the Pyrenees is, I think, proved not only
by his letter of February 10th concerning the siege of fortresses
in Northern Spain, quoted above, but by similar hints on
l\lay 6 concerning the absolute necessity for naval co-operation
in the North. He asks Lord Bathurst to insist Oil the presence
of a squadron under an admiral in the Bay of Biscay, and for
1 \Vcllillgton to Bathur.lt, Di$patdies, x. 372.
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careful supervision of the whole coast from Bayomle to
Corunna, which must absolutely stop French enterprise at
sea, and' simplify arrangements for convoy and naval opera-
tions in concert with the army during the ensuing campaign 1.'
Taking this in conjunction 'wi.th the letter of February 10. it
seems certain that Wellington was thinking of stores to be
landed at Santander, and 0. battering train to destroy San
Sebastian-which was to look forward some way! There was,
however, a secondary reason for requiring more naval super-
vision in the Bay of Biscay: American privateers had been
putting in an appearance in these waters, and had captured
several small transports.
A plan of campaign that contemplated the driving back of
the French to the Pyrenees must, of course, embrace a good
deal more than the mere rcol'gani7A\tion of the Anglo-Portu-
guese army for n great push north of the Douro. There were
many minor factors to be taken into consideration and utilized.
First and foremost came the question us to how far the position
of Generalissimo of the Spanish Armies could be turned to
account. Aftcr his experiences in 1812 'Wellington was deter-
mined to entrust to his Allies no crucial part of the operations,
whose failure eould wreck the whole sehcme. With his own
striking-force he intended to take only onc Spanish army,
that whieh was under the sole Spanish general whom he eould
trust for willing co-operation, even though he knew him to be
no great military genius. Castaflos had, by his influence at
Cadi7., been nominated as Captain-General alike in Galicia,
Castile, and Estremadura, and all the troops in those provinces
now format parI; of the new '40th Army.' They included
Morillo's division, now eantoned about Cac;eres, Carlos de
Espana's in the mountains between Ciudad Hodrigo and the
pass of Perales, the lancers of JuJian Sanehe7..--now counted
a brigllde of regular cavalry and not n parlida-on the front
between the Agueda and the Douro, and the two Galician
divisions of Losada and Barcena, with their weak attendant
cavalry brigade: to bring tllis up to strength two extra
regiments 2 had filed up the Portuguese frontier during the
1 Wellington to &thunot. May 6. DUipaklrea,'x. p. 36l.
• Algarve, and Hussars of Estrcmadura.
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winter from Estremadura. All these were in touch with the
Anglo-Portuguese army, and were intended to move with it.
They made up 18,000 foot and 8,000 horse. In addition there
were many other troops theoretically belonging to the 4th Army,
hut at present cut ort from it by the intervening zone of French
occupation-viz. Porlicr's division in the Eastern Asturias, and
Mcndizubal's irregular forccsin Biscayand Cantabria-thc troops
of Longa. and the Biscayan volunteers with other smaller hands.
These scatteroo units, which could only come under Wellington's
real control when he should have beaten the French back to
the Ebro. might make up 10,000 or 12,000 men. But they could
not be counted upon for the first month of the campaign.
In addition, Castaflos had a number of immovable troops-
the garrisons of Rodrigo and Badajoz, a depot of unhorsed
cavalry in Estremaduro., and a sedentnry unit called the' Army
of Reserve of Galicia,' consisting of all the most depleted corps
of the old Galician army: its six battalions only made up
2,000 men, and it stopped at Vigo or Corunna all through the
year 1818. Two other Galician battalions 1 had b<;en sent
round by sea during the winter, to join the much-tried Army
of Catalonia. This small transference of troops had reached
the knowledge of the French in an exaggerated shape, and
caused much speculation at Madrid.
Beside the 21,000 men of the 4th Army, who marched in the
Anglo-Portuguese line under Castanos's nephew General Giron 2,
there was only onc other Spanish force which Wellington in-
tended to employ in his own operations. This was the so-called
< Army of Reserve of Andalusia,' which had to come up all the
way from Seville, and was far too late to join in the campaign
of Vittoria: it did not get to the front till July: even later
than the Generalissimo expected. The origin of this corps was
that, when Soult evacuated Andalusia in September 1812, the
best-equipped of the Cadiz garrison troops joined the field-
army of Ballasteros, and advanced with him to Granada. This
body was in April 1813 known as the' Third Army' and was
• Pontcvedra and Principe.
• Casw.i\os himself during the campaign tiClcd morc 1UI C"ptaiu-
General than as Anny-Commandcr--stationing himself at Salamanca and
reorganizing the districts jllst recovered from the French.
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now commanded by the Duque del Parque, the successor of
thc cashiercd Ballnsteros. But the remninder of the Cadi ...
garrison, which hoo not gonc to the front, was organized during
the winter into a separate unit, under Henry O'Donnell, thc
Conde d'Abispal. It was rather a miscellnneous assembly-
sevcn of its fourteen battalions baying been regiments which
did not march in October 1812 because they were low in
numbers or equipment, and three more newly-raised units,
formed ~ replace in the Army List old regiments which had
perished in previous campaigns. However, they were filled up
with recruits, re-clothed and re·equipped, and Wellington
intended to use them with his o'wn army, as etape and blockade
troops. He preferred to take them with him rather than the 3rd
Army, which was suspected of having many officers who had
been devoted to Ballasteros, and who had resented the appoint-
ment of the new British generalissimo 1. Moreover, O'Donncll
was in every way a better officer than Del Parque, and had a
good fighting rcputation, though he wus noted as impetuous
and quarrelsome. The Army of Reserve of Andalusia was
14,000 strong, in two infantry divisions under Gcncrals Echevari
and Crcagh and a weak cavalry brigade under Frcirc-Iatc
second in command of the Murcian army. The slow equipment
oC this corps, its late start, and its frequent halts for want of
provisions, formed a perpetual sourcc of dispute betwccn
Wellington and the Minister of War at Cadiz. But as it was
not destined to form part of the original striking-force at the
opening of the campaign, or to discharge any esscntial duty
in the general scheme, its absencc was not much felt. When it
did appear, after Vittoria, it was usefully employed in blockad-
ing Pampeluna.
But in the summer campaign of 1813 it must be remembered
that Wellington employed no Spanish troops save thc original
21,000 Galicians and Estremadurons under GiroD, and 1.onga's
",000 Cantabrians, who joined in from the North ten days
before Vittoria, and took a creditable share in that battle.
1 Apporently not without reason, n \\"C can trtlllt King Josep!l's oorrespon.
denCl.', wWeh contains notes of a treasonable iJltrigue in May, between
certain officers of the! 3rd Army and General Virucz, an AfTarn:esado at
Madrid. See C(JTTC8pOndanrAJ du Rei, ix. pp. 130 and 400.
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It remains to be explained how Wellington intended to get
an indirect profit out of the existence of the. other Spanish
corps-the re-named First, Second, and Third Armies, as well
as out of the Anglo-Sicil~an expeditionary force at Alicante,
whose conduct had given him so many just causes of complaint
during the autumn of 1812.
As to the' First Army,' now commanded by General CoPOIlS
(the defender of Tarifa), this gallant remnant of the old Catalan
levies could not take the field 10,000 strong, was almost desti-
tute of cavalry and artillery, and had no large town or secure
fortress in its possession 1. It held, in a rather precarious
fashion, a considerable portion of the mountainous inland of
Catalonia-the head-quarters were usually at Vich-but had
no safe communications with the sea, or certainty of receiving
succours, though it was intennittently in touch with Captain
Codrington's cruising squadron. Copons, who took over
command in March 1818, though less disliked than his arbitrary
and ill-tempered predecessor Lacy, w-as not popular with the
Catalans. They would have liked to see their local hero, the
Baron de Eroles, who had been in charge of the principality
for some months after Lacy's departure, made captain-general 3.
Weak in numbers as it was, the Army of Catalonia could
obviously do no more than detain and keep employed General
Decnen's French army of occupation, which had more thnn
double its strength. The garrisons of Barcelona, Tarragona,
Figueras, Lerida, and Tortosa absorbed 13,000 of Decaen's men.
But he had 15,000 more available for field service, {Utd I.us
flying columns ofLcn put Copons in danger, for thc Catalan
army had to scattcr its cantonments fux and wide in order to
live, and a ouddcn hostilc concentration might easily cut off
somc fraction of it, when onc part was as far north as the
Ampurdam and the passes into France, and another as far
cast as the Aragoncse border 3, Normally thc Calalans
1 Total force a nominal 15,000. but dcpbts. hospitals, petty gm:r:isons, &c"
absorbed a full thifd_tlu: cavalry wlUl441 !l6bres only.
• See Codrington to Wcllcslcy, January 18, in Supplementary Dispatches,
vii. p. 569.
• Sllrsflehl with one or the two Catnlall field divisions WUlI 1l0rmlllly
operating as a sort of guerrillcro on the Aragoncse sidc, Manso generally
hung about the Ampurdam with a brigade.
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employed themselves in cutting the eommWlications between
the grellot fortresses, with tton occasional foray into Roussillon.
Wellington thought that they could not be better employed,
and that nothing more could be expected of them. He sent
them a small reinforcement of 2,000 men from the suppressed
third division of the Army of Gallcia, and urged that munitions
should be thrown in from the side of the sea whenever possible.
There was little' to be expected from the exertions of the
Catalan army, persevering and meritorious though they were.
It remained to be seen, however, whether something could not
be d~ne in the Principality with external help. Here eame in
the IIltl.in problem of the Eastern Coast: Suehet must be kept
employed at all costs, while the main blow was being delivered
by Wellington himself on the other side of the PeninsuJn..
Murray's and Ello's futile operations of April had accomplished
little: the Marshal, though frightened at ftrst by their move-
ments, and though he had suUcred thc bloody eheek of Castalla,
had been able to preserve his forward position on the Xucar :
he retained complete possession of the Valencian eoastland,
and his army was intact as·a striking force. If, during the
forthcoming campaign north of the Douro, he chose to draw off
his main force towards Aragon, and to come in to join the King,
there was at present nothing on foot that could stop him from
such a course. Wellington resolved that this possibility must
be averted, by giving the Marshal a problem of his own, which
should absorb all his attention, and keep him from thinking of
his neighbour's needs. And this was all the more easy because
Suchet was notoriously 0. selfish commander, who thought
more of his own viceroyalty and his own military reputation
than of the general cause of :France: his intercepted dispatches,
of which Wellington had a fair selection in his filc of cyphers,
showed that he was always ready to find plausible excuses for
keeping to his own sidc of thc Peninsula.
The plan which Wellington formulated for the use of Sir Jolm
l\1urray, in two dispatches dated on the 14th and 16th of April,
was onc which depended entirely on the judicious use of Ilaval
power. The British fleet bcing completely dominant in the
Mediterranean, and Murray having at his disposition the large
squadron of transports which had brought his troops from
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Sicily, it was clearly possible to land as many men as the
transports could carry. at BIlY point on the immensely long
coast-line of Valencia and Cntalonia that might be selected.
They would have a local superiority on the selected point until
the French troops, dispersed in many garrisons and canton-
ments, could mass in sufficient strength to attack them: and
meanwhile the Catalan army would join Murray. If the
French should draw together in overwhelming power, the
expedition could, if proper precautions were taken, re-embark
before its position became dangerous. The farther north that
the landing took place, the more inCQnvenient would it be for
Suchet. who would obviously have to draw on his field army in
Valencia for numbers that would enable him to deal with the
Anglo-Sicilian force. But the moment that Suchct should be
forced to deplete his field army in the South, which was already
too weak for the task set it, the Spaniards could advance 011
the line of the Xucar, and make a dash at Valencia during the
Marshal's absence. In order to give them an irresistible numeri-
cal preponderance over the divisions that Suchet might leave
behind him, Del Parque should bring up the Andalusian army
to reinforce Elio's Murcians. Between them they would have
some 30,000 regular troops, besides the bands of the Empecinado
and Duran, who would operate on the side of the mountains
against the French rear. It would be hard if such an accumula-
tion of force could not thrust back the thinned line of the enemy
on to and beyond Valencia.
Finally, the point at which the expeditionary force was to
make its thrust was to be TlU'ro.gona, which was known to be
in a state of bad repair, and thinly garrisoned, while it had also
the advantage of being a very isolated post, and remote both
from Decacn's head·quarters at Ccrona, and from Suchet's at
Valencia. Moreover, it was conveniently placed for com-
munication with the Catalan army, but separated by difficult
defiles both from Tortoss southward and Barcelona northward,
at which French relieving forces would have to gather.
If the whole plan worked, and Tarragons were to fall in a
few days, the Catalan army would once more havc a safe
dehouch to the sea, and the Allies would gain a foothold such
as they had never owned north of the Ebro since 1811, while
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at the same time Valencia ought to fnll into the hands of Elio
and Del Parque during Suehet's enforced absence. But
supposing that Tarragona. held out firmly, and Decaen and
Suehet united to relieve it, the expeditionary foree eould get
away unharmed, and meanwhile Valencia ought to have been
taken. And even if the blow at Valencia failed also, yet at least
the whole French army on the East Coast would be occupied for
a month or more, and would certainly not be able to spare a
single man to help King Joseph or Jourdan.
As we shall see, a long series of blunders, for wmeh Murray
was mainly responsible, though Elio and Del Parque each took
his share in the muddle, prevented all Wellington'l> schemes
for active profit from coming to a successful end. Nevertheless,
the main purpose was achieved~not a Frenchman from the
East Coast took any share in the campaign of Vittoria.
1'0 descend to details. Murray was directed to ship off every
man of the Alicante army for whom he could find transport,
provided that the total of infantry and artillery embarked
should not fall short of 10,000 of all ranks. He was to take '\\o;th
him both the Anglo-Sicilians and as many of Whittingham's
Spaniards as could be carried: if the ships sufficed, he might
take all or some of Roche's Spaniards also. Less than 10,000
men must not sD.il~the force would then be too small to cause
Suchet to detach troops from Valencia. Elio and Del Parque
would remain behind, with such (ifany) of Roche's and Whitting-
ham's battalions as could not be shipped. They were to keep
quiet, till they should learn that Suchet had weakened his
forees in Valcncia. Whcn it became certain that the French
opposite thcm were much reduced in numbers, they wcre to
advance, alwaYIi taking care to turn the enemy's positions
rather than to make frontal attacks upon them.
If, which was quitc possible, Murray should fail to tuke
Tarragona, and should find vcry large French forces gathering
around him, such as he and Copons could not rcasonably hope
to hold in check, hc was to rc-embark, and bring the Expedi-
tionary Force back to the kingdom of Valencia, landing it at
such a point on the coast as should put him in line with the
front rcached by Elio and Del Parque in their advance.
There was a subsidiary set of directions for a policy to be
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carried out if the transports available atAlicante should be found
insufficient to move so many as 10,000 men. But as the ship.
ping proved enough to carry )4,,000, these directions have only
an academic interest. In this case :Murray and Elio were to
threaten the line of the Xucar frontally, while Del Parque
turned it on the side of the mowttains of the interior. Duran
and Villucumpa were to devote themselves to cutting the line
of communications between Suchct and the King. In this way
employment would be found for all the French on the East
Coast, for Capons was to reecive a reinforcement of 3,000 men,
and was to keep Decaen on the move by raids and forays.
Finally, and this clause governed the whole of the instruc-
tions, 'the General Officers at the head of the troops must
understand that the success of all our endeavours in the
ensuing campaign depends on rwne of the corps being beaten.
They must not attack the enemy in strong positions: 1 shnll
forgive anything excepting that one of the corps should be
beaten. and dispersed.' Wellington afterwards said that this
warning was intended for Elio and Del Parque only, but it
had a deleterious eUect during the ensuing operations on all
the actions of the timid and wavering Murray. To say to sueh
an omcer that it would be a sin not to be forgiven if he let his
corps get beaten under any circumstances, was to drive him toll.
policy of absolute cowardice. Wellington was an austere master,
and the mental cUect of such a threat was to make Murray
resolve that he would not take even small and pardonable risks.
The main idea that he h.1.d in his head in May and Jwte 1813 was
that he ' must not allow his corps to be beaten and dispersed.'
Hence, like the unprofitable servant in the parable, he was
resolved to "'Tap it up in a napkin, and have it rendy to return
to his master intact-though thereby he might condemn himself
to make no worthy use of it whatever while it was in Iris
hands. 'i'he threat ,of the Commander-ill·Chief might have
been addressed profitably to llobert Craufurd; when adminis-
tered to John Murray it produced terror and a sort of mental
paralysis.
It is true that lIJurray's weakness of will and instability of
purpose were so great t~t he would probably, in any case, have
mnde a very poor game from the.splendid cards put into his hand.
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But lhat the Tarragona expedition ended in the discredit-
able fiasco which wc shall have to narrale, was undoubtedly
the result in part of the impression which 'Wellington's orders
produced on his wavering mind. Yet, {.'Ontemptible as his
conduct of operations was, still Suchet was kept employed in
the FAc;t and gave no help to King Joseph. That much was
secured by Wellington's knowledge of how sea-power can be used.
By the 1st of May everything should have been ready, but
the late spring and the slow-moving pontoons delayed the
start. On the 12th-13th-14th, however, every soldier, British
and Portuguese, was ready to march. Every available unit was
being brought up-there remained behind only the fever-ridden
Guards' brigade at Oporto; the weak 77th, which provided,
along with one Veteran Battalion, a skeleton garrison for Lisbon;
three Portuguese line regiments, two in Elvas, one in Abrantes,
and the dismounted drabroons of the same nation, who had not
taken the field for three years: only D'Urban's and Campbell's
squadrons marched in 1813. The infantry consisted of 56
British and 53 Portuguese battalions-making about 67,00.0
bayonets. The British battalions were of very unequal sh:c-
a few as low as 450 men, a few others us slrong as 900: the
average was 700. The Portuguese battalions were rather weaker,
some of the regiments never having recovered from the priva-
tions of the Burgos retreat, and did not exceed on an average
500 bayonets or 550 of all ranks. Of cavalry there were 22
regiments, of which four only were Portuguese-total 8,000
sabres. Of artillery there were 102 guns, in seycnteen batteries,
of whieh three were Portuguese and one belonged to the King's
German Legion I, Adding Engineers, Staff Corps, Wagon
Train, &c., the whole represented 81,000 men of ~1I ranks and
all arms.
I The I-I.A. troops were' A ' Ross, 'D' Beon, • E' Gnrdincr, • F'
Webher-Smith, nnll • l' RumSlly. The foot oomplInics were those ot
Dubourdictl (19tDivision), Moxwcll (2nd Division), Douglas (3rd Division),
Sympher K.G.L. (4th Division), Lowson (5th Division), Bmmlreth (6th
Division), Cairncs (7th Divlllion). Tulloh's l'orlugut,'SC compao)' wall
attached to the 2nd Dh'ision, Da Cunha's to SjJYeirn's division. The
resenre was compooed of\Vebbcr·Smith's H.A. troop, Arrill.ga's Portuguese
heavy l8-pounders, nod Parker's root compuny. &"" Colonel Lcl;lie's
edition of the Dicksoo Papers, ii. p~ 719.
SECTION XXXVI: CHAPTER II
Ol~ERATIONS OF lULL'S COLUMN: l\1AY 22-JUNE 3
THE concentration of the southern wing of Wellington's army
for the great advance was in some ways n more difficult, in
others an easier, problem than the concentration of the northern
wing.
On the onc hand, the distances from which the various
elements of Hill's force were to be drawn were in many cases
shorter than those of Graham's force; the roads were well
known to all the troops, who had used them repeatedly in their
moves up and down the Spanish·Portuguesefrontier in 1811-12;
and, though poor enough, they were on the whole better than
those of the Tras-as-Montes, which the northern column had
to employ. No part of the British army had tried these latter
routes since the pursuit of Soult in 1809, and few remembered
how bad they were. But, on the other hand, the concentration
of the southern column was from points more remote from each
other than those of the northern: the divisions of the latter
had all been collected in the Douro country during the course
of the spring, and started on their final march from a single
area: moreover, they were moving well inside Portugal, by
routes very remote from the enemy. But the larger half of the
southern force had to be brought up from a region far distant
from that where the smaller half was cantoned in May. For
Hill's two divisions, the British 2nd and the Portuguese inde-
pendent division (so long eommanded by Hamilton, but now
under Silveira, the Conde de Amarante), had been scut back to
the borders of Estremadura at the cnd of the Burgos campaign,
and werc lying, much scattered, at points so remote from each
othcr as Coria, Plascncia, Bcjar, Bohoyo, and Brozas. Morillo's
Spanish di\'ision, so often associated before with Hill, was even
further ore, south of the Tagus, in the Caljeres·A1cnntarn
cowltry. All these troops would have to move up, in order t~
join Wellington, by routes not very remote from the French
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division ut Avila, which (as it will be remembered) had tried
to beat up Hill's winter-quarters as late as thc prcceding
February. And therc was a chancc that, if the cnemy were
alert and well-informed, he might try to block Hill's march, by
coming out from the Puentc dc CQngosto or some such point.
If Wellington had only known it, the French higher command
had actually been fearing that Hill might make a stroke at
Avila by some of the passes leading from the upper Tormes to
the upper Adaja, and was nervous about this line of country.
The plan for the concentration of the southern force was that
Hill should unite the 2nd Division, Morillo's Spaniards, and
Long's Cavalry 1 at Dejar, and the": march by the pass through
the Sierra de Francia to Miranda de Castnnar and '£amames.
Silveira, with the independent Portuguese division, was to take
a parallel route farther west, by the pass of Perales, Pcfiaparda,
and Moras Verdcs, to the same point 2. Thcse troops on arriving
near Tamames would find themselves in touch with another
column, which was already on the ground where operations
were to begin. It consisted of the Light Di\'ision, which had
been eantoned on the COB and Agueda during the winter, and
Victor Alten's, Fane's, and Robert Hill's cavalry brigades-the
last-named a unit new to the army, and lately arrived from
Lisbon: it consisted of six squadrons from the three regiments
of Household Cavalry. To join these British troops came J uHan
Sanehez's Castilian lancers-now reckoned regular cavalry
and not a partida-and Carlos de Espafia's Castilian division,
which had been wintering in the valleys above Ciudad Uodrigo.
When united, the whole strength of the southern wing of
Wellington's army would be about 30,000 sabres and bayonets,
including only five brigades of British infantry, the equivalent
of four brigades of Portuguese, and two Spanish di visions.
The cavalry was very strong in proportion-this was intentional,
l\S Wellington intended to keep out in his front such a strong
I Long was IIOW in cburge of Hill'a Ctlvulry vi« Erskine, n genernl whose
acts have so oftell required criticism. This unfortunate officer had com-
mitted suicide at Dl"O"1.as during the winter, by leaping out of 1\ loUy window
while non ClnIlPOII menfis. The moment he WII.!I removed Wellingtoll
abolished. the ' 2nd Cavalry Division', ::md threw its two brigades into the
general stock under Stapleton Cotton for the campaign of 1813.
• Wellington to Hill. Supplcmmlary DUtplJlches, xiv. pp. 200 and 216.
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cavalry screen that the enemy should have no chance of
discovering for some time that the column was not the main
Anglo·Portuguese army, but in fact a demonstrating force.
The real strength of his army, six of his old eight divisions, was
marching under Grahnm to turn the line of the Doura, far to
the north.
On the 220d Wellington abandoned his head-quarters at
Frellcda, where he had stopped ever since his return from Cadiz
in January. and rode out to Ciudad Rodrigo; the Light Division
and three cavalry brigades had preceded him to Santi Espiritus,
ten miles in front, where they were in touch with Silveira's
Portuguese, who formed Hill's left·hand column, and· had
reached Tamames. Hill himself with the 2nd Division was a
march behind Silveira: Morillo's Spaniards keeping more to the
right, on the road along the mountains, was moving from Los
Santos and Fuenteroble, by the track which leads straight to
Salamanca from the direct south. Far out on the left .JuHan
Sa.nchez's lancers were feeling their way towards Lede~ma
and watching the western flank.
On the 24th the union of the forces was complete, and the
news that came from all quarters was s~tisfactory. Villatte
was in Salamanca, with no more than his own infantry division
and one regiment of cavalry 1: he had small detnchments on
his fl.o.llks at Lcdesma and Alba de Tormes, but no friends
nearer than Darieau at Znmora; and for Daricau full employ-
ment was about to be fOWld, since Craham's great column was
marching straight upon him. It was pretty ccrtain that King
Joseph had not yet ordcred the gcneral conccntration which
Wl\S thc only thing that could savc him from destruction. The
Frcneh division at Avila had "not moved: Madrid was being
held, and as late as the 20th Maransin's brigade had been at
Toledo, and some of Lhe Avila division at ?tIonbeltran on the
borders of Estrcmadura. The map showed, therefore, that the
Army of the South could 110t possibly meet on the Tonnes in
time to succour Villattc, who would have either to retreat or to
be destroycd. And Villatte being driven off eastward Oil
Cantalpillo, or northward on Toro, the junct.ion of the two
wings of Wellington's army at or Jlear Zamora was certain.
I 12th Dmgoons, or Dtgeon's divisioll.
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But haste was neccssary, wherefore the anny advanced by
very long marches, through the devastated country over which
it had passed in such different conditions seven months back.
On the 25th, head-quarters were at MatiUa, with the infantry
advancing in three parallel columns, the Light Division on the
high road to Salamanca, Hill and Silveira to the right, MoriUo
still farther out, making for Alba de 'l'ormes. The satisfactory
news came in that Villatte had withdrawn his detachment
from Ledesma, which indicated that he did not intend to keep
touch with Daricau at Zamora, so that the passage of thc
Douro would bc simplified 1. A vcry long march on thc 26th
brought matters to a. crisis. Victor Altcn's ca.valry pushing for
Salamanca bridgc, and Fane's for the fords which lie above
the town, found that Villatte had just evacuated it, after
barricading and obstructing its exits, but wa.~ visible on the
heights above the fords of Santa Marts. (one of Wellington's old
positions of June 1812) in line of battle. His delay in retreating
is censured equally by Jourdan and by Wellington-npparently
he wished to be eertain that he WllS not being imposed upon by
a mere cavalry demonstration, and had a serious force opposite
him: moreover, hc was waiting to pick up his detachment from
Alba de Tormes, which hc had only just ordered to join him,
when he heard that Long's cavalry and l\forillo were moving
on that place.
On seeing the French in position the British cavalry pushed on
with all speed, Alten through Salamanca city, Fane by the fords
above, leaving the infantry faT behind them, hut hoping to
detain the enemy long enough to assure his destruction.
Uealizillg over-late his danger, Villatte moved orf eastwa.rd
when he recognized that heavy forces were conccntrating upon
him, and threatening his retreat. He marched not for Toro,
but due east by roads parallel with the Tormcs. • It is rather
extraordinary,' wrote Wellington that evening, • that hc should
have marehed by Cahrcriws and the ravine, which wc used to
think so bad for even a horse, and thence by Aldea Lcngua 2.'
At any rate the two cavalry brigades caught him up not far
I This is Wellington's own ob::;crvation, Dillpalchu x. 391, to Grahllm
from Matilla•
• Wellington to Gmlllull, DilJpalcha, x. 401.
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from Aldea Lengua, nnd, after scattering his rear-guard of
dragoons, rode in upon his infantry, which were marching hard
in close column. The tactical conditions were exactly the same
as those which had been seen during the retreat of Picton snd
the 3rd Division from El Bodon to Fucutc Grimaldo in Septem-
ber 1811. The brigadiers, after trying some partial and inclCce·
tivc charges 1, judged it useless to attack steady and unbroken
infantry in solid order, and contented themselves with following
the column at a cautious distance and picking up stragglers-
just as Montbrull had done in 1811 on the way to Fuente
Grimaldo. Fane's horse-artillery battery got up, Bnd put in
some damaging shots on the rear battalions, but they closed up
and hurried on. The day was hot, many of the French fell out
of the ranks exhausted and were gleaned up on the way. Their
divisional ammunition train got jammed in a hollow road and
was captured-the leading caisson bad been overturned and
blocked the exit of the rest. But the main body of the infantry
held Oll its way in a solid mass, and after five miles, Wellington,
who bad just ridden up, ordered Fane and Alten to desist from
the pursuit. Villatte, therefore, got off, leaving behind him
a couple of hundred prisoners, and some scores of men who had
fallen dead from sunstroke and over-exertion, or had been
knocked over by the round-shot of Gardiner's H.A. batterya.
This was one more example of the incapacity of cavalry unsup-
ported to deal with unbroken infantry, of which we have had
to give so many previous instances. The only exception to the
rule was the extraordinary achievement of Bock's heavy
German dragoons at Garcia Hernandes on the day after the
battle of Salamanca. Clearl)' ViIlatte waited too long, and
should never have allowed himself to be caught so near Sala·
manca.. He got oH better than he deserved " and picked up his
I That the Charges were flot pushed home is shown by the ensuulties--
10 wounded in the Royals, I killed no wounded in the 1st Hussars K.G.L.
• Creditable as was the conduct or Villatte's infantry, it is hyperoolc
to s.ay with Napier (v. p. 98) that I the dauntlellll survivors won their way
in the race or 30,000 enemies I' For only 1,600 British horsemen were up,
and the nearest allied inrantry was 6 or 8 miles away.
I .Jounmn (MblwirQ, p. 464) holds that Villattc was to blame, Bnd
• cngugea. le eomwt mal u propo:l!:l,' but oon!lio:1ers thut he WllS I r.\iblement
suivi' by Fane and Alren. He acknowledges the loss of some of Villatte'!1
guns, probably in error, ror Wellington speaks or captured caissons only
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detachment from Alba, which came in upon him from the right
a few miles farther on, beyond Babila Fuente, cautiously
pursued by Long's Light Dragoons. The column went out of
sight, retreating on Cantalpino, not on Toro--onc morc proof
to Wellington that the enemy was not going to attempt to
strengthen the linc of the Douro, but to concentrate somewherc
about Medina del Campo or Valladolid.
The various infantry columns reached thc neighbourhood of
Salamanca on the evening of the 26th, and crossed the Tormes,
some by the bridge, some by fords, next day. They were ordered
to take up the position faeing north and east on the heights
beyond the city which Wellington had held against Marmont in
June 1812. The Light Division v.w; on the left, the 2nd Division
in the centre, Silveiro.'s Portuguese on the right at Cabrerizos,
Morillo on the upper Tonnes at l\.fachacon with a detachment
in Alba. The cavalry patrolled towards Zamora, Toro, the
fords of Fresno on the Douro, and also eastward toward the
Guarena. Bill now halted for six days-it was Wellington's
intention, now that he had displayed himself in force at Sala-
manca, and set all the lines of French intelligence quivering,
that the enemy should conclude that his great attack was to be
delivered between the Domo and the Tormes, and he hoped that
they would attempt to parry it by a concentration in the region
of Valladolid-Toro for the defence of the line of the Douro, or
perhaps (but this was less likely) by a eounter-offensive south of
the Douro from the direction of Medina del Campo, so as to take
him in flank and prevent his further progress northward.
Either of these moves would fall in with his desires, since Iris
real intention wus to turn the line of the Douro much lower
down, in the direction of Zamora, by mcans oC Graham's corps,
which was about to start fTom Braganza and ltfuanda on the
very day of the occupation oC Salamanca, and was due to arrive
011 the Esla, behind Zamora, on the 30th. It pleased him well
that VilIatte should have retreated due east, that the cavalry
found no hostile forces south oC the Douro in the direction of
either Zamora or Toro, and that it was reported that there was
only one French infantry division holding those towns.
in his report of the affair. Martinlcn's list of casualties shows hanlly any
officer-easualties on this day in VilIatte's division.
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Having allowed time for the enemy to get full knowledge of
his presence at Salamanca, and to act upon it-it was inevitable
that they should regard the place where he had shown himself
as the base of his future operations-Wellington made ready to
transfer himself rapidly and secretly to the other and stronger
wing of his army, which Graham was now conducting against
the extreme western flank of the French line. On May 28th he
handed over the command of the southern wing to Hill, and
announced his own departure. The orders given to Sir Rowland
were that he was, unless the unexpected happqned, to make
ready to march on the Douro at Zamora the moment that he
should receive nc,",,'S that Graham had crossed the Esla 1.
Bridges should be ready for him, and the fortunate dis-
appearance of the enemy's horse from the region of Ledesma
made the rapid transmission of information between thc two
wings certn.in.
There was onc possibility to be considered. Though Welling.
ton was convinced that the French would concentrate north of
the Douro, in the direction of Vnlladolid and Medina de Rio
SeeD, it was just conceivable that they might take the other
course oC concentrating south oC the river, round Medina del
Campo, and marching straight on SalamllJlca with all the troops
that could be hastily drawn together. It was impoosible Cor
them to gather their whole force in the few days that would be
at their disposition; but conceivably they might think it
worth while to make a eoulltcrstroke with such divisions as
could be got together in haste. It is interesting to know that
such an idea did flash through .Tourdan's mind for a moment,
only to be rejected by King Joseph on the advice of the other
generals 2. Should the French mareh on the 'l'ormes, a grave
responsibility would be placed on Hill's head. He was told to give
them battle' if he was strong enough '-i. e. to judge their force
according to the best information to be had, not an easy thing,
but Hill was pre·eminently clear-headed and averse to unneces~
sary risks. Should they be too numerous, he was not to retire
on Rodrigo by the route by which Wellington had come, but to
throw up his communication with that fortress, and move off
, See the elaborate dispatch of June 28 (to Hill, Dispatchc$, x:. pp. 402-4).
I See Jourdan's jl1tmoires, p. 400.
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in the direction oC Zamora, carrying out at all costs the plan for
the junction of the two wings oC the army 1. Nothing was to
remain behind to cover the Ciudad Rodrigo road and the
Portuguese frontier but the single Spanish division oC Carlos de
Espafla: all convoys on the march from Salamanca were to
be turned off towards Ledesma and Zamora. It might look
perilous to leave Central Portugal unprotected, but 'Yellington
was sure that the enemy would be so distracted by his great
movement north of the Douro, that they would not dare to
advance on Ciudad Uodrigo and Almeida, to strike ab his old
line oC commUl'uentions. Moreover, it would not matter if they
did, for his new line of eommunien.tion wns now entirely north
of the Douro, n.od Oporto, not Lisbon, would be his base.
On the 20th at dawn Wellington rode off to the north-west,
almost unattended, and Hill's responsibility began. It was not
to turn out a heavy onc, since (as his ehicC had foreseen) the
enemy was not in the least thinking of taking up the offensive,
but was rather expecting a continuation of the British advance
from Salamanca. It did not come, and before the French had
made up their minds as to what the halt of the southern column
might mean, they were attacked on the 30th by the northern
column, whose existence had hitherto been hidden from them.
Hill therefore had only to wait for Wellington's directions to
march northward, when the date and route should be given.
These orders did not come till the 2nd of June, so that the
southern corps had to remain for a week in its own cantonments
round Salamanca, doing nothing more than wateh the French,
north and enst, by means of cavalry reconnoissances.
We must now turn to the operations oC the more important
northern corps, which crossed thc Portuguesc frontier on thc
26th, Cour days after Wellington had startcd out in pc~on from
Ciurlad Rodrigo.
\ For all this sce Wellington to Hill, DilJpaftllU, x. pp. 402-4.
SECTION XXXVI: CHAPTER III
OPERATIONS OF GRAHAM'S COLUMN: MAY 2G-JUNE a
ON May 18th Wellington had issued his filial orders for the
ad\'l:Lncc of the great turning force uncleI' Graham, all of whose
troops were due to conycrge on the remote corner of Portugal
between Braganza and Miranda de Dalll'o between the 21st Rnd
21th of the month. Many of them came from long distances,
and had to start early-the Ist Division from Vizeu as early as
]\fay 13th; and left behind it, as hopelessly inefficient from sick-
ness, Howard's brigade of the Guards, reduced to a strength
of 800 bayonets by the fever which had ravaged its ranks
during the spring. Shifted from Vizcu to Oporto for the benefit
of the milder climate, this brigade could not be moved for
another month, and missed the campaign of Vittoriu. The
5th, 6th, and nh Divisions left their winter quarters in the
Bcira. 011 the 14th, the 8rd and 4th, who were close to the Douro
or actually on it, at Moimenta and St. Juao de Pesqueira, eould
afford not to move till the] 6th. To securc a rapid movcment
for the columns whieh had farthest to go, and to save any
congestion of traffie at the usual ferries of passage on the
Douro--bridges there were none-Wellington had collected
a large number of barges alld river ooats at l>eso de Regoa,
St. Joiio de Pesqucira, and the Barm of POl;inho near the
confluence of the COll and the Douro.
The arrangement of the marches was calculated to nllow the
heavy infantry columns to make use as far as possible of the
only two good roads in the Tras-os-i\Iontes, of which the one
goes from the Douro to Braganza, the other to l\1iranda. The
1st and 5th Divisions crossed by the much-used ferry of Peso de
Rcgoa near Lamego, and marched by Villa Real and Mirandella
on two separate routes to the neighbourhood of Braganza 1.
, 'l'hcrc tlrc somc slips ciU,cr ill the origirml or thc copy of thc Marching
Orders printed in Supplementary Dispatches, xiv. pp. 215-16. For Cam-
:redo, given on the itinernry of the 1st Division, is m;lny miles from it,
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'fhe 3rd Division crossed the ferry at St..Joao de Pesqueirll. and
went by Villaflor and Vinhas to Vimioso, half-way between
llragan7.ll and Miranda. All the!>c columns had some cross-road
marching to do, where they were forced to cut across from one
chmt.S8ee to another. The third column, the 4th, 6th, and 7th
Divisions, more fortunate, was on the high rond nearly all the
way: after crossing the Douro at the ferry of l'oyinho. they
marched from Torr€' de Moneorvo by the great chau8see to the
frontier town of Miranda and the neighbouring village of
Malhadns, where they were due to arrive on three successive
days (24th, 25th, 26th May). This column was followed b,)'
the ull-important pontoon-train, and by the reserve of siege
artillery-Portuguese IS-pounders under Major Ariaga I_as
well as by t.he main ammunit.ion train.
The three British cavalry bri!,rades which Wellington had
allotted to the great turning movement, those of Anson, Bock,
and Ponsonby, had been eantoned in the winter months in the
lower lleira, along the coast, and in the valley of the Vouga.
Before the infantry had moved, they had all three been brought
north of the Douro ahout :May 1, through Oporio, and billeted
in Braga, Guimaraens, San Tyrso, and neighbouring villages.
On May 12th orders set them moving eastward to the Bragsl.llza
country-their march was much more fatiguing than tnat of the
infantry divisions, for there are no high roads of any value going
directly from the Braga country to the direction of l\1iranda
and Braganza-all run nort.h and !>outh, not east a.nd west.
Thougn allotted short da.ily stages of only thrce or four leagues,
thc cavalry found tlte route fatiguing-the mountain cross-
roads were more like staircases lhan paths-the horse artillery
accompanying the brigades had in some cnscs to swel·veof[ from
its itinerary and take circuitous turns 2: in others it had to be
though it is on the proper line of the 5th Division, which was going to
Outciro and not to DruganZll. Limao OD the itinerary 01 the 3rd Division
should be Vinhas, if I am not mistaken.
1 Another odd error in Murching Orden> given in Wdlillgtm~ Dispatches,
x. p. 368, had tUnlcd t.he Portuguese hcavy gUlls into infantry' 18th Portu-
guese Brigade' which should read' Portuguese 18-pounder brigade.' There
WM no higher IlUlnucred Purtuguese infantry urigade t1llln the 10th.
'l'hls misprint has misled many historian5.
2 See Tomkinson, p. 232, for the road by Chaves and Monrorte.
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.man-handled down precipitous tracks. The only horsemen
who had an easy job were the Portuguese brigade of D'Urban,
who had been wintering at llraganza, and had only to advance
a few miles to the frontier, and Grant's newly-arrived Hussa.r
Brigade which, coming from the south, followed the infantry
column that went by Tone de l\foncorvo to Mimnda, nlong
the high road all the way.
Pack's and Bradford's Portuguese illfulllry, who (like
D'Urban's dragoons) had wintered north of the Douro, at
Pcnafiel and Villa Real respectively, had a short way to go, and
were timed to arrivc at Braganza before the heavy columns
from the south came up.
Portugal and Spain, as is well known, turn their back!; on
each other for the greater P{\.1't of their long frontier, and though
there were decent chaussees from the Douro to Dragan7.a and
Mirn.nda they stopped short at thc boundary line. From thence
onward there were no good roads till Za,mora, was reached, and
thosc bud ones which existed were country tmeks, only useful
for operations in the summer. That they could be so used, for
all arms, in Ma)' and June, was onc of Wellington's secrets,
which he trusted that thc French would nc\'cr guess. For both
parties during the war had left alone this remote corner of the
Peninsula. The only operations scen Ilear it had been Soult's
spring campaign of 1809, and the forays of Silveira's militia
when they occasionally raided towards Zamora.
Country roads, however, existed between the Sierra dc
Culebra and the bend of the Douro between Zamora and
l\firanda, and the whole detail of Graham's march dependcd on
their practicability: Wellington had caused the whole region
as far as thc Esla to be explored by his inteUigenee officers, and
the report had been that the movement of all arms was possible
in the summer. The permanent bridges of the Esla, from
Denavcntc down to its eonfll;lenee with the Douro, had been
broken long ago; but there was a certain number of fords,
and convenient places for the laying of temporary bridgcs. By
the end of May it was calculated that the spring floods due to
the melting of snows in the Galician and Asturian mountains
would be over, and that the river would be down to its normal
low summer level. On thesc fact'i depended the success of the
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operation, which must be fL rapid onc, in ordcr that thc :French
might have no timc for concentration. But Wellington's
provident mind had taken into consideration the possibility of
unexpected high-water, and as a matter of precaution he had
ordered up his main pontoon-train from the Tagus. To get the
cumbrous pontoons, 33 of them, from Abrantcs to Miranda de
Douro by land was no small matter. They tra\'clled slowly on
specially constructed wheeled trucks 1 by Castello Branco,
Sabugal, and Pinhel, crossed the Douro at Villa Nova de Foscoa,
and were then brought up on the l\Iiranda high road as far as
Villa Velha, where they were halted for a short time, as Welling-
ton was not quite certain whether he would not lay them at
Espadacinta on the middle Douro, rather than farthcr up,
beyond J\liranda. For across the pontoons he intended to lay
the main line of communication between Graham's and Hill's
wings of the army, and if the latter failed to get forward on the
Tormes and to open up touch with Graham via Zamom., it
might be necessary to throw the bridge at some lower point,
such as Espadaeinta 2. On the 20th he made up his mind that
If pontoons should be sent to Espadacinta, while the remaining
19 should proceed to l\Iiranda, and from thence follow the course
of the Douro to the point where they would be laid-probably
the ferry of Villa al Campo, a mile below the' confluence of
the Esla and the Douro. The nineteen all-important trucks with
their burdens reached Miranda safely, and moved close behind
the right-ha.nd column of Gra.ham's army during its advance.
Down to May 26 all the British troops had been kept behind
the l}onuguese frontier, nothing having been sent beyond it save
D'Urban's Portuguese dragoons, who formed a screen some little
way on the Spanish side. Their appearance would, in the event of
a French cavo.lry raid from Zamora, create no suspicion of there
being in the rear anything more than the usual Tras~os-Montes
militia. Nor could spies draw any deduction from their presenc€'.
But on the 20th the whole of Graham's army 3 started out in
three columns arranged as follows:
1. From Braganza marched, as the northern column, Anson's
1 Improvised by dismnnUing artillery earrillges. Wellington to Bathurfit,
DUpatC~I1, x. 388. 2 Wellington to Gnlhlllll, Dispalc1/fJ.Il, x. 1).3tl2.
3 Minus Grant's hussars, who only arrivcd on thc 27th.
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light and Ponsonby's hcavy dragoon brigades, preceding the
1st Infantry division and l>tlck's Portuguese independent
brigade. Crossing the frontier river, the Manzanai:l, at fords by
Nuez, they were ordered to move on Tabara in four marches,
by the country road through Sesnande.
2. From Outeiro and Vimiow marched, ns the central column,
following D'Urbnll's Portuguese light horse (who were already
over the border), Dock's heavy Germnn dragoons accompanied
by the Brd llnd lith Divisions and Bradford's indepcndent
Portuguese brigade. They were directed to move by Alenni7.us
in four marches on 1.osillo, five mile... south of Tnbara.
8. From Mirandn de Douro marched, as the right column,
close to the river, the 4th, 6th, and rthDivisions; their cavalry,
Grant's hussar brigade, overtook thclll on the second day.
Having a shorter distance to cover than the other two columns,
their van was to rcach Carvajales on the 28th, in three marches.
On the BOth the pontoons, which followed in their rear, wcre
to reach the fcrry of Villa al Campo, where it was intended that
they should be laid down across the Douro.
'fhe left-hand or northern column was to gct into touch with
the Army of Galicia-llnrcena's and Losada's divisions and
l'enne Villemur's cavalry, about 12,000 strong, who, marching
from Astorga on the 20th, were to be at the broken bridge of
Bcnavente on the Esla on the 20th-30th.
It will be seen that Graham's force was marching on a very
compact front, the central column being not more than fivc or
six miles distant from each of the flanking ones, so that the
whole could be assembled for action, in the unlikcly event of
opposition being met, in a very few hours. The cavalry scrccn
of five brigadcs Wt\S so strong that it was impossible for auy
French horse which might be in the Zamora direction to pierce
it, or discover what was behind. The whole army counted not
less than 42,000 sabrcsalld bayonets, exclusive of the Galicians-
as strong an Anglo-Portugucsc force as that with which Welling-
ton had fought the battlc of Salamanca, and outnumbering
considerably thc other wing of 'Vcllington's army. which was
marching south of the Doma.
By au extraordinary piece of luck thc attcntion of the French
highcr command was completely distracted at the moment
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from the Esla front, as a result of the last authcntic reports
Wleived from that direction. For as latc as May 20th Reille
had sent Boyer's division of dragoons across the Esla at Bella-
vente, to makc a sweep to the north and west in the direction of
La BanC7.a and the road to Puebla Senabria. They had gonc
almost as far as Astorga without meeting troops of any kind;
and reported that some of the Galician army were at Astorga,
but that they had henrd of no llritish save two or three com-
missaries, who had becn buying up barley and wheat in the
valley of the Tera, which were to be sent back into Portugal I.
Heille drew the natural deduction, that there was nothing
stirring in this part of the world, and Boyer, after thoroughly
destroying the bridgc of Castro Conzalo outside BCllavcntc,
went back to his former cantOlunents cast of the Esla. If the
raid had been maue a week later, he could not have failed to
bring news of the advance of the Galicians, and would probably
have heard of Craham's movemcnts from Braganza and
Miramla de Douro. But by the 27th all the attcntion of thc
French generals was already distracted to Wellington's march
against Salamanca, at the head of Hill's column, and the Esla
front received little notice. There remained opposite the
ad\'I\ncing troops of Graham only Daricau's infantry division
of the Army of the South, with u brigade each at Zamom and
'foro, and three regiments of Digeon's dragoons wntching the
Esla from Snu Ccbrian to its juncture with the Douro, and at
the same time keeping a look-out southward towards Salamanca.
For the cavalry of Hill's column wus already on thc 27th-28th
pushing out northward towards Zamora us well us eastward
towards thc Cunrcna. On the 28th this danger began to prey
so much on Daricau's mind that he withdrew 0.11 his infantry
save four companies from Zalllora, leaving Digcon's dragoolls
practically unsupported to watch mthcr than to defcnd the line
of the Esla. Urgent requests were sent to the cavalry of lhe
l ,Tourdll.n's ,)1tllloiru, p. 4{)4. Note thl'lt NUllier (v. 102) ]m... got thi~
expedition u weck too lute-Muy 29--30. Hill Sllll£mcnt that thc French
cavalry got in touch with the northenl wing of Graham's [Hlny :uld was
closely followcd hy Oritish scouting parties, is C(Intrndietcd by the nlosolutc
silence lloout 11ll)·tOllch willl the I~relleh in the diury of TomkiIlSO/l, whOfiC
regiment was at Tabara and mllst have becn the onc which Buycr would
have met.
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Army of Portugal, farther north along that river, to keep touch
with Digeon and help him if neceiisary.
The cavalry at the head of Graham's three columns reached
their destinations-Tabara, Losilla, Carvajales, on lI-fay 28th-
the infantr)' on the 29th. No French parties were found on the
hither side of the Esla, and though the peasantry reported that
there were vedettcs on the farther bank, none were seen.
Exploration of the course of the Esla, however, led to the
vexatious discovery that the river wus very high, owing to tor-
rential rain on the night of the 28th-29th, and that some of the
fords intended for use were probably impracticable for cavalry,
most certainly so for infantry. Graham, though vexed at the
delay, refused to push across the water with horsemen alone,
and waited for the pontoon-train-due on the 30th-to come
up, resolving to lay it across the Esla, and not across the DOllro
as had been at first intended. l\1emlwhile the Frcnch showed no
signs of life on the 80th-it had been fcarcd that Daricau
might comc out of Zamora, only eight miles away, with
infantry and guns, to oppose the passage. But, as wc have
seen, he had really departed on the 28th, and there was nothing
opposite Graham but a cavalry screen. The main attaek
seemed to the French generals to be on the side of Salamanca,
where Wellington was known to have been present on May 27th.
Digeon had discovered on the 29th that there were llritish
troops on the opposite bank of the Esla, but had no notion of
their strength or purpose 1.
But if Wellington's presence marked the danger-point, it was
now suddenly displaced. On the morning of the 29th the
British Commander-in-Chief had gone off on one of his not
unusual lightning rides. Starting early from Salamanca, he
rode by Ledesmo. to the Douro opposite Mironda-over 50 miles
~bcforc dark. Facing Miranda there is no road on thc Spanish
side, the river descends fiercely in something likc cataracts, with
I Diboeon's own report, which chanced to be entirely inllceurllte, wus
that on the 29th llls reoonnaissance reported that there were signs or
intentions to throw trestle bridges aeross tIle Esla opposite the rord of
1II0relllls. the lowest ford on the Eslo.loward the Douro, "lid III Suntll Eu-
ferina opposite San Ccbriall, where Spanish troops were visible. Also that
at Almendro. there WlI.!I a post of British hussars. Only the third Item was
correct. (ATc1lives Nalilma/Q---COpy lent me by !Ill'. Forlescue.)
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high rocks on its eastern bank. The only communication fTom
shore to shore was by a rope and basket contrivance, worked
by a windlass, and stretched high above the water. Dy this
strange method Wellington crossed the Douro-what would
have been the results of the campaign of 1813 if the ropes had
been rotten? He slept at Miranda, started off at dawn on the
80th and was at Carvajalcs-20 miles away-by the o.fternoon,
not so tired but tho.t he eould write dispatches to Bill and Giron
that night, an~ settle with Grnhnm the dispositions for next
morning.
Wellington's first decision wus that the pontoons, which had
conic up on the BOth, should be laid no~ on the Douro at Villa aI
Campo, but on the Esla opposite Almendra, .where the high
road from Puebla Senahria to Zamorn crossed the river. Dut
at tbe same time attempts were to be made to get cavalry (and
infantry if possible) aqross the water at other points.
At dawn on the 31st Grant's hussar brigade entered the ford
of Almendra, where it wa.<; intended that the bridge should be
laid; each man of the leading squadron had an infantry soldier
of the 7th Division hanging on to his stirrup. At the same time
Bock's German dragoons and D'Urban's Portuguese essayed the
ford at Pallomilla, opposite Montemarta, four miles up-stream.
The hussars crossed with great trouble-the bottom was stony,
the water had risen in the night, some horses lost their footing-
many of the infantry stepped into holes, or stumbled and were
carried away. The majority were snved. but ten of the 51st
and rather more of the Brunswiekers were swept right down·
stream and drowned: Yet, despite mishaps, the hussars got ovcr,
und, advancing rapidly, surprised the French cavalry picquet at
the village of Val de Perdriees, a little way up-stream, taking
it whole-un officcr and 32 men. This was certainly about the
most extraordinary instam,.'c of carelessness Oil the part of
outposts during the war, and relleets us much discredit on
Digeon, whose dragoons were supposed to be watching the lower
Esla, as on the wretched officer in charge of the piequet. How
was it possible that such a large body as a brigade could
approach in daylight the best·known ford of the neighbourhood,
at a spot where the course of the high road showed the con-
venience of the passage, without finding a single vedctte on the
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bank? And why was such an important point watched (or
not watched) by a half-troop, instead of by a force which could
have orfered at least a momentary opposition, and ha....e passed
the nJarm to its regiment, which, as Digeon's report shows, was
at Iniesta, only four miles to the rear?
Meanwhile Boek's Germans and D'Urbo.n's Portuguese
dragoons had an equally difficult, though equally unopposed,
passage at the ford of Palomilla, four miles up-stream. The
river was running furiously, and seven or eight horses and three
or four men were washed away and drowned. Anson's light
dragoons at the head of the third column had an even worse
experience at San Vineente del BareD, opposite San Cebrian :
the ford was found utterly impracticable, and the brigade was
ordered back toward Tabara: on its way it WfLS turned off to
~ second projected crossing-spot farther south. Tills was also
discovered to be hopeless, and finall?l' the whole northern
column was ordered to cross at Ahnendra, behind the southern
column. After a day's profitless countermarching \ it came
down thither, to find thc pontoons h\id, the infantry of the
southern column all aeross the ri\'er, and well forward, while
that of the centre column was crossing rapidly. In the end all
Graham's troops save the leading cavalry brigades 'hall to use
the bridge,
Meanwhile Grant's hussars, ad\,ancingon Zamora, found tha\)
the Freneh had eys.euated it in haste on the fll'st news of the
crossing of the Esla. Digcon, with his two regiments of dragoons,
his half-battery of horse artillery, and the four companies of
voltigeurs, had gone orc to Toro, Wellington therefore was
able to oecupy Zamora without opposition on the night follow-
ing the passage of the fords 2, and moved his head-quarters
thither next day. The moment that he knew that Daricau
and Digeon had absconded, he sent orders to lIil1 to march not
011 Zamora, or thc ford of Villa al Ctlmpo, as he had at first
intended, but directly on Toro, which would save twenty miles
I 'l'omkillsoll S:l.)'S Umt hi.... regilllcnt. the 16th Light Drngoons, was
20 hours on horseback this day, continually hurricd olT and counter-
marching (p. 235),
2 Julilln Snnche7:'<; IUllccrs. from Hill's wing, moving hurn Pennmoclll!c,
got in the snmc night to Zamorn.
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marching for the right wing. For it was clear that Digeol1 and
Daricau could not hold Toro with some,6,OOO men against
Graham's 40,00U, now acro!'lS the Esla nnd in close pur!'luit of
them. And there was no great body of Frcnch availnble to
reinforce thcm within a couple of days' mnrch-at most Reille's
horse and one infantry division could have come up. On .Tu.ne 1st
the signs were th..'\t the enemy would not stand-Digeon's
dragoons were falling back on the Toro road-Rei lie's cavalry,
hcard of at Delver in the morning, had gone off eastward
towards Medina del Rio Seeo in haste. Wherefore Wellington
pushed on fast on that day, sending on Graham's columns by the
two roads Zo.mora-'J'oro and Zamorn-Uio Seco, whieh do not
diverge suUiciently to make it impossible to concentrate the
troops on them in a few hours. But caution proved unnecessary.
The French evoeuo.ted Toro in the afternoon, so .that the
junction-point with Hill was safely secured, and Graham's
divisions were prcsent in full force next morning, to covcr the
passage of the southern wing aeross the Douro.
Wellington mo\'cd his head-quarters la Toro on the mQrning
of June 2nd, and sent out his cavalry on all the roads which
branch out from it: Anson's and Bock's brigades going north-
east occupied Vezdemarhcll. Grant's hussars pushing along the
river-road towo.rd Tordcsillas came up with Digcon's rear at
Morales, six miles outside Toro, and fell upon it vigorously.
The French dragoons-two regiments-were drawn up in a
defensive position, with a swamp in front and bridge over
a ravinc behind. Grant charging furiously with the 10th
Hussars Ilnd the 18th in support on the flank, broke the front
regiment, whereupoll the enemy went to the rear in disorder, and
was chased for two miles, prisoners being captured in consider-
able numbers. At last pursuers and pursued rail in on the rear
brigade of Darieau's infantry, drawn up in good order, willl
a battery across the road, on the heights of Pedroso del Rey.
Grant had therefore to call off his men, and to wait for the
enemy to retire, which they presently did in good order. Two
ornecrs alld 208 men, all of the 16th Dragoons, were captured \
1 Digcon hu.~ 1111 elnbomte flnl! unconvincing n....oount or this nfTnir
ill the IOllg dispatch quoted nbove. He says that he had two rogimenb
(10th Dud 21st Dragoons) drown up in front or~, bridge and ravine, awaiting
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about a hundred of them wounded 1; the rest wcre mainly takcn
owing to the bad condition of their mounts, ' raw-boned horses
with evident marks of bad provender, escort duties. and
counter-mnrches-nearly the whole of them had horrible sore
backs.' The loth Hussars had only 16 casualties-onc of them
an officer who had pmsued incautiously ::I.lld ridden into the
Frcnch infantry, by whom he was woundcd and taken prisoner.
TILis was a good day's record for the loth Hussars, who started
their first Peninsular service-they had only landed in February
-with a very handsome success.
During the day of the combat of Morales Hill's infantry had
stnrted oU from their billets in the villages ten miles north of
Salamanca to move on 'roro. A forced march of over twenty
miles, through Fuentesauco, across a very bare and desolate
country, brought the head. of the column down to the Douro,
where they eneampcd among well-watered fields and vegetable
gardens. < Offieers and men, after the long sultry day, devoured
with zest and relish the raw cabbages, onions, and melons.'
Next morning (June 3rd) the whole column began to erosslthe
river at Toro, the artillery and baggage by a ford no more than
knee-deep, the infantry by the fine but broken bridge. Only
onc arch of it had been blown up, nnd a resourceful engineer,
Lieutenant Pringle, ho.d contrived an easy method of utilizin'g
it. A row of long ladders had been laid against each side of the
gap in the roadway: their feet inclined together l\nd united in
Ule return of a reconnaissance scnt to Toro: Ulat the detachment arrived
hotly pursued by Dritisb bussars, whereupon be resolved to retire, and
told the brign.de to file ncross the mviue. But the 16th Dmgoons charged
without omers, in order to 8IIW Ule !lying party, and got engaged agaInst
foudold numbers, while the 21st 'was retiring. They did wonders: killed
or wounded 100 hussars, captured an offioer lllld 13 mell, nlllt retired
llghting on the battery and infantry at Pedroso, losing only 100 men.
, Two officers ot the 16th were taken: the lists in Martinicn show onl)·
onc more officer wounded-from whieh we should gather that tJle resist.'1nec
must have been poor. For n regimcnt fighting strongly should have had
more officer·casualties than tluee to 208 other mnks. The 10th Drngoollll
must hllVc been pretty well destroyed_wilh 1 ofnoer IUlU 108 mCll un'
wound(.,{) prisoners, 1 officer and 100 men wounded prisoners, und 1 olllcer
and an unknown number ot other ranks wounded but not captured. Thi.'l
WIIS the SlIme regiment which 11lId lost the 1 officer and 32 men t!lken by
their own carelessness ut Vul dc l)crdiecs Oil the 31st. It had Ix:en Iws
than 400 strong by its last prcscrwd morning.statc.
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the shallow water below. Long and stout planks had then been
laid across, resting at each end on the rungs of each pair of
corresponding ladders, and making a sort of platform. 'fhe
men went down the upper rungs of one set of ladders, walked
a few steps over the planks, and ascended by the rungs of the
ladders on the other side. This was rather tedious for the
pnssage of four divisions, and took the whole day and the foUow-
ing morning. But by 11001\ on Jtule 4 the entire army was
concentrated in the vicinity of Toro on the north bank. Its
ClLvO.lry was many miles in advance, at Pcdroso del Rey on the
Tordesillas road, Almaraz and ViIlavelid 011 the Rio Seco rood.
Parties sent ont northward had got in touch with Giron's
Galiciuu army, which had passed Benavcnte on June 1 and
reached Villalpando on the 8rd, with Pennc VilIemur's squadrons
out in its front.
Thus cvery man of Wellington's striking force, 80,000 sabres
and bayoncts, was concentrated north of Toro on the night of
June 3-all the British in a single mass, the Galicialls some
18 miles oU on the flank, but. easily a\'ailablc. Nothing was now
south of the DOLUO save (Aulos de Espafia's Spanish division,
Icft to garrison Salamanca, and Juliall Sanchcz's horse, who
were searching the roads south of the river, and had justcaptured
a large French cavalry patrol at eastro Nuno, near Pollos. It
seemed to Wellington incredible that the enemy would reply to
his stroke at their communications by a similar stroke at his on
the Salamanea-Rodrigo line. Indeed, all reports showed them
moving north, in order to form opposite him on the north bank
of the Domo. Moreover, it was elear that they would have the
greatest difficulty in concentrating a sufficient force to fight him,
for the possession of Valladolid and the defence of the great
northern clutU88ee. The first stage of his plan had been com-
pleted with entire success.
SECTION XXXVI: CHAPTER IV
l\IOVE~mNTS OF THE FHENCH: MAY 22---JUNE 4,
AT the moment when Wellington launched his two great
columns into Spain, the French head-quarters staff was in
a condition of nervous expectation. The spring was so far
advanced that it had been expected that the Allies would have
been already on the move, an'd their long quiescence W3S
supposed, very reasonably, to co....er some new plan which it
was impossible to divine. The position of the French armies
was very unfavourable, entirely owing to the continued absence
from the front of the whole infantry of the Army of Portugal,
which, by Napoleon's desire and by the detailed instructions of
the Minister of War at Paris, had been lent to the Army of the
North, Imd sent. backward into Biscay, Nuvarre, und Aragon
to hUllt thc gucJ'rillcro~. I<'ivc and a half out of the six divisions
of Rcillc's command wcre still occupied on thcse marches and
countermarches in the rear, when May was far spent, and
when the offensive of the Allies must be expected at cvery
moment.
The French army, available for immediate operations, was
therefore short of one·third of its strength, and J ourdan and
King Joseph disliked the situation. Jourdan confesses in his
I\femoirs that he and his master ought to have ordered Clausel
to suspend his operations, however incomplete they might be,
and to send baek all the borrowed infantry to the valley of the
Douro. But the minister's letters kept repeating so often that
the campaign north of the Ebro must be completed at all
costs, that the King considered that he could do no more than
transmit to Paris the warnings that he was receiving, urging on
the minister that it was time to suspend those operations, and
that General Clausel should be ordered to come baek in haste
towards Burgos 1. This self·cxeulpation of Jourdan shows
clearly enough the miserable consequences of the system of
1 Jourdan, ,lftmoiru, p. '\'(l3.
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double-comma.nd whicll'Napolcon had always kept up in Spain.
The habit of sending orders direct from Paris to fractions of the
Army of Spain was so deeply ingrained, that the titular Com-
mander-ill-Chief and his Chief of the Staff dared not issue
instructions of primary importance to onc of the generals
under them without obtaining leave from the Emperor I And
at this moment the Emperor was not even at Paris-he had
long been at the front in Germany, and had fought the battle
of Liitzen on May 2. What came from Paris was not even the
orders of Napoleon, but the orders of Clarkc, transmitting his
impression of the imperial will from dispatches already many
days old, which would be doubly out of date before they
renched Valladolid. The supreme mastcr must take the
responsibility of the f!\Ct that on .May Iv or !\lay 18 his repre-
sentatives in Spain wcrc nsking for leave to modify his arrange-
ments, by petitions which could receive no reply-for mere
reasons of space and time-till the crisis which they were
fcaring had burst upon them. The whole system was ruinous-
in 1813 as it had been in 1812. The only rational method
would have been to turn o....er the whole conduct of affairs in
Spain to some locnl authority, supreme in everything and
responsible for everything. Yet stronger men than Joseph
and Jourdan would perhaps have taken the risk of offending
their master, and have issued peremptory orders, which Clausel,
Foy, and the other outlying generals would probably have
obeyed.
On May20thedistribution of the Army of Spain wasas follows:
King Joseph and the 2,500 men of his guards, horse and foot,
lay ut gcncml hcad-quarters ut ValludoJid. Of the two'
illf,mlry divisions of D'Erlon's Army of the Centre, Olle, that of
Darmagllae, bad bCClllent to RcilIe, wllcn all the infantry of the
Army of Portugal had been borrowed from him, and was lying
at Medina de Rio Seeo, ill the reur of Reille's cavalry, who were
watching from a discreet distance the Army of Galieia and the
roads in the direction of Astorga nnd Leon. It will be remem-
bered that 011 May 20 Reille, bearing vague rumours of allied
movements beyond the Esla, had executed a great s .....eep with
Boyer's dragoons across the bridge of Benuvente, and for five
leagues beyond it, had found nothing, and had reported that
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there were no British troops in the direction, and no Spaniards
nearer than Astorga I.
The other division of the Armyofthc Centre, thatofCassagne,
was at Segovia, far south of the Domo, keeping touch with
the large garrison still left in Madrid, which, as long as it was
maintained there, could not be left in a state of absolute isolation.
Of the Army of the South, Ga7'.an had his head-quarters at
Arevo.lo, not very far from the King at Vnlladolid, but retained
with him only Tilly's cavalry division. The rest of his troops
were wofulIy dispersed. Daricau's division and Digcon's
dragoons lay at Zamofll. and Toro-nearly 100 miles frOID head-
quarters-maintaining a loose touch with Rcillc's cavalry.
Villattc-with onc detached regiment of Digcon's dragoons to
keep watch for him~was at Salamanca~fifty miles from
Daricau. Conroux, with a third division, was at Avila, with
a whole block of mOllntains between him and Villatte. He was
supposed to be watching Hill, and had detachments as far out
as Monbeltran on the borders of Estrcmaduru. He was also
separated from the force at Madrid" by several sierras llnd the
formidable pass of the Gundarrama. In the capital itself lay
Leval with onc more di vision, while the independent brigade
of Maransin 2, had been intermittently holding Toledo, and
was actually there on the 20th, in company with a brigade of
light cavalry under Pierre Soult 3. The extreme outer flanks
of the Army of the South were as far apart therefore as Zamom.
and Toledo--160 miles as the crow f1ics-and a Spanish crow
has rough country to flyover-and each of them was some
90 miles by road from the head-quarters in the centre.
As to the infantry of the Army of ]}ortugal, the only clement
of it which lay anywhere near head-quarters was a brigade of
Maucunc's at Palencia on the Carrion, which was guarding
a large depot of stores and transport. The other brigade of
Mo.ueune's was at Burgos. Lamartiniere's division (late that
commanded for so long by Bonnet) was watching the great
• Sce above, p. 827. a 45th Ligne and 12th Uger.
3 2nd Hu.ssars, 5th and 10th CIIa88ettTIJ d Chtvl'll. For nn interesting
narrative of 1I1l1ransin'!J and P. Soult's man~uvres about Toledo, sce the
book of Wellington's intelligence officer, Leith Hay, who was then a prisoner
with them, having been captured while soouting (vol. ii. pp. Hz-65).
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chaussee from Burgos by Briviesea to Miranda del Rbro, in
order to keep touch with Clausel in Navarre. Similarly Sarrut's
division, after its long and fruitless chase of Longa, was keeping
safe the roads from Bilbao to Miranda, in order to link Foy with
thc main army. Foy himself was 011 thc shores of the Bay of
Biscay, where hc had stormed Castro-Urdiales on May 12, and
was trying to make o.n end of the local guerrilleros. The other
two divisions of Reille's infantry were lost to sight in the
mountains of Navarrc, wherc they were marching and counter-
marching with Clauscl, in pursuit of the elusive Mina. These
were the divisions of Taupin and of Barbot: the troops which
were working along with them were the two' active' divisions
o{ the Army of the North, those of Abbe and Vandcrmacsen.
Clausel's grcat flying column, of 15,000 men or more, was so con-
tinually on the move through regions where cross·communication
was impossible, owing to the insurrection, that it could not be
located with certai.nty on any given date, or receive instruction
without a delay that might run to eight or ten days.
Obviously it would take the French army a week to coneen·
trate on Valladolid or Arevalo, if Wellington should be aiming at
Salamanca and the Central Douro. But if he were about to
attack onc of the extreme wings, at Zamora or Madrid, the
time required would be much greater. And Joseph and JOl,lrdan
were not at all sure that the secret plan of Wellington might
not be a thrust, with Hill's force as the spear-head, at Madrid.
One of the many false rumours sent to head-quarters was that
forage had been ordered for Long's cavalry at Escalona on the
'l'iet.'lr, many miles in front of Talavera. \Vhile another report
truly chronicled the concentration of Hill's brigades at Dejar,
and the gathering of stores there, but interpreted their meaning
as preparation {or n march on A....Ua by the Puente de Congosto.
Uncertain as to what was W'ellington's plan, the French
Highcr Command finally rcsol\'ed to await its manifestation
before giving the final orders-a system which was certain to
lead to some initial loss of territory at the opening of the
campaign, since the enemy would have a wcek in hand, before
he could be opposed by 0. sufficient mass on the line which he
might select. On t.fay 18th Jourdan ordered Ga1.an to push
exploring recOlmaissances towards the Portuguesc frontier,
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and, if Wellington should be met advancing, to order Leval to
evacuate Madrid, to send forward all his cavalry to support
Villatte at Salamanca, and, when the latter should be driven in,
to have his whole army ready to receive him behind the line of
the Traballcos river, except Daricau's division, which should
remain at Toro. Rcillc was to bring forward Dnrmagnac's
infantry from Rio Seeo to support his cavalry 011 the Eslu, and
to unite Maucunc's scattered force by calling up his rear brigade
from Burgos, so as to proddc a reserve fur Darmagnac. If
Wellington should advance, as was thought most probable,
from Ciudad Rodrigo, marching on Salamanca in full strength,
and driving in Villatte, it was intended to bring in all the troops
of Gazan and D'Erlon to the north bank of the Douro, and to
defend the course of that river from Toro to Tordesillas, as
Marmont had done in June 1812. lfthe British showed strength
011 the Eslo., which was thought unlikely, Reille would reinforce
Daricau and Digeon with all his cavalry and the divisions of
Darmaglll~e !Uld Maueune. But no definite ~rders were sent
either to Clauscl l or to Foy, Sarrut, and LamRrtinicrc-thc
direction::> to be given them would depeml Oil thc ::>tl'cngth
which the British displayed, and the front on which they
appeared. Thus a week or more after Wellington should have
shown his hand, the two armicfI of the South and Centrc, with
the cavalry and onc infantry division of the Army of Portugal,
ought to be concentrated on the required points north of the
Douro, with the possibility of bringing up la-ter the five missing
divisions of the Army of Jlortugal, and Clausel's two disposable
divisionfl from the Army of the North. But these last might
take a very long time to appear, and meanwhile there would
only be 45,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry in hand opposite
Wellington 2. Considering the latter's estimated numerical
superiority, it seemed that he might be brought to a stand,
but hardly beaten, by the forces which the King eould collect:
, ClauseJ was sent a dispatch on May 27 110/ ordcring him to come
south at once, but requesting' him to scnd baek Baroot, Taupin, nnd Foy
it his OlJCrutions were !lOW completed in NU\'tlrre! Mblwiru du RQi Joseph,
ix.230.
• Vi>;. four and a hall divisions of tJJe Army of the South, two of the
Army of the Centre, one of the Army of Portugal, the J(jng's French
Guards, nnd his trilling Spanish auxiliary for:ce.
18131 PLAN TO DEFEND n·n: DOURO LINE
A defensive campaign on the Douro was really Jourdun's
forceast of the game; it might perhaps be turned into an
o[[ellsi ...·e, when the missing divisions of the Army of Portugal
and Clausc1 should come up, with some 30,000 men of rein-
forcements.
It is a nervous business to wait for the move which finally
betrays the enemy's intention, as everyone knows who remem·
bers August 1914. It was probably with some feeling of relief
Umt Gazan at Arc\'~lo and King Joseph at Palellcia heard,
on the 2.1th, that Wclliul:,'toll had passed the Agucda on the
2211d, and was apparently marching on Salamanca in great
strcngth. Conroux scnt in ncws that Hill was at the same timc
marching up from Bejar northward-not turning east. Thc
campaign thereforc, as it appeared, was to take the form
which had seemcd most probable, and the hypothetical orders
for concentration which had been issued to the generals on the
18th became valid. But Gazan lost a day in evacuating Madrid,
by riding over from Arevalo to Valladolid and formally request-
ing the King's authorization for the n'treat of Leval from the
capital. So the aide-de-camp bearing thc dispatch of recall only
started from Valladolid on thc morning of thc 25th, instead of
from Arevalo on the afternoon of the 24th: it was clear there-
fore that Leval would bc late at the concentration point.
The other parts of the French scheme were carried out
according to plan between the 25th and the 29th. When
Villatte found himself attac}ced at Salamanca, and got away
with some loss eastward on the 26th, he fell back on Medina
del Campo, and found waiting for him there on the 28th
Conroux's division from Avila and the division of cavalry which
Gazan had been kceping at his head·quarters at Arevalo-
'filly's dragoons. D'Erlon was in march from Segovia with
Cassagne's division and Treillard's horse, and had reached
Olmedo, only fifteen miles from Medina. so that he would be
available next day. The whole made up a force of 10,000 foot
and 4,000 horse. But Leval was late,' and would not be up for
three days more, nor had Maucune's brigade yet come down
from Burgos, while Daricau and Digeon began to look uncom-
fortably remote ill their position at Toro and Zamora, where only
Reille could reaeh,them.
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Joscph and Jourdan had intended to take position behind
the Zapardiel on the 30th. there to demonstrate against Welling-
ton, who ought b)' this time to be coming down upon them. It
was necessary to hold him in check till Lcval should have got
in from 'Madrid to join the main body, and then all would
retire beyond the Douro, to the intended dcfensh·c position.
But this day two disquieting facts became notable: onc WRS
that 'Vcllillgton was not advancing from Salamanca: the
troops that he had brought thit.her had not moved since the
26th. The other was that Digcon scnt word that there were
allied forces approaching the lower Esla from the direction of
Bragallza, although Rcille had reported ten days back that
there were absolutely no signs of allied movement from this
direction-their numbers were as yet incalculable. The
suspicion, then for the first time, arose that the Salamanca
advance might be a mere feint, despite of Wellington's personal
appearance in that direction.
On the morning of June' 1st suspicion becnme certainty.
Digeon rcported that the British hud crossed the Esla in
great force, by scvcral fords, and that he and Daricllu
were retiring on Toro at once. Joseph would havc likcd to
go bch.ind thc Douro without delay, but could not possibly do
so until Lcval, Maransin, and Pierrc Soult should havc come
up from the south. And the Madrid t'Olumn was not due on
the Douro for two more days, owing to its late start-no fault
of its own, but duc to Gazan's dilat.ory conduct on :May 2,~th.
Leval had onl)' got the order to evacuate thc capital on the
2tith. Luckily for him l\laransin had come in with his flying
column from Toledo on the 21st, so that there was no need to
wait to piek up this detachment. The garrison was directed to
be under arms"for marching at daybreak on the 27th, and with
them went a considerable train of AJra.llcesado refugees, for
many of .Joseph's ministers and courtiers had refused to sLut
by thc Co.'\r1ier convoys, which had gone to Valladolid in March
and April, hoping that emigration might nevcr again become
necessary. The remembrance of' the miserable march to
Valencia in July ]812 weighed on their minds, and made them
unwilling to face a second hegira of the same sort. Now all had
to go; and quant.ities of carriages, carts, wagons, and mules
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belonging to civilians wcrc mixcd with, or trailed behind, the
columns of Lcval's infantry. The convoy could not travel vcry
fast; it only rcached thc foot of the mountains on the night of
thc 27th, crossed the Guadarril.ma pass on the 28th, and reach~d
Espinar on the northern dcscent on the 29th. Here Lcval
turned off the baggage and rC£ngecs on to the 1'000 of Segovia,
undcr charge of un escort commanded by General lIngo, late
Governor of Madrid. He himself with the fighting men went on
to Arevalo by the great clluussee, rCllchcd the Domo on thc 2nd
of June, and joined Gazan atTordesillas. The latter had crossed
the river 011 May 31st, the momcnt that it becamc clear that the
Madrid column was not going to bc intercepted by any British
force from the Salamanca direction. D'Erlon passed the Douro
only 011 June 2, the same day as Leval, having waited behind
to cover the arrival of the column of refugees and transport
from Madrid, which had been directed on Segovia and Cuellar.
On June 2nd therefore the south bank of the Douro had been
at last evacuated by all the French forces, but .Tourdan's and
.Toseph's plan for defending the northern bank was obviously
out of date and impossible. For Wellington wa.t; already at
Toro with Graham's 40,000 men, and there was no means of
preventing Hill's 30,000 and the Galicians from joining him
north of the river. The Salamanca column, if only the ]i'rench
had known it, was already marching north, to fall in alongside
of the other and larger mas!'; of the allied army, and was due
at Toro next day (June Srd).
This last fact was, of course, unknown at French head·
quarters on the afternoon of June 2nd-all that had transpired
was that Wellington was at '1'01'0 with a very large force, and
the Galicians close by his !lank on the llenavente road. The
exact position of the imperial army was that Ga'l..nn, with four
and a half infantry divisions of the Army of the South flnd nil
the cavalry of Digeon, '1'ilIy, and Pierre Soult, was concentrated
on a ten·milc front between Tordesillas and Torrelobaton:
HeiJIe, with Darmagnac's division and Boyer's cavalry, was
at ?tfedina de Rio Seco, twelve miles farther north. D'Erlon,
with Cussagne's division and Treillard's dro.goons, was at
Vallndolid, fifteen miles behind '1'ordesillas; the King and his
Guards at Cigales, ten milcs north of D'Erlon, twelve miles east
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of Rcille. Maucune's two brigadcs hud at last conccntratcd II.t
Palcllcia-somc 25 fililc~ north of Valladolid. There was now
a very solid mass of troops, which <.'Ould be united at onc spot-
Torrelobaton for example-by a concentric march, taking up
one day, or could on the ot.her hand string itself out in a well
closed-up front behind the Carrion and l'isucrga rivers, from
Palencia to Simancas, to defend the line of those streams.
The force was fonnidnhle-ovcr 40,000 bayonets, quite 10,000
sabres. It was physically possible either to mass and offer
Wellington a battle, or to stand fn~t to defend the line of the
Pisucrga. But would either course be prudent, considering
that Hill could join Wellington with case at Toro, so that the
entire Anglo-Portuguesc army could be concentrated for a
general action, not to speak of the Galieians of Giron on his
flank 1 Exact calculations as to the allied strength were impos-
sible-bilt it would certainly exceed 70,000 men: some of the
French generals put it at 90,000. To engage in an open battle
west of the Pisuerga against such superior numbers would be
insane. But what of the idea of taking up a defensive line east
of that river, in the hope of rallying Foy, Clauscl, and other
outlying forces within a weck or ten days? Marmont had done
weH with his position behind a river in July 1812, and had only
been ruined at Salamanca because he had left his strong line
and attacked with insufficient numbers.
There was mueh debate at head-quarters on the afternoon of
June 2. Several policies were discussed, even, as it would
appear, a desperate suggestion of .Tourdan's to bring the whole
army baek southwa.rd across the Douro, to Medina del Campo
and Olmedo, and defy 'Vellington to cross its front so as to eut
the Durgos road and the communication with France. 'It is
doubtful whether Wellington would have dared to continue his
march to the Carrion, and to abandon his line of conne:xioll with
Portugal,' writes JOllJ'dan; • more probably he would have
repassed the Domo, to follow the French army, which could
then have retired up-stream to Aranda, and from thence either
on Durgos or on Saragossa. Time wou.ld htwe been gaincd-
Clausel would have come up, and we could have fought on
ground more suitable for eavnlry I.' 'This most hazardous
I Jourdan. lUbnoirts, p. 466.
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plan would ha\'c commenced by abandoning to the enemy all
Old Castile and Biscay, with the l''reneh forces scattered in
them; for even if Wellington had followed the King with his
Anglo-Portuguese army, Giron's Calieians and the insurgents
of the North-Longa, Porlier, El Pastor, and the rest-would
have been left free to clear the whole country up to the Pyrenees.
The French detachments in the North must have retired 011
Bayoune. King Joseph and the generals rejected the scheme
at once, on the ground that Napolcon's orders had always
insistcd on the retention of the direct road to France, by
Burgos and Vittoria, as the most important of all considerations.
This was undoubtcdly a correct decision. Not only was the road
along the south bank of the Douro to Amnda a very bad one,
through an exhausted country, but it is clear that, if they took
it, the French would never have got back again on to the Burgos
lin,e, but would have been forced to take the Samgossa line.
The way from Aranda by Soria to Saragossa was through
a rough country infested by Duran, the Empecinooo, and other
active gucrrillero leaders. It could ncver have servcd as the
main artery of communication for an army of the sizc of King
Joseph's. But suppMing that the King should have reached
S:nagpssa, his only touch with France would be through
Barcelona and ROUSSi1l0ll, for there is no decent carriage road
from Saragossa across the Central Pyrenees-the difficult pass
by Jnca having often been tried and found wanting, save for
small and unencumbered detachments. '1'0 base the whole
army of Spain on Perpignan instead of Bayonne would have
been hopelessly impractieabl~.
The question as to whether the line along thc Pisucrga, from
Palencia to opposite Simancas, could not be held was the
rcall)· hard problem. it was 35 miles long, well marked, but with
local faults; the water was low; there were points where the
west bfl,nk commanded the east; from near Valencia to Cabezon
tile only good road WflS on the western side of the river, and so
out of control; while the bad path on the eastern side WfiS cut up
by three streams coming in from the high plateaux of the province
of llurgos. In the rcar there was the defile of 'J'orquemada,
where the road and the Pisuerga itself came out of the upland.
After pondering over the qucstion, Joscph decided that the
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Pisuergll was too dangerous a line to hold, that he was still too
weak in nwnbcrs, and that he had better fall back on Burgos,
and wait in position there, on ground much more defensible
than the broad plains of the Pisuerga and the Carrion, for the
arrival of the missing division!'! of the Army of Portugal and of
Clause!.
On the evening of the 2nd orders were issued that all the
impedimenta of the Army of Spain should move off northward
at once. The Grand Park and other transport, the Spanish
refugees with all their carriages and lumbcr, the Frcnch civil
administrators, the King's ministers with his private baggage
and treasure, and much misccllaneous stuff from the royal
palaces-pictures, books, and antiquities-were to start ott at
once on the road to Burgos. One great convoy was dispatched
that night, a second and still larger one the following morning.
Escort was found for them from the King's Spanish troops, .the
so-called' division' of Casa Palaeios, and other detachments,
making up 4,000 men in all. On the afternoon of the 3rd the
army executcd a gcneral movemcnt of retreat, leaving only
a ea...·ulry screcn behind, to observe 'VeUingLon's advance. The
Army of the South came back through Valladolid, after blowing
up all the bridges on the lower Pisuerga and the neighbouring
streams, and then marched up it,> western bank to Cabczoll.
Reille evacuated Medina de Rio Seco and fell back on llalencia,
.where he picked up Maucune. Head-quarters and the King's
guard moved to Magoz. just south of }laleneia. D'Erlon
marched from Valladolid to Dueiias. ten miles farther south
than Magoz, and made ready to blow up the bridge there and
cross to the other side of the Pisuerga. The whole army was
collected in a space of 15 miles, and halted for two days, in
II safe position for retreat on Durgos, when it should be prcssed.
For Joseph and .Jourdan naturally wished to gain time--every
day that passed made it more likely that the missing divisions
from the North would be hcard of, or even be reported as
app.roaching. Yet it would seem that cven yct no direct and
peremptory orders had been sent to Clausel, for Jourdan writes
in his Memoirs that' the King suspended the retrograde move-
ment because he thought to gain time, and hoped that the
Minister ~r War would have givc-n orders to General Claw.:el to
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come down on Burgos 1.' Again the wretched system of double-
command and constant reference to Paris was working! If it
be remembered tllat it was only on the 18th of May that the
King had made his final appeal to the minister to let loose
Clauscl from the northern operations, and that the news of
'VeIlingtou's adual advance had only been sent to Franee on
the 24th, when could it be expected that the directions from
Paris would rcnch the scattered columns lost inlhe mountains of
Navarre? And wus there any certainty that Clarke would
visualize the full dunge! (If the position, and givc at once the
kind of orders that the King desircd? Hc might send instead
a lecture Oil the Emperor's intentions, if past experiem..'C was to
be trusted, and some suggestions which the events of the last
ten days would have put completely out of date.
• Jourdun, I11blUnra, p. 467.
SECTION XXXVI: CHAPTER V
THE Ol'EllATlONS AROUND BURGOS : JUNE 4-14
ON J\UlC Srd Wellington had halted the infantry of Graham's
column at Toro, in order to allow the whole of Hill's column to
cross the bridge and fords, and to complete the junction of the
army. He gave as his reasons that he expected to meet Cazan,
D'Erlon, and the King, on the Hormija river, when he should
have debouched from Toro, and that he intended to fight them
with his whole force, not with the northern column only. 'I do
not think,' he wrote, ' that we arc so close up or so well concen-
trated as we ought to be, to meet the enemy in the strength in
which he will appear on the Hormijo., probably to·morrow ; and
therefore I propose to halt the heads of the different columns
to-morrow, and close up the rear of each, moving Hill in this
direction preparatory to our further movement 1.' Only the
cavalry continued to press forward on the 3rd; thcy found no
signs of resistance, but only vcdcttcs, which retired cautiously
on their approach. Wellington was so far right in'his apprehen-
sion, that the idea of fighting in front of Valladolid had been
one of the three pluns which the :F'rench Head-quarters Staff
had considered on June 2. But, as wc have already seen, that
scheme had been rejected ns rnsh, and during 'Wellington's halt
upon June S the enemy were evacuating Valladolid and aU its
neighbourhood, nnd commencing their retrcat behind the
Pisuerga. Dy eight o'elock on the c\'cning of that day the
cavalry reports, all along the front, showed that the cnemy was
retiring on every road, and it appeared certain that they did not
intend to fight; the army therefore advanced in tlu'ec niain
columns, Wellington himself with the 3rd, 4th, 6th, and 7th
Divisions. followed by Hill, by the high road Oll Vulladolid
through La Mota: Gmham with the 1st and 5th Divisions,
Pack and Bradford, by the more northern parallel road, by
ViIlavelid and VilIar de Frades, on Medina de Rio Seeo. The
, Wellington to Grnham, Dispalches, x. p. 411.
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Galicians were converging on the same point as Graham, by the
high road from Villalpando and Villafreehos, but were directed
not to approach too close to Medina till further notice. The
reason for their delay wa.'l a euriou!! one--Giron had just written
on the previous day to say that he had no reserve of infantry
cartridges, and only GO rounds a man in the soldiers' pouches.
He wanted to borrow a supply from the British army. Welling-
ton replied in considerable heat: when he was on the move he
oould not give away his own reserve ammunition: no doubt
Giron was not personally to hlame-nor his men-but the
administrntion in Galicia. Y~t the unfortunate result would be
that the Galicin.ns must never be put in a position where there
would be a heavy consumption of' cartridges, i. e. must. be held
in reserve, or used for subsidiary operations only. Giron was
directed to make small regimental reserves, by taking away
a proportion of the cartridges from each man and carrying them
on mules. The general got off easily-but Wellington thundered
that night on the War Minister O'Donoju, 'Here is an army
which is clothed, armed, and disciplined, hut cannot be brought
into action \\;th the enemy: I am obliged to keep it in the rear.
How can troops march without provisions, or tight wi.thout
ammunition? The cause of the eountr)' may be lost unles.<;
the Government establish in the provinces some authority to
which the people will pay obedience, and which will insure
their resources for the purposes of the war I.' It will be noted
that all through the rest orthe campaign Giron's corps was used
for flanking movements, and never put in the forefront of the
fighting-though the other Spanish troops with the army,
Morillo's and later Longa's divisions, were used freely.
011 the 4th June Wellington moved with the' Head-Quarters
Column' as far as La MoW., Hill getting no farther than Morales.
At La Mota the information received showed that the l;reneh
were in general retreat-the cavalry advance got into Valladolid
and found some undestroyed stores of ammunition there.
Julian Sanehe?:, scouti.ng far towards the south, discovered
a considerable magazine of grain at Arevalo, where Gazan's
head-quarters had been. In view of the new situat.ion it wns
I Wellington to Giron, DUqxIlc1,CII, x. 413 1111<1 414, Ulul to O'Oonoju,
x. pp. 414-15.
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necessary to recast the movement>; of the army-there was to be
no fight on the Hormija, or for the possession of Valladolid.
The initial strategical success of the passage of the Esla had
settled the event of the first phase of the campo.ign, and cleared
the French not only out of New Castile, but out of the kir,gdom
of Leon and great part of Old Castile. The fact that the enemy
had' abandoned Vo.lladolid and the lower crossings of the
Pisuerga, would seem to show that he intended to fall back on
the Burgos country: he could hardly be intending to defend
!I position behind the middle Pisuerga and the Carrion, since he
had surrendered the passages at and about Valladolid, by which
the southern flank of such a position could be turned.
Now nine months ago Wellington had been in these same
regions, with the army of Chusel retreating before him from
Valladolid on Burgos_ On that orcasion he ha4 followed the
enemy in a straightforward pursuit along the great high road,
by Cabezon and Torquemndn. On this occasion his strategy
was entirely difterent. Leaving only a cavalry screen between
himself and the enemy, he proceeded to move hi!'! whole army
towards the north-west by secondary roads, marching in {QUI'
parallel columns not on Burgos but on the upper Pisllerga
north-west of that fortress, so as to turn entirely llny position
that the enemy might take up on the TIorma7.a, the Arlan7.on,
or the Urbel. It can hardly be doubted that he had already in
his mind the great manreuvre whieh he was to accomplish
during the next fortnight-that of outflanking the French
right wing by a wide sweeping movement, whieh would not only
force Joseph and Jourdan to evacuate Burgos and its neighbour-
hood, but would cut them off from the royal road to Dayonne
and their main communication with }rance. The first order
in his dispatch book which definitely revenls this intention does
not appear till June 10 1, but the facts which it contains prove
that the plan must have bren laid long ere Wellington started
from Portugal.
This plan was no less a scheme tluur-the tmnsferenee of the
base of the British army from the port of Lisbon to the Bay of
Biscay, so that when, in its wide turning movement, it should
• Viz. 'Vetlington to Colonel Dourke from Melgar, .Tunc 10, Dispattlles,
x. 1).429.
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have passed the Ebro and neared the Cantubriall COllSt, it
should find stores and munitions awaiting it, and be no longer
tied to the long line of communication with Portugal, whieh it
had always used hitherto. It was an astonishing example of
the strategical use of sea-power, to which there had hitherto
been no parallel in the Napoleonic wars. The only mana:uvre
at all resembling it was that by which Sir John Moorc in
De(."Cmber 1808 had changed his line of eOllunullication from
Lisbon to Corunua. But this was for a sudden hasty retreat,
made by a small army-a very dilIercnt thing from an advance
made by a large army. For Moore had only wanted transports
011 whieh to abscond from the Peninsula; Wellington had
planned the arrival of a fleet of supply vessels, on whose COI1-
tents hc was to rely for the future sustenance of his army during
a long campaign.
Their existence was his second great secret in 1813-the
first had becn his plan for the crossing of thc Esla. But the
latter might have been guessed at as a possibility by any
intelligent Frellchgeneral: the former, it is safe to say, had
never been dreamed of as a conceivable move. Santanucr is so
remote from Portugal, and the Frcnch werc so firmly rooted in
Northern Spain in the spring of 1813, that it could ncvcr enter
into the head of any of Napoleon's subordinates that thc British
Commander-in-Chief was planning such an c1aboratc surprise.
They were bound to believe that all Wellington's operations
would be founded on, and circumscribed by, the basic fact
that his line of communication was on Lisbon. A manCCllvre
which presupposed the complete abandonment of that line was
not conceivable by omcers rearcd in Continental campaigns,
and unused to contemplating t.he correlation of land opera-
tions and naval strategy. Yct thc fact that the supply fleet
had been gathercd at Corunn:\, long weeks before, and kept
there till the conquest of Northern Spain was well on its way
to completion, is conclusive evidence as to Wellington's inten-
tions. The crucial dispatch of June 10 ran as follows-it was
addrcssed to Colonel Bourke in charge of the British dep6ts in
Galieia ;
• There arc at Corunna certain ships loadcd with biscuit and
flour,. and certain others loaded with a train of heavy artillery
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and its ammunition, and some with musket ammunitioll. and
1 shall be much obliged if you will request any officer of the
navy who ma.y be a.t Corunna. when you receive this letter, to
t..1.ke under his convoy all the vesscls loaded as above mentioned,
and to proceed with them to Santandcr. If he should find
Santander occupied by the enemy. I beg him to remain off the
port till thc opcrations of this army have obliged the enemy
to aL~mdon it.
, [f the cnemy is 1I0t occupying Santander, I Lcg him to enter
the port, but to be in readiness to quit it again if the enemy
should approach the place, until [shall eommunieatewith him 1'.
It should be noted that Wellington had carefully avoided
calling attention to the accumulation of ships and stores at
Corunna, even in his letters to the ministers at home 2. Their
existence there was plausibly explaincd by the need for supply-
ing the Spanish army of Galicia-which had indeed reeci\'ed
much material during the spring. The provision of heavy
artillery shows that hc was contemplating as a probability the
siege of San Sebastian and the other northern fortresses. He
had failed at Burgos in 1812 for lack of the 24-pounders whieh
Home Popham had vainly orrered to send him from Santander:
now he was quite ready to receive them from that port. As
things stood on the Pisuerga, at the moment that he sent this
preseicnt dispatch to Bourke, it was ecrtainly a bold prophecy
to write that he was about to clear the Cantabrian eonst by
his next movc. The French wcre still unbeaten, and he was
more than a hundred miles from the Bay of Biscll.Y, from which
he was sepamled by a most rough and complicated land of
mountains. But he had already taken his measure of the
capacity of the hostile commanders, and his hopcs were high.
The great flank movement's initial stages can be best traced
by following 011 the map Wellington's nightly head-quarters.
'fhey were La. l\Iota on the 4th, Castromonte on the 5th,
Ampudia on the 6th-all thcse carefully avoid the neighbour-
hood of the Pisuerga, though the cavalry pushed on to feel
the lines of the French along the river. But the army, instead
, Wellington to Dourke from Mclgar, June 10, Di$patcJlis, x. 429.
• As, for example, in the letter to Thlthurst about shiJl6. Displllcha,
x. 4.lG.
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of making for the crossings at Vallndolid, Cabezoll, or Duellas,
kept steadily on in four parallel columns, on ronds far from the
river. lull, still as always on the right, went by 1'orr<"lobatoll,
Mucientes, and DueJ1as; Graham, on the left, by Medina de
Rio Seeo and Grixota; 'the Hco.d-(~uarters Column' under
Wellington himself, by Castromonte and Ampudia-while, far
ort, the Galician army on the north moved by Villaramicl and
Villoldo on Aguilar de Campus. The flanking eu.vu.lry kept up
a continual bickcring along the Pisucrga with French outposts;
on the 6th those at the hcad of the advance had a distant
glimpse of a great review of the Army of the Centre, which King
Joseph was holdiug outsidc Palcncia, from the heights which
overlook that city from the west. In front of Duefias there was
an exchange of letters undcr a Hag of truce between 'Vcllinbtton
and Gazan-a most odd proceeding at such a. moment-from
which both parties thought they had derived useful informa-
tion 1. The British parlementairc reportcd to the Commander-
in-Chief that Duciias was still held by French infantry-which
was good to know: the French, on the other hand, got a reply
to Gazan's letter to Wellington within four hours-which
proved that British Head-Quarters must be a very short way
from them-which was equally a valuable scrap of knowledge.
The King had now waited three days in the temporary.
position behind the Pisuerga, without being attacked, though
he was in the close neighbourhood of the enemy. The quiescence
of such an adversary madc him uncomfortable, and at last he
guessed part of what was going on opposite him. The British
must be pushing up northward parallel to his line, and preparing
to turn his right flank (which extended no farther than Palcncia)
by way of Amusco and the upper Carrion. Whereupon Joseph
on the 7th hastily resumed his retreat, and got behind the defile
of Torquemada. There was danger in waiting-nothing had
been heard of Clauscl, but news were to hand that Lamartiniere,
with onc of thc missing divisions of the Army of Portugal, was
, These sort of courtesies were most misplaced. TI,e subjc<:t of dis-
cussion was the exehan/,<e of the British omcer cnptured at l\Iorulcs (!>ec
above, p. 332) for a French OfliCCf whom GU1.l1n wa!J lIoxioUll to get bacl:.
Sce Di8patches, x. ·.21, Wellington to Gaz.an ; Jourdan's lUtmoirtB, p. 4.67 ;
lInd the narrative or the f1ag-lJCafcr in l\Illxwcll's Penillsular Sketches, Ii.
pp. D7-8.
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nearing lllll'gos from the north. The main body took post on
the Arlanzon-but Rcille with his two divisions at Castroxcriz
Oil the Odra. J ourdan went forward to report on the condition
of Burgos, where important new works had been commenced in
the spring, and to ehoose good defensible positions in its neigh-
bourhood. It was expected that the British army would follow
in pursuit, up the great chaussee from Paleneia to Torquemada.
And at first it looked as if this might be the case: entering
Palencia on the same day that the King had left it, Wellington
pushed up the chofl,ssee part of Hill's eolumn-Grant's and
Ponsonby's cavalry brigades and the Light Di....ision, whieh
kept in touch with the enemy's rear. The rest of the right
column had got no farther fonrard than Palcncia. But the
main body of the army continued its north-westerly turning
movement, Graham's infantry that day reached Grixota., Rye
miles north of Palellcia; the Galicians were up parallel with
Graham farther west, somewhere near DececriJ. The movements
of June 8 and 0, however, were the decisive revelations of
Wellington's intentions. He moved his head-quarters not up
the Torqucmada road, but to Amus(.'O on the Carrion river, and
continued to urge his columns straight northward-Grahalll to
San Cebrian and Pefiaon the 8th and Osorlloon the 9th, the main
body of Hill's column to Amusco and Tamara, the Galicians to
Carrion. He was thus getting his army well north of any
positions which the enemy would be likely to take up in the
neighbourhood of Burgos, giving it very long marche.'l, but still
keeping it closely concentrated.
On the loth he judged that he had got sufficiently round
the enemy, and turned all his columns due east towards the
upper Pisuerga-Graham's and "7ellington's own divisions
crossing it at Zarzosa and l\lclgar, Hill at AstudiIlo, some miles
farther south. Head-quarters were fixed that night at l\lelgar.
With the pnssage of the Pisuerga ended the long Illllrch through
the great flat corn-bearing plaillland of Northern Spain, the
Ticrra de Campos. The next tcn days were to bc spent among
rougher paths. The triumphant and almost unopposed advance
from the Esla to the Pisucrga, executed in olle sweep and at
high speed, was an episodc which those who were engaged in it
never forgot.
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• From the time of our crossing the Esla up to this period,'
wrote one diarist, • we have been marching through one con-
tinuous cornfield. The land is of the richest quality, and pro-
duces the finest crops with the least possible labour. It is
generally wheat, with a fair proportion of barley, and now and
then a crop of vetchcs or clover. The horses fed on green barley
nearly the whole march, and got fat. 'I'he army has trampled
down twenty yards of corn on each side of the roads by which
the several columns have passed-in many places much more,
from the baggage going on the side o£ the columns, and so
spreading farther into the wheat. Dut they must not mind
their corn if we get the enemy out of their country! . , . The
cowltry gives bread and corn, and hitherto these have not
failed, and this is a region that has been plundered and devas-
tated for five years by the enemy! It was said before our
march that until the harvest came in, not a pound of bread by
way of supplies for the army could be procured 1,'
A Light Division diarist writes in a more romantic frame of
mind: • The country was beautifully diversified, studded with
castles of Moorish architecture, recalling the chivalric days of
Ferdinand and Isabclla. The sun shone brilliantly, the sky was
heavenly blue, and clouds of dust marked the line of march of
the glittering columns. The joyous peasantry hailed our
approach and came dancing to meet us, singing, and beating
time on their small tambourines; and when we passed through
the principal street of Paleneia, the nuns, from tllC upper
windows of a convent, showered down rose-leaves upon our
dusty heads 2.'
The dry comment of the Commander-ill-chief, in his report
to the War Minister at home, contrasts oddly with this
enthusiasm; 'I enclose the last weekly and daily states. We
)(ecp up our strength, and the army are very healthy and in
better order than I have ever known them. God knows how
long that will last. It depends entirely upon the officers 3.'
'While 'Vellington's columns were hurrying northward, the
French remained for two days (June 1-V) in position behind
the Pisuerga-Reille on the right at Castroxcriz, the rest of the
• Tomkiusou's Diaru (16th Light Dra.goons), pp. 239-40.
I MaxweU's Pe'lin8tllat SketCl1C8, ii. ~7. • Dispatcllelf, x. 4a7,
300.6 A a
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army. holding the height.<; down to VilIadiego and the Arlan1.a.
river. Only British cMralry scouts appeared in front of them.
• The position was excellent,' says Jourdan, ' and it was hoped
tQ hold it for some days. Dut the generals commanding the
armies represented to the lGng that the troops lacked bread,
l;\nd that they dared not send out large detachments far afield
to requisition food from the peasantry, wherefore the whole
force retired on Burgos.' No doubt the country was bare; and,
when the enemy is known to be near, it is unsafe to make large
detachments: but it .may be suspected that the real cause for
retreat was the continuous uncertainty as to Wellington's
northward movement. Yet it is clear that the French Head·
Quarters had no suspicion how far that movement wus going.
For on the 9th, when they retreated, they took up position
011 a very short line north and south of Burgos. Reille's two
divisions lay behind the Hormaza river, ten miles west oC the
fortress-with the right opposite Hormaza village, the left at
Estepar-forming u. front line. The Army of the South was on
both banks of the Arlanzon, fIve miles behind Rcille-right wing
behind the Urbel river, left wing behind the Arcos river. The
Army of the Centre and the King's Guards were in reserve,
billeted in Burgos itself. But already Wellington's columns
were aiming at points far north of Reille's position. That day
the northernmost divisions of Graham's infantry 1 were at
Osorno, next day (June lOth) at Zarzosa, beyond the Pisuerga,
a point from which they could easily march round the Hormaza
position, and on June 11th, at Sotresgudo, where they halted
for a day 2. The centre 3, with Wellington himself, on the same
day had reached Castroxcriz on t~c Odra river, while Hill was
close by at Barrio de Santa Mariaand Valbases. Nothing had
been sent south of the Arlanzon save Julian Sanchez's lancers,
who were scouring the country in the direction of Lerma, on the
look-out for belated French convoys or detachments. The
Galician army, keeping (as always) far out on the left wing,
had reached thc Pisuerga at Herrera, ten miles north of Graham's
extreme flank. They were now within two marches of the
'Ist and 5th with llrndtord's Portuguese.
• 1\'ood huving run low, owing to the mule-transport railing behind .
• 3rd. 4th. 6th, 7th Divi~ioll~ and Pack's Portuguese.
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upper Ebro, anti thcrc was absolutely 110 enemy in front of-them
for scores of miles-the nearest Frenchmen in that direction were
the columns with which Foy was scouring the roads of Biscay,
after his capture o~ Castro-Urdi&lcs.
The halt ot the Freneh army in the neighbourhood of Burgos
was not to mark the end of it" retrcat, and the commencement
of offcnsive operations, as King Joseph had hoped. The only
cheering featurcs in the gencral outlook were that Lmuamniere's
division of the Army of Portugal was now in touch-it was
reported coming up from Brivicsea~and that a bullctin of the
Grand Army was received from Germany, telling of the victory
of the Emperor at Bautzen. But the discouraging news was
appalling~the first instalment of it was that Jouroan rcported,
after investigating the fortifications ofDurgos, that he considered
the place untenable. During the spring building and demolition
had been taken in hand, for the purpose of linking up the old
castle, which had givcn so much trouble to Wellington in 1812,
with the high-lying' Hornwork of St. Migucl' on thc rising
ground above. Thc schemc was wholly UllfUlishcd-thc only
result achieved was that St. ?tliguel, as reconstructed, com-
manded the castle, and that the alterations started in the
ell.Ceinte of the latter, with the object of linking it up with the
former, had rendered it, in the marshal's opinion, incapable of,
holding out for a day. Yet this would not have mattered so
much if the army had been about to resume the offensive, or to
put up [L stablc dcfcnce in the Burgos region.
But it was declared that this was impossible-the governor
reported that the immcnse convoys which had been passing
through Burgos of latc, and the reccnt stay of (:ousidcrablc
bodies of troops in the place 1, had brought Ius magazines to
such a low ebb that he could not feed an army of 50,000 men
for more than a few days. The town was still crammed with
the last great horde of Spanish and French refugees, who had
come on from Madrid, Segovia, and ValIadolid, and all the
King's private train. 'l'hey were sent on at onee towards
Vittoria, under escort of Lamartillicrc's division-which thus
no sooner become available than it was lost ugain. No news
, Presumably Mll.ueunc's brigade, whieh had been there some time, all
well liS the oollvoy eooorts.
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had arrived either from Foy or from Clausel: but Sarrut's
division of the Army of Portugal had been located north of t.he
Ebro, and would be coming ,in ere very long. The news that
Clausel was undiseoverable brought King. Joscph to such a
pitch of excitement that he took, on June 9th, a step which he
should have taken a fortnight before, and threw over all his
fears of offending the minister at Paris or the Emperor in
Saxony. He sent direct peremptory orders to Clausel to join
him at once, and told off a column of 1,500 men to escort the
aide-dc-camp who bore them: it went off by Domingo Calzada
and Logrono. As a matter oC fact the order reached the general
in six days-but it might have taken longer for all that Joseph
could guess. And the King came to the conclusion that if he
were at 0.11 pushed by Wellington within the next few days, he
must abandon Burgos and retire behind the Ebro. He might
even have to go without hostile persuasion, on the mere question
of food-supplies. .
But on June 12 the pressure was applied. Wellington had
now got all his forces over the Pisuergn, and his two southern
columns were concentrated bct.w.een Castroxeriz and Villadiego :
Graham was farther off, but not out of reach. Having recon-
noitred the advanced position of Reille on the Hormaza river,
and found that his supports were far behind, he resolved to
attack him in front and flnnk that morning. Only the southern
column-HiU's troops-wasemployed, the centre divisions being
halted in a position from which they might be brought in on
the enemy's rear, if the King reinCorced ReiUc, but not if the'
French showed no signs of standing. But thc push against thc
Army of Portugal, made bythc 2nd Division, Silveira's Portu-
guese, and Morillo's Spaniards, was sufficient to dislodge the
enemy: for while they were deploying against the Fnmeh
front, thc cavalry brigades of Grant and Ponsonby, supported
by the Light Division, appeared behind Reillc's right flnnk. The
enemy at once gave way, before infantry fighting had begun, and
retreating hastily southward got behind the Urbc1 river, where
the Army of the South was already in line. H.cille then crossed
the Al'lanzon by the bridge of Buniel and took post south of
Burgos. The Frcneh loss was small-the retre.'\.t wus made in
good order and with great speed, before the British infantry
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could arrive. Grant's and Ponsonby's horse, already out-
flanking the rearguard, got in close, but did not deliver a.
general attack-by Wellington's owu orders as it is said 1: for
(despite of Garcia Hernandez) he held to his firm belief that
cavalry cannot break intact infantry. A half troop of the
14th Light Dragoons, under Lieut. Southwell, charged and
captured an isolated French gun, which had fallen behind the
renrguard; but this was the only contact between the armies
that day. Jourdan says that Reille lost about fifteen men only
-an exaggeration no doubt, but not a very great one.
The result, however, WllS to determine IGng Joseph to retreat
at once, and to abandon Durgos, before his obviously out-
flanked right wing should be entirely circumvented. That
night desperate measures were taken-everything that could
travel on wheels was sent oH by the high road towards the
Ebro; the infantry followed, using such side rooos as were
available. At dawn only cavalry rearguard.s were covering
Burgos. J ourdan explains the hastc of the retreat os follows.
'H was casy to foresee that next morning that part of the Army
gfthe South which lay behind the Urbe! river would be attacked,
and that being separated by the Arlanwn from the bulk of the
army, which lay on the south bank, it would be compromised.
Three choices lay open-first, to bring the whole army across the
Arlanzon and to fight on the Urbel; but this would have
brought on tbe-general nction which it had been determined to
il,\"oid, ever since the King had made up his mind to call in
Clause!. Second-to bring the whole army across to the south
bank of the Arlanzoll, where thcre was a good position: but
this move would have allowed the enemy to cut the great road
and our communieations with France-and the same motives
which had caused the rejection of the scheme to retire south of
the Douro on June 2 caused this alternative to be disapproved
on June 12. Third-to fall baek by the great road to the Ebro,
and so secure the earliest possible concentration of all the a.rmies
of Spain. This was the scheme udoptcd 2.'
, , Grant begged Lord Wellington to allow him to attack the reUring
infantry, but in spite of his pressing solicitations was not pennitted.'
Maxwcll's Pcnirnndur Skekllu, H. 00.
t Jourdan, Memoires, p. "69.
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It is said that Gazan was for fighting on the UrbeP, while
Rcille and D'Erlon opted for the second choice-that of
abandoning the high road to France, going south of the Arlanzon,
and rctreating by the bad track to Domingo Calzada and
Logrofio, because Clauscl, being certainly somewhere ill.
Navarre, would be picked up much sooner at Logrofio than at
Miranda or other points higher up the Ebro. But the Emperor's
orders that the direct communication with France must be kcpt
up at all costs, were adduced against them, and settled the
question.,
Defore leaving, the French made nrmngements to blow up
the castle which had scrved thcm so well in the prcceding
October, and to destroy a great store of powdcr and munitions
for which no transport could be procured. According to
Jourdan the disaster which followed was due to thc llrofessional
ignorance of General d'Aboville, the director-general of artillery,
who maintained that shclhi would do no great harm if they
were exploded, not in a great mass but placed in small groups,
at distances onc from another. H.e had 6,000 of them laid in
pareels on the ground in the castle square, and connected with
thc mines 'Xhich were placed under the donjon keep. Orders
were given that the fuses were only to be lit when the last troops
should have left, and the inhabitants were told that if they
would keep to their houses they would incur no danger. But
the mines by some error were fired before seven o'clock in the
morning, and the effects of the explosion had been so badly
calculated, that not only were many houses in the city injured,
all the glass blown out of the splendid cathedral, and its roof
broken in several places, but a hail of shells fell nil over the
surrounding quarter,and killed 100 men ofVillatte's division, who
were halted in the Plaza Mayor, and a few of Digcon's dragoons
who were crossing the bridge 2. There were casualties also, of
course, among the unfortunate citizens. When the smoke
• Ct. Miot de Melito in Dncusse, ix. p. 468.
• Ct. Jourdan'slUbnoirt8, p. 470; Wtllinll/on Di$patchu, x. pp. 436-7;
Digeon's Report, and the Appendb: in Arteche, xiii. p. 480. Toreno
(Hi. p. 230) says thnt the eitizcns held that the French had intended the
mine ta work when they were gone, alld to dcstroy the eity and the in-
coming allied troops, but leans to the view that ignorance of the power
of explosives cxplains all.
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cleared away, and the fIrc had gone out, it was found that the
destruction of the donjon keep and upper works of the eastle
hAd been complete, but that most of the outer wall was
standing-as indeed it is to this day. Wellington remarked
that it was quite capable of restoration, if the fortunes of the war
made it necessary I. They did not; and the skeleton of the
castle still remains ruined nnd riven on its mound, to surprise the
obscrver by its moderate size. 'fhosc who go round it can only
marvel that sueh a small fortress should have held all Welling·
ton's army at bay during so many eventful days in 1812.
The British general, hearing at Castroxcriz, on thc early
morning of .June 13, that the French had cvacuated Burgos and
blown up its works, did not even enter the town, and sent
nothing more than cavalry scouts to follow the retreating
enemy, but ordered the instant resumption of the north-
westward march of the whole army. It was now his intention
to turn the line of the Ebro, in the same fashion that he had
turned the line of the Douro on May 31-by passing it so far to
the westward that any position whieh the enemy might adopt
would be outflanked, even before it was fully takcn up. And
hc was aiming not only at turning the Ebro line, but at cutting
Joseph's communication with France: he was already taking
Vittoria, far behind the Ebro, as the goal for which he was
making.
We have Wellington's own word for the fact that it was the
collapse of the French opposition in front of Burgos which
finally induced him to develop his original plan of campaign,
spoken of above, into the more ambitious scheme for driving
the French completely out of the Peninsula, which he now took
in hand. Unfortunately his statement was taken down many
years after thc event, and his memory of details was not all
that it might have been in his old age. But the story is so
interesting and fits into the psychology of the moment so well
that it must not be omitted.
"When 1 heard and saw the explosion (1 was within n few
miles, and the effect was tremendous) 1 made a sudden resolu-
. tion forthwith-to cross the Ebro instanter, and to endeavour to
push the French to the Pyrenees. We had heard of the battles
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of Liitzen and Bautzen, and of the Annistiee, and the arfairs of
the Allies looked very ill. Some of my officers remonstrated with
me about the imprudence of crossing the Ebro, and advised me
to "take up the line of the Ebro ", &c. I asked them what they
meant by "taking up the line of the Ebro",-a river 800 miles
long, and what good I was to do along that line'l In short
I would not listen to that advice, and that evening (or the very
next morning) I crossed the river and pushed the French till
I afterwards beat them at Vittana. And lueky it was that
I did J For the battle of Vittoria induced the Allies to denounce
the Armistice-then followed Leipzig and all the rest.
'All my staff were against my crossing the Ebro: they
represented that we had done enough, that we ought not to
risk the army and all that we had obtained, that the Armistice
would enable Bonaparte to reinforce his army in Spain, and we
therefore should look for a defensive system. I thought
differently-l knew that the Armistice could not afiect in the
way of quick reinforeementso distaJlt an army as that of Spain.
I thought that if [could not husllethem outof Spain before they
were reinforced, I should not be able to hold any position in
Spain after they should be. Above all I ealculatcd on the effect
that a victory might havc on the Armistice itself, so I crOl;scd
the Ebro and fought the battle of Vittoria.'
How far is this curious confidence, made to Croker in .January
1837, and taken down by him in two separate drafts (Croker
Papers, ii. p. 309, and iii. pp. 336--7), a blurred impression,
coloured by after evcnts? It is quite true that the Burgos cx-
plosion took place early on the morning of June 13, that the
orders dictated at VilIudiego that day (Suppl. Disp. vii, p. 637)
give a sudden new direction to the army, and that next evening
(June 14) the heads of the columns were over the Ebro. But
\Velliugton's own dispatches seem to show that he did not know
anything of the Armistice on JUlle 13, for he wrote to his brother
Henry that day, ' I have no news from England. The French
have a bulletin of May 24th, when Napoleon was at Drcsden-
they talk of successes, but as he was still at Dresden on the
24th, having arrived there on the 8th, they cannot have been
very important.' Now the Armistice of Pliiswitz was signed
on June 4, and on the 13th \Vellington's latest news was of
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MAy 24. But on the 17th, when he had been two days across
the Ebro, he did at last hear something. Again he writes to his
brother ;
, I have got, by Corw108, English papers of the Srd. Thcre
were several actions in the neighbourhood of Dautwlt on the
2oth-22nd May.... Bonaparte turned then, and they retired.
'fhe AJIies have lost ground but are unhurt. He has offered
(before the battle) to consent to a congress at Pmgue.... An
armistice is to commence when the ministers shall arrive at
Prague.... 1 do not think that the Russians and Prussians can
agree to the armistice, unless they submit entirely' (Disp.
p. x. 443).
Clearly, then, Wellington 011 the 13th knew nothing of any
armistice, since he introduces the proposal, not the accomplish·
ment, of it to his most trusted correspondent on the 17th, as the
last news to hand. He was committed to the advance on
Vittoria long before he could know of its subsequent political
erfects. And thus in his old age he underrated his own prescience.
But the fact thnt his officers doubted the wisdom of the advance,
and that he swept their objections away, is probubly eorrcet.
'fhat he had considered thc possibility of au advance far beyond
the Ebroscems, as has been said before (pp. 301-3), to be proved
by orders given in the spring, before the campaign began.
On the evening of the 13th head-quarters were at Villadiego,
while the columns were all heading northward on parallel routes.
The Galicians were moving from Aguilnr on the bridge of
Rocamonde 1, the highest on the Ebro save that at its source
near Reynosa. The bulk of Graham's column was marching by
La Picdra on the bridge of Sail Martin, a few milcs lower down
than Rocamonde, though some of its llank.ing cavalry crossed
at the latter passage, ahead of the Galicians. The Head-Quarters
divisions and Hill's column moved, using aH available secondary
roads, from their position opposite the lower Urhel, by Villa-
diego and Montono respectively, on the bridge of Puente Arenas,
some fifteen miles below that of San Martin. All three columns
had on the 18th-14th-15th very hard marches, of four long
Spanish leagues on three successive days, across upland roads
I Sometimes called the bridge of Policutes, from tlle name of the
villuge 011 the 0Jll)OOitc bunk.
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where artillery had never been seen before. The move would
only have been practicable ut mid-summer. But the columns
were absolutely unopposed, and the upper Ebro country had
been entirely neglected by the French, as Wellington had
foreseen. • Onc division could have stopped the whole column
at the bridge of San Martin,' wrote an intelligent observer,
, or the other at Rocamonde, where some of ow column likewise
crossed-the enemy cannot be aware of our movement 1.'
Graham was all across the Ebro by noon on the 14th, Hill by the
morning of the 16th. Wellington who had fixed his head-
quarters at the lost village of Masa in the hills, was able to
declare with confidence that the whole army would be over the
river by the night-' and then the French must either fight, or
retire out of Spain altogether.'
The Ebro country was 0. surprise to the British observers
who had spent so many years in the uplands of'portugal or the
rolling plains of the Tierra de Campos. 'Winding suddenly out
of a narrow pass, we found oursclves in the river valley, which
extended some distance on our right. The beauty of the
scenery was beyond description: the rocks rose perpendicu-
larly on every side, without any visible opening to convcy an
idea of an outlet. This enchanting vallcy is studded with
picturesque hamlets and fruitful gardens producing cvery
description of vegetation. At the Puente Arenas we met
a number of sturdy women loaded with fresh butter from the
mountains of the Asturias. We had tlot tasted that commodity
for two years, therefore it will be unnecessary to describe how
readily we made a purchase, nibbling by the way at. such
a luxury 2.' Northern or Pyrenean Spain is a very different
country from the dusty wind-swept central plateaux:: above all
the lack of water, which is the curse of Castile, ceased at la<;t
to be the bane of marching columns.
After crossing the Ebro on the 14th Graham's column made
another four-league march on the 15th to the large town of
Villarcayo, while the Galicians got to Soncillo on the main road
from Santandcr to Bwgos; thus Wellington was certain of the
new naval base to which he had bid the Corunna. transports sail
only five days before. Hill's troops, who had a longer march
, Tomkinson's Diary, p. 341. • J\lllxwcll's Pell;fUfultl7 S~'etdu:s, ii. p. 311.
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during the last two days than the other columns, were not so
far forward, but nearing the river had occupied the heights on
the southern side of the Puente de Arenas. 'l'he three columns
forming the Anglo·Portuguese army were, as a glance at the
map shows, in close touch with each other, a.nd in a position
whcre thc whole 80,000 men could be concentrated by n single
march. Undoubtedly thc most surprising features of the
advance is that Wellington's commissariat was able to feed
such a mass of troops in sueh a limited area, after they had left
the plains of Castile and plunged into the thinly inhabited
mountains. The local supplies obtainable must have been very
limited. Several diarists speak of biscuit being short 1, though
meat was not. But somehow or other the commissaries
genernlly contrived to find more or less food for the army-the
well-organized mule trains were not far behind the infantry
columns, and the long and difficult movement was never
ehcckoo-as earlier marches had been in 1809 and 1811 Z_by
the mere question of provisions, though many brigades got but
scanty meals.
J e. g. Wachholz oC Brunswiek·Oels, attached to the 4th Division, p. 314.
t Sec, for exnmple. vol. ii. p. (,SIl and vol. iv. p. 159.
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AFrER evacuating Burgos the French army had retir~d, at
a rather leisurely ratc, dO'\\71 the high road which leads by
Briviesca and the defile of Pancorbo to the valley of the Ebro.
The rearguard, as we have seen, hnd left llurgos on the morning
of the 13th, and halted for great part of the day o.t Gamonal,
a few miles cnst of the city, on the spot where Napoleon had won
his casy victory over the Conde de Bclvedcl' on November 10,
1808. It was only followed by Spanish irregular horse-some
of Julian Sallchcz's ubiquitous lancers. Head-quarters that
night and the next (June 14) were at Briviesc3, and remained
there for forty-eight hours: on the 15th lhey were moved 011
to Pancoroo, an admirable position with a high-lying fort in
the centre, while the road is flanked for miles by steep slopes,
011 which an advantageous rearguard action might ha\'c been
fought. Dut 110 pursuing enemy came in sight: this fact
began to worry the French Head-quaTterf: Staff. • What could
have become of Lord Wellington? The French Army, in full
retreat, was permitted to move leisurely along the great route,
wit)1out being harassed or urged forward, not a carriage of
any description being lost. It appeared inexplicable 1: The
1<'rench retreat wns leisurely for two reasons-the Ilrst was that
King Joseph wished to gain time for the immense convoys
lumbering in front of him to reach lIliranda and Vittoria
without being hustled. The second was that he thought that
every day gained gave more time fOf Clausel to come up: at
the slow rate at which he was proceeding he might almost hope
to find the missing divisions of the Army of Portugal converging
on l\lirnnda, at the moment when he should arrive there himself.
'J'he Council of War at Burgos had. decided that Wellington
, These were the words of Colonel AmaUll, senior nidc...Ie-ellmp to
Gazan, conversing (most illCllUtiously) with his priSOller Leith Hay. whose
diary is most intel'Cl;ting tor these days. Sce Leith Hay, H. p. 170.
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must inevitably pursue by the great cltaussec. . The routes
from the Burgos region to the upper Ebro had been reported
both by French officers who claimed to know the country, and
by local Afra'lcesados, as presenting insuperable difficulties to
a large anny. There was, it is true, the high road Burgos-
Santander by Santijanez, l}edrosn., and Reynosa-but this led
north-west in an eccentric direction, not towlU'ds Miranda or
Vittoria. That thc danger lay on the rough mountain ways a
little farther cast, which fall down to San Martin and Puentc
de Arenas, seems not to have been suspected. Yet it was
disquieting to find no pursuit in progress: eould the Allied
Army possibly have been forced to halt at Burgos for want of
supplies ?
'On the 16th the l~reneh army descended from the defile of
l'aneorbo to the Ebro, and proceeded to distribute itself in the
region round Miranda, in cantonments which permitted of
rapid eonccntration whcn it should become nccesslU'Y. Nothing
was yet to be heam of Cla.usel-but on the other hand LamarLi-
niere's division was again picked up-it handed over the duty
of escorting the cOllvoys toward Vittoria to Joseph's Spanish
contingent, the small division of Casapalacios. Sarrut's division
also camc in from lliseay, and reported that it had been lately
in touch with Foy, who was successfully hunting the local
guerrilleros in the coast-land. But neither l~oy himself, nor the
troops of the Army of the North whieh had been co-operating
with him of late, were anywhere near. Strange as it may appear,
that very mpablc officer had wholly failed to understand the
general situation: though apprised ere now of the evacuation
of :Madrid and Valladolid, he had nothing in his mind save his
wholly secondary operations against the Biscay bands. His
dispatches of this period show him occupied entirely with the
safety of Bilbao, and the necessity for guarding the high road
from Dergara and Tolosa to France. There were 20,000 troops
in Biscay, but they wcre entirely dispersed on petty expeditions
and convoy work. On June 19, when he got from hend-quarters
the first dispatch that caused him to think of conecntrating and
joining the main army, Foy had only onc battalion with him
at the moment at Bergnra. A column of1,000 men was moving
to reinforce the garrison of Bilbao, a brigade was ut Villafranca
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escorting towards France the large body of prisoners whom he
had captured in Iris reeent opemtions-another brigade wns
waiting on the rov.d between Vittoria and Mondragon, to pick
up a large convoy which, as he had been warned, would be
coming up the Royal Road and would require to ,be protected
as far as San Sebastian. He was making eIlorts to send pro-
visions by sea to Bilbao and Castro-Urdiales-a task in which
he was being worried by British cruisers off the coast-and was
preparing to go to Bilbao himself!.
No doubt the main blame for this untimely dispersion of
forces lay with General Head-Quarters. Jourdan and Joseph
ought to have sent orders to Foy, after the evacuation of
Madrid, ordering him to cease 0.11 secondary operations, to
lcave minimum garrisons at a few esscntial points, abandon
all the rest, and collect as strong a field-force as possible, with
which to join the main army. But they had written to the
minister at Paris suggesting such moves, instead of dispatching
direct orders to that eIlcct to the general himself. Foy had
been sent information, not orders, and had failed to realize
the full meaning of the information-absorbed as he was in
his own particular Biscayan problems. Events were marching
very quickly: it was hard to realize that Wellington, who had
been on the Esla on May 31, would have been aeross the upper
Ebro with 70,000 men on June 15. It had taken little more
than a fortnight for him to overrun half of Northern Spain.
The fact remained that' of all the French troops operating in
Biscay in June, only Sarrut's division, from Orduna, joined
the King in time for the battle of Vittoria. Yet Foy had under
his orders Il.ot only his own division but the Italian brigade of
St. Pol, and the mobile brigade of Berlier from the Army of
the North, in addition to 10,000 men of the garrisons of the
various posts and fortresses of the North and the littoral. And
be had no enemy save the great partisan Longa in the western
mountains, and the scattered remains of the local insurgents
under El Pastor and others, whom he had defeated in April and
May, and wbom:hc was at present harrying from hill to eoast
and from coast to hill. 'Ve are once more forced to remember
that the ,French armies in Spain were armies of occupation as
• Foy to Jourdan, Rcrgara, June 10.
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well as armies of operation, und that onc of their functions
was often fatal to the other.
But to return to the moment when the King's army ~ame
back to the Ebro. Head-quarters were, of course, established
at Miranda, where the royal Guard served as their escort. The
Army of the South sent three divisions across to the north bank
of the river; they were cantoned on the lower Zadorra about
Arminion; but Gazan kept three brigades on the south bank
as El rearguard for the present, but (as the King hoped) to form
El vanguard for a counter-advance, if only Clausel should come
up soon, and an offensive campaign become possible. A smull
observing force wus left at Pancorbo, into whose castle a garri-
son was thrown. Cavalry exploring parties, pushed out from
this point, sought for Wellington's approaching columns as far
as Poza de la Salon the right, Briviesca 011 the high road, and
Cerezo on the left; but to no effect. They came ill touch with
nothing but detachments of Julian Sanchez's Lancers. D'Erlon,
with the Army of the Centre, went ten miles down the Ebro
to Haro: he had now recovered his missing division, Darmag-
nne's, which hud been lent to Rcillc for the last two months.
For the Army of Portugal having now three infantry divisions col-
leetcd-Maueune's, Sarrut's, and Lamartinierc's-was ordered
to give back the borrowed unit to its proper commander.
Reille took the right of the Ebro position, having Maucune's
division at Frias, Sarrut's at Espejo, and Lamartiniere's at
the Puente Lara. He was ordered to use his cavalry to search
for signs of the enemy along the upper Ebro. The King had
thus an urmywhich, by the junction of Snrrutand Lamartinicre,
had risen to over 50,000 infantry and nearly 10,000 cavalry,
concentrated on a short front of 25 miles from Frias to Haro,
covering the main road to France by Vittoria, a.nd also the
l:iide roads to Ordufia and Bilbao on the one flank, and Logrono
and Saragossa on the other. His rctreat, though dispiriting,
had not yet been costly-it is doubtful whether he had lost
1,000 casualties in the operations of the last six weeks. With
the exception of the combats at Salamanca on May 26· and
Morales on June 2, there had been no engagements of any
irnportnnee. The army was angry at the long-continued
retreat; the officers were criticizing the generalship of their
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commanders in the most outspoken fashion, but there was no
demoralization-the troops were clamouring for a general
action.
But on June 17, when the French armies settled down into
theiT new position, with no detected enemy in their neighbour-
hood, their fate wns o.I.ready determined-the Ebro line had
been turned before it was even taken up. For on this same day
Wcllington had not only got his whole a.rmy north of the Ebro,
but was marching rapidly castward, by the mountain roads
twenty miles north of the river, into the rear of ReilIe's eanton-
mcnts. Of all his troops only Julian Sanehcz;, and Clidos de
Espaflas' infantry division were left in Castile.
The movements of the Allied Army on the 15th-16th-17th
.June had been carried out with surprising celerity. The
Galician infantry, who haderossed the river first, at Rocamondc,
the bridge highest up on its course, on the 13th were hurrying
northward, by cross roads not marked on the map, and obviously
impracticable for guns, to Soneillo (15th), Quintanilla de
Pienza (16th), VilIasann (17th), and Valmaseda in Biscay (18th).
When they had reached the last-named town they were
threatening Bilbao, and almost at its gates. This was the great
demonstration, intended to throw confusion among all the
}"rench detachments on the northern coast. Several of the
stages exceeded thirty miles in the day.
Meanwhile the three great columns of the Anglo-Portuguese
army were executing a turning movement almost as wide as
that of Giron's Galieians. Converging from dirferent bridges
of the Ebro-Roeamonde (where some of Graham's cavalry
passed), San Martin de Lines (where the bulk of Graham's force
debouched northward on the 14th), and Puente AreDas (used
by the Head-quarters column on the 15th and by Hill's column
on the 16th I)-the whole army came in by successive masses
on to the two neighbouring towns of ViUarcayo and Medina
de Pomar. At the latter plaee Longa turned up with his hard-
marching Cantabriall division, and joined the army. These
considerable towns arc the road-centres of the whole rugged
district between the Ebro and the Cantabrian mountains.
1 Some of Hill's troops used the bridge of Rampalarcs aJso, a few milcs
wcst of Puentc Arenas.
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From them fork out the very few decent roads which exist in
the land-those northward over the great sierras to Santander,
Sanoofia, and Valmaseda-Bilbao: those eastward across their
foot-hills to Orduiia-Vittoria and to Frias-Miranda. These
five roads are the only ones practicable for artillery and tmns-
port: there are, however, minor tracks which can take infantry'
in good summer weather.
From his head-quarters at Quintana, near the bridgc of
Puente Arenas, Wellington dictated on the 15th the marching
ordcrs which govcrned thc next stagc of thc campaign. With
the exception of the Galicians, already starting on their circular
sweep towards Bilbao, all his columns were directed to utiJii'.e
the road parallel to the Ebro, but twenty miles north of it,
which runs from Medina de Pomar to Osma, OrdUlia, and
Vittoria. He deliberately avoided employing the other high
road, which runs closer to the river from Medina de Pomar to
Frias and l\1iranda, even for 0. side-column or a flying corps:
only cavalry scouts were sent along it. The reason why the
whole army was thrown on to a single road-a thing generally
to be avoided, especially when time is precious-was partly
that the appearance of British troops before Frias, where the
enemy was known to have a detachment, would give him early
warning of the move. But the morc important object was to
strike at the Freneh line of communication with Bayonne as
far behind the known position of King Joseph's army as
possible. If the line Frias-Mirando. had been chosen, the
enemy would have had many miles less to march, when once
the alarm was givcn, if he wished to eover his proper line of
retreat. If a fight was coming, it had better be at or about
Viltoria, ra.ther than at or about Miranda. Moreover, the high
road, for a few miles ea...t of Frias, passes to the south bank of
the Ebro. which it reerosses at the Puente Lara-there is only
a bad track north of the river from Frias to that bridge. It
would be absurd to direct any part of the army to cross and
rccross the Ebro at passages which might be defended.
So the whole force was committed to the Medina-Osma road,
except that the infantry occasionally took cross-cuts by local
tracks, in order to leave the all-important main line, as far ns
possible, to the guns and transport. The three corps in which
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the army had marched from the Pisuerga fell in behind each
other, In the order in which they had crossed the Ebro-Graham
leading-the Head-Quarters column following-Hill bringing
up the rear. Longu's Cantabrians went on as a sort of flying
vanguard in front of Grnluull, not being burdened with artillery 1.
o The road was onc which (.'auld only have been used for such a
large force in summer-it hugged the foot-hills of the Cunt,,-
brian sierras, crossing successively the head-waters of several
small rivers running south to the Ebro, each in its own valley.
The country was thinly peopled and bare, so that little food
could be got to supplement the mule-borne rations. For this
reason, as also with the object of granting the French as little
time as possible after the first alarm should be given, the pace
had to be forced. '1'he marches were long: on the 15th the
head of Graham's infantry was at Villarca)'o: on the 16th at
I~a Cerea (five miles beyond Medina de Pomnr): on the 17th at
the mountain villages ofSnn Martin deLoza and Lastres de'rew.:
Oil the 18th it was due at Osmll. and at Berbcrena-a few miles
up theOsrna-Ordullll. road. The Head-Quarters column having
110 exploration to do, since the way was reported clear in front,
covcred the same distance in threc marches instead oC four, and
was cxpectcd to reach the neighbourhood of Osma on the 18th.
Hill's column had also to hurry-its leading division was on
that same day expected to be at Venta de Membligo, a posting
station six miles short oC Osma, so that its head would be just
behind the tail of the preceding corps. But Hill's rear would
be strung out for many miles behind. However, all the fighting
army was again in onc mass-with a single exception. Welling-
ton had ordered the 6th division, commanded temporarily by
his own brother-in·law Pll.kenham, to halt at Medina de Pomar.
The reason which he gives in his dispatch 2 for depriving himself,
now that the day of crisis was at hand, of a good division of
7,000 men, is that he left it' to cover the march of our magazines
and stores.' This is almost as puzzling a business as his leaving
of Colville's corps at Hal on the day of the battle of Waterloo--
the only similar incident in the long record of his campaigns.
I But did not follow the main road to Qsma, going orr by a by-path
north of the sierras to Ordui'la.
• Dispatchu, x. p. 450.
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If this was his sole reason, why should not a smaller unit--..
Pack's or Bradford's independent brigadc-or both of them_
have been left behind '[ For that purpose sueh a force would
have sufficed. We are not informed that the 6th Division was
more amicted with sickness than any other, or that it wus
more way-worn. The only supposition that suggests itself is
that Wellington may have considered the possibility of Giron's
raid into Biscay failing, and bringing down on his rear some
unsuspected mass of French troops from Bilbao. If this idea
entered his head, he may easily have thought -it worth while
to leave behind a solid reserve, on which Giron might fall
back, and so to cover the rear of his main army while he was
striking at the great road to France. But it must be confessed
that this is a mere hypothesis, and that the detachment of
Pakenham's division seems inexplicable from the information
before us. It was ordered to follow whe" the whole of the
transport should be clear, if no further developments had
happened to complicate the situation. Carrying out this
direction literally, Pakenham waited three days at Medina
de Pomar, and so only got to the front twenty-four hours after
the battle of Vittoria.1
The orders which Wellington is-'med upon the 17th 2 brought
the head of his columns into touch with the enemy. They
directed that Graham, with the 1st and 5th Division, Pack and
Bradford, should move past Osma on to Orduiia, by the two
alternative routes available between those places, while the
Head-Quarters l.'Qlumn should not turn north toward Ordufia
on reaching Osma, but pursue the roads south--eastward by
Espejo and Carcamo, which lead to Vittoria by a more southerly
line. The result contemplated was very much that which was
worked out in the battle of the 21st-a frontal attack by the
main body, with an outtlanking move by Graham's corps,
which would bring it into the rear of the enemy. But the
1 Pakeuham's l'rivare Corruprmdcnce (cd. Lord Longrord, 1014) gives
no help. He only writes on June 24th, • Lord W. left me to protoot his
rear: I executed my duty, but have lo!lt my laun.::1. . .. I havc satisfied
myself, and I hope my m:u;ter ' (p. 211).
• In SlIppkmclIJury Di:!]JaJcIlC8, vii. the two lJapers on Ill). 641 and 644
should be read together, the first giving the moves ror Gmham and the
'Light llnd 4th Divisions, tllC second for Hill and thc 3rd and 7th Divisiollll.
nb'
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route via Orduiia was not the one which the northern column
was nctuo.lIy destined to to.ke, o.s the events of the 18th dis·
tro.cted it into n shorter but rougher rood to the same destina-
tion (Murguia), which it would have rCllchcd by a much longer
turn Oil the high road via Orduua.
But all the columns were not moving on the main track
from Medina de Pomar to Osma this day, for Wellington had
directed the Light Division to drop its artillery to the care of
the 4th Division, and cut across the hills south of the high road,
by a country path which goes by Lo. llovcda, San Millan,
and Villanan to a point, n few miles south of Osma, in the
~ame valley of ~he Omeeillo in whieh that town lies. And
Hill, still far to the rem, was told 1;0 detach two brigades of
thc 2nd Division, and send them to follow the Light Divisioll
along the same linc: if A1ten should scud baek word that the
route was practicable for guns, Hin was to attach his Portuguese
ficld battery to this advance-column.
It was, apparently, on thl;: morning of thc 17th .Junc only that
the French got definite indications of the direction in which the
British army might be looked for. Maucunc reported from
Frias, not long o.fter his arrival there, that hostile cavalry
were across the Ebro in the direction of Puentc Arenas, and
that other troops in uncertain strength were behind them. It
was clearly necessary to take new measures, in view of the fact
that the enemy was beyond the Ebro, in a place where he had
not becn expected. How much did the move imply? Mter
consideration Joseph and Jourdan concludcd, quite correctly,
that sincc the main body of Wcllin~Jton's army had been
invisible for so many days-it had last been scen 011 thc Hor-
Illuza 011 JUl1e 12th-it was probably continuing its old policy
of circular marches to turn the French right. TillS was correct,
but they credited Welliu!.oton with intending to get round them
not by the shorter routes Osma-Vittoria, but by the much
longer route by Valmascda and Bilbao, whieh would cut into
the high road to Franec at Bergara, far behind Vittoria.
With this idea. in their heads the King and the Marshal issued
orders of a lamentably unpractical scope, considering thc
position occupied byWellington's leading divisions on June 17th.
Rcillc was ordered to collect his three infantry divisions at
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Osma, and to hurry across the mountains by Valmnseda. to
cover Bilbao from the west, by taking up a position somewhere
about Miravallcs. He would find the Biseayan capital already
held by St. Pol's Italians. aod Rouget's brigade of the Army of
the North. Foy, who was believed to be at Tolosa. was in·
structed to bring up his division to the same point. Thus a
force of some 25,000 men would be collected at Bilbao. Mean-
while ReiJIe's original positions at Frias and the Puente Lara
would be taken over by Ga7..an, who would march up the Ebro
from Arminion with two divisions of infantry and one of
cavalry, to watch the north bank of the Ebro. • These dis-
positions,' remarks Jourdan, • were intended to retard the
advance of the enemy in this mountainous region, and so to
gain time for the arrival of the reinforcements we were expecting
[i. e. Clauscl]. But it was too late! 1 ,
No worse orders could have been given. If Wellington had
struck twenty-four hoors later than he did, and Reille had
been able to carry out his first day's appointed move, and to
get forward towards Bilbao, the result would havc becn to
split the French army in two, with the main range of the
Cantabrian sierras between them: since Rcille and Fay would
have joined at Bilbao-thrce days' forced marches away from
the King. Meanwhile Joseph, dcprived of the whole Army of
Portugal, would have had Wellington striking in on his flank
by Osma, and would have been forced to fight something
resembling the battle of Vittoria with 10,000 men less in hand
~ than he actually owned on June 21. Either he would have
suffered an even worse defeat than was his lot at Vittoria, or
he would have been compelled to retreat without fighting,
down the Ebro, or towards Pampcluna. In either ease hc
would have lost the linc of communication with Frauce; and
while he was drivcn far cast, Foy and Rcille would have had
to hurry back all Bayonne, with somc risk of being intercepted
and cut oU on thc way.
As a matter of fact. ReiUe was checked and turned back
upon the first day of his northward march. He had sent
orders to Maucune to join him from Frias, either by the road
along the Ebro by Puente Lara, or by the mountain track which
1 Jourdllll, 1I1bmrircs, p. 472.
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goeS direetly from Frias to Espejo. Then, without waiting for
Maueune, he started from Espejo to mareh on Osma. He had
gone only a few miles when he discovered a British column
debouching on Osma, by the road from Berberenn 1 and the
north-west, which he had been intending to take himself.
Seeing his path blocked, but being loth to gi \'e way before
what might be no more than a detachment, he drew up his
two divisions on the hillside a mile south of Osma and appeared
ready to oUer battle. Moreover, he was expecting the arriv~
of Maueune, and judged that if he made off without delaying
the enemy in front of him, the column from Frias might be
intercepted and encircled.
The troops which Reille had met were Graham's main column
-the 1st and 5th divisions with Bradford's Portuguese nod
Anson's Light Dragoons, on their march towards OrdUlia.
Grnham prepared to attack, sent forward the German Legion
light battalions of the 1st Division, and pushed out Norman
Ramsay's horse artillery, with a cavalry escort, to the right of
Osma, forming the rest of his force for a general advance
across thc Bilbao road. After estimating the strength of the
British, Rcillc appeared at fIrst inclined to fIght, or at least to
show an intention of fighting. But a new enemy suddenly
came up-the 4th Division appeared on a side road, descending
from the bills on the right of Graham's line. It had just time
to throw out its light companies to skimrish 2 when Reille, seeing
himself obviously outnumbered and outflanked, retreated
hastily on Espejo; the 5th Division foUowed him on the left,
with some tiraillade. the 4th Division on the right. but he was
not caught. • Considerable fIre on both sides but little done,'
remarked an observer on the hillside 3. Reille's loss was
probably about 120 men, nearly all in Sarrut's division 4: that
of the British some 50 or 60.
Meanwhile there had been a mueh more lively fight, with
heavier casualties, a few miles farther south among the moun-
• Not Darlmcena as in Napier: the latter place is in Portugal.
• They lost 1 officer nnd 1 man wOllllded only.
• 'l'olUkinson'y Diary, p. 242.
• At least Martinien's lists show one officer killed and five wounded-
nil but one in Saunt's regiments-which at the IIsual rate would mean
]20 cWll1l1ltiey.
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tnins nenrer the Ebro. Maucune had started before dawn from
Frias, intending to join Reille -by a short cut through the hills,
instead of sticking to the better road along the river-bank by
the Puente Laro.. He only sent his guns with 0. cavalry eseort
by that route. He was marching with his two brigades at a
considerable distance from each other, the rear onc being
hampered by the charge of the divisional transport and baggage.
The leading brigade had reached the hamlet of Sail Millan
and was resting there by a brook, when British cavalry scouts
came in upon them-these were German Legion Hussars, at
the head of the Light Division, which Wellington had sent by
the cross-path over the hills by La Doveda. The approaching
column had been marching nlong a narrow rond, shrouded
by o\'erhnnging rocks nnd high banks, in which it could neither
sec nor be seen. On getting the alarm the four French battalions
fonned up to fight, in the small open space about the village,
while the head of the British column, Vandaleur's brigade,
deployed us fast as it could opposite them, and attacked; the
2j95th and Brd Ca~adores in front line, the 52nd in support.
Maucune was forced to make a stand, because his rear brigade
was coming up, unseen by his enemies, and would have been
cut off from him ifhe had retreated at once. But when the head
of Kempt's brigade of the Light Division appeared, and began
to deploy to the left of Vandaleur's, he saw that he was out·
numbered, and gave ground perforce. He had been driven
through the village, and was making ott along the road, with
the Rifle battalions in hot pursuit, when his second brigade,
with tbe baggagc in its rear, came on the sccne-most unex·
peeted by the British, for the track by which it emerged issued
out between two perpendicular rocks and had not been noticed.
Perceiving the trap into which they had fallen, the belated
Freneh turned off the rond, and made for the hillside to their
right, while Kempt's brigade started in pursuit, scrambling
over the rocky slopes to catch them up. 'fhe line of Hight
of the ltrench took them past the ground over which Vanda-
leur's men were chasing their comrades of the leading brigade,
and the odd result followed that they came in upon the rear
of the 52nd, and, though pursued, seemed to be themselves
pursuing. The Oxfordshire battalion thereupon performed the
•
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extraordinary feat of bringing up)ts left shoulder, forming line
facing to the rear at a run, and charging backward. They
encountered the enemy at the top of a slope, but the French,
seeing themselves between two fires, for Kempt's men were
following hotly behind them, avoided the colJision, struck orr
diagonally, and scattering and throwing away their packs
wcnt oU in disorder eastward, still keeping up a t'Ulming fight.
The large majority escaped, and joined Gazan's troops at
l\Iiranda. Meanwhile the first brigade, pursued by the Rifles
and Ca~adores, got away in much better order, and reached
Reille's main body at Espejo. The transport which had come
out of the narrow road too late to, follow the regiments, was
captured whole, after a desperate resistance by the baggage-
guard. .Maueune got off easily, all things considered, with
the loss of three hundred prisoners, many of them wounded,
and all his impedimenta 1. The fight was -l10 discredit to the
general or to his men, who saved themselves by presence of
mind, when caught at every disadvantage-inferior troops
would have laid down their arms en 17la.sse when they found
themselvcs between two fires in rough and unknown groWld 2.
The total British loss in the two simultaneous combats of
Osma and San Millan was 27 killed and 153 wounded.
Reille, having picked up l'tfaucune's first brigade at Espejo,
cQntinued his retreat, and got behind the Bayas river at
Subijana that night. The report which he had. to send to
head*quarters upset all the plans of J ourdan and the King,
and forced them to reeonsicler their position, which was
obviously most uncomfortable, as their line of defence along
the Ebro wns taken in flank, and the proposed succour to
Bilbao madc impossible. At least four British divisions had
been detceted by Reille, but where were the rest, and where
I Most 01 these details arc Irom tIle e:xeellent account by nn officer of
the 4Srd in Mnxwell's Pmill8ular Sketc1UJS, ii. pp. 311-40. This nnrrntivc
Wllli evidently lICCll by Nupicr, who rcpr<JdU("c~ JIlUlIY of its uctual words,
as I have done m~'SCIr. It must have been lent him long belore it was
pfinted in 1845.
I Mllrtinien's lists show only 1 officer killed nnd 5 wounded lhis dny in
Maucunc's division-this means about 120-50 casualties, but 01 course
does 1I0t include tile unwoundcd prisoners from the baggage-guard.
JOllrdau says t.hat t.hl' ,1iv;sion hftd • line perlc ll'I.SCZ eonsidcmblc.'
18131 JOSEPH RETIRES ON VITTORIA 877
were the Spaniards, who were known to be in some strength
with Wellington? Was the whole Allied host behind the force
which had drivcn in thc Army of Portugal, or was there some
great unseen column executing some further inscrutable
movement?
There was hot discussion at Miranda that night. Reille
repeated the proposition which had already been made at
Burgos six days back, that in consideration of the fact that
the army was hopelessly outflanked, and that its retreat by the
high road to Vittorw. and Bayonne was threatened by the
presence of Wellington on the Buyas, it should abandon that
line of communication altogether, march down the Ebro, and
take up the line of Pampeluna and Saragossa, rallying Clausel
and, if possible, Suehet, for a general concentration, by which
the British army could be driven back as it had been from
llurgos in 1812. Foy and the Biscay garrisons would have to
take care of themselves-it was unlikely that Wellington would
be able to fall upon them, when the whole of the rest of the
French armies of Spain were on his flank, and taking the
offensive against him.
Joseph, for the third time, refused to consider this scbeme,
alleging, as before, the Emperor's strict orders to keep to the
Bayonne base, and to hold on to the great royal chaussee. But,
as is clear, his refusal was affected by another consideratidll
which in his eyes had almost equally decisive weight. Vittoria
was crammed with the great convoys of French and Spanish
refugees which had a.ccumulated there, along with all the
plunder of Madrid, and the military material representing the
'grand train' of the whole army of Spain-not to speak of
his own immcnse privatc baggage. There had also arrived,
within the last few days, a large consignment of hard cash-the
belated arrears of the allowance which the Emperor had
consented to give to the Army of SPtloin. Onc of Foy's brigades
hud escorted these fourgons of treasure to Vittoria, and dropped
them there, returning to Bergara with a section of thc refugees
in charge, to be passed on to Bayonne,l Thc amount delivered
was not less than five million francs-bitterly needed by the
troops, who were in long arrears. All this accumulation at
1 s...'C Vii; lIIi1itaire (Ill. Cbu':ral Fay, PI). 206-7.
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Vittoria was in large measure due to the King's reluctallce
during the retreat to order a general shift of all his officials and
impedimenta over the border into France. As long as his
ministers, and all the plant of royalty, remained on the south
side of the Pyrenees, he still seemed a king. And he had hoped
to maintain himself first on the Douro, then about Burgos,
then on the Ebro. It was only when this last line was forced
that he made up his mind to surrender his theoretical status,
and think of military considerations alone. The lateness of
his decision was to prove most fatal to his adherents.
Having resolved to order a general retreat on Vittoria,
.Joseph Bnd Jourdan took such precautions as seemed possible.
Reiterated orders for haste were sent to Foy and Clausel: the
latter wns told to march on Vittoria not on l\1iranda, Unfor-
tunately he had received the dispatch sent from BUTgos on
June 15th, which gave him Miranda. as the concentration·point,
und had already gathered his divisions at Pnmpeluna on Junel8,
and stnrted to march by Estella and Logrofio and along the
north bunk of the Ebro. This gave him two sides of a triangle
to cover, whilc if he had been assigncd thc routc Pampcluna-
Salvaticrra-Vittoria, he would havc been saved cighty miles
of road. But on JWle 9th, whcn the original orders were
issued, no one could have foreseen, save Wellington, that the
critical day of the campaign would have found the French army
far north of the Ebro. And the new dispatch, sent of{ on the
night of the 18th-19th, started far too late to reach Pampeluna
in time to stop Clausel's departure southward. Indeed, it did
not catch him up till the battle of Vittoria had been fought,
and the King was a fugitive on the way to· France, Fay
received orders a little earlier, though not apparently those
sent directly by the King, but a copy of adispatch to Thouvenot,
governor of Vittoria, in which the latter was instmcted ' that
if General Foy and his division are in your neighbourhood, you
.are to bid him give up his march on Bilbao, and draw in towards
Vittoria, unless his presence is absolutely necessary at the
point where be may be at present 1: This unhappy piece of
I Vie miliUlirt: du Gtntral Fay, p. 200. The editor, Ginxl de l'Aill,
seems to prove that Foy got no other dispatch, though JOllrnan declares
that severnl had been sent to him.
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wording gave Foy a choice, which he interpreted as authorizing
him to remain at Bergaro, so as to cover thc high road to Frnllcc,
a task which he held to be • absolutely necessary.'
As to the troops already 011 the spot, Reillc was ordered to
defend the line of the Bayas river, until thc armies of the
South and Centre flhould have had time to get past his rear
and reach Vittoria. Ga:l,an was ordered to collect the whole
of the Army of the South at Arminion, behind Miranda,
drawing in at once the considerable detachment which he hOO
left beyond the Ebro. In this position he was to wnit till
D'Erlon, with the Army of the Centre, who had to move up
from Haro, tcn miles to the south, should have arrivcd and
have got on to thc great cltaussee. He was then to follow him,
acting as rearguard of the whole force. Between Arminion
and Vittoria the road passes for two miles through the very
narrow defile of Puebla, the bottle-neck through which the
Zadorra river cuts its way from the upland plain of Vittoria
to the lower level of the Ebro valley.
i)'Erlon, starting nt davm from Haro, reached Arminion at
10 o'clock in the morning of the 19th, and pushed up the defile:
the head of his column was just emerging from its northern end
when a heavy cannonnde began to be hcard in the west. It
continued all tte time that the Army of thc South was pressing
up the .defile, and grew nearer. This, of course, marked the
approach of Wellington, driving the covering force under Reille
before him toward the Zadorra. The British commander·in·
chief had slept the night at Berberena near Osma, and had
there drafted a set of orders which considerably modified his
original scheme: probnbly the change was due to topographical
information, newly garnered up from the countryside. Instead
of sending Graham's column via Ordufia, to cut in on the flank
of the chaussee behind Vittoria, he had resolved to send it by
a shorter route, a mere country rood which gocs by Luna,
Santa Eulalia, and Joca.no to Murguia-thc village which it had
been ordcred on the previous day to reach via Orduiia and the
high road. Presumably it had been discovered thut this would
save time,-the advantage of using a fIrst-rate track being
more tlmn counterbalanced by the fact that the Ordufia road
was not only ten miles longer but crossed and rec:rosscd by
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ste€p slopes the main sierra, which forms the watershed between
Biscay and Alava. Or possibly it was only the discovery that
the Luna-Jocano route could be taken by artillery that settled
the matter: if it had been reported useless for wheeled
traffic the old orders might have stood. At any rate, the turning
movement, which was to take Graham into the :renx of Vittoria,
was made south of the main mountain chain, and not north
of it 1.
l\ieanwhile, though Grahn.m diverged north-enstw!U'd, the
rest of the Army moved straight forward from the valley of
the Omccillo to that of the Bayns in four columns, all parallel
to each other, and all moving by country roads. The 3rd
Division was ordered from Berberen6 to Carcamo-the 7th
followed behind it. The 4th Division with D'Urban's cavalry
in front, and the Light Division with V. Alten's hussars in
front, were directed on Subijana and Pobes, keeping in close
and constant communication with each other. Behind them
came the cavalry reserve-R. Hill's, .Grant's, and Ponsonby's
brigades-also the heavy artillery. Hill's column, which had
now eomc up into touch with the leading divisions, kept to
the high road from Osmn and Espejo towards the Puente Lam.
and the Ebro. But only cavalry reconnaissances went as far as
the river-the mass of the corps turned oU eastward when it
had passed Espejo, and moved by SlIlinas de Anafia, so as to
come out into the valley of the Bayas south of the route of the
Light Division. It thus became the right wing of the army
which was deploying for the frontal attack.
It has been mentioned above that a local Spanish force from
the Cantabrian mountains had joined Wellington at Medina
de Pomar; this was the so-called • division', some 8,500
bayonets, of the great guerrillero of the coast-land, Longa., now
no more an irregular but a titular colonel, while his partida had
been reorganized as four battalions of light infantry. Lollga
was a tough and persistent fighter-a. case of the' survival
I It would appear, however, that though the 1st and 5th Divisions and
Ansan', cavalry never went near Ordufta, }'Ct Bradford and Pack's Portu-
gucse (without artillery) had got 80 nen~ it on thc preceding day that
Wellington let them go through it, bringing them baek to the ml1in body
via Unr.a by a mountain path. Sce SUppltftle'll/UT1J Di$palclles, vii. p. 647.
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oC the fittest' a.mong many insurgent chiefs who had perished.
His men were veteran mountaineers, indefatigable marchers,
Bnd skilled skirmishcrs, if rudimcntary in thcir drill and equip-
ment. Wellington during the ensuing campaign ga.ve more
work to them than to any other Spanish troops that were at
his disposal-save the Estremaduran division of Morillo, old
comrades ofHill's corps, to which they had always been attached
since 1811. The use which Wellington now made of Longa's
men was to employ them as n light covering shield for Graham's
turning force. They had been sent across the hills from Quin·
coccs 1 on ~hc 17th to occupy Orduiia-from thence they
descended on the 19th on to Murguia, thus placing themselves
•
at the head of the turning column. The object of the "arrange-
ment was that, if the enemy should detect the column, he would
imagine it to be a Spanish demonstration, and not suspect
that a heavy British force lay hid behind the familiar guerrilleros.
While Longa was thus brought in sideways, to fonn the hend
of Graham's column, the other Spanish forcc which Wellington
was employing was also deflected to join the main army.
Giron's Galicians, as has been mentioned above, had been
sent by a long sweep through the sierras to demonstrate
against Bilbao. They had reached Valmaseda on the 18th,
and their approach had alarmed all the French garrisons of
Biscay. Now, having put themselves in evidence in the
north, they were suddenly recalled, ordered to march by
Amurrio on Ordufia and l\{urguin, and so to fall into the rear
of Gmham's column. The distances were considerable, the
ronds sf;c(:p, and Giron only came up with the Anglo-Portuguesc
army on the afternoon of the battle of Vittoria, in which (unlike
Longa-) he was too late to take any part. Somcwhcre on his
march from Aguilar to Valmaseda he picked up a reinforce-
ment, the ver}' small Asturian division of Portier-three
battalions or 2,400 men-which Mendi7Abal had sent to join
him from the blockade of Santona. This raised the Galician
Army to a total of some 14,000 bayonets.
The 19th June was a very critical day, as no onc knew better
than Wellington. The problem was whether, starting with the
heads of his column facing the line of the Bayas, where Reille
, Probably by Angulo, and the valley of the Gordajucla.
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. had rallied his three divisions and was standing at bay, he
CQuld drive in the deroining force, and cross the Zadorra in
pursuit of it, fast enough to surprise some part of the French
army still in its march up from the south. And, as an equally
important problem, there was the question whether Graham,
marching on Murguia, could reach the upper Zadorra and cut
the great road north of Vittoria, before the French were in
position to cover it. If these operotions oould be carried out,
there would be 0. scrambling fight scattered over much ground,
rather than a regular pitched battle. If they could not, there
would be a formal general action on the 20th or. 21st against
all enemy established ill position-unless indeed King Joseph
should choose to continue his retreat without fighting, which
Wellington thought quite possible 1.
Wellington is censured by some critics, including Napier 2,
for not making a swifter advance on the 19th. It is said that
a little more haste would have enabled him to get to Vittoria
as. soon as the enemy, and to force him to fight in dislocated
disorder on ground which he had not chosen. This seems
~njustifiable. The distance between the eamps of the Allied
Army, in front of Osma and Espejo, and Vittoria is some twenty
miles-difficult ground, with the Bayas river flowillg through
the midst of it and a formidable position held by 15,000. Fren~h
behind that stream. As Reille, conscious how much dependcd
on his gaining time for the King to rctreat from l\liranda, was
determined to detain the Allied Army as long as he could, it
would have been useless to try to drive him away by a light
attack. The rear of each of Wellington's columns was trailing
many miles behind the leading brigade. It was necessary to
bring up against Reille a force sufficient to make serious resis-
tance impossible, and this Wellington did, pushing forward
not only the 4th and Light Divisions, but Hill's column in
support, on the southern flank. It took time to get them
deployed, and the attack was opened by a cannonade. By the
time that a general advance was ordered Reillc had begun to
retire-he did so very neatly, and crossed the Zadorra by the
• He says so in his letter to the Condc d'Abispal, Di6paU:hlJ8, x. pp. 445-6.
• Jc ICli nttl\qucmi deml\iu, /I'ils 11e fall' pas la re/railc dallB la nllit.'
I Nupier, v. p. 114.
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four nearest bridges without any appreciable loss. By this
time the afternoon had arrived, the rest of the French army
had passed the defile of Puebla, and Wellington judged the
hour too late for thc commencement of a pitched battle 1.
Moreover, he did not intend to fight without the co-operation
of Graham's column, and the latter was not where he would
have wished it to be. The day had been very rainy, the cross
roads were bad, and by some error of staff-work the head of
the column had not received the counter-marching orders
directing it to march direct on Murguia, but had started in
accordance with the earlier plan on to the Ordufia road; the
]st and 5th Divisions had gone some way upon it before they
were recalled and counter-marched into the right path 2.
Owing to blocks and bad weather they only rcached Jocano,
somc six or eigl~t miles cast of Osma, by six in the evcning.
l\turguia was still nine miles ahead, the rain was still falling in
torrents, and Graham ordered the divisions to halt and encamp
for the night. The fate of the campaign was not to be fought
out that day, nor on the next, but on the third morning-that
of June 21st, 1813.
I 'fhere is a good aecount or the skirmish 011 the Buyu>; ill \Vuehhol"/;,
1'.314. He remarks on the abominable weather, • incredible lor the time
of )'car---continIlOlls unlJcamble coi<l and min~tllC sun visible only for
. short intervals. Very bud roads.'
• For all this scc Tomkinson's Diflry, p. 243. His statement that the
column went off on the Orduiill road by mistake nud WlI.S lit once ~t right,
seems to me conclusive against Napicr's views.
SECTION XXXVI: CHAPTER VII
THE BATTLE Ob' VITTORB.. JUNE 21, 1813
(A) TIlE FlitsI' STAGE
TOE phdn of Vittoria, into which the French army debauched
on the afternoon of June loth, is II plain only by compa.rison
with the high hills which surround it on all sides, being an oval
expanse of rolling ground drnined by the swift and narrow
Zadorra river, which runs on its north-eastern side. Only in it-s
northern section, near the city, does it show rcully Oat ground.
It is about twelve miles long from north-east to south-west,
and varies from six to eight miles in breadth. 'fhe Zadorra is
onc of those mountain streams which twist in numberless loops
and bends of alternate shallows and deep pools, in order to
get round rocks or spurs which stand in the way of their direct
course I, At onc point seven miles down-stream from Vittoria
it indulges in a complete' hairpin-bend' in which arc the bridges
of Tres Puenles llnd ViUodas, mj it circles round II prceipitoUli
knoll. At several other spots it executes minor loops in its
tortuous course. The little city of Vittoria stands all an
isolated rising ground at its northern cnd, very visible from all
dircetions, and dominatingthc whole upland with two prominent
church spires at its highest point. The great road from France
enters the plain of Vittoria and the valley of the Zadorra three
miles north-east of the city, descending from the defile of
Sallnas, a long and difficult pass in which ~rina and other
guerriIleros had executed some of their most daring raids all
l~reneh convoys. Mter passing Vittoria the rood keeps to the
middle of the upland in a westerly direction, and issues from it
by the defile of La Puebla, where the Zadorra cuts its way
through the Sierra de Andia in order to join the Ebro. There
is not much more than room for road and river in the gorge,
which is dominated by the heights of La Puebla, a spur of the
• An English eye-witness calls it 'nowhere fordable': a Freneh eye-
witness' rordable everywhere': both arc wrong. cr. Fortcscltc, ix. p.152.
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Andia, on the east, and by a corresponding but lower range,
the elld of the heights of Morillas on the west.
But the Bayonne chaussec is by no means the only ro.'ld in the
Vittoria upland. The city is the meeting point of a number of
second-class and third-class routes, debauching from various
subsidiary valleys of thc Pyrences and Icading to vMious Lowns
in Navarre or Biscay. or these the chief were (l)the Salvatierra-
Pampelima road, running duc cast, and then crossing from
the valley of the Zadorra to the upper waters of the Araquil, by
which it descends into Navarre. This was a route practicable
for artillery or transport, but narrow, ill repaired, and steep-
eminently not a line to he taken by a large force in a hurry;
'(2) the main rood to Bilbao by VilIareal and Durango, a coach
road, but very tortuous, and ascending high mountains by long
curves and twists; (3) the alternative coach route to Bilbao
by Murguia and Ordmin, easier than the ViUareal road in its
first section, but forced to cross the main chain of the Pyrenees
by difficult grndients before descending into Biscay; (4) a bad
side road to the central Ebro, going due south by Trevillo an.d
La Guardia to Logrofio; (5) a similar route, rWIlling due cast
from Subijana on the Bayas to the bridges of Nanclares three
mile.'i up-stream from the defile of Pucbla. At the opening of
the battle of Vittoria Graham's column was already across the
Murguia-Bilbao road, and in its earliest advance blocked the
Durango-Bilbao road also. Thus the only route beside the great
chaussie available for the French was that to Salvatierra and
Pampelunn. The road to Trevino and Logrofio was useless, as
leading in an undesired direction.
In addition to thcse five coach roads there were sc\'cral
country tracks running fmm various points on the Bayas rivcr
to minor bridges on the Zadorra, across the 10fty:Monte Arr.t.to,
the watershed between the two streams. It was these fifth-rate
tracks which Wellington used on the battle-day for the advance
of some of his central columns, while Hill on the right was
forcing the defile of La Puebla, and Graham on the left was
descending from l'ifurguia on to the bridges of the upper Zadorra
north-east of ViUorill.
Having their troops safely concentrated east of the Zadorra
on the evening of June 19, Joseph and Jourdan made up their
356.8 c C
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minds to stand on the position behind that river, even though
Clausel had not yet come up. Ilor sent any intelligence as to the
route by which he was arn viug. Aides-dc-camp were searching
for him in all directions-but nothing had yet been ascertained,
beyond the fact that he had started from Pampeluna on
June 15th, marching on Logroi'io 1. There was a high chance
t.hat some one of many missives would reach him, and turn him
on to Vittoria. But the idea that Clausel must now be very
near at hand was less operative in compelling Joseph to fight
than the idea that he must at all cost save the vast COll\'0YS
accumulated around him, his treasure, his military train, his
ministers, and his refugees. He was getting them oIl north·
ward by the high road as Cast as he could: one convoy marched
on the 20th, llllder the charge of thc troops of the Army of the
North who had formed the garrison of Vittoria, another and
a larger at dawn on the 21st, escorted by the whole of l\faucune's
division. It had with it many of the Old Masters stolen from
the royal palace at :r.ladrid-the pictures of Titian, Rafael, and
Velasquez, which had been the pride of the old dynasty-with
the pick of the royal armoury and ca binet of Natuml History!.
It is almost as difficult to make out how Joseph, already unequal
in numbers to his enemy, dared to deprive himself of l\{aucune's
division of the Army of Portugal, as to discover why Wellington
left the 6th Division at Medina de Pomar. It does not seem
that the morale of the unit had been shaken by its rude experi-
ence at San Millnn on the 18th, for it fought excellently in
subsequent operations: nor had it surtered any disabling losses
in that fight. A more obvious escort might have been found in
Casapalacios'Spanish auxiliaries, who had already becn utilized
for similar purposes between Madrid and Vittoria, or in the
scraps of the Army of the North which had lately joined the
retreating host. But they remained for the battle, while
Maueune marched north, with the cannon sounding behind
him all day.
When Jourdan and Joseph first arrayed their host for the
expected battle, it would seem, from the line which they took
up, that they imugined that Wellington wouId attack them
only from the dircetion of the Bayas, and paid 110 attcntion to
1 Jourdan's jlUmoire" p. 474. • See Toreno, Hi. pp. 233-6.
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Graham's flanking movcmcnt, though aCterwards they wrote
dispatches to prove that they had not ignored it. For they
drew up the Army oC the South on a short frollt, from the exit
of the defile of Puebla on the south to the bridge of VilIodas on
the north, a front of three miles, 'with D'Erlon's two divisions in
second line on each side of the village of Gomecha, two miles
farther back, and the Army of Portugal and the King's Guards
as a third line in reserve about Zuazo, not far in front of Vittoria,
along with the bulk of the Cowalry. This order of battle, as
a glance at the map shows, presupposed a frontal attack from
the line of the Bayns, where Wellington was known to be. It
was iIl-suiled to face an attack from the north-west on the line
of the Zadorra above Villodas, and still more so an attaek from
the due north by the roads from Ordui\a and Murguia. On the
morning of the 20th cavalry reconnaissances went out to look
for the Allied Army-they reported that the camps along the
Bayas above Subijana Morillos did not seem very large, and
that on the ~{urguia rood they hfld fallen in with and pushed
back Longa's irregulars, obviously a Sp.'l.nish demonstration 1.
, No indication being available of the details of a projected
attack, and further information being unproeurable, only con·
jectures could be made 2.'
It is interesting to know from the narrative of Jourdan
himself what these conjectures werc. 'Wellington,' he writes,
, had shown himself sincc the start of thc campaign morc dis~
posed to manreuvre his opponents out of their positions, by
constantly turning their right wing, than to attack them
frontally and force on a battle. It was thought probable that,
pursuing this system, he would march on Bilbao by Orduna, and
from thence on Durango, so as to force them to fall back
promptly 011 Mondragon 3, in order to retain their communica-
tions with France. He might even hope to force them to
evacUAte Spain by this move, because it would be impossible to
feed a great army on that section of the Pyrenees. The King,
• There is an account of this skirmish in Digoon's report, and in Hay's
Rtminuumu urnkr WeUingtQn, pp. 107--8•
• Jourdan, p. 413.
I The fortified position north of the defile or Salinas, where the road
fmm Bilhno to Franoe joins the great chalJ.ute.
CO2
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knowing that Clausel was on the move, had little fear of the
results of a march on Bilbao, for on receiving Clausel's corps
he would be strong enough to take the offensive himself, and
would strike at Wellington's communications. It did not
escape him that if the enemy, instead of wasting more time on
flank movements, should attack him before the arrival of
Clauscl, he was in a perilous position. For there was little
chance of getting the better of an adversary who had about
double numbers, and a lost battle would cut off the army from
the rood to France, and force it to retire on Pampelllna by
a road difficult, if not impracticable, for the train and artillery
of a great host. To avoid the risk of an instant attack from
Wellington, ought we to fall back and take up the position
above the pass of Salinas ? 1 But to do this was to sacrifice the
jWlction with Clausel, who was expected on the 21st at latest.
And how could the army havc been fed in the passes? The
greater part of the cavalry and the artillery horses would have
had to be sent baek to France at once-famine would have
forced the infantry to follow. Then the King would have been
accused of cowardice, for evacuating Spain without trying the
fortune of battle. To justify such a retreat we should have had
to be cert.ain that we were to be attacked before the 22nd, and
we considered that, if Wellington did decide to fight, it would be
unlikely that be could do so before the 22nd, because of the
difficulty of the roads which he had taken. After mature
consideration of the circumstance the King rcsolved to stand
fast at Vittoria.'
Putting aside the gross over-estimate of Wellington's strength
-hc fought with a superiority of 75,0002 to 57,000, not with two
to one-the main point to note in this curious and interesting
argument is its defective psychology. Because Wellington had
hitherto avoided frontal attacks, whcn flank movements suited
him better, was it safe to conclude that he would do so ad
infinitum? That he was capable of a sudden onslaught was
obvious to everyone who remembered the battle of Salamanca.
Why, if he were about to repeat his previous encircling policy,
should he go by Orduiia, Bilbao, and Durango, rather than by
I i. e. the position above the northern exit from the pluin of Vittoria.
• Not CQullting !)akenham and Givon, but including Longa llnd Morillo.
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the shorter turn Osma-Murguia-Vittoria? Apparently the
French staff underrated the possibilities of that road, and took
the presence of Longa upon it as a sign that it was only to be
used for a Spanish demonstration 1. Should not the speed with
whieh Wellington had traversed the detestable country paths
between the Arlanzon and the Ebro have served as a warning
that, jfhechose to push hard, he could cover at a very rapid rate
the rather less formidable tracks north of the Zltdorra? In short,
the old marshal committed the not uncommon fault of making
false deductions from an imperfect set of premises. It is
much more difficult to say what should have been his actual
course under the existing circumstances of June 20. Napier
holds that he might still have adopted Reille's old plan of
June 12 and June 18, Le. that he should have thrown up the
line of communication with France by the high road, have made
ready to retrcat ou- Pampcluna instead of on Bayonne, and
have looked forward to making Saragossa his base. After
having picked up ftrst Clausel and then so much of the Army of
Aragon as could be collected, he might have got 100,000 men
together and have started an offensive campaign 2. This over-
looks the impossibility of getting the convoys and train safely
along the bad road from Vittoria to Pampeluna, and the
difficulty of making Saragossa, where there were no great
accumulations of stores and munitions, the base of an army ot'
the size projected. All communication with France would have
becn thrown 011 the hopelessly long and circuitous route from
Saragossa to Pcrpignan, for thc pass by Jaca was impracticable
for wheeled traffic. Certainly Joseph would have had to destroy,
as a preliminary measure to a rctreat via Salvatierra or Pampe-
luna, the greater part or his train. And what would have
become of his wretched horde of refugees?
Another school of critics-among them Belmas-urge that
while it was perfectly correct to cling as a primary necessity to
the great road to France, Vittoria was not the right point at
which to defend it, but the pass of $.'l.linas. Jourdan's objection
that the cavalry would be useless in the mountains i~ declared
I Digeoo in bis report insists that be thought there was something more
behind T..ongn. But this is u poS/. facto llllegntion .
• Naplcr, v. p. 134.
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to have little weight, and his dread of famine to be groundless.
For Wellington could not have remained for many days in front
of the passes-he must have attacked at once a very formidable
position, or Foy and the other troops in Biscny would have
had time to join the King; nnd with 15,000 extra bayonets the
French would have been hard to dislodge. The danger to Clause!
would have been not very great, since Wellington would not
have dared to detach a force sufficient to crush him, while the
main French army was in his front, intact and ready to resume
the offensive. And on the other flank Biscay, no doubt, would
have been exposed to an invasion by Giron's Galicinns, when
Foy had withdrawn its garrisons to join the main army. But
it is improbable that tbis movement would have been backed
by any large section of the Anglo-Portuguese force; for Welling-
ton, as his previous aetion showed, was intending to keep all
his own old divisions in oue body. He would not have risked
allY of his OWII troops between the Pyrenees and the sea, by
trying to thrust them in on the back of the French position,
to Durango or Mondragon. And if Giron alone went to Bilbao
and Durango, his presence in that direction, a:nd any threats
which he might make on the King's rear, would be tiresome
rather than dangerous.
Be this as it may, whatever the general policy of Jourdan
and Joseph should have been, their pnrticular dispositions for
occupying the Vittoria position were very faulty. It was as
well known to every proetical soldier then as it is now, that
a normal river-position cannot be held by a continuous line of
troops placed at the water's edge. For there will be loops and
bends at which the ground 011 one's own side is commanded
and enftlacled by higher ground on the enemy's side. If troops
are pushed forward into such bends, they will bc cl'Ushed by
artillery flrC, or run danger of being cut orr by attacks on the
neck of the loop in their rear 1. Unless thc general who has to
defend a river front is fa vourcd with a stream in front of him
absolutely straight, and with all the commanding ground on
his own side (an unusual chance), he must rather look to
arranging his army in such a fashion as to hold as strong points
all the favourable sections of the front, while thc unfavourable
l Cl. events in the Nimy-obourg Sallcnt at Mons on August 22, 1914.
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ones must be watched from suitable positions drawn back from
the water's edge. By judicious disposition of artillery, the
occupation and preparation of villages, woods, or other cover,
and (if necessary) the throwing up of trenches, the enemy,
though he cannot be prevented from crossing the river at
certain points, can be kept from debauching out of the sections
of the hither bank which he has mastered. And if he loads up
the captured ground with heavy masses of troops which cannot
get forward, he will suffer terribly from artillery fire, while if
he does not hold them strongly, he will be liable to counter-
attacks, which will throw the troops who have crossed back into
the river. The most elementary precaution for the general on
the defensive to take is, of course, to blow up all bridges, and to
place artillery to command all fords, also to have local reserves
ready at a proper distance behind every section where a passage
is likely to be tried 1.
We may excuse Joseph and Jourdan for not entrenching all
the weak sections of their front-hasty field works were little
used in the Peninsular War; indeed the trenches which Welling.
ton threw up on the second day of Fuentes de Ofioro were an
almost unique instance of such an expedient. But the other
precautions to be taken were commonplaces of contemporary
tactics. And they were entirely neglected. The !ront liable to
attack was very long for the size of the defending army: whole
sections of it were neglected. Bridges and fords were numerous
on the Zadorra: incredible as it may seem, not one of eleven
bridges between Durana to the north and Nanclares to the
south was blown up. The numerous fords seem lIot to have
been known accurately to either the attacking or the defending
generals, but some of the most obvious of them were ignored
in Joseph's original disposition of his troops. Several alike of
bridges and fords were lightly watched by cavalry only, with
!l0 further precn.ution taken. What is most astonishing is to
find that bridges which were actually used by French exploring
J The clNlsicnl inlrtanceof the wnper clefence of a river front is (I sUPIKlse)
Lee's dClfcllcc of the Rupplltll~nnockut the bl\ttle of I''rcdcrickllbllrg. For the
ruinous tate or an army which gets across at one or two points ot a long
front. l\nd i~ oounter-attaeked, cf. the battle or the Katzbaeh. Cought two
months utter Vittoria.
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parties' on June 20t.h, so that their existence was thoroughly
realized, were found intact and in some cases unguarded on the
21st 1. The fact would seem to be that the King's head-
quarters staft was dominated by a false idea: that 'WeUington's
attack would be delivered on the south part of the river front,
from the defile of Puebla to the bridge of Villodas; and that
the troops discovered on the Murguia rond were Longa's
irregulars only, bound on a demonstration. An acute British
obser\'er remarked that the French position had two main
defects--the more important onc was th!lt it faced the wrong
way 2: this was quitc true.
The final arrangement, as taken up on the morning of
June 20 was that the Army of the South arrayed itself so as to
block the debauches from the defile of La Puebla and the
bridges immediately up-stream from it-those of Nanclares and
Villodas. Gazan did not occupy the entrance of the defile of
LaPuebla-to doso he must have stretched his line farther south
and east than his numbers permitted. But he held its exits,
with some voltigeur companies from l\Iaransin's brigade, perched
high up on the culminating ground immediately above the river.
From this lofty point on the heights of Pucbla his first line
stretched north-eastward along a linc of low hills, past the
villages of Subijullu (Iow down and not far from the Puebla
heights) und Arii'icz (011 the high road, at thc spot where it
crosses the position), a dominating point on the sky-line. The
right wing nearly reached to the Zadorra at the spot where it
makes the' hairpin bend' alluded to above. But the solid
occupation by formed troops did not extend so far: there were
only a cavalry regiment and three guns watching the bridge of
l\:Iendoza 3, and. a single company of voltigeurs watching that of
Villodas. 'fhe disposition of the units was, counting from the
French left, first Maransin's brigade occupying Subijana, next
Conrollx's division in a single line on the slopes to the north of
the village of Zumclzu, with a battalion holding a wood in front
, Especially the bridges of Trcs Puentes and Nanclar~ by which a
reconnaissance was madc on June 20, and thllt or Mendoza up-stream.
See Jourolln. p. 4.73.
I Blllkiston's Twdw Yean of MiiiJe"!J A/Ive11fure, ii. p. 207.
• And this not belonging to the Army or the South, but to d'Erlon-
Avy's 27th Chasscurs.
1813] DISPOSITION OF THE FRENCH ARTILLERY 393
on lower ground. Then came Daricau's division, one brigade
in front line across the high road, the other brigade (St. Pol's) in
reserve north of the rond, and in rear of LevaJ's division, which
was deployed on the prominent height in front of the village of
Arifiez, which formed the end of the main position. Between
Lcval and the Zndorra there was only Avy's few squadrons of
light horse, watching the bridge of Mendoza. Nearly n mile
to the rear of the main line Villatte's division stood in reserve,
on the heights on the other side of Ariiiez, and with it Pierre
Soult's cavalry. The position was heavily gunned, as artillery
support went ill those days. Each of the three front·line
divisions had its battery with it-a fonrth belonging to Pierre
Soult's cavalry was placed on a knoll in front of the position,
from which it could sweep the approaches from the bridge of
Nanclares. In reserve behind Arifiez was not only Villatte's
battery, but two others drawn from the general artillery park,
and during the early stage of the battle another pair of batteries,
belonging to the Army of Portugal, were sent to join Leval's
divisional gUlls on the north end of the position. Gazan had
therefore some 54 pieces in hand, 'without counting the half-
battery of horse artillery belonging to Digeon's dragoons,
which was absent far to his extreme right, by the banks of the
upper Zadorra..
Three-quarters of a mile behind Gazan's reserves, the whole
Army of the Centre was deployed on each side of the high road,
Darmagnac's division north of it in front of Zuazo, Cassagne's
division south of it, level with Gomeeba. 'l'reillard's dragoons
were behind C!\Ssagne; Avy's ehasseurs (as has been mentioned
above) were watching the Zadorra on the rigbt.
In the original order of battle of the 20th the Army of
Portugal had been in third line, a mile behind the Army of the
Centre, on 0. level with the villages of Ali and Armentia. But
when Digcon's dragoons reported in the afternoon that they
had discovered Lollga's column on the Murguia road, it was
decided that a flank guard must be thrown out ill that direction,
to cover Vittoria and the high road to France from possible
raids. Wherefore Reille was told that it would be his duty to
provide against tillS danger. He took out :Menne's brigade of
Sarrut's division from the line, pushed it over the Zadorra, and
304 THE BATTLE OF VITTORIA [JUNE 2\
established it in a position level with Aranguiz on the Murguia
TOad, a mile and more beyond the river. Late at night, appal"
ently on a report from a deserter that there were British troops
behind Longs. Yindced the man said that Wellington himself
was on the Bilbao road)-Rcillc took ocr the other brigade of
58orrut's division in the same direction, and sent it with Curlo's
regiments of light horse to join Mennc. There remained in
front of Vittoria of infantry only Lamartiniere's division, and
the King's Guards; but there was a very large body of cavalry
in reserve-'!'iIIy's and Digeon's dragoon divisions of the Army
of the South, the King's two Guard regiments of lancers, and the
hulk of the horse of the Army of Portugal, Boyer's dragoons
and Mermet's ehasseurs: there must have been 5,000 sabres
or more in baud.
One further precaution was taken-lest the enemy might be
moving against the high road to Franee from points even more
to the north than Murguia, a trifling force was sent to cover the
exit of the c!UJ,ussee from the pass of Salinas; this was the
Spanish' division' of Casapalaeios belonging to the Army of
the Centre, strengthened by SQme scraps of the French troops
of the Army of the North, which had come in from minor
garrisons during the recent retreat. Casapalo.cios' AfrancesGdcs,
nominalJy three regiments strong, were under 2,000 bayonets-
they had with them five weak squadrons of their own nation,
s half-battery, also Spanish, and an uncertain (but small)
French auxiliary force, whieh included a battalion of the
3rd Line, purt of the 15th Chasseurs. and a sectiolJ of guns
equipped from the artillery dcp6t of the Army of the North,
which had long bcen established at Vittoria and bad not been
sent to the rear 2. Casapalacios took post at Durana, covering
, 'rhis story is given by Gazan in his report, as a proof that Jourdan
had 3mple ..n,ming that there WlI.lI danger from the north as 'wel! llS from
the east.
• TllellC troops were' nobody's children' and get ignored in GQ7.11n'S
and Reille's reports. But we hear of the 3rd Line defending Gamarra
l\lenor in one French report, 11 fnet l'Orrobomted by its showing two onk'Cr-
casualties in lIIartinien'slists---thc guns are mentioned in '1'irlct's artillery
report. Cavalry of tile Army of the North is vaguely mentioned-its
presence seelll~ eslnblisherl by !Ill offieer-cnlSuulty of the 15th ChuS&eurs in
lIInrtinicn. 1 suspect the P~l;CI1CC of part of the 10th Ugcr, which has an
olfieer·cQ.SlIlllty. Vittoria 22n4 June. presumably a misprint for 21st.
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the bridge of that village, the most northerly onc on the
Zadorra: the French battalion was at Gamarra Menor on the
other side of the water.
Wellington spent the 20th in arranging for the general attack,
which he had determined to deliver if Joseph stood his ground.
The plan was ambitious, for the battlefield was far larger than
any o.n which the Anglo·Portuguese Army had ever fought
before, and the numbers available were 30,000 more than they
had been at Salamanca or Dussaco, and more than double those
of J."'uentes de Oi'ioro. Moreover, he intended to operate with
a great detached turning force agninst the enemy's flank and
rear, a thing that he had only once done before-at Salamanca-
and then only with a single division. The battle plan was
essentially a time·problem : he had to arrange for the simul·
tancous appearance of four separate masses in front of the
French position. All started from par!l.llcl points in the valley
of the Rayas, but the obstacles in front of them were of very
varying difficulty, and the distances to he covered were very
different.
(1) Hill, 'with the large 2nd Division (four brigades), Silveira's
Portuguese division, Morillo's Spaniards, and V. Alten's and
Fane's light dragoons, 20,000 sabres and bayonets in nil, was
to cross the r-ndorra completely outside the extreme }'rench
left wing, to storm the heights of Pl1ebla, which formed the end
of Gazan's line, and then, advancing from the defiJe, to strike at
Subijana de Alava with his main body, while continuing to
thrust his flank along the heights above, which dominated the
whole region, and extended far behind the enemy's left wing.
(2) Two parallel columns were to march from the camps on
the Rayas; onc consisting of the 4th and Light Divisions,
R. Hill's, Grant's, and POllsonby's cavalry brigades, and
D'Urban's Portuguese horse, was to advance by the country
road from Subijana Morillas to the two bridges of Nanclares.
Opposite those passal:,'"CS and the neighbouring ones it was to
deploy, and to attack the French centre, when Hill should have
got a footing on the Puebla heights and in the plain by Subijana.
The second column, consisting of the 3rd and 7th Divisions,
was to move from Zua7.o and Anda on the Rayas across the high
mountain called Monte Arrato by a country track, and to
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descend into the valley of the Zadorra at Las Guetas, opposite
the bridge of Mendoza, up-stream from the' hairpin bend '.
In this position it would be almost in the rear of Gazan's right
wing above ViIlodas: it was to attack at once on reaching its
ground, if the progress of Hill on the south was seen to be
satisfactory. 'The movement to he regulated from the right:
although these columns are to make such movements in advance
as may be evidently necessary to favour the progress of the two
columns on their right, they are not to descend into the low
ground toward Viltoria or the great road.' The total strength
of the four divisions and cavalry of this scction of the army was
about 80,000 sabres and bayoncts.
(8) Graham's column-head was at Olaoo, three miles in front
of Murguia, and six from the Zadorra. He had in front Longa's
Spanish infantry, with whom Anson's light dragoons were to
join up when operations should begin. Behind were the 1st and
5th Divisions, Pack's and Bradford's Portuguese brigades, and
Dock's heavy dragoons. The total force was about 20,000 men
of all nations. As an afterthought on the 20th 'Wellington
directed Giron, who was to reach Ordufia that day, to CQme
down to the upper Bayas in Graham's rear, where he would net
as a support if necessary. The object of this order is not quite
obvious. Giron Ctl.lllC down too late for the battlc, arriving at
Murguia only in the afternoon. It is known from his own
dispatches that Wellin&>ton oveNlstimated Reille's force, which
Graham had to fight, not knowing of Maucune's departure 1,
and Giron may have bcen intended to add weight to the attack
in this quarter, His troops would, apparently, have been more
usefully placed if they had been sent from l\Iurguia to attack
the unguarded upper fords of the Zadorra.
The orders issued to Graham gave him a rather perplexing
choice of action. He was (like the Brd and 7th Divisions) to
guide himself by what was going on upon his right: he must
get in touch at once with the centre columns; he might attack
if it was obviously profitable to the main advance, but he was
,
1 ~J1atc/teIS, X. p. 440•.says thllt Reille JllId two dilMif11l$ i/1 reserve (Uley
were only two brigade,) in addition to his front line hokling the bridges:
and cr. x. p• ..w, which says directly that four divisions of Reille's army
were )Jresent,
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to avoid letting his whole corps be drawn into close action in
£ronto£ Vittoria, for his main object must be to turn the enemy's
position, by getting round its right wing and cutting the great
road to France. The lack of precise direction in this omer is,
no doubt, a testimony to Wellington's' confidence in Graham's
judgement. But it cast a grave responsibility on him: if he
had been told simply that he was to turn the French right and
seize the great chaus8ce, matters would have been simple. But
he ii,; given leave to attack frontally if circumstances farther
down the line seem to make such a policy desirable: yet he
must 110t attack so heavily as to make his great turning move-
ment impossible. It must be confessed that the difficult
problem was not well solved that day by the gallant old general.
The whole day of the 20th was spent in getting the columns
into order, and the arrangements for the attacks synchronized.
Wellington took a survey of all the routes in person, as his wont
was. It was not till late in the afternoon that he became certain
from the dispositions of the enemy that an eleventh hour
retreat was not contemplated by the King 1. The timing was
thatHill, who had a few miles to march,should attack at eight in
the morning, that both Graham and the column consisting of the
3rd and nh Divisions should get into position by the same hour,
and make ready to attack, when it was clear that the flank
movement of Hill had already begun and was making good
progress. Meanwhile the other central column, the Light and
4th Divisions, should cross when Hill had won the defile of
Puebla and room to deboueh beyond it, but not before. The
rather late hour fixed, in a month when dawn comes at 4 a.rn.,
was dictated by the fact that Hill had a river to cross, and the
3rd and 7th Divisions mountain tracks to follow, which neither
1 Here comes ill l' curiOlls incident, illustrating the extmortlinary care-
IcssncSll of the French Stalf. Guzun was very umdoUll to get restored to
him an artillery officer, a Captain Cheville, then a prisoner. As an exchange
lor him he sent into the British lines on the 20th, Calltnin Leith Ha)', a
captured British intelligence olllcer. who had been with the Army 01 the
South for a month, and had witnessed the whole retreat, during which he
had been freely in intcreourse with Genentl Mllnmsin ullIl muny IltuR olllcers.
On his release he was able to tell Wellington that the F'rench were dctlllitcly
halted, and expected to fight. Why exchange sllch a prisoner on such a
day? Sce Leith Hay, ii. p. lOO. Cf. Wellillghm DisWur:hu, x. p. 448, which
corroborates Hay's story.
398 THE BATTLE OF VITTORIA [.JUNE 21
could have negotiated in the dark. Some hours of daylight were
needed to get them into position. Eyen so the brigades of the
Icft·cenl;rc colwnn were several hours late at their rendezvous.
The French commanders, lIS wc have seen, made no move 011
the 20th, save to hurry off eOl1Voys and to throw back Reillc on
the north-west flank of Vittoria, to protect the royal chau8see
and the two Bilbao roads. .rourdan wrote to Clarke that evening
a perfectly sensible dispatch ns to the difficulties of the sitnation,
but onc which showed that he was wholl~' unaware that he might
be forced to a general action within the next twelve hours. All
depended, he said, on Clausel's prompt arrival: if he should
come up on the 21st there was no danger: if he delayed, the
urmy might have to ehoose between two tiresome altcrnativcs-
a retreat on the pass of SaUnas and olle 011 Pampclulla. If
Wellington, as he suspected, was making a great turning move~
ment by Ordufla and Durango, the army would be forced to
take the wretched road Salvatierra-Pampcluna. 'The King
does I)ot yet know what decision he will have to make: if
General Clausel delays his junction much longer, he will be
forced to choose the retreat into NM'arre.' Of any idea that
Wellington was about to attack next morning the dispatch
shows no sign.
Jourdan had been indisposed all that day-he was laid up in
bed with a feverish attack. This caused the postponement of
a general recOllnaissance of thc position, ·which he and his King
had intended to carry out together. They rode forth, however,
at 6 a.m. on the 21st. 'No intelligence had come to hand,'
writl.>S Jourdan in his memoirs, ' which could cause us to foresee
an instant attaek. We arrived at the position by Zuazo, from
which {;QUilt RcilIe had been recently moved, and stopped to
examine it. Its left rested 011 the mountain-chain in the
direction of Bcrostigucta. its right camc down to thc Zadorra
behind La Hcrmalldad and Crispijana. It is dominating, yet not
ovcr steep, and has all along it good artillery emplal.'Cfficnt for
many batteries. It connected itself much better than docs the
Arifiez position with the ground about Aranguiz now occupied
by Rcillc, which might be heavily attacked. Struek with thc
advantages of this position, the King appel\rcd inclined to
bring back the Army of the South to occupy it, and to place the
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Army of the Centre between it and the Army of Portugal. The
three armies would have been closer together, and more ablc
to give each other rapid ussistance; and the eye of the Com-
mander-in-Chief could have swept around the whole of this
more concentrated field in one glance. This elumge of dispo-
sitions WQuld probably have been carried out on the 20th if
Marshal Jourdan had not been indisposed, and might perhaps
have prevented the catastrophe that was to come. But the
otnccr sent to call General Gazan to confer with the King came
back to say that the general could not leave his troops, as an
attack on him was developing. It was judged too late to change
position. Riding to the front of Ariilez, to a long hill occupied
by Leval's division, on the right of the Army of the South,
the King saw that in fact the enemy was 011 the move. About
eight o'clock the posts on the mountain reported that the Allies
had passed the Zadorra above La Puebla: a strong column was
coming up the high road and the defile, a smaller one had
diverged to its right and wus climbing the mountain itself.
General Avy, sent on reconnaissance beyond the Zadorrn on the
sidc of Melldoza, reported at the same time that a large corps
was coming in on Tres Puentes behind the rear of General Leval.
And he could see signs in t.he woods opposite, which seemed to
indicate the march of other troops in the direction of the bridge
of Nanelarcs. No news had yet come in from Reille, but wc
prepared ourselves to hear ere long that he, too, was attacked 1' •.
It is unnecessary to comment on the character of a Head-
quarters where a passing indisposition of the Chief of the Staff
causes all movements to be postponed for eighteen hours, at
a moment when a general action is obviously possible. But it is
necessary to point out that the existing dislocation of the troops
left three miles of the Zadorra front between Reille's left and
Gazan's right unguarded when the battle began, and that this
had been the case throughout the preceding day. And during
that day who was responsible for the fact that not a single onc
of the eleven bridges between the defile of La Puebla and Dumnn
had been ruined and onJy three obstructed 2? Gazan must take
a good deal of responsibility, no less than Jourdan.
" Jourdan, Mbnmru, p. '1075.
• Digeon 11lId obstrucled the bridges of Arrillgl' llnd Gllmarm. The
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At eight o'clock on the morning of the 21st the action corn·
menced, on a most beautiful clear day, contrasting wonderfully
with the heavy rain of the 19th and intermittent showers on the
20th. Every hill-crest road and village for twenty miles was
visible with surprising sharpness, so much so that incident<;
occurring at a great distance were easily to be followed by the
naked eye, still more easily by the staff officer's telescope.
The clash began, as Wellington had intended, on the extreme
right. Here Hill's columns crossed the Zadorra, where it
broadened out below the defile of La Puebla, far outside the
French line. The 2nd Division led up the high road, with
Cadogan's brigade heading the column j but before they
entered the narrows, Morillo's Spaniards were pushed forward
on their right, through a wood which covered the lower slopes,
to seize the spur of the Puebla heights immediately above the
road. Till this was cleared, it would be impossible to move the
2nd Division forward. Eye-witnesses describe the deploying
of the Spanish column as clearly visible from the high ground
on the Monte Arrato heights: the first brigade appeared emerging
from the woods below, then came stiffer ground, • so steep that
while moving up it they looked as if they were lying on their
faces or crawling 1.' Then the smoke of the French skirmishing
fIre began to be visible on the crest, while Morillo's second
brigade, deployed behind the first, went up the heights in
support. The enemy, who was not in great strength at first,
gave way, and the Estremadurans WOIl the sky-line, formed
there, and began to drive up from the first summit to the next
above it. This also they won, but then eame to stand-Gazan
had pushed up first one and then the other of the two regiments
or Maransin's brigade from his left, on the main position, to
support the voltigcur companies which had been the only
troops originally placed on this lofty ground. Hill, seeing the
advance on the mountain stop, sent up, to help Morillo, Colonel
Cadogan, with his OWII regiment the 71st, and all the light
companies of Cadogan's and Byng's brigades. This turned the
fight, and after a stiff struggle for the second summit, in which
bridge or Villodns, below Gazan's extreme right, had been partly barricaded.
Not so Nanclares, Mcndoza,and the bridge immcdiatelybelow Tres PuentclI.
, Diary or the 4ard officer, in MlIx ....ell, ii. p..100.
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Morillo was severely wounded, Maransin's brigade was turned
back and flung down hill: it halted and reformed low down on
the slope, losing the crest completely.
Having his flank now reasonably safe, Hill turned off the
other two battalions ofCadogan's brigade to follow the 71st, and
then pushed his second British brigade (O'Callaghan's) up the
defile of La Puebla., and deployed it on the open ground opposite
the village of Subijana de Alava, which lay near the high road,
and was the first obstacle to be carried if the whole corps was to
issue forth and attack the French left. One battery moved up
with the brigade, and got into action on a slope to its right. The
rest of the 2nd Division and Silveira's Portuguese issued from
the defile, ready to act as reserve either to Morillo on the heights
or O'Callaghan in the open ground. Meanwhile the enemy
CQuld be seen dispatching troops from his reserves, to attack
the spurs of the mountain which had been won by Morillo and
Cadogan. For thc height$ of Puebla commanded all the left
flank of thc main French position, and, if Allied troops pushed
along them any further, Gazan's line would be completely
turned. Jourdan says that his orders wcre that 1't1aransin's
brigade should have attacked, with a whole division in support,
but that Gllzan took upon him the responsibility of sending in
Maransin alone, and only later, when the latter had becn'beaten
down from the crest, first Rey's brigade of Conroux's division
and then St. Pal's reserve brigade of Daricau's division,
from the hill on the right behind Leval. It would seem that
Darieau's two regiments took post on the slopes behind
Subijana, where there was a gap in the line, owing to :a.Iaransin's
departure, while Rey and his brigade went up the Puebla. heights,
to try to head off Morillo's and Cadogan's attack.
In this it was wholly unsuccessful: after a severe struggle
on the crest, in which Co.dogan was mortally wounded 1, the
French reinforcements were checked and routed: the Allied
troops Qegan to push forward again on thc heights, and were
• Tbete is a good account of the heroic deRth of Cadogan, R much-loved
oolonel oC the 7ht, ill the diary of hi~ quarter-master, William Gavin, of
the same regiment. When aware that he was mortally hit, Cadogan
terused to be moved from the field, Rod Imd himself propped up against
two knap!;ack!J, on a point from which his dying eyClS could survey the
whole field, and watclled the fight to the bitter cnd.
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gelling right ruund thc Oank of Gnwu's left wing, whilc Mnrall-
sin'li troops 011 the lowcr slopes were bcing contained by the
92nd and 50th, the rear regiments of Cadogan's brigade,
and Daricau's were hotly engaged with Q'Callaghan's three
battalions, which occupied Subijana and then attacked the
hillside above it, but failed for some time to secure a lodge-
ment there.
.Jourdan was by this time growing anxiouli, and not without
realiOll, at thc rapid progress of the Allies on the Pucbla heights.
He ordered Ga7.an to send up at once his only remaining reserve,
Villatte's division from the height behind Arifiez, to gain the
crest at a point farther east than any that the enemy could
reach, and to attack in mass along it. In order that he might
not bc forestalled on the summit, VilIatte was told to mareh
by a long detour, through the village of Esquivel far to the cast,
where there was a country road debouching from the chau/Jsee.
Indeed so perturbed was the Marshal by the threat to his left,
that he suspected further turning movements in this quarter,
and sent 'orders for '.filly's dragoons, from the cavalry reserve,
to ride out by Berostigueta to the 'l'revino road, to see if there
were no British columns pressing in from that quarter. He
also directed D'Erlon to move one of his two infantry divisions,
Cassagne's, in the same direction, to support TiIly if necessary.
Gazan, if wc may credit his long and contentious report on the
battle, suggested to Jourdall that it was dangerous to disgarnish
his centre, and to push so many troops to his left, while it was
still uncertain whether Wellington's column-heads, visible all
the other side of the Zadorra, were not about to move. Might
not Hill's attack be a feint, intended to draw off the French
reserves in an eccentric direction? The Marshal, says Gazan,
then declared in a loud voice, so that all around could hear,
'that the enemy's movements opposite our right are mere
demonstrations, to which no attention should be paid, and
that if the battle were lost it would be because the heights on
the left of Subijana remained in the enemy's power 1.' There
lay the real danger.
I jomm Gazan's I,<;:port in the Freneh Archives, written at St. ,Jean·
Pied·du·Port in July-very mueh l':X l'o.'It 1000. Tt WlUl lent me by
Mr. Fortescue. along with several other Vittorhl.ll Uocumcntli.
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Orders were given that when Villnl..l..e should have got on the
crest of the mountain, and should be delivering his attack,
a simultaneous movc forward was to be made by Conroux, and
thc brigades of Maransin and SI;, Pol, to cast the encmy out of
Subijuna, as well as off the heights of Pucbla. It is interesting
to note that Hill had as yet only engaged two British brigades,
and one small Spanish division, and had succeeded in attracting
against himself a much larger force--the whole of Conroux's and
Villatte's divisions, and the two brigades of l\faransin and
SI;, Pol. In the French centre and right there remained now
only Leval's division and the remaining brigade of Daricau's,
and in reserve there was only one of D'ErIon's divisions, sinee
the other had gone oU on a wild goose ehase toward the
Trevino road. Wellington could hu.ve wished for nothing
bet.ter.
But by the time that the French counter-attack on Hill's
corps was developing, matters were beginning to look lively all
along the line of the Zadorra, and the combat on the heights
was growing into a general action. It was now about eleven
o'clock, and Wellington had been for some time established on
a high bank above the river, facing the centre of the French
position, to the left of the village and bridges of Nanclare..'>,
from which he could sweep with his glass the whole landscape
from the heights of La Puebla to the bridge of Mend07.a. To
his left and right the Light and 4th Divisions lay in two masses,
a. mile or more back from the river, and hidden very carefully
in folds of the Mont.e Arrato, the battalions in contiguous close
column lying down in hollow roads or behind outcrops of rock,
and showing us little as possible. The great mass of cavalry in
reserve, four brigades, had not been brought over the sky-line
yet, and lay ~ome distance to the rear. Only Grant's hussars
were near thc Light Division, dismouuted Rnd standing to their
horses in covered ground. The French lines were perfcctly
visible, , unmasked, without a bush to prcvent the sweeping of
their artillery, the charging of their cavalry, or thc fire of their
musketry acting with full cffect on thosc who ~hould attcmpt
to cross thc bridges ill their front, which it was Ilc(:cssary to
carry beforc we could begin the attack un their centrc 1,' Ki.ng
I Diary of Cooke of the 4..'lrd ill Maxwell's Penil/sular Skdchc8, ii. 42.
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Joseph and his staff were conspicuous on the round hill before
Ariiicz.
Hill's advance having begun, and made good progress,
Wellington was 'watching for the two other movements which
ought to have coincided with the attempt to cross the river
at Nanclarcs for the frontal attack. They had neither of them
developed as yet: at least nothing was to be seen of the Srd and
7th Divisions on the down-slope of the lofty Monte Arrata, and
there had not yet been any heavy burst of cannonading from
the upper Zadorra (which was not visible from the spot where
the Commander-in-Chief had placed himself), to tell that Graham
was engaged.
'I'he reason for the comparative silence in this quarter Wll.S
undoubtedly the wording of Wellington's orders to Graham,
which left so much to the judgement of the commander of the
great turning column. He had been placed, almost froUl the
start of his march, in the presence of a secondary problem.
Rcilic, as wc have seen, had been given on the 20th the charge
of the upper Zadorra and the great road to France. Hoping
that he had only Long~'s Spaniards in front of him, and judging
that it would be well to keep them as far from the road and the
river as possible, the commander of the Army of Portugal had
placed Sarrut's division and a brigade of l'I:lermet's light horse in
an advanced position a mile and more in front of the river, on
a ridge flanking the main Bilbao road, above the village of
Aranguiz. Lamartiniere's division and Boyer's and Digcon's
dragoons had been left on the nearer bank. When therefore
Graham, marching down from Olano, neared Aranguiz, he
found a considerable }~reneh force blocking the way. Remem-
bering his orders to look to the right, to adapt his movements
to those of the trool)$ in that direction, and not to be drawn
into unnecessary fighting, he halted for some time, to see how
matters were going on the critical wing, and meanwhile deployed
alongside of Longa's men in his front, Paek'!:. Portuguese
brigade and Anson's light dragoons, with the 5th Division in
support, before Sarrut's position. He also detached Bradford's
Portuguese to his right, with the: idea of getting in toueh with
the troops in that direction. Reille, who was present in person
with his advanced guurd, saw with dismay the depth oC th~
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column descending upon him, and recognized that he must fall
back and hold the line of the Zadorra, the only possible front
on which he could oppose such an enemy. About midday or
a little later Graham 'thought himself justified in advancing,
in order to draw the enemy's attention to his right, and so assist
the progress of the army from the side of J\.lir8nda (i. e. Hill's
column), where the enemy seemed to be mAking all obstinate
resistance in the successive strong positions'which the country
afforded 1.' The very moment that Graham sent forth Longa
llnd Pack to advance, the French retired by order, not without
some skirmishing, in which the 4th Ca.yadores storm.ed the hill
just above Arnnguiz. But neither side had any appreciable
losses.
Gl'ahnm could now advance to within a mile of the Zndorra,
and was in command of the plain-ground us far us the villages of
Abcchuco, and Gamarra Mayor and Menor. All three are Oil the
northern or right bank of th~ river, und Rcille had determined
to hold them as tetes de PQ71t covering the bridges. They had
been hastily barricaded, and the artillery of the Army of
Portugal had been placed on the opposite bank in a line of
batteries, ready to sweep the open grolwd over ,,'hich an
assault on the villages must be launched. Graham had there-
fore to deploy for a formal attack 011 the Ilew position. He sent
Longa up-stream and over the hills, to attack Gamarra Menor
and Durana, placed Oswald and the 5th Division, with a section
of L..'l.wson's battery, over against Gllmarra Mayor, and drew out
the 1st Division and the two Portuguese brigades opposite
Abechuco, which would have to be taken before the bridge of
Arriaga could be attacked. Keeping in mind Wellington's main
purpose, indicated in his orders, of cutting the great road to
Fra:nce, he told Longa and Oswald on the flank that they might
push hard, while he seems to ho.ve o.cted in, a much more
leisurely way in front oC Abechuco, where no attack. was
launched till nctual orders had been received from head-
quarters bidding him press harder. But meanwhile Longa
took Gnmatra Menor from the French battalion of the Brd Line,
and then, pushing on, came into collision at Durana bridge with
his renegade compatriots the Franco-Spanish division of
, Graham's Report, Welling/oft Supple'rlnI/ary Di'JluldlU, viii, 7-8.
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Casapalacios. As the great road to Bayonne actually passes
through Durana, and was now under fire from Longa's skir·
mishers, it may be said to have been blocked for all practical
purposes at this early stage of the battle. It was not till
the afternoon, however, that Longa succeeded in storming the
bridge and occupying the village. thus formally breaking the
enemy';; main line of communication with France-to save
which King Joseph had risked his all. Apparently he was
hampered by having no artillery, while the Franco-Spaniards
had some four or fi\'c glUlS with them, bearing on the bridge.
Meanwhile Robinson's brigade of the 5th Di vision had
stormed Go.marra Mayor, defended by the French 118th and
119th-Gauthicr's brigade oC Lumartilliere's division. This
was a brilliant and costly affair-it being no light matter to
attack in column of battalions the barricaded streets of a com-
pact village. The British, however, burst in-Colonel Brooke
with the 1/4th being the first to force an entrance: the French
abandoned three guns which had been placed in the barricades,
and fell back in disorder across the bridge. General Robinson
endeavoured to improve the success by instant pursuit, but
the French had gUllS bearing on the bridge, which swept away the
fust platoons that tried to cross it. Very few men reached the
other side, and they were shot down before they could establish
a lodgement on the farther bank. It was necessary to halt,
reform, and bring up more artillery before the attack could be
repeated.
It was now past two o'clock, and the noise of Graham's
attaek was sufficiently audible all down the British line, and
was carrying dismay to French head-quarters. But what of
the other column, that of the ard and 7th Divisions, which was
to appear on the middle Zn.dorra opposite Gazan's almost
unguarded flank, in the direction of the bridge of Mendoza ?
It was overdue, now that both the large flanking corps were
seriously engaged. and the attention of the enemy attracted
toward them. But before the missing column came into action,
there had been an unexpected modification of the position in
the right centre. At 11.30 Wellington appeared before the
Light Division, and told Alten to move it more to the left, so
as to be over and above the bridge of Villodas, which it would
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have to attack at the moment of general advance, leaving the
two bridges by Nnnclnres to the 4th Division and the eavnlry.
So rough and wooded was the ground that the di\'ision, moving
ill a hollow way, was established less than 800 yards from the
brink of the Zadorra and the French line, without attracting the
notice of the enemy. An officer of the 43rt1 writes: 'I felt
anxious to obtuin a view, and walking leisurely between the
trees found myself at thc edgc of the wood, in clear sight of the
enemy's cannon, planted with lighted matches and ready to
apply them 1. Had our attuck begun here, the French could
never have stood to their guns, so near were they to the thicket
-our Riflemen would have annihilated them.' The British bank
o(the Zadorra here completely commanded the bridge and the
.French bank, which accounts for the fact that the enemy's
artillery did not detect the appro.'l.ch of such a large body of
troops as the Light Division. Dut nfter a time a biekering fire
across the river between skirmishers on both sides broke out at
several points, and some voltigeurs even pressed across Villodns
bridge, and had to be cast back again by the skirmishers of the
2/95th.
There was to bc, however, no attempt to pass this bridge as
yet by the British. While 'Wellington was still with the Light
Division, a peasant came up to him with the astounding intelli-
gcncc that the bridge of Tl'cS Puclltes, the OllC ut the extreme
point of the 'hairpin-bend' of the Zadorra, was not only
unoccupied but unwatched by the enemy: he oltercd to guide
any troops scnt to it. The Commander-in-Chief made up his
mind at once to seize this crossing, which would outflank thc
French position at Villodas, and told the peasant to lead
Kempt's brigade of the Light Division to the unwatched point,
about a mile and a half to the left. 'The brigade moved off by
threes at a rapid pace, along a very uneven and circuitous path,
concealed from the observation of the French by high rocks,
and reached the narrow bridge, which crossed the river to the
hamlet of Yruna (part of the seattered village of Tres Puentes).
The 1st Rifles led the way, and the whole brigade following
I Cookc, the 43rd officer in Maxwcll's Peninsular Sketches, ii..w. 'l'he
guns were undoUbtedly the Hol'!le Artiller:,' battery on the high-road in front
or GaUln'lI centre.
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passed at a run, with firclocks and rifles ready cocked, and
ascended a steep road of filty yards, at the top of which was an
old chapel. Wc had no sooner cleared it than we observed
a heavy column of the French on the principal hill, and com-
manding a bird's eye view of us. However, fortunately, SI COIl-
vex bank formed a sort of We de pont, behind which the
regiments formed at full speed, without any word of command.
Two round shots now came among us; the second severed the
head frolll the body of our bold guide, t.he Spanish peasant.
'l'he brigade was so well covered that the enemy Sooll ceased
firing. Our post was extraordinary-we were in the elbow
of the Fl'ench position, and isolated from the rest of the army,
within 100 yards of the enemy 1 and absolutely occupying p"rt
of his position, without a.ny attempt having" been made to
dislodge us..•. Sir James Kempt expressed much wonder at
our critical position, without being molested, and sent his
aide-de-camp at speed across the river for the 15th Hussars,
who came up singly and at a gallop along the steep path, and
dismounted in rear of our centl'e. Some Freneh dragoons,
I..'OOJly and ut a slow puce, came up to within 50 YUl'ds of us, to
examine, if possible, our strength, but a few shots from the
Rifles caused them to decamp. We could see three bridges
within a quarter of u mile of each other, in the elbow of the
enemy's position. 'We had crossed the centre one (Tres Puentes),
while the other two, right and left (Villodas and Mendo:r.a), were
::;till covered by Freneh artillery 2.'
Expecting to be instantly attacked, and to have to fight hard
for the chapel-knoll on which they had aligned themselves,
Kempt's brigade spent' half an hour of awkward suspense.'
The immunity with which they had been allowed to hold their
position was suddenly explained by a movement which they
had not been able to observe. The missing column of Welling-
ton's nrmy hOO at last come up, and was plunging with headlong
speed into the rear of the troops which were facing Kempt, so
, Of CQurse, Cooke is understating the distance, whicll was about
1\ quarter of a mile.
• This illtercstin~ Ilurn,tive or Cllptuin Cookc of the 43rd must have
been in Napier's hands bctore it was printed by Maxwell, as several
phrases rrom it lire reJ>cated in Najlier, vol. v, p.121. Sir WiJliam him·
self WWl in England thnt dllY.
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that the French had no attention to spare for the side-issue in
the hairpin-bend of the Zadorra. Instead of being attacked
the brigade was about to become at once Ull u.ttncking
force.
A word is necessary as to the leading of this column. It had
been placed by Wellington under Lord Dalhousie, now com-
manding the 7th Division. This was all extraordinary choice,
as this officer had been only a few months in the Peninsula, and
had no experience of the higher responsibilities-though he had
commanded a brigade in the Wnleheren expedition 1. But being
as Lieutenant-General slightly senior to Pieton (though they
had been gazetted major-generals on the same day in 1808), he
was entitled to take the command over the hcad of thc war·worn
and expericnced leudcr of thc 3rd Division. Thc luttcr had
been directing onc of the great marching columns during the
carly stagL'S of the advance, and was not unnaturally sulky at
being displaced. Common report in the army held that he was
in disfavour at Head-Quarters, for intemperate letters complain-
ing of the starving of his division during the recent march
beyond the Rbm 2. Be this as it may, l'ictoll was during the
forenoon hours of June 21st in one of his not infrequent rnges.
]~or though his column had started enrly, and the Srd Division
had reached Las Guet~s, the villages on the south side of the
Monte Arrato, which were to be its srorting-point for the attack
on the line of the Zadorra, Lord Dalhousie refused to advance
farther than the edge of thc hills, using apparently his discretion
in interpreting the orders given him' to regulate his action from
what was goillgon to his right ',and only to move when it should
be ' evidently necessary' to favour the progress of the columns
in that direction. Hc was obviously worried by the fact that
thc two rear brigadcs of his own division, Barnes's and Lc Cor's,
had bcen hindered by an artillery breakdown in the steep road
, He was, ulong with Stewart and Oswald, one of the three divisionnl
generals who committed the gross breach of orders duriug the Burp
retreat mentioned above, p. ]52.
1 Cf. Durgoyne, Life and LttUTlJ, i. 263 (June 23, ]813), with Picton's
letters in JIIellillgloll SllppU:mt':OlUlry Dupatdll's, xiv. 225, nbout. 'the
3«1 Division lJciug: kept in the blLCkgroulll.l, for Sir T. P. ig by no mCllJl8"
favourite with Lord W,' Cairncs (In Dickson, ed. Lcslie) puts the change
down IlS • most mortit)"ing to Pieton '.
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behind, and were not yet up. though Caimes's battery, which
had delayed them, ~ltimalcly overtook the leading brigudc 1,
Hence he used his discretion to wait for Cormal orders from
Head-Quarters, and lodo nothing. Piclon, who could note the
ndvance of Hill's column, and could see that the French were
utterly unprepared for an attack on the middle Zadorru,
chafed bitterly at the delay.
We have an interesting picture of him on that moming from
eye-witnesses. He was a strange figure--surtering from inflam-
mntion of the eyes, he had put on not his cocked hat but a broad·
brimmed nud tall civilian top-hut-the same that may be seen
to-day in the United Service Museum. •During the struggle
on the right the centre was inactive. General Pictoll was
impatient, he inquired of every aide-de-camp whether they had
any orders for him. As the day wore on, and the fight waxed
louder on the right, he became furious, and observed to the
communicator of these particulars, 'D-n it! Lord ·Wellington
must have forgottcn us.' It was near noon, and the men were
getting discontented. Picton's blood was boiling, his stick was
beating with rapid strokes upon the mane of his cob. He rode
backward and forward looking in cvcry direction for the
arrival of an aide-de-camp, until at last ouc galloped up from
Lord Wellington. He was looking for Lord Dalhousie-thc
7th Division had not yet arrivcd, having to move over difficult
ground. The aide-de-camp checked his horse and asked the
general whether he had seen Lord Dalhousie. Pietoll was
disappointed; he had expected that he might at least move
now, and in a voice which did not gain softness from his feelings,
answered in a sharp tone, 'No, Sir: I have not seen his Lordship,
but have you any orders for m.e.' 'None,' replied thc aide-de-
camp. 'Then, pray Sir, what are the orders that you dQ
bring?' 'Why,' o.nswercd the officer, 'that as soon as Lord
D. shall commence an nttack on thnt bridge,' pointing to the
one oil the left (l\fendoza), the 4th and Light are to support
him.' Pielon eould not understand the ideo. of any other
division fIghting in his front, and drawing himself up to his full
height said to the astonished aide-dc-camp, • You may tell
, Sce Dalhollllic to \YcllingWll. in Sllpplemell/tlMJ 1JUpaiclles, viii. p. 6,
which leaves much unsaid.
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Lord Wellington from mc, Sir, that the ard Division, under my
command, shall in Icss than ten minutes attaek that bridge and
carry it, and the 4th and Light may support if they choose.'
Having thus expressed his intention, he turned from the uidc-de·
camp and put himself at the head of his men, who were quickly
in motion toward the bridge, encouraging them with the bitmd
appellation of 'Come ou, ye rascals I Come on, ye fIghting
villains t.'
Tell minutes as the time required to plunge down from the
hillside to a bridge two miles away seems a short estimate. But
there i .. no doubt that the advance of the 3rd Division was fast
and furious-an eye-witness describes it as shooting like a
meteor across the front of the still-halted column-head of the
7th Division. The military purist may opine that Picton should
have waited till he got formal orders via Lord D~lhousie to
advance. But the moments were preciolls-Kempt was across
the 7..adorra close by, in an obviously dangerous state of isola-
tion: the French in a few minutes might be sending infantry
to block the bridge of Mendoza, which they had so strangely
neglected. The 7th Division was short of two brigades, and
not ready to attack. Wellington's orders were known, and the
situation on the right was now such as to justify the permissible
advance which they authorized. Neither Wellington nor
Dalhousie in thcir dispatches give any hint that Pietou's action
was disapproved--complete success justified it.
Pieton had directed BrisbllllC'S brigade of thc 31'd Division
straight upon the bridge of l\!endoza, Colville's upon a ford 300
yUl'ds farther up-stream. Both crossed safely and almost
unopposed. The only French troops watching the stream hcre
were Avy's weak brigade of cavalry-under 500 sabres-and
thcir thrce horse-artillery guns commanding the bridge. But
the lattcr hardly got into action, for on Picton's rapid approach
becoming visible, General Kempt threw out some companies
of the 1/95th under Andrew Banlam, Cram his point of vantage
011 the knoll of Yruna, who opened such a biting fire upon the
half battery that the officer in command limbered up and
galloped off. Avy's ehasseurs hovered about in an undeeidtxi
way-but were lIot capable either of defending a bridge or of
, Narrative or one of Picton's staff in Robinson's LiJ~0/ PU:I01I, ii. 195-6.
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attacking a brigade in position upon a steep hill. Wherefore
Picton got across with small loss, and formed his two British
brigades on the south side of the river. Power's Portuguese
rapidly followed Brisbane, as did n little later Grant's brigadc
of the 7th Division-Lord Dalhousie's other two brigades (as
wc huvc ulready noted) wcre not yct all the ground. Oil seeing
Pictoll safely established all the left bank Kempt advanced
from his knoll, and formed on the right·rear of the 3rd Division.
The trifling French detachment at the bridge of Villodas-onl)'
a voltigeur company-wiJ'iely absconded at filII speed on seeing
Kempt Oil the move. 'l'he p..'lssage there was left completely
free for Vandeleur's brigade of the Light Division, who had
long been waiting OD the opposite steep bank.
The British were across thc Zaclorra in force, and thc critical
stugc of the action was about to commence: the hour being
between 2 and 3 in the afternooll.
SECTION XXXVI: CHAPTER VIII
BA'M'LE OF VI'I'TORIA. ROUT OF THE FRENCH
WHEN Pictou and the BTd Division, followed by the onc
available brigade of the 7th Division, came pouring across the
Zadorra on the side of Mendozo., while Kempt debouched
from the knoll of Yruna, and Vaudclcur crossed the bridge
of Villodas, the position of Lcval's division became desperate.
It was about to be attacked in flank by fOUf brigades and in
front by two more, and being onc of the weaker divisions of the
Army of the South, only 4,500 bayonets, was outnumbered
threefold. Its original reserve (half Daricau's division) had
b'One off to the Puebla heights hOUffl before: the general
army-reserve (Villatte's division) had been sent away in the
same direction by Jourdan's last orders. The nearest dis-
posable and intact French troops wcre Darmagna.c's division
of the Army of the Centre-two miles to the rear, in position
by Zuazo: the other divisions of that army had (as we have
seen) gone off on a wholly unnecessary excursion to watch thc
Trevino road. The left wing and centre of the Army of the
South was absorbed in the task of keeping back Hill, and had
just begun the counter-attack upon him which Jouroan had
ordered an hour before.
'I'he sudden change in the situation, caused by the very rapid
advance of Picton and the brigades that helped him, was all
too evident to King Joseph and his chief of the staff, as they
stood on the hill of Ariiiez. The whole force of the ani division
struck diagonally across the short space betwcen the river and
Leval's position-Brisbane's brigade and Power's Portuguese
making for the French flank, while Colville, higher up thc
stream, made for thc rear of the hill, in the direction of the
village of Margarita. Kempt followed Brisbane in second line,
Grant's brigade of the 7th Division, when it crosscd at Mcndoza.
came on behind Colvillc. So did Vandeleur, from Villodns,
after he had pulled down the obstructions nnd got his men
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over the narrow bridge. Nor was this all-the 4th Division,
so long halted on the scrubby hillside opposite the left-hand of
the two Nanclares bridges, suddenly started to descend the
slope at the double-quick, Stubbs's Portuguese brigade leading.
Jourdan had to make a ' lightning change' in all his dis-
positions. Lcval, obviously doomed if he did not retire quickly,
was told to evacuate his hill and faU back past Arificz, into which
he threw a regiment to cover his retreat, on to the heights
behind it. The two brigades of Daricau and Conroux, which
had stood on the other side of the high road from Leval, were
to make a parallel movement back to the same line of heights.
. The other brigades of Daricau and Conroux, with Maransin-
now deeply engaged some with O'Callaghan and others 'with
the 50th and 92nd-were to abandon the attack which they
had iust begun, and which had somewhat pushed back the
British advance. They too must go back to the slopes behind
Ariiiez. It would take longer to recall Villalte, who was now
far up on the crest of the mountain to the left, engaged with
I'IIorillo's Spaniards and the 71st. But this attack also must
be broken off. Lastly, to fill the gap between Leva\'s new
position and the Zadorra., the Army of the Centre must come
forward and hold Margarita, or if that was impossible, the hill
and village of La Hermandad behind it. But only Dnrmagnac's
division was immediately available for this task, Cassagne's
having to be brought back from the eccentric counter-march
toward the Trcvino road, to which it had been committed an
hour before. In this way a new line of battle would be formed,
reaching from the Zadorra near Margarita across the high road
at Gomecha, to the heights above Zumclzu on the left. It waS
at best a hazardous business to order a fighting-line more than
two miles long, and bitterly engaged with the enemy at several
points, to withdraw to an unsurveyed position a mile in its rear,
where there was practically no reserve waiting to receive it.
For on the slopes above Arinez there was at that moment
nothing but Pierre Soult's light horse, and Treillard's dragoons,
with two batteries of artillery I. The new front had to be
I The third battery originally at Arii'icz was Vmattc's divisional battclJ',
which had gone off with him to the Puebla hcights. Ncithcr P. Soult nor
'l'rciJltml Jmd gun~ with thcm.
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constructed frolll troops falling back in haste and closely pur-
sued by the enemy, combining with other troops coming in
from various directions, viz. the two divisions of the Army of
the Centre. And when the line should be reformed, what was
to prevent it:. left from being turned ollce more by the Allied
troops on the Puebla heights, or its right by colwnns crossing
the middle Zadorra behind it 1. For there would still be a gap
of two miles between 1\fargarita village and the nearest troops
of the Army of }"lortugal, who were now engaged with Graham
at Abechuco and Arriaga.
To speak plainly, the second French line was never properly
formed, especially on its left j but a better front was made,
and a stronger stand, than might perhaps have been expected,
though the confusion caused by hasty and imperfect alignment
was destined in the cnd to be fatal.
On the extreme left ViIlatte had been caught by the order
of reeall at the moment when he was delivering his attack on
Morillo and the British 71st. He had rcached the crest as
ordcrcd, had formed up across it, alld then had marched on a
narrow front against the Allies. Both British and Spanish
were in some disorder when he came in upon them-they had
now been fighting for four hours, and in sUL'eessive engagements
had driven first Maransin's and then St. Pol's brigades for
two miles over very steep and rocky ground. At the moment
when VilIatte came upon the scene, the Allied advance had
just reached a broad dip in the crest, which it would have to
cross if its progress were to be continued. The Spaniards were
on the right and the 7lst and light companies on the left, or
northern, pa.rt of the ridge. It would have been a suitable
moment to halt, and reform the line before continuing to press
forward over dangerous ground. But the otficer who had
succeeded Cadogan in comma.nd 2 was set on 'keeping the
, Sueh turning might have ~n done either by the two belated brig-<ldClJ
of the 7th Division or by troops detached by Gmham, who Imd severnl
briglldes to spure, which he never used, but might huve sent to plll;l:i tile
Ztt.dorra at the bridge of Yurr<: or the fords west of it, both well ochilld
the new French line.
I Who \VIIS this onicer? NQ/ Hrevd Lieut.-Colonel Cotller of the 7ht
nor Brevet Lieut.-Colonel Harri!lOn of the 50th. Hope of the !lZnd, in his
rather detailed narrative of this fight, calls him' Colonel fi__: I cannot
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French upon the run,' and recklessly ordered the tired troops
to plunge down the steep side of the declivity and carry the
opposite stope. Hc was apparently ignorant that fresh French
troops were jw;t coming to the front-several eye-witnesses
say that a column in light-coloured overcoats with white shako-
covers, which had been noticed on the right, was taken for a
Spanish detachment 1. At any rate, the 7lst crossed the
dip-four companies in its centre, the remainder at its upper
end-and was suddenly met not only by n charging column
in front, but by an attack in flank Bnd almost in rear. The first
volley brought down 200 men-the shattered battalion recoiled,
and remounted it:; own slope in utter disorder, IC8\ring some
forty prisoners in the hands of the enemy. These were the
only British soldiers who fell into the hands of the French
that day 2. Fortunately the 50th, coming up from the rear,
was just in time to form up along the edge of the dip and cover
the retreat, and was joined soon after by the 92nd, who had
been facing another separate French unit lower down the slopes
and to the left Hunk. Seeing thcir opponents move off for no
visible reason (they had received no doubt the gcneral order
to retire), the Highland regiment had pushcd up ou to thc crest
and joincd thc 50th and the Spaniards.
Villatte, still ignorant that the whole French army waS
falling back, tried to improve his success over the 71st into a
general repulse of the Allied force upon the crest, and ordered
his leading regiment to cross the dip and attack the troops
upon the opposite sky-line. They surIered the same fate as
the 7lst and from the same cause: the climb was steep among
stones and furze, they werc received with two dcvastating
identify him. Conceivably, it may have bo.'<:ll Colonel Hooke, the ~cnior
omccr 01 Hill'~ staff who moy have bt."ell sent up the Ileights, and may
have taken over command on Cadogan'li being mortally wounded.
I So ~ayli theunonymolls blltinvlllunble 'T. S.' 01 the7ht. Leilh HIlY,
a pril:Kmer with the Freneh in this campaign, remarks that they were all
in their summer wear of long linen overcoats, with the eto6li·belbi put on
Iloove.
t They were released at Pampeluna on the surrender of that lortress
three months later, in a state of semi·starvation, having been carried on
with Villlltte's division during the Freneh retreat. They deseribed to
Gavin of the 7ht, who happened to be present at the surrender, their
unllappy fortunes. SCe his diary, p. 25.
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volleys when they ncarcd the top of the declivity, and then
charged by the 50th and 92nd-thc oolumn broke, rolled down
hill, and went to the rear. A second but less vigorous attack
was made by another French regiment, and repulsed with the
same ease-the wrecks of the 7lst joining in the defence tltis
time. Villatte then brought up a third regiment, but this was
only a feint-the attack never developed, and while it was
hanging fire the whole division swung round to the rear
and went off-Jourdan's general order to retreat had at last
been receivcd, and Villattc was falling back to the ncw line 1.
Cameron of the 92nd, now in command ou the heights, followed
him up, as did the Spaniards. But there was to be no more
serious fighti.ng upon the Puebla mountain: the French gave
way whenever they were pressed 2.
Long before Villattc's fight ou the high ground had tome to
an end, the engagement at the other cnd of the French line
had taken an unfavourable turn. The battle in this direction
fell into three separate sections. Close to the Zadorra, Colville,
with the left-hand brigade of the 3rd Division, was pushing
up towards ?tIargarita, while Darmagnae, {Tom the heights of
Zuazo, was making for it from the other side. It had taken
some time to file Colville's battalions across the ford, and
deploy them for the advance, and the F'rench brigade of
Darmagnac's dh'ision got into the village first, and ma.de a
1 Ga:wn'g most unconvincing account 01 flll this engagement is thflt
'General ViI1attc attacked the enemy with his usua.l vigour: nothing
could resist the shock 01 his division. The position, whooe recupture
ought to have assured us the victory. was retaken, as well as the height in
front or Subijnnfl. The enemy was routed at every point. Such was the
position of the Army 01 the South, when news CflIDe to the King that our
troops by the Zadorra were attacked. and could not maintain them-
selves. I was told to break on my attaek and retire to a position further
back.'
• 'l'he 'llst lost. beside tIleir well-loved colonel-the only man mentioned
in Wellington's private letter or next morning to his brother Henry (Via·
paWWJ, x. p. 454)--44. killed, 272 wounded, and nearly 4() prisoners :
half thc battalion. The 50th lost only 7 officers and 97 men; the 92nd
no more than 20 men. If ViIlatte gave correet figures. his total loss was
only 2 officei'll nnd 28D men-including 22 prisoncrs. or t111',o;e the 63rd,
obviously the lcading regiment, was responsible ror 135 casualties, thc
95th for 94. The other two regiments Illld practically no I~s. These
figures arc very low. but ooem to be corroborated by Mnrtinien.
356.6 E e
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strong defence there. while the German brigade occupied
La Hermandad in its rear. Colville was held in check, suffered
heavily, and could not get forward. But after half an hour's
deadly fighting the enemy gave way. not only because of the
frontal pressure, but because the troops on his left (Leval's
division of the Army of the South) had been defeated by Picton
and were retiring, thereby exposing the flank of Darmagnac's
line. D'Erlon drew back Chasse'smuch thinned brigade halfa
mile, to the better defensive ground formed by the village oC La
Hermandad and the height above it, where his German brigade
was already in position: this was an integral part of the new
line on which J ourdan had determined to fight, while Margarita.
was on low ground, and too far to the front. Colville's brigade,
like its adversaries much maltreated 1, was replaced by
Grant's brigade of the 7th Division in front line 2, while Vande-
leur's of the Light Division followed in support. They had
now in front of them not only Darmagnae's but Cassagne's
division, which had come back from its fruitless cxcursion to
thc Trcvino road, and had joined thc other scction of the
Army of thc Centre 3, taking up ground in second linc.
Meanwhile the really decisive blow of the whole battle was
being delivered by Picton, a thousand yards farther to the
south, in and above Ariflez. The striking force here consisted
of Power's Portuguese brigade on the left, and of Brisbane's
British brigade on the right, opposite the village. Kempt's
half of the Light Division had followed Picton faithfully in his
diagonal movement across the slopes, and was close behind
Brisbane. Farther to the right the new front of attack of
Wellington's army was only beginning to form itself-the
4th Division had deployed after crossing the upper bridge of
• Its ItCKVy lOll!! of 33 oflll:cr!I Kllll 515 men out of about 2.200 present
was nearly all, I believe, suIt'cred at this point. The 2/87th with 244-
caljualtiesout ofulJout 600 present lost 40 per cent. of its Iitrenglh. Chu.ss(;'s
Freneh brigadc, the immediate opponents, had 800 casualtics, nearly all
at this moment.
• Why did not DlIlhousie support Colvillc more promptly l' He Imd a
bridge to Cro.'lS. and SOInC way to go. but was cvidcntly lute.
• These details come mainly out of the lIUmoirt sur la &lraiU da
Armks !ratlJ;afM8 in the French Archives, lent me by !\Ir. Fortescue.
Internal evidcnce shows it writtcn by solnc member of D'Erlou's litH,ff.
Tlrlet's report is also useful.
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Nanclares, and was now coming on in an echelon of brigades-
Stubbs's Portuguese in the front echelon, then W. Anson, last
Skerrett. They extended from the high road southwards, and
were getting into touch with Hill's column, which after the
French evacuated the height behind Subijana had also deployed
for the advance-the 2nd division having now thrown forward
Byng's brigade on its left, with O'Callaghan's next it. and
Ashworth's Portuguese in second line. Silveira's division
remained in reserve. The cavalry of the centre column had
crossed after the infantry-B.. Hill, Ponsonby, Victor Alten,
and Gr8l1t by the upper bridge of Nanolares, D'Urban's Portu~
guese by the lower. They deployed all each side of the high
road cast of the river, behind the 4th Division, ground suitable
for horsemen being nowhere else visible. On the heights of
Puebla there still remained Cadogan's brigade (now under
Cameron of the 92nd) and Morillo's Spaniards. This detached
force, whieh was hard in pursuit of ViUatte's retreating column,
was decidedly ahead of the rest of the army, and well placed
for striking at the new French flank, but it was tired and had
fought hard already for many hours.
When the 4th Division had passed the upper bridge of
Nanelares, and before the cavalry began to cross the Zadorra,
Colonel Dickson had by Wellington's orders commenced to
bring forward the reserve artillery. Very few British batteries
had yet come into action, the broken nature of the. ground
preventing them from keeping close to their 'divisions. Hence
it came to pass that there was by this time an accumulation
of guns in the centre: during the rest of the battle it was
employed in mass, many divisional batteries joining the
artillery reserve, and a formidable line of guns being presently
dc\'eloped along the heights whieh had been the original
position of Gazan's centre and right. Some of them were to
the north of the high road, on Leval's hill: some to the south,
where Daricau's front brigade had stood when the action
commenced. As soon as they had come up, they began to
pound the French infantry on the opposite hill. Here General
Tirlet had a still more powerful artillery force in aetion-all
the guns of the front line had got back in safety save one
belonging to the horse artillery battery whieh had been placed
Ee2
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opposite the bridge of Nanclares 1, and three batteries from
the reserve were already in position. The cannonade on both
sides was fierce-but it was the infantry whieh had to settle
the matter, and the disadvantage to the French was that
their troops, much hustled and disarranged while retreating
into the new position, never properly settlcd down into it-
(.'specially Conroux's and Daricau's divisions, whieh had been
divided into separatc brigades by the way in which Cazan
had dealt with them at the commencement of the action, never
got into regular divisional order again, and fought piecemeal
by regiments.
The decisive point was on the ground at and above Ariiiez,
which was held by Leval's division, with onc regiment of Dari·
cau's (103rd Line) on their left. 'rhe village, low down on the
slope, was held by Mocquery's brigade-Morgan's was in support
with the guns, higher up and more to the right. Picton attacked
with Power's Portuguese on his left, Brisbane's brigade on his
right, and Kempt's brigade of thc Light Division in support,
except that some companies of the 1/05th had been thrown
out in front of Brisbane's line, and led the whole attack. The
Riflemen rushed at the village, penetrated into it, and werc
evicted after a fierce tussle, by a French battalion charging in
mass down the street. But immedia.tely behind came the 88th
and 74th. The former, attacking to their right of the village 2,
• Captured by skinnishers of the 1/05th, ns it was retrenting up the
high road and WICJ nearing Arinez. The Ji'n:nch infantry recovered it
for a moment by a counter·stroke, but as the lli(lemen had eut the traces
nnd shot or removed the hol'6cs, they could not get the gun away. Tillet
~aYl' the battery lost only QIIC gun, wbicJl is corroborated by CostcJlo of
the 95th, present on the spot. Kineaid and other llinemen say three.
• There iSI,eurious problem connected with u corre~pomlcnce (Dispalcha,
". pp. 329-31) between }'jcton and WcllingWn on July 16-tbn:tl wcekll
nftcr the battle. Wellington apparently thought that Picton blamed the
88th for lOlling Ariiie~ in the first llIlIlault, while it WI'S really only two COlli-
panics of the 1/05th whieh had entered that village and been driven out.
lIe says tliat he had seen the 88th ooming inro action in a very ragged line,
und hud himself hulted them IInd dressed their front, before he let them go
on: alter this Ill'. did not notice what became or them, but saw tllCrD
again after the fighting formed on the other side of the village.
WIIi!.t WeUington did not witness is ellronicJcd by CoIitcllo or the 1/05th :
after describing the repulse of the Riflemen, be notcstheir pleasure at seeing
• our favourik third division' coming down the rond. ATiiiez W!l.S promptly
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completely smnshed the Freneh regiment which came down to
mcet them in a close-fire combat, and drove them in disorder
up the hill, while the latter carried Arincz itself and swept
onward through it. The 45th, farther to the right, attacked
and drove oU the regiment of Daricau's division which was
flanking Leval. Power's Portuguese would seem to have got
engaged with Morgan's brigade, on the left of the village; it
gave way before them, when the 74th had stormed Arif'iez and
the Connaught Rangers had broken the neighbouring column.
Leval's routed troops appear to have swept to the reflr rather
in a southerly direction, and to their left of the high road, so as
to leave the beginnings of a gap between them and Cassagne's
division of the Arm)' of the Centre, which wns coming up to
occupy the ridge north of Gomecba., in the new position.
The complete breach in the Freneh centrc made by Pieton's
retaken and the advance recommenced. 'I noticed a regiment, whieh by
itll yellow raeings was the Conuaught Rangers, marehing in elose column
or compiUlies to IIUuek a I<'reneh regiment drown up in line 011 tile verge
of the hill, with a small village [Gomeeha 1J in its rear. The 88th, althpugh
under Il heavy ennnonode rrom the enemy's artillery, continued ndvancing
gnllantly, whilc wc skinnishcrs took grolUld to tllC left, close to the road,
in order to allow them to oppose tllis line in front. Though we were
hotly enl.'tlged I watched their movements. The 88th ncxt deployed into
linc, ndvaneing all the time towards their opponents, who seemed to wait
very coolly for them. When they had approached within :)00 yards the
French poured in n volley, or I should mther sny a nlllning fire rrom right
to Idt. As soon as the Dritish regiment recovered the f1.rst shock, and
elosed their files on tlle gap that had been made, they commenced advancing
at double time till witbin !Uty yards nearer to the enemy, when tbey
halted and in turn gave a running fire from the whole line, and then
without Il moment's plIuse, eheered Ilnd cJuuged up tJle hill against them.
The French meanwhile were attempting to reload, But they 'were hard
pressed by the Dritish, who gave them no time for a second volley. They
went imll\cdiutel)' to the right aoont, milking the IJcst of their WllY to the
village behind.'
From this it is clenr that t11e 88th fought on open ground, to the right
of Arii'iez nnd the high rood. It Wllll tile centre regiment of the brigade:
the 45th, therefore, must have been more to the right and well south of the
toad; the 74lh on tile high roud were the aetuul takers of Ariiie1.. We
buve uuluekily no dL'SCription of Power's Portuguese at thc moment-but
they lost heaVily-the casualties being 25 officers and 380 men. They
mus' have been enguged with Levul', 2nd Brignde, which had been
stationed about and to the north or Gomeeho, wltile tlae 1st Brigade held
the villllge or Arifie7. and the hill behind.
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capture of Arificz, and the driving of Lcval out of his position
above it, had the immediate erreet of compelling Darmagnac's
division to conform to the retreat, by falling back from M:argnrita
on to La Hermandad and the hills behind -it on the onc wing,
while the confused line of Daricnu's, Conroux's, and :Maransin's
troops, on the other hand, had to retire to the level of Gomecl;m,
though the 4th and 2nd Divisions were not yet far enough
forward to be able to press them. Nearly all the French guns
appear to have been carried back to the new position, which
may roughly be described as c:x-tcnding from Heimandad on
the Zadorra by Zua'1.O and Gomccha to the hills in front of
Esqui vcl. It was quite n.s good as the Margnrita-Ariiicz-
Zumclzu line which had just been forced by Picton's central
attack.
It took some little time for Wellington to organize his next
ad vanee; the troops whieh had forced the Arifiez position had
to be rc-formed, and it was necessary to allow the 4th and 2nd
Divisions to come up level with them, and to bring forward
Dic,kson's mass of I1rtillery to a more advanced line, to batter
the enemy before the next infantry assault was let loose. The
only point wllcre close fighting scems to have continued during
this interval was on the extreme left, wherc Lord Dalhousic,
lI.ftcr the French had left Margnrito., was pressing forward
Grant's brigade of his 0\\'Il division, supported by Vandcleur's
brigade of the Light Division, against D'Erlon's new position,
where Ncuenstcin's brigade of five German battalions lay
in and about La Hermandad, with ChassC's dilapidated regi-
ments in reserve behind. There was a very bitter struggle
at tills point, rendered eostly to thc advancing British by the
superiority of the Freneh artillery-D'Erlon had now at least
two batteries in action-Dalhousie only his own six divisional
gUllS, those of Cairnes. Grunt's brigade, after advancing some
300 yarrls underu. very heavy Hre, eame to astand,and took cover
in u. dcep broo.d ditch only 200 yards from the French front.
A(.-cording to an eye-witness Dalbousic hesitated for a moment
as to whether a fqrthcr oovallCC was possible I, and had thc
• The amusing story told or this storm by Harry Smith in his auto·
biogruplly (i. pp. U'T-tl) is too good to be olllitted•• My brigude .....IlS sent
to support the 7th Division, whieh WlIS hotly engaged. ] was sent forward
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matter settled for him by the sudden charge of Vandeleur's
brigade, which came up at full speed, carried the 7th Division
battalions in the ditch along with it in its impetus, and stormed
La Hermandad in ten minutes. The German defenders-
Baden, Nassau, and Frankfurt battalions-reeled back in
disorder, and retreated to the erest of the heights behind, where
Cassagne's division, hitherto not engaged, picked them up.
O'Erlon succeeded in forming some sort of a new line from
Crispijana near the Zadorra to Zuazo, where his left should
have joined the right of the Army of the South. It is curious
to note that while Grant's brigade lost heavily in this combat
(880 casualties), Vandeleur's, which carried on the attack to
success, suffered hardly at all (S8 casualties). Their German
opponents were vcry badly punished, having lost 620, men,
to rejlOrt to Lord Dnlhousie, who (xunmlloded. I fOUlld his lordship and
his Q.M.G. Drake in deep conversation. I reported pretty quick, and
l\llked for onlel'S (the hend or the brigade was just getting under fire).
I repeated tile quClltiou, "Whut orders, my lord '/" Druke beeame
somewhat animated, and I heard his lordship say, .. Better tnke the
Villllge." I roared out, "Certllinly, my lord," nnd off I glllloped, both
Clltling to me to come bnck, but" none are so deaf a.s tllOSC wilo won't
hear." I told General Vnndeleur we were immediately to take the village.
The 52nd deployed into line, our Rincmen were sent out in every direction,
keeping up 11. fire nothing could resist. • .. 'rhe 52nd in line and the swarm
of Riflemen nlshed at the village, and though the ground was inten;ected
by gardens Dud ditches uothing ever checked liS, unti/wc renehed the reur
of it. There was never ll. more impetuous ouset-nothing could resist sueh
ll. bUl'St or determination.' Smith's n.ddition thn.t the brigooe took twelve
gun!! in thi!! eharge seem!! (us Ur. I?orte!lCue remaric:l) to llc of more doubtful
vaJue.
Naturlllly tllere is nothing or this in Dalllousie's displlteh-n most
diSHppointing paper. It is mostly in a seU-cxeulpntory tone, to justify
his lnteness Il1ld the absence of his two rear brigndes. He BrAys that they
cn.me up at the snme time a.s Vandcleur, whieh is certainly uLltrue, n~
neither of them had u single casualty all da.y. And they eould not have
fniled to cnteh n shell or two if tlley Ilad been nnywhere near the fighting-
line during the subsequent cupture of Crispijunu nnd ZUIlZO. Mr. Fortes-
cue's note that Captain Cainles's letter in the Dickson Paperll, p. 916,
proves thllt Dames's brigade had nrrivcd by this time, is 11 misdeduetion
from Caimes's cureleS8nC!lll in tnlking of Grant's brigade as • Ollr IIl'St
brigade,' meaning thereby our leading brigade, oot the brigade offieilllly
numbered 1. When Cairnes says tba.t the' fil'!lt brigade' and the gUllS
were' in their place,' while the rest urriVt.'d very lute in the action, we
need only contrast the casualty lists-1st Brigade flif, 2nd Brigade
3.'10 eUlii\l1\lties, :lrd Rrigndc I/i/, to see what he means.
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including 250 prisoners, in defending La Hermalldad ago.inst
the two British brigades 1.
While Wellington, after the first breaking of the French line,
was preparing under cover of the cannonade of Dickson's guns
for the assault on their new position in front of Zua7.o and
Gomecha, General Graham was developing his attack on the
Army of Portugal Bud the French line of retreat, but not with
the energy that might have been expected from the victor of
Barrosa.
He had, as it will be remembered, sent Oswald and the 5th
Division against the bridge of Gamarra Mayor, and Longa's
Spaniards against that of Durana, while he himself remained
with the 1st Division, Pack's and Bradford's Portuguese, and
I It will be noticed that I put La Hermandad as the village where the
heavy fighting took place, IIlId which Vandeleur's brigade stonned. All
historians up to now have followed Napier in making a-fargarita the impor·
tant place. A ghmce at the map will sllow that the latter village is too far
forward to have been held for any time, aftcr Leval had evacuated Ilis
original position on thc great knoll facing Tres Puentcs and VilIodas.
I have to point out that neither Wellington lIor Lord Dalhousie in the
two contemporary dispatches (Dispute/les, x, p, 451, and Supplemtfltary
Dispaldlu, viii. pp. 4-6) mention eitller plnce by lIIune-only speaking of
• a village.' D'Erlon's staJT-olUccr in the report of the Army of the Ccutrc
says that l'>Iargarita was held for some time but was rendered untenablc
by Lcvn!'s retrent---l;o that Dnmlllgnac had to go back to the heights
behind. Gazan'8 report says that the British were masicra 01 ?llargarita
before he took up his position on the heigllts above Ariiiez, and that the
ltriglll8 behi,ld :Margari/ll were the fighting position of D'Erlon. or the
diarists or chroniclers who issued their books before the ftJtJl volume of
Napin came out, and who wcre present on this part of the field, Green
(68th), Wheeter (!iIst), Cnptain Wood (82nd), mention no village names,
nor do Lord Gough's and Captain Caimes's contemporary letters, nor
Geo. Simmons' contemporary diary. Nor does Sir Harry Smith's amusing
n.cCOUllt of his dClllings with Lord Dlllhousie before' the village' which
Vandeleur took (Amolliograp}ly, i. pp. 97-8) quoted in tllc preceding note.
After Napier's book stntcd that tlle Light Division battalions took
MllrglUitn, Dnd Cough with the 2/87tll La HerllUlndad (a reversal of tile
real time and facts as I think), most later writers accepted these statemcnts
08 goo;pel. But the report of Kruse, commnnding the Nassau regiment,
absolutely proves that Napicr is wrong. Moreover, the rough map, annexed
to D'Erlon's original report of the battle in the Freneh Arehives, gives
Hermnndad ns the position of Darmagnn.c, with his march thither lr/'11ll
Gomceha and tQ ZUIIZl) indiCllted by arrows. Kruse's report mllY be found
at length In the Nassau volume of Sausscz's us Allemands sous res Aigles,
pp. 340-1.
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the bulk of his cavalry on the high road, facing the bridge of
Arriaga and its outlying bulwark the village of Abechuco.
We should have expected that the main attack" would be
delivered at this point, but nothing of the sort took place.
When the noise of Oswo.ld's heavy fighting o.t Gmnarro Mo.yor
had begun to grow loud, Graham directed the two Light Batta-
lions of the German Legion (under Colonel Halkctt) to clear
the French out of Abcchuco. This they did with trifling loss-
1 officer and 51 men, capturing several guns in the village 1.
But Graham made no subsequent attempt to improve his
success by forcing the ,bridge behind-as is sufficiently witnessed
by the fact that of his remaining battalions the Guards' Brigade
had no casualties that day, and the three'! Line l:>attalions of
the K.G.L. one killed and one wounded. Before drnv."ing up
in front of Arriaga he had sent Bradford's Portuguese, for a
short time, to demonstrate to his right, toward the bridge of
Yurre; but he called them back after 0. space, and placed
them to the right of Abcchuco, continuing the general line of
the First Division. Bradford's battalions lost precisely 4 men
killed and 9 wounded. It is clear, therefore, that Gr'aham
never attacked the Arriaga position at all. Why he massed
4,000 British and 4,000 Portuguese infantry on this front-not
to speak of two brigades of cavalry-and thcn never used them,
it is hard to make out.
We know, it is true, that not only Graham but Wellington
himself over-estimated the strength of Reille's force. They
did not know that Maucune had gone away in the dark, in
charge of the great convoy, and thought that Foy's and Taupin's
divisions were the only troops of the Army of Portugal which
had not rejoined. Arguing that he had four infantry divisions
in front of him (though they were really only two), Gruhnm no
doubt did well to be cautious-but he was much more than that.
]t was at least his duty to detain and engage as many of thc
enemy's troops as was possible-and he certainly did not do so.
There was opposite him at Arriaga one single infantry
division-Sarrut's, and he did so little to employ it that Reillc
dared-after observing the British movements for some time-
1 This British eloim is corrobomted by the nurrutive or the Freneh
surgeon Fee, present at Abcchuco that day.
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to take away Sarrut's second brigade (that of Fririon) for use
as a central reserve, which he posted at Betonio a mile back
from the river, leaving Menne's brigade alone-not much
over 2,00.0 bayonets-opposed to the whole 1st Division,
Bradford, and Pack. It is true that l\fenne had heavy cavalry
supports-Digeon's dragoons and Curto's brigade of l'l1ermet's
light horsc--on one flank, and Boyer's dragoons not far away
on th~ other. But cavalry in 1813 were not troops whieh could
defend a bridge or the line of a rivcr. There was also a good
dcal of French artillery prescnt-a more important fact under
the existing circumstances. For Reille had still twenty gUllS
ranged along the river I, beside those which were detached on
the flank with Casapalaeios' Spaniards. But Graham had almost
as many-the three batteries of Lawson, Ramsay, and Dubour·
dieu-and of these the two Inst, ranged opposite Arriaga bridge,
and pounding the village behind it, quite held their own against
the opposing guns.
It can only be supposed that Graham, in refraining from any
seriCl.us attack along the high road, was obeying in too literal
0. fashion Wellington's orders not to commit himself to close
fighting in the low ground, and to regulate his movements by
those of the columns 011 his right (Picton's and Dalhousie's
divisions). When these had worked their way up the Zadorra
to his neighbourhood he did advance. But it was then so late'
that the enemy in front of him was able to get away, without
any very disastrous losses.
While Graham kept quiet on the high road, Oswald was
engaged in a very dirCerent style at Gamarra Mayor, where after
his first capture of the village, he made at least three desperate
attempts to foree the bridge, held most obstinately by Lamarti·
nicre's division. The passage was taken and retaken, but no
lodgement on the southern bank could be made. AJ'ter Hobin·
son's brigade had exhausted itself, Oswald put in the ll/Ist
from Hay's brigade and some of his Portuguese 2. )jut no
, Though he had lost scveral when La Martini~re was driven out of
Gamarra .Mayor (scc above, p. 425) and Abcchuco.
• The other regiments of Hay'l> brigade were evidently kept in reserve,
for the casuultiCli of the 1/38th were eight only, ami those of the l/9th 25.
The 8th Cayadores of Spry's brigade lost 40 men, the Portuguese Line
blll.Lnlions olll)' 41 between the four of them.
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success WUl:i obtained, though both sides suffered heavily. The
casualty rolls of the 5th Division show a loss of 38 officers and 515
men-those of their French opponents 38 officers and 558 men.
Practically all on both sides fell in the murderous fighting up
and down Gamarra bridge. The forces were so equally balanced
-each about 0,000 bayonets and one divisional battery-that
on such a narrow front decision was impossible when both
fought their best. The only way of attacking the bridge was
by pushing straight down the narrow street of the village from
the British side, and across an open field from the French. Both
parties had guns trained upon its ends, which blew to pieces
any column-head that dcbouched. There were no fords any-
where near, and the banks for somc distance up-stream and
down-stream were lined by the skirmishers of both sides, taking
what cover they could find, and doing their best to keep down
each other's fire. • It plainly appeared this dny that the enemy
had formed a sort of determination not to be beat: we ne\'er
saw them stand so vigorous before,' writes a diarist from the
ranks, in Robinson's brigade 1.
There was an absolute deadlock at Gamarra Mayor till nearly
five o'clock in the afternoon. At Durana things went other-
wise: Longa, though hampcred by his lack of guns, ended
by pushing the Franco-Spanish brigade across the bridge, and
then for some way down the south side of the Zadorra. The
retreating party then made a stand behind a ravine and brook
some half-mile farther on, where they were flanked by a
brigade of Mermet's light cavalry, as well as by their own five
squadrons, and supported by the Freneh battalion of the
Srd Line which had been in their quarter of the field from the
first. Longa was unable to push them farther-probably for
fear of lcnding his flank to cuvulry elml'ges, and gained no
further b'Touud till the general retreat of the Frcnch army
began. But he had effectively cut IGng Joscph's communica-
tion with France by seiziilg Durana-and this was the govern~
ing factor of the whole fight, since the enemy had now only
the Pampe}wla road by which he could retreat. If Josepb had
I Sergennt JaIDes Halc of t]IC 1/9Ul, who h.'lll left us the only good
dcmilcd account of the Ilghtillg lit GlIllUlrru with which I lIm f1cquainlcd
(pp. 10a-G).
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owned some infantry reserves, he could (no doubt) have driven
Longa away; but he had not a man to spare in any part of the
field, and things were going so badly with the Army of the
South that he had no attention to spare for the Army of
Portugal.
It must have been about four o'clock Defore Wellington,
having rearranged his line and brought up his artillery, deter-
mined to renew the general attack on the French right and
centre. Joseph had brought up to the new position (extending
from Crispijana on the left by Zuazo to the heights in front
of Esquivel) the whole of the infantry of the Armies of the
South and Centre, which now formed one rather irregular line.
The only infantry reserve was the six weak battalions of the
Royal Guard-perhaps 2,500 bayonets 1, placed on the high road
in front of Vittoria-there wss also a mass of cavalry in reserve,
but this was of as little use for the defence of a hill-position as
was Wellington's for the assault on it. There were now in line
TiIly's division of dragoons which had been brought back from
its useless excursion on the Logrono road, and Pierre Soult's
light horse, both of Ga7.an's army, with Treillard's dragoons,
Avy's Chnsseurs, and the two cavalry regiments of the Royal
Guard, all from the Armyof the Centre-in all some 4,500 sabres.
The artillery, however, was very strong, nnd-deployed in a
long line on both sides of the high road-was already sweeping
all the slopes in front. There were present 46 guns of the Army
of the South (all that it owned save onc piece lost at Arillez
and three absent with Digeon's dragoons), twelve guns of the
Army of the Centre, and 18 from the reserve of the Anny of
Portugal-76 in all 2. Dickson would appear to have brought
up against them very nearly the same number: 54 British,
18 Portuguese, and a Spanish guns, when the last of the reserve
batteries had got across the Zadorra and come forward into
line-a total of 75 pieccs 3 • The cannonade was the fiereestcvcr
• Numbers impossible to dctennine. as they arc never borne in the
muster mill! of the Army of t11e Centre. But as they were 2,019 strong on
July 16. whcll Soult reorgunizetl the whole Army of Spain, they were
probably 2.500 strong before the battle.
• So Tirlet. making allowances for the lost pieces.
• Viz. the divisionul bnttcril'll of the 2nd Division (onc British, onc
PortngucllC), 3rd. 4th, 7th, Light. and Silveira's Divisions, two H. A.
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known in the Peninsula----ea.ch sidc WlI.ll mainly trying to
pound thc encmy's infantry-a task marc easy for the French
than the Allied gunners, since the assailant had to come up
the open hillside, and the assailed was partly screencd by woods
(especially in front of Gomeeha) and dips in the rough ground
which he was holding.
The French line was now formed by Cassagne's division on
the extremc right, 'with one regiment (thc 16th Uger) in
Crispijana, and the others extending to meet Darmagnac's
much dcplcted battalions which werc in and about Zuazo.
Lcval ought to have bcen in touch with Du.rmagul\c, but
obviously was not, the ground Oil each side of thc high road
being hcld by guns only, with cavalry in support some way
behind. For after looing Ariiiez Leval's infantry had inclined
much to thcir left. But on the other flank Villatte had, as it
seems, inclined somewhat to the right, for having lost thc
heights of La Pllebla, he could not prevent Cameron and
Morillo from pressing along their crest and getting behind his
ncw position: they were edging past his flank all through this
period of the action.
The long front of the British advance started with Colville's
brigade-now once more in front line-opposite Crispijana,
and was continued southward by those of Grant, Power, Bris~
bane, Stubbs, Byng, and O'Callaghan, while Vandclellr, Kempt,
W. Anson, Skerrett, and Ashworth were formed in support,
with Silveira's division and the cavalry in third line. The
missing brigades of the 7th Division wcre not yet on the field,
possibly not even across the Zadorra, for neither of them lost
a maIL that day. The advall(:c of the line was a splendid
spectacle, recorded with notes of admiration by many who
witnessed it from the hill of Ariiiez or the heights of La Puebla.
The French artillery fire was heavy, and in some sections of
the line very murderous-Power's and Stubbs's Portuguese
brigades were special sufferers. But the infantry defence was
not resolute: on many parts of the front it was obviously
very weak. The enemy was already a beaten army, he had
been turned out of two positions, the news had got round that
batteries attached to the cavalry, two British and one Portuguese batteries
of the reserve, and three Spanish guns belonging to Morillo.
430 THE IJATTLE OF Vl'l"l'QRIA lJUNJ> 21
the'road to }~rance had been cut, and that Reille's small force
was in grave danger of losing the line of the Zadorra-in which
case the whole army would find itself attacked in the rear. It
is clear from the French narratives that the infantry did not
support the guns ill front line as they should. The reports of
the Army of the Centre speak of being turned Oil their right
by a column which kept near the river and took Crispijana-
obviously Colville's brigade. As the 16th Ugcr in that village
only suffered a loss that day of onc officer and 26 men, its
resistance cannot have been very serious. But D'Erlon's
divisions were also outRanked on their left-by clouds of
skirmishers drifting in by the wood and broken groUnd about
Gomccha, who turned on the linc of artillery, and began
shooting down the gunners from flank and rear 1. Obviously
there was a gap along the high road, by which these light
troops must have penetrated, and as obviously it was caused
by Leval having sheered off to· the south. For the artillt'ry
report of Gazan's army also speaks of being turned on its right
wing-' enveloped by skirmishers who had got into Gomeeha
and were in rear of the position, which was being also attacked
frontally.' Nor is tills all, 'the mtlSs on the mountain (Camcron
ll!-ld l\Iorillo) descended on the left flank and rear of the Army
"of the South before it had time to form again: the artillery
fQund itself without support.' If so, where were the four and
ahalfdivisionsofinfantry which should have Ocen protecting it?
The only possible deduction from all our narratives is that
Gazan's army made no real" stand on the Gomccha-Esquivcl
position, and retired the moment that the attack drew near.
And the person mainly responsible for the retreat was the
Army-Commander himself, whose very unconvincing account
of this phase of the action is that' the right flank of the line
was continually being outflanked: I received no further orders
about the taking up of the position of which the King had
spoken j the enemy was getting near the gates of Vittoria (!),
and so I had to continue my movement toward that town,
after having taken up a position by ZU37,o, with the intention
1 These notes are partly from Tidet's very interesting artillery report,
parUy IrOl1l the nurrative of the sto.rr-offiocr or the Army or the Centre,
already often quoted ubove.
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of covering with my right.-hand division and my guns the
retreat of the rest of the army, which without this help would
have been hopelessly compromised. At tlus time I had only
lost four guns, abandoned on the extreme left of the line: the
artillery was intact, und the army had suffered no greuter loss
than it had inflicted on the enemy.'
Reading tlus artful narrative, wc note that (1) Gazan eva-
cuated on his own responsibility a position that the King had
definitely ordered him to take up-because he had' no further
orders'; (2) the continued' turning of his right' could only
have resulted from the defeat of his own troops on and about
the high'road-which was in his sector, not in D'Erlon's,
Leval was across it when the last phase of the battle began;
(8) D'Erlon held ZuaZ() and complained that there was nothing
on his left, which was completely turned on the side where
Lc\'al ought to have been but was not; (4) Gazan retreated
without any serious loss having compelled him to do so. This
is obviously the fact. ViIlattc's whole division had less than
300 casualties, Lcval's under 800, Darieau's under 850: the
only troops hard hit were Maransin's brigade, Rey's brigade of
Conroux's division, and the 103rd Line in Daricau's_ More-
over, the 4th and 2nd British Divisions, the troops immediately
opposed to Gazan's main line, had insignificant losses in this
part of the action, Byng's brigade under 150, Ashworth's just
23, Anson's 90, Skerrett's 22; the only appreciable loss had
been that of Stubbs's Portuguese-about 240. For thc heavy
casualty lists of O'Callaghnn's, Cndogan's, and Brisbane's bat-
talions had all been suffered in the earlier phases of the fight 1.
The fact is that Gazau went off 'without orders, nnd left the
King and D'Erlon in the lurch. Jourdan is telling the exact
truth when he says that' General Gazan, instead of conducting
his divisions to the position indicated, swerved strongly to thc
right, marching in retreat, so as to link up with Villattc; he
continued to draw uwny, following the foothills of the mouu·
tain [of Pucbla], leaving the high road and Vittoria far to his
left, and a vast gap between himself and Count D'Erlon' 2.
No doubt the breach made in the French centre when Pieton
, Scc I..a.l.Jlcs of losses ill Appcndi<;lCS, IIQ5. xi IInll xii.
I Memoirs, p. 479.
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stormed the heights behind Ariiicz had been irreparable from
the first; and no doubt also the flanking movement of Morillo
and Camerou on the mountain must have dislodged the Army
of the South, if it had waited to come into frontal action with
Cole and Hill. Dut Gazan showed complete disregard of all
interests save his own, and went off in comparatively good
condition, without orders,leaving the King, D'Erlon, and UeiUe
to get out of the mess as best they might.
Some of the British narratives tend to show that many parts
of Gazan's line had never properly settled down into the
Gomeeha-Esquivel position, having reached it in such bad
order that they would have required more time than was
granted them to re-form. An officer present with the skirmish-
ing line of the 4th Division writes in his absolutely contemporary
diary: • From the time when our guns began to open, and to
throw shells almost into the rear of the enemy's height, we saw
him ,begin to fall back in haste from his position. Wc [4th
Division] marched on at a great pace in column. From that
moment the affair became a mere hunt. Our rapid advance
almost cut off four or five French battalions-they made some
resistance at first, but soon dissolved and ran pell-mell, like
a swarm of bees, up the steep hill, from which they began to
fire down on us. We disregarded their fire, and kept on
advancing-in order to earry out our main object: broken
troops are easy game. When we found the enemy in this
second position there was heavy artiUery fire. Since his left
-wing was somewhat refused, wc advanced in echelon from
the right. When we got within musketry range, we found
he had gone off out of sight. After that we drove him out of
onc position after another till at last wc were near the gates
of Vittoria 1.' Several other 4th Division and 2nd Division
narratives agrec in stating that after the storming of Arii'iez
the French never made anything like a solid stand on the
Gomecha-EsquiveI heights. But (as has been :;aid above) thc
best proof of it is the British casualty list, which shows that
the reserve line was hardly under fire, and that the front linc
had very moderate losses, except at one or two points.
• D~rll of Waebhol~, attached with a Brunswick light company to the
4th Division, PI). 315-16.
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D'Erlon made a more creditable resistance on the French
right, hut he was obviously doomed if he should linger long after
Gazan had gone off. After losing Crispijana and Zuazo he
made a last stand on the slopes a mile in front of Vittoria,
between All and Armentia, to which the whole of his own
artillery and that of the reserve, and perhaps also some guns
of the Army of the South, retired in time to take up a final
position 1. For soine short space they maintained a furious fire
on the 3rd Division troops which were following them up, so as
to allow their infantry to re·form. But it was but for a few
minutes-the column near the Zadorra (Grant, Colville, and
Vandeleur) got round the fla.nk of the village of AIi, and the
line of guns wus obviously in danger if it remained any longer
in action. Just at this moment D'Erlon received the King's
orders for a general retreat by the route of Salvatierra. The
high road to France had ceased to be available since Longa got
across it in the earlier afternoon. Any attempt to force it open
would obviously have taken much time, and might well havc
failed, since the French were everywhere closely presscd by
the pursuing British. Jourdan judged the idea of rcopening
the passage to be hopelessly impracticable, Md ordered the
retreat on Pampeluna as the only possible policy, though (as
his report owns) he was aware of the badness of the Salvaticrra
road, and doubted his power to carry off his guns, transport,
and convoy of refugees by such a second-rate track. But it
was the only onc open, and there was no choice.
The orders issued were that the Train and Park should get off
at once, that the Army of the South should retreat by the
country paths south of Vittoria, the Army of the Centre by those
north of it. The Army of Portugal was to hang on to its
position till O'Erlon's troops had passed its rear, and then
follow them as best it could. AI] the cross·tracks indicated to
the three armies ended by converging on the Salvatierra road
east of Vittoria, so that a hopeless confusion was assured for
the moment when three separate streams of retreating troops
should meet, and struggle for the use of one narrow and inade-
quate thoroughfare. But as [l matter of fact the chaos began
I Thirty gUlls according to Gar1Je's reJlort-40 according to that of
D'Erlon's staff-officer, quoted above.
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long before that time was reached, for the road was blocked
or ever the three armies got near it. The order for the retreat
of the Park and convoys had been issued far too late--Gazan
says that he had advised Jourdan to give it two hours before,
when the first positions had been abandoned. But the Marshal
had apparently high confidence in his power to hold the
Hermandad-Gomceha-Esquivellinc; at any mte, he had given
no such command. The noise of battle rolling ever closer to
Vittoria had warned the mixed multitude of civil and military
hangers-on of the army who were waiting by their carriages,
carts, pack-mules, and fourgons, in the open fields east of
Vittoria, that the French army was being driven in. Many of
those who were not under military discipline had begun to
push ahead on the Salvatierra road, the moment that the
alarming news flew around that the great chaus8ee leading to
]~ranee had been blocked. The Park, however-which all day
long had been sending up reserve ammunition to the front, and
even one or two improvised sections of guns-had naturally
remained waiting for orders. So had thc immense accumulation
of divisional and regimental baggage, the convoy of treasure
which had arrived from Bayonne on the 19th, and the heavy
carriages of thc King's personal caravan, stuffed with the plate
and pictures of the palace at Madrid. And, of the miscellaneous
French and Spanish hangers-on of the Court-ministers,
eourtiers, clerks, commissaries, contractors, and the ladies who
in legitimate or illegitimate capacities followed them-few had
dared to go off unescorted on an early start. 'fhere was 0. vast
accumulation of distracted womenfolk-nOU$ etions un bordel
ambulant, said one French eye·witncss-some crammed together
in travelling coaches with children and servants, others riding
thc spare horses or mules of the mcn to whom thcy belonged.
'Whcn the orders for gcneral retreat were shouted around,
among the fields where the multitude had becn waiting, three
thousand vehicles of onc sort and anothcr tried simultancously
to get into onc or another of the five field-paths which go cast
from Vittoria, all of which ultimately deboueh into the single
narrow Salvaticrra road. A dozen blocks and upscts had
occurred before the first ten minutes were over, and chaos
supervened. Many carriages and waggons never got on on a
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road at all. Into thc rear of this confusion there came charging,
a few minutes later, batteries of artillery going at high speed,
and strings of caissons, which had been horsed up and haa
started aw.ay early from the Park. Of course they could not
get through-but the thrust which they delivered, before they
came to an enforced stop, jammed the crowd of vehicles in
front of them into a still more hopeless block. Dozens of
carriages broke down-whereupon light-fingered fugitives
began to help themselves to all that was spilt. Of course camp
followers began the game, but JOUfihul-..sayS that a large pro-
portion of the French pri!>Oners that day were soldiers who
s'atll1Lsaienl cl piller in and about Vittoria; onc of the official
reports from the Army of Portugal remarks that the retreating
cavalry joined in the' general pillage of the valuables of the
army,' and other narrators mention that the treasure-fourgons
had already been broken into long before the English came
upon the scene 1. Be this as it may, there was no long delay
before thc terrors of the stampede culminatcd with the arrival
of several squadrons of Grant's hussars, who had penctrated
by the gap between D'Erlon's and Gazan's lines of retreat, and
had made a short cut through the subUrbs of the town. Of the
chaos that followed the firing of the first pistol shots which
heralded the charge of the British light cavalry, we must not
speak till we have dealt with the last fight of the Army of
Portugal, on the extreme Freneh right.
i'iIl Grant's and Colville's brigades broke into Crispijana and
Ali, the line of Reille's gallant defence along the Zadorra had
remained intact. Only artillery fire was going on opposite
the bridge of Arriaga, where the 1st Division and the two
Portuguese brigades had halted by Graham's orders at some
distance from the river, and hOO never advnnced. The two
cnvalry. brigades were behind them. At Gamo.rra Mayor the
5th Division had failed to force a passage, though it had inflicted
on Lamartiniere's troops as heavy a loss as it suffered. Longa
was held up half n. mile beyond Durnnn., though he had success~
fully cut the Bayonne chaussce. There was considerable
cannonade and skirmishing fire going on, upon a front of three
miles, but no further progress reported. The whole scene,
I B1llze, p. 244.
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however, was changed from the moment when Grant's and
Colville's brigades, turning the flank of D'Erlon's line close to
the Zadorru, came sweeping over the hills by Ali into the very
rear of Reille's line. The Army of Portugal had been directed
to hold the bridges and keep baek Graha.m, until the rest of the
French host had got off. But the danger now came not from
the front but from the rear. In half an hour more the advancing
British columns would be level with the bridge of Arriaga and
surrounding the infuntry that held it. Reille determined on
instant retreat, the only coursc open to him: so far as was
possible it was covered by the very ample provision of cavalry
which he had in hand. Digcon, who has left a good account
of the crisis, madc several desperate charges, to hold back the
advancing British while l\{enne's brigade was escaping from
Arriaga. Onc was against infantry, which formed square and
beat off the dragoons with no difficulty I_the other against
hussars, apparently two squadrons of .the 15th, which had.
turned northward from the suburbs of Vittoria and tried to
ride in and cut off the retreat of Melille's battalions 2:. They
were beaten back, and the infantry scrambled oU, leaving behind
them Sarrut, thcir divisional general, mortally wounded as
the retreat began. Moreover, all the guns in and about Arriaga
had to be abandoned in the fields, where they could makc 110
rapid progress. The gunners unhitched the horses, and escaped
as best they could.
Rcille had drawn up in front of Bctonio the small infantry
reserve (Fririon's brigade) which he had wisely provided for
himself, flanked by Boyer's dragoons and Curto's brigade of
light cavalry. The object of this stand was not only to givc
Menne's and Digeon's troops a nucleus on which they could
1 Whut regiment was this? Obviously one of Colville's or Gmllt's-as
obviously lIot the 51st, 68Lh. 82rld, 87th, 9·:I,th, from all 01 whieh we l'l\ve
narrativesof the battle, whichdo not mention theirbcingchargcd by cavalry
or Corming square. There remain the Cl10SSCUrs TJrnonniques, 1/5th, 2/83rd
-it may huvc becn uny of these.
• Tomkin!lOn of the 16th, fighting lIot far off, says that these squadrons
• got into a scrape' hy charging about 2,000 French cavalry (p. 249).
They lost 2 officers and 5, men. This was obViously the atta.ir of whieh
Digeon speaks. nis 12th Dragoons, which charged the square, lost 22
casualties.
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raJly, but to gain time for Lamartiniere to draw off from in
front of Gamarra l.fayor bridge, where he was still hotly
engaged with Oswald's division. This infantry got away in
better order than most French troops on that day, and even
brought off its divisional battery, though that of the cavalry
which had been co-operating with it had to be left behind not
far from the river-bank, having got into 0. marshy bottom
where it stuck fast. 'fhe Franco-Spaniards of Casapalacios and
their attendant cavalry escaped 'over the hills east of Durana,
pursued by Longa, who took many prisoners from them.
When Lamartinicre's division had come in, Reille made a
rapid retreat to the woods of Zurballo, a mile and a half behind
Bctonio, which promised good cover. He wus now being
pursued by the whole of Grahum's corps, which had crossed
the Zadorra. when the bridges were abandoned. Pack's brigade,
followed by the 1st Divisioll and Bradford, advanced on Arriaga;
they were somewhat late owing to slow filing over the bridge.
At Gamarra Oswald sent in the pursuit of Lamartiniere two
squadrons of light dragoons 1 which had been attached to his
column; thcse were followed by the rest of their brigade, which
Graham sent up from the main road to join them, and also by
llock's German dragoons. The object of using the smaller
and more remote bridge was tha.t cavalry crossing by it had
a better chance of getting into Reille's re.'l.1' than they would
have secured by passing at Arriaga. The much exhausted 5th
Division followed the cavalry.
Having reached the edge of the woods, Reille ordered the
bulk of his troops to push on hard, by the two parallel roads
which traverse them, keeping Fririon's brigade in hand as a
fighting rearguard. The rather disordered colwnns were
emerging on the east side of the woods, and streaming into and
past the village of Zurbano, when the leading squudrons of
the 12th and 16th Light Dragoons came in upon them. These
squadrons had avoided entangling themselves in the trees till
the French rearguard had passed on, but prepared to charge the
moment they got into open ground, though the main body of
the brigade had not come up. They found opposed to them
a regiment of Boyer's dragoons, supported by another of
• Onc eneh of the 12th nnd 16th.
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hussars, ,,,.hich they charged but did not break 1. Dut on the
coming up of the rear squadrons, the attack was renewed with
success. The French cavalry gave way, but ouly to clear the
front of the 86th Line of Fririon's brigade, which was in square
outside Zuroo.no. The British light dragoons swept cl,own on
the square, but were completely repulsed by its steady fire.
This gained time for the rest of Reille's troops to make orr, and
the pursuit slackened. Dut the bulk of the French went orr
in such haste that they abandoned four guns of Lamartiniere's
artillery, and took away with them only the remaining two--
the sole pieces that escaped that day.of the immense train of
Joscph's three armies. Some hundreds of stragglers were
taken, but no single unit of the retiring force was cut oU or
captured wholc. Rcille wisely kept hi!> army, so long as was
possible, on the side~paths by Arbulo and Orcytia, before
debouching into the main Salvatierra road, which was seething
over with the wrecks of the other armies and the convoys.
Hence he succeeded in esCSlping the utter confusion into which
the rest fell, and, finally, when he turned into the main track,
wus able to constitute himself 0. reo.rguard to the whole.
Graho.m's pursuit of him seems to have been slow and cautious
-no troops indeed ever came near the retreating columns
except the two light dragoon regiments, the Ca~ador battalions
of Paek and Bradford, and somc of Langa's skirmishcrs, who
(as Relie mentions) followed him along the hills on his left,
shooting down into the retreating masses, but not attempting
to break in. The 5th Division appears to have followed not
much farther than the open ground beyond the woods of
Zurbano, where it halted and cncamped after eight o'clock
in some bean-fields. Nor does it seem that the 1st Division got
, The best account oC all this is in the invaluable Tomkinson's DWry
(pp. 250-]). There is also an interesting narrative by Dallas, who took
purt ill the ehlU'gc, though he lllW no busincs~ thcre (pp. 92-3). The
French cavalry wcrc the 15th Dragoons and 3rd I-IUliS3rs. They suffcred
heavily-tile former regiment losing" offioors and 53 men, tile latter
4 officcrs und 36 mcn. Thc British dn~gOOll9 got oll lightly, all things
considered, with 1 ofliccr and 11 men lIit in the 12th, and 1 officer and
20 men ill thc 16th. Tomkinson much prni!lCs the French infantry.
• 1 nevcr saw mcn more stcndy nnd CXllct to the wont of oomDmnd. I rode
within a yard of them, they had their arms at flle port, and not a man
attempted to fire till we beg:lIl to retire.'
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more than a league or so beyond the Z"dotra 1. The Ca~adores
and cavalry, however, did not halt till they reached El Burgo,
four or five miles farther on.
The scene was very different on the other side of Vittoria,
where n'Erlon's army was pushing its way, in utter disorder,
through the fields and by-paths over which the Parks and
convoy were trying in vain to get off, and Gaztm's (farther to
the south) was making a dash over ground of the most tiresome
sort. For in the rugged tract east of Esquivel and Armentin
such paths as there were mostly ran in the "'-'Tong direction-
north and south instcn4 of ~t and wcst-and it was nccessary
to disregard thcm and to strike across country. Six successive
ravines lay ill the way-marshy bottoms in which ran trifling
brooks descending toward the Zadotra-and several woods on
the ridges between the ravines. Hill's and Colc's skirmishers
were pressing in the rear, and above, on the heights of Puebla,
Morillo's and Cameron's troops could be seen hurrying along
with the intention of getting ahead of the retreating masses.
The confusion growing worse every moment-for companies
and battalions each struek out for the easiest line of retreat
'without regard for their neighbours-Gazan gave orders to
abandon all the artillery, whieh was getting embogged, battery
after battery, in the ravines, nnd gave leave for every unit to
shift for itself-general sauve-qui-peut. 'fhe horses were un-
hitched from the guns and caissons, many of the infantry threw
off their packs, and the army went off broadcast, some in the
direction of 1tIctauco and Arbulo, others by village paths more
to thc south. The gencral stream finally Oowed into the
Salvatierra road, where it was covered by the Army of Portugal,
which was making a much more orderly retreat 2. English
eye-witncsses of this part of the battlc complain bittcrly that
• Cf. the reporlll of the Anny of Portugal, Tomkillson, Hille 01 the l/Oth,
and Gmham's very sketchy dispatch, which says thnt the Infantry was
mueh delayed at the bridges, but that • the greatest eagcrne.ll$ WlUl mlUli-
tested by till the corps. 'l'he Cu9f'dor butttlliou~ of boUI Portugucse
brigades followed with the cavalry...• 'l'he enemy's fUght, howevcr, was
so rapid that no material impreS!lion could be madc on them, though more
thlln once eharged by SqWuJrolUl of General AI!son's brib'llde.' (Supple.
melllary Dispatclin, viii. p. 9.)
• Gllo1.ll1i says in his report that he only abllniloncd thc gUlls beeause he
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no horsemen ever came up to assist the wearied 2nd Division
infantry in the pursuit, and maintain that thousands of prisoners
might have been t.'lken by a few squadrons J. But all the
cavalry seems to have been diJ;;ected on Vittoria by the high
road, and save Grant's hussar brigade none of it came into
nction. 'fhis is sufficiently proved by its casualty lists-in
R. Hill's. Ponsonby's. Long's, Victor Alten's, and Fanc's
brigades that day the total losses were Que man killed and
eleven wouuded I Only Ansou's Light Dragoons in Graham's
corps and Grant's regiments in the centre got into the fighting
at all. The rugged ground. it is tnlc, was unfavourable for
cavalry action in reguJar order, but it was almost as unfavour-
able for disordered infantry escaping over ravines and ditches.
Something was wrong here in the general direction of the
mounted arm-perhaps it suffered from the wnnt of II responsible
cllvalry lender-the brigadiers dared not act for themselvcs, and
Back (the senior cavalry officer) was not only short-sighted in
the extreme, but absent from the main battle all dayin Graham's
corps. One calUlot but suspect that Wellington's. thunderings
in previous years, against reckless cavalry action, were always
present in the minds of colonels and brigadiers who had a chance
before them. And possibly, in the end, there was more gained
by the avoidance of mista.kes of rashness than lost by the missing
of opportunities, if we take the war as a whole. But at Vittoria
it would most certainly appear that the great mass of British
cavalry might as well have been on the other side of the Ebro
for all the good that it t\ccomplished.
It only rcmains to spcak of the chaos in the fields and roads
cast of Vittoria. Whcn the general tUblkle bcgan King Joscph
and Jourdan took their post on a low hill half a mile east of thc
town, and endeavoured to organize the departure of the Park
and eonvoys--a hopeless task, for the roads were blocked, and
no onc listened to orders. It was in vain that aides-de-camp
and orderlies were sent in all directions. Presently a flood of
found the roads south of Vittoria bloeked by fugitive vehicles (rom
Vittoria.
• L'&Lmnge of the 31~t ~ay~ that some or tile French, moving almost
in the middle of advancing British brigades, were mistaken for Spaniards,
and allowed to get oa unharmed. Surtees o( the 2/95th tells a similar
story.
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fugitives were driven in upon the starr, by the approach of
British cavalry in full career. These were Grant's 10th and
18th Hussnrs, who had turned. the town on its left, and galloped
down on the prey before them. Joseph had only with him the
two squadrons of his Lanccr~ of thc Guard, which had bcen
acting as head-quarters escort all day. It would appear that
thc Guard Hussars eamc up to join thcm about tills time. At
any rate, thcse two small regiments made a valiant attempt to
hold off the hussars-they were of course beaten, being hope-
lessly outnumbered 1. The King and staff had to fly as best
they could, and were much scattered, galloping over fields and
marshy ravines, mixed with military and civil fugitives of all
sorts. Some of the British hussars followed the throng, tnking
a good many prisoners by the way: more, it is to be feared,
stopped behind to gather the not too credit.'\ble first-fruits of
victory, by plundering the royal carriages, which lay behind the
scene of their charge. The French stragglers had alrcudy shown
them the way.
Wellington, on reaching Vittoria, set Robert Hill's brigade of
the Household Cavalry to guard the town from plunder, and
sent on the rest of the horse, nnd the infantry as they came up,
in pursuit of the enemy_ The French, however, had by now a
good start, and troops in order cannot keep up with troops in
disorder, who have got rid of their impedimenta, and scattered
themselves. The country, moreover, was unfavourable for
cavalry, as has been said above, and the infantry divisions
were tired out. The chase ended five miles beyond Vittoria-
the enemy, when last seen, being still on the run, with no formed
rearguard except 011 the side road where the Army of Portugal
was retreating.
If the prisoners were fewer than might have becn expected,
the material captured was such as no European army had ever
laid hands on before, since Alexander's Maccdonians plundered
the camp of the Persian king after the battle of Issus. The
• 'i'he laneers nrc shown in Marlinicn'a IistB to hElve lost six officers, the
hussars lour. Tile casualties 01 the 18th Hussars (3 officers and 37 meo)
and of the lOth (10 men) were certainly got in this uITair, which WUF.
evidently hot while it lusted. The best account of Joseph'~ lust half-hour
on the battlefield is in the Menwirts of Miot de l\lelito (ii1. pp. 280-1). who
was nt the King'F. ~i(le ;).(ld shnred his wild ride.
442 THE BATTLE OF VITIORlA [JUNE 21
military trophies compared well even wit!h those of Leipzig and
\VaterlOO-151 gUllS, 415 caissons, lOO artillery waggons.
Probably no other army ever left all its artillery save two solitary
pieces in the enemy's hands 1. There was but onc flag captured,
and that was only the standard of a battnlion of the 100th Line
which had been reduced in May, and had not been actually
borne in the battle 2. The baton of Jourdo.n, as Marshal of the
Empire, was an interesting souvenir, which delighted the Prince
Regent when it arrived in London a, but only bore witness to
the fact that his personal baggage, like that of his King, hud
been' captured. A few thousand c:lI..1:ra prisoners-the total
taken was only about 2.000-wQuld have been morc acceptable
tokens of victory.
But non-mill!..'!ry spoil was enormous-almost incredible.
It represented the exploitation of Spain for six long yenrs by
its conquerors. ''1'0 the accumulated plunder of Andalusin
were added the collections made by the other French armies-
the personal baggage of the King-fourgons having inscribed
on thcm in largc letters .. Domairw exterieur de S.M.t'Empereur"
-the military chest containing the millions rccently received
from France for the payment of the Army, and not yet distri·
buted-jewels, pictures, embroidery, silks, all manner of things
costly and portable had been assiduously transported thus far.
Removed from their frames and rolled up carefully, were the
finest Italian pictures from the 1'0)'0.1 collections of Madrid:
they were found in the " imperials" of Joseph's own carriages.
All this miXed 'with cannon, overturned coaches, broken-<lown
waggons, forsaken tumbrils, wounded soldiers, French and
Spanish civilians, women and children, dead horses and mules,
absolutely covered the face of the country, extending over the
I 01 the artillery Tirlet's report shows that 104. I'i-ere field guns actually
used in the battle. The remaining 47 were partly the reserve guns of the
AJ:my 01 the North, lelt stacked ut Vittoria when Clause:l took his divisions
to hunt for Mina, and partly guns of position from the garrisons of BUlges,
Vittoria, Mimml(., &e.
, There is n report of the regiment in the Archives NatUmalts setting
forth that it did not lose its eagle, but the flag 01 the battalion reduced by
Imperial orders in the spring, whieh Wn8 in the regimental rourgon.
• It inspired him with the idea of designing u British mund,"l's OO1on,
on which lions were Bublitituted lor eagles. Wellington naturlllly got the
fll'lit ever made.
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surface of a flat containing many hundred acres 1.' The
miserable crowd was guessed by an eye-witness to have numbered
nearly 20,000 persons. Spanish and French camp-followers and
military stragglers had already started plunder-on them
supervened English and Portuguese civil and military vultures
of the same SOl't-servants and mulctecrs by the thousand,
bad soldiers by the hundred: for while the good menmarehcd on,
the bud ones melted out of the rlUlks and flew to the spoil,
evading the officers who tried to urge thcm on. In such a chaos
evasion was ea.sy. Nor were the commissioned ranks altogether
without their unobtrusive seekers after gain-as witness the
subjoined narrative by one whom a companion in a contem-
porary letter describes as a ' graceless youth.'
• As L. and I rode out of Vittoria, we came to the camp in
less than a mile. On the left-hand side of the road was n
heap of ransacked waggons already broken up and dismantled.
There arose a shout from a number of persons among the
waggons, and wc found that thcy had discovered onc yet
unopened. We cantered up and found some men using all
possible force to break open three iron clasps secured with
padlocks. On the side of the fourgon was painted ,. Le Lieu-
tenant-General. Villatte." The hasps gave way, and a shout
followed. The whole surface of the waggon was packed with
church plate, mixed with bags of dollars. A man who thrust
his arm down said that the bottom was full of loose dollars
and boxes. L. and I were the only ones on horseback, and
pushed close to the waggon. He swung out a large chalice,
and buckling it to his holster-strap cantered off. As the people
were crowding to lay hold of the plate, I noted a mahogany box
about eighteen inches by two feet, with brass clasps. I picked
out four men, told them that the box "[as the renl thing, and if
they would fetch it out we would sec what it held. They caught
the idea: the box was very heavy. I led the way through the
standing corn, six or seven feet high, to a small shed, where we
put it down and tried to gct it open. After several devices had
failed, two mcn found a large stone, and, lifting it as high as
they could, dropped it 011 the box. It withstood several blows,
, All this from Leith Hay (always on interesting naM'lltor), vol. ii.
pp. 203 lIod 208.
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but at length gave way. Gold doubloons and smaller pieces
filled the whole box, in which were mixed some bags with
trinkets. Just then an Ordnance store-keeper came up. and
said there was no time to count shares: he would go roulld and
give a handfuJI in turn to each. lie first poured a double
handfull into my holster. 'the second round was a smaller
handfull. By this time I was reflecting that I was the only
officer present, and in rather an awkward position. I said
they might have the rest oC my shnrc.-thcrc was first a look
of surprise, and then a burst of laughter, and I trotted away.
I rode eight or ten miles to the bivouack and found the officers
in an ancient church-housed a la Cromwell. On the 2300,
before we left our quarters, I and -- wcnt up into the belfry,
and counted out the gold-the doubloons alone made nearly
£400. I remitted £250 to 'my father, and purchased another
horse with part of the balance 1.'
Geneml Villatte, no doubt, had special facilities in Andalusia
-but every fourgon and carringe contained something that
had been worth carrying oll. The amount of hard cash dis·
covered was almost incredible. Men and offieCl'S who had bccn
self-respecting enough to avoid the unseemly rush at the
waggons, had wonderful bargains at a sort of impromptu fair
or auction which was held among the debris of the convoy
that night. Good mules were going for three guineas-horses
for ten. Every one wished to get rid of the heavy duros and
five-franc pieces, which constituted the greater part of the
plunder; six and eight dollars respectively were ollered and
taken for a gold twenty·franc piece ora guinea.• The camp WfiS
turned into a fair-it was lighted up, the cars, &c., made into
stands, upon which the things taken were exposed for sale.
Many soldiers, to add to the absurdity of the scene, dressed
themselves up in uniforms fOWld in the chests. All the Portu-
guese boys belonging to some divisions arc dressed in the
uniforms of French officers-many of generals 2.'
• Oddly enough. two contemporary diaries mcntion Mr. D.'s lUCk. Hc
K<'t by 110 means the biggest h"ul. Sergeant CoIrtello or the IJ95t.h Bayti
that he got over £1,000. A private 01 thc 23rd cauicd off 1,000 dollsrli
in silver-a vast load I Green of thc 08t.h records that two of his oomradCll
got respectively 180 doubloons, and nCl1Ily 1,000 dollarli (p. 166)•
• TomkillllOll, p. 254.
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Wellington had hoped to secure the five million franc~ of
thc French !>ubsidy which had just arrived at Vittoria bcfore
thc battle. His expectations were deceived; only onc-twentieth
of the sum was recovered,. though an inquisitorial search was
made a few days later in suspected quarters, One regimcnt,
which had notoriously prospered, ,"v'as made to stack its knap-
sacks on the 23rd, and they were gone through in detail by an
assistant provost-marshal-but little was found: the men had
stowed awaytheir gains in belts and secret pockets; or deposited
them with quartermasters and commissaries who were known
to be honest and silent.
The only fe..'lture in this discreditable scene that gives the
historirm some satisfaction is to know that there was no mis-
handling of prisoners-not even of prominent Spanish traitors.
The only person recorded to have been killed in the chaos was
M. Thiebault, the King's trensurer, who fought to defend his
private strong-box containing 100,000 dollars, and got shot 1.
The women were particularly well treated-the Countess Gazan,
wife of the Commander of the Army of the South, was sent by
Wellington's orders in her own carriagc to join her husband-
a courtesy acknowledged by several Freneh diarists 2. Thc
same leave was givcnlater to many others, and the Commander-
in-Chief wrote to the Spanish Ministry to beg that no vengeance
might be taken on the captured afrancesaMs, and seems to
have secured his end in the main.
The French loss in the battle, according to the definitive
report made from the hend-quarters of the three armies after
they had got back into France, was 42 officers and 716 men
killed, 226 officers and 4,210 men wounded, and 23 officers and
2,825 prisoners or missing-a total of 8,091. It is knoTh"Tl th(Lt
of the' missing' some hundreds were stragglers who rejoined
later, and some other hundreds dead men, who had not got
into the list of killed. The total number of prisoners did nut
really exceed 2,000. But on the other hand the official returns
are incomplete, not giving any Hgures for the artillery or train
of the Armies of Portugal and the Centre, or for the Royal
1 l\Iiot de i\lelito, iii. p. 279.
• There are amusing llCCOllnts of the conversation or this lively lady in
the narratives of Leith Hay and Dr. McGrigor, who took (:ure 01 her.
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Guards (which lost 11 officers and thercfore probably 150 to
200 mcn), or for the Gencral Staff (which had 35 casualtics), or
for the stray troops of the Army of thc North prescnt in the
battle. Probably the real total, therefore, was very much
about the 8,000 men given by the offieial return.
The Allied casualties werc just over 5,000--0f whom 8,672
wcrc British, 921 Portuguese, and 552 Spaniards. A glancc
at the table in the Appendix will show how unequally they
were distributed. Seven-tenths of the whole loss fell on the
2nd and ard Divisions, with Grant's brigade of the 7th, Robin-
son's of the 5th, and Stubbs's Portuguese in the 4th. These
troops furnished over 8,500 of the tot.'\l loss of 5,158. The
1st Division (34 casualties), the British brigades of the 4th
Division (125 clLSualtics), Hay's and Spry's brigades of the 5th
(200 casualties), Barncs' and Lccor's of thc 7th (no casualties I),
the Light Division (182 casualties), Silveira's Division (10
casualties), the cavalry (155 casualties) had no losses of impor-
tance. Thc 266 men marked as missing were all either dead
or absent marauding, save ·iO of the 71st whom the French
took prisoners to Pampeluna. The Spanish loss of 14 officers
and 524 men was entirely in MorilIo's and Longa's Divisions,
and much heavier among the Estremadurans, who fought so
well on the heights of La Puebla, than among the Cantabrians
who skirmished all day at Durana. Giron's Galieians were
nevcr cllgaged, having only arrived i.n the rear of Graham's
column just as the fighting north of the Zadorra was over.
They cneamped round Arriabl'tl. at the end of the day.
That the battlc of Vittorio. was the crowning-point of a vcry
brilliant strategic campaign is obvious. That in tactical details
it was not by any means so brilliant an example of what
Wellington and his army could accomplish, is equally obvious.
Was the General's plan to blame? or was a well-frnmed
scheme wrecked by the faults of subordinates? It is always
a dangerous matter to criticize 'Wellington's arrangements-
so much seems clear to the historian that could not possibly
have been known to the !loldier on the morning of June 21st.
• But Le<:or had a straggler or two out ol onc ol hi~ line-battalioIlS-
no doubt men who had gone off marauding, like most of tbe missing In
the British list.
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It is obvious to us now that there was a fair chance not only
of beating the French army, and of cutting ort its retreat on
Bayollne, but of surrounding and dcstroying at least a COll-
siderable portion of it. 'Vellingtoll's orders arc always extremely
reticent in stating his final aims, and give a list of things to be
done by each division, r<l.ther than a general appreciation of
what he intends the army to accomplish. But reading his
directions to Graham, Hill, and Dalhousie, and looking at the
way on which they work out on the map, and the allocation
of forees ~n each column, it would seem that in view of the
distribution of the French troops on the afternoon of June 20th,
he planned a complete encircling scheme, which should not
only llccomplish what he nctualIy did llccomplish, but much
morc. Groham, with his 20,000 men, must havc been intended
not only to force the line of the Zadorra and cut the Royal
Road, but ~o fall upon the rear of the whole French army,
which on thc afternoon of the 20th had been sccn to have a
most inadequate flunk-guard towards the north-east. Hill's
20,000 mcn wcre not, as Jourdan thought, the only main
attack, nor as Gazan (equally in error) thought, a mere demon-
stration. They werc intended to make an encircling movement
to the south, as strong as Graham's similar movement to the
north. But obviously both the ftankingcolumns, Hill's far more
than Graham's, were in danger of being repulsed, if the French
could turn large unemployed reserves upon them. Whereforethc
central attacks, by the 4th and Light Divisions on the Nanelares
side, and by the 3rd and 7th Divisions on the !I1end07.& side, were
necesSAry in order to contain any troops which Jourdan might
have sent off to overwhelm Hill or Graham.
And here comes the weak point of the whole scheme-all the
movements h~d to be madc through defiles and over rough
country: Hill had to deboueh from the narrow pass of Pucbla,
Grahnm had a long mountain rond from Murguia, nnd, worst of
all, Dalhousie, with the Srd and 7th Divisions, had to cross the
watershed of 0. very considerable mountain by mcre peasants'
tracks. Only the column which marched from the Bayns to
Nanelares had dccent going on a second-rote road. There was,
therefore, a considerable dnnger that some purt of the compli-
cated scheme might misCfiITy. And any failure at onc point
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impexiUcd the whole, since the Nallclnres eolwnn was not to
act till Hill was wcll forward, and thc MClldoUl. column was
ordered to get into touch with thc troops to its right, and rcgu-
late its movements by them; while Graham, still farther off,
was also to guide himself by what was going on upon his right,
to correct himself with the Mendo7A column, and only to attack
on the Bilbao road when it should be seen that an attack would
be obviously useful to the main advance.
Hill discharged his part of the scheme to admiration, as he
always did anything committed to him, and took up the
attention of the main part of the Army of the South. But the
central and left attacks did not proceed as Wellington had
dcsired. Craham got to his destined position within the timc
allotted to him, but when he had rcachcd it, was slow and
unenterprising in his action. He was seeking for Dalhousie's
column, with which he had been directed to co-ordinate his
operations: he sent out cavalry scouts and Bradford's Portu·
guese to his right, but could find nothing. This, I think,
explains but does not wholly excuse his caution at noon. But
it neither explains nor excuses at all his tactics after he had
received, at two o'clock, Wellington's orders telling him to press
the enemy hard, and make his power felt. With his two
British divisions, the Portuguese of Pack and Bradford, and
two cavalry brigades, he only made a genuine attack at onc
point, and did not put into serious action (as the casualty lists
show) more than four battalions~those used at Gamarra
JI,[ayor. The whole left column was contained by little more
than half of its number of French troops. Graham says in his
dispatch to Wellington that' in face of such force as the enemy
showed it was evidently impossible to push a column across
the river by Gamarra bridge.' He does not explain his in·
activity at othcr points. except by mentioning that the enemy
had ' at least two divisions in reserve on strong ground behind
the river 1: There was really only one brigade in reserve, and
so fur from bcing compelled to attack at Gamarra only, Graharn
had besides Arriaga bridge on the main road, two other bridges
open to assault (those of Coveo and Yurre), besides at least onc
and probably three fords. All these more southern passages
I Supplemel1lflry DispIJIdWJ, viii. p. 8.
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were watched by cavalry only, without infant.ry or guns. It
is clear that Graham could have got across the Zadorra some-
where, if he had tried. Very probably his quiescence was due
to his failing eyesight, which had been noticed very clearly by
those about him during this campaign 1. The only pa.rt of his
corps which did really useful work was Longa's Spanish division,
which at least cut the Bayonne road at the proper place and
time.
But if Graham's tactics cannot be praised, Lord Dalhousie
,was even more responsible for the imperfect consequence of
the victory. Why Wellington put this fussy and occasionally
disobedient officer in charge of the left-centre column, instead
of Picton, passes understanding. The non-arrival of the 7th
Division, which was to lead the attack, was due to incompetent
work by him or his staff. He says in his dispatch that he was
delayed by several accidents to his artillery (Cairnes's battery).
But from his own narrative we see that the guns got up almost
AS soon as his leading infantry brigade (Grant's), while his two
rear brigades (Barnes and Le Cor) never reached the front in
time to fire a shot. What really happened was that for want
of staff guidance, for which the divisional commander was
responsible, these troops did not take the path assigned to
them, and went right over, instet\d of skirting, the summit of
Monte Arrato, making an appnrently short (nnd precipitous)
cut, which turned out to be a very long one 2. So when Dal-
housie did arrive, with one brigade and his guns, Pieton had
long been waiting by Las Guetu.s in a state of justifiable irrita-
tion. Finally, Dalhousic (lacking the greater part of his
division) did not ~ttack till he got peremptory orders to do so.
from the Commander-in-Chief. Hence the extreme delay,
which caused grave risk to Hill's wing, so long engaged without
support. It is fair to add that the delay hOO onc good ertect-
since it lcd Jourdan to think that his right was not going to be
attacked, and therefore to send of( Villatte's and Cassagne's
1 Sce c. g. Swabcy's note on his dangerous ride with Graham along the
EsJa, at the end of May, • whether the General is blind or mad I have not
decided-he must have been one or the other to ride in cold blood over
those roeks and precipices'. Swabey'6 Diary, p. 50S.
• Caimcs's [)Wry, p. 026.
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divisions to the fa.r left. If Dalhousie had advanced an hour
earlier, these divisions would have been near enough to support
LevaL But this is no justification for the late arrival and long
hesitations of the commander of the 7th Division. Undoubtedly
a part of the responsibility devolves on Wellington himself, for
putting an untried officer in charge of a crucial part of the day's
operations, when he had in Picton all old and experienced
tactician rcady to hand.
The strategical plan was so good that minor faults of execu-
tion could not mar its general fiuccess. Yet it must be remem·
bered that. if all had worked out with minute accuracy, the
French army would have been destroyed, instead of merely
losing its artillery and train. And the fact that 55,000 men
escaped to France, even if in sorry condition, made the later
campaign of the Pyrenees possible. There would have been
no combats of Maya and Roncesvalles, no battles of Somuren
and St. Marcial, if the eight French divisions present at Vittoria
had been &nnihilated, instead of being driven in disordcr on to
an eccentric line of retreat.
SECTION XXXVII
EXPULSION OF THE FRENCH FROM
SPAIN
CHAPTER I
THE PURSUIT OF CLAUSEL
A'c ten o'cl~k on the morning of .Tunc 22nd Wellington
moved out from Vittoria in pursuit of the French. Touch with
them had been lost on the preceding night, as the divisions
which had fought the battle had ceased to move on after dark,
and had settled into bivouacs four or five miles beyond the
city. The enemy. on the other hand, had continued his flight
in the darkness, till sheer exhaustion compelled each man to
throw himself down where he was, at! order having been lost
in most units, and only Ueille's rearguard of the Army of
Portugal having kept. its ranks. About midnight the majority
had run to a standstill, o.nd the hills along the Salvatierra road
began to be covered with thousands of little fires, round which
smaU groups were cooking the scanty rations that they had
saved in their haversacks, "fhe impromptu illumination had
a very pretty effect: if the enemy had seen it he might have
thought that wc had rallied and were in order, But it was
only next morning that the regiments began to coalesce, and
reorganization was not complete till we g<lt baek to France,
Generals were seeking their divisions, colonels their regiments,
officers their companies, They found them latcr--:-but onc thing
was never found again-the crown of Spain, fallen for ever from
the brow on which it wn.s not to be replaced 1.' King Joseph
himself, pushing on ahead of the rout, reached Salvatierra,
sixteen miles from the field, before he dismounted, and shared
ameagre and mclancholysupper withD'Erlon and two ministers,
the Irish-Spaniard O'E'arrill and the Frenchman :Miot de Mclito,
, 1<'&, S(nlvcniTIl de la gll~rre d' Ellpaglre, pp, 249-iiO,
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To them entered later Jourdan, who had been separated from
the rest of the stalI in the Hight. He flung himself down to the
table, saying, 'Well, gentlemen, they would have a battlc,
snd it is a lost battle,' after which no one said anything more.
This was the old marshal's reflection on the generals who, all
through the retreat, had been urging that it was shamcful to
evacuate Spain without risking a general action. After three
hours' halt, sleep for some, but the wakefulness of exhaustion
for others, the King's party got to horsc at dawn, and rode on
toward Pampeluna, the army straggling behind them. It was
a miserable rainy day with occasional thunderstorms: everyone,
from Joseph to the meanest camp-follower, was in the same
state of mental and physical exhaustion. But the one thing
which should nave finished the whole game was wanting-
there was practically no pursuit.
Of Wellington's nine brigades of cavalry only two, those of
Grant and Anson, had been seriously engaged on the 21st, and
had suffered appreciable losses. The other seven were intact,
and had not been in action. It is obvious that they could not
have been used to effect in the darkness of the night, and over
rough ground and an unknown track. But why an early
pursuit at dawn was not taken in hand it is difficult to make out.
Even the same promptness which had been shown after Sala·
manca., and which had been rewarded by the lucky gleanings
of Garcia Hernandez, was wanting on this occasion. There was
no excuse for the late start of the cavalry, nnd in consequence
it rode ns flU' as Salvatierra without picking up more than a
few wounded stragglers and worn-out horses and mules. The
French had gone off at dawn, and were many miles ahead.
The infantry followed slowly; not only werc the men tired
by the late marches and their legitimate exertions in the battle,
but many thousands had spent the hours of darkness in a
surreptitious visit to the field of the convoy, and had come baek
to the regimental bivouac with plunder of all kinds bought
at the cost of a sleepless night. Many had not come back at
all, but were lying drunk or snoring among the debris of the
French camps. Wellington wrote in high wrath to Bathurst,
the Minister for War: ' We started with the army in the highest
order, and up to the day of the battle nothing could get Oil
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better. But that event has (as usual)l annihilated all discipline.
The soldiers of the army have got among them about a million
sterling in money, with the exception of about 100,000 dollars,
whieh were got for the military chest. They are incapable
of marching in pursuit of the enemy, and arc totally knocked
up. Rain has come and increased the fatigue, and I am quite
sure that we have now out of the ranks double the amount of
our loss in the battle, and that wc have more stragglers in the
pursuit than the enemy have, and never in one day make more
than an ordinary march. This is the consequence of the state
of discipline in the British army. We may gain the greatest
victories, but we shall do no good till we so far alter our system
I\S to force all ranks to do their duty. The new regiments are
as usual worst of all. The -- are a disgrace to the name
of soldier, in action as elsewhere; I shall take their horses from
them, and send the men back to England, if I cannot get the
better of them in any other manner 2.'
. This, of course, is one of Wellington's periodical explosiolli>
of general indiscriminating rage against the army which, as he
confessed on other occasions, had brought him out of many
a dangerous scrape by its sheer hard fighting. He went on
a few days later with language that can hardly be forgiven:
'We have in the Service the scum of the earth as common
soldiers, and of late years have been doing everything in our
power, both by law and by publication, to relax the discipline
by which alone such men can be kept in order. The officers of
the lower ranks "":iII not perform the duty required from them
to keep the soldiers in order. The non-commissioned officers
are (as I have repeatedly stated) us bad as the men. It is
really a disgrace to have anything to say to such men as some
of our soldiers are 3.' The Commander-in-Chiefs own panacea
was morc shooting, and much morc flogging. All this language
is comprehensible in a moment of irritation, but was cruelly
unjust to .many corps which kept their discipline intact, never
straggled, and needed no eat·o'-nine-tails: there were battalions
• He is thinking of !lIe nights arter the storms of Rotlrigo and Badajoz.
• D1spalcht!'. xii. p. 473. The regiment namcd is a ncwly arrived cavalry
unit, which attracted the Commander-ill-Chiefs special notiee by itl
prominenee in plundering.
• Wellington to Bathurst. l)fspulcllclI, xii. p. MIC.
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where the lash was unknown for months at a time. But
Wellington usually ignored the moral side of things: he seldom
spoke to his men about honour or patriotism or e.Trit de corps,
and long years afterwards officially informed a Royal Com_
mission on the Army that' he had no idea of any great effect
being produced on ~ritish soldiers by anything but the imme-
diate fear of corporal punishment.' It is sad to find such
mentality in a IllIl.Il of strict honour and high military genius.
On this particular occasion hc, no doubt, did well to be angry:
but were there no regiments which could have marched at dawn
to keep up the pursuit? Undoubtedly there were many:
Ponsonby's heavy dragoons had ridden through the chaos of
plunder without a mall leaving the ranks, and had bivouacked
five miles to the front of Vittoria. Thcre were several infantry
brigades which had been so far to the left or the right in the
action that they never came near the temptation, and only
remembered the night of the 21st as one of short commons and
hard lying 1. Perhaps the sight of the disgraceful confusion in
and about Vittoria gavc the Commandcr-ill-Chief an cxag·
gerated impression of tile general condition of the army. And
undoubtedly he had an absorbing night's task before him, whcn
he sat down to work out the entire recasting of his operations
which the victory had made necessary.
His main design, as expressed in the order for the 22nd, WfiS
to send Giron and Longfi into Biscay by the great Bayonne
chaU$s(:e, to llUrsue Msucune's convoy and to cut off, if possible,
Foy and the garrison of Bilbao, while the Anglo·Portuguese
army marched in pursuit of the French main army on Pllmpe-
luna. Clause! hnd been henrd of in the direction of Logrolio ;
a zealous and patriotic innkeeper had ridden 40 miles on the
night of thc 20th to report to Wellington the position of the
head of his column; and it was the knowledgc that he Wlls morc
than a full day's march from Vittoria which had enabled the
arrangements for the battle to be made with complete security
against any intervcntion on his part z. But, though it was
• Pel'801l1l1 diaries seem to show thnt this WIlll the cnse with Cndogllll's
brigade un the right, and the whole 5th Division on the left.
1 This interesting fact is recorded in a oonversation of \Vellington with
Croker, which OOlitain~ some curious notes 011 the battle (Crokcr, ii. p. 232),
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most probable that he would have heard of the disaster to the
King's army, and have turned back to Pampeluna or Saragossa,
there was a chance that the news might not have reached him.
If so, he could be at Vittoria by the afternoon of the 22nd, and
his appearance there might prove very tiresome, as the British
hospitals and the whole spoil of the battle would have been at
his mercy. Wherefore Wellington, who somewhat underrated
Clausel's strength 1, left behind at Vittoria the 5th Division
and R. Hill's cavalry brigade to guard the place: the 6th
Division was due to arrive at noon, or not much later, from
Medina de Pomar, so that 12,000 men would be available if the
possible but improbable event of a raid on Vittoria should
come to pass.
These precautions having been taken, the army marched off
at ten o'clock, in three columns, the 'Centre Column' of
previous days with head-quarters and the bulk of the cavalry
sticking to the main Salvatierra-Pampehma road, while Hill
and Graham kept to side-tracks 2, which werc available so long
as the march lay in the plain of Vittoria, but converged on
Salvatierro., where the watershed comes, und the mountains
of Navarre block the way. Here all the roads met, and there
was a steep rise and a defile, before the headwaters of the
Araquil, the main river of north-western Navarre, were reached.
That afternoon Wellington's quartermaster-general, George
Murray-about the only man who ever dared to make a
suggestion to his chief-asked him whether it might not be
worth while to send a detachment northward, by the mountain
road which goes from Salvatierra to Villafranca on the great
Bayonne cllaussce. For Giron and Longa might have been
detained by the French forts at the defile of Salinas, at Mon-
dragon and elsewhere, and so have failed to get forward in
their pursuit of Maucune's convoy and the Bilbao garrison.
But a force sent across the hills from Salvatierra would cut in
to the chau$s(;e behind the fortified posts; and, if the convoy
I Thinking that be had only his own two divisions of the Army of the
North, and Taupin's or the Army or Portugal, while renlly Bo.rllot's
division was also with him•
• The former going by El Burgo and Alcgria, tlle latter by An.ubiaga
and AudiCllna.
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were moving slowly, might catch it a.<; it passed through Villa·
franca, or at any rate intercept other stray bodies of French
troops 1. Wellington approved the idea at once, and ordered
Graham to take the grenter part of his own column-the
1st Division, Pack's, and Bradford's Portuguese, and Anson's
cavalry brigade,-to Icave the pursuit of the King's army, and
to march to co-operate with the Spanish troops who had already
bcen detachcd to prcss thc rctreat of thc Frcnch garrisons of
Biscay. The road Sil.lvaticrra-Villafranca turned out practi-
cable for all arms, but very trying both to cavalry and artillery,
its first stage being a long uphill pull, over a road of the most
stony kind-on the watershed at the Puerto de San Adrian it
was taken through a tunnel cut in the solid rock. The diversion
of Graham's column being an afterthought-the orders for it
were only issued at 8 p.m.-there was some delay in finding the
troops in an afternoon of blinding rnin, and turning them on to
the ncw direction. The general himself, as his dispatch shows,
Wasllot reached by Wellington's orders till next morning 2• Only
the light brigade of the German Legion got well forward on the
22nd,-the rest of the 1st Division and Bradford's Portuguese
hardly got started. Anson's Light Dragoons and Pack's
Portuguese, like Graham himself, never received their orders
at all that night, having pushed on beyond Salvatierra for
two leagues or more, where the officers sent in search of them
failed to catch them up. They had actually gone forward
some miles farther towards Navarre, on the morning of the
28rd, before they were found and set right. This caused a
tiresome countermarch of some miles to get back to Snlvatierra
and the cross-roads. Wellington was mueh \"cxed with the
bad staff-work, but vented his wrath, unfortunately, not on
his own aides-dc-camp but on a meritorious officer whom they
had failed to find or warn. Captain Norman Ramsay, the
hero of the 'artillery charge' at Fuentes de Oiioro 3, was
attached with his battery to Anson's cavalry brigade. He
was still moving eastward, on the night of the 22nd, when the
Commander-in-Chief chnnced to come upon him. Wellington
, Murray to Wellington, Supplementary Dispatches, viii. pp. 3-4.
• See his dispatch to Wellington dated from Tolosa on ,June 20th.
• See vol. iv. p. 327.
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9.t once ordered him to halt, billet his men in a neighbouring
village, and wait for new directions. According to Rams9.Y's
version of the words used, they were that' if there were any
orders for the troop in the course of the night, he would send
them 1.' But "'ellington was under the impression that the
phrase used was that Ramsay was not to move until he had
direct orders from Head-Quarters as to his route. Next morning
about 6 a.m. an assistant quartermaster-general (Captain
Campbell) came to the viJ1age, and asked·Ramsay if he had yet
received his directions. On hearing that he had not, the staff·
offIcer told him to follow Anson's brigade, who (as Ramsay
supposed) were still moving eastward j for no hint of the change
of route had been gi\'cn him on the previous night. The
battery was started off again on the rond towards Po.mpeluno.,
and its commander rode on ahend to seek for the cavalry to
whom he wns attached. At this moment Wellington ClI.me up,
expressed high wra.th (Lt finding the guns on the move in the
wrong direction, and asked for Ramsay, who was not forth·
coming for some time. Whereupon the angry general ordered
him to be put under arrest for flagrant disobedience, and spoke
of trying him by court martial. His version of the offence was
that' Captain Ramsny disobeyed a positive order given him
verbally by me, in expectation of a circllmstnnce which occurred,
namely that he might receive orders, from some one else to move
as I did not ·wish him to move z.' It is easy to see how the
vagueness in the wording of the order, or even a misconception
of the stress laid upon one of its clauses, brought about llamso.y's
mistake. He understood that he was to halt till he got orders,
and took Campbell's message to be the orders meant. It is
pretty elear from Wellington's own language that Ramsay was
not warned that he might receive orders not directly proceeding
from G.H.Q., which he was to disrcgard entirely. Explanation
of that kind would not have been in the Wellingtonian manner.
The unfortunate battery-commander, who ha.d done splendid
service on the 21st, a.nd hnd a brilliant record behind him,
gained the sympathy of the whole army, and such senior officerS
1 See Colonel l''razer's account in his Ptmingulur Ut/NS, p. 186.
• See, for this statement of the Duke's. Fortescue's Brili8h Army, vol. ix.
p. 199.
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as dared continued to make intercession for his pardon. After
keeping him for some weeks under arrest, Wellington resolved
not to try him, and to send him buck to his battery. But he
was cut out of the reward which he had earned at Vittoria, and
did not receive the brevet advance in rank or the decorations
given to the other battery-commanders, so that he practically
lost ground in comparison with his equals and fell to the bottom
of the list. This was a deadly blow to Ramsay, who was
sensitive and full of professional pride: he kept silence-not
so his comrades, who filed the incident as "another flagrant
example of Wellington's dislike for and injustice to the o.rtillery
arm 1. He fell, still only a hattery-commander, at Waterloo.
The result of the miscarriage of orders on the night of the
22nd and the morning oC the 28rd was that Graham's turning
eolumn was late in its movement. The general himself was
one of the last to get the new direction-the cavalry which
should have been at the head of the march was at its tail. The
German Light Battalions were very far ahead of all the other
units, and had to hold back in order to let the rest come up.
Henee the attack on Villafranca was not delivered on the
evening of the 23rd, as it might have been, but on the afternoon
of the 24th, and in the intervening twenty-four hours the greater
t-mrt of the l;'rench troops whom Graham might have cut off
filed through Villafranca on their way to 'folosa and the
frontier, and only a flank-guard was brought to action. Of
this more in its proper place.
The rest of the troops undcr Wellington's immcdiate eye, the
, Centre Column' and Hill's corps, pursued their way on the
23rd along the Salvaticrra-Pampcluna road-only Victor
Altcu's hussars got in touch with the tail of King Joscph's
fugitive host, which was moving at a great pace and had a long
start. There was now a proper rearguard-Cassagne's division
of the Army of the Centre, which had lost only 250 men at
Vittoria, and had been more shaken than hurt, having replaced
the much-tried Army of Portugal as the covering force. King
.1oseph halted for some hours at Yrurzun, and there gave orders
> See Duncan's HilJwry oJ lM Royal ATtiUery, vol. ii. pp. 856-60, an
indictment. of Wcllillgtoll'~ whole policy to the corp~. and especially of
his famous Waterloo letter on their conduct in 1815.
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for Reille to diverge from the main line of retreat, and to take
his two divisions, a ca.valry brigade, and all the teams of his
lost artillery by the route of Santesteban and the valley of the
Rastan, back to the French frontier on the lower Bidassoa l .
"Finding himself so feebly pursued, he had jumped to the con-
clusion that Wellington might Illn'c marched with the bulk of
his force on the great chaussee, making directly for lrun and
Bayonne. Thcre being nothing to stop him save the scattered
detachments under Foy, ::m invasion of Franee was possible.
Hence Rcille was directed to join Fay in haste, and eover the
line of the Bidassoa. Thus Graham and Reille were now moving
parallel to each other, both in a direct northerly direction, but
separated by many JI. mile of impracticable mountains. The
Armies of the South and Centre continued their retreat on
Pampeluna.
Meanwhile Wellington on the morning of the 23rd received
somc important news from Vittoria. The unexpected had
happened: Clausel having failed to hear of the King's defeat-
as chance would have it-was marching on the city by the
Trevino road. Pakenham had already arrived there, but the
5th Division had gone forward to join the tail of Graham's
column on being relieved by the 6th, nothing having yet been
heard of the French till midday. The force on the spot,
therefore, was rather weak, if Clausel had meant mischief. But
he did not, and was becoming aware of the danger of hifl own
poflition. Hc had heard on the 20th, when he was in march
along the Ebro from Logrofio on Haro, that the King had
evacuated Miranda that day, and was drawing back to Vittoria.
It was obviously dangerous to seek to join him by the road
near the river, and Clausel on the 21st, the day of the battle,
was trying to recover toueh with the main army by taking
the route La Guardia-Trevino. This detour removed him out
of striking distance during all the critical hours. By some
strange chance he neither met any of the King's aides-de-camp,
who were hunting for him on all sides, nor fell in with any of
the fugitives from the routed army either on the night of the
21st nor on the morning of the 22nd. He resumed his march
I ReiJlc reported Uu<t the lltruggling wll8 llO porteIltolL'l thnt only 4,200
infantry were with the cagles on July 24th. See Vidal de la Blllche, i. p. 79.
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from La Guardia, and reached Trevino in the afternoon. 1'here
he heard from afTancesados the news that there had been a
disastrous battle on the previous day, but could get no details.
He therefore detached some squadrons to explore along the
mountain road from Trevino to Vittoria-they mnde their way
as far as the crest of the heights of Puebla, above llcIT<Istiguetn,
driving in first some Spanish irregulars, and then picquets of
British cavalry; from the watershed they could sce allied
troops getting into order, but not their numbers. Pakcnham,
all being warned by the gucrrillcros, had occupied Vittoria town
with two Portuguese battalions, drawn up the rest of his troops
.for a fight, and sent to warn Oswald and the 5th Divi!:iion. as
well as Giron's Spaniards, who had not gone many miles yet,
that trouble was at hand. Both of these forces halted and
prepared to turn back.
But on hearing the report of his horsemen Clausel had no
thought of a fllid on Vittoria: his only idea was to get out of
danger, and rejoin the main anny as quickly as possible. That
Joseph and Jourdan had been beaten, he was now aware; but
details were wanting: he did not know whether the rout had
been complete, or whether the King's army was capable of
rallying and making head at Pampelunn. If he had understood
that all the artillery had been lost, and that a retreat into
France was imminent, he might probably have given up the
idea of a junction, and have set out in haste to retire on Sara-
gossa, by way of the main road down the Ebro by Logrol'l.o and
Tudela. But not knowing this, his first plan was to march for
Salvatierra by the mountainous road which goes from Vianll
on the Ebro to the upper valley of the Ega. 011 the 23rd he
marched from Trevino to Vinoa, on the 24th he started out
from that place and went 20 miles as far as Santn Cruz de
Campero, where he henrd that Mina and all his bands were on
his flunk, and that an English column was coming down upon
him from Salvatierfll. The latter rumour was false, but
induced Clause! to abandon any idea of taking a short cut to
join the King. It would seem also that he had picked up some
news as to the crushing effect of Vittoria on the French army,
and knew that it must have fallen back on Pampc!unu. He
hurriedly retraced his steps, picked up the garrison of Logroiio
1813] PLANS TO INTERCEPT CLAUSEL 461
and set out to move on IJampeluna by the Mendavia-Puente
la Reyna ro.'\d late on the 25th. His vanguard had got as far
as Sesma when he heard that Mina had dropped down from
Estella to Lerin, blocking this road also. It might have been
possible to attack and bent him, but renewed reports that the
British were also approaching distl;lrbed Clausel, and he
swerved back to the Ebro by cross-roads and crossed it at
Lodosa on the 26th.
This move, which placed him on the high road from Logrofio
to Saragossa, implied thc abandonment of all hope of reaching
Pampeluna nnd joining the King. He hud resoh'ed to fall back
on AragOll and seck refuge with Suehet's troops in that direc-
tion. But he had lost much time in his countermarches, and
was on the 27th in greater danger than he knew, since Welling-
ton was now coming down from the north, in the hope of
heading him off and cutting his line of retreat. And if Clauscl
had lost as much Lime in the next five days as he had in the
last, his. position would have been most desperate, for Welling-
ton had ascertained his whereabouts, and was marching upon
him in great strength, with a good hope of intercepting him,
if he were still adhering to his original plan of making for
Pampcluna and rejoining the King.
The idea that Clausel might be caught and destroyed had
come to the British general's mind all the 26th, when he had
reached thc environs of Pampcluna, and had made sure that
the whole of King Joseph's armies were well on the road for
Francc. The pursuit had been little more fruitful on the
24th-25th than it had been on the 22nd-23ro. But at least
closer contact had been secured with the enemy: on the after·
noon of the 24th the leading British troops had broughtD'Erlon\i
rearguard to action at the passage of the Araquil, in front of
the cross-roads at Yrurzun. This combat, in which the 1st
German Hussars, the 1st and Srd battalions of the 95th,
and Ross's battery were engaged against Darmagnae's division
of the Army of the Centre1 cost the enemy about 100 casualties 2,
and onc of the only two guns which he had brought off from
Vittoria. It was a running fight, in which the rearguard all the
, Which hod relieved CaSSllgne's division, the rearguard on the 23rd.
• The regiment or NIl~sau lilone rctumed 76 ca~ulllties that day.
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way from Yrurzun to Berrioplano was being turned and driven
in. But no large captures were made.
While this skirmish was in progress, on the afternoon of the
24th, the main body of the French army was already on the
march past Pampe[una towards France. The troops were not
allowed to enter the fortress, where only the King, his General
Staff, and his courtiers lodged on the night of the 24th. It was
feared that the famished soldiery might plunder the stores if
they got access to them, so they were taken round by suburban
roads, which did not pass through the city. Gazan with the
Army of the South started on the evening of the 24th, taking
the route by Zubiri and the Pass of ROIlcesvalles to St. Jean·
Pied·dc-Port. D'Erlon set out nine hours later, at dawn on
the 25th, using the better road by the Col de "elate and the
Pass of Maya, whieh took him to the Bastan, whither Reille
had gone before him. But while the Army of Portugal passed
on to the lower Bidassoa, the AImy oC the Centre was ordered
to halt in the Bastan and hold its ground if possible. .
Qnly three or foUl' hours after D'Erlon's eolUlilll had left the
suburbs of Pampeluna the first English vedettes showed them·
selves on the Salvatierra road. These came from Victor Alten's
light cavalry j they eoasted round the city on the south, and
piequeted the Puente la Reyna and Tafalla roads, by either of
which Clausel might conceivably be on the mO\'e to join the
King. But no trace of the :French could be found, save that of
the retiring rearguard of the Army of the Centre. Of British
infantry only the Light Division appeared in front of the Cortress,
on the side of Berrioplano, though the 4th and Grant's hussars
were close behind it. Picton and Dalhousie with the 3rd and
7th Divisions were still farther back on the Salvatierra road,
and Hill's whole corps was told to halt until thcir predecessors
should have eleared the way in front of them. The 5th Division,
having received the alarm about Clausel's raid Ol~ Vittoria, had
turned baek on the 23rd and was a full march behind Hill. The
6th Division had now passed out of Pakenham's hands into
those of Clinton, its normal commandcr, who had just come
up from Lisbon 1. It remained at Vittoria whcll all danger from
• And took over COlllllltmd on the night or thc 22nd; scc l'akelllllllll
Ldttn, Junc 26, 1813.
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Clausel was over, and had originally been intended to come in
on the rear of the 5th Division at Salvatierra, leaving the
hospitals and spoils under the guard of some details 1. But
other orders were soon to reach it.
During the night of the 25th \Vellington got the news from
Mina that Clausel's column, which he had supposed to be making
!l. hasty retreat down the Ehro, ever since its vain appearance in
front of Vittoria on the evening of the 22nd, was much less far
off than he had supposed. Owing to its countermarches on
the 23rd-24th it had only just got back to Logroi'io, and had
started off from that town on the 25th by the road north of the
Ebro via Mendavia and Sesma, apparently heading for Pampe-
luna. If this were Clausel's game, he might be intercepted and
caught, and allied columns might thrust themselves between
him and his escape towards Saragossa or .Jaca. The nearer
he got to Pampehllla the better, since the French main army
was no longer there, but in rapid march for its native soil.
'fhe orders which Wellington had issued upon the afternoon
of the 25th for the movements of the army 011 the 26th, had
contemplated nothing more than the investment of Pampeluna
by the Srd and 7th Divisions on the north side, and the Light
and 4th Divisions on the 'outh side of the Arga. But the news
which had come in from Mina caused a complete change in his
plans: the morning orders of the 26th direct Cole, with the
4th and Light Divisions, not to linger near Pampeluna, but to
move off as far as the men could go on the 'l\idela road-to
l\fendavil, half-way to TafaIJa, if possible: Grant's hussar
brigade was to push ahead in front of the infantry, and dis-
cover whether Clausel was to be heard of on this road, or
perhaps on the E,<;tella-Puente la Reyna road, which was an
alternative (if less likely) track for him to take if marching on
Pampeluna. Hill was ordered to hurry up from the rear, and
replace in the blockade not only the troops of eole, but those
of Picton and Dalhousie. For the 3rd and. 7th Divisions were
to get ready to follow Cole's column the moment that they
were relieved: they were to concentrate meanwhile at the
, Who~ riotous allu undil;CipJined conduct l>O irritated Wellington that
he directed that all the officers in charge should miss their next step in
regimental promotion, by being passed over by their juniors.
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village of Sielvas, south of the Arga, and to march southward
as soon as Hill came up. But it was calculated that they would
not be able to move till dawn on the 27th, as Hill had a long
way to come. Ponsonby's cavalry brigade WQuld attach itself
to them when the move should begin. Meanwhile, four divisiolls
being set in motion to head off Clausel from this side, another
column was ordered to strike across the mountains and fall in on
his rear if possible. The 6th Division was still at Vittoria on the
25th, as was R. Hill's brigade of heavy cavalry. Clinton (now
commanding his old division in lieu of Pakenham) received
orders to start off with all speed on the Logrofio road. tnking
the Household Cavalry with him, and to endeavour to catch up
the retreating French. He made foreed marches via Trcvino
and Penaccrrada, and reached Logrono on the 27th, where he
picked up six abandoned French guns, but learned that Clausel
had been gone for two days, and had crossed the Ebro at Lodosa
instead of continuing on the Pampeluna road. There was
little chance of catching him up, when he had a start of two
marches, but Clinton continued the pursuit as fnr as Lerin on
the Miranda-dc-Arga road, where he gave it up. The Household
Cavalry returned to LogrOlio, where it was directed to go into
billets, as horsemen would not be wanted in the Pyrenees, while
the 6th Division marched at leisure from Lerin to Pampeluna I.
, I havl: only ffil:ntiOlll:d till: 1ll0VCllll:llt of till: 6th Division and H. Hill's
I:avalry above: there is no doubt as to wlmt they did, and 011 the 30th
they IU'C both at Ledll, o.coordillg 1.0 thc location given by Sl<pp/eIlIelIlMy
Di9pIJUneB, viiI. p. 39. But there is a puzzle about Oswald's 5th Division
on the 26th-80th, which I was long unable to solve. \Vellington in his
dispatch lo Bathurst of July a (Dillpakllel$, x. p. 501) S,lyS thut he moved
not only Clinton from Vittoria but Oswald from Salvatierra towards
Logroilo, on the mareh to intercept Clausel. He ought to have known
if UllY 0111: dilll But I wu.s not able to fiEld nllY trn(.'e of the 5\h Division
having actually gone to Logrono: to marell back from Salvatierra. to
Vit'toria, nnd thence to follow Clinton to Logroiio and r.erin would have
bel:n a very long busillCSII. Now regimental diuries or the 3jlst and IjDth
prove that the division was at Salvatierra on the 25th, and marched back
to Vittori:l on the 26th. But the I><:st of them (Hale of the 1/9th) says
t1mt rrom Vittori" tile division WIIS tunleu back towards Pallll><:lulIlI, Illld
reached a spot within two leagues 01 it 011 the third day. At this point it
was turned aIr northward nnd llk'\rehed by Tolosa to join Graham's column
and ru;sist lit the liiege of St. &busti"ll. All llreQuntJ; "gree that it relwhed
the neighbourhood of that fortress on July 5tll-6th. Allowing six da~
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The only real c111mce of catching Clausel was to head him off
at Tudela, by means of the four di visions which were descending
upon him down the Tafalla road. But a glance at the map will
show that he could only have been intercepted if he had dis-
played uncommon torpidity. For having crossed the Ebro at
Lodosa on the 26th he was only 85 miles from Tudela on a good
rond : and marching hard he reached the town on the afternoon
of the 27th, when the advanced cavalry of the column sent to
intercept him had only got to Olite, 25 miles to the north, and
the Light Division at the head of the infantry column was
10 miles behind at Barasonin. Clausel did not halt more than
a few hours at Tudela: there was no need for the intervention
of the treacherous alc.'\ldc-who figures in legends of the time-
to bid him press on hard for Saragossa. For the design, attri-
buted to him by some of the contemporary British diarists, of
marching up from Tudela along the Aragon river, with the
object of reaching }"'rance and· joining the King by way of
Sanguesa was never really in his mind. Ever since he had
crossed the bridge of Lodosa his only desire was to get to
Saragossa in the shorlcst possible time. Starting off again at
dawn on the 28th, with his force increased by the garrison of
Tudela, he marched that day twenty miles to Mallen, and on
the 29th a similar distance to Alagon. On the 80th a shorter
stage of Hi miles brought him to Saragossa, where he found
General Paris, the Governor of Aragon, still completely ignorant
of the battle of Vittoria, though it had taken place nine days
back.
Since the 26th Clause! had been practically out of danger,
for he had the Ebro, whose bridges at Lodosa and Tudela he
had destroyed, between him and Wellington's columns. 'fhere
was no force which could have stopped him, for there are
20 miles less of road between Lodosa and 'l'udela than between
llampeluna :md Tudela. Wellington had hoped for a moment
tor the ml\rch Vittorill.--St. Sebastil\lI, \\'C IUIVC only the 27th, 28th, 29th,
30th June tor the supposed march Salvatlerra-Vittoria-Logrono, and
return. The solution at last came to hand in General Shadwell's Life 01
Coliu Cnmpbell of the 1jOth (loOrd Clyde). Here it is mentioned, Il.ppnrentty
011 lJQmc record of Camllbcll's, t1mt his urigatlc only got to La Guardia,
one march beyond T1'Cvino, and WIUI then turned back und sent north
(LiJt 0/ CampbeU, i. p. 18). Tllis is 110 doubt correct.
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that Mina might have intercepted the l;rench column at Tudcla,
and have held it in check long enough to allow the British to
come up. But though Mina was, so Car as mere distances wcnt,
capable of striking at Tudela, two things prevented him from
being able to do so-the first was the obstacle of the Ebro, the
second the fact that '1'udela was a fortified place with a com-
petent garrison. Even if the great guerrillcro had got his men
across the river, he certainly could not have captured l'udela,
and equally certainly would have been beaten by Clausel, when
the French column-double his available force in numbers-
came up, if he had dared to arrer battle in the open near the
town.
During the night of the 27th Wellington heard that Clause1
had slipped past Turlela in haste, and that Mina, quite unable
to stop him, was only able to follow him with his cavalry-to
which JuHan Sanehez's Lancers had joined themselves. At a
very early hour on the 28th-before 5 o'clock in the morning-
the British Commander-in-Chief issued a fresh set of orders in
view of tins untoward news 1. They are a little difficult to
understand, but internal evidence seems to show that Welling-
ton must have received some sort of report tending to make
him think it possible that ClauscI, instead of falling back 011
Saragossa and joining Suchet's army, might march aeross
country by the road Tauste-Exea-Un Castillo-Jaca, or the
alternative road Exea-Luna-MuriIlo-Jaca, in order to cross
the Pyrenees by the pass of Canfranc and join the King's army
in Dearn. Or he might march through &'\ragossa in haste, and
make for Jaca by the Gallego river 2. There was a bare possi-
bility of intercepting him by turning the whole pursuing column
eastward, and taking it into the valley of the river Amgon, from
which it would march by Sanguesa and Berdun on JaCEL. The
weak point of the scheme was that there was no certaint.y that
• SUppleoMlltaT'lJ Diapakhu, viii. I). 33.
• WcllillgWn'8 Icttcl'li to Hill, Copontt, and Castai'los in Diapo.lt::hu,
x. pp. "70-], all state very shortly that he hopes to cut off Clausel if he
tfies to get back into France by .Taca. All that is said is, • T do not think
wc shall be ablc to do much against Clau.scl. Hc has passed Tudcla on
the way to saragossa. I propose to tfY for him on the road to Jaea '
(to Hill). The letters to the Spanish gellemls do not KjJeak of Chlllsel's going
through Saragossa, but of his mafching IlCI'OSS Anlgon to JaCll.
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Clausel wguld march on Jaea at all: he might stop in Aragon
and combine his operations with those of Suehet. Or even if
he did start for Jaca, when he heard that his road was, inter-
cepted by British troops, he would naturally turn baek and
cast in his lot with the French Army of Aragon, rather than
with the King.
It is therefore rather surprising to find that Wellington
imposed two days of heavy marching on his left wing, on the
bare possibility that Clausel might be intercepted at or near
Jae<,"l. The orders for the 28th June were for the cavalry at
the head of the column to make the long march Olite-Caparrosa-
Caseda, by the good but circuitous road along the valley of the
Aragoll, taking in charge the artillery belonging to the infantry
divisions. The latter were to cut across from the Pampeluna
to the Sanguesa roads by COWlUY tracks in the hills-the
Light Division by Olite-Beyre-Gallipienzo, the 4th Division
by Tafalla-St. Martin de Unx-Gallipienzo. The ard and 7th
Divisions, farther behind, went from Mendavil by OUeta to
c.'1Seda. This move concentrated 80,000 men in a solid body
on a decent road-but left a very long gap between them and
the troops blockading Pampeluna-and the gap would grow
longer each day that the marching force pushed north-eastward
up the course of the Aragon on its way to Jaca I,
On the following day (June 29th) the column, now with the
3rd Division at its head and the 4th Division at its tail, had
moved along the river till its head reached Sallguesa, when
Wellington suddenly made up his mind to relinquish theseheme,
which (as he himself owned) had never been a very promising
one. He wrote to Castaiios that Cla.usel, having passed '1'udela
marching hard for Saragossa, had got too long a s,tart, and could
not be caught. The plan of intercepting him at Jaca had been
given up, firstly because it wou.ld probably have failed, and
secondly because, if it had succeeded, it would only have forced
Clausel to join Sllchet-which was not a thing to be desired 2.
A third reason, which he did not cite to Castaiios but reserved
• See • Dispositions tor the 28th June,' Sllpplemenlary DispalcJICt/,
viii. p. 33.
I Wellington to Castaiios, Monreal, June 30, Dispalc1lfl', x. p. 477. Ilnd
to &lhurst, X. p. 4096 and ibid, SOl.
uh2
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for Lord Bathurst's private eye, was that t.he Army was
marching very badly, with ma.ny stragglers, and many
marauders. 'The British on the 17th June werc 41,547 rank
and file: on the 29th, 35,650 rank and file-diminution, 5,897.
Now the loss in the battle was 3,164---50 that the diminution
from irregularities, straggling, &c., for plunder, is 2,783.' The
Portuguese before the battle were 25,489-their present
strcngth is 23,044. As they lost only 1,022 in the battlc, t.hey
show an extra diminution of anothcr 1,423 rank and file, from
the same rouses as thc British. • Thcrc ure only 160 men in
the hospital which I established-the others are plundering
the country in different directions.' The truth was, that the
Army was sulky-the men had not got over the effects of the
looting at Vittoria, the weather had been bad, and the hunt.
after Clausel had been regarded by officers and men alike as n
wild-goose chase.
The French General gave his men three days' rest at Sam·
gossa (Junc SO-July 2) and thcn started to march up the
Gallego rivcr to Jaca, where the head of his column arrived
on .July 6th: he then halted his divisions fOf some days,
stopping in a position where he could either cross the pass of
Canfranc into France, for he had no field·guns or wheeled
transport Vtith him, to impede his pnssage by that steep defi.le,
or else return into the plains of Aragon. If Suehet should come
to Saragossa with the Army of Valencia, he could drop back to
meet him. But on the 11th arrived the news that Saragossa
hud been evacuated on the preceding dny, after some indecisive
fighting between General Paris's garrison and thc bands of
Mina. and Duran, who had beset the city on both sides of the
Ebro. All chance of a j\Ulctioll with Suchet having vanished,
Clausc! crossed the Pyrenees next day, after leaving a garrison
in Jaca. He came down into the Val d'Aspe on the French
side, with 11,000 infantry, 500 horse, and six mountain guns
packed on mules-his sole artillery. He had lost somewhere
about 1,500 men in his long march-some broken-down
stragglers, others sick left in hospital at Tudela and Saragossa.
An these fell into tbe ha.nds of Mina, but tbe casualties in
actual fighting hnd been practically nil. fly July 15th the
whole column, marching over the Pyrenean foot-hills, had .
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reached St. Jcan-Picd-de-Port, and come into touch with the
Armies of the South and Ccntrc, who had so long and vainly
desired to see Clausel.
Meanwhile Wellington, having stopped his eastward march
on June 29th, had given his troops one day's rest, and then
drawn them back toward Pampeluna by the road through
MonreaL He was now about to take up the pursuit of the
King's troops, which had been abandoned on the 25th while
he went off on his fruitless hunt after Clausel-an enterprise
whieh would have been far better left toMina and the guerrilleros,
for there never had been much probability of its succeeding.
But the new move required several days of preparation, sincc
four divisions had to be brought back from the valley of the
Aragon, and one more, the 6th, to come up from Lerin via
Puente La Reyna. And it was necessary to provide a con·
siderable force for the blockade of PampeJuna. The instruc·
tions for July 1 were that Hill was to make the first move, by
marching northward with the 2nd Division, handing over the
investment of Pampeluna to Silveirn's Portuguese and Morillo's
Spaniards I, to whose assistance there would come up in
24 hours the 7th Division, and a little later the 3rd Division.
Hill was to march by the Col de Velate and Santesteban into
the Rastan, from which it was intended that he should drive
out D'ErJon's divisions.
Out these operations belong to the fighting of July, and before
dealing with them it is necessary to go back to June 22nd,. in
order to follow the fortunes of the other large French force,
which might have been present at the battle of Vittoria, but
was not.
I Elubomte dispositions for their distribution round the fortl'el;ll are
given in the Order dated June 30 (SUpplt:IllDiJllry DUpatellt!~, viii. pp. a4-6).
SECTION XXXVII: CHAPTER 1I
THE PURSUIT OF FOY
WE left General Fay at the decisive moment when he
received the dispatch forwarded by Thouvcnot from Vittorill,
,which informed him of the King's retreat beyond the Ebro,
and suggested that he might come in to join the main army,
but left him the futal choice of deciding whether his own
irmnediate operations were or were not of such paramount
importance that they could not be abandoned I, Foy decided,
and many other generals have made a similar error in all ages,
that his own j<?b was.the really important thing. The dispatch
reached him on the 19th, when he had his division concentrated
at Bergara, and could have brought it to Vittoria in time for
the battle. Probably the brigade of Berlier, belonging to the
Army of the North, which was under his orders, could also
,have been brought in from ViIlafranea to Vittoria by the 21st,
But on the ,'ery eve of ,the decisive engagement, and with
Jouroan's dispatch advising him' de se rapprocher de Vittoria '
before his eyes, Foy decided that the p~tty afrairs of the Biscay
.garrisons werc of more importa.nce than the fate of the King's
Anny. Instead of bringing down his own and Berlier's troops
to· Vittoria, where 5,000 bayonets would have been most
wele,ome to. the depleted Army of Portugal, he proceeded to
disperse them. He sent, on the 20th, two battalions to El Orrio
to facilitate the retreat of the garrison of Bilbao, dispatched
two others to Debs, on the coast, to guard against a rumoured
British demonstration against that port, and remained at
Bergara with the 6th Leger alone. Orders were fonvarded to
I Sce above, p. 378. .For all the narmtive whieh follows j;'oy's well-
written dispatches, printed in full in his life by Girod de l'Ain, are a primary
lluthority. But I tl,illk that hilttorillll~huve given him a IittJe more eredit
than he deserves-he is a very engaging witness. As to his own strength,
that of his enemies, and the losses on both sides, he is no more tru~tworthy
than Soult or MllSlSCna. It llIuy suffice to s(l,y that h~ muk(.'S the British
4th and 5th Divisions present at Tolosa, aud gives Longa 6,000 men.
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Berlier to stand fast at Villafranca, and to the troops expected
from Bilbao to make the best pace that they could, as the
Army of GaJicia would soon be upon them I. Giron's demon-
stration on the Balmaseda cood had convinced Foy that the
Spanish 4th Army was aiming at Bilbao-he could not know
that Wellington had brought the Galicians down by Ordufia
to join his main body.
On the evening of the 21st the division of Maucune, escorting
the convoy which had started from Vittoria at dawn, came
through the pass of Salinas unmolested. Its general met }~oy,
and told him that he had heard heavy cannonading for many
ho~rs behind him, but had no notion of what was going on
upon the Zadorra. The column bivouacked between 1\fondragon
and Bergara, and started off again before daybreak. It had
not gone more than a league when fugitives began to drop in
from Vittoria, bringing news of the disaster. The King's army
had been routed-his artillery abandoned: he had been pushed
aside on to the Pampeluna road, and Allied columns were
coming up the great chaussee making for Bergara and Durango.
On hearing these depressing news the commandant,.<; of the Carts
which guarded the passes-those of Arlaban, Mondragon, and
Salinas-spiked their guns, and fell back without orders to join
Foy at Bergara.
The news was only· too true. On the night of the battle
Wellington had issued orders for Longa's Division to set out
at dawn on the 22nd to force the passes, and, if possible, to
overtake Maucune's unwieldy convoy. Giron was to follow,
when his men, who had suffered dreadful fatigue in their forced
march from Orduiia, were capable of movemjmt. As the
l5alicians were terribly under-gunned-there appear to have
been only six pieces with the 12,000 infantry-Wellington lent
them two batteries from the British artillery ceserve 2. Giron
started from the neighbourhood of Vittoria at 3 o'clock in the
afternoon, and had gone only some sL" miles when the news
of Cluuscl's raid was sent to him by Pakenham. The whole
army halted and began to retrace its steps, with the object of
, Foy to Jourdan, 20 June, in Giro<! de I'Ain·s appendix, pp. 3!l8-4.
I Batteries of Smith and Arriaga. Julius Hanmann, commanding
Artillery Reserve, accompanied them; see Dicksoll Papers, June 22.
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joining the 6th Division and fending ort this unexpected attack.
Dut the return march had hardly begun when the message
arrived that Clausel's cavalry had retreated in haste, and that
there wns no danger on the side of Vittoria. GirOIl therefore
resumed his original advance, but only reachCd Escoriaza,
a hamlet half-way between Slllinll.S and Mondragoll after dark I.
His troops were worn out, and had not received any regular
rations that day.
It thus chanced that only Longs's Division continued the
advance along the Bayonne chaussee on the 22nd, and thnt
all day the Cilntabrians were far ahead of, and quite out of
touch with, thc Army of Galicia. It was with this small force
alone that Foy had to deal. The Frcneh Gcneral had been
prepared for trouble by the ominous news that Maueunc had
given him on the previous day, and conceived that it was his
duty to hold the pllSSCS as long as was prudcnt, in order to
gain time for the convoy to get on its way, and for the garrison
of Bilbao to come in from the right rear. Accordingly he was
much vexed to fmd that the officers commanding thc Mondragon
forts had evacuated thcm, and had fallen back 011 Bcrgara. Hc
resolved to hold the deme if possible, and marched back toward
it, taking with him the only two battalions of his division which
he had at hand 2, and the garrisons of the three forts.
The fort of Mondragon was found empty-there were no
enemies visible save some local guerilleros who fled. But on
advancing a little farther, .l<~oy came on the head of Longa's
column, descending from the defile of Salinns. He spent the
whole afternoon in a series of rearguard actions, making his
men fall back by alternate battalions, and defending each turn'
of the road, The French troops behaved with great steadiness,
and Longa WilS cautious, having received false news that the
Bilbao garrison had joined Foy. He contented himself with
turning ench successive position that the enemy took up, and
at nightfall had only got about two miles beyond Mondragon.
, From the joufllal or opcrutions oC Gencml Giroll's Army, lent me lJy
Colonel Arzadun.
• In his Diary (Girod de l'Ain, p. 210) Foy says that he had only on~
battalion oC the 6th Ugcr. in /'is (onnul disputeh tu Clarke (ibid. 395) he
Iiays that he had two,
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Here he halted, having occupied the fort (where he found six
spikt.'<l guns) and taken sa prisoncrs. Foy had lost about
200 men in all in the long bickering, and had been himself
slightly wounded in the shoulder, though he was not disabled :
the Spaniards probably somewhat less 1.
During the evcning hours three more battalions of Foy's own
division arrived ut Bergara, but the garrison of 'Bilbao and
St. Pol's Italians had not yet been heard of. Having now
8,000 men in hand, the French general resolved to hold Longa
up, until the missing troops should have passed behind him and
got into a safe position. He waited opposite the Calltabrians
all the morning, but was not attacked: a reconnaissance sent
out reported that the encmy wus quiescent at l\londrugon.
The fact was that LOllga had heard that the French hud
received reinforcements, and wus waiting for Girolt to come up
with the three Galieiun divisions. They arrived by noon, much
fatigued and drenchcd by heavy rain, and Giron contcnted
himself with making arrangements for an attack on Bergurn
on the ncxt morning.
But this attack was never delivered, for Fay having at last
picked up the missing brigades, retreated on Villareal during
the afternoon, using St. Pal's Italians as his rearguard. He
says in his dispatch that he hud deduced from Longa's strange
quiescence the idea (quite correct in itself) that the Spaniards
were rcfraining from pushing him, because they were hoping
-that he would linger long enough a.t Bergara. to be cut off by
some other column, coming from Salvatierra -on to Tolosa far
.in his rea.r. And Graha.m's force had. actua.lly bcen detached
for this very purpose that afternoon~butGiron did not know
it, and was really detained only by the exhaustion oC his troops.
It was not till evening that he got a dispatch from Wellington
directing him to press hard upon Fay and delay his ma.rch,
because an Anglo-Portuguese force wus moving by the Puerto
de San Adrian to intercept his retreat 2. But Foy, having
guessed what plans might be brewing for his discomfiture, had
I ]n reporting to Ginm Longa mentions Ili~ 53 prisoners, IUld l<llys that
his own losses were • inconsiderable.' Journal of Ille Army of GaUda,
JUlIC 22•
• JournaloJ tM Army 01 Galida, .June 28.
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not only retreated betimes, but ordered Maucune. who was now
a day's march in front of him with the convoy, to drop the
impedimenta and bring all his fighting force back to Villa·
franca, to block the road from Sll.lvaticrru. until he and his
8,000 men should have got past the point of danger. This
order Maucune executed on the morning of the 24th, turning
the convoy into 'l'olosa, and turning back to hold the junction
of the roads, with onc of his brigades in ViUafranca town, and
the other thrown forward across to the river Gria to Olavcrrin
nnd BelLSsayn on the south bank. News had by this, time come
to hand that the march of a British colmnn from Salvalierra
across the hills had been verified, and that the peril was a real
onc. Wherefore Foy pressed his retreat, and sent l\Iaucune
orders to hold on at all costs till the column from Dergara
should have passed his rear.
Now Wellington's orders to Graham to cut in by the Puerto
de San Adrian with the 1st Division, Pack's and Bradford's
Portuguese, and, Anson's Light Dragoons, had been issued late
on the 22nd, but had only reached thc Gencrnl and the greater
part of his troops on the morning of the 23rd. Of all the column
only the two Light Battalions of the King's German Legion and
Bradford's Portuguese had turned orf that night. Consequently
on the 23rd, the critical day, Graham and the bulk of hi~
command were toiling up the pass in heavy rain, and had not
crossed the watershed, only Bradford and the two German
battalions having renehed the village of Segura, It was not
till dawn on the 24th that Anson's cavalry nnd Paek'iii Portu-
guese got to the front; the rest of the infantry was still far oft.,
Graham thcn advanced on Villafrallca, and soon came into
collision with l'\faucwle, who was alrcady ill position covering
the cross-roads. Thc head of Foy's column, coming in from
the West, 'yas clearly visible on the other side of the Oria
in the act of passing behind the screen formed by l\1aucune's
covering force. He bad started from Villareal before dawn,
and got clear away before Longa and Giron were on the move,
or able to delay him.
.. Graham attacked at once, in the hope of driving in l\1aucune
before Foy could get past. Bradford's Portuguese, endeavouring
to turn the French flank, pushed to the right; Halkett's
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Germans, supported by the grenadier and light companies of
Pack's brigade, made for Beassayn on the left wing. Brad·
ford's leading unit, the 5th Ca.';Rdorcs. attacking recklessly on
unexplored ground, was thrown back at its fust assault i but
the Brigadier, extending other battalions farther to his right,
ended by taking the village of Olaverria and pushing hi~
immediate opponents across the river. The German light
battalions carried Beassayn at their first rush. But Maucune,
retiring to a new position on high ground immediately abovc
Villafranca, continued his resistance, trying to gain time at all
risks. In tlus he was successful: Fay, hurrying past his rear,
got well forward on the Tolosa road with his two leading
brigades-the other two he dropped behind the town, to support
l\1aucune or relieve him when he should be driven in.
Owing to the early hour-three in the morning-at which
Fay had started on his retreat from Villareal, the bulk of
Ciron's army was never able to catch him up. Only Longa's
Cantabrians, leading the advance as usual, came into contact
with his rear brigade-St. Pol's ltalinns-at the defile of
.La Descarga west of ViUafranca. Failing to force a passage
,by a frontal attack, Longa turned the position; but the delay
permitted St. Pol to get off with small loss and to catch up the
rest of l~oy's column.
By three in the afternoon Graham was beginning to outflank
Maucune's line about Villa£ranca, with Bradford's brigade on
his right and Pack's on his left, while Longa had come in sight
upon the .cho:ussee. Thereupon the French General, having
held his ground for the necessary space of time, made a prompt
retreat along the Tolosa road, pursued but not much harmed
by the Portuguese.
This ended a rather unsatisfactory day-the French had lost
more fJlen than .the Allies 1, but the trap to catch them had
failed completely. It is clear that if Graham's column could
have crossed the Puerto de San Adrian twelve hours earlier,
or if Giron had pressed Fay hard and delayed his movements
, Mo.ucune reportcd 200 ca.sualtiC8 (Foy, cd. Girod dc l'Ain, p. 333),
Graham'93, llIostly in the 5th Ca~adores. St. Pal's Italians had beaten ofT
Longa without losing more than.JOO men_Giron dOCJl not give Longn's
100000, which WlIS probubly It. little more.
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either all the 23rd or on the 24th, the scheme would have
worked. Bad starr work was apparently rcspow~ible in some
measure for both of these failures, though the extreme incle-
mency of the weather was a secondary cause. Foy's conduct
of the operBtions 011 the 22nd-23rd appears a little rash-he
!}light have been caught but for his good luck. But till he had
picked up the troops from' Bilbao, at noon Oil the 23rd, he was
constrain<..-d to wait at Bcrgara; and after he had once received
them he marched hard, and so escaped, thanks to his wise
precaution in sending Maucune to Villafranca.
After the combat of the morning Graham moved forward
a few miles as far as lchasondo and neighbouring villages Oil
-the Tolosa road, while Giron came up in the evening, and
billeted his army in Villafranea, Beassayn, and other pla<:es
on the Oria. As the missing brigades of the 1st Divisioll
appeared that night, there were now some 10,000 Anglo·
Portuguese 1 and 16,000 Spaniards 2 massed along the chaussee j
Foy. having picked up the garrisons of Tolosa and some smaller
places, and having been joined by a stray brigade from the
Army of the North, had also as many as 16,000 men in hand 3,
so that the opposing forces Oil both sides had swollcn to a con-
siderable strength.
Grahum having failed (through no fault of his own) to inter-
cept the enemy's retreat at Villafranca, and regarding extreme
haste as no longer necessary, sinee the scheme had miscarried,
set himself to carry out Wellington's orders to drive back the
enemy to the Bidasson without any great hurry. He was
much hampered by the fact that Giron's urlllY had outmarched
its train, and was therefore suffering for want of supplies, which
could not be procured ill the mouutains of Guipuzcoa. On
the 25th he brought the whole of the allied forces up to Alegria,
haU-way to Tolosa, driving out 1Uaueune's division, which
• lst Division about 4,!iOO bayonets, Pack and Dmdford 4,500, Anson's
cavalry 650.
• Giron's two GaHciau divisions 11,000, Porlicr 2,500, Longll 3,000.
• Hi!; own division and 1I1aucwle's about 3,000 each, St, Po!'s Italians
1,500, garrisons from Bilbno, Durnngo, and other wcslenl places about
3,000. Dc Conchy'lI brigade of Army 01 the North (64th (2 battalion!!),
22nd (1 battalion), lilt Line (2 compuniell), and 34th (4 companies)) 2,000,
garrisons or 'L'olosa and other IJ]U.cell in GUipU1.COU ubout 2,500.
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Foy had left there as a rearguard. It was then discovered that
the enemy had taken up a long and extensive position on each
side of Tolosa, and showed no disposition to give ground. It
was clear that he must be driven off by force.
Foy, as he explains in his dispatch ofJune 28th 1, had resolved
to make a stand at the junction of roads in Tolosa, because he
was obsessed by a theory (less accurate than that which he had
formed as to Graham's march two days before) to the effect
that King Joseph might have dispatchcd part or the whole of
his army, by the road which leads from Yrurzun on the Araquil
to Tolosa across the mountains, in ordcr to transfer it to the
lower Bidassoa and the Bayonne road. He was still ignorant
of the full effects of the battle of Vittoria, and having heard
cannonading far to the south-west on the 23rd 2 had jumped
to the conclusion that the main" army might be moving up to
join him at Tolosa. As a matter of fact King Joscph had
turned a detachment off the Pampcluna road at Yrurzun-
Reillc's two divisions-but they had been sent 1I0t by the
more westerly road to Tolosa, but by the Col de Vclatc route
to Santestcban, on which thcy travelled fast beeause they had
no guns or transport.
But to (:ovcr the iml1ginary movement Foy disposed his
troops in front of the jUllction of roads. Tolosa town lies in
a narrow defile, through which pass the Oria river and the
grcat chaussec. It had becn prepared long before for serious
defence, us it wus one of the chief hulting-placcs on the great
road from Bayonne to Madrid. The old walls had been
strengthened with blockhouses, the gates wcre palisaded out·
side and had guns mounted by them. The town blocks the
defile completely, but is comma.nded by steep hills on either
side.
Foy sent on the great convoy which l\laucune had escorted,
under charge of four battalions commanded by General Berlier.
The rest of his troops he disposed for defence. De Conchy's
brigade held the fortified town. On the south-east Don,w's
brigade and St. Pol's Italians were placed on the heights above
1 Giro<! de PAin, p. 400.
• This was merely the noise of the rearguard action of Cassagne with
\Vellingwn's advancc, near Yronun, on the :.ftemOQll of that day.
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the Lizarz3 torrent, a forward position in which they protected
the Pampeluna road. The second brigade of Foy's own division
was placed on the hiU of Jagoz, on the same flank but nearer
the town. On the other or western bank of the Qria Rouget's
brigade (the troops from Bilbao) were ou commanding ground,
flanking the town and blocking two mountain paths which
came down on to it from Azpcytia in the valley of the UrolL
l\Iaucunc's division was in reserve behind Tolos8, massed on
the cha'WIsce. As Foy very truly observes in his dispatch, the
position wus strong against frontal attack, and could only be
turned by very wide detours by any troops arriving from the
south.
This was as evident to Graham as to Foy, and the British
General prepared for a long day's work. His intention was to
outflank the position, even though it should take many hours.
In the centre the bulk of the 1st Division, followed by Pack's
Portuguese and Giron's Galicians, advanced up the chaussee
on the left bank of the river Oria, and halted a considerable
distance from Tolosa. But Longa's Cantabrians and Porlier's
sman Asturian division were sent off to make a very circuitous
march over the mountains on the right by Alzo and Gastolu
with the object of cutting into the Pampeluna road many miles
east of 'l'olosa, and then taking the town in the rear. A less
wide curve was ma,de by a column consisting of Bradford's
Portuguese brigade, with the three Line-battalions of the King's
German Legion in support, who were also to operate to the
enst of the clUw,88ee and of the river Oria, and were directed
to cross the Lh,nrza ravine and carry the hill behind it, from
whence they were to push forward to the Pampeluna road and
then turn inwards against the town. A smaller column, con-
sisting of one battalion of Pack's brigade and the light com-
panies of Giron's Brd Division, was to make a corresponding
movement to the west, and to endeavour to get on to the hill
dominating Tolosa on that side. Nor was this an: information
came to hand that Mendi7.abal had brought to Aspcytia
what remained of the Biscayan irregulars whom Foy had
routed and dispersed a month back 1. Graham wrote to beg
him to demonstrate with these bands against the Bayonne
1 See above, p. 274.
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chau~see north of 1'olosa, and to get'on to that road if possible
and block it.
The main column halted while the flanking operations were
pursuing their slow course. The only fighting which took place
iu the morning was an attack by Bra.dford's brigade on the
heights oceupicd by Boute, opposite Aleon and beyond the
Li7.arza torrent. The }reneh ]~rigadier had neglected to guard
the passages of the ravine, and allowed the Portuguese to get
on to the ridge of his position without much difficulty 1. He
then counteNl.ttacked them, first with his own brigade, then
with St. Pol's Italians also, but was unable to cast them down
from the hill : nor could Bradford get forward. All the hours
of the early afternoon were spent in an indceisive tiraillade on
this front. It is curious to note that both the commanders-in-
ehicf write in sharp. criticism of their subordinates: Foy say~
that Bonte was careless and disobeyed orders; Graham that
Bradford's men, after a good start, fought in a confused and
disorderly fashion~. On the other flank the Spanish-Portuguese
detachment, sent to try to gain a footing on the hills to the
west of Tol08a, reported that they had come _up against an
absolute precipice, and eould do nothing.
So matters wore on till about six o'clock in the afternoon,
when distant firing in the rear of the French position announced
that both Longa on the right and Mendizabal on the left were
in touch with the enemy_ Grahnm then ordered a general
attack, the three German Line-battalions, hitherto in reserve
behind Bradford, being ordered to strike at the Pampeluna
road; meanwhile the main column, whieh had so long waited
opposite Tolosa, deployed thc two light German battalions in
its frout, with the Guards Brigade and Giron's Srd Division
, The CQlumn was led_for reasons which are not given-not by its own
~dor battalion, but by three companies of the 4th Cat;l3dores and two
or the ]st Line, borrowed from the neighbouring brigllde of Puck. Grllluun
praiSCII the conduct of this detachment.
, Foy (Girod de l'Ain, p. 400) says tlm.t if hi~ orders hOO been obeyed
there would huve been a battalion Ilnd not 11 detachment holding the
aCC«li to the hill. Graham (Wellington Sl.lpplt11Wltary Dispaldlu, viii.
p. 44) declllres thnt though mnny of Bradford's men fought well, • the
olllccrs did not seem to understand wlmt they were about, or how to keep
their men in the proper place,' and a good many hung back.
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supporting, and advanced against the south face of the town.
The detachment to the extreme left, which had failed to get
up the precipices in its front, was directed to turn inward to
attack the west side of Tolosa.
These orders brought on very heavy fighting, for Foy had
held his forward positions so long that he had great difficulty
in withdrawing his troops from them, whcn he found that he
was outflanked, and even attacked in the rear. At the south
end of the field, along the chaussee. the allied attack failed
entirely, the strength of the fortifications of the toWIl having
been under-estimated. When the leading battalion (1st Light
Battalion K.G.L.) approached the gate, it came into a cross-fire
from the blockhouses, and still heavier frontal musketry from
the well-lined ramparts, which proved wholly inaccessible.
Scaling ladders would have been required to mount them.
The line broke, but the men did not retire, but threw them-
selves down behind walls and in ditches and tried to answer
the fire from such cover as they could find. Many took refuge
in the courtyard of a convent not far outside the Vittoria gate,
from which their oolonel, Omptcda, led out a second assault,
which melted away under the fire as the first had done. In
truth, the attempt was a misjudged one on Graham's part-
possibly his bad eyesight had failed to note the strength of the
defences. The 1st Light Battalion lost five officers and 58 men
killed and wounded in a quarter of an hour 1, and had to keep
under shelter as best it eould; the supporting troops were
halted and ordered to lie down, while guns were brought up
from the rear to batter the gate. This should obviously have
been done before, and not after, the assault. The check was
unneceSsary, as was shown a little later when the artillery
smashed the gate by a few shots, and cleared the neighbouring
walls.
Meanwhile there had been fieree fighting on the eastern side
of the town, where Bradford's Portuguese, and the three German
line-battalions, with Longa's men on their northern flank, had
fallen upon the three French brigades lying outside the town.
l Very different figures from those of Foy's dispatch, which stated thut
eight minutes of terrible fire laid low 500 of the assailants I (Girod de l'Ain,
11. oW2).
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Bonte's and St. Pol's battalions, still frontally engaged against
Bradford, suddenly realized the danger of their position, when
the Germans attacked their left flank, and Longa appeared
almost in their rear. They retreated in haste towards Tolosa,
and got jammed outside the l'ampcluna gate, which had been
blocked for defence and could not readily be entered. To avoid
being crushed against the walls, they massed themselves for
a counter-stroke, and thrusting baek the Germans for a moment,
raeed along the river-bank, past the foot of the ramparts, till
they got under the cover of Foy's second brigade on the hill
of Jagoz, and escaped beyond the north end of the town. 'l'he
Germans, though in great disorder, made an attack on the
Pampeluna gate, which failed for 'the ~me reason that had
wrecked that on the Vittoria gate-the impossibility of escalad-
ing a well-defended rampart.
Meanwhile there was heavy skirmishing going on to the
north-west of '1'olosa: l\fcndizabal's bands had appeared on
the mountain road from Aspeytia, and had engaged Rouget's
brigade, which was covering Foy's right flank. The French
general's dispatch confesses that the troops from thc Bilbao
garrison, which included somc conscript battalions from the
Bayonnc rcsCf\'C, bchavcd badly, lost ground, and had to be
rallied by their gcneral's pcrsonal exertions. They were
apparcntly thrown into a panic by an attack delivered on their
flank, by the small Spanish-Portuguese detachmcnt ~hich
Graham had sent out on Ius left: it had worked up by the
narrow space between the walls of Tolosa and the precipice
above, and eame up very opportunely to aid Mendizabal.
Rouget held on till dark, but with difficulty, and the knowledge
that his route of retreat was threatened added to Foy's anxiety,
for Longa was also pushing behind the town on the other side.
Accordingly he ordered Deconehy's brigade to evacuate 'l'olosa
at once, just as the sun was setting, and prepared for a general
retreat.
If the order had been given half an hour later, the garrison
of Tolosa would probably have been captured whole, for
Graham's guns had just blovm the defences of the Vittoria gate
to pieces, and the German light battalions burst in with ease
at the point where they had been checked before. There was
353.6 I i
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some confused lighting in the streets, but the l"rcllch got of[
with no great loss under cover of the darkness, and fell in
with the reaf of their main column, which went olf down the
c!laus8ec at great speed. Mcndizabal made some prisoners
from Rouget's brigade, as it fell back to join the rest across
the slopes, and Longa caught some fugitives on the other
flank 1.
Foy says that he lost some 400 men in the fight, which
would seem a low estimate, as the Allies could show 200 prisoners,
and Dante's and Rouget's brigades had been very roughly
handled. Graham reports 58 kiUed, 316 wounded. and 4!:i
missing-the last all from Bradford's brigade. Of the Spaniards
I.o.nga and ]\{endizabal only were engaged: Giron's report
(us so often occurs with Spanish documents) gives no figures,
only remarking that some of Longa's 1st battalion of Iberia
• perished by reason of their rash courage, but had a great
share in dceiding the day '-presumably by pushing far ahead
in the turning movemcnt which caused Foy to order a general
retreat. If wc allow 200 Spanish killed and wounded, wc shall
probably not be Car out of our reckoning. Had Graham with-
held his unlucky assault on the Vittoria gate till it had been
well battered, and trusted entirely to his turning movements,
he would have got off with a much smaller casualty list. His
original design of mana:uvring Foy out of Tolosa was the right
game, considering the strength of the position. The French
general could plead in defence of his risky tactics that he had
held up a superior force for a whole day-but at that particular
moment time did not happen to matter-as Graham's leisurely
pursuit on the subsequent days sufficiently shows. He was
only set on getting Foy across the Bidassoa; and nothing ill
the general course of the campaign depended on whether he
did so a day sooner or a day later. On the other hand, by
1 There is one pamgraph 01 Foy's dispatch which I cannot make out.
He f;,'lys thnt two Britisl1 regiments tried to frtorlll the 11ill or Jngm, and
were repulsed by the voltigcur companies alone or the brigade which held it.
I cannot fit this in to any British narrative-the only red-coated battalions
in that part or the field \"ere the line battalions or the K.G.L., and they hnd
ccrt.llinly been engtlged llgllinst RontC llnd the ltalians, and ultcrwards
tried to storm the Pampcluna Gate. Longa's men only were opposite
the Jagol': position, as rar as I can make out.
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standing too long at. Tolosa Foy nearly lost. t.hree brigades, and
might. indeed have lost his whole force.
The remainder of this side-campaign displays none of the
interest of its four first days. Foy retired to Andoain Oil.
the night of the combat of Tolosa, where he was joined by t.he
battalions of the 40th and JOIst under General BerHer, which
had escorted l\!aucune's convoy to the frontier, and by the
62nd and a Spanish' .Juramelltado' regiment withdrawn from
Biscay garrisons. Thhi, despite of llis recent losses, gave him
a force of 16,000 infantry, 400 sabres, and 10 guns. Graham did
not press him, his troops being much fatigued: only the inde-
fatigable Longs appeared with his Ca.ntabrisns in front of
the position. On the 27th the whole French force retired
unmolested to Hernani.
It was of course all-important to Foy to know what were
the situation and intentions of the King. Not.hing could be
heard of the main army at Andoain or Hemani, so he detached
Berlier's brigade to seek for news in the llastan, along ·the
upper llidassoa. On the 28th llerlier discovered Rcille and
two di\'isions of the Army of Portugal at Vera. They were in
bad order, without guns and much under strength, though
stragglers were rejoining in considerable numbers. Reille had
been as ignorant of Foy's whereabouts as Foy had been of that
of the main army. He was rejoiced to hear that all the Biscay
garrisons had been saved, and that there was a solid force
ready to co-operate with him in the defence of the line of the
Bidassoa. His own troops were not yet fit for fighting. Accord-
ingly he sent Foy orders to cvacuate Hernani and come baek
to the frontier, though he need not actually cross the Bidassoa
unless he were compelled to do so. By stopping at Oyarzull he
could keep up communication with St. Sebastian, which must
be needing attention.
The condition of that fortress, indeed, had already been
troubling the mind of Foy on his last day of independent
command. It lay so near the l<Yench border, and had been
for years so far from any enemy-Guipuzcoan guerrilleros
excepted-that it had been much neglected. When General
ne)', named as Governor by King .Joscph two days before the
battle of Vittoria, arrived with orders to put it in a state of
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derelU~(l, he found it {fdrrisollcd only by 500 gendarmes, a
battalion of recruits 011 the way to join the 120th Line, and
two weak companies of pioneers and sappers-l,200 men in all.
Thc stores of food were low, the glacis was cwnbered with
huts and sheds, there was no provision of gahions, fascines, or
timber. Moreover, the town was full of Spanish and French
fugitives who had preceded the King on his retreat-there
were (it is said) as many as 7,000 of them, lingering in Spain till
the last moment, in the hope that Wellington might he stopped
on the Ebro. The news of Vittoria arrived on the 28rd, and
caused hopeless consternation-the plaee was not ready to
stand a siege-the garrison so small that it eould not even spare
0. battalion to escort the tiresome mass of refugees to Bayonne.
Hey began in feverish haste to clear the glacis, palisade the
outworks, and rearrange the cannons 011 the walls, but he hud
too few hands for work, and was in a state resembling c;lcspair
when on the 28th Foy turned up for a flying visit, saw and
acknowledged the nakedness of the land, and promised to do
all that he could to help-though it was less than the Governor
required. He took away the old garrison-the recruits were
not too trustworthy, the gendarmes not siege troops: to replace
them he threw in the whole oC De<..'Ollchy's brigade-four
battalions, about 2,000 infantry-and all the gunners that he
eould spare. As the garrison of Guetaria, 450 strong, escaped
by sea to San Sebastian two days later~ and a number of
stragglers dropped into the plaee before the siege began, the
gross total of the garrison was raised to some 8,000 men. Rey
asked for 4,000, but Foy would not grant him another battalion
-and was justified by the course of the siege, for the plaee was
very small and, if it could be held at all, was defensible by the
lesser number. The only doubt was whether there would be
time to get it in order before the Allies appeared 1. But
perhaps the best service that Foy did Cor Rcy was that he
removed, at two hours' notice, the whole mass of refugees. They
marched, much lamenting, for Bayonne, under the escort of
the old outgoing garrison. On the 20th Reille ordered Foy to
evacuate Oyarzun and fall back to the Bidassoa, and before
, For 611 this sec Hey's letter ill the Pit~ justiJlc(divcs of BclwlUl's
Hil;tory 01 Sieges in Spain, iv. p. 662.
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he had been gone three hours l\lendizabal's Guipuzcoan irre-
gulars, 3,000 strong, appeared in front of the fortress and cut
its communication with France. They wcre an unorganized
band, without artillery, but effective enough for stopping the
highway.
Graham, seeing that the French had escaped him, and had
a clear retreat to the frontier, had made no serious attempt to
press them. He was quite content that they should go at thcir
own pace, and was determined not to harass the 1st Division,
who, as he wrote to Wellington, were in a state of great exhaus-
tion. To have hurried Foy out of Spain two days earlier would
have cost men, and would have had no beneficial eftect on
the general course of the campaign; for Wellington and the
main army were far away in NavlU'l'e, and if Graham had
reached the Bidassoa on the 26th or 28th, with his own and
Giron's 25,000 men, they could have done nothing, since they
had in front of them the fortress of Bnyonne, with Fay's
16,000 men, thc 7,000 whom RcilIe had brought up from
Santcstcban, and the remains of the general reserve-for though
Rouget's b~ttalions and other detachments had been lent from
Bayonne already, there were still a few thousand men in hand.
In all, Reille would have had an army as large as Graham's
own, and though some of itwas rather demoralized, the fortress,
and the strong positions in front of it along the Bidassoa, Nivc,
and Nivelle, counterbalanced this disadvantage. If Wellington
had chosen to march on Bayonne with his main body, the
day after Vittoria, the problem would have been a very different
one. But since he had preferred to move in pursuit first of
King Joseph and then of Clausel, there WlloS nothing more
which the commander of a detached corps like that of Graham
could accomplish. He did all that his chief required of him,
when he pushed Fay out of Spain and laid siege to St. Sebastian.
That the project for cutting oU the French detachments at
VilIafranca came to nothing was no fault of Graham's-being
due partly to bad staU-work at Head-Quarters, partly to the
chances of rough weather, and partly to Foy's laudable caution
and celerity.
The side-show in Guipuzcoa eame to a tame end twenty-four
hours after the blockade of St. Sebastian had been formed.
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On the 80th Reille ordered all the troops on the south bank of
the lower Bidassoa to retire into France. Foy':; and Maucune's
divisions crossed the bridge of Behobie, under the protection
of four battalions of the Bayonne reserve, which remained on
the heights by the hermitage of St. l\Iarcial, and marched to
Urogne "and other villages down·stream. I.amartiniere's
division remained at Vera, l"ririon's (late Sarrut's) at Hendaye.
Late on the same afternoon the advance-guard of Graham's
army cn.me in sight of the BidassoB~it consisted as usual of
Longn's ulltiring Cantabrians only, the 1st Division and the
Portuguese having been halted near St. Sebastian, the bulk of
the Galicians at Herllani and Rentcria. Longs, keeping to"the
coast, surprised and captured thc French garrison of Passages
(150 men), whieh was too late in obeying Reillc's order to retreat
on France while the bridge of Behobic was still available. He
thcn came in contact with the covering force on the height.'l
of San Marcial 1, which was at the same time menaced by
Castai'i.on with a brigade of the 4th Galician Division, who had
come up the high road from Renteria.
The French brigadier evacuated the position at once. ReiUe
had told him that he was only placed there to protect the retreat
of Fay. He crossed the Bidassoa, leaving only a detachment
of sixty men in the tete de pont which covered the south or
Spanish end of the bridge of Behobie; it consisted of a stone
blockhouse surrounded with palisades. The further or French
end of the long bridge was blocked by the fortified village of
Hendaye.
Next morning Graham resolved that the fete de pant must
be taken or destroyed, so that the enemy should have no open
road by which he might return to Sps.i.n. While some Spanish
infantry exchanged a vague fusillade across the river with the
French in Hendayc, ten guns 2 were turned on the blockhouse.
'fhe garrison tried to blow it up and to retreat, but their mine
failed, their commanding-officer was killed, and they were
about to surrender when Foy sent two fresh compo.nies over
, Under Gencral Ikoollchy, who got a new brigade whell his old onc
was thrown into San Sebnstian.
I Dubourdieu's bD.ttery belonging to the British 1st Division, nnd
rOUf gWls of GiwlI's OWII smllll artillery equipment.
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the bridge to bring them ot!. This was done, at the cost of
four officers and 64 men, killed and wounded while crossing
the much-exposed bridge. Foy then ordered the structure to
be set on fire; and as its floor was composed of wood this was
easily done: the four arches nearest France were burnt out
by the following moming (.TlIly 1).
This evacuation, without any attempt at defence, of the
bridge-head on the Bidassoa angered the Minister of War at
Paris, and still more Napoleon, when the ne,",,'S reached him
at Wittenberg nine days later. Foy and Reille had men enough
to have held the heights of San hlarcial, against anything short
of an attack by the whole of Graham's and Giron's infantry.
And it is certain that Graham would not have delivered any
such assault, but would have halted in front of them, and waited
for orders from Wellington. The Emperor, who--as we shall
presently sce-was set on a coWlter-offensive from the moment
when the news of Vittoria reached him, was wild with wrath
at the abandonment of the foothold in Spain. 'It was insane,'
he wrote to Clarke, • to reeross the Bidassoa: they all show
themselves as timid as women 1.'
But whether it would have been possible for the French to
hold thc lrun-Behobie-San Mareial tete de pont, when Welling-
tOil had come up in person from the south, is another matter.
Pr~bably he would have decided that the enemy must be thrust
back across the Bidassoa, before he dared to sit down to
beleaguer San Sebastian. And undoubtedly he had men enough
to carry out that operation. But this was no excuse for Reille's
evacuation of the position, one of the highest strategical value,
before he was compelled to do so by force. The fact Wll.'i that
Reil1e, like most of the other French generals, was demoralized
at the moment by the recent disnster of Vittoria, and had lost
confidence both in himself and in his troops.
• Lecesbc's LeUres inMilt$ de Napolbm, H. p. 205.
SECTION XXXVII: CHAPTER III
THE EAS'r COAST. MURRAY AT 'fARRAGONA
IN.B.-Folt i'llAP OF CATALONIA AND PLAN OF TARRAGONA SEE VOL. IV,
PP. 538 AND 524]
TnERE arc certain episodes of the PcninsuIlU' War which the
British historian has to narrate with a feeling of some humilia-
tion, but which have to he set forth in full detail, if only for
the purpose of illustrating the manifold difficulties with which
Wellington had to cope. Of these by far the most distressing
is the story of General Sir John Murray at Tarragona.
It will be remembered that a diversion on the East Coast
formed an essential part of Wellington's great scheme for the
expulsion of the French from Spain, and that he had devoted
much care to instructing Murray in the manner in which it was
to be carried out. If sufficient shipping to embark 10,000 men
could be procured at Alicante, the bulk of the Anglo-Sicilian
army was to be transported to Catalonia, and to strike at
Tarragona, getting what aid it could from the local Spanish
forces under the Captain-General Copons. If, as was to be
expected, Suchet should fly northward from Valencia with all
his available field-army, to rescue Tarragona, the two Spanish
units in the kingdom of Murcia, Elio's and Del Parque's armies,
were to take the oUensive against the detachments which the
French Marshal would have to leave behind him to hold down
his southern conquests. Murray might fail in Catalonia, if
Suchet were rapid and lucky in his combinations; but in that
case Elio and Del Parque ought to get possession of the city of
Valencia and all its fertile plainland. Or, on the other hand,
Suchet might be loth to abandon his advanced position, might
hold it in force, and might order Dccaen and the Army of
Catalonia to make head against the Anglo-Sicilian expeditionary
force. If this should happen, the Spanish generals might be
held in check, but Murray would have a free hand at Tarragona.
With the aid of CoPOtlS he ought to be able to take the place,
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and to throw all the French occupation oC Catalonia into dis-
order. In the cnd, Suchet would have to evacuate Valcncia,
in order to save Dceu.en and the CataIan garrisons. At the
worst the expedition of the Allglo-Sicilian army ought at least
to have the errect of giving Suchet so much to think about,
that he would have no attention to spare for the perils of
King Joscph and the fate of Castile.
This last minimum result was all that was achieved. Suchet,
it is true, had an anxious time during the critical days of
Wellington's march to Vittoria, and sent no help to the King.
But neither was 'l'arTagona taken by the Anglo-Sieilians, nor
Valencia by the armies of Elio and Del Parque. Both of those
forces endured humiliating checks, from an enemy over whom
they had every strategical advantage. And thc story of
Murray's operations about Tarrngona is not the story of an
honest and excusable failure, but one which provokes bitter
irritation over the doings of a British general who showed him-
sclfnot only timid and incompetent, but shifty, mendacious, and
trcacherous to his allies. There is nothing in the whole history
of the Peninsular War which produces !:iuch an unpleasant im-
prcssion as the facts revealed by the minutes of l\Iurray's court-
martial, supplemented by certain documents which ought to
have been forthcoming at that trial, but unfortunately were not.
But to proceed to the details of this unhappy campaign. In
obedienc~ to Wellington's orders, 1\Iurray began to draw his
army in to Alicante between the 25th and 27th of May, the
forward positions which the Anglo·Sieilians had held being
handed over to Elio's troops, while those of Del PaTque, who
had at last been brought up from the borders of Andalusia, took
post on Elio's left, about Yecla and Chinchilla. Both these
armies were to move forward, flS soon as Suehet should be
detected in the act of dctaehing divisions northward to deal
with Murray's oncoming invo.sion. The appearance of thc
Spaniards on ground hitherto hcld by British outposts gave the
Marshal warning that some new plnn was developing. A raid
by sea was an o~vious possibility, but he could not tell whether
it might not be dirceted on a point as far south as Valcncia or
as far north as Rosas. Till Murray showed his hand only
preCfl,utiollary movcments could be made. Suchet was at this
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moment stronger than he had been at the time of the battle
of Castalla. Wamed of his danger by the results of that fight,
he had strengthened his troops on the littoral at the expense of
the garrisons inland. Se\'eJ'oli's Italian division had been
ordered down from Saragossa to Valencia 1. This heavy draft
on the northern section of his army \Vas rendered possible by
the fact that Clausel had come far forward into Aragon in
pursuit of 1tfina, so that Saragossa and its region could be held
with smaller numbers than usual. The Sptmish irregular forces
in this direction had full occupation found for them, by the raid
of the Army of Portugal into their sphere of operations. And
this suited well with Wellington's general plan-the morc that
French troops were drawn down to the Mediterranean, the Icss
would there be of thcm available for service in Castile, when his
own blow came to be delivered.
Morray had at his disposal in the harbour of Alicante trans·
ports sufficient to carry muehmore than the force of 10,000 men,
whieh Wellington had named as the minimum with which a raid
on Catalonia might be attempted. He was able to embark the
whole of his own army, with the exception of the regiment of
Sicilian cavalry (he was short of horse-transports), and in
addition neaTly the whole of Whittingham's Spaniards-all
indeed save one battalion 2 and the attached squadrons. This
made up a force of 14,000 infantry, 800 cavalry, and 800
artillery, with 24 field-guns and the battering train which had
been sent round from Portugal. The British contingent was
a little stronger than at the timc of the battle of Castallll, for if
onc battalion of the King's German Legion had been sent back
to Sicily since that fight, Wellington had permitted Murray
to draw in the 2/67th, long in garrison at Cartagcna, and had
sent him (I. Portuguese and a British company of artillery to
man his batterin.g train :I. Moreover, two squadrons of Bruns-
wick Hussars had arrived direct from England.
, Sevcroli reached Valencia on Mny 2 (Vucuni, vi. p. 207), so was not
drawn down in consequence of Mllrray's move of May 25, as i\1r. Fol1escue
seems to imply in Bri/ish Army, ix. p. -1.9. He had wiLhJlim two battalions
each of the 1st Line and 1st Lige.ro, with 0. weak cavalry regiment.
t 2nd of Burgos, detached by Wellington's order. See MUlTay's Court
Martial, p. fl71 •
• ThCllC clmnge.9 or units hnd caused somc re-brigrnling. .MurrllY had
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The whole force, having been swiftly embarked at Aliennte,
sailed on May 31st; and being favoured with a strongsouth-west
wind came ill sight of the high-lying Tarragona on June 2nd.
The fleet of transports ran into the bay sheltered by Cape Salon,
eight miles south of its goal. There would have been no object
in risking a more difficult disembarkation OIl the long open
beaches at the mouth of the Francoli river, eloser to Tarragona.
Before landing his main body Murray shipped off two battalions
(2/67th and De Roll-Dillon) under Colonel Prevost, to sei7..c the
defile of the Col de Balaguer, the point twenty miles to the south
of Tarragona where the coast-road from Tortosa curves round
a steep headland between a precipice and the sea. There was
0. smo.ll French fort, So.n l"elipe de .llo.lo.guer, blocking the Col,
o.nd Prevost was ordered to take it if he could. But its fall was
not an absolutely essential condition to the success of the siege,
for the road could be cut, blasted away, or blocked with
entrenchments north of the fort, at several points where a
thousand men could stop a whole army corps. It was desirable
to take this precaution, because the Col de Balaguer road was the
only route by which succours coming from Valencia could reach
the plain of Tarragona, 'without taking an immense detour
inland, by paths impracticable for lll'tillery.
On hearing of the arrival of the British fleet oU Cape Salou,
General Copons, Captain-General of Catalonia, rode down from
his head-quarters at Reus, ten miles away, to report to Murray
that he had received Wellington's instructions, and had done
his best to carry them out. The Spanish Army of Catalonia
consisted of ll9 more than 15,000 men, even after it had received
the two bnttalions which Wellington hoo sent to it by sea
during the winter 1. Over 5,500 of them were locked up in
garrisons in the interior; many of these were untrained
recruits, and nonc were available for the field. Ofthc remainder,
Copons had brought down twelvc battalions to the neighbour-
transferred the 4th K.G.L. and the Sieilinu 'E!>wro' regiment to Clintoll's
division, but taken away from the latter and given to Mackenzie the 2nd
Italian Levy, the l/lOth and the 1/81st. Dut Clinton was given charge
over WhiUinglUllU's Spaniards, und authori7.cd to lu;e them ns part
of hls division, so that his total command WlI.lI now lDuch larger than
Mackem:ie's•
• Pontcvedra and l'rincipc.
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hood of Tarragona, leaving only two under his second-in-
command, Eroles, to watch the French garrisons in the north I,
He had also with him his handful of cavalry~370 sabres i
ficld4 guns the army had none. Altogether there were 7,000 men
ready to join Murray at once: 1,500 more might be brought
in, if the French of the northern garrisons should move down
to join General Decaen at Barcelona. Copons had certainly done
all that was in his power.to aid Wellington's scheme. Murray
asked him to lend two battalions to join the brigade that was
to strike at Fort San Felipe and to block the Col de Balaguer,
and to arrange the rest so as to cover at a distance the disem·
barkation of the Anglo-Sicilian army. Copons consented, and
on the next morning the whole force came ashore, Prevost's
brigade in a creek near the Col de Balaguer, where it found the
two Spanish battalions already arrived, the rest of the army at
Salou Bay. The expeditionary force was little cumbered with
transport, and had but a small allowance of horses and mules :
the infantry and some of the field-guns with the greater partor
the cavalry were ashore by the early afternoon, and marellCd
that same night on Tarragona, which was invested from sea to
sea, Mackenzie and Adam taking up their position by the
mouth of the Francoli, Clinton occupying the Olivo heights,
and Whittingham extending down to the shore east of the city.
The French garrison kept quiet-being of no strength sufficient
to justify the showing of a man outside the walls.
General Bertoletti had with him two battalions, one French
and one Italian 2, a company of J uramentados, two companies
of artillery, and the armed crews of three small vessels which
were blockaded in the port-they were turned on to act as
auxiliary gunners. Thc whole did not exceed 1,600 men. This
was an entirely inadequate force, and the'defences were in an
unsatisfactory condition. After Suchct had captured the city
in 1811, he had no intention of leaving locked up behind him
a garrison of the size required for such a large fortress. The
1 It is interesting to compare the May 31 morning state of the Army of
Catalonia with tile list of battalions which Murmy reports Bs haviag been
brought down to the neighbourhood of'l'url'llguna. All are there save two
(Femando 7th Bnd Ausona) left at Vich under Erolcs (see Table in Appen-
dix), twelve battalions were with Capons.
I Qne of the 20th Line, onc of the 7th ltuliun Line.
11:1131 DEFEXCES OF TARRAGONA 493
outer enceinte had been left in the {:Qndition of ruin consequent
on the siege 1, and only the Upper City on its high elire was
occupied. Its western front, where the breaches had been, was
rep.'lired; but thc Lowcr City and its fortificntions remained
praeticnlly untouched. All that had been done was to patch
up two isolated strong·pointo;, the so-called Fort Royal and
Bastion of St. Carlos. Thesc had been cut off from the mass of
the ruins, and closed in at the rear: each was armed with onc
gun. The object of this was merely to prevent British ships
from entering Tarragona roadstead and mooring there. These
two outlying posts, dangerously remote from the city above,
were held by no morc than a company cach. llertoletti thought
for a moment of abandoning them, since he dared not detach
reinforcements from his inadequate garrison, and his communi·
cation with the forts was across half a mile of exposed ground:
nothing was more likely than that the enemy would slip detach·
IIlcnts among the ruined houses and walls of the Lower City, and
dig himself in betwecn the Uppcr City and the weak outlying
po~ts, whieltmustincvitably fall. Butrcflectingon theudvantuge
of kceping thc harbour unusable, he resolved to hold on to them
till the last miuute. And his policy turned out to be justificd,
for had they been evacuated, even the torpid and timorous
Murray could hardly have avoided. the temptation of closing in
on the Upper City, which was in no condition to hold out for
the space of nine days during which the Anglo-Sicilian army
lay in front of it.
From the first moment of his landing l\Iurray seems to have
been obsessed with the idea. that every disposable French
soldier in Cata.lonia and Valencia would be on his back within
a very few days. As his evidence during his court martial
shows, he had a notion that Suchet would practically evacuate
Valencia, and march against him with three-quarters of his
available men, while at the same time Deeaen would abandon
nil C'ltalonia snve the largest towns and bring an even greater
force to 'l'arragona from the north. He had made elaborate,
I Not only was the whole of the enceinte of the lower city abandoned,
but the outer enceinte of the upper city on its cast and north sides, from
the oostion of El Hey to that of Lu Ueynu (SL'C n",I' of l'urro~,'onll, JI. 1124
of vol. iv).
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:.lIld in part correct, calculations as to the gross force of the
two French annies, by which he made out that the enemy
might conceivably concentrate 25,000 men against him. For
the fact that such a force would have to be scraped together
from very remote points, between which communication must
be very difficult, he made insufficient allowance. Still less did
he ca.lculate out the handicap on the enemy caused by the fact
that Suchet and Decaen were out of touch with each other, and
would obviously look upon the problem presented to them
from different points of view,-all the fonner's action being
influenced by his wish to hold on to Valencia, all the latter's by
his anxiety not to have his communication with France cut oft
MurTay assumed that all roads marked on hi!'> map would be
practieabletotheenemy, thatSuchet's information would always
be correct, that his troops would march every day the possible
maximum, !lnd that they would have no difficulties concerned
with food, water, or weather. Every conceivable hazard of
war was to fall luckily for the enemy, unluckily for himself. At
his trial in 1814 he explained that he was never sanguine of
success, and that he did not expect when he sailed that he could
take Tarragona 1. He chose to regard. himsclf as the blind and
unwilling instrument of Wellington's ordcrs, which hc would
carry out, so far as hc cou~d, with an expectation that they
would lead to failure. And he observed that the dominating
motive which influenced all his doings was that Wellington had
written that' he would forgive everything excepting that the
corps should be beaten or dispersed ' ~. Deducing from this
phrasc the general policy that he must pursue, Murray cnme
to the conclusion' thc Hrst principle is the army's safcty '. He
started intending to subordinate all chances of success to the
remotest risk of defeat. His mind obsessed with this miserable
prepossession, he was, in fact, defeated before he had ever set
sail. Yet he hid his resolvc from his geueraIs, even from the
senior officer, Clinloll, who would have suceeeded to the com-
lDand if he had fallen sick or received a chance bullet. They
I Courl Marlial ProcudinB$, p. 228. Bc adds that his only chance (as he
thought) was that oonceivably he might find Tarragona so ill-fortified
that he migllt risk nn imlllediate ll~!)(Lult 00 ullfioi~hed defences.
• Ibid" I), 202.
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nil complained that he never gavc them any hint of what wel'e
his intentions, or showed them Wellington's orders which it
was his duty to c<'\rry out. • \Ve were totally uninform~,'said
CIinton at the court martial, •of the instructions which the
Commander of the forces might have for his guidance 1. The
first that we knew of these instructions of the Commander of the
forces, and then partially only, was wh~ he produced them at
a Council of War on June 17th,' after the siege of 'l'arrngona
was over. Clinton,l\fa.ckenzie, and Adam, the three commanders
of units, were all very confident in their men: • they wcre in
thcbighcststntc of discipline and equipment 2,' said JrIackenzie,
and spoiling for a fight. Hence their entire amazemcnt as they
discovered that Murray was intending to avoid all oCIensive
opcrations: it even led to an infraction of discipline, when
Mackenzie, Adam, and General Donkin 3 called together on their
commander to urge on bim a more active policy 4, and were
chased out of the room with the words • it 'will not do ,-
a decision which, as Mackenzie remarked, ' was unanswerable '.
For any further urging of the point would have amounted to
military disobedience. From the moment when the army
landed at Cape Salou on June 3rd, down to the day of its igno·
minious flight on June 12th, Mun;ay was thinking of nothing
but horrible possibilities-he was what the French call a
catastrophard.
Probably his most disastrous resolve of all was that which
he came to when first he surveyed Tarragona, Oil the
evening of his disembarkation. 'fhough he noted the
half-ruinous condition of the two outworks, on which
the enemy was working to the last moment, their isolated
position, and the fa",! that they were surrounded by all sorts
of cover easily to bc seized, hc resolved to lay formal sicgc to
them, as if they were the solid front of a regular line of defence.
As Napier remarks with perfect gooU sense, they should have
been dealt with as Wellington dealt with the Redoute Renaud
at Rodrigo, or Hill with the forts of Almaraz, which were far
more formidable works than the Fuerte Real or San Carlos 6.
1 Court Martial Proceedinglf, p. 188.
I The Quartcnnastcr-Gcneral or the Army.
I Note, Napicr, v. p. 147.
, Ibid., p. 165.
• PrO(;eedinglf, p. HloS.
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They should have been taken by force, escaladed, 011 the night
of the formation of tile blockade. And being incomplete, ill-
flanked, and without palisades or ditch, and under-manned,
they undoubtedly eould have been rushed. But Mueray, instead
of trying to gain time for the prompt attack on the main
fortress alld its badly-stoppelI hreaches, proceedcd to layout
approaches and commence batteries on the low ground by the
mouth of the Franeoli river, with the object of reducillgthe two
outworks by regular operations. On June 4t.h one battery was
commenced Ileal' the sea, 600 yards from San Carlos, another
farther inland, 000 yards from the E\terte Heal. Their construc-
tion was covered by a naval bombardment: Admiral Hallowcll
moved into the roadstead a brig, three bomb-vessels, and two
gunboats, which shelled the Upper City freely, in order to
distract the attention of the garrison from tIte work on the
batteries by the Franeoll. The fire was kept up from dusk till
dawn Oll the 4th-5th, alId repeated on the 6th-7th during the
same hours-throughout the day the workers ill the trenches kept
low. This bombardment had the desired result of permitting
the batteries to be finished without molestation, but inflicted
no great damage on the city, though it set fire to some houses,
and caused casualties both among the garrison and the inhabi-
tants. But unaimed night-fire had of course no effect on thc
walls of the enceinte.
By dawn on the 6th the two batteries were ready and opened
on the outworks with six guns: they kept up the fire all day,
and with some effect, suffering themselves very little from the
distant counter·fire of the Upper City. At dark, according to
the :Freneh narrative of the defence, parties of skirmishers
came out of the trenches, took cover in the ruins of the lower
city and kept up a persistent tiraillade against the outworks 1.
It was expected that they would try to rush- them at some
chosen hour-and this would undoubtedly have been the right
policy. But nothing of the kind happened; the British parties
withdrew at dawn, Hnd Bertoletti began to ask himself whether
the whole of these feeble operations were not a mere demonstra-
I All this from Vucuni (vi. p_ a21), the only full Freneh source:
lean f1.nd 110 melltion 01 this abortive demonstration from the Britisll
side.
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tion, intended to draw the French armies of Valencia and
Catalonia toward 'l'arragona, while the real blow wa~ being
delivered in some other quarter.
During the second night of naval bombardment, that of the
6th-7th, Murray had ordered a third breaching battery to be
built, nenr the bridge of the F'rll.ncoli, 800 yards closer to the
Fuerte Real than the original battery, No. 2. On the morning
of the 7th all three batteries were hard at work, and with good
effect; the gorge of the Fuene Ue.'!l was blown to bits by flank
fire from the new battery, its onc gun silenced, its parapet
levelled for a long space: the garrison had to keep under cover.
At dusk Major 'l'haekeray, the se~ior enginecr of the army,
rcported that the work could be stormed at any moment.
According to Murray's narrative 'l'hackeray mooe at the same
moment the curious comment, that if the fort were ese....tladed
and occupied, the ground gained would be of no immediate usc
for the attaek on the Upper City, whose most accessible front-
the bastions of San Juan and San Pablo-might be much more
easily battered from the slopes of thc Olivo hill, farther inland,
than from the low-lying site of the Fuerte Real. To storm the
outworks would <.:ost men-to build new advanced batteries
011 or near them would cost many more, sinec they were com-
pletely commanded by the Upper City. • As the state of the fort
was now such that it could be taken whenever eonvenient,'
wrote Murray, • I consented to defer the attack, and directed
that the fire upon it should·continue only sufficiently to prevent
its being re.established 1.'
The decision seems of more than doubtful wisdom. It was
from ground near the Fuerte H.eal that Suchet had pushed
forward his approaches in the siege of 1811, and his batteries in
the lower town had proved effective. To resolve, after four days
spent on battering the outworks, that it was better to attack
from a new front, was equivalent to sacrificing the whole of the
exertions of those four days, and starting the siege anew. Dut
Murray accepted Thackeray's scheme, though the engineer
warned him that he should require fourteen days more of open
trenches to reduce the Upper City. 'l'his would relegate the
crisis of the final assault to July 21st, and meanwhile Suchet
Court MartUil ProceemlJglI, p. 4,(l.
356.e K k
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and Decacn would have had three weeks to concentrate,
instead of one. The time-problem looked very unsatisfactory.
However the new plan was taken up-more artillery and
engineer-stores and morc guns were landed on the bench west
of the mouth of the Francoli, as were also the remainder of the
horses of the caYulry and the field.gwlf:l. The disembarkation
was not always cas}', as the surf on the bcacJl grew dangerous
whenever the wind was high. On several days communication
with the shore had to be given up for many hours on cnd.
Murray complained that the foreign troops worked slowly and
unwillingly, and that he had to replace them with British
parties, in order to get up the ammunition from the boats to the
batteries 1.
However, progress was made, and in the fOUI days between
the 7th nnd the loth of June two heavy batteries were thrown
lip on the high-lying slopes of the Olivo hill, in positions from
'which they could bring an enfilading as well as a frontal fire to
beaT upon the three corner bastions of the Upper City, including
the roughly repaired breaches in the curtain, by which Suchet
had made his entry in 18Il. On the 9th and again on the 10th
Admiral Hallowell sent his available vessels in-shore to resume
the bombardment; and late on the latter day the batteries on
the Olivo began their fire, which they continued on the following
morning: it was very effective, all the attacked bastions and
the curtain between them being much damaged. Meanwhile
the old batteries by the Francoli overwhelmed the :Fuerte Real
Dud San CarIos forts with renewed fire, destroying such repairs
us the garrisons had been able to carry out. The Governor,
Bertoletti, made up his mind that there would be a general
assault both on the forts and on the Upper City ou the night
of the 11th, and made such.preparations as he could to receive
it. But the prospect was gloomy-the garrison was worn out,
the walls were crumbling, and there seemed no hope of succour
from without.
Meanwhile, harassed fiS the Governor might be, l\lurray was
in n.n even greater state of depression. He had never believed,
as he acknowledged at his eourt martini, that he could succeed.
The only gleam of hope which ever entered his mind was when
• l\furraY'li evidence at the Court Martial, p. 50.
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on thc mornillg of the 8th he received news that the fort of
Balaguer had bcen taken, so that the road by which Suchct
could most en.sily arrive was completely blocked. At any rate
there would be a day or two gained, since the army of Valencia
would have to take difficult and circuitous roads, instead of
a short and direct one, when it came up.
The siege of the Fort of San ]'elipe dc Balaguer had lasted
four days. The place was small, only sixty yards squnre; it
mounted twelve guns, but was held by only a single company,
It was in a rocky and inaccessible position, and when Colonel
Prevost had landed with his brigade, and had reconnoitred thc
place on the 3rd, he found that it must be battered by heavy
gUllS. Shelling it with field pieces proved unavailing. Accord-
ingly aid was sought from the fleet, and with great difficulty
the sailors of the Invincible got two 12·poundcrs and a howitzer
ashore, to a spot 700 yards from the fort. But the ground
was so steep and rocky that it was difficult to construct a.
battery, and when the fire was opened it proved not very
etreetive, It was only when more guns hnd been hoisted up the
rocks, to a position only 300 yards from the fort, that anything
was accomplished, On thc evening of the 7th a lucky bomb
(rom n mortar exploded onc of the French magazines, and the
commandant surrcndered 1. It was thought that he might
have held out longer, as his main magazinc was intact-but
nearly a third of his garrison of 150 mcn had becn Inut, and their.
morale was low. With the capture of Fort San Felipe the coast
road became absolutely blocked to any troops coming from
Suehet's direction, and l\furray, as he confessed, • entertained
a ray of hope, not so much of the capture of Tarragolla itself,
but that the expedition might prove, as Lord Wellington
wished it to provc, an effective diversion in favour of the allied
army in Valencia 2.' It was this success, as he explained, which
encouraged him to remain two days longer in front of Tarragona
than he would otherwise have done, since the loss of the coast·
road would add two marches to the distance which Suchet had
to cover in order to join Decnen,
1 PreV06t's very moderate 10S!i was 1 offioer und 4 men killed. 1 sergeant
and 38 men wounded. TlUs includes Spaniards.
I Courl Martial. Murmy's defenoe, p. 228.
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For already this downhearted general was obsessed with
I);:mic fears that the enemy might be upon him at any moment.
He was gleaning in every rumour of the near approach of
Sucltct and Dccaen, however incredible. On the 4th he had
received an express from Prevost, with a message that the
Mu.rshal had reached Tortosa and might be at the Col de
Balagucr on the 5th. On the 7th there was a report that
a heavy French column was at Amposta., near the mouth ofthc
Ebro, marching north. And on the other side Decaen was said
to bein movement-' Could I ever hnvc expected,' said Murray,
a year later, 'that his army would not be united, that his
movable column would have remained divided at Gerorm,
Figucrns, and Bn.rcclona 1 ?' Accordingly he wrotc that night
to 'Wellington, • I run much afraid we have undertaken more
than we are able to perform. But to execute your Lordship's
orders I shall persevcre as long as prudence will pcrmit. I hu\'c
as yet no certain information of Suehet's movements, nor of
Deeaell to thc eastward. But there arc reports of both, and if
they provc true, irt five or six days I may be attacked by a force
infinitely ~upcrior, without thc hope of u. retreat in case of
misfortwlC. I calculate that Suehct cuu bring into the field
24,000 or 25,000 men without difficulty 2.' There is not a
thought in Murray's brain of the chance that one of the enemy's
colmnns might be late, and, that it might be possible from his
central position to fall upon the other, with his own forces and
those of Copons united.
As a matter of fact things were working out most favourably
for him. Suchet had seen the great transport-fleet pass the
coast of Vulell.cia 011 the 31st May; but he wa... wholly in doubt
whether the expedition might be intending to strike at 'l'ortosa
or Tarragona, at Barcelona or Rosas. The Marshal had to make
up his mind to act, before he knew his enemy's objective or his
exact numbers. After many searehillgs of heart he resolved
to keep the bulk of his forces ill the kingdom of Valencia, which
he was most wl\villing to give up, and to march with a column
of moderate strength to reinforce the Army of Catalonia. He
left Harispe in command in the South. with his own division.
, l'o1tlrTay·s De!e'lCt. p. 232.
• Murrny to Wellington, SupplcmcnUlnJ DiI,paldleS, vii. p. 467.
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that of Habert, Severoli's Italians, and the bulk of his cavalry,
and resolved to move on TOl'tosll. with 1'IIusllier's division, his
hussar regiment, three batteries of artillery, and an improviSed
brigade under General Panneticr, composed of four battalions
borrowed some time back from the Army of Catalonia, one
battalion of his own, and an odd squadron of Westphalian
light horse belonging to the Army of the Centre. The whole
made up about 8,000 men I, a force so weak that it was clear
that he dared Il'otattack Murray till he should he joined by the
troops of Decnen. Pannctier's brigade had a long start, as it
was about Castellon and Segorbe when the order to march
nrrived: it reached 'l'ortosa on June 8th, and Perello on the
Dnlaguer road on the lOth. Then the news came in that the
fort of San Felipe had capitulated two days before. Pannetier
baited, and sent hack the information to Suchet, who had
reached Tortosa on the Oth, escorted by a squadron ofdragoons.
But 1'IIusnier's division had t.'l.ken some time to assemble, only
left Valencia on the 7th, and was far behind. Suchet was in no
small perplexity this day. The coast-road was blocked: it was
the only one by which guns and trrmsport could move directly
on Tarragona. No news whatever had been received of Decaen
and the Army of Catalonia. Musnier eould not reach Tortosa
till the 11th. Should he recall Pannetier, wait for the nrrivnl of
the rest of his column, and thcn march with his whole force by
the circuitous inland road along the Ebro, by Cincstnr, Tivisa,
and Momblanch, so as to reach thc plnin of 'l'arragonn from thc
north? This would lead to insullcrablc delnys-the country
was desolate and waterless, and when the column reached its
goal thc Army of Copons, with help perchance from Murray,
would be in the way. Ten days might ensily hc wasted, and
meanwhile Tarragona would probably have fallcn. Informa-
tion must at all costs be got, aud the Marshal fmaUy ordered
Pannetier to drop all his impedimenta, and push with his
I Mllsnier'~ division Imd 4,100 mcn present. by its return of June 15th.
['annetier's column consisted of two battalions eaeh of the 3«1 Ugcr and
20th Linc and onc of the 5th Ugcr find a squadron of Wcstphaliallll-by
lhe relum of the su.me uule 2,600 in nil. 1'11C hus~ars were 650 snures-----
adding the squadron of drflgoons (200), the gunnern of three butteries,
tmin, &c.; the wllole may have made jllst tmder 8,000 or all arms. Sce
Tables in Appendix, p. 755.
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infantry alone by mountain paths fromPerello to A[onroig, on the
edge of the hills overlooking the plain of Tarragona. This was
to take a dangerous risk-a brigade of 2,500 bayonets might
easily be surrounded by the Catalaos and cut oH. But the
attention of Copons was at this moment distrncted to the other
direction. Pnnnctier reached the slopes above Monroig on the
night of the Hth-12th, and could get no information there-
the people had fled up into the mountains. The only Cact that
came to his notice was that no cannonading could be heard
next morning from the direction of Tarragooa: the most
natural deduction was that the place had fallen. Blit in case
it might still be resisting, Panneticr ordered a row of bonfires to
be lighted along the hill-sides, which he thought would be visible
to the beleaguered garrison, and would show that succour was
at hand. lIe then drew off again by the same rough paths
by which he had come, and returned to Valdellos, half-way back
to Perel1o. From thence he could only send n report of a nega·
tive kind to Suehet, who was left none the wiser for this risky
reconnaissance. :Meanwhile Musnier's division had at last come
up, but there had also arrived the news that Del Parque and
Elio were on the move in Valencia, and were pushing back
Harispe's advanced troops. On the 12th-18th-14th the
Marshal £cmaillcd stationary, waiting vainly for news, and
fearing the worst. Murray, if he had but known it, hud nothing
to fear from this quarter.
On the other flank also things were working out in the best
possible fashion for the besieger of Tarragona. There was a long
delay before the Army of Catalonia could prepare a field force
which could dare to face the Anglo-Sieilians. Decaen himself
was at Gerona, far away to the North, and got the news of
i\lurray's landing on June 5th, by a dispatch sent him by
Maurice Mathieu, .Governor of Barcelona. He had no troops
under his hand save the four battalions of Beurmann's brigade
of Lamarque's division; he could only coiled more men by
cutting down the garrisons of Figueras and Puycerda, and
calling in two brigades (those of Petit and Espert) which were
acting as flying columns at the moment, and were out of touch,
in the sub-Pyrennean foot-hills. The news that a very large
disembarkation had taken place near 'l'arragona struck him at
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first with such dismay that" he replied to Maurice Mathieu that
they could not hope to resist such a force, and that it might
even be necessary to evacuate Barcelona 1. However, resolving
to do what he could, he ordered Deurmann's brigade to march
on Barcelona (June 8), and sent orders around for a general
shifting of the northern garrisons, so thnt he hoped to collect
another 4,000 men at Gerona in the course of a week, if the
flying columns could be discovered and brought in. With this
reserve he intended to come down to join the rest of the field
force about the 14th or 15th. Meanwhile he ordered Maurice
If!nthieu to demonstrate against the enemy, without risking
anything, or quitting the valley of the Llobrcgat and the vicinity
of Barcelona.
Maurice Mathieu was the only one oC the generals in Catalonia,
Frcnch or allied, who deservcs any credit Cor his conduct in this
campaign ofblWlders. He rcsolved that the onc thing necessary
was to takc the oHensive, and to thrcaten the besiegers of Tana-
gona, even if he dared not venture to attack them. Beurrnann's
brigade having arrived on June 10th, hc marched ncxt day with
it and four battalions of his own to Villafranca, half-way
bctween Barcelona and Tarragona, and drove in Copons' out-
posts-leaving his base-fortress occupied by a very inadequate
garrison. He had only 6,000 infantry and 300 horse with him,
so that he was wholly incapable of facing Murray's expeditionary
force if it should show fight. Meanwhile he sent letters to
Decaen, telling him that the honour of the Army of Catalonia
was at stake, and that it was necessary for him to come down
from Gerona without delay, and with every available man. But
the Commander-in-Chief did not appear-he was detained by
a naval demonstration in the Bay of Rosas. For Sir Edward
Pellew, then in command of the Mediterranean Fleet, had run
down from his usuar cruising ground opposite '1'oulon, and con-
centrated a numerous squadron off the coast of the Ampurdam.
He came elose in-shore, made a great display of boats, and even
landed a few hundred marines on June 8th. The news of this
disembarkation filled Decaen with the idea that the 'farragonfl
expedition was only a snare, intended to make him draw off all
his forces southward, and that the tnle blow would be struck at
I Deca.en to M. ~lathieu, 5th June: scc Vidlll de la llhlCile, i. 3,;::1.
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Rosas. He concentrated his scattered troops with the object
of parrying it, and wo.s so long in detecting his mistake that it
was only on June 15th that he set out from Gcrona, with four
battalions and onc squadron, to join Maurice MaUueu, having
at last discovered that Pellcw could do no real mischief.
The Governor of Barcelona, therefore, had never more than
6,000 men at his disposition during the critical days of the
campaign-Jwlc llth-12th-13th-Htb. He had, as has been
mentioned above, reached Villafranca on the first-named day.
There he received what had been longed for in vain up till now,
n detniled dispatch from Suchet, setting forth his intentions.
nut it was no less than twelve days old, having been written at
Valencia on :May SIst, before the Marshal had any knowledge of
Murray's strength, objective, or intentions. It stated that he
was intending to march via Tortosa, and that he hoped that
Decnen with all his disposable field force would eome down to
meet himat Reus, wuess indeed the Anglo-Sicilians \\'ereaimingat
some more northern point, in which case he would have to follow
them to Upper Catalonia. But he added that it was possible that
the whole naval expedition might be a mere feint, intended to
lure him northward beyond the Ebro; the lIeet might turn back
again and re-land the whole of 1I1urray's force near Valencia 1.
The dispatch was hopelessly out of date, and l\Iaurice Mathieu
had no means of knowing whether Suchet had carried out his
original intentions. But his first impression was that he must
seek for the Marshal at Reus, according to the directions given.
Accordingly on June 12 he pushed his vanguard as far as Arhos,
six miles in advance of VilIafranca, and some 24 miles from
Tarragona. But nothing could he heard of the Marshal's
approach, and Capons' troops were gathering in from all sides
to block the road, while Murray was only one march away.
Seized with sudden misgivings at finding' himseJf close to
20,000 enemies with such a trifling force, Mathieu made up his
mind that it would be madness to push on. At 10 o'clock on
the night of the 12th-13th 2 he evacuated both Arbos and
• Suchet to Decaen, Valencia, May 31. Sce Vidal de In lllachc. i. p. 352.
I Report 01 Brigadier Lluuder, commanding Copons' left wing, to Murray.
Proceedings, p. 100. LlaUtler adds that be had discovered that Mathicu's
column Wll)! only 5,1>00 ~hung.
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Villafranea, and retreated in haste to Barcelona, to await the
arrival of Decu.en and the reserve.
Murray's miserable timidity now intervened, to save Tarra-
gana, just when both the French forces had found themselves
foiled, and had given up thc relief of thc fortress as impossible.
The story rends like the plot of a stupid theatrical fu.rce, wherc
cvcry character does thc wrong thing, in ordcr to produce
absurd complications in the situation. On the 12th Pannetier,
on the hills abovc l\Ionroig, heard no bombardmcnt, because
the bombardmcnt had ceased. And Mauriee Mllthieu on the
night of that same day was running away from an enemy who
had already absconded that very aftenlOon. So, after coming
within 85 miles of each other, the two French generals had
turned back in despair and given up the game. But Murray
had given it up also.
The bombardment had gone on very successfully throughout
the 11th June, and the engineers reported at noon that the
Fuerte Real could be stormed at any moment, and that thc
works of the Upper City were crumbling in many 1)laces. Orders
were issued that Mackenzie's division should storm the Fuerte
Real at 10 p.m., while Clinton's was to make a demonstration
against the Upper City. All arrangements were made, and after
dark the troops designated for the assault filed into the advanced
trenches: the signal was to be by a flight of rockets 1. But the
rockets never went up.
For some days :Murray had been in a state of agonized
indecision. On the 9th he had received information from
a trusted secret agent in Valencia that Suchet had marched for
Tortosa on the 7th with 9,000 men-this was absolutely certain
and showed that all the previous rumours from the South had
been false. On the same day a dispatch came in from Eroles
at Vich to say that a. French column (Beurmnnn's brigade) had
left Gerona on the 8th, marching for Barcelona, and that he
intended to follow it with his own detachment. and would join
Copons before the enemy could concentrate. The French then
were on the move on both flanks-but still far oH. On thc night
of the lOth General Manso, commanding on Copons' right flank.
, Scc especially Clinron'R evidence on pp. 180-2 01 Murruy $ CauTt
Murliul.
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reported the approaching departure or Maurice Mathicu from
Barcelona, but overrated his force at 10,000 men. Hc undertook
to detain them in the defiles beyond VilIafranca for at least onc
day. This news was corroborated next evening by an officer of
Whittingham's start, who had seen the column, estimated it at
7,000 to 8,000 infantry, and reported that it had entered
VilIafmnco. at 4. p.m. on the 11th 1. But it wns the movements
of Suchct which gave Murray the greater alarm: by ingenious
miscalculations 11 he had arrived at the statistieul conclusion
that the Marshal had got 12,000 or 18,000 men of all arms with
him, instead of the real 8,000 3. And when the arrival of
Panneticr's brigade at Pere110 on the lOth was reponed to him
on the following dlLy, he proceeded to assume that the French
column was all closed up: 'the Marshal with 13,000 men was
within two long marches of Tarragona 4.' Many generals would
have asked for no better opportunity than that of being placed
in a central position with some 23,000 mcn-the Anglo-Sicilian
troops and those of Capons exceeded that figure-while two
hostile columns, one of 18,000 men nnd the other of 10,000,
35 miles apart, were trying to join each other ncross a difficult
country by bad roads. (As a matter of fact, of course, the
French force was much smaller-no more than 8,000 men on
the West, and 6,000 on the East, though M:urray must not be
too much blamed for the over~cstimate.) But the two governing
ideas that ruled in thc brain of the unfortunate general were
firstly the memory of Wellington's warning that' the one thing
that could not be forgiven would be that the corps should be
beaten or dispersed " and secondly the fact that his army was
composed of heterogeneous material, some of which might be
found wanting at a crisis. But he concealed his downhearted~
• See Manso's letter and Guillot's report on pp. 275-0 of the COlirt
JUarlwl Prot:udings.
I For which sce COUTt Marlicl Procudings, pp. 282-3.
I His main blunder was that he took Pannetier's brigade to be a separate
item of 8,000 men, over and above the 9,000 men coming from Valencia
of whom his emissary had written. He also douhled Suehet's cavalry, by
supposing that the 9th bi8 of Htl.S$8TS and the 12th Hussars were two
scpurotc regimenta. But tllCy were the Sllme unit, lhc number having
recenUy been changed by order from Paris•
• • COlirl Marlw! ProcudinBs, p. 285.
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ness till the last moment, both from his own lieutenants and
from the Spaniards. On the 10th he rode out to meet General
Copons at Torre dem Barm, to which place the Catalan head·
quarters had just been moved, and agreed with him to defend
the line of the Gaya river against the column coming from
Barcelona. He promised to send up all his cavalry, 8,000
infantry, and two field batteries to join the Spanish army, which
was now concentrated across the two roads by which Tarragona
could be approacbed from Villafranca. Five battalions were
on the northenl road, by the Col de Santa Cristina, four and the
three squadrons of horse on the southern route, nearer the sea.
Warnings were issued to Clinton's and Whittingham's divisions,
an!l also to Lord Frcd.crick Bentinck, the cavalry brigadier, to
be ready to march to the line of the Gaya 1. This looked like
business, and the spirits of the Anglo-Sicilians were high that
night.
On the morning of the 11th, while the bombardment of
Tarrogona was going on in a very satisfactory way, Murroy rode
out again, met Capons at Vcndrils, behind the Gays, and spent
much time in inspecting the chosen positions. He disliked
them; the river was fordable in many places, and a very long
front would have to be guarded: it was considered that the
French might break through by one of the roads befOI:e the
troops guarding the other could arrive. However, adhering to
his promise of the lOth, l\lurray ordered up Bentinck 'with two
squadrons of hussars and two guns to the mouth of the Gaya,
where they took over the outposts on the coast-road. 'l'he
infantry was not brought up--as the assault on '1'arragona was
to take place that evening. The only news from the front
received in the afternoon were rumours that Maurice Mathieu
had actually reached Villafranca 2.
At seven o'clock Murray started home, and reached his head·
quarters before Tarragona two hours later. There he found
a batch of reports awaiting him, which finally broke down his
resolution to fight, and drove him to the ignominious flight
1 See evidence of Bentinek, p. 175, and Clinton, p. l80, of COUf1 Mariwl
Procudi,,&s.
• Evidence of Captain Milncr. ibid., P' 397. This was not true at the
moment, cl1rl~' in the morning.
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which he had already contemplated on more than one day
during the preceding wcek. Two Spanish officers had come in
from the Col de Sant<'\ Cristina, to report that the Barcelona
column had certainly occupied Villafranea, and was apparently
pushing on beyond it: this was discouraging. But the docu-
ment which Mureay regarded as all-important was 11 note from
his adjutant-general, Donkin, to the effect that peasants, who
had just come in from Perello, reported that Suchet's column
had continued its advance: 'This corps of infantry may be at
Reus to-moreow, if they think proper to march by Perello
'lDithaut artillery. And Deca.en (i. e. Mnthieu), if he marched
this day to Villnfranea, cnn <'\Iso rench Ueus to·morrow. This
possibility may, perhaps, make somc change in your arrange-
ments 1.' As a matter of fact, we have ahcady sccn that it was
only Pnnnctier's brigade which hod gone across the hiJIs from
Percllo towards Monroig, and that this was a mcre recon-
naissance.
But Donkin's picture of Suehet and the Barcelona column
joining at Reus, in his rear, on the 12th, with forces which
Murray's imagination raised to 25,000 men, was so much in
consonnnce with the fears which had been obsessing the brains of
the Commander-in-Chief throughout the Inst ten days, that be
felt that his nightmn.re was coming true. There could be no
doubt that he was on the brink of a disaster like the Ostend
catastrophe of 1798 2• Of course Suchct's active brain had
planned his complcte dcstruction. He tclls us in his defencc 3
that he asked himself whethcr it was probablc that an officer of
the :Ptfarshal's activity and reputation would have lcft a man"
more than hc could help in Valcncia. 'Was it the eharactcr of
1\ French gcncral to act with inadequate means when ample
mCllIlS were within his rcach? Was it probable that he would
have brought a small force only from the XUCllr by the fatiguing
march to Tortosa? Would he have left a man idle in the south
whcn in danger of losing his commlUlication with France?
Every disposable corps, many more than what might be caleu·
I o.:lIlkin to !'>lunay, 3 p.m. 11th June. Court Martial ProceedilIg~.p. 360.
I He rccmJlll this forgotten disaster in his defence (p. 3(0). A IRuding
force cut off by storms from its tmnsports boo to surrender whole.
I ermrl Martifll Proccedi"g$, pp. 285-6.
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latcd to be fairly disposable, must be with the Marshal.' He
might have not 18,000 men hut many more. And the Barcelona
column might be not 10,000 men but 18,000.
Rather than take the risk of waiting one day longer in his
present position, Murray resolved to abscond by sea, while the
enemy was still twenty miles away from 'farragona. By
9.30 p.m. he had sent his staff officers with messages to his
divisional generals to stop the projected assault, to order all
gUllS, horses, and stores to be got on ship-bon.rd, and the
infantry after them. He calculated, in his panic, that he had
only eighteen hours in hand: thc rc-embarkation must be over
by dusk on the 12th. But the most disgraceful part of his
I;eheme was that hc had resolved to leave Copons and the
Catalans to their fate, after having brought them to the Gayn
by definite promises of assistance, without which they would
never havc taken up their fIghting position, and this though
he had renewed his pledges that same morning. He sent 110
warning of his teal intentions to his colleaguc, hut only told
him that reccnt information had made it necessary for him to
rc-embark his battering train; hut six Anglo-Sieilian battalions
should be sent out next morning, to strengthen the forcc behind
the Gaya.
There followed a night and a morning of confusion. No one
III the expeditionary force had hitherto suspected Murray's
wavering confidence, except Admiral Hallowell, to whom he had
on .Tunc 9th made the remark that he imagined that they ought
to be thinking about getting away in safety rather than about
prolonging the siege, and the Quarter-Master-General, Donkin,
to whom on the same day Murray had said that he suspected
that they would have ere long to depart, whereupon that ofliccr
had drawn up a secret scheme for the details of re-embarkation t.
Butsinee nothing more had been henrd about such a move on the
10th or the 11th, Hallowell and Donkin had supposed that the
idea was abandoned. Clinton and the other senior officers had
been kept entirely in the dark, till the sudden orders of 9.80 p.m.
were delivered to them. At midnight Admiral HaJlowell came
in to Murra)"s quarters to protest against the hasty departure,
which would cause all manner of confusion and ensure the loss
1 OQnkin's evidence, Court Manial Procudings, p. oWS.
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of much valuable material: they parted after all angry alterca·
tion. Colonel Williamson (commanding the artillery) also
appeared, to say that in the time given him he eould get off the
guns in the batteries near the shore, but not those on the distant
Olivo. He understood the general to reply that he might be
granted some extra hours, and that the Olivo guns might be
brought down after dark on the 12th 1.
But in the morningMurray's apprehension grew progressively
worse. He had at first intended to do something to cover
Copons' inevitable retreat, and ordered Clinton to throw out six
battalions towards the Gnya. But he soon cancelled this order,
and directed llentinck to bring back his cavalry and guns from
Altafulla without delay. At 0 a.m. a message was sent to
Williamson, to say that the guns on the Olivo must be spiked or
destroyed, as it would be perilous to wait till night 2. Half an
hour later Murray's notions of retreat llickercd round to a ncw
scheme-the troops on the shorc should embark thcre; but
those on thc northern heights-the divisions of Clinton and
Whittingham-should march to the Col de Bala.guer via Con-
stauti, and takc ship in the much better harbourage behind
Cape Salou. Half an hour later he abandoned this scheme, and
ordered them down to the beach by the Francoli, there to
embark without delay.
This disp.'ltch reduced Clinton to a state of cold rage: at the
court martial in 1814 he produced seven separate orders which
he had received between dawn and 1.30 that day: they were all
contradictory, and deserve record as showing Murtay's state of
mind during the criticn.l hours. (1) 'l'he first, received cnrly,
directed him to take six battalions towards the Ga.yn, to cover
the retreat of Copons from Altafulla. (2) The second, sent off
at 9 o'clock, told him not to execute this ma.rch, but to wait till
the Spaniards had cleared off, and then to move, not with six
battalions but with the whole of his own and Whittingham's
divisions, to Constanti 3. (8) The third was to the efieet that
Williamson's evidence, PTocudingt, p. 124•
• Williamson's evidence, ibid., p. 125.
• !'tIr. FortCSCllc has, I think, misinterpreted this order, when be says
that it told C1inton to march to the same spot as the first (IJritUh Army,
ix. p. 63), for Constanti is not in the direction of the Gnya, but 011 the
opposite Jlallk, west of the Franeali river.
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the baggage should be sent to the Col de Balaguer, to which the
whole anny would now proceed 1. (4) Half nn hour later
Clinton was told to cancel the last two dispatches, and to come
down to head-quarters on the nenrest beach. (5) A supple-
mentary verbal order directed that the guns in the Olivo
batteries should be spiked. (6) 'l'wenty minutes later Ctinton
was told that the guns might still be saved: Whittingham's
Spaniards should remain on the Olivo and guard them till dusk,
when the artillery would try to get them down to the shore.
(7) Lastly, at LOO, the final order cancelled the sixth, it directed
(once more) that Whittingham's troops must follow Clinton's
for instant embarkation, and that the guns should be spiked.
without delay. This was done, to the intense disgust of the
gunners, who had been getting everything ready for an orderly
retreat after dusk. Seventeen heavy pieces in good condition,
and one more which had been disabled, were spiked and left in
the Olivo batteries, while the infantry hurried down to the
shore.
The momentary wavering in Murray's orders during the early
morning, when he seemed inclined to risk a longer stay, and to
march Clinton's division and the baggage by land to the
anchorage by the Col de llalaguer, was apparently caused partly
by new remonstrances from HalloweD, partly by an interview
with some of his subordinates, somewhere between 8 and 0 a.m.,
Mackenzie, Adam, Donkill, and Thaekeray, the chief engineer,
entercd thc housc of the Commander-in-Chicf together, and
Adam, as thcir spokesman, urged him with great heat not to
embark, but to advance, join Copons, and attack the French
on the Gaya with every available man. Murray replicd that if
he did so, the French would refuse to fight and give back toward
Bareelona; while Suchet, coming from the other direction,
would cut him off from the fleet and relieve Tarragona. But if,
on the other hand, he were to march against Suchet, and stop
him, then the Barcelona column would relieve '!'arragona and
get the expeditionary force separated from its transports.
Either course would be equally ruinous. He nlso said that
Wellington had told him' not to commit the army'. 'l'!;le
generals withdrew-further insistence would have amounted to
1 A queer misprint in this dispatch makClllt say' the enemy will march.'
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military insubordination. The final hurry-scurry order, to
destroy the brtll1S and embark pell-mcll, was caused b)' news
from Copons that the French at Villafranca had advanced as
far as Arbos. only ten miles from the Gaya, and seemed still to
be coming on.
During the night and the morning that followed all the guns
from the lower batteries, much valuable material, some of the
cavalry, and the infantry of Adam, were got aboard. 'fhe
shipment of artillery stores was still proceeding at 10 o'clock,
when :Murtay ordered that nothing but mell should now be
cmbarkcd-all else must be abandoned. Admiral HalloweD,
who was superintending the work on the beach in person, was
much incensed with this resolve, and took it upon himself to
direct the sailors in the boats to refuse infalltry~ and to go on
lading stores. Then came a deadlock-ITallowell said that there
was plenty of time to take off everything: Donkin, coming
down from Murray's quarters, maintained that the French were
only two and a half hours' march away, and that the infantry
must be got all at all costs: horses and mules might have to be
shot, and food and ammunition abandoned 1. There was much
disputing, but the naval men, obeying the admiral, continued
to embark horses and artillery material till midday, when
Mackcllzie's infantry began to pour down to the beaches,
followed by Clinton's llnd Whitting-harn's battalions 2.. All
through the afternoon theshippingoffoftroopseontinucd without
any interruption, till only a rearguard of 500 of Clillton's men
was left on shore. No news of the Freneh coming to hand, there
was a relaxation of the wild hurry which had prevailed between
9 a.m. and 2 p.m. Murtay permitted Bentinck to take that
part of the cavalry which had not yet embarked round to the
anchorage by the Col de Balaguer by land 3, and sent on behind
them twelve field-guns escorted by a half battalion of the
2/27th. Meanwhile, the troops having all got off, the boats
bega.n to load again "ith transport mules, entrenching tools,
, .Evidencc of Capblins Withers llnd BaUlUrst, R.N., Court M«rfilllPro-
oeedings, pp. 80 aDd 95.
• Mackenzie in his evidence llllYS his men began nt 2 p.m. to get into
the boats.
• Evidence of Dentinck, ibid., p. 176. The cavalry went oa at 3 p.m.
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sparc shot, platform timbers, sand bags, and biscuit. Thc rear
guard was not taken off tilllatc at night; and, even after it was
gone and dawn had come, thc sailors continued to find and takc
off various valuable leavings 1. No molestation whatevcr was
suffered from the garrison, who regarded the whole movement
as inexplicable, and only erept out with caution after the last
British troops had disappearcd, to fmd 18 spiked guns and somc
artillery stores in the Olivo batteries, and a eertain amount of
flour and beef barrels left on thc shore. The most distressing
part of the chronicle of this wretched day's work is Murray's
dealings with Copons. He had induced the Captain-General to
bring his army to the line of the Gaya, by the promise ofsupport-
ing him with 8,000 men, renewed on the morning of the 11th.
At dawn on the 12th the message was sent that six battalions
only could be spared. An hour or two later Copons received
the crushing news that the whole expeditionary army was
about to re-embark, abandoning him to his own resources. If
l\Iurray's view of the situation had been correct, the Spaniards
must have been caught between Suchet advancing on Heus and
Mathieu converging on the same point from Villafranea. His
moral guilt, therefore, was very great. But, as a matter of fact,
nothing disastrous happened. On hearing that he had been
left in the lurch, Copons withdrew the troops which he had at
Altafulla on the coast-road, to join those at the Col de Santa
Cristina, leaving the way to Tarragona open to Mauricc Mathieu,
and preparing to retreat into the mountains if necessary. He
keptacloselook-out upon theF'rencheolumn,and was astonished
011 the morning of the 18t~ to learn that, after sending a van-
guard to Arbos on the previous day, six miles down the southern
road, it had turned back at ten o'clock at night, and was llOW
in full retreat on Barcelona. 'fhe crisis was over for the
moment. Copons returned to his old head-quarters at Reus,
threw out a slight sexeen of troops to the line of Gaya, and
reoccupied Villafranca with n few cavalry. He was quite ready
• The hours 01 this belated work arc stated very diJtcteotly by various
naval witnesses, some of whom say that they worked till 1 a.m., others
till 4 lun., others till 7 j one thinks tlmt emlJarkations continued till
well into tile 10fCIloon of the 13th-say 11 o·dock. At any rate. the hour
must have been long arter daylight had come-which was at 4.15, as is
recorded by OI\C witness.
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to retreat into the mountains once more if any untoward
developments should supervene.
On June 18th Murray hnd all his army on ship-board,! save
Prevost's two battalions at the Col de Bnlaguer, and the guns
and cavalry with Bcntinck, which hOO marched by land to
that same pass. Wellington's orders told him that if he failed
at Tarragoll8 he was to return to Valencia, join &lio and Del
Parquet and fall upon the diminished French force on the
Xucar before Suchet could get back. It was his obvious duty
to pick up Prevosl's and Bentillck's detachments, and to depart
at once. He did nothing of the kind, but proceeded to employ
himself for several days in minor operations, in the vain hope
of redeeming the disgrace of June 12th.
On the morning of the 18th l\{urray received news from
Colonel Prevost at San Felipe to the effect that the French
column in front of him (Panlleticr's brigade), about 3,000
strong, had marehed from Pcrcllo by mountain paths east-
ward, but had not been followed by Suchct's "main body.
Prevost thought that it might be intending to cut him off from
the rest of the army by dropping down into the coast-road
in his rear. Pannetier's movement was also reported by
Bentinck, whose flank patrols had run against similar parties
of the French while on their way to the Col de Balaguer. It
was necessary to bring off Prevost, the cavalry, and the guns
by sea, if the French were trying to get l'Ound them. So
M:urray asked Admiral HaUowell to send ships inshore to the
Col, and with them part of Mackenzie's division 2, to act as a
covering force for the re-embarkation of l'revost's detachment.
These troops-apparently three battalions-were landed near
the fort late on the evening of the 18th,
• The total lOllS of Murroy's Army during the 'furragouu operotions
was:
KiUed. Wounded. MUrillg. Total.
British, Germans. Cal~br<:sc, Italian Levy 14 60 5 I
Sicilians. 15 102
Whittiog]ul.lll·S Spuninrd,; " 1 7
Dcrtoletti's garrison lost 13 killed and 85 wounded = 98. The cnemiC!l
did encll other little harm I
• Not apparently the whole division, for Mackenzie calls it ' a small body
9£ infantry.'
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Now during that day Pannetier, conscious that he was too
far away from his chief, and quite' in the air,' had drawn back
from near Monroig to Valdellos, ten miles nearer to PereUo.
The same idea had occurred to Suchet, who simultaneously
brought up his main body from Tortosa to Perello, though he
knew that the coast-road was blocked by the British force
holding l~ort San .Felipe. But on the morning of the 14th the
l\Iarshal, exploring toward the Col, sighted not only Mackenzie's
infantry on shore, but the whole transport fleet lying oH the
const from opposite the fort as far as Cape Salou-ISO ships
small and great, as he counted. A frigate and two brigs took
a number of long shots at the Marshal and his large escort, which
had to retire in ho.ste. Suchct saw the whole expeditionary
force bcfore him, and rceognized that he was too wcak to tackle
it. Wherefore he sent orders to Palllleticr to fall back and
rejoin him-and came to a halt. Early on the morning of the
15th he wrote to Deeaen :
'The loss of thc Col de Balagucr has foiled aU my plans. The
English fleet flrcd more than a thousand shot at us. Menaced
by forces of four times my own strength, I wish to know what
you proposc to do. The enemy [Del Parque] has attackcd my
lincs on the Xucar 1.'
Tlus last fact, at the moment, was worrying Suchet even
more than the unknown fate of Taxragona, for Harispc had
just reported that the two Spanish armies in Valencia had
advanccd against him in force, and on a long front. Now, wlule
the Marshal halted in indecision, Murray was scized with a
spasmodic fit of energy-he knew that l\Iauriee l\Iathicu was
for the moment out of the game; he saw that Suchet was
blocked, a.nd tha.t Pannetier was in a dangerously advanced
position. He concei ved the idea that he might land more
troops at the Col, and strike in between the French main body
and the brigade at Valdellos. To the astonishment of his
subordinates he ordered the rest of Mackenzie's troops and all
Clinton's to be landed, as also the remainder of the cavalry,
and instructed Mackenzie to make a forced march on Valdellos
and beat up }lanlletier's camp. The General did so, but arrived
only just in time to see the French rearguard absconding on
, Suchet, MblWires, ii. p. :$16.
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.the 15th 1. This demonstration of energy having failed, as it
was pretty certain to do (for events like the surprise of Arroyo
dos MoUnos are not common), Morray had another inspiration.
On the evening of the 15th 2 he suggested to Admiral Hallowell
that the garrison of 'l'arragona must now be quite off their
guard, that they had not been strengthened, and that it might
be possible to re-embark 5,000 men secretly at }~ort Bnlnguer,
land them at Cambrils, and make a sudden dash at Tarragona
by escalade or surprise. The Admiral answercd that as Murray
had not felt himself equal to storming Tarragona when the
whole army was with him, and the batteries playing on the
place, he (Hallowell) did not think him equal to it now with
5,000 men 3. The idea was dropped: it was not without its
merits, but though Pieton or Crnufurd might have succeeded
in such a desperate stroke, Murray would certainly have failed
from lack of nerve at the decisive moment, as the Admiral
meant to insinuate.
This wretched campaign was now nearing its end-but still
reserved two extraordinary surprises for its last days. On the
16th Suehet, much impressed with the strength which MW'ray
had shown, judging from the stroke at Valdellos that he was
thinking' of taking the orIcnsive, and harassed by fresh news
of Del Parque's advance on Valencia, retired from Perello, and
took his main body baek across the Ebro to Amposta, which he
reached on the 17th. He left only Pannetier's brigade and the
hussar regiment to wateh Murray. Thus the Anglo-Sicilians
had opposite them 011 the south only 3,000 men, (rom whom
110 possible danger could be apprehended. But their General
had no idea as yet that only a rearguard lay before him, and
imagined that the Marshal and his main body were close in
Pannetier's rear.
The second surprise took place on the other front. Maurice
:Mathieu had got back to Barcelona by a forced march on the
13th. On the next day spies brought him the news that
I Date stated by 90me as the 16tb, but the earlier day seems correct.
See Mackenzie'6 evidence, pp. 152--3: he was uncertain as to the date.
• Hallowell6R)'8 on the evening oftbe 14th or the 15th, he !orget.\l whicb.
But the latter date must be the true one.
I Hallowcll's speech, p. 554 of the Courl Martial PrfJCUdings.
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Murray had raised the siege of Tarragona, and gone away with
his whole army by sea. There wus nothing to prevent him from
relieving Bertoletti's garrison, save Copons' troops holding the
line of the Gays. Therefore, although Deeaen had not yet
arrived from the North, and indeed had written that he could
not start from Geron8 until the 17th, l\Iathieu resolved to make
a second attempt to reach Tarragona. He could still COlmt on
no greater force than thc 6,000 mCil with which he had madc
his first fruitless expedition; but hc thought this sufficient to
deal with the Catalans. He moved once morc upon ViIlafranca
early on the 15th, and reached that place the same night. Next
day a forced march of twenty-four miles brought him to Tarra-
gona unopposed; Cor Copons would not fight whcn unsupported
by]\[urray, and had withdrawn his troops to Valls. At Tarra-
gona Mathieu learned that the Anglo-Sicilians had not dis-
appeared entirely from Cata.lonia, as he had hitherto believed,
but were concentrated at and about the Col de Balaguer.
Though no news had been received from Suchet, it might be
conjectured that Murray had landed at the Col in order to
hold back the Marshal, who could not be very far off. On the
morning of the 17th Mathieu resolved to take the risky stel)
of advancing by the coast-road to feel for Murray's rear, and
marched out to Cambrils six miles west of Tarragona, hoping
to hear that Suchet was simultaneously attacking the front of
the Anglo-Sicilians. He wa.c; thereby exposing himself to
fearful danger, for l\Iurray had his whol~ 15,000 men in hand,
and quite disposable, since Suchet had withdrawn southward
on thc 16th. And Copons at Valls was in a position to cut in
upon the rear of the Barcelona column with 6,000 men more:
each of them was only ten miles from Cambrils, and they welt
in full communication with each other. Indeed, Murtay had
sent to Copons late on the 16th, imploring him to fall upon the
flank of the enemy, though he spoilt the effect of the appeal by
explaining that he was going to be attacked by Suchet and the
Barcelona column simultaneously, and expected to be out-
numbered-the :Marshal had 24,000 men (!), while 8,000 men
were coming via Tarragona against his rear. Startled by these
astounding figures, the Spanish General did not actually
attack Maurice :Mathieu, but contented himself with bringing
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forward his infantry to La SeI va and feeling for the French
column by cavalry patrols sent out from Reus.
The 17th June was a day as full of ridiculous cross-purposes
as the 12th. Suchet's main body was in full march for Amposta
and the road to Valencia 1, just ns Maurice Mathicu was at last
coming to look for it. l\1urray in the centre was expecting to
be attncked on both sides of the Col de Balaguer, believing
that the reckless advance of the Barcelona colunUl was timed
to coincide with a desperate assault on the Col by Suchct and
bis whole army. :Mathicu was advancing ill ignorance into a
death.trap, if he had only known it, expecting every moment
to hear gWlS in his front, or to get news of Suchct by spies or
patrols. Copons was hanging back on Mathieu's flank, deterred
from pressing in by J\[llrray's ridiculous overstatement of the
total French force. If l\furray had marched from the Col that
morning early with 10,000 men and had met the French column
at Cn.mbrils, while the Catalans closed in on its rear, no possible
chance could have saved it from complete destruction.
But l\furray was doing something very different; aftcr
having made his urgent appeal to Copons to take part in a
general action on the 17th, it o{.'Currcd to him that a general
action might perhaps be avoided by the simple method of
absconding once morc by sea-and again leaving the Catalans
to shift for themselves. Mackenzie was back from Valdellos,
and the whole force was concentrated in the pass, with the
immense transport fleet at its elbow, and several decent
embarkation places. In the morning he called a council of war
-which, as the old military proverb goes, 'never fights ,-
though he had assured Admiral Hallowell on the preceding
night that he had chosen his positions, and intended to stand
and receive the enemy's attack 2. The council of war voted,
by a large majority, for embarkation-probably as has been
acutely observed 3, because none of the generals liked the idea
of being commanded in action by Murray, after their recent
experience of his methods. The preparations for departure
1 PlIllllcticr's rcarguard followcd on the 17th. Sce letter of the Alenlde
01 PerclIo, Court Marlial, p. 361.
• Hallowell'~ speech, Court Marlifll Procuding8, p. 556.
• By I\Ir. }l~ortescuc, Ilistory of tire British Army, ix. 67.
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were begun on the afternoon of the 17th, but no notice of them
was sent to Copons.
Meanwhile l\faurice Mathieu had halted at Cambrils: he
could get no news of Suchet, and no fIring c~uld be heard in
frout. On the other hand, British warships ran closc inshore,
and began to cannonade his column, as it defiled along the
coast-road. And his cavalry patrols discovered those of Capons
in front of Reus, and afterwards got in touch with the Spanish
infantry behind them. The situation was getting unpleasant;
and reali:r.ing that he had better draw back, Mathieu turned
the head of his column inland to Reus, for he was determined
not to expose it a second time to the fire of the British ships,
which swept the coa.<;t-rond at many points. Marching in the
night of the 17th-18th he almost surprised Copons, who had
brought his infantry up to Reus in order to fall in with l\furray's
plan for attacking the enemy in flank. But the Spaniard was
warned in time, and escaped to La Selva, from whence he
,,{rote to Murray, to complain that the British had not kept
their part of the bargain, nor even sent him news of l\Iathieu's
retirement from their front.
At Reus the :French General picked up the spy to whom
Suchet had entrusted his despairing note of June 15, which
avowed his impotence and asked what the Army Qf Catalonia
could do 1. Seeing that he must hope for no help from the
Marshal, Mathieu retreated by the inJand road to Constanti,
two miles from Tarro.gona (June 18), where he ha.lted for a day,
after sending on Suchet's letter to his chief Decaen, and
renewing his former petitions that the reserves from the North
should get to Barcelono. as soon as possible. It was clear that
the Army of Cntalonin. must save itself, without any aid from
the Army of Valencia.
While Maurice Mathieu stood doubting at Cambrils, and aU
through the night hours while he was marching on Reus, there
had been a rapid shifting of scenes at the Col de Balaguer.
Murray's orders for re-embarkation were just drawn up when
a formidable fleet of men-or-war became visible on the horizon,
and presently ran close inshore. This was Sir Edward PeUew
with the 'i'oulon blockading squadron, twelve line of battle ships,
I Scc above, p. 515.
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besides smaller craft. They had run down from the Bay of
Rosas, after picking up at Port Mahon a vessel from Sicily, on
which was Lord WiUiam Bentinck, who had at last arrived to
assume command of the Anglo-Sicilian army. He had torn
himself away with some reluctance from his plans for raising
a general insurrection in Italy against Napoleon, having
satisfied himself that there was no risk ofMurat's invading Sicily
in his abscncc, and that the local politics of Palermo were
deplorable but not dangerous 1. When the signal was made
from Pelew's flagship that Lord WilIiam had arrived, Admiral
Hallowell answered with the counter-signal, • We are all
delighted,' which was sincere and accurate, but not officially
correct. It was remembered against him afterwards, as an
improper ebullition of misplaced humour.
Bentinck landed at San Felipe without a moment's delay,
took ovcr the command from l\Iurray, llnd beard his report.
Hc also talked with Hallowe11 and thc senior land-officers. Re
made up his mind very promptly: the embarkation which had
begwl was to continue, and the Army was to be taken back to
Valencia at once, in strict consonance with Wellington's original
orders. He explained in his next dispatch home that he was
aware that he might have chased Mauriee Mathieu, and prob-
ably have compelled him to throw himself into Tarragona.
But he conceived that a second siege of that fortress would
take many days, and would not be so profitable to the general
cause as an unexpected return to Valencia to join Del Parque
and Elio. The Army, as hc wrote to Wellington, was in the
best sl)jrits, but most dissatisfied ns to what had happened
before 'l'arragona, • concerning which, from motives of delicacy,
he wou.ld refrain from saying anything 2.' But there had been
much material lost, the horses and mules were in a bad way,
from having been so often landed and re-shipped, and it was
better to return to Alicnnte and reorganize everything thnn to
start another Catalan campaign.
The troops were got on board very rapidly, and the whole
transport fleet set sail southward on the 18th. The fort of
San Felipe was blown up, as Belltinck was not willing to
, SupplmrumltJry Dispatches, viii. PI). 18-10, June 2<1.
I Ibid., p. 20.
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leave any troops behind to garrison it. Unfortunately, the
good weather which had been granted to lItlurray at the starting
of the expedition was denied to Bentinck during its return.
A furious north-east wind was blowing, which scattered the
ships, and drove ha less than fourteen of them ashore on the
projecting sands at the estuary of the Ebro. Ten were got off
•when the storm moderated, but four had to be burned, after
the crews and troops had been taken off. Bentinck, after
four days at sea, got into Alicante on the 22nd June, ahead of
the great majority of the transports, which continued to drop
in, some much disabled, for three or four days after. This
caused a tiresome delay in the reorganization of the army, as
odd companies of every regiment were missing, and the units
could not be reformed and marched inland for somc time. The
delay gave Bentinck time to write long dispatches to the
Secretary for War and to Wellington. These went off on the
23rd by spccial messenger, and along with them lengthy screeds
from Murrayand Admiral I:TallowelJ. The two officers wrote most
Hitterly of each other to the Commander-in-Chief-the Admiral
rletailing all the General's hesita.tions and tergiversations with
caustic irony, while the General wrote that' if I had only
allowed the Admiral to command the army you would never
have been troubled with the long letter which accompanies
this. . .. He thinks that prejudice against him led me to act
as I did. 'l'hese are the real grounds of all his outcry I:
.l\furray's long dispatch was not only very di.!lingenuous in
suppression of facts, but so vague concerning all necessary
dates and figures, that Wellington, when it came to hand,
showed profound dissatisfaction. He observed that it 'left
him entirely ignorant of what had occurred,' and administered
a searching interrogatory of eleven questions, answers to which
were necessary before a judgement could be formed by himself
or the Home Government on what had really happened in
Catalonia 2. Murray's replies were as unconvincing as his
original dispatches, and the matter ended in a long-deferred
and lengthy court martial at WinchCl'iter in ]814, after the
war had come to an end. To describe it here would interrupt
1 Supplementary Dupakhe$, viii. p. 22.
• Wellill~..tOl1 to lIIurray, .July 1, Dispatches, x. p. 487.
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unseasonably the narrative of the summer campaign of 1813.
But it may suffice to say that he did not get his dcserts. Be was
only convicted of an error oC judgement, and not oC the' dis.
obedience to orders and neglect oC duty. highly to the prejudice
of the service. and detrimental to thc British military character'
Cor which he was put on trial. He was never even indicted for his
worst offence-the callous betrayal of the Spanish colleague who
had done his best to serve him.
SECTION XXXVII: CHAPTER IV
WELLINGTON ON THE DIDASSOA
ON July 1st the last of .E'oy·s troops on the sea-coast front
had rccrosscd the lower Bidassoa, leaving Graham and Giron
in complete possession of the Spanish bank, and free t~ com-
mence the siege of St. Sebastian. They had 25,000 men in line.
without counting Mendiwbal's Biscayan irregulnrs, who were
observing the fortress, and the 5th British Division, which was
now on its march from Vittoria to the frontier, and was due to
arrive on the 5th or 6th. These forces were amply sufficient to
hold in check Reille, Foy, and the Bayonne Reserve.
On July 1st also Wellington began to arrange his march
northward from Pampcluna, which might have begun on the
26th June if he had not taken oH so many divisions fOf the
fruitless pursuit of Clausel. The five days' respitc granted to
the enemy had been very useful to him. If thc King hud been
followed up without delay, at the moment when he had split
his army into the -threc columns, whieh marched the ftrst by
Yrurzun and Santcstcban (Reillc), the second by the Col de
Velate (D'Erlon), and the third by the Pass of Ronccsvallcs
(Gazan), it is hard to say where or how he could have rallied
or oIlered any eIlective resistance. Wellington had preferred
to take the doubtful chance of intereepting and destroying a
secondary force, rather than to devote himself to the relentless
pursuit of the demoralized main body of the encmy. But it
must be remembered that a resolvc to push thc chase after
the flying King would have involved an instant invasion of
France. And though on general military grounds a defcated
enemy should be kept on the run and destroyed in detail-like
Brunswick's army after Jena-there were in June-July 1813
the strongest political reasons to deter Wellington from crossing
the frontier. It was not merely that he had outmarched his
transport, and had not yet got into touch with his new bases of
supply at Santander and on the Biscay coast, so that for the
lUm2
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moment he was a little shoTt of ammunition, and also living on
the country, a practice which he disliked on principle and wished
to end as soon as possible 1. Nor was his hindrance the fact
thAt his army wos tired and sulky, and that many of his
stragglers had not yet rejoined-though both of these vexations
had their weight 2. Nor was the political consideration that
held him back the deplorable news from Cadiz, received at
Caseda on June 28th, to the effect that the Regency had deposed
Castaiios from his office as Captain·General of Galicia, Estre-
madura, and both the Castiles, and had superseded his nephew
General Giron in the command of the Fourth Army 3. This
was indeed a serious blow-not so much because Wellington
could always rely on CastaJ1os, and had found Giron more
obedient than most Spanish officers, but because it looked as if
the Cadiz Government was aiming at an open repudiation of
the bargain that had been made in January, by which they had
agreed not to make or revoke appointments of the military sort
without giving notice, and receiving approval. The excuses
given for the changes were paltry and unconvincing-Castai'ios
was wanted to take his seat in the Council of State-Giron was
to be sent, with large reinforcements, to serve with Copons as
second in comll}(l.Ild of the Army of Catalonia. Wellington
concluded, and rightly, that the real causes of these attacks on
his friends were petty political intrigucs-the ' Liberal' party
in Cadiz was trying to secure its own domination by evicting
those who might be considered' Serviles ' or even' I'oIoderntes '
from positions of power 4. He had resolved· not to bring the
relations betwcen himself and the Rcgcney to a crisis, by making
a formal demand for the restoration of CastaJ10s and GirOIl to
their posts. He wrote indeed to the Minister of War to say
that he considered that he had been' most unworthily treated '
1 Di$pa/che8, x. p. 495, to Lord Dathu1'lit, July 2.
• To the same, Dupa/ches, x. p. 490.
• To O'Donoju, l\linistcr of Wur, Di:sllalclW8, x. pp. <J.{I2...;J; to Custmlos,
x. p. 475; to Lord Bathurst, x. pp. 473-4.
• ," We and the powers of Euwpe are interested in the success of the
'Var in the Peninsula. But the creatures who govern at Cadi7. appear
to feel no sllch interest. 1\11 thut tlu:y cure about really is the pmise of
their foolish Constitution. . .. As long as Spain shall be govcmt-d by the
Cortcs, acting upon Republican principles, we cannot hope for allY perma-
neut umeliomtion.' Dispalchu, x.I). 4,'t4, Wellington 1.0 DathU1'lit, ,Tune 29.
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and that there were limits to his forbearance, but he avoided
an open rupture, and waited for the Hegeney to take the next
step. He wrote, however, to his brother, the Ambassador at
Cadiz, that he ought to call together in private all the more
sensible and sound members of the Cartes, and to warn them
of the pernicious effects of this last move: unless they wished
to sec him resign the position of Generalissimo, given him only
six months back, they must bring pressure on their government
-' they have it in their power to interfere if they still wish
that I should retnin the command 1.'
But this political trouble, ominous though it might be of
friction in the near future, was not the cause of Wellington's
failure to exploit to the utmost the effeets of the battle of
ViLtoria. The real hindrance wns not the state of Spanish
politics, but the posture of affairs in Central Europe. The
Armistice of PI1i,sswitz had been signed on June 4, amI till it
came to an cnd on August 11 there was a possibility of peace
between Napoleon and his Russian and Prussian enemies,
on terms which Great Britain would be unable to accept.
Wellington was sent frequent dispatches by Lord Bathurst, to
kcep him abreast of thc latest developments in thc Conferences,
but inevitably it took a very long time Cor news from Saxony
to reach London alld be transmitted to Spain. Now if Napoleon
should succced in making a separate peace with the Allies, his
first cure would bc to cviet the British Army, if it should have
entered France in suceess(u! pursuit of King Joseph and his
demoralized host. Even if it should have taken Bayonne,
crushed thc cnemy's field foree, and made.good way towards
Bordeaux, it would have no ehanee of standing against the
enormous reservcs that could be drawll from Germany, with
the Emperor himself at their head. Therefore it would be
better to take up a good position all the line of the Pyrenees,
secured by capturing St. Sebastian and Pampeluna, than to
make an irruption into France, however brilliant the immediate
results oC such a movc might be. Still ignorant 011 July 12 of
thc tendency of the conferences at Dresdcn, 'Vellington wrote
to the Seerctnry for War: • My future operations will depend
a good deal upon what passes in the NOl'th of EUl'Ope: and if
, Wellington to Henry Wellesley, Diqlaldll:8, x. p. 491.
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operations should recommence there, on the strength and
description of the reinforcement which the enemy may gct on
our front. . .. I think I ean hold the Pyrenees as easily as I
can Portugal. I am quite certain that I can hold the position
which I have got more easily than the Ebro, or any other line
in Spain 1.' Iu another letter he explains that he is giving his
army a few days of much needed rest, by the cnd of which he
hopes not only to havc heard of the fall of St. Sebastian, but
of the result... of the negotiations in GermslIly2. In a third he
puts the matter in the clearest terms: • !'tIuch depends upon
the state of arrairs in the North of Europe. If the war should
be renewed, I should do most good by moving forward into
France, and I should probably bc able to establish myself there.
If it is not fCnewed, I should only go into France to be driven
out again. So I shall do my best to confine mysclf to securing
what I have gained 3.' In a fourth he complains that many
people, even officers at the front, seem to think that after
driving the French from the frontiers of Portugal to the Pyre-
nees, he ought to invade France immediately. • Some expect
that we shall be at Paris in ft month.' But though he enter·
tained no doubt that he could enter France to-morrow, and
establish the Army on the Adour, he could go no farther. For
if peace were made by the Allies, he must necessarily withdraw
into Spain, and the retreat, though short, would be through a
difficult country and a hostile population. So from what he
could gather about the progress of negotiations in Gennany,
he had determined that it would be unsafe to think of anything
in the way of an irwasion of France 4.
Everything therefore at present, and for many weeks to
follow, depended on the news concerning the Armistice. And
the happy intelligence that it had come to an end, and that
the war was renewed, with the Austrians added to thc Allied
forces, only reached Wellington on September 7th. The actual
declaration of war by Austria took place on August 11, by
, Dil1puldles, :'C. pp. 523-4. • Ibid., x. p. 521.
• Ibid., x. pp. 553-4. When this letter was written to Lord WilJiam
Bentinek, Wellington tand received no London dispateh for twenty days,
mllinly owing to bad wel1ther in the Bay or Biscay.
• Ibid., x. pp. 613-14, to 1..<lrd Dathurst.
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which time the situation on the Spanish frontier had suffered
many vicissitudes, for in the last fortnight during which the
Armistice endured, there had taken place Soult's desperate
invasion of Spain, and all the Woody fighting knOV>'ll OS the
Battles of the Pyrences.
l\Ieo.nwhile wc must return to July 1st, on which day Welling-
ton had already made up his mind that his present programme
should be confined to bringing up his army to the Bidossoa
and the Pyrenean passes, und undertaking the siege of St.
Sebastian and the blockade of Pampcluna. He was still not
quite happy about the intentions of Clallscl-he trusted that
the French General and his 15,000 men would retire to France
by the pnss abo....e Jaea 1. If he were to remain at Saragossa,
and Suehet were there to join him, a tircsome compliCll.tion
would be created on his right rear-wherefore he kept sending
letters to William Bentinck, ordering him to keep Suehet busy
o.t all costs, by whatevcr means might seem best to him 2. It
was not till July 16th tho.t news came that this danger had
ended in the desired fashion, by Clausel's crossing the passes :I.
But who.tever might happen in that direction, there was still
one point that had to be settled, before it could be considered
that the allied army wos established on a satisfactory line for
defending thc Spanish frontier and covering the sieges of
St. Sebastian and Pampelllna. 'I'he French were still in posses-
sion of the Hastan, the high-lying valley of the Upper llidassoa,
through whieh runs the main road from Pampeluna to llayonne,
by the Col de Velate, and the pass of .M:aya. This last corner
of Spain must be cleared of the invaders, or the crest of the
Pyrenees was not yet secure. Accordingly arrangements were
made for marching the main body of the British Army to its
destined positions through the Bastan, in order to sweep out
the lingering enemy.
A sufficient corps must be left to blockade Pampeluna;
during the operations against Clausel this duty had been dis-
charged by Hill's and Silveira's and Morillo's troops. As these
units had enjoyed fi ....e days' rest, while the remainder of the
divisions had been marching hard in eastern Navarre, it was
, Ibid., x. p. 478, to Bcntinck.
• Ibid., x. pp. 477-9. • Ibid., x. p. 531..
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arranged that they should give over the service of the blockade
by sections to the returning columns as each came up. Welling-
ton intended to transfer the whole a.ffair in the end to a
Spanish force, the < Army of Reserve of Andalusia' under
Henry O'Donnell, which had been occupied for the last week
in the siege of the forts of Pancorbo, after its vcry tardy
arrival in the zone of operations. King Joseph, whell lying at
Burgos, had thrown a garrison of 700 men into these forts,
which command the high road to the Ebro. in the vain hope
of incommoding Wellington's advance. But as the allied army
did not march by the eamino Real at all, but cut across by
side rout.es to :Medina del Pamar, the precaution was useless,
and cost the enemy a battalion. However, it was necessary
to clear the defile, in order toopen the easiest line of oommunica-
tion with l\ladrid, and O'Oollnell was directed to capture the
forts on his way north to join the main army. He invested
them on June 25, and stormed the lower o.nd weaker fort of
Santa Marta on the 28th. The upper fort of Santa Engrncin
was a veritable eagle's nest, on a most inaccessible position:
O'Dollllell succeeded with great difficulty in getting six guns
up to a point 011 which they could bear on the work. But the
reason why such a strong post surrendered by capitulation
two days later was not the artillery fife, but mainly lack of
water, the castle well having run nearly dry, and partly the
news of Vittoria. A small party of fugitivcs who had eSC<'l.pe<1
from the lield by an incredible detour, corroborated the claims
made by the Spani.sh general when he summoned the place,
and the commandant (l'tIajor DUfalld of the 55th Line) surren-
dered with 650 men, 2,L guns, and a good stock of ammunition
on June 80th 1.
On getting these news Wellington, on July 2, ordered
O'Donnell to CQffie up at once, and take over the blockade of
l'ampeluna, for which his whole force of 11,000 men would not
be too great. J'or the fortress was large and strongly garrisoned.
The King had brought up the number of troops left to the
1 Full details ill O'Dollllell's report to Wellillgtou of July 1, 1813.
DispUlch«, p. ;'03. Toreno mnkell an ood mistake ill r.ulling the French
oommunder de CCVll: this wus t1m nllllle of the junior ofll~r who drew
up the cnpitulntion.
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Governor-General Cassan 1 to 3,600 men before leaving the
place, and there were over eighty gUllS mounted on the walls,
though two outlying forts in the plain had been abandoned.
Wellington allowed nine days for the orders to reach O'Donnell,
and for the Army of Reservc to make the long march from
Pancorbo to Pampeluna: as a matter of fact it took eleven.
Meanwhile the fortress had to be contained by troops from the
main army, till the Andalusians should come up-they were
due on .Tilly 12th. The scheme adopted was that Hill should
collect the 2nd Division and Silveira':;; Portuguese l!~thcir usual
contingent of auxiliaries---on the north sidc of Pampehma on
July 1st, and march on July 2; the ground which he had held
being taken over by thc Light 3,'d and 7th Divisions, returning
from the chase of Clause!. ·On the 3rd the 7th Division was to
be relieved by the 4th, and to follow HiJl~ On the 5th the
6th Division (Clinton) would arrive, and relieve the Light
Division which would follow the 7th. The greater part of the
cavalry was to be left behind in the plains, being obviously
useless in the Pyrenees except in small parties for exploration;
but each of the marching divisions had a regiment attached
to it.
The result of these arrangements was to leave three divisions
(3rd, 4th, 6th), and nearly all the cavalry, for the blockade of
Pampeluna~a rather larger force than might have been ex-
pected 3. .Four divisions (2nd, Light, 7th, and SHvcira's
Portuguese)moved out to e1ear the Bastan, and to establish com·
munications with Graham's corps on the Lower Bidassoa. If
the French had Ucell in good lighting trim, four divisions would
have bcen none too many for the t.ask, more especially when it
is remembered that they were advancing in three echelons,
cach separated from the next by a long day's march. But
Wellington rcckoned that, although he had all Gazan's and
D'Erlon's troops in iront of him~the pres.cnce of Reille's on
the Lowcr Bidassoa had becn reported by Graham~they
, Not to be conrounded with Genernl Cassagne, who long comnmndetl
u division ill tile Army or Afldulusiu .
• Late Hamilt.on'ij division in 1810--11_12.
I Lord Dalhousie was left in command-a great slight to Picton-all
the llIore so lIl'ter what had happened at ViUorill. Sce Suppltmetllary
Disppli:lltlJ, viii. p. 249.
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would have no artillery (since it had been lost at Vittoria),
would be low in numbers, because they had not yet gathered
in their stragglers, and lower still in morale. His estimate was
on thc whole justified, for the operation was successfully
carried out; but it did not go of! quite so easily as had been
expected. It should be mentioned that, on the bare ehanc.'C
that thc French might make a movement from St. Jean-Pied·
du-Port to disturb the blockade of Pampeluna.-an unlikely
possibility-the 2nd Division had detached Byng's brigade to
hold the pass of ROllcesvslles, in eonjun('tion with :Morillo's
Spanish division. Hill therefore, leading the march towards
the llastan, had only three of his four brigades with him-
Cumeron's I, O'Callaghan's 2, and Ashworth's Portuguese. The
total of the marching eGlunm, from front to rear, was about
22,000 men.
To understand the task set before Hill's corps it is necessary
to go back to the arrangements-if arrangements they can be
called, for they were hugely im'oluntary-made by the French
Head-quarters Staff during the preceding week. After Reille's
divisions had turned off towards the Bidassoa, and D'Erlon's
had retreated into the Dastan, the main body of the Freneh
Army-the four and 0. half infantry divisions of the Army of
the South, with its own cavalry and the bulk of that of the
Army of llortugo.l 3-had taken the route of the Pass of Uonccs·
valles, and reached St. Jean·Pied-du·PQrt, in a slate of complete
confusion (June 27), preceded by a vanguard of marauders
several thousands strong, who swept the countryside of cattle
and corn just as freely after thcy had reached France as while
they were still in No.varre. Behind the troops who had kept
to their cagles followed a rearguard of footsore stragglers and
slightly wowlded mcn, harassed till they came to the frontier
by bands of local guerrilleros. The whole mass was in a state of
demoralization: the French peasantry had to flec to the hills
with what they could co.rry--evcry housc was plundered save
those in which a general or other officer of high rank had
1 Late Cadogan's.
• Pringle arrived and took oomm3ud of this brignde a fortnight later.
Menllwhile the senior llnttnlioll oomnmnder IIJ,d it.
I Reille had only two chns!lCur regiments with him.
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quartered himself!. St.Jean-Picd·du·Port was a small third·c1ass
fortress, garrisoned by a battalion of National Guards, not an
arsenal or a depe3t. It was impossible to reorganize an army
there, or even to feed it for a few days. The Army of the South
rolled back on June 29th to the valleys of the Nivelle and Nive,
so as to be near the great magazines of Bayonne, which had
always been the base from which the Frcnch forces in Spain
were supplied. There alone would it be possible to reform it,
and to rc-equip it with all the guns and transport necessary
to replace the losses of Vittoria. Gazan left onc division-that
of Conroux-at St. Jean, to block the pass of ROlleesvalles :
with the other three and a half divisions he arrived on July 1st
at Usiaritz, St. Pee and Espcllcttc in the valleys of the Nive
and Nivelle, only twelve or fifteen miles from Bayonne. The
cavalry was sent baek still farther to the line of the Adour.
Soon after this there was a great reduction made in the
mounted arm. Orders arrived from Gennany that only the
cavalry of the Army of the South ,vas to remain on the frontier.
Boyer's dragoons of the Army of Portugal, Treillard's dragoons
of the Army of the Centre, und sevcn light cavalry regiments of
the Armies of Portugal and the North wcre to startofl at.once 2.
Napoleon in his Saxon campaign had been sunering bitterly
from a want of good cavalry, and had directed the King to send
these veteran regiments across France with all speed, whatever
might be the state of aUsirs in Spain.
It is quite clear that if Wellington had chosen, on June 26th,
to follow Go.zun across the Pyrenees, instead of turning aside
to chase Clausel, he could have done anything t.hat he pleo.sed
with the enemy. But this, for the reasons that we have detailed
o.bove-was not his game for the moment. Hence the shattered
Army of Spain had a few days in which to commence reorgani-
zation. The easiest thing was the replacement of the 151 cannon
lost at Yittoria. Bayonne waS a great artillery storehouse, and
the French gunners had brought away their teams, if they had
, See tlte indigulIllt letters of French officials quoted ill Yidul de I"
Blachc, i. pp. 69 and 165-7.
I For the Army of Portugal only two chasseur regimentIJ were left ~
for the Army of the North only onc: for the Army of the Centre only
the .....enk Nassau squadrons. But 13 Ollt of the 14. cavulry regiments of
the Army of the South remained bebind.
5B2 WELLINGTON ON THE BIDASSOA (Jut,y 6
left all their pieces behind them. On July 6th General l'irlet,
the officer commanding the artillery of the united armies, could
report to the King that he had already served out 80 guru;-
33 each to the Armies of Gazan and Rcillc, 10 to the Army of
the Centre. and 4 to the mobile division of the Bayonne Reserve.
By the end of the month he promised to have 120 or even 150
pieces ready, which would give every division its battery, as
wcll as a good reserve. And these pledges were fulfilled-with
help from the arsenals of Toulouse, Blaye, and La Hochcllc.
But the supply of caissons was for some time very low, und
the wheeled transport for the train was much more difficult
to procure, requisitions on the Pyrenean departments being
difficuJt to enforce, and slow to collect. As to food supply, the
main difficulty was that although there was a considerable
accumulation of storcs at llayonnc, no onc had evcr contem-
plated thc chance that 60,000 starving men would be thrown
on the resources of the dcp3t in onc mass. Much flour was there,
but not cnough ovens to bake it, or wagons to carfY it to the
troops lying fifteen or twenty miles out, on the Bidassoa or the
Nive. And these troops had lost all their own carts and
fourgons. Even as.much as a month later the army, reorganized
in other respects, had not got enough transport to carry more
than a few days' food, as Marshal Soult was to find.
King Joscph had left Pampehma long before his troops, and
taking a short cut had reached St. Jean de Luz on June 28th,
and set up his last head-quarters there. He was painfully
aware of the fact that his great brother would in all probability
visit upon his head all his inevitable wrath for the rcsults of
the late campaign; but to thc final momcnt of his command he
strove to cxercise his authority, and busied himself with the
details of projected operations. He was at this moment some-
what estranged from Marshal Jourdnn, who had taken to his
bed, and kept complaining that the generals would neither
give him information nor take his orders, but confined them-
selves to making ill-natured comments on the battle of Vittoria.
The King, instead of relying on his advice, asked council on all
sides, and hovcred between many opinions.
It is a sufficient proofof the incoherence of both .Tourdan's and
Joseph's military ideas, that at this moment they were thinking
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seriously of resuming the offensive and re-entering Spain.
When he received Clausel's dispatches announcing his safe
arrival at Saragossa, and the possibility of his junction with
Suchet, the King was fascinated for the moment '\\ith the idea
of bringing Wellington to a stand, by attacking his flank and
rear in Aragon. 'l'his could only be done by sending large
reinforcements to Clausel, and so weakening the main army.
The real objection to this plan was that the troops were in no
condition to march, or indeed to fight, till they should have had
time for rest and reorgani7.ation. Jourdan, however, drew up
on July 5-the very day on which Wellington was beginning
to drive GM.nn out of the Bastan-as we shall presently see-
a memoir for the King's consideration, which laid out three
possible policies. One was to advance with every unit that
could move, against Graham, who wns wrongly supposed to
have only one British division with him. The second was to
march to relieve Pampeluna by Roncesvalles, after first calling
in Clause! to help. The third was to accept the idea which lay
at the base of Clausel's last dispatch, to leave 15,000 men on
the Bidassoa to detain Graham, and to move the rest of the
army by the Jac.'\ passes into Aragon. It was conceded that
artillery could not go that way, and that Clausel had none with
him-but some guns might be picked up at Saragossa and from
Suchet, and a very large body o( troops would be placed on
Wellington's flank. It is difficult to say which of the three
scheme... was more impracticable for the moment, as a policy
for the starving and demoralized Army of Spain.
A more serious project, and one for which there would have
been much to say, if the French Arm}' had been at this moment
in a condition to feed itself, or to mu,nccuvre, or to commit itself
to an action which would involve the expenditure of more
ammunition than the infantry could carry in their pouches,
was one for strengthening the front in the Bastan. While this
long valley was still retained, direct communication between
Wellington's main body about Pampeluna and the large
detachment under Graham on the Bidassoa was blocked. But
the Bastan was occupied by the weakest section of the French
forces, D'Erlon's Army of thc Centre, one of whose infantry
divisions (Darmagnac's) had been ruined at the battle of
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Vittoria, where it lost more men in proportion to its strength
than any other unit 1, while another-Casapalaeios' Spanish
division-was disappearing rapidly by desertion. There were
only left, in a condition to fight, the Royal Guards-a little
over 2,000 men-and Cassagne's division, which had suffered
no serious casualties in the recent campaign. Clearly the
Bastan and the numerous passes whieh descend into it could
not be held by 10,000 infantry, some of them in very bad
order, even though they might get some guns from the Bayonne
arsenal. Wherefore Joseph ordered D'Erlon to make over the
defence of the Bastan to the Army of the South, and to fall
back to the line of the Nivcllc, where he should join Rcille.
Gazan was directed to take over charge of this important
salient, with thc whole of his army, save Conronx's division
left at St. Jcan·Pied·du·Port 2 (July 3).
Gazan, who had only reached the Nive two days before, whose
troops had not yet recovered from the starvation which they
had suffered in the march from Pampeluna to Ustaritz and
Espellette, who had lost his transport, and who had not yet
received the 33 guns which had been sent him from Bayonne
(though he was told that they were just coming up), made
objections very rational in themselves to these orders. He said
that his troops must ho.ve food and guns, or they could not be
expected to maintain their positions. He also remarked that
it was exasperating that he had not been told to march straight
from St. Jcan·Pied-du·Port to the Bastall by the dircct pass at
Ispegui, irn;tcad of being brought ~aek two days' march to thc
Nive, and then sent south again to the Maya pass, only twelve
miles from his starting.point 3.
Gazan started out, unwillingly and with many protests, from
his cantonments on the Nive on the morning of July 3, sending
• Ch3s5l:'s brigade lost 850 men of ),700 present, and the Nassau regi-
ment in the Gernmn IJrib'll.de Imd similar casuulties, though the Baden
I'('giment got oft more lightly.
• ]t should be noted that Darieau's 6th Division was now led by
Mamnsin-itll old eomnmnder having been badly wounded ut ViUorin.
Maransin's late brigade, still extra-divisional as at Vittoria, had ~n
made over to Grnardet.
• Jourdnn answered that it TaM n flllse movement, but thnt on .June 20th
he could not possibly foresee that the King would change his mind 11.5 to
the destination oC the Army oC the South. See Vida! de la Dlache, l. p. loa.
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one of his divisions, Leval's, by the inferior mountain foad from
Sane on the Nive1le to Etchalar and Santesteban in the
western BaStan, the rest by the Maya pass to Elizondo, the
chief road·centre in the eastern or upper Bastan. From these
points they were to spread themselves out, and take over all the
passes south and west from D'Erlon's troops. The commander
of the Army of the Centre began to clear out his reserves north·
wards, and to arrange for the rapid departure of each advanced
section, as it should be relieved by the· arrival of Gazan's
divisions .. He met his colleague on the way, handed over the
charge to him, and then rode down to make his report to
Jourdan at St. Pee (July 5), where he dropped the cheering
remark that if the Army of the South did not receive very
heavy convoys of food at once, it would go to pieces of its
own accord and quit the Bastan within a few days, as his
own army had eaten up the valley and no troops could live
there 1.
Darmagnae's division and the Royal Guard had been
relieved by Lcval, while Cassagne's first brigade was marching
north by Elizondo, though his second was still blocking the
Col de Velate till Ga7..an's troops should arrive, when Welling.
ton's attack was delivered----at the most opportune of moments.
Nothing could have been better for him than that the enemy
should have been caught in the middle of an uncompleted
exchange of troops, before the incoming army had gained any
knowledge of the ground. Moreover, though Gazan had double
as many men with him as D'ErIon, they had not enjoyed the
comparative rest which the Army of the Centre had gained since
June 26th, but had been countermarching all the time, and were
in a very dilapidated condition. Otherwise there would have
been much greater difficulty in driving them out of the Bastan
with the very moderate force that Wellington actually used.
For he was able to finish the business with four brigades-the
three of the 2nd Division and onc of Silvcira's-which formed
the head of his column. Of the rear echelons, the 7th Division,
whieh started from Pampeluna on the 4th, got up only in time
to sce the very cnd of the game, and the Light Division were
never engaged at all.
I Sce Vidlll de la Dlaehe, i. pp. 100-4.
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At noon on July 4th Cnmeron's Brigade 1, forming the
advanced guard of the 2nd Division, crossed the highest point
of the Col de Velate, and fan into half a battalion of the 16th
Leger. This was the rearguard of Beaun's brigade of Cassagne's
division, which was holding the village of Berrueta, a few miles
down the northern slope of the pass, waIting till it should be
relieved by l\Iaransin's division from Gazan's army. This
detachment was evicted from Bcrructa and Aniz, and fell hack on
Zit"ra, where the other battalion of its regiment was in position.
That village also was cleared, but Hill's leading brigade then
found itself in front of 1I1aransin's division marching rapidly up
the road, with other troops visible in a long column behind.
Hill, seeing that he was about to be involved in a serious fight
with heavy nwnbcrs, began to deploy the rear brigades of the
2nd Division behind the ravine in front of An.iz, as eaeh came
up, abandoning: thc recently taken Ziga. The French, in the
same fashion, gradually formed i long line on their side of the
ravine, extending it eastward from the village and showing
two brigades in front line and two in reserve on the heights of
Irurita some way behind.
Hill appears to have felt the French front in several places,
but to have desisted on discovering its strength. Skirmishing
of a bloodless sort went on all the afternoon, eaeh side waiting
for its reserves to come up. Before dusk Gazan had drawn in
all Villatte's division, which had reached Santcstcban earlier in
thc day, and thc non-divisional brigade of Gruardct, so that by
night he had two complete divisions and two extra brigades
conccntrated-at least 13,000 men 2. Behind Hill there was
only Do. Costa's brigade of Silvcira's division, which was a full
march to thc rear: for Wellington had ordered A. Campbell's
brigade-the other half of the Portuguese division-to take
a dif1erent route, that up the Arga river by Zubiri to Eugui,
which goes by a bad pass (Col de Urtiaga) into the French
valley of the Aldllides.
Hill's position was a distinctly unpleasant one, sinee he had
, Under Co.meron or the 1)211d lIS senior oolonel_Cndogun who fell at
Vittoria not having yet been replu~ .
• Viz. VilIattc's and Maransiu's divisious, and Gruardct's briW'de of
his own army, find Draun's brigade of the Army or the Centre.
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only three brigades up in line, with another out of any reason·
able snpporting distance, if the enemy should think fit to press
in upon him. 'l'he7th Division was two marches away, while.the
Light Division was still before Pampelunu; both were altogether
out of reach. Owing to heavy losses at Vittoria, the three
S"econd division brigades can hardly have numbered 6,000
bayonets t. Their commander very wisely waited for the arrival
of Wellington from the rear. Head·quarters that day had been
at Lanz, on the road from Pampeluna to the Col tic Velate.
The Commal1der-ill~Chiefcame up at about midday on the
5th, following in the wake of Da Costa's Portuguese, who were
bringing up with them two batteries of artillery-the frrst guns
that either side had shown in the Bastan. After looking at the
French positions Wellin!,>ton resolved to push on-this was
a purely psychologieul resolve, for his numbers did not justify
any such a move j he relied on his estimate of the morale of
Gazall, and that estimate turned out to be perfectly correct.
Hill's operations, till Wellington took over charge of the field,
had been limited to cautious reconnaissances of the enemy's
flanks. But with the change in command decisive action began:
Cameroll's brigade was sent out by the steep hill-sides on the
right to turn Gazan's left flank; O'Callaghan's, with Ash-
worth's Portuguese in support, erossed the ravine in front of
Aniz, and deployed on each side of the road to attack his centre.
If GlI.zan had stood to fight, and brought up all his reserves, it is
hard to see how he could have been moved: indeed he ought
to have scored a big success if he had dared to coullter-attack-
for 'Wellington had no reserves save Da Costa's Portuguese
brigade. But, likc Murray at Tarragona, the French general
had been making himself dreadful pictures of the strength that
might conceivably be in front of him. Three prisoners taken at
Zigu 011 the preceding day had told him that they belonged to
Hill's corps-he presumed it complete in front of him, with all its
six brigades, instead of the actual three. Then a heavy column
.hud (,'Qme up at noon-Du Costa's brigade-Ga~tn judged it
• On May 1 the three 2nd Division brigades had shown 7,200 bayonets-
they had lost 900 men in action at Villoria. Ir we allow for siek and
stmgglel'llllnd other ellsulIllosst)s, they cannot possibly IIIlVC hud 6,000 men
in line on July 5.
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to be some fresh division from Pampeluna. In addition he had
received a cry of alarm from Conroux 8tSt. Jcan-Pied·du·Porl-
that officer reported that on July 4 B Spanish corps was threaten-
ing his flank from the Vat CatIos-this was no more than a recon·
naissance thrown out by Marillo. Also he got news from the
Alduides valley of the arrival of A. Campbell's Portuguese
brigade at Eugui~he deduced from this information, joined to
the report about Morillo. a turning movement against his left
flank, by forces of unknown but probably considcmble strength.
Lastly, by drawing in Villattc's division to his main body, he
had left open a gap on his right, between his own positions in
'Front of Eliwndo and those of Leval at Santesteban. He was
seized with a panic fear lest another British column might pour
into this gap, by the mountain roads leading from Lanz and
Almandoz into the middle Bastan 1. And, indeed, Wellington
had started the 7th Division on one of these passes, the Puerto
de Arraiz--but it was still 20 miles away.
Already on thc night of the 4th Gazan had written to the
King that he must ask for leave to make his stand at the ?tfaya
pass, rather than to hold all the minor defiles which converge
into the Bastan-a complicated system of tracks whose defence
involved a terrible dissemination of forces. By noon on the 5th,
having seen Wellington's arrival with Da Costa's brigade, he
made up his mind that if the enemy attacked him frontally it
must be to engage his attention, while encircling columns
closed in upon his flanks and rear, from the Alduides on the one
side and the western passes on the other. When the movement
against his front began, bis troops in the position by Ziga
retired, without waiting to receive thc attack, and took cover
behind Villatte's division, drawn up on the hcights of Irurita.
Hill had to spend time in re-forming his lines before he could
resume the offensivc; but when he did so against VilIatte's
troops, they gave way in turn, and retired behind i\laransin's
division, whieh was now plaeed above the village of Elizondo.
In this way the enemy continued to retire by echelons, without
allowing the pursuers to close, until by dusk he stood still at
last at the Col de ?tIaya, where he offered battle. Gazan was
1 All these absurd theories lire to IJe found in Gawn'8 reports to Jourrlsn
of July 4. and 5. See Vidal de la D1aehe, i. pp. 106-7.
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extremely well satisfied with himself, and considered that he
had made a masterly retreat in face of ovenvhelming hostile
forces. As a matter of fact he had been btiving way, time after
time, to mere demonstrations by a force of little more than
half his own strength-four ~eak brigades were pushing: back
bis six. But he never made a long enough stand to enable him
to discover the very moderate strength of the pursuers. The
whole business was a field day exercise-the total casualties
only reached a few Scores on each side. Gaun's elaborate
narrative about the various occasions on which British van·
guards were surprised to run into heavy fire, su(!ered heavily,
and had to halt, find its best comment in the fact that the total
loss of English and Portuguese during three days of petty
combats was only 5 officers and 119 men, and that this day,
July 5, was the least bloody of the three.
Well satisfied to have manocuvrcd the enemy out of the
Bastan without any appreciable loss to himself, Wellington
accepted the challenge which the Army of the South oltered
him by halting on the Maya positions. But he waited for the
7th Division to come up, rightly thinking that the two British
and t.wo Port",gucse brigades hitherto employed were too weak
a force, now that the enemy showed signs of making his final
stand. The 7th Division, acting under the senior brigadier.
Barnes, for Lord Dalhollsie had becn left behind to conduct the
blockadc of Pampeluna, had marched on the 4th, the day when
Hill was commencing to push the }~rellch north of the Col de
Velatc. Wellington had intended from the first that it should
take a route which would enable it to turn Gaznn's right: it
went north from l\[arcnlain, where it had eonccntro.tcd on giving
up its blockading work, by Lh.aso, to the pass of Arraiz, by
which it descended into the Bastall on the 6th. It then occupied
Santcsteban, from which Leval's division had been withdrawn
by Gazan at the same momcnt at which he fell back himself
on to the pass of Maya. Pending its arrival Wellington re-
mained halted in front of the French positions for the whole of
the 6th, filling the enemy with various unjustifiable fears; for
they over-valued his strength, and credited him with much
more ambitious projects than those which he really entertained.
This halt on the 6th seemed to them to cover some elaborate
N n2
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snare, while its real purpose was only to allow him to make his
next move with 14,000 instead of with 8,000 men. The plan
for the morning of the 7th was that Hill's column should attack
the Maya positions in front, while the 7th Division should cross
the llidassoa at Santesteban, and take a mountain road which
would bring it out upon the flank of Gazan's line, which rested
on the Peak of Atchiola. This would be a hard day's march by
a rough track, along interminable crests and dips. Meanwhile,
on July 8th, another British unit would come up: the Light
Division was relieved at Pampcluna by the 4th Division on the
5lh, and following in the track of Barnc:s, Charles Alten was to
be at Snntcstcbun on the night of the 7th, I.Ind at the fighting
front by the next morning.
The halt which Wellington imposed on his leading colulllll
upon July 6th gave time for the PrclLch Higher Command to
make an astounding series of blunders. To discriminate
between true and false reports is one of the most dillieult tasks
for any general, and the faculty of making a correct decision
after receiving a number of contradictory data is undoubtedly
onc of the best tests of military ability. All men may err-but
greater errors have seldom been made in a day than those of
Jourdan and King Joseph on .July 6th. They started, perhaps
naturally, with the leading idea that Wellington was about to
undertake the invasion of France on a grand scale. 'Vhere
would the blow fall? Graham had been quicscent for somc days
on the Didassoa, and it was obvious that the troops on his front
were mainly Spaniards-the Army of Galicia and Longa's
Cantabrians were alone visible. GU7.an, though making
constant complaints that he was outnumbered and oppressed
by a ' triple force " had not as yet accounted for anything but
Hill's corps as present in his front. 'Vhere, then, was the rest of
Wellington's army'l The concentration of troops in front oC
Pampeluna had been ascertained-what had become of them?
NowConrouxat St. Jean-Pied-du·Port kept sending in messages
of alarm. Marillo's reconnaissances had induced him to push
most of his division forward to watch the passes in his front,
and he reported Byng's brigade at Ronccsvalles as a consider-
able accumulation oC British troops. Then came the news that
A. Campbell's Portuguese brigade had entered the Alduides
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valley, by descending which it could cut in between Conroux
and the rest of the army. Probably it was the over-emphasis
of Conrollx's cries of warning which set the King and Jourdan
wrong-but whatever the cause, they jumped to the conclusion
that the seriOlls invasion was to come on the inland flank-
that Byng and Campbell were the forerunners of a great force
marching to turn their left, by Roncesvalles and the eastern
passes. Acting on this utterly erroneous hypothesis, they
issued n series of orders for the hasty transference of great
bodies of troops towards St. Jenn·Pied-du-Port. Leval's
division of the Army of the South-which hOO retired to
Echalar after evacuating Santestcban-Cassllgnc's and Dar-
magnac's divisions of the Army of the Centre-which had handed
ovcr thc Bastnn to Cazan and retired to St. Pec-and Thou-
vcnot's provisional di vision of troop::; of the Army of the North I,
from the Lower Bidassoa, were all started oIf by forced
marches to join Conroux at St. Jean-Pied-du-Port. Only Reille
with the four divisions of the Army of Portugal was left to face
Graham 2, and Gazan was directed to hold the Mayo. positions
with Maransin's and Villatte's divisions and Gruardet's brigade
alone. Thus, while Wellington was about to deliver his rather
leisurely blow at the French centre, all the enemy's reserves
were sent off to their extreme left. Nothing could have been
more convenient to the British general, if he had attacked one
or two days later on the 1\1aya front, when the troops on the
move would all have got past him on their way south-eastward.
But as he made his assault the day after the King's orders were'
issued, it resulted that the marching columns were passing just
behind the part of the enemy's line at which he was aiming, so
that Gnznn hOO more supports at hand than might have been
expected. But this was neither to the credit of the King, who
had not intended to provide them, nor to the discredit of
Wellington, who could not possibly hll.vC foreseen such strategical
errors as those in which his enemy was indulging.
, The troops of thc Anny of thc NorUl which Foy had collccted from
the Biscay garrisons, the brigades of Deoonchy, Rouget, and Berlier
or whieh we have heurd 110 much in (l, previous cllllllter.
I Jl"oy. Lamartinien:. Maucunc and Fririon (late Sarmt). 'l'here wen:
behind them the King'~ Spanillrds und the raw Bayollne reserve.
642 WELLINGTON ON THE BIDASSOA -[JULY 8
On the morning of July 7th Gazan was in battle order at
?lIaya, with Maransin's division Bnd Gruardet's brigade holding
the pass, and the heights on each side of it from the hill of
Alcorrunz on the west to the rock of Arctesquc on the cast.
Villatte's division (commanded on this day by its senior
brigadier, Rignoux. for Villatte was sick) formed the reserve,
on the high road to Urdax, behind the main crest. Wellington's
simple form of attack was to send O'Callaghan's brigade to
turn the French left by l\ mountain road, Cameron's brigade
to seize the peak of Atchiola beyond his extreme right, so as to
outflank Gazan on that side, todemonstrnte with the Portuguese
and his two batteries in the centre, and to wait for the crucial
moment when the 7th Division, on the march since the morning
by the hill rond from Santesteban to Urdax, should appear in
the enemy's rear. Then a general ossuult would take place.
The scheme did not work out accurately. The Portuguese
demonstrated, as was ordered. O'Callaghan's brigade accom-
plished its turning movement, and got into contact with
Remand's brigade of Maransin's division, on the extreme French
left at the rock of Aretesque. Cameron's brigade took the hill
of Alcorrunz without difficulty, but was then held up by the
bulk of Villatte's division, which came up from the rear and
held the crest of the Atchiola with six battalions; it could not
be dislodged. So far so good-the enemy was engaged all along
the line and had used up three·fourths of his reserve. But
early in the afternoon a dense fog set in, and the 7th Division
never appeared in the enemy's rear. It had got involved in the
darkness, lost its way, and wandered helpless. Wherefore the
other attacks were never pressed. • If the 7th Division had
arrived in time, and the sea fog had held off for an hour or two,
we should have made a good thing of it,' wrote Wellington to
Graham 1. 'Our loss is about 60 wounded--on the other days
(4th and 5th) there was a good deal of firing, but we sustained
no loss at all.'
Early on the morning of July 8 Gaun, after having written
a most insincere report (,'oncerning the skirmish of the preceding
day, combat des pltU opinilUre8, in which he had checked the
, DUpatdIU, X. p. 512. 'fhe tollll losses Imvillg IJecIl 124 on ull three
days, \Vellington's' no 1089' means. of course, practically no loss.
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enemy with loss, abandoned the Maya positions before he was
again attacked. He had the impudence to write to Jourdan
that he had only recoiled because Head-Quarters refused to
send him any supports 1. As a matter of fact the King had
checked the progress of the troops marchingtoSt. Jean-Pied-du_
Port, and was sending them straight to Urdax and Ainhoue,
where all the four divisions arrived on the 8th, early in the day.
If Gazan had chosen to hold on to the pass he would have had
15,000 men added to his strength by the evening. But hc wcnt
orI at 6 a.m., and Hill occupied the crest an hour later. Welling-
ton was so far from intending any furthcr advance that he wrote
that afternoon to Graham that he was now at leisure to take
a look at the whole line of the Bidassoa down to thc sea, and
intended to pay his lieutenant a visit. A day latcr he told
Lord Bathurst that' the whole of our right being now estab-
lished all the frontier, I am proceeding to the left to superintend
the operations there '-which meant in the main the siege of
81. Sebastian. The troops which had been brought up to the
Rastan took up permanent quarters--the Light Division at
Santesteban, the 7th at Elizondo, Hill's two British brigades
at the Maya positions, to which artillery was brought up, while
Ashworth's and Da Costa's Portuguese were set to guard the
minor. eastern passes which open from the Bastan into the
Alduides, or Val de Daygorri-the Col d'Ispegui and the Col de
Derderis. They connected themselves with A. Campbell's
Portuguese brigade, which wa.tehed the southern exit from that
long French valley. Campbell, for his part, had to keep touch
along the frontier with Dyng and Morillo in the ll.oncesvalles
country. The Srd, 4th, and Oth Divisions still lay round
Pampeluna, anxiously expecting to be relieved by the Army of
Reserve of Andalusia. But Henry O'Donnell, though due on
the 12th, did not appea.r and take over the blockade till the
16th-17th. This delay began to worry Wellington n few days
, The clearest proof of Gazlln'~ resolute resolve 1I0t to stand, nud of the
complete mendacity of hls dispatches concerning his heavy lIghting on
the 4th-ath and 7th, is that he returned the total of his losses at 85 killed
and 800 wounded. All he had ~ix brigndcs, or ]8,000 men at ICMt, engaged,
it is clear that there ....-as no serious fighting at all-a fact borne out by
Hill's oorm;ponding return of 8 killed, 119 wOWlded, and 2 missing in the
whole petty clullpaiKO.
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latcr, but on the 8th-9th he was still content with the position
of a.ffairs, rightly judging that the enemy was in no condition
to make a push in any direction, till he should have got his
troops rested, his artillery repla.ced, and his transport re·
organized.
Otherwise he could not have taken so lightly the fact thnt
opposite the Maya positions the enemy had now accwnulated
six and a half divisions, expecting to be attacked by columns
descending from the Bastnn within the next few days. Joseph
and Jouroan spent an immense amount of unnecessary pains
in the hurried shifting of troops, during the short space that
intervened before the thunderbolt which was coming from
Germany fell on their unlucky heads. But who, in their
position, could have guessed that a mainly political considera-
tion was intervening, to prevent 'Vellington from undertaking
that invasion of France whieh seemed his obvious military
duty?
Onc last measure of prccaution on their adversary's part
modified the front at the cnd of the pctty campaign of the
Bastan-but by that time Joseph and Jourdan were gone. Oil
July 15th Wellington made up his mind that the defensive
position on the lower Bidassoa, by which he was covering the
siege of St. Sebastian, was not safe on its inland flank, where
the French were still in possession of the town of Vera, at the
gorge of the Bidassoa, where it emergeg from its high upland
course in the Bastan. Vera and its bridge presented an obvious
.point of concentration fC!r a force intending to trouble the right
.wing of Graham's corps. Wherefore it was necessary to clear
the enemy out of this point of vantage, and to shorten the line
between Hill in the Ba.stl\n and Giron on the lower Bidassoa.
Uncertain as to whether the :French would make a serious stand
or not, Wellington ordered up large forces--the 7th Division
and the newly-arrived Light Division from Santcsteban, Longa,
:md one brigade of Giron's Galipiaps from the covering troops.
But the cncmy-Lamllrtiniel'c's division of Heille's army-
offered only a rearguard action, and withdrew to the other side
of the hills which separate the Bastan from the coas~ region-
abandoning the < Puertos' or passes of Vcra and Echalar.
They feared that the advance of the allied left centre might be
~:!Jf~~k al---4t0rlrfm1:aLn~
po'" duo/'o,.lraif ':!I fjirar,Ja
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the prelude to a general attack, and began to make preparations
to receive it. But their anxiety disappeared when it became
clear that 'Wellington only wanted Vera and its defile, and had
no further offensive purpose. The Light Division occupied
Vcro: the 7th, extending to the right, took over the pass of
Echalar and got into touch with Hill's advanced guard at Mayn.
SECTION XXXVII: CHAPTER V
EXIT KING JOSEPH
'VlIlLE Wellington was pressing his victorious advance to the
Ebro, the Emperor Napoleon had been so entirely engrossed
in the management of his own great campaign in Saxony that
he had little Of no time to spare fOf considering the affairs of
Spoon. King Joseph had continued to receive dispatches from
Paris, which purported to set forth his brother's orders and
commands. But, as he well knew, they were really the compo-
sitions of the War-Minister Clarke, who, from the general direc-
tions which the Emperor had left when departing for Germany,
and such curt comments as intermittently came back from
Dresden or Wittenbcrg, used to construct lectures or critical
essays, which he tried to make appropriate to the IMt news
that came up from Spain. The original instructions were
completely out ofdate, and no new general scheme of operations
eould be got out of Napoleon, who eould only find time to make
commentaries of a caustic kind on any correspondence that
cume from beyond the Pyrenees I. Clarke's dispatches to the
King were quite uscless, and they were often oltensive in tone-
it is clear that the minister took a personal pleasure in making
sarcastic observations on the conduct of the war in Spain, whieh
he could foist Oil King Joseph as his brother's composition.
They generally arrived at moments which made them particu-
larly absurd reading-what eould be more annoying to the
King than to be told that Wellington's Army was a wreck, and
that there was little chance of the Allies taking the offensive,
at the very moment when the French Head-Quarters was moving
ever northward, pushed on by what seemed in the eyes of Joseph
and Jourdan to be overwhelming numbers? It was absurd
to be given hints on the defence of the Douro when the retreat-
• Cf. Lecestre, ullrts inidites, il. p. ]037, where the Emperor says 011
July 3 that he CUllllot make out what is hBppening; Bnd t1l(1t Joseph and
Jourdan arc incnpables.
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ing host was already on the Ebro, or lectures on the advantages
of the line of the Ebro, when the Pyrenees had already been
erosscd. Thc habit of Clarkc, howcvcr, which most irritated thc
King, was that of corrcsponding dircctly with the minor army-
commanders in Spain, over the head oCthc nominal commander-
in·chicf 1. Joscph held very strongly to the opinion that a main
part oC his disasters was due W Clarke's dispatches to Clauscl
and Suchct, which gave thosc generals excellent excuses for
ignoring orders from Head-Quarters, and carrying out their own
designs, under pretence that thcy were morc consonant with
the Emperor's intentions than the directions which came to
them from Madrid, VaUadolid, or Burgos.
Dut the Emperor's attention was at last attracted to Spain
by a disaster which could not be overlooked, or ignored as
a passing worry. The news of Vittoria reached him at Dresden
on July I-nine days after the battle had been lost--forwarded
by Clarke with imperfect details. For the minister could only
transmit a second-hand narrative writ~ by Foy, who had not
been present at the battle, and ;Joseph's first short note from
Yrurzun, dated July 2Brd, which concealed much and told
little. There was, hoy,ever, enough information to rouse thc
Emperor to wild rage. He had three weeks before (June 4)
concluded the armistice of Pliisswitz with the allied sovereigns,
so that he W!lS not entirely absorbed in the details of his 0'\\'0
strategy, und could at last find time to devote some attention
to the arIairs of Spain, whose consideration he had been putting
oU from week to week all through the last two months. His
own situation was still pcrilous enough-he was uncertain
whcther he could come to terms with Russia and Prussia, despite
of his recent victories. And the idea that Austria might be
meaning mischief, and not merely playing for the enviable
position of general arbitrator between the belligerents, was
already present. But at least he was not wholly occupied by
the strategical and tactical needs of each day, and eould turn
to contemplate the Spanish campaign as part of the European
crisis. The exasperating thing was not so much that the
Imperial arms had suffered a hideous affront, though this was
a not unimportant consideration, which might encourage
, Sce, c. g., Jooeph to Clarkc, p. 336 of vol. ix of bill CCTrTt8pCmdance.
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Alexander and Frederick Williarn III to renew the waT. It was
rather that the position of Spain, as a counter in the negotiations
which were going on at Prague, wns completely changed. On
May 25th the Franco-Spanish kingdom of Joscph Bonaparte
made an imposing appearance-Madrid was still occupied, and
a solid block of territory from the Esla to the Guadalviar-
morc than half the Peninsula-showed Oil the map as part of the
Napoleonic empire. On July 1 it was known that the King
was a fugitive on the :Prench border, that the Castiles, Leon,
Navarrc, and Biscay had all been lost, that Valencia would
certainly, and Aragon probably, go the same way within a week
or two. The pretence that Joscph was King of Spain had
suddenly become absurd. In continuing the hagglings at
Prague for a new European settlement, it would be ludicrous
to insist on the restoration to Madrid of a king whose only
possessions beyond the Pyrenees were a few scattered fortresses.
For Catalonia, it must be remembered, did not count as part of
Joseph's kingdom; it had been formally annexed to France
by the iniquitous decree of .February 1812 1.
It was a bitter blow to the new Charlemagne to see the
largest of his vassal-kingdoms suddenly torn from him, by
a stroke dealt by an enemy whom he affected to despise, while
his attcntion had been distracted for the moment to the Elbc
and the Oder. The unexamplcd rapidity of the campaign of
. Vittoria was astounding-there was nothing to compare with it
in recent military history, save his own overrunning of the
Prussian monarchy in the autumn of 1806. Wellington's army
had crossed the Tormes on lUay 26th-by June 26th King
Joseph was a fugitive in France, and the main French Army
of Spain was pouring back as a disorganized rabble aeross the
passes of the Pyrenees. The whole affair seemed incredible-
even ludicrous 2-the armies of King Joscph still appeared Oll
the imperial muster-rolls as well over 100,000 strong, not
includingSuchet's forces on the East Coast. It wss only a month
or so back that the Emperor had been comforting himself wiLll
the idea that Wellington could not put 40,000 British troops in
, See vo!. v, p. 01•
• 'us Jllulhcul'S dc l'Espogllc sont d'fLlltnnt plus gtlmds qu'ils sont
ridicules.' Napoleon toSavary,Dresden,20July: Lecestre, Lellresintdites.li.
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the field, and was no longer a serious danger 1. Obviously the
only explanation of the disaster must be colossal incapacity in
the French Higher Command in Spain, amounting to criminal
negligence. That there might bc another explanation, "iz.
that a war could not be successfully conducted in those pre-
telegraphic days by orders sent from live hundred miles away,
by dispatches liable to constant delay or loss, nnd by a eom-
mander·in-ehief much distracted by other busincss, hardly
occurred to him 2. His own system of managing the ll.!lll.irs of
Spain, as has been set forth in many earlier pages of this hooka,
was really the source of all evil. His nominal transference of the
supreme command to King Joseph had been a solelIUl farce,
because hc still permitted interference by the minister at Paris,
acting in his name, tolerated private reports from army-
commanders, whieh were conecaled from the King, and refused
to allow of the punishment of Oagrant instances of disobedicnce
to his viccgercnt's commands.
This perhaps the Emperor could hardly bc cxpeeted to sce.
The news of Vittoria having arrived, a culprit had to be sought,
and the culprit was obviously King Joseph, who with a magnifi-
ccnt army at his disposal, and a good military situation, had
allowed himsclf to be turned out of Spain by a contemptible
enemy. It went for nothing that the unfortunate monarch had
repeatedly asked for leave to abdicate, and had demonstrated
again and again that he was not allowed the real authority of
l\ commander-in-chief. The blame must be laid on his shoulders,
and hc must be disgraced at once-not with too great public
scandal, for after all he was the Emperor's brother-but in the
manncr whieh would prove most wounding to his own feelings .
• All thc fault was his ... if therc was onc man wanting in the
army it was a real gcneral, and if there was one man too many
with the army it was the King 4.' Clarke was told to write to
him a dispatch which not only superseded him ill command,
and deprived him of even the services of his own Royal Guard,
I Even that he was withdrn'.ling the British Army lrom Portugal.
Leoostre, ii. 998, lIIay 5.
I Though he did once mnke the observation that' on ne conduit pll8
des campagnes 11. 500 Iieues de distance,' in a lucid interval .
• See v. pp. l1H-6.
• Napoleon to Cambac~.res, Lcccstrc, ii. 1055.
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but put him under a sort of arrest. He was on no account to
go to Paris. • The importance of the interests that are at stake
in the North, and the effeet that your Majesty's appearance
could not fail to produce on public opinion-both in Europe
at large and more especially in France-are so great, that the
Emperor is constrained to issue his formal orders that your
Majesty should stop at Pampeluna or St. Sebastian, or at least
come no further than Dayonne.... Extraordinary precautions
have been taken to prevent the newspapers from mentioning
either the event of June 21st [the battle of VittoriaJ, or the
Emperor's decision concerning your Majesty.... It is at
Bayonne, where the Emperor foresees that your Majesty has
probably arrived, that his further intentions will be signified,
when he has acquired full information as to the recent events.
It is his definite order that your Majesty should come no
further into France, nor most especially to Paris, under any
pretext whatever. For the same reasons no officer of your
Majesty's suite, and none of the Spanish exiles, must come
beyond the Garonne. They may be directed to establish them-
selves at Auch.'
But though this was bad enough, the greatest insult in
King Joseph's eyes was that he was directed to hand qver the
command of the army and his own Guards to his old enemy
Soult, whose expulsion from Spain he had procured with so
much difficulty, and whom he had denounced to the Emperor
as selfish, disloyal, disobedient, and perjured, 'the author of
that infamous letter found at Valencia l' which bad accused
the King of conspiring with the Cadiz Cortes against the
interests of his own brother. When Soult had returned from
Spain the Emperor had decided that all the accusations against
him were frivolous, 'des petitesses.' He might not be an
amiable character-how many of the marshals were ?-but he
had 'the only military brain in the Peninsula'. He was not
given the command of any of the army corps in Saxony, nor
any administrative post of importance, but kept at Head·
Quarters, at the Emperor's disposition, for two whole months.
Apparently e\'en before the news of Vittoria arrived, his master
had thought of sending him back to Spain, but had postponed
I Sce above, p. 88.
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the scheme, because he did not desire an open breach with his
brother. But when Joseph's debacle was ELnnounced, the
Marshal received orders to leave Dresden at a few hours' notice,
to call upon Clarke at Paris on the way, in order to pick up the
latest military information, and then to assume the command
at Bayonne at the earliest possible moment. He was posted up
ill all the Emperor's latest political and military schemes-
even, as it seems, entrusted with the secret that if matters went
very badly it might be necessary to open secret negotiations
with the Cadiz Regency, on the base that the Emperor might
restore Ferdinand VII to his subjects, and withdraw all his
troops from Spain, if the Cortes could be persuaded to make
a separate peace, and to repudiate the British alliance I. It
seems to have escaped Napoleon's observation that the return
of the ultra-conservative and narrow-minded Ferdinand would
be the last thing desired by the Liberal party now dominant in
the Cones. Dut all the disappointments of the treaty of
Valen~ywere still in the far future.
Among the instructions entrusted to SouIt, for use it' they
should prove necessary. was a warrant authorizing him to put
Joseph under arrest, if he should openly flout his brother's
orders to halt at Bayonne, and should show any intention of
setting out for Paris. This warrant had actually to be employed
-the most maddening insult of all in the eyes of the King-it
made his treacherous ellemy into his jailer, as he complained.
Joseph received the first notice of his supersession from the
mouth of the Senator Roederer, who had beell sent orc by
Clarke a few hours in advance of Soult, in order that there might
not be any scandalous scene, such as might have occurred if the
Marshal had presented himself in person to inform the King
of his fate. Rocderer had served under Joseph as King of
Naples, was friendly to him, and broke the unpleasant tidings
as tactfully as he could. The results were what might have
been expected-the unfortunate monarch said that he had
realized that he must go, that he was already drafting another
act of abdication. But it was an insult to send Soult to take
over the command, after all the proofs of the Marshal's pen'er-
~ity and disloyalty which he had forwarded to the Emperor.
1 See thc very intcreliting pagcs of Vidal de la Blachc, i. pp. 142-3.
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He did not object to being deposcd, or imprisoncd, or put on
his trial for treason, but he did object to being made the
prisoner of Soult. 'As often as he got on this topic his Majesty
grew quite frantic 1.'
But when Soult presented himself next morning there was no
scene. The King handed him over his papers and dispatches,
and said that he intended to establish himself in a country house
just outside the gates of Bayonnc (July 12). 'fhree days later,
however, hc made a sudden and secret departure, ,and was well
on the way to Bagneres de Bil"rorrc before his escape was
discovered. He had to be pursued, stopped by force, and
shown the imperial warrant which authorized Soult to put him
under arrest. For eight days he was a prisoner at the Chl\teau of
]loyanne, when a dispatch arrived from Dresden, in which the
Emperor said that he might be allowed to retire to his own
estate of l\Iortefontaine, on condition that he saw no one, and
never visited Paris [July 24]. If he should make himself
a centre of intrigues, and should fail to reali..-,c that he was in
disgrace, the Minister of Police had orders to imprison him 2.
And thus Joscph disappears from the purview of students of
the Peninsular 'War, though he was to have onc more short
moment of notoriety in the following spring, when he was made
the nominal head of the Council of Regency, which purported
to govern France for a few weeks, before the Northern Allies
forced their way into the French capital. He did not shine in
that capacity, and would have done better to content himself
with escaping the notice of the world in the semi-captivity to
which his brother had condemned him in July 1813. But
Joseph, however much he might deny the impcnchment, loved
8 prominent place, however incapable he might be of filling it
in a competent fashion.
'l'his, indeed, is the secret of his whole unfortunate career.
The chance which made him the brother of Napoleon put
within his grasp ambitions with which his very moderate
talents could not cope. He was by no means a bad man:
the Spaniards would gladly have drawn him as a tyrant or
I See Roederer's aceollnt of the interview in Vidal de la B1Rchc, i.
pp. 132-3. Nupolcon had ~lIgget>l.ed him 11.8 the lIcst perooll for the errand•
• Napoleon to C3mbaceats, Lcecstre, Latru illtdite~, H. 1055.
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a monster, if it had been possible to do so ; but had to oontent
themselves with representing him as a ludicrous and con·
temptible character, 'Pepe BoteUas' \ a comic-opera king, too
much addicted to wine and women, and tricked by his courtiers
and mistresses. There seems no reason to suppose that the
charge ofinebricty had any particular foundation; butJoseph-
long separated from his wife by the chances of war-undoubt·
edly sought consolations in more than onc other quarter at
Madrid. His amatory epistles and souvenirs, captured in his
carriage at Vittoria, provoked a smile and a caustic remark
from Wellington. As to the taunt that he was continually
cheated and exploited by those about him, there is no doubt
that the unfortunate King was possessed of the delusion that
his personal chnrm and nrrnble manners won all hearts; he
wasted mueh time in cajoling every person of any importance
with whom he came in contact, and had many sad moments of
disillusion, when he discovered that supposed friends had failed
him. His most persistent and dangerous error was that he
imagined that he eould win over the Spaniards to his cause, by
generous treatment aud emotional sJXX.'Ches. For years he went
on enlisting in his • national army' cvery prisoner who was
willitlg to save himself a trump to a French prison, by taking an
easy oath of allcgianee. When given arms and lllliforms they
deserted: fIrst and last Joseph enlisted 60,000 Spaniards in
his leaky regiments-about 1,500 crossed the Bidassoa with
him at the moment of his fall. With those. above the rank and
file he was a little more successful, because officers and poli·
tieians were marked men, when once they had risked their
necks by forswearing their allegiance to Ferdinand VII. They
knew that there would be no such easy pardon for them as was
granted to the common soldier. There had been moments of
intense depression for the Spanish cause, such as those following
the capture of "Madrid in December 1808, and the invlLSion of
Andalusia in 1810, at whieh many timid or selfish souls had
despaired or the game, and had taken service with the adver-
sary. Having once done so it was impossible to go back-hence
the King, when his star began to wane, was overloaded with
hundreds, an~ even thousands, of downhearted and pessimistic
• 'Jocy Bottles' is the Englisb equivalent.
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dependants, who had no faith in his ultimate triumph, yet still
hung on to his skirts, and petitioned for the doles whieh he was
no longer able to give them. :Few served him zealously-those
who did were in the main adventurers as destitute of morality
as of national feeling, who strove for their own profit rather
than their master's-his prefects and intendants had villainous
reputations for the most part.
Though vain and self-confident, .Toseph was entirely lacking
in backbone-he endured all the Emperor's insults and taunts
vtithout any real feeling of resentment, though he protested
loudly enough. Unlike his brothers, Lueien and Louis, he
never dnrcd to set his wiIl against Napolcon's-his threatened
abdications never became realities. He pretended that his
submission was the result of loyalty and brotherly affection-in
rcality he had an insufficient scnse of righteous indignation and
self-respect, and an exaggerated love of royalty-evcn of its
shadow. An inteIligcnt Freneh observer summed up Ius
character in the following curious phrases:
, Thc King's most striking characteristic is his casy temper.
It does not come from a generous heart or a real magnanimity,
but from a facile disposition and a total absence of decision.
Hc has not the courage to refuse to do things which his own
reason condemns, and is often guilty of acts which he himself
acknowledges to be unwise. At bottom he is an honest man,
but he has not the firmness to maintain his principles if he is
pressed and harried. Tiresome solicitation may induce him to
cast aside principle and act like a rogue. His greatest hobby is
a belief in his own finesse-a great perspicacity in discovering
the secret and selfISh motives of those about him. He often
giv~s them credit for more Machiavellian ingenuity than they
really possess. He does not always withdraw his favour from
those whom he has disCQvered cheating him, but rejoices in
making them feci that he has found out their private designs.
He is incapable of owning that he has done an injustice: when
he discovers that he has wronged one of his followers, he shirks
meeting him, and tries to get rid of him by circuitous methods.
Hcnee he often persists in acts of injustice, because he is ashamed
of confessing himself to have been mistaken.'
The natural result of this lack of moral backbone was that
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Joseph was systematically disobeyed and cheated. Very little
was to be feared from bis anger, much could be got by threaten·
ing or worrying him. It is true that he was much handicapped
by the constant interference of the Emperor, and even of t.he
French Minister of War, in all his attempts to create a Spanish
administ.mtion, and to co-ordinate the efforts of the various
armies in the Peninsula. Nevertheless there was much truth
in his brother's savage comments on his eharaeter-' he cannot
get himself obeyed '-< he has neither military toJent nor
administrative ability '-' he does not know how to draw up
accounts '-he' cannot command an army himself, but he can
prevent other and morc compctcnt peoplc from doing so'-
< thc greatest moral error is to take up a profession which onc
does not understand: that the King was not a profcssional
soldier was not his fault, but he was responsible for trying to
be one l.' To this last and perfcetly just remark Joseph could
have made an unanswerable reply, by asking who was responsible
for the promotion of a person who was not, and never could be,
a professional soldier, to the post of Commander-in-Chief of all
the Armies of Spain.
It is only fair to concede to this unlucky prince his good
qualities: he was never cruel-no usurper ever shed so little
blood: he was a good master to many ungmteful servants': he
was courteOllS and considerate, liberal so far as his scanty means
allowed, ond interested in literature and art. Unfortunately
his artistic tastes brought him only ridicule. He was greatly
giycn to pulling down slwns ond eyesores in Madrid, but ncvcr
had thc money to replace them by the stately buildings which
he had designed-his good intentions were only shown by
empty spaces-whence the pcople called him El TCtJ PlazuelQs.
This was rather to his ercdit than otherwise--Icss so the interest
in art shown by his eleventh-hour pilfering of the best pictures
of the Madrid Galleries, of which Wellington rceaptured a selec-
tion at Vittoria. To sum him up in a single phrasc, Joseph
Bonaparte was the mildest mannered man who ever stole a
erown-or rather acted as receiver of a crown stolen by hili
rnthless brother.
• Scc cspeciully the ca.ustic parogmlllls in Lecestre. H. 1045, ]041,1055,
to Clarke and Cambaceri:B.
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With King Joseph his Chief-of-the-Staff went into the depths
of disgrace. Napoleon wrote that he never wanted to hear of
Jourdan again. Hc must go into complete retirement at his estate
of Coudray near Orleans. Hc was cut down to the strictest
minimum of retired pay-not over 20,000 francs a year 1, which
left him in miserable straits-for he had a large family, and he
was honest,and had never feathered his nest like other marshals.
The only notice to be taken of him was that he was to be
ordered to draw up a memorandum explaining how the battle
of Vittoria had been fought and lost-if any explanation were
possible 2. But Napoleon, when he pardoned Joseph a few
months later, pardoned Jourdan also. He wus given thc
command of the Roucn Military District, where hc did compctent
administrative work in the spring of 1814, so far us his brokcn
health permitted. It is surprising to find that, with all his
ailments, this worthy old officer-the Cassandra of the great
drama of 1812-13-survived till 1833, when he died, after
having been for many years Govemo'r of the Invalides. His
military memoirs, first published in a seattered and incomplete
form in Ducasse's TAfe and Correspondencc of Joseph Bonaparte,
and afterwards in a better shape so late as 1008, form one of the
best ~ritieal commentaries on the Peninsular War. As a pur-
veyor of hard truths concerning his imperial master, and the
marshals who were his colleagues in Spain, Jourdan hllS no rival.
, So Jourdnn's MCtllQiTeJI, p. yiii. Vidal de la Blache, i. p. HO, SIIyl
5,000 frlluc>; only, which SCCIlLS llll impossibly ~mall ~wn for lUlll'shul's
half pay.
• Napoleon to CamhllcCr~, Leccstrc, ii. ]045.
SECTION XXXVIII
THE BATTLES OF THE PYRENEES
CHAPTER I
THE SIEGE OF ST. SEBASTlAl"\'. FffiST PERIOD
HAVING pushed his whole front line up to the French horde!.
from Giron atlrun, hard by the ocean, to Byng, far inland on the
wntershed of the historic Pass of RoncesYalles, Wellington
turned his attention to the siege of St. Sebastian. on which he
inten~ed to press hard and rapidly, while Pampcluna was to be
left for the present to the slower process of blockade and
starvation. He had no intention of pushing forward into
France till the result of the negotiations in Germany should
be known. He was kept informed of the doings at Dresden
from time to time, but occasionally bad weather in the Bay of
Biscay delayed the courier from Downing Street, and there
W31> an interval of many days, during which the absence of
political information began to cause him anxiety. On the whole,
as he was informed, it was probable that the war would be
renewed; but the intentions of Austria were still suspect. and
the danger of a separate peace in the North never ceased to
disturb him until hostilities actually recommenced in the middle
of August. On July 10th he had still many weeks to wait,
before the news arrived that Metternieh had broken with
Napoleon-after a certain famous and stormy interview-and
that Austria had come into the Grand Alliance. Meanwhile
he intendcd to make his defensive position on the Pyrcnean
frontier sure, by the eapturc of the fortresscs. It is curious to
note that Napoleon understood and approved from the military
point of view of this policy. On Aug. 5 he v,'Tote to his minister
Marct from Dresden, • it is certain that Lord Wellington had
a very sensible scheme: he wished to take St. Sebastian u.nd
Pampcluna before the French Army could be reorganized. Hc
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supposed that it had suffered more heavily than was actually
the case, and thought that more than a month would be
required to refurnish it with artillery 1.' This was a guess that
cn.me very near the truth, though the Emperor could not know
that the causc of the British general's delay was mainly political
and not military.
It ,vas fortunate for Wellington that the astounding triumph
of Vittoria had put him in a position to dictate his own policy
to the Ministry at home. For Lord Bathurst and Lord Liver·
pool had been sending him suggestions which ruled him with
gravc apprehcnsions. Bcforc the news of Vittoria reached
London, the War Miniiiter had' thrown out for consideration'
two most inept projects. If the French in Spain had been
driven beyond the Ebro, would it not be possible to • contain'
them for the future by Spanish and Portuguese armies, nnd
to bring round Wellington himself and the bulk of his British
troops to Germany, lcaving only a small nucleus to scrve as
a backbone for the native levies of the Peninsula? The
appearance of Wellington with 40,000 of his veterans on the
Elbe would probably induce the Allies to appoint him General-
issimo against Napoleon, and if Great Britain had the chief
command in Germany she could dictate the poliey of the
Coalition. But supposing that the war was not resumed in
Central Europe, and that 0. general peace was negotiated, would
it be possible or expedient to allow the Emperor to retain the
boundary oC the Ebro for the French Empire, on condition that
he yielded to the demands of thc Allies in other parts of the
Continent? Or would Wellington guarantee that in the event
of a Peace from which Great Britain stood out, he would be
able to maintain himself in Spain and Portugal, as in 1810 and
1811, even though Napoleon had no other enemies left, and
could send what reinforcements he pleased across the Pyrenees 72
Even after the great event of June 21st had become known
in London, we find tbe Prime Minister repeating some of Lord
Bathurst's most absurd suggestions. He wrote in a tentative
1 Napoleon to l\larct, No. 28 in LeUrCII de Napoleon non instrtell don' la
CorrespOlllJallte, Aug.-Sept.--{)ct. 181J. Pari~, 1907.
I Bathurst to Wellington, June 23, Supple7nfmw.nJ Oillpfllchc8, viii.
pp. 11-18.
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and deferential style, to set forth the hypothesis that it might
be possible to so rortify the Spanish frontier that it might be
held by a small Britillh force aided by Spanish levies, ' applying
the principle upon which the Lines before Lisbon were formed
to the passes of the Pyrenees'; and he inquired whether the
warlike Navarrese and Biscayans could not defend this new
Torres Vedms, if backed by a small foree-20,OOO or at most
SO,OOO-veteran Anglo-Portuguese troops 1. If this could be
done Lord J~ive;pool obviously hoped great things from the
errect of the appearance of Wellington, with his new prestige
and the bulk of his victorious battalions, in Central Europe.
The recipient of these ill-advised suggestions would have
nothing to do with them. When on July 12th he got Bathurst's
dispatch of June 28rd, he replied that, being the servant of the
State, he must obey any orders given him by the Prince Regent
and the Ministry, but that he saw no profit in going to Germany,
whieh he did not know, and where he was not known, whereas
in Spain he had a unique advantage in 'thc confidence that
everybody feels that what I do is right'. 'Nobody could enjoy
that same advantage here-while I ~hould he no better than
another in Germany. If any British army should be left in the
Peninsula, therefore, it is best that I should remain with it.'
As to making any general peace which left the French the line
of the Ebro as a frontier, that problem had been settled by the
battle of Vittoria. 'I recommend you not to give up an inch
of Spanish territory; I think I can hold the Pyrenees as ensily
as I ean Portugal.' It would really be better to have Joseph
Bonaparte ns King of Spain (considering how ready 0.11 Bono.-
partes are to break away from their brother), than to have
Ferdinand back with the Ebro as his frontier. ']n the latter
ease Spain would inevitably belong to the }~rench 2.'
As to the ridiculous idea of fortifying the Pyrcnean passes in
the style of the Lines of Torres Vedras, Wellington speaks with
no uncertain sowld. 'I do not .think we could successfully·
apply to the frontier of Spain the system 011 whieh we fortified
the country between Lisbon and the sea. That line was a short
, Liverpool to Wellington. Supple:mentary DispaJchtB, viii. pp. 04-1>.
dated July 7.
• W('lIington to Bathul'8t, July 12. from I-1ernllni. JJi'ijlafches, x. p. 524.
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one, and the communications easiest and shortest on our side.
The Pyrenees are a very long line; there are not fewer than
seventy passes through these mountains, and the better corn·
munications, so far as I have been able to learn, arc on the side
of the enemy. Wc may facilitate defence by fortifying some of
the passes: but we can never make in the Pyrenees what we
made between the Tagus [Lnd the sea 1.'
It looks as if Lord Liverpool, in serene ignorance of local
geography, imagined the Pyrenees to be a simple line of preci-
pices, pierced by a limited number of passes, whieh could be
scaled up with walls, in the style in which Alexander the Great
in the mediaeval romance dealt with the • Caucasian Gates'.
For we cannot suppose that even the most unmilitary of
politicians could have conceived it possible to build something
like the Great Wall of China for several hundred miles, along the
whole frontier from Fuenterrabia to Figueras. Yet this is what
his proposal, iftnken literally, would have meant; and Welling-
ton, to show its absurdity, gave the total number of passes
available for mules or pedestrians between the Bay of Biscay
and the Mediterranean. Those by whieh guns or wheeled
transport could pass were (of course) no more than five or six-
but there would bc no finality in sealing up these few: for
the enemy could turn the flanks of any of them with infantry
scrambHng up accessible slopes-as Soult indeed did during the
battles of the Pyrenees, only a month after Lord Liverpool had
made his egregious suggestion-m as Napoleon had done at the
Somosierra in the winter of 1808.
Lastl)', as to the Prime .Minister's proposal to hand over the
defence of the Pyrenees to Spanish armies backed by a mere
20,000 Anglo-l>ortuguese, Wellington replied tha.t the Spanish
Government had shown itself most consistently unable to feed,
pay, and clothe its armies, or to providc the transport which
would make them mobile. In June 1813 there were 160,000 men
on the Spanish muster rolls, but only a third of that nwnber
at the front and actively engaged with the French, even when
all troops in the Pyrenees, Aragon, and Catalonin were reckoned
up. To trust the defence of the frontier to a govenunent which
• \Vellington to J..ord Liverpool, July 23, from LesaCll, ihid., x. p. 5GB.
cr. sunw to same, x. p. 500.
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eould not move or fced more than a third of its own troops,
would be to invite disaster. The best way to help the Spaniards
was not to ask for more men, but to improve their fmanees, so
that they should be able to employ a greater proportion of their
already existing troops. AB things stood at present, it would be
insane to request them to take over the main burden of the
war.• It is my opinion that you ought not to have less than
60,000 British troops in the field, let the Spaniards have what
numbers they may 1.'
Wellington had by this time established himself in such
a commanding position that the ministers had to accept his
decision-however much they would have liked to move him
round to Germany, and to press for his appointment to the
unenviable position which Prince SchWRr7,cnberg occupied
during the second cnmpaign of 1818. The best proof of the
wisdom of his determination to remain in the Peninsula was
that the French, far from adopting a defensive policy, reswned
the orlcnsive under Soult within a few weeks. It would be
an unprofitable, as also a dismal, task to consider what would
have happened during the battles of the Pyrenees had Soult
been opposed, not by Wellington and his old army, but by
a Spanish host under O'Donnell or Freire, backed by two or
three Anglo-Portuguese divisions.
Controverfly with Lord Bathurst on general principles was
only one of Wellington's distractions during the middle weeks
of July: he was at the same time carrying on an acrimonious
correspondence with the Spanish l\Iinister of War, concerning
the removal of Castailos and Giron from their posts, and
enduring many controversial lettcrs from Sir John Murray
regarding the 'l'arrngona linsco. Murray had realized the
disgust which his wretched policy had rouscd, alike in the arm)'
and in the British public, and was endeavouring to justify him-
sdf to his commander-in-chicf by long argumentativc epistlcs.
Wellington refused to commit himself to any judgemcnt, and
agreed with the ministers at home that a court martial would
be required 2. He suggestcd to the authoritics at the Horse
Guards that l\1urray should be charged firstly with making no
, JJiS]JaJcIiCII, X. p. 570.
• Se<' Wellington to Torrens, m!r]JulclICil, x. p. 616.
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propel' arrangements to raise the siege of Tarragona or to bring
off his guns, secondly with having disobeyed the clause of his
instructions which bade him return at once to Alicante if he
failed in Catalonia, and thirdly with having betrayed General
Copons, by bringing him down to the coast and then absconding
without giving any proper warning of his departure t. After
mature reflection, however, he advised that the third charge
should be dropped, not because it was unjustified, but because
there would be great inconvenience in bringing Copons or his
representatives to bear witness at a British court martial, when
they were wanted in Catalonia.
But all this correspondence, and much more on less imJXIrtant
subjects, did not prevent Wellington from paying his promised
visit to General Graham, to inspect in person the allied positions
on the lower Bidassoa, and to supervise the arrangements for
the siege of St. Sebastian, which indeed required supervision,
for already it was evident that things were not going so well 3S
might have been hoped in tlus direction (July 12).
'rite first impression made on the observer by the fortress
of St. Sebastian is that it is an extremely small place. This
is true-though it is also true that its eflect is somewhut
dwarfed by its immense surroundings-the limitless expanse
of the Ocean on onc side, and the lugh and fantastic peaks of
thc Jaizquibcl, the Pena de la Haya, and the Four Crowns,
which have just been passed by the traveller coming from
the side of Bayonne. The fortress consists of a lofty sand-
stone rock, as steep as Edinburgh Castle and 400 ft. high,
beaten on three sides by the sea, and united to the land by a low
sandy isthmus about 900 yards long. There was an old castle
called La i\lota, on the summit of the rock, which is named
Monte Urgull, with three modem batteries on its southern or
landward face 2, which is very steep and only accessible at two
points by winding roads. But these were not the main defences
of the place, which lay lower down. The town of St. Sebastian
, See Wellington to Bathul'8t, Dillpalcllt8, x. p. 599, and other epistles on
same topic.
• Called the i\lirador (' look-out '), Queen'~, and Principc batteries:
there were others facing seaward, which were of no account in this siege,
liS 110 atLtLck rrom the water-side took pIuCl'.
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was built 011 the lower ground below the rock, extending from
sea to sea and occupying about a third of the isthmus, the rest
of which was broken sandy ground about 400 yards broad. At
the southern neck of the isthmus was a hill crowned by the large
monastery of San Bartolome. which the French held as an
outwork at the beginning of the siege. The space between this
hill and the wall of the town, now thickly packed with the
hotels and avenues of a fashionable seaside resort, was in 1813
waste ground dotted with a few isolated houses and gardens,
which the governor was busily engaged in levelling when the
blockading force arrived. At two points therc was a sufficient
accumulation of buildings to form a small suburb. Onc group
was at the head of the bridge across the ri,'cr Urumea, which
joined the peninsula to the eastern mainland; this was named
Santa Catalina, from a chapel of that saint which Jay in it. The
other, called (for a similar reason) San Martin, was immediately
at the foot of the hill of San Bartolome. The bridge had been
blown up by the Freneh when the Spaniards first appeared,
and the suburbs set on fire, but their rooflcss and partly fallen
houses still gave a good deal of cover.
The land-front of St. Sebastian was very formidable; it was
only 400 yards broad and was composed of a very high curtain
from which projected one large bastion in the centre and two
demi-bastions overhanging the water on eaeh flank, that of
San Juan, above the estuary of the Urumea, that of Santiago
on the western side nearest the harbour. In front of the
bastions was a very broad hornwork, having outside it the
usual counterscarp, covered-way, and glacis. Specialists, wisc
after the event, criticized the whole land-front: they found its
trace defective, considered that the searp of the hornwork
ought to have been more than 23 feet high, and pointed out
that in the rear line the two demi-bastions did not well protect
the flanks, since they were not themselves covered by the
hornwork, and had no ditch or glacis, because the salt water
came up to their foot at high tide 1.
But as the land·front was never attacked, these objections
were of comparatively little importance. The weak side of
St. Sebastian was really its enstern water-front. The western
l See Jone~'s Sil"ges of lilt Pmi7181da. ii. p. D4.
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water-front on the open bay was inaccessible; but on the
opposite side, where the town wall ran along the estuary of the
river Urwnea, the conditions were peculiar. The Urumea is
a tidal river-at high water it washes right up to the foot of the
walls, but at low tide it recedes into a narrow channel and leaves
exposed an expanse of rock and sand, ranging in breadth from
50 to 150 yards, all along the water-wall for a length of some
400 yards-half the enst side ot' the town. The rampart here
was a plain curtain, not very high and only 8 feet thiek: of
course it could have no ditch or other outer fittings, since the
salt water reached right up to it for half the day. Its only
salients, from which flank fire could be used, were one small
bastion (St. Elmo) and two ancient round towers called Los
Hornos and Amezqueta, which projected slightly from the
straight curtain.
At high tide this water-front was unapproachable--at low
tide it was weak and accessible, for the Urumea was fordable
in many places, and shrank into a channel only 50 yards broad,
meandering through a waste of shingle, rocks, and mud. On its
eastern bank were rolling sandhills of some height, which com-
manded the isthmus and the southern half of the town, from
a distance of no more than 700 or 800 yards. To the right of the
san4hills, called Los Chofres, was a steep hill, the Monte Olia,
facing the castle of St. Sebastian across the broader part of the
estuary, and by no means out of gunshot of it, since not more
than 1,000 or 1,100 yards of water lies between them.
Since it had been rebuilt as a fortress of the Vauban-Cohorn
style in the last years of the seventeenth century, St. Sebastian
had only once been besieged: for during ~he Revolutionary War
of 1792-5 it surrendered without any resistance to the J aeobin
armies, while in 1808 Napoleon had seized it bytreaehery and not
by force. The one formal attack mude on it was by the Duke of
Berwick in 1719, when the amlics of the Regent Orleans crossed
the Bidassoa, in the short war provoked by the ambitions of
Elizabeth l<~arnese and Cardinal Alberoni. Berwick had
established his siege-batteries not on the isthmus, to ba.tter the
land-front, but on the Chofres sandhills, from whence he
pounded the eastern sea-front to pieces. Severo.l breaches
huying becn made in it, and trenches on the isthmus IHwing
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been pushed as far as the glaeis of the hornwork, the governor
very tamely surrendered, without waiting for an assault 1.
Unwarned by this revelation of the weakness of the defences
along the Urumea, the engineers of Philip V made no improve-
ments in them when they were reconstructed after the war,
and the fortress was in 1813 little dirrerent from what it had
been in 1710.
The easy success of Marshal Berwick turncd out a vcry
unhappy thing for the British army; for the history oC the last
siege being well remembered, Major Charles Smith, the senior
engineer with Graham's column, reported that Berwick's plan
was the right onc 2, when the first survey of the place was made.
And when the head-quarters staff came up, his superior officer,
Sir Richard Fleteher, agreed with him, as did Colonel Diekson
commanding the artiUery. They all forgot that to make
a breach with ease is not necessarily the same thing as to
capture a fortress, and that the eighteenth-century slackness
of the governor, who capitulated when his walls were once
breached, gave no indication of what ffiight be done by 0. very
resourceful and resolute French officer, who had in his mind
Napoleon's ediet of 1811 that every commandant who hauled
down his flag beCore standing at least one assault should be sent
before a court martial. Nor is there any doubt that Wcllingwn
himself must take his share oC th~ responsibility, as he went
round the place on July 12th and had a good look at it, in
company with Charles Smith and Diekson, from Monte Olia and
the ChoCres sandhills. Diekson summed up the results oC thcir
discussion as follows :-' The project is to effeet a breach in the
uncovered sea-wall forming an angle on the left of the land-
front, between two towers [Los Hornos and Amezqueta], being
the same spot the Duke of Derwick breached in 1719, when he
took St. Sebastian. The convent oC San Bartolome, which the
}"'rcnch have fortified and occupied in force, is absolutely
necessary to take first, in order to be able to advance ou the
isthmus in support of our breaching opemtions from the
1 The governor surrendered the town on August I, bul retired into
the castle of La Mota, where he capitulated a few days later, Just as Rey
did in 1818.
I JOlles's SWgu of fM PCflilll~ula, ii. p. 14
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Chofres. The plan of attack was the proposition of Major
Smith 1.'
This, of course, was not the rcgular and orthodox way 00
attack such a fortress-as it ifi\'olvcd the making of breaches
only accessible at low tide, in a part of the wall to which no
trenches could draw near, since its lower courses were six feet
under water for half the hours of the day. There would have
to be a long advance from the nearest dry ground on which
approaches could bc dug, across the tidal waste, in order to
reach the spot selected for breaching. And this would undoubt-
edly be a very bloody business for the exposed storming troops.
The advantages to be gained were rapid action and a quick end,
without the necessity which an orthodox scheme would have
involved of sapping up to the hornwork, storming it, and then
tackling the lofty bastion behind it. The British engineer who
wrote the history of the siege considered that' the operations
against San Sebastian afford a most impressive lesson on the
advantage of due attention to science and rule in the attack
of fortified places: the effort then made to overcome and
trample on such restrictions caused an easy and certain opera-
tion of eighteen or twenty days to c>..1:.cnd over sixty days, and
to cost the besiegers 8,500 men killed, wounded, or taken,
bearing strong testimony to the truth of the maxim laid down
by Marshal Vauban, that hurry in sieges does not lead to all
early success, often delays it, and always makes it very bloody 2.'
St. Sebastian had been abandoned to its own resources on
June 28, when, after the departure of Fay's troops from Oyarzun,
the Spaniards had closed in on the· place, and established a
blockade. The force employed was four battalions of Bi~cayau
volunteers under Mendizabal, the remains of the bands which
Foy had beaten in May, and which had taken part on June 26
along with the British 1st Division in the combat of Tolosa 3•
They were very irregular troops, and their indiscipline and
incompetence shocked General Graham when he came to visit
their lines on July 6th 4. They had no notion of guarding
• Dicksoo's diary, July 12, 1813, p. 900 of Coloncl John Lcslic'li edition
of the Dickson Paper8, • Joues. ii. p. 97. • See above, p. 4018.
• Sce Graham to WcUingWn. Supplementary DispafcJlu, viii. p. 62. The
K.G.L. brigade of the 1st Diviliioll was present Cor a Cew days.
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themselves, and had suffered severely, first from an attempt to
storm San Bartolomc on June 28th, and later from a French
sortie on .July 3, when Reysentout two columns of 700 men from
the Convent, which surprised their camp, took many prisoners,
and drove them back for nearly two miles. Graham recom-
mended that they should be replaced at once by solid troops,
and at Wellington's suggestion told off the British 5th Division
and the unattached Portuguese brigade of Bradford for the
siege 1. ~Iendizabal'smen were sent off to join in the blockade
of Santona 2• On July 7th the siege-troops arrived; the in-
dependent brigade established itself on thc Chofrcs, the 5th
Division-stiU under Oswald as at Vittoria-took post on the
heights of Ayete, facing the hill and convcnt of San Bartolomc.
From this moment the serious opera.tions may be considered
to have begun. A blockade of the sea-side had been established,
in a rather intermittent fashion, four days earlier, when Sir
George Collier appeared in the.hay with a frigate, the Surveil·
lank, a corvette, and two brigs, all the force that he could collect
for the moment in response to Wellington's appeals to the
Admiralty. The amount was wholly inadequate, even when
supplemented by some local fishing craft and pinnaces, which
were manned by the battalion of marines from Giron's Galician
army. All through the siege I,'reneh trincadorcs and luggers
from Bayonne and St. Jean de Luz ran the blockade at night,
bringing in food, munitions, and reinforcements. For Rey
having asked for more gunners, he was sent several detaelunents
of them, who all arrived in safety, while he got rid of many of
his wounded by the returning vessels. Wellington was full of
justifiable wrath at the miserable help given him-his objurga-
tions brought from Lord l\Ielville an unsatisfactory reply, to
the effect tha.t the operations in the Baltic and the American
War absorbed many of the British light craft which would have
been available in earlier years, and that the Admiralty had not
been warned in the spring that any large fighting force would
be wanted on the Biscay coast in July. • Neither from you,
nor from any other person at your suggestion, did we ever
receive the slightest intimation that more was expected than
, Wellington to Grnham, Dispa~s, x. p. 612.
I lI'ellillg/an Di8pa/cJIClI, ;0;. p. (;25.
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the protection of your convoys, till the actual arrival of Sir
Thomas Graham on the coast after the battle of Vittoria.'
MclviIlc then proceeded to write lengthy observations on the
dangerous nature of the coast of Northern Spain, • where ships
cannot anchor without extreme risk, and are exposed to almost
certain destruction in a gale, when from its direction they can
neither haul off shore nor run for shelter into a port. )f you
will ensure the ships a continuance of east winds, they could
remain with you, but not otherwise. All the small craft in the
British navy could not prevent the occasional entry of small
boats by night into San Scbastiau's, though it may be rendered
more difficult and uncertain.' l\fclvillc then proceeded to tax
Wellington with grave professional irregularity, for having
written to Sir George Collier, and other naval officers, letters
taxing the Admiralty with neglect and incompetence. 'Appeals
to subordinate officers against their superiors are not customary
in any branch of the service, and must be injurious to the public
interest 1.'
It was not so much the arguments used by Mclville as his
orIeusive tone which Wellington rescnted. The victor of
Salamanca was naturally irritated at fmding himself trcatt,.-d
de haut etJ has by a pcrsonagc of such complete insignificance,
who had not even thc equivocal reputation of his father (the
devisor of so many unlucky expeditions, the impeached minister
of 1806) to lend weight to his lectures. He replied in a very
short letter that he was not desirous of getting into discussions,
that his demands for more naval assistance had begun in the
winter of 1812-13, and that after reading over again his letters
to naval officers he could see nothing to find fault with-save
that he had once sent to Sir George Collier an extract of
B dispatch to Lord Bathurst, instead of a separate communi-
cation on the same topic addressed to Collier personally-
B trifling subject on which to start B controversy 2. ~Ieanwhile
he considcred, as a dozen letters show, that he was being poorly
served by the Admiralty, and' formed private opinions on the
subject-which private opinions may not perhaps deserve much
attention,' as he sardonically observed.
I Melville to Wellington, S"pplelnrnwy DispatdlC8, viii. pp. 2U--G.
t Wellington to Mclville, Di!J[JatchC8, xi. p. 115.
Pp
1813] ARRIVAL OF THE SIEGE TRAIN 569
Onc thing, however, the Admiralty had contrived to ctu"ry
out according to Wellington's request-the stores and battering
train, which he had accumulated at Corunna in the spring, had
eome round to the Biseay coast as soon as could have been
cxpected; they had been sent to Santandcr, as he directcd,
and arrived in that harbour OIl the very day (June 29) on whieh
Major Frazcr, sent off four days after Vittoria, came from Head-
Quarters to inquire for them 1. The orders were to land them at
Deba in Guipuzcon, fifteen miles west of St. Sebastian; but just
as the disembarkation was commencing (July 3), a change of
destination was made----everything was to be put ashore at
Passages, a much more convenient place, only a couple of miles
from the blockaded fortress. This is a most astonishing little
harbour, the safest port on the coast, for it is absolutely land·
locked; its entrance is so narrow that the circular basin looks
like a lake without an issue, till the eye has with some difficulty
discovered its exit. It pays for its security, however, by being
hard to enter in time of stonn, when very careful navigation is
required. But a besieging army has seldom been granted a base
so ncar to its field of opcrntions-it was only two and a half
miles from the water's cdge at Passages to the Chorres sand-
hills, where the ehief batteries were to bc constructcd, tkough
four milcs to the head of thc istlmlWJ where the lcft attack was
to be made. And the fording of the Urumca, whose bridgc the
French had burncd, was sometimes dangerous-more than one
gun was lost in the quicksands ~.
By the time that Wellington had worked out the scheme of
assault with Charles Smith, the glUlS were already arriving, not
only the battering train from Col'unna., which had begun to
eome ashore on July 7, but the heavy artillery reserve of the
army, whieh had traversed nil the weary miles of road from
Ciudad Hodrigo. The total of pieces available was twenty-eight
from the convoy, six from the heavy battery of the army
reserve, and six lent by Sir Gcorge Collier from the main deck
of his ship, the Surveillante-or forty in a1l 3-a very different
1 See the interesting account of his cross-eountry ride on .June 25-0 in
his I.eaerll from /lIe Petlillwla, pp. Hl7-74. • See Fro~r, p. HIS•
• In detail Jones gives them as twenty 24-poundel"S, mx 18-poundc",
four 6S·[)Ound cannonadcs, six 8·inch howitzc". and four mortars.
3&G.6
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train from the miserable four guns which had battered Burgos
in the preceding autumn.
Defore any regular siege work could begin, it was obviously
necessary to clear the Ii'reneh out of the monastery of San
Bartolome, on its hill at the neck of the isthmus: till this
should be taken, it wns impossible to get forward on the shore
from whieh the assault was to be delivered. Under-estimating
the strength of the post Graham and the engineers, contrary
to the advice of Major Hartmann of the K.G.L., the senior
artillery officer present before Diekson's arrival 1, had tried to
reduce it on July 7th by the fire of a Portuguese field battery
belonging to the artillery reserve; but the walls proved too
solid for 8-pounders to damage, and some firing with red hot
shot failed to set fire to the roof. It was clear that it would be
necessary to wait for the heavy guns to come up. Meanwhile
the French continued to strengthen San Bartolome, throwing
up an earthwork in its cemetery and loopholing and barricading
the ruined houses near it, as well as those in the LUMlt-out
suburb of San Martin, which lay at its foot. They also eom·
menced a redoubt 011 the istlunus, half-way between the outlying
convent and the hornwork in front of the city wall.
While the siege train was being got ashore, the engineers
made ready the emplaeements for the guns-they started with
throwing up two batteries on the Ayete heights to play on the
convent of San Dartolome 2, three on the Chofres sand-hills 3
to aet against the sea-wall where the main breach was to be
formed, and one on the lofty Monte Olia, for long-distance fire
against all the fortifi~ations, including those of the rock of
1I10nte Urgull '. But on the 14th, when the battering began,
the onI)' guns used were those on the left attaek opposite the
convent, 8S it was considered unwise to molest the city fortifica-
tions before there was any way of getting near them: approach
was impossible as long ns the isthmus was all in the enemy's
hands.
Two days' battering (July 14-15) brought down the roof and
part of the walls of San Barto!olllc, and damaged the subsidiary
works around it severely. But General Rey was determined to
, Sce HartmanJl'S Life, pp. Hi3-4.
• .No~. 1, 2, a in mup.
• NOli. 40, 5 in mu".
• Ko. 0 in the map.
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hold on to his outer defences as long as possible: the best
part of two battalions was told on to hold the ruins and thc
suburb of San :r.fartin behind them. On the afternoon of
the 15th General Oswald, judging from the dilapidation of thc
buildings that they were untenable, sent in the 8th Ca';&dores
from his Portuguese brigade to stonn them; but the French
had dug themselves well in, a furious fire broke out against the
assailants, and the attack was turned back with the loss of
65 men 1. It was obvious that mOTe battering was required
to evict the gallant garrison, so the fire was resumed on the
16th, 'with the aid of a field battery playing across the Urumea
to enfilade the defences, and to pound the ruined houses of
Sun Martin, where the lrench reserves were sheltering.
'fhe fire was very effective: the inner woodwork of the
monastery blazed up, its porch was levelled to the ground, great
gaps appcM'cd in the walls, and the earthwork in the cemetery
was much damaged. At 10 a.m. on the 11th a second storm
was tried, with forces much larger than thosc used at the Hrst-
not one battalion, but thc equivalent of three: Oswnld drew
upon Bradford's independent brigade from ueross the Urumea
for 700 Portuguese volunteer::;. Two columns were launched
against the French position, each consisting of a screen of
~adores, a support of Portuguese Line troops, and a reserve of
British companies from the first brigade of the 5th Division t.
The right column aimed at the cemetery earthwork and the
fortified houses-the left at the main buildings of the convent,
which were still smouldering from the fire. Both achieved their
purpose without any very serious loss, and the garrison was
driven down hill into the suburb of San Martin, pursued by the
1 Why tloes Bclmus, who WU9 very well inCormetl, nlld u~d Joncs's
book, call the stonners 'Ics Anglais' and say that they lost 150 men?
(Saga, iv. p. 608). He knew from Jones that they were Cu~dores only
(Jones, ii. p. 21), nnd that their loss Wall under 70.
• Right column, to attaek the cemetery and fortified housl!3-150 of
iith Cac;adorcs, 150 13th Portuguese Line, three companies l/11th Foot,
thtcC companies 3/ht Foot (Royal SCOtll) all under Hay, Brigadier of tJle
5th Division. Lert column: 200 of 5th Cu~dores,200 of 18th Portuguese
Line, three compnnies 1/111.11 Foot--nll under 13mdIonl comlOnntlillg
Portuguese indcpcndellt brig",de. Why did not Oswald use his own Portu·
gUetle brigade, but draw on Bradford? Possibly because Spry's brigade
were disoourngclllJy the fuilllre or Lhcir CQI,lo.dor bo.tt.o.lion on the 15th.
Pp'
• Butteries 13 UlHl 14. in tile mup.
• No. 0 in the map.
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stormers. Here the French reserves intervened, and for a
moment thc attack Wll.S turned back; but the companies of
thc l!Oth whieh formed the British supports rc-established the
fight, and the enemy retired in disorder towards the town.
Unfortunately the victors pursued recklessly, nnd cnme under
the fire of the French guns in the hornwork and the bastion
behind it, whence many mmecessnry casualties. For it had
never been intended that the troops should advance on to the
isthmus, where oC course they could do nothing' against an
intact front of fortifications. The total losses of the assailants
were 207 killed and wounded-the Ij9th which had headed the
rush on to the bare ground suffering most, with 70 casualties.
The :Freneh had 40 killed and 200 wounded.
It was now possible to commcncc thc subsidiary attack on
the side oC the isthmus, as the French held nothing outside
the walls save the recently constructed redoubt in front of tile
hornwork 1. Two batteries were thrown up on the San Barlo·
lome hill, and on the 18th the guns with which the convent
had been breached were moved down into them 2. The main
object of these batteries waS to enfilade the stretch of sea-wall,
on which the greater weight of metn! 011 the Chofres downs was
to plny from the front. Two additional batteries were thrown
up, more to the right, which, while aiding the enfilading fire,
were also intended to shell the land-front, and keep down t.he
fire from the bastion and hornwork 3. Finally, the Chofres
attack was strengthened with two more batteries '-. On the
night of the lOth sixteen guns in all were in place on the isthmus
front, or left attack, twenty·three on the right attack to the cast
of the Urumea, including six on the summit of the lofty Monte
OH", on the extreme flank 6. Meanwhile the approaches, by
which thc troops wonld have to move out to assault thc breaches
when made, were not nearly so far forward as could have been
desired: little more had been done than to push a Zig-7.ag down
the slopc of San Bartolome into the ruins of San Martin-
1 Generally in British narmt.ives Clllled the Cask Redoubt, because wine·
eallks hOO beeD used to revet tlle shifting SlInd of whieh the soil Wall there
oomposed .
• Batteries 8 and 7 in the map.
• BntteriCl> 12 1I1ld 11 ill the mu!'.
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further advance was made difficult by the fact that the French
were still holding the forward position of the redoubt in the
centre of the isthmus. It was only on}he night between the 19th
and 20th that they evacuated this post J. Moreover the fire of
the defence was as yet intact, since the British heavy batteries
had not begun their work: hence the sap-head wa.'l a decidedly
unhealthy place.
At 8 a.m. on the morning of July 20 nine of the eleven siege
batteries opened-all but the two new ones on San Bartolome,
where the work was a little belated. The effect of the first day's
work was fairly satisfactory-the parapet of the sea-wall began
to crumble, the enemy's gWlS en baThe/te on the land-front were
partly silenced, and the high trajectory fIre from the lofty
Monte Olia battery searched the streets, the back of the bastion,
and the interior of the horllwork. The enemy concentrated all
his attention Oll the largest British battery upon the Chattel>
dWles, the eleven guns which were farthest forwlU"d (No. 3) and
were doing much damage to the sea-wall. The counterfIre here
was severe--one gun was split by a ball striking its muzzle,
others had wheels broken, three had to stop firing because
their embrasures, badly built with sand, fell in and could not be
kept clear 2. By evening only six of the eleven guns were still
at work.
An afternoon of wind and showers, which had made accurate
aim difficult, was followed on the night of the 20th-21st by
a torrential rain, which much impeded the special work which
had been set aside for the dark hours. Seven hWldred men
from Spry's Portuguese brigades had been told oll to open
a parallel right across the isthmus, starting from the lodgment
already established in the ruined houses of San Martin. • In the
perfect deluge the working parties sneaked away by degrees
into houses and holes and corners. After numerous difficulties
and exertions only about 150 could be collcctcd and set to work
I There is a curious contradietion between Joncs and Dclmas as to the
fate of the Cask Redoubt. 'l'be latter says that the British took it-the
fonner tbat the gunioon ubumlon..,d it. thuugh not IIttaekl-d.
I • From the looseness of the sand in which the battery was COlUltructetI,
it Wall found impos.~ible to keel' the wleR of the embrllSUr(!S Ruffieicntly clear
to use thc three short 24-poulldcr!:l mounted on ship carriugell--ufter u few
rounds they had to cease firing. JOllCS, ii. p. 28.
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at II p.m. The party was not discovered, and the soil being
light soon got under eover.... But the parallel finished was for
only about one-third of the extent required 1.'
On the next morning Sir Thomas Grahnm sent out lJ. par/e-
mentaire to summon the governor to surrender-rather
prematurely as it would seem, for no real breach had yet been
formed, nor had the fire of the defence been subdued. General
Rey having made the answer that might be expected from
a resolute officer 2, the battering recommenced, and was con-
tinued on the 21st~22nd-23rd-24thJuly. It was quiteelteetive:
on the 28rd fifty yards of the curtain, between the towers of
Los Homos and Arnezqueta, fell outward on to the strand that
was exposed at low water-appearing to present a practicable
breach. But partly to make things sure, and partly because
the trenches on the isthmus were still remote from the point
which it was intended to reach, the battering was continued for
two days longer. Not only wus more of the wall thrown down
near the tower of Los Homos, but at Graham's desire a second
and minor breach was made, some distance farther north ill the
sea-wall than the first:i. The temptation to make it was that
Spanish refugees brought intelligence that the ramparts here
were very thin-which proved to be the case, as one day's
battering brought down a broad pateh of stones. On the other
hand the specialists are said to have warned Graham that the
second breach would be rather useless, because the space ot
shore below it exposed at low tide was very narrow-under
50 feet wide-and could only be reached by skirting along for
800 yards below the walls and past the foot of the first breach.
However, the creation of a second point of attack would
certainly distract part of the attention of the garrison from the
real place of danger, and if the small breach could be carried,
the flank of the defenders of the great breach would be eHcc-
tually turned.
It was a thousand pities that the formation of the first breach
• llurgoyne's Lile and Oorrespondence, i. p. 267.
• Burgoy"e, who took out t.he lI11gor truce, &>yll thut lhe Freneh olllcer
who met hilQ 011 the glacis used very angry wurds (ibid.).
• See Dickson Papers, cd. Col. Lcslic, P' 970. The second breach is
lUurked us • Lesser Breach' on the IUUI)'
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on July 28rd was not followed by an immediate attempt to
storm, as the enemy was given two whole days to perfect his
inner defences. But un assault was impossible till the ap-
proaches should have got close to the walls, and owing to the
initial delays they were not ready till two days later. On
the night of the 22nd-28rd the parallel reaching right across thc
isthmus was begun and half completed, with the French' Cask
Redoubt' at its left extremity. Digging close to this spot, the
working parties found a large drain or channel 4 feet high and
3 feet wide, which belonged to the aqueduct which supplied
the town with water. It was empty, as the Spaniards had cut
it off at its source when they first blockaded the town. Lieu-
tenant Reid of the Engineers volunteered. to explore it, and
crawling 230 yards fonvard, found that he was under the
west corner of the counterscarp of the horn~ork, where the
French had cut oU the channel and blocked it with a door:
This discovery suggested to the engineers that the channel might
be used as a mine; if its farther end were filled with powder,
and then built up with sandbags, the explosion might bring
down the counterscarp and fill the ditch, so that the hornwork
might be stormed across the debris. Unfortunately there was
complete uncertninty as to whether the plan would work: quite
conceivably it might result in the door being blown open, and
the force of the powder might be spent in sending a local blast
along the ditch, without much damaging the superincumbent
earth. However, thc experiment was tried; layers of sandbags
were placed against the door, then thirty barrels of powder
were inserted, standing on cnd but not tamped in, for foul air
greatly troubled the miners, so that there was much empty
space above and between the barrels. The near cnd was then
built up with more sandbags and a train laid to the mouth of
the channel in the trenches 1.
1 Durgoyne, whose diary of the siege is one of the primary authorities,
1;ll.y8 that in his opinion the mine could luwe been mueh more useful than
it WIlII. 'On the discovery of UIC drain, I should have immediately have
altered the whole pllln of attaek. I would have made a .. globe of com-
pression " to blow in the counterscarp and the erest or the glneis, lllld then
at low water have. threatened nn attnek on the breaches, exploded tile
mine, llnd have made the real assault 011 the hornwork, which not being
threatened had few people ill it, and wonld untloui:>tedly have been carried
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During the day of the 28rd and the foUowing night the
parallel was complcted, and good communications made from
it to the base, the hill of San Bartolomc. The greater part of the
enemy's visible guns were silenced, and the enfilading fire from
the two last-erected batteries on the isthmus set ablaze the
quarter of the town immediately behind the two breaches.
This lust achievement turned out to be anything but Ull
ad \'antagc.
For arrangcmcnts for the assault having been made for
daybrc'ak on the 24th, and the storming party and supports
having been brought down to the trenches after midnight, to
wait till half low-tide, it was found that the whole of the streets
adjacent to the grcat breach were blazing so fiercely that it was
thought that nny cntry into the town would be impossible,
Craham therefore countcrmanded thc storm-thii:l was probably
necessary; but Rey thereby gained anothcr day for perfecting
his internal defences.
These were most elaborate and excellent, surpassing by far
even the very competent arrangements made by ]lhilippon at
Badajoz, 'l'he peculiar part of them was that Rey had to depend
almost entirely on engineering work-his artillery hnving been
completely crushed during the preliminary battering, Such
guns as he contrived to use on tins day were either very remote-
on thc rock and its slopcs-or clsc pieces that had been with·
drawn and kcpt undcr cover till thc critical momcnt should
arrive, Thc British artillery officers, whose telescopes were
alwayi:l busy, dii:lcovered somc of them, but informed Graham
that they undertook to crush them when they should be brought
outl provided that light and atmospheric conditions were
satisfactory 1,
But the main defence which Rey had prepared depended on
fortification, not on artillery fire, His chief advantage was that
at both breaches the stones had fallen outward, and the back
of the rampart.<; was intact, All along the sea-wall there was
eu.sil)'.' 'j'l,erc wus, he su)'s, good cover ill the hornwork, which woulll
have been easily connected with the parallel. and used as the base lot
att.1cking the main front, with brenelling batleries in its terre-plcin and
tl,e crest of the glnci!i. Blltgoy"e, i. p. 271. Bul this is wiooom anet the
event.
I Janes, ii. p. 30,
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a drop of 15 to 20 feet from the rampart-walk into the street
behind: this still existed, as the core of the wall was still
standing, though the facing had given way. To descend from
the lip of the breach into the town, therefore, was more than
a feasible leap: it could not be done without ladders. Rey had
demolished some houses which hud been built with their back
to the ramparts, and had cut away all stairs lcading up lo thcm.
He had blocked with stone barricades all streets opening
towards the breaches, and hud loopholcd all buildings com-
manding a vicw ofthcrn. When the fIre in thc quarter that had
been ablaze on the 24th died down, hc rcoccupied the ruincd
houses, making shelten; in the debris. He had cut oll the
rampart·walk on each !:1ide of the breachc!:1 by building a !:1ucces·
sioll of stone traverses across it, so that troops who had mounted
to the top could not push out sideways. As it was clear that the
storming columns would have to advance for 300 yards parallel
with the eastern faussebraye of the hornwork, and close to it,
because of the water on their right, he told orr a large number ~
of picked marksmen to line this flank, and ranged live shells
along it, which could be rolled down on to the strand while the
enemy were passing.
The preparation for a storm on the 24th, and its countermand
becausc of the conflagration, had. been notcd by thc governor,
who understood the cause of the delay. Obviously the attack
would come on thc following morning, so the reserved guns
were got into position tl.ftcr midnight--two in the casemates of
thc high curtain, two others in the uitch kloVl' it, onc in the
eastern face of thc hornwork, two in tiw south front of the
bastion of St. Elmo: into the towers of Los Homos and
Amezqueta, on cach side of the main breach, three pieces were
hoisted not without difficulty, since the towers, though still
standing, were in bad ordcr. Even in thc distant amI lofty
Mirador battery, on top of the rock, some guns were trained on
the point of danger 1. Having made all possible preparations
Rey waited for the assault, which came just as he had expected.
The exact share of responsibility fOf the details of the stofm
of July 25th, which fell respectively on the engineers who had
settled the scheme of attack, on Graham who designated the
I For nll these detail~ see Bclmas, h'. pp. 620-1.
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hour, on Oswald who arranged the order of the troops, and
on the artillery officers who had undertaken to keep down the
enemy's fire, is not easy to determine. All apparently have to
take their portion; but that of Charles Smith, who devised, and
Sir Richard Flcteher, who approved, the choice of the sea-wall
for the breach-spot would seem to be the heaviest, and that
of the gunners the least.
'fhe troops were to sally out from the eastern end of the long
parallel across the isthmus, when there should be a sufficient
breadth of strand exposed for them to rush straight for the
breaches, passing between the hornwork on their left and the
receding tidal water on their right. Unfortunately the hour of
low tide and the hour of daybreak were not conveniently
correlated: the ideal combination would have been that the
four hours during which there was good access across the
exposed flats should have been from 5.30 a.m. till 9.30 a.m. :
daybreak falling at about 5.20·a.m. But as it chanced the
extreme of low tide that day wus at 6 a.m., and the practicable
hours were from 4 a.m. onward. In order to lose none of the
limited time available, Graham determined that the rush should
be madc at 5 o'clock sharp, before it was full daylight; and
this choice had onc unlucky effect. The engineers settled that
the signal for assault should be the blowing up of the mine in
the aqueduct 1; but they had so little confidence in its eITect,
that the only arrangements made to utilize it were that sup-
posing it should do much damage and blow down scarp and
counterscarp (which was hardly expected), the Portuguese
companies which held the extreme left of the parallel should
make a rush at the west flank of the hornwork, and enter O\'cr
the debris. This was a very half-hearted scheme. :For the
real assault General Oswald seems to have made a very faulty
disposition of his troops. The opening made in the parallel was
so narrow that not more than two or three men could issue
abreast. 'l'he troops, therefore, had to start in a sort of narrow
file or procession, and took an unconscionable time in trickling
, Burgoyne says (i. 309) that the engineers on the 24th &ettled that the
mine Wu.'l no more thun tl "igllUI • with tl chalice or ulurming thcm'. On
the 25th it would lICcm that a little more nttclltiou, but IIOt ncurl)' cuuogh,
Wtlll given to this useful subsidiary opemtion.
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out from the trench. The head of the column was composed
of the right wing of the a/1st (Royal Scots); then came a ladder
party from all three regiments of Hay's brigade; then the left
wing of the Royal Scots: an these were to strike for the main
breach. Next were the 1/38th, who were directed to pass
between the leading troops and the water's edge, and to make
for the lesser breach, along the ever-narrowing strip of exposed
beach. Last came the 1/9th, the third battalion of the brigade,
with orders to support wherever it could make itself most
useful. Some picked shots from the 8th Cal/adores of Spry's
brigade were placed along the front of the parallel. and in
0. ditch which had been scraped during the night a fe\\> yards in
advance of it. \,..ith orders to try to keep down the enemy's
musketry from the eastern flank of the homwork.
At 5 o'clock, or perhaps a little earlier 1, the mine was fired,
and did much more damage than was expected. bhwing down
the counterscnrp of the western flo.uk of the hornwork, injuring
the scarp. and filling the ditch with earth. The Portuguese
troops in thc opposite trcnch madc an assault, according to
their orders, swept over the covered way and into the ditch,
.and tried to enter the work. They failed with loss. because no
proper preparations had been made to utilize the opportunity 2,
which indeed had hardly been taken into consideration. They
might have got in, for the French g'.\rrison flinched at first,
terrified by the explosion.
On the side of the main attack the Royal Scots led out of the
parallel immediately that the explosion was heard, and pushed
forward in almost complete darkness on to the strand. It was
found to consist in many places of hard rock overgrown with
slippery seaweed, and interspersed with deep pools. The men
stumbled over, and into, many traps which might have been
avoided by daylight. and all order was lost. But for the first
few mi.nutes there was little fire bearing on them, and the
platoons at the head of the column reached the main breach.
I Burgoyne snys nt 4.30.
• TllilI is slllJ'red over in the British nurrotives except IJUkgon'. Diafll,
p. 913. Belmas givcs some account ot it, however, though he 001111 the
assnilan18 British instead of Portuguese (iv. p. 623). They were SOllle
companies or the SUI Cu~w.ores.
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The conducting engineer, Lieutenant Harry Joncs, and Major
Fraser. commanding thc wing of the Royal S<.'Ots, had aetually
got to the lip of the breach, with thc leading men of the storming
party, before the enemy really opened. That the crowning ot
the breach was not followed by a rush into the town was due to
Rey's precautions-there was a sudden drop of twenty feet
between the top of the wall and the street below, and no means
to descend, as all stairs and ramps had been eut away. There
were some ladders with the column, but not at its head-they
were being carried in the rear of the right wing of the Royal
Scots. As the leading company came to a halt the French
began to shoot hard from behind tra\'crses on the rumpart.walk,
barricades, and loopholed houses, and the brullS in the two
flanking towcrs played on the breach with grape. The head of
the eolumn began to wither away; Fraser and Jones were both
wounded-the former mortally-and so was every man who
had ren.ched the summit. The sun'ivors on the brench threw
themselves down among the stones and bcgan to return the
enemy's firc-the first impetus being lost, and any clmm.'e of
suecess with it.
But it was only about the equivalent of a company whieh
had advanced so far; the rear of the right wing of the Royal
Scots were still passing along the flank of the hornwork, ill
a straggling lile, when the enemy's fire began to be serious. It
came most fiercely from an entrenchment which Rey had
thrown up across the main diteh between the hornwork and the
high front of the demi-bastion behind it. It seems, from the
narrative of an officer who took a prominent part in the storm-
Colin Campbell of the l/Oth, who was with the ladder party-
that many of the ROY1l.l Scots, arriving in the darkneS1; ut this
opening iuto the main ilitch, mistook it for a passage by which
they might force their way into the place, or evenior the great
breach itself. At any ratc they turned in toward it, and on
meeting with strenuous resistance began to fire upon the enemy.
The men following gathered in upon the flfSt corners, and
a erowd accumulated at tillS point, whieh checked the ladder
party and the left wing of the Royal Scots as they came up.
Hardly anyone pressed on to ioin the hend of the column on
the slope of the breach. :Meanwhile the tail of the column was
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blocked, as it tried to press on past the hornwork. The French,
standing above, rolled down the shells whieh had been laid
ready upon the British below, and kept up a vigorous discharge
of musketry. With great exertions individual company officers
succeeded in collecting parties of their own men, and leading
them out of the crowd, so as to pass on to the great breach.
But the attack there had already come to nothing: ·the stones
all up the slope were strewn with dead and wounded-a few
survivors were keeping up an ineffectual return fire upon the
well-concealed enemy. Three or perhaps four attempts. to
mount again were made by small parties of the rear companies
of the Royal Scots, but there were never more than 80 or 90 men
acting together, and the offieers and lending men were always
shot down on the crest. At last the senior captain surviving,
seeing the impossibility of getting forward, ordered the'stonners
to retire, which they did-only half an hour or less after the
assault commenced-though the time had seemed much longer,
as was natural, to those involved in the bloody business. The
larger body of men engaged farther back, opposite the main
ditch imd under the dcmi-bastion of St. Juan, gave way also
when the head of the column fell back among them: they had
themselves suffered heavily, and of eourse had made no progress.
Just as the whole body rolled baek along the beaeh they eame
into collision with the front of the 1/S8th, who had only just
finished filing out of the parallel, so slow was the process of
emerging from its narrow exit. Their commanding offi<:cr,
Colonel Greville, had halted them for a short time to let their
rear close up, and to prevent them from dribbling for.ward in
a thin string of small parties, as the Royal Scots had done. Just
as they came parallel with the north end of the hornwork the
broken mass of men from the front ran in upon them; all order
was lost at onee, and after some vain attempts to get forw:ud
the 38th feU back along with the Test over the slippery shore 1.
The disordered crowd suffeTed heavily from the French grape
and musketry-they were a mark impossible to miss, and
strewed the rocks and pools with dead. The 1/9th, who were
, Most of this narmtivc is from Colin Campbcll's long and interesting
letter to Sir J. Cnmeron, printed on pp. 2r.-oo of his T.ife by General
ShadweJl.
582 FIRST SIEGE OF SAINT SEBASTIAN [.JuI.Y:!5
just beginning to file out of the parallel, were of course ordcrcd
back at once-' but had lost almost as many heads as they
showed 1.'
So quickly was the whole arlair over that the artillerymcn,
standing by their guns on the opposite side of the Urumca,
ready to co-operate as soon as dawn should come, believed at
first that there had been a feint or a false attack. It was only
when the growing light showed them the breach strewn fTom
lip to foot with Ted coats, and the strand below thickly dotted
with them also, that they realized that the v.ssault had been
made and had failed 2, without their being given the chance to
intervene as they had promised.
The loss had, ofcourse, been very hcavy-out of 571 casualties
of all ranks 3 more than 880 belonged to the unfortunate Royal
Scots, whose right wing companies were almost exterminated.
Six officers and 118 men, almost aU wounded, fell into the
hands of the enemy. It should be remembered to the credit of
the garrison that, the moment that the storm was over, they
collected from the foot of the breach and the neighbouring
strand many officers and men who would otherwise have been
drowned by the returning' tide 4. When it was seen that this
was the task of the French who were seen busy on the beach,
a flag of truce was hoisted, and all firing ceased for an hour.
The prisoners, olle of whom, the engineer Harry Jones, has left
all interesting account of his experiences during the ncxt sLx
weeks 6, were very well treated. The extremely moderate loss
of the garrison was 18 killed and 49 wounded-all by musketry
fue, sin~e by the abominable misarrangement of the assault the
British artillery had no chance of acting.
Two comments by eye- witnesses 011 tills woful business are
worth giving. CoHn Campbell wrote :
, One main cause of failure was the narrow front and conse-
quent length and thinness of the column in which we advanced.
• Gomm, p. 312.
• Frnzer's LeUen jrrrm the Petlitlsuw, p. 205.
• 'fhe 38th lost 118 men, the 9th 25, the Portuguese ]38 in the side-attack.
\Vhy need Bclmas. who 1I11d JODes's book before him. give the total ot
British losscs as 2,000 f (Silges, Iv. 625).
• Though Jones says that he saw some wounded bayoneted.
I Printed in Maxwell's Ptmill.suwr Skelcl,u, vol. ii.
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This necessarily became more loosened and disjointed by the
difficult nature of the ground it had to pa.<;s over in the dark.
It reached the breach in driblets and never in such body or
number as to give the mind of the soldier anything like eonfi·
dence in success. If some means had been devised of starting
the Hoynls in one big honest lump, which might have been
contrived without much difficulty or danger, so that they couJd
have started in some dense form, with the 38th wel1 packed up
in a front of fours in readinelili to start immediately behind after
them, the stoppage at the demi-bastion would never have
occurred, and some 200 men at leas't of the Royals would have
reached the breach in a compact body. Such a number would
have forced bodily through all opposition. Even under all the
disadvantagcs of bad arrangements, I firmly believc that if we
had moved forward by daylight, when an officer could have
seen, and been seen by, his men, whcn the example of the former
would have animated the exertions oC the latter, the Royals
would have gone over the breac;h on July 25th 1.
Campbell's blame, thereCore, would fall mainly on Oswald, who,
though he had protested against the points chosen for attack,
had actually arranged the troops, and failed to remember that
men shoulq go 'over the top' on a broad front, and on Graham,
who fixed the ' Zero' point half an hour before dawn. Gomm,
of the 1!9th, also a most distinguished and capable officer, goes
for other game-the officers oC the scientific services:
• I am afraid our success at Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajo'l,
owing to the almost miraculous efforts of the troops, has stopped
the progress of science among our engineers, and perhaps done
more j for it seems to have inspired them with B contempt for
so much of it as they had attained before. Our soldiers have
011 all occasions stoOd fire so well that our artillery have become
as summary in their processes as our engineers. Provided that
they have made a hole in the wall, by whieh wc can cla.w up,
they care 1I0t about de:;troying defences. In fact, we have been
called upon hitherto to ensure the success of our sieges by the
sacrifice of livcs. Our Chief Engineers and Commandants of
Artillery remind me of nurke's "Revolutiona.ry Philosophers"
and their "dispositions which make them indifferent to the
, Campbcll's letter quoted above in his Life, i. p. :lO.
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cause of humanity; they think no more of men than of mice in
an air pump ". We came before the place well equipped with
all the means necessary for attncking it en regie, and I saw no
rcason for attacking it otherwise. I may dwell longer than
I ought to do on this subject. But it is, at least, pardonable in
us, who are most nearly cOllccrncd, to bccomc tedious in passing
our censure upon the methods of those whom wc cannot but
consider as the authors of our calamity; which, as it was
foreseen by others, and might have been by them, could have
been avoided.'
The narrative of the assault seems to show that both Camp.
bell and Gomm had reason for their complaints, though they
chose different points to criticize. But of the various errors
made, undoubtedly the most fatal of all was attempting to
storm breaches that could only be approached by a long defile
along the flank of the hornwork, which was intact and well
garrisoned. And for this the engineers have to take the responsi-
bility. Camp rumour very cruelly put the blame on the troops!,
alleging that there had been a panic: this was a monstrous
injustice. Everything that mismanagement could accomplish
had been done to discourage them; but it WlLS not poor spirit,
hut physical incapacity to finish a task impossible under the
conditions set, that caused them to retire.
Wellington had, on the 24th, received disquieting news about
movements on the French front, and wo.s very anxious to hear
of the fall of St. Sebastian before he might be committed to
another campaign in the field. He stopped at his head-quarters
at T..esacn on thc morning of the 25th, lest more definite and
threatening information might come to hand. During the hours
of dawn he was standing about in Lesn.ca churchyard listening
to the guns, lLnd speculating on the cause of their cessation at
6 o'clock, when the armistice to recover the wounded was made.
At ] 1 came a messenger, Colonel de Burgh, to say that the
assault had failed with loss. This was a severe and rather
unexpected blow; Wellington had counted on success as
•• The men, punic stricken, turned a.nd could never be milled,'
writes Fruzcr next da.y (p. 204).• One pnrty, I believe of the 11th and
38UI, went up to the breach llnt! then turned and ran away,' saya Larpent
(p.200). Neither saw the l.Ictlll.ll ll.Sl;ulllt in Ule dark.
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probable 1. Taking the chance of more news coming in from
the Pyrenees during his absence, he rode over in haste to
St. Sebastian and inspected the scene of the disaster. He
declared that the siege must continue, that the Hornwork and
the demi·bastion of San Juan must be bnttered to pieces, and
that the engineers had better draw up an altemative scheme
for an attack en regie on the land front. More guns and ammu·
Ilition were expected from England; the latter was much needed,
for the reserve was low after the rapid firing on the 22nd-24th.
Then:: would probably be some delay before a second storm
could be tried 2.
While riding back to Lcsaca after his flying visit to the
trenches, Wellington was met on the road by messengers of
evil. The threats of the preceding day had turned into immi-
nent dangers. Heavy firing had been heard since noon from
the side of the Dastan, seeming to show that Hill's divisions
at the Pass of Mnya were being attacked. And just as he
reached his head-quarters a messenger came up from Cole, at
tile extreme southern end of the line, to say that he had been
assailed in the Pass of Roncesvalles by the enemy in over-
whelming strength, and had been fighting hard since dawll-
results were still un<.'Crtain 3.
Without further information it was, of course, impossible to
take more than preliminary measures for parrying the French
thrust. Wellington speculated on the situation: one of its
meanings might be that the enemy was demonstrating at
Honeesvalles and Maya, in order to cover a thrust on the side of
the Bidassoa, with the object of raising the siege of St. Sebastian.
He wrote at onee to Graham that he must expect to be o.ttaeked
in force, telling him to ship his siege-guns at Passages 4, to leave
a minimum of troops to continue the blockade, and to concen-
trate for the dcfcm:e of the line of the Bidassoa, It is clear
that Wellington was thinking of the llcandal caused by the IOllll
. 'So at least he lvmte to Cllstufios 011 lhe 24lh ; , j'Cl:l~rc qu<.: <::cUe IIffairc
est f1nie.' Dispafchu, x. p. 594.
• See Frnzcr, p. 206, and Burgoync, L p. 20l).
I Scc Wellingtoll to Gl"lIhllm, night of thc 25th, Disp(llc1u:s, x. p. 566.
• Pcrmission was given to leavc lour guns behind in the main breaching
battcrks !llld two UII Monte Qlin, to kecp up u scmblance of continucd
attack. Dispatdwi, x. p. !,l06.
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of Murray's guns at l'arragona, and was determined that his
own siege train should be afloat betimes. After the guns were
safe other stores were put on shipboard.
So ended the first siege of St. Sebastian-a depressing failure
not creditable to any onc engaged ill it. As if the tale of disaster
was not complete, a. disgraceful incident happened on the night
of the 26th-27th. Rey had noted the disarmament of the
batteries proceeding all day, and the departure of troops; he
resolved to try a sortie at night, to sce if the besiegers were all
absconding. Before dawn five companies emerging from the
Hornwork swept along the parallel, guarded at the moment by
detachments of Spry's Portuguese brigade. Sueh a bad watch
was kept that they were completely surprised, three officers and
198 men were captured: the remainder of the trellch·guard
fled hack to the suburb of San Martin. When the reserves came
up and made for the parallel, it was found that the French had
retired with their prisoners, after doing some inconsiderable
damage to the works 1.
• The British officer in command in the trenches, Major O'Halloran,
wa~ court rnartiallcd, but acquitted. It was ]lI'Oved that he had given
the coITCet ort.lers to the Portuguese captains uf the CUmpulIic»OIl guard,
who had not obeyed them. All the prisoncrs except;}() wcre Portuguese.
SECTION XXXVIII: CHAPTER II
SOULT TAKES THE OFFENSIVE IN NAVARRE
Tm: Duke of Dalmatia had arrived at Bayollllc on the after-
lloon of July 11th: on the morning of the following day he had
taken over from the hands of King Joseph the· command of the
armies of Spain, after a short and formal interview, at which
each said little and thought much. Whcn the King had
departed to his enforced retirement, the Marshal called together
the senior officers of all the four armies, and informed them that
by the Emperor's orders he hOO to carry out n general reorganiza-
tion, which would affect the positions of many of them. There
would for the future be one Army of Spain-the separate staffs
would disappear: so would many divisional commands,
administrative o[Hccs, and departmental posts. He had been
entrusted b)' the Emperor with full authority to carry out the
changes on his own responsibility. .
This was a great moment for Soult: hc had at last achieved
his ambition, and received that full power over all the armies of
Spain which he had coveted since 1808, and had never attained,
either while the Emperor pretended to direct in person the war
in the Peninsula, or wbile King Joseph held the nominal post of
commander-ill-chief. It is true that the long·desired position
came to him in (."Qlllicqucnce of a terrible disaster to thc imperial
arms, but there were compensating advantages even in this:
the disaster, as hc conceived, had been due to his old cnemies~
at any rate it could be ascribed to them with all plausibility.
And he was thus provided with an admirable opportunity to
repay old grudges, of which he took full advantage in the famous
proclamation issucd to the army bcfore thc commcncement of
his new campaign: it is a series of elaborate insults to his
predecessors, as a short quotation may show.
• Soldiers! with well-equipped fortresses in front and in
rear, a capable gcncral possessing the confidcnce of his troops
could by the choicc of good positions have faced and defeated
Qq2
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the motley levies opposed to you. Unhappily at the critical
moment timid and downhearted counsels prevailed. The
fortresses were abandoned or blown up: a hasty and disorderly
retrcat gave oonfidence to the enemy; and a veteran army,
weak in numbers (it is true) but great in everyt.hing that consti-
tutes military character. that army which had fought, bled, and
conquered in every province of Spain, saw with indignation its
laurels blighted, and was forced to abandon its conquests, the
trophies of many sanguinary days of battle. When at last the
cries of an indignant army stopped the dishonourable flight,
and its chief, touched by a feeling of shame, Bnd yielding to the
general desire, gave battle in front of Viltoria, who can doubt
that a general worthy of his troops could have won the success
merited by their generous enthusiasm, and their splendid sense
of honour? Did he make the arrangements and direct the
movements which should have assured to onc part of his army
the help and support of the rest? ... Soldiers! I sympathir£
with your disappointment, your grievances, your indignation.
I know that the blame for the present situation must be
imputed to others. It is your task to repair the di~astcr1.'
'.fhis may have been good • propaganda' for the army-it
served to soothe their wounded pride by throwing all blame on
their late commanders. But there can be no doubt that it was
inspired not so much by this very comprehensible motive as by
long-cherished malice and hatred for the unfortunate Joseph
and Jourdall. Tins was quite in keeping with Soult's character.
He was a most distinguished soldier, but n most ullamiablc
man; and his memory was as long as his spite was strong.
Wc have already had much to "Tite on this cold calculating
son of a provincial lawycr---one of the few • best military
brains,' as his master called him, but also, as King Joseph truly
1 The history or this proclamation is curious. Chukc, or Napolcon
hilllSClf, oonsidercd it too full or insultl; 01 a person who was, after nil, the
Emperor's brother. So it had to IXl disavowed: Soult wrote to l'uris t1mt
he had not authorized it, and ChHkc had tIlC ingenuity to print in the
Freneh newspapers that it was an invention of the English government,
intended to disgust the SpRnisll partisnns of King ,Toscllh, and to ndvertise
the ill feding t1mt prevuiled betwccn the French urrny und the Impcrial
fnmily. Sce Vidal de la Blaehe, 1. p. 138: o.s lie remarks, the style is all
Soult's, and th.... re is not a trace of forciWl diction in it. No Englishman
or Spaniard could have written it.
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observed, 'untrustworthy, perverse, dangerous 1,' He served
the Emperor well as long as their interests coincided, but he was
quite ready for any other profitable service. Some thirteen
months later, as the war minister of Louis XVIII, he showed him-
self a zealous persecutor of Bonapartists 2. Soult was the most
monstrous of egotists; at this moment his ambition served his
master well: 1\0 general save WilIiam III ever wall so mueh
eredit from a series of defeats as did Soult in 1813-14 from the
operations that began with the disaster of Sorauren and ended
with the loss of Toulouse. But on the receipt of the news of the
abdication at Fontainebleau he became a zealous Royalist:
eighteen months later he was, as the minister of the Bourbons,
issuing flamboyant proclamations against 'the usurper and
adventurer, Napoleon Bonaparte 3,' Yet in the Hundred Days
he was to be found as the' usurper's' Chief of the Stair on the
field of Waterloo! Proscribed for a short time on account of
this unhappy error in calculation, he was so far back in favour
with the' powers that were' as to receive a gift of 200,000 fmncs
from Louis XVIII in 1820, and the grand eordonofSt. Louis from
Churle$ X in 1825, on the occasion of his coronation at Reims.
But as long as Napoleon I was empcror, Nichola::! Soult was
hi::! most valuable lieutenant: their interests coincided, and it
is certain that nonc of the othcr marshal::! would havc played
such:), creditable losing game on the Pyrenees and the plains of
Southern France against such an adversary as Wellington.
Thc Army of Spain received the news of his advent with
mixed feelings. There was a considerable faction among his own
old generals of Andalusia, who wclcomed back one who had
been an indulgent spectator of their peculations-of which he
himself had set the example. For Soult's acquisitivencss WllS
portentous-he was ready to snatch at everything from
a shadowy Portuguese crown in Oporto to infcrior Murillos ill
the convents of Seville. Thc train of his personal plunder had
cxcited 3n!,rcr, envy, or derision, according to the temper of the
ob~crve~, as it denIed through Madrid, when he quitted Spain
five months back. Hc had left behind him many adherents,
, ,Joscph to Napoleon, 1st Febnlll.ry 1813.
• Sec notably thc <:Use or Gcneral E"ct<Jrnuns.
, See especially the proclamation or lItIareh 6, 1815.
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who followed him for the same motive for which he himself
followed Napoleon. They rejoiced at his return, belicving, not
in error, that his patronage would be exercised in favour of old
comrades of the Army of the South, rather than for the benefit
of strangers. Others held that he was to be welcomed because
any leadership would be better than that of King Joscph, and
because his undoubted military talents would be exercised in
the best style when he was working for his own credit, and not
for that of anyone else. Like the Emperor, they had a great
belief in his brains. It was difficult to feel much personal
enthusiasm for a chief so self-centred, so cold and hard in his
dealings with subordinates, so ready to shift blame on to other
men's shoulders, so greedy in getting and so mean in spending.
But a.t any rate he would not be weak likc Jourdan, or rash like
Marmont, or simply incapable likc Dorsenne or Caffarelli.
A general who served as his senior aide·de·camp for eight
nncomfortable years; and left his staft with glee, sums him up
in the following enlcl phrases:
'In war he loved vigorous enterprises, and when oncecommitted
to a scheme stnck to it with obstinacy and force. If I say that
he loved vigorous enterprises I must add that he loved them
provided that they did not involve too mueh personal danger,
for he was far from possessing the brilliant courage of Ney or
Lannes. It might even be said that he was the very reverse of
rash-that he was a littlc too careful of himself. This failing
grew upon him nfter his grent fortune had come to him-nnd
indeed it was not uncommon to meet officers who showed no care
of their lives when they were mere colonels or brigadiers, but
who in later years took cover behind their marshal's baton.
But this caution visible on the battlefield did not follow him to
the tent, under whose roof he conceived and ordered, often in
the presence of the enemy, movements of great audacity-
whose executiOn he handed over to ollieers of known courage
and resolution 1.' Another contemporary makes remarks to
much the same effect, ' Proud of the reputation which he had
usurped, he was full of assurance on the day before n: battle:
he recovered that same aSSllranC<l the day after a defeat. But
in action he seemed unable to issue good orders, to choOiie good
, ll1tmoires of St. ChamBns, p. ::15.
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positions, or' to move his troops freely. It seemed as jf anv
scheme whieh he had once conceived and written down at his
desk was an immutable decree from heaven, which he had not
the power to vary by subsequent changes 1.'
This is much what Wellington meant when he observed in
familiar conversation that Soult was not equal to Massena.
• He did not quite understand a field of battle: he knew very
weU how to bring his troops on to the field, but not SO well how
to use them when he had brought them up 2.'
But on July 12th Soult, with his !,>reat opportunity before
him, was in his audacious mood, and it was in all sincerity that
he had written to the Emperor before he assumed his command,
that he would concentrate the army, and retake the ofi'ensive
within a very few days, and that he trusted to be able to stop
the movements of Wellington. This was no small promise
considering the state in which the army was handed over to him,
and it is B marvellous proof of his driving power that he actually
succeeded in launching a most dangerous attack on Wellington's
line by the thirteenth day after his arrival at llayonne.
The detailed orders for the reorganizntion of the anny were
published on Jul~' 15th. Soult had started 'with a general idea
of the lines on whieh they were to be carried out, und had just
received a more definite scheme from the Emperor, sent off
from Dresdcn on July 5th in pursuit of him. Napoleon ordered
that not only were the armies of thc North, South, Centre, and
Portugal to be abolished-their names were now absurd
anachronisms-but, despite of the great number of troops
available, no army eorps were to be created. Evidently he had
come to the conclusion that not only army-commanders, but
even army-eorps-comnianders might be strong enough to impair
the complete control which he wished to give over to Soult.
He directed that the infantry should be divided into as many
divisions of two brigades and 6,000 men eaeh as the available
total of bayonets could complete. The Marshal was authorized
to work them as he pleased, in groups of two, three, or four
divisions. 1'0 command these groups (which were really army-
corps in all but name) he might appoint three officers with the
I Mnximilicn L.'1mnrquc, H. p. 182.
• Stanhopc·", COllfKnHlJifJ/I.¥ with lI'elli"g/oll, 1'_ 20.
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title of lieutenant-general, who would have the divisional
generals under their orders. There were to be no special staffs
for thc groups, whose composition the Marshal might nlter from
time to time: the lieutenant-generals were only to be allowed
a ehief start-officer and their own personal aides-dc-camp, and
their pay was to be no more than 40,000 francs per annum.
Clearly there was to be no recrudescence of the enormous staffs
and liberal perquisites and allowances of the old corps·
commanders.
Artillery might still be short, despite of the large number of
guns sent up La the front from Toulouse and Bordeaux. But
the :Bmpcror directed that each infantry division ought to have
two field batteries, each cavalry division onc horse artillery
battery, and that Soult ought to create an army-reserve of two
horse artillery batteries and several batteries of. guns of position.
There was to be one general commanding artillery and one
general commanding engineers for the whole arlllY, and (what
was quite as important) one commissary general only, in whose
hands all responsibilities for food and transport were to be
centrali7'.ed.
In a general way, but not in .0.11 detnils, Soult carried out
these orders. The gross total of' the troops under his command
would nppenr to have been 117,789 of all mnks. But this
included the garrisons of St. Sebastian, Pampe!ulla, and
Santona, 8,200 men in all: also 5,595 half-trained conscripts
of thc Bayonne Reserve, 16,184 sick and detached, and over
4,500 men of the non-combatant scrvices-Quvriers m.ilitaires,
transport train, ambulance train, &e. Deducting these, he had
available 84,811 fighting men, of who~ 72,664 were infantry,
7,141 cavalry, and about 4,000 artillery, sappers and miners,
gendarmerie 1, &c. This total does not include Paris' troops
from Saragossa, who were lying at'Jaca, and had not yet joined
the Army of Spain, being sti1l credited to Suchcl's Army of
Aragon and Valencia.
SOlut created out of these elements nine fighting divisions of
infantry, two of cavalry, and a strong but miscellaneous Ueserve
• 'rhe gendarmerie were those who had come lrom the 'legions',
employed in 1811-12-Hl (l.S gnrri~olls ill Norlhern Spaill. 'l'hey were
embodied ill units, horse und loot, nnd used liS oomootantl; (ItS nL lhe
combat 01 Venta del Pow, lor which sce p. 71).
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Corps, which had the equivalent of five brigades. The plan
whieh he adopted for the reorgrmi7.ation was to select nine of the
old infantry divisions (of which there had been 14l) and to
keep them as the bases of the ncw units, drafting into them the
battalionsofthe other five!. Thoscabolishcd were the two divisions
(Abbe's and Valldermacscn's) of the Army of the North, Sarrut's
division of the Army 01 Portugal, Lcval's of the Army of the
South, and Darmagnac's of the Army of the Centre. Sarrut
had been killed at Vittoria, Leval had gone to Germany; but
provision was made for the other three generals whose divisions
were' scrapped': Abbe took over VillaUc's old division of the
Army of the South, while Villatte went to command the gcncral
reserve. Vandermacsen was given the division of the Army
of ])ortugallately under llarbot, who relapsed into the status 01"
a brigadier. Darmagnac went with the two French regiments of
his old division to join the surviving unit of the Army of the
Centre, Cussagne's division, and took command of it-Cassagnc,
its former chief, disappearing. LasUy, Dnricau huving been
se\'ercly wounded at Vittoria, his division was given to Marall-
sin, whose iudependent brigade was absorl.:x;J. Thus, of the
old divisions, only those of Foy, Conroux, l\!aucullc. Taupiu,
Lamartiniel'e, remained under their original lead el'S : the other
four sur\'iving divisions got lIew chiefs, whose names are
familiar to liS, but who had hitherto been connected with quite
different troops.
Napoleon's ideal of the 'standard' division of 6,000 men
was not accurately realized, owing to the fact that some corps
Md suffered heavily and others hardly at alJ during thc recent
campaign. Putting six regiments into each division, Soult
found that he had created units varying in size from Abbe's
with 8,030 men to Vnndcrmaesen's, witb only 4,181. For there
was no uniformity of size among the regiments, which varicd
, As Table XVI in the Appendix shows, Foy'~ division received two of
SllrruL's regiments: Cn.ssuglle'~ (now Dllrlllugrme's) touk nil the }<'rcneh
inrantry or the uld Army of. the centre: ViIlutt.c's (now Abbe's) wrns given
tlVO or Abbl!'s regiments of the Army of the North: Conroux's division
absurbed Mflmnsiu's illdeperulcllt hrignde : Bllrllot·s (IlQW VlLm.!('rmllescn'S)
received tWQ regiments of the Army of the North: Daricau's (now
Mllrllnsin's) !fQt half Lcvnl'6 • serllppcd' division, 'l'nupin the other hair
or it: MllUCUIlC llhsorl.lcd onll of Vuudermuescn'lI ohl regimcllb, LIUtH,r.
tini~re one of Sarrnt's.
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from 1,900 bayonets in three battalions 1 down to 430 in one 2.
Abbe's, Lamartiniere's, Conroux's, and Darmagnac's divisions
had 7,000 men each, or more; }~oy's, Taupin's, and Maransin's
just about 6,000; Vandennaesen's and Maucunc's not much
over 4,000 each. It was still impossible to carry out NapoleOll's
orders to give each division two bntteries of field nrtillery, only
one apiece could be provided; but, this moderate provision
having bcen made, there remained ovcr for the gcncral artillery
reserve two batteries of horse and two of field artillery. The
army had in all 140 guns horsed-72 with the infantry divisions,
32 with Villatte's reserve, 12 with the cavalry divisions, 24 as
general army reserve. 1'here were also three mountain bat-
teries-two- or three-pounders carried on muleback.
For his chief of the staff Soult chose Gnzan, who hnd long
sen'ed with him in the same capacity in Andalusia. The late
generals-in-chief of the Armies of Portugal, the North and the
Centre--Reillc, Clauscl, and Drouct D'Erlon, naturally took
the three lieutenant-gencraleies: Soult gave each of them three
divisions in charge, but being prohibited from calling tbese
groups' army corps '. he styled them, the' lieutenancics' of
the Right, Left, and Centre. These terms soon became anoma-
lous-for by the chances of manreuvre the' Centre '-D'Erlon's
group-during the campaign of the Pyrenees fought on the
right, the' left' (Clausel) in the Centre. and the' right' (Reille)
on the left wing. The absurd nomenclature of the groups some-
times makes a Frenchdispatch hard to understand: it would have.
been much simpler to call the three groups army-corps, but this
designation was under t..'\boo by the Emperor's special command.
Clausel took the left lieutenancy, because he and his troops,
which he had brought back from his long march in Aragon, were
actually on the left on June 15th: he had under him the two
divisions, those of Vandermaescn and Taupin, which practically
represented the bulk of his former eolumn, with Conroux's
division whieh had remained at St. Jean_Picd_du_Ilort when the
rest of the Army of the South went to the Bidassoa. The total
of bayonets was 17,218--this was the weakest of the' lieutcn-
ancies' because the individual regiments recently returned'
, 12Qth Line of Lam[lrtini~re.
• 2nd Ugc~ofSlltne. which sufl'ercd henvilyllt Vittorin while unuerSnrrut.
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from Aragon were low in Ilumbers (rom three months of moun-
tain warfare against l\1in~.
D'Erlon had the Centre, with the divisions of Abbe and
Maransin, both consisting of old Andalusian regiments, and of
Darmagnac, who represented the French part of the Army of
the Centre. His corps were strong-just under 21,000 bayonets].
Reille, late chief of the Army of Portugal, had the remaining
three.divisions, Foy, l\faucune, and Lamartiniere, all of them
coming from his own old command, and under officers who had
long served in that army. Their total strength was 17,285-
many of the regiments were low in numbers from the recent
fighting in Biscay.
Each of the three' lieutenancies' hud a light cavalry regiment
attached to it-we should have called them corps-cavalry had
the llame been permitted. They were weak-only 808 sabres
between the thrct'-but sufficicnt for scouting purposes.
Adding the two cavalry divisions of Pierre Soult (the Marshal's
very undistinguished but mucb cherished brother) and Treillard,
the Army of Spain had 7,147 sabres, including the remnants of
the foreign ~avalry-Nassau Chasseurs, Spanish light horse,
and noyal Guards, who were something under ],000 all told.
The very large body of troops under Villatle which Soull had
left outside his ninc marching divisions, and his three' lieuten-
ancies " consisted of a great number of battalions of the recently
abolished armies, which were left us a surplus, when the new
formations had bcen brought np to the six-regimcnt standard.
They included of French troops onc odd batta.lion of the Army
of Portugal, eleven oC the Army oC the North, and six oC the old
Bayonne Reserve. The eighteen battalions were mostly rather
weak, and mustercd only a little over 9,000 bayonets between
them.
In addition Villatte's reserve included all the foreign troops-
Neuenstein's Rheinbund Germans, who had servcd so long in the'
Army of the Centre, St. Pal's Itnlian brigade, the IGng's Foot-
Guards-a solid body ot' 2,000 infuntry, all Frenchmen, though
in Spanish uniform-and the forlorn remnant of the AJrance-
sados-threc dwindling regiments under Casll.palacios, which
had shrunk from 2,000 to 1,100 bayonets during the last month.
, 20,057 to 1Je exact.
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Adding 0. battalion of foot-gendarmes from the evacuated
Biscay garrisons, and another of local National guards, Villattc
had over 11,000 infantry-a force as big as Rcille's or Clausel's
lieutenancies. There was some. weak stull among them t, but
the greater part were experienced troops in nowi>;e inferior to
the units of the marching divisions. It is hard to see why Soult
did not make up a tenth division out of the best of them: this
would still have left Villatte 12,000 men, and would hav~ been
very useful in the fighting army. But apparently, as \\111 be
seen during the narrative of the campaign of July-August, he
intended to usc the Reserve in an active fashion, und was foiled
by the caution or timidity ofViIlattc, who discharbTCd the orders
given him i~ a very half-hearted way. This Illass of troops was
really quite capable of being used as a fighting unit-it had its
fOUT batteries of field artillery, the foreign cavalry were allotted
to it, and a proportion of sappers and engineers. Even after
leaving a detachment-say the Afrancesad()8 and onc or two
of the weakest French battalions-to aid the conscripts to
garrison Bayonne, it could have taken the field with 15,000 men
of all arms ~.
'1'0 assume the offensive with a recently beaten army is
dnngerous. Many of the regiments which Soult had to use ha.d
only a month before reerossed the Pyrenees ill a slate of com-
plete disorder: they had been entirely out of hand, and had
been guilty of outrages among the French peasantry wh.ich
recalled their worst doill!,t'S in Spain. The greater number of the
senior officers had applied for serviee in the Army of Germany
the moment that they hud crossed the frontier: it was refused
to nearly all of them. The junior offiecrs woultl have made
similar applieations, if they had thought that it would be of any
use, Everyone of every rank was cursing King Joscph, luck,
I Not only the Afranc~sadollbut some of the "Army of the North troops
withdr'\wn from the Biscay garrisons had (l, poor record, llnd had disgusted
Ji'oy in his recent '1'010llu light. '1'he8C were high-numbered battalions,
reeently made up from the na~"Onne conscript reserve.
• 1.'he bcst proof of the efficiency of the bulk of Villatte's corps is that
whcn Vlllldermuescn's llllt! l\1aUCllllC'S divi!liulIs wcre Cllt to pieces ill the
battlcs of the }lyrentts, Boult made up a ncw brigade fur cuch of them
out of the Reserve. Joscph's French Guards fought splendidly at Sail
Murciul. '.rhe Germans were very steady vetemn troops.
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the weather, the supply services, the War Ministry at Paris, and
his own immediate hierarchical superior: a sentiment d'ineptie
generate prevailed 1. A great deal of this demoralization was
mere nervous exhaustion, resulting from long marches and semi-
starvation extending over many weeks. Aflcr a fortnight of
comparative rest and more or less regular rations it commenced
to subside. The whole army consisted of veteran troops proud
of their regimental honour and their past victories: they soon
persuaded themselves that they had never been given a fair
ehance in the recent campaign-Soult's clever and malicious
proclamation exactly hit off their state of mind. It was easy
to lay all the blame on bad generalship, and to plead that a good
half of the troops had not fought at Vittoria.: in full force and
under a competent leader they would have made mincemeat
of the' motley levies' of Wellington. ,When the whole host
was reassembled, after Clausel's arrival, everyone could see
that the numerical loss in the late disaster had been very
moderate: there were more French troops assembled on, the
Bidassoa. than any member of any of the armies had ever seen
conccntrated before. Shame and anger replaced dejection in
their minds: even the marauders and deserters came back to
thc Eagles by thousands. Soult wrote to the lIlinister of War
that the disquieting state of indiscipline which he had discovered
on his arrival was subsiding, that marauding had ceased with
the distribution of regular rations, and that the morale of the
army was satisfactory.
The weakest part of the reorganiz..."tion was, of course, thc
transport. The army had lost all its wheeled vehicles and many
of its animals in the disaslcr of Vittoria: they had not been
replaced in any adequate fashion during the fO,ur short weeks
that followed. By extraordinary efforts the Commissariat had
found food for everyone, so long as the main body of the army
was encamped between llayoffile and the Bidassoa. But it
would be impossible to start it properly equipped for a long
mountain campaign fllr from its base. 50ult took the desperate
risk of starting on July 23 with only four days' rations in hand
with the marching columns: all that would be wanted later'
was to come up by suceessivc convoys sent out from the neigh~
1 Vidal de 11l11lnehc, i, p. lOO.
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bourhood of Bayonne. And it was little bettcr with munitions
for infantry and artillery a.like. The campaign became n time·
problem: unless a decisive success were achieved within the
first four or five days, there was grave danger of the army being
brought to a stop. It would be helpless if it should have used
up all its cartridges in several days of continuous and severe,
hut indecisive, fighting: or if bad weather should prevcnt the
regular appearance of convoys from the rear. This Soult knew,
but thought that his arrangements were calculated to secure
that'quick and decisive victory which would justify all taking
of risks.
The plan of campaign which the :Marshal chose was onc of
the three alternative schemes which the unlucky Jourdan had
formulated during his last days at the front 1. It will be
remembered that they were (1) to cndeavour to raise the siege
of St. Sebastian by massing every available man on the
Bidassoa, and striking at Giron and Gmham-who .was wrongly
supposed to have only one British division with him. After
driving back Graham as far as Tolosa on the high road, it would
be possible to turn southward and relieve Pampeluna: Clausel's
corps, meanwhile, should demonstrate in Navarre, to distract·
Wellington from sending his reserves fro~ the south to the
main point of danger. Both .Tourdan on July 5 and Soult on
July 23rd believed, the former correctly, the latter wrongl}',
that there were three British divisions engaged in the blockade
of Pampeluna.
(2) '1'0 leave a corps of observation on the Bidnssol\ to contain
Graham, while the rest of the army struck at Pampeluna by the
route of lloneesvalles. This would have the advantage of
raising the siege of that place at once, though the relief of
St. Sebastian would be deferred. But, Jourdan added. it had
three disadvantages-the roa~ was bad and might conceivably
prove impracticable for artillery: the bulk of the British
divisions would probably be found concentrated for a fight to
cover the blockade: and Navarre was a country in which no
army eould scrape together food enough to live upon,
1 See above. p. 533. Jourdan to Joseph, July 5. The mcmor,lIldulD
Imd been made over to Soult. cr. Clero. Campagru: du AIa,tchal SI»lU,
p. 46, alld Vidlll de III llI11chc, i. p. 182.
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(3) To leave a corps of observation on the Bidnssoa, and
convey the rest of the army into Aragon, by the pnss of Jaca, to
join Suehet and operate with overwhelming forces on the Ebro
against 'Wellington's flank and rear. This, the operation which
Jourdan regarded as the best of the three, had since beeome
impossible, because Paris had abandoned Saragossa, and
Suehet had taken his army to Catalonia: on July 17 he was
at Tarragona.
Soult's plan was in essence Jourdan's second alternativc; but
he complicated it by dividing thc army whieh was to strike at
Pampeluna into two columns. Two-thirds of the whole (ReiIIe
and Clausel) was to march by the Roneesvalles passes; D'Erlon
with the remainder was to force the pass of l\Iaya and to
converge on Pampeluna by the Bastan and the Col de Velate.
Jourdan's memorandum contained a special caution against
the dissemination of columns, ' je pense que toute operation de
plusieurs corps isolCs ne reussira pas.' Ho,,, frequently in
military history two columns starting from distant bases have
failed to meet on the appointed day is known to every student.
ItisseldoUl that a complete success is seeured-as atKtiniggrutz.
Much more frequently the enemy against whom the conccntra-
tion was planned has beaten one corps before the other--
del~)'ed by onc of the uncountablc chances of war-has come
upon the sccnc. And this was to be the case with Soult before
Pampcluna.
The advantagcs of Soult's sehcmc werc vcry {,'Omprchensible.
The greatest was that, owing to thc cxistence of a first-class road
from Bayollne to St. Jean-l)ied-du-Port, he could concentrate
the main body of his army upon his extreme left wing long before
Wellington could make the corresponding counter-move. In
the early days of the operation he could calculate on having an
immense superiority of force on the Roncesvallcs front. It was
more doubtful what would happen on the third or fourth day,
if Wellington divined his enemy's plan at the first moment,
and ordered a general concentration before Pampelulla, as
Jourdan had taken for granted that he would. But Soult
considered that he had found menns to make sueh a concen-
tration impossible, by sending D'Erlon and his 20,000 men to
pierce thc allied left-Centre at l\Iaya, and to sweep down the
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Bastan. If D'Erlon broke in on the first day, and brot possession
of the positions that dominate the road-system of the Bastan-
Elisonclo and the Col de Velate-the northern divisions of
Wellington's army would only be able to join the southern
divisions in front of Pampeluna by immense detours to the
west-by Santcstcban and the Pass of Donna Maria, or even
by Tolosa and Yrur~un. In all human probability they would
arrive too late.
The British commander, as wc shall see, did not divine
Soult's whole purpose at the first moment, and therefore his
general concentration was ordered a day later than it might
have been. And the officers who were in charge of his extreme
right at Ronccsvalles gave way quicker than he had intended.
The campaign became a most interesting time problem, which
was settled in favour of Wellington in the cnd, by the fact that
his first-arriving northern reserves got to the positions in front
of Pampeluna a day before Soult's secondary column under
D'Erlon eame into touch with the French main body. The
subordinate officers on both sides made some extraordinary
mistakes, which compromised the plans of their superiors: the
worst of them were in the line of slow and irregular transmission
of news, which in a mountain country, where all side communi-
cations were difficult, and no general view of the situation could
be taken by the commander's own eye, sometimes led to
ruinous miscalculations at head-quarters. It cannot be said
that one side suffered more than the other from this negligence
of subordinates.
To proceed to the details. Soult's left wing at St. Jean-Pied-
du-Port was ready to start, Conroux and Clausel's old divisions
having been cantoned in the neighbourhood of that fortress ever
since they arrived in France; they were only onc long march
from their objective, the gap of ROllccsvalles. At the other cnd
of the line, D'Erlon's three divisions were also within onc
long march of the Pass of Mayn-they already lay with their
vanguard at Urdax and their last rear brigade at F..spclcttc.
The difficulty lay with the third • lieutenancy' j Reillc's
thrcc divisions of the old Anny of Portugal on July 20th
were Oil the lower Bidassoa, holding the front upposite
Graham and Giron; they had to be got to St. Jcan_]lied_
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du-Port, to join Clausel and co-operate in the main attack I,
To draw them out of their existing positions without arousing
too mueh attention at Wellington's head-quarters was com-
paratively easy. On the night of the 19th-20th four brigades
of VilJatte's reserve replaced Reille's troops at the outposts.
On the following day the thrce fighting divisions concentrated
at St. Jean de Luz and started to march,eastward, with orders
to eross the Nive at Cambo, and to get into the great cltausscc
by Urearay and Hellette, which leads to St. Jean-Pied-du-Port.
Drawing up a far too optimistic time-chart, Soult had hoped
that they would all be in the neighbourhood of St. Jean-Picd-
du-Port by the morning of the 22nd. As the distance was not
less than 50 miles, this would have been very hard work ill any
case, for a long column marching with a large train of artillery,
aI; Reillc WIIS briuging up beside his own pieces three batteries
for Clauscl, who had arrived gunlcss from Aragon. But the
main cause of delay WIIS quite dirCerent: though the Bayonnc-
St, Jean-Pied-du-'Port cltaussee was excellent, the local cross-road
from St. Jean de Luz by St. Pee to the bridge of Cambo was not,
and torrential rainli on the 20th made it into a quagmire 2, The
troops got on very slowly, and at night the bridge at Cambo
was carried away by a spate, leaving the bulk of Lamartiniere's
division on the wTong side of the water. It ·was repaired; but
the general result was that the head of Hcillc's column only
neared its destination late at night on the 22nd, while the rear
division and the guns did not get up till the 2·:Uh. 'fhe I'Iarshal
had been waiting for them since the morning of the 21st, and
had hoped to start operations on the 2Brd. He had been joined
by his two cavalry divisions, brought up from their cantonments
between the Nive und the Adour on that dny, so that Reille's
delays put the movement of all the other corps a day late,
On the 24th Soult was able to commence moving up both
'One ask!! oneself why Soult did not give ncmc the l\Iaya attack,
saving him two-Ihirds of his journey, and send D'Erlon to join Clausel at
St. Jean.Pied-du-Port, by II mUl'Ch Illuch shorter thun Reille WIIll asked
to makc.
• It is said that persons acquaillted with the country toln SOlllt to send
the whole column round by Bllyonne, on IlCcount of the aMltIery, but that
he refused. As a matter of fact, Lamartiniere'a division and some of the
gUlls did go lhllt clo':tOllr, owing to the broken bridge.
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Clausel's and Reillc's columns toward the Ronccsvallcs gap, so
that they should be a.ble to attack it on the 25th at an carly
hour. D'Erlon, being already in position in front of l\faya, was
only waiting for the signal to march. Villatte had been given
orders which left a good deal to his private judgement, to the
effect that he must simulatc an offensive attitude Oil the
Bidassoa front, but tnake no real attaek till he knew that
D'Erlon had got well forward in the Bastan and that Graham's
flank was threatened. He might then push lhe latter with
confidence, as the allied troops on the coast would have to give
way, and to raise the siege of St. Sebastian, if their centre in
the Baslan had been broken and driven westward.
It is interesting to find in a dispatch which Soult sent to
Paris on the 23rd his estimate of the position of Wellington's
line of defence. He starts fairly well-Graham with the
1st Division is on the heights beyond the Bidassoa: Oswald
with the 5th Division and a Spanish (it should be a Portuguese)
eorps besieges St. Sebastian. The 7th Division under Lord
Dalhousie holds the front Vera-Echalnr. 1'hen comes a curious
blundcr-thc 6th Division under Ceneral Hay is on the (French)
left of the 7th Division. Really it was in rescnre at Santcstcban,
ancJ under Pack; Clinton, who had only taken over command
after long sick leavc on June 22nd, having again fallen ill.
General Hill, with the 2nd Division under W. Stewart, and
Hamilton's Portuguese (Sih'eira had superseded Hamilton
many months back) is in the Bastan, and holds' with camps
and batteries' the passes of Maya and Ispcgui. 'Wc are assured
that the 8rd and ,uh Divisions and a Spanish corps arc besieging
Pampc1una. 'There seems to be another division (probably the
sUt Division) under a Ceneral Bird in position at Altobiscar,
above Roncesvallcs. There is an English (Portuguese) bribrade
under General Campbcll in the Alduides. The Spaniards of the
Army of Calicia guard the Bidassoa from Vera to the sea.'
It will bc noted that this reconstruction of We!1ington's line
makes the covering force in front of Pampeluna loo weak, for
it is believed to consist of' Bird's 'division (a mistake for Byng's
brigade?) and the force of Cnmpbell in the Val de Alduides only.
UeaHy the Conde de Abispal's Andalusians had relie...·cd the
8rd and ,I:th Divisions on July 16-17, and they were frce, and
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disposable ns a reserve to the troops on the Roneesvalles front-
Pieton being at Olague in the valley of the Lanz, Cole at Vis-
carret on the Pampcluna-Roneesvalles road: Pack and the
6th Division at Santesteban were only a little farther away.
?!foreover, MorilIo's Spaniards were up in line with Byng. The
Light Division makes no appearance in Soult's table, unless he
means the 8th Division trnder < General Bird' to represent it.
There is therefore a grave miscalculation when Soult ends
by informing Clarke that, after examining the whole Allied line,
he has come to the conclusion that the right wing is the weak
point, and the onc that should be attacked, by a flank move·
ment which he will continue till he has turned its rear. If
Wellington's plans had worked out well, there would have
happened what .Jourc;lan had foreseen, viz. so vigorous a resis-
tance in the passes by the Dritish outlying troops, that Soult
would only have arrived in front of Pampeluna to find the main.
bulk of Wellington's army offering him battle in front of the
besieged city. But, as we shall see, Cole and Picton received
Wellington's orders just too late to allow them to carry out the
policy which he dictated.
Such were Soult's views of Wellington's situation. It
remains to be seen what Wellington made of Soult's intentions.
He was from the first conscious that thc Marshal's appearance
, might mean a prompt rcsumptionofthe offensive by thc enemyJ.
And the movements of the French were reported to him with
very fair accuracy and dispatch. As early as the 22nd he WIlS
aware that the enemy was weakening his front on thc Bidassoll.,
and that troops were accumulating at St. Jean-Pied-du-Port 2..
Un the 24th he knew that the force moved in that direction
must be the larger half of the French army. But his judgement
on the meaning of this movement was entirely coloured by the
fact that he had breached St. Sebastian, and that he believed,
like Graham, that it would be stormed successfully on the 24th
or 25th. He also knew that Soult was being informed, day by
day, of the state of the fortress. On the other hand, he was
aware that Pampelunll. was quite safe-it had food enough to
last for several weeks at least, and he was not pressing it hard,
t Wellington to Graham, July 22. Di$palcha, x. p. 559.
• [bid., p. 568, same to same.
R"
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as he was pressing St. Sebastian. From this he deduced the
conclusion tha.t Soult <-'QuId not in honour surrer St. Sebastian
to he taken almost under his eyes, as it would be unless he
intervened. Therefore the moving of troops-evcn large
numbers of troops-towards St. Jean-Pied-du-Port, must be
n feint, because the Marshal's obvious duty was to save St.
Sebastian-while Pampcluna was in no danger. He read the
French mallreuvrcs as an attempt to distract his attention from
the Bidassoa. And his idea that a desperate attempt would be
made to relieve St. Sebastian seemed to be borne out by the
fact that Villatte was making Aying bridges at Urogne, and
that French boats were running in to the mouth of the Bidassoa
from St. Jean de Luz. Still, if reports were correct, the enemy
was likely to make a very serious demonstration on the Ronees.
valles frout. Wellington therefore wrote to Cole 011 the 28rd
that h~ was not to allow himself to be pushed in too easily
towards Pampeluna. • You should support Major-General
Byng in the defence of the passes as effectually as you can,
without committing his troops and the 4th Division against
a force so superior that the advantage of the ground would not
compensate it. You will be good enough to make arrangements
further back also, for stopping the enemy's progress toward
Pampcluna, in the event oC your being eompelled to give up
the passes which General Byng now occupies.... A sure com- ,
munication should exist with General Sir Thomas Pictoll, and
Sir Thomas should be apprised of allY movement of troops,
either upon the Roncesva.lles road, or upon that of Eugui and
the Alduides, in order that he may make such arrangements lIS
circumstances may dictate for giving support, should such an
event occur.... It is desirable that you should transmit a daily
report for the present to Head Quarters 1.'
This was followed up by even more stringent orders on the
following day. George Murray wrote to Cole,' Lord 'Wellington
has desired that I should express still inore strongly how
essential he considers it that the passes in front of Roncesvalles
should be maintained to the utmost. And I am to direct you
to be so good as to make every necessary arrangement for
repelling effectually any direct attack that the enemy mllY
, SUl'l'lemtnlory Di$JJal.l;hu, viii. p. na.
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make in that quarter.... Lord Wellington attaches very little
importance to any wider turning movement which the enemy
might make UpOll our right. The difficulties and delays of any
wider movement are considerable obstacles, and would retard
him sufficiently to give time to make other arrangements to
stop his progress 1.'
It would be most inaccurate to say that Wellington was
surprised by Sou1t's offensive at the southern end of his line,
as these orders sufficiently demonstrate.. At the same time he
remained till late on the night of the 25th firmly convinced
that the French move in NavarTC was a feint or subsidiary
operation, and that the real attack would be on the Bidassoa.
On the 24th, knowing of the accumulation of hostile troops
before Uoncesvalles, he wrote to Gmham that undoubtedly the
enemy is very strong on that side, ' but only because he enter-
Wits serious designs to draw away our attention from the
side of Irun, and then to attempt to pass the river 2.' And on
thc samc morning he "'Tote to Giron that' the enemy's main
force has moved towards St.•Jean-Pied-du-Port; but his two
pontoon bridges remain at Uroglle. It would seem that he
intends to distract our attention to the other side, and then
to make a try at the river. But as (at 11 a.m.) Ino longer hear
the guns at S1. Sebastian, I am hoping that its business has been
settled 3.' It will be remembered that the projected storm on
the 24th had been postponed because of the conflagration, so
that the cessation of the firing had not the happy meaning that
Wellington attributed to it.
On the morning of the 25th, when the unsuccessful attempt
011 St. Sebastian was actually made, Wellington was up at early
dawn, listening once more to the guns, as he strode up and down
in the churchyard of Lesaca. Again they stopped, after two
hours of furious firc, just as on the preceding day; and again
Wellington hoped that' the business had been settled '--that
the French scheme (as he conceived it) had been foiled, because
there was now no garrison at St. Sebastian left for Soult to
relieve. But erc noon there arrived 3 dejected messenger to
report that there had been tills time no postponed assault, but
, Ibid., p. 114.
• Wellington to Graham, -1u]y 24, JMpo.lch(I/, X. p. 563.
• Same mornillg, to Giron. ibid.• p. G64.
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a serious attack defeated with very heavy loss. This unhappy
fact upset Illl Wellington's calculations; if the failure had been
very disast.rous, it would result that St. Sebastian must be
reckoned w; in no immediate danger; and Soult's heavy
demonstration in front of Roncesvalles might prove to be liD
feint, but a real attempt to relieve Pampeluna. Yet Wellington
still doubted this interpretation 'of the enemy's move: 'onc
can hardly believe that with 80,000 men he proposes to
force himself through the pusses of the mountains. The
remainder of his force. one must think, must come into opera-
tion PIl some other point, either to-morrow or the day after 1.'
In fact he still opined that there would be an assault on the
Bidassoa-not understanding that the enemy's surplus, or the
greater part of it--D'Erlon's column of 21,000 men-was
striking at the Maya Pass, and was in possession of it at the
moment when he wrote this dispatch to Graham.
Meanwhile the great thing was to discover exactly what was
the condition of affairs at St. Sebastian, and Wellington rode
over the hills in haste to visit Graham, before any llotk'C of the
attacks of the French at Maya and at Roncesvalles had come
to hand. He spent a long afternoon opposite the fortress, with
the results that have been explained in the preceding chapter.
It was only on his ride back to Lesa.ca in the dark that he met the
first messenger of evil. His Chief of the Staff, George Murray,
had sent out an offieer to tell him that furious firing had been
audible from the side of the Mayo. passes al! through the after-
noon. But no explnnfLtory dispatch had been received either
from W. Stewarl in command at Mayo. itself, or from Hill, in.
charge of the whole defencc of the Bastan. This was astonishing,
as there was a properly established line of communication along
the Bastan to head-quarters; rumours had come to hand that
the enemy was stopped, but no official report. On reaching
Lesaca. an hour later, Wellington found an omcer sent by Cole
from Roncesvallcs awaiting him, who brought the news that
the Frcnch wcre attacking on that front in overpowering
numbers. But up to midday, whcll the messcllb"Cr had started,
110 breach had been made in the British line 2. .
, Wellington to Graham, 25th July, Dispatches, x. p. 566.
• \Vetlington to Grnham, Dispute/Its, x. p. 570.
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Late at night news did finally come from the Maya front.
Stewart sent a verbal message that he had lost the pass, and
though he had regained it for a moment by the aid of a brigade
of the 7th Division, Hill had ordered him to fall back. This was
confirmed by a letter from Hill, which said that Stewart had
been driven out of the pass, but that they were going to try to
hold on in 0. position at Elizondo, tcn miles farther down the
Bastan. It was owing to absolutely criminal negligence on the
part of his subordinates that Wellington lea.rned the details of
a fight that had begun at about 11 a.m., only twenty miles away,
at no earlier an hour than 10 p.m. But late as it was, he had
now at last the information which enabled hi.m to guess at
Soult's general design, and to give orders for dealing with it.
SECTION XXXVIII: CHAPTER III
RQNCESVALLES A.:..~D l\1AYA
SaULT, though a day later than he had intended, was ready
for his great stroke at the passes by dawn on July 25th. 'The
main blow was to be delivered 01\ the Roncesvalles front, where
he had the 84,000 jurantI')' of ReilIe and Clausel assembled, not
to speak of the two cavalry divisions, which would only
become useful when he should reach the plain of Pampc-
Iuna. So much was D'Erloll's attack on the Maya passes the
secondary part of the scheme, that we find Soult informing
that: general that his advance would probably be facilitated by
the arrival in the enemy's camp of the news that Roncesvalles
had been forced: this would compel Hill to fall back down the
Bastnn, and he should be pursued as briskly as possible.
'l'he Roncesvlllles business was therefore the more important
part of the programme for July 25th. The Marshal had chosen
for the routes of Clausel and Reille two roads, which climb .up
from St. Jcan-Pied-du-Port and the valley of thc Ni,'c to the
bleak plateau above thc historic abbey, where the rclics of
Roland were still shown. Between them lies a broad and deep
valley, the Val Carlos, with the mountain stream called the Nive
d'Arncguy running down its middle. The eastern road climbs
the slopes to the (Frcnch) left of the valley: it was practicable
for artillery and vehicles, and sappers had been working for the
last few days .to improve some of its more tiresome curves.
This road, after passing the Venta d'Orissoll, the last inhabited
spot on the north slope, and the ruined fort of Chateau Pignoll,
comes to the crest under a hill called Lci/iaratheea, immediately
in front of the higher position called Altobisear, where the water·
shed lies. It then passes for a mile along this watershed known
as the ridge of Ibaneta, and descends by curves to the abbey
on the Spanish side, The other road, no more than a mountain
track in 1813, and quite impracticable for guns or tl"Ansport,
elimbs uphill on the western slopes of the Val Carlas, only three
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or four miles from the better route as the crow Hies, but always
separated from it by the broad and deep intervening combe.
After pnssing the village of Arneguy, it gcts up on to the narrow
. crest of the mountain, the Airola, which separates the Val
Carlos from the VI'I Haira, the next valley westward. Along
this ridge it winds for five or six miles, till the crest joins the
main watershed of the Pyrenees at a small plateau called the
Linduz, about two miles or so west of the point on the Ibanetn.
ridge wherc the other road comes in. A practicable track along
the watershed joins them. Sinee 1813 the whole of the rooo-
geography of this stretch of thc Pyrenecs hus bcen changed, by
the construction of a mctallcd chuussee from Arncguy up the
Val Carlos, which dld not exist in 1813: it goes along the
SIOpCll, not along thc actual crcllt, like the mere track whieh
Rcille's mcn had to follow on July 25th, and is now a bettcr
route than the old high road by Vellta d'Orisso.ll and Chateau
Pignon. From the Linduz there is a steep path going straight
down into Spain, without joining the Roneesvalles road: it is
called the Puerto de Mendichuri, and leads to Espinal. The
little plateau has yet another cxit; along the crests to its west
comes in a very bad track from the valley of the Alduides,
Milled the path of Atalosti. It is because it lay at such a
ganglion of joining ridges, that the Linduz was marked by
a. ruined earthwork-a rclic of the war of 1793-4•
. To understand the general lie of the fighting ground, it must
be remembered that from the Linduz to Altobiscar is about
three milcs of saddle· back ridge, lowest in the middle, where
the c}WU8see crosses the sky-line at 8,600 feet above sea·level,
while the highest point of the Linduz is about 4,200, and tha.t
of Altobiscar about 4,900 feet up. The descent into France is
much steeper than that into Spain-Burguete and Espinal are
only 700 feet below the summit of the pass, Arneguy and the
village of Val Carlos on the Frcnch side 8,000 feet below it.
This is the reason that caused Soult to send his right column
along the lofty path on the Airola ridge, from which they could
approach the Linduz on a level, instead of bidding them climb
up direct from the deep~sunkbottom of the Val Carlos trough.
It should be added that the scenery of the three miles of the
Honecsvalles front is not precipitous or Alpine. There [U'c some
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outcrops of rock in certain places-e. g. along the front of the
Lci,;arathcca hill, lJUt the prcvuiliug aspect is rather like that
of Scottish highland scenery on a large scale. The slopes acc
mostly short slippery grass, not unclimhablc for a good walker, .
though difficult for the soldier of'I8IS carrying the 70 lb. of his
lighting kit and heavy knapsack. The lower skirts of the hills
ace covered in many parts with woods of pine and beech and
stunted undergrowth of oak: in some places these stretch up
right to the summits-the Linduz has thick foliage on its
castetn flank, aod the ridge leading to it from the Airola spur
has trees on both sides of the narrow track which winds along
its crest, so that troops ascending it are only intermittently
visible. l\Iuch of the Ibaneta position-the central saddle
between the Lindu7. and Altobisear-is covered with busb.
But from the highest summits there are long and clear views over
the woods and the grass-slopes alike-views much more com-
manding, it may bc noted, toward the French than toward tbe
Spanish side. So striking is the general errcet that, cven on the
morning of battle, it fixed itself on the minds of several of
the combatants as a memory not to be forgotten 1: fighting
has seldom taken place with sueh a broad and majestic horizon.
Soult knew that his attack would be expected on the high
road-Clausel's troops had been visible to Byng's outposts for
some time, and on the night of the 24th there had been a slight
skirmish of picquets between the Lei~a.ratheeaand Chateau.-
Pignon. But hc was under the impression that he would take
thc encmy entirely by surprise in his second attack, that
directed against the Linduz by the obscure rmd difficult path
along the crest of thc Airola mountain, which sinee the war of
1193-4 had only been used by shcpherds and smugglers. And
on to this narrow puth he pushed the full half of his infantry-
the whole of Rcille's three divisions. It is probable that we
must "''lite down the whole of this movement as a mistake: the
traek was so bad that it could only be wi:ed by daylight-at
night it would have been impossible to discover the way, among
steep slopes and thickets. There were so many ups and downs,
and the grass slopes on each side were so slippery, that nothing
• See especially Lemoonier·Delnfosse, pp. 211-12, llnd Wachholz or
Brunswick·QcIl>, I). 321.
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could be done in the dark. Thc actual result was that the whole
17,000 bayonets of Reille advanced with a front of two men, or
even in Indian me, forming a sort of procession many miles long,
The head battalion was fighting hard on the Linduz before the
tail battalion had begun to stidrom Arneguy. Reille had made
over his batteries and his regiment of corps-cavalry to Clausel,
receiving in return eight mountain guns carried by mules, and
Il train of pack-beasts laden with infantry ammunition. It is
obvious that a movement of this s<?rt could only succeed if the
enemy WIlS surprised, since the column had no thrusting-power;
it was all length without breadth, and one brigade ready at the
Linduz might hold up the entire three divisions, which would
have no space to deploy so us to make their numbers felt. This,
as wc shall sce, is precisely what happencd: the Linduz was
found in British occupation, and Rcille was blocked for the
whole day in front of a very inferior force.
9n the Chateau Pignon-Altobisear road Soult had sent
forward thc whole of Clausel's force, the three divisions one
behind the other, in the order Vandermaesen-Taupin-Conroux.
Behind the la.,>t infantry division was the cavalry, and then all
the guns and transport. Everything on wheels belonging to
Reille had been put in at the tail of Clausel's impedimenta.
This madc a column of interminable length. 'f.he conditions
were better for an advance on this front than on the western
truck, since the road was broad and the slopes on each side of it
fairly practicable: but there were formidable positions to be
carried before the watershed could be reached.
Byng and Morillo had been for three weeks at the Rances-
valles passes, but it wus only eight days since they had been
put under the command of Cole, who had CQmc up with thc
4th Division from his long stay in front of Pampcluna. And it
was only on the 22nd that Wellington had sent to Cole the
warning that the French main body was moving toward St. Jeall-
Picd·du-Port, and that he might expect to be attacked. On
th.c 23rd Colc received the stringent orders which have becn
quoted 011 all earlier page, but the still stronger message of thc
24th seems only to have reached him after the fighting had
begun.
While Byng and Morillo were in charge thcy had cvidently
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counted on being attacked nlong the high-road, and possibly
also in the depths of the Val Carlos. But no serious attempt
had been made to cover the highland path that comes out on
the Linduz, much farther west. It was only watched by
n picquet-....·{lIlC company of l\1oriUo's men encamped in the
ruined redoubt of 1793 on the Linduz. The other points of
access were carefully blocked: Dyug had a strong first line of
defence on the Leic;aratheca hill, whose rocky upper face gave
good cover for skirmishers. It was held by the three light
companies of his brigade, the attached company of the 5160th
and onc battalion! nnd three light companies from Marilla's right-
hand brigade. 'l'wo miles behind was the rem fighting position.
occupied by the Buffs and the' 1st Provisional' (2/81st and
2/66th), with twoofMorillo's battaliolls2• Byug's third battalion,
the 1/57th, was detached fardownhi11 to the left, on the lowerslopes
of the Altobiscar, watching the Val Carlos. The third Spanish
battalion of Morillo's right-hand brigade, Loon, WRS detached in
a similar fashion to the right, to the foot of the Altobiscar
heights, to guard 0. by-path, which crosses the main chain of the
mountains and comes down into the upper volley of the Irati
riycr at the foundry of Orbaiceta.
The remaining battalions of Morillo's left-hand brigade 3 were
dowil in the Val Carlos, 011 ground south of the village of the
same name, in a position blocking the uppcr and higher cnd of
that deep-sunk depression. They covered the flank of the
Altobiscar heights, and were not far from the 1/571h. Their
line of retreat, if they should be pushed, was up SI. very steep
path, which comes into the chall$see on the Ibaneta ridge 4. It
was this brigade whieh supplied the picquet on the Linduz, the
only precaution taken to cover the extreme left of the Allies'
fighting ground. The whole force on the front origino.lly
consisted of 2,000 bayonets of Byng's brigade and 8,800 ill
MoriIJo's six battalions.
When Cole took over from Hyng the general responsibility
for the safety of the eastern passes, he brought up his head-
• Vittoria and lightoompllnics olDoylc, LnUnion, IlndLcgionEstremenli.
I La Union and the Legion, minus their light companies.
• Doylc ul1d ~Ild of .Joen.
• Sometimes called tbe Puerto de Val Carlos.
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quarters to Viscarret in the valley of the Erro, hut placed his
first British brigade, that of Ross, at Espinal, ill the valley of
thc Urrobi, on the high road to Ronccsvallcs, only five miles
from the abbey and the' Puerto', and three from the pass of
?oIendiehuri leading up to the Linduz. He was thus in a position
to reinforce the passes at two or three hours' notice with one·
brigade, and with his whole 6,000 bayonets in half a day's
march. On the night of the 24th, having received both Wellil'lg-
ton's first lettcr of warning and Byng's report that his piequet.-;
had been attacked, Cole resolved to bring up his reserves nearer
, to thc front. By the most fortunate of inspirations he dirceted
Hoss's brigade to march before dawn-at 2 a.m.-and to
occupy the hcad of the l\fendichuri pass and the Linduz.
Ross, obeying orders all the more readily because he had
just received Spanish information that the Linduz was going
to be attacked next day 1, moved off in the dark, and mounted
the i\lendichuri, much incommoded on thc way by sharp turns
where trees had been blown down in a re(.'Cnt storm, and
cumbered the path. He had the 20th with him: the 7th was
following: the 23rd was left behind at Espinal, to start by
daylight and bring on the baggage. Though the distance to the
Linduz was only three miles, it took' in the darkness more than
four hours to reaeh the summit 2. There everything was found
quiet at dawn-the Spanish piequet in the old redoubt indeed
was so sleepy that Ross and his staff rode into them without
having been challenged 3. Dawn had now eome; though
nothing suspicious had belln observed, t.he general sent out the
llrunswiek-Oels company attached to the brigade to recon-
noitre along the spur in front, while the 20th piled arms and
lay down on the summit, to eat and get some rest after the night
, See the very interesting letter of Bainbrigge of the 20th, printed as an
.o\ppcudix to tbe regimental histm"y of that corps, 1" 300.
• Bainbrigge says that it was 7 a,m, before the regiment reached the
Linduz, but that it was nn hour earlier is clemOllstrntcd by lhe fact that
they Ileurd liring ut Rouccsvllllcs ufter llrrivillg. Now Byng's ltght 011 the
Lei~aratheca began at Ga.m. Therefore Ross was on the Linduz earlier,
I What became of this Spnnish compnny? Cnplnin 'J'ovey of the 20th
(k1: history o£lhllt corps, 1'. ·W8) says that the l"rendl' ll'lIde the Spanish
picquet, who were posted to give us intelligellce, prisoners, without theit
firing n. shot '. Another account is that huving seE!1I R06Il arrive, they
quietly wcnt off to rejoin tllcir brigade, without giving !lny not ice.
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march. In the far distance to the north-west the tents of
Camphell's Portuguese, encamped on the farther side of the
Alduides valley were perfectly visible. But shortly after
6 o'clock distant musketry began to be heard from the other
Hank-the direction of the Lei~ratheca·-where the busy
day's work was just beginning. It was some time, however,
before .Ross's brigade came in for their share of it.
Soult's attack, as wc have seen, was delivered by two columns
eaeh of 17,000 men, and eae'l striking by one narrow road at
a vital point of the enemy's defences. There was practically
no dispersion of forces on subsidiary enterprises, for the two
demonstrations which he made on his flanks on the morning of
the 25th were trifling affairs. To distract the attention oC
Campbell's brigade in the Alduides, he directed all the National
Guards of the Val de Baigorry and the other western valleys
to assemble on the mountain called Hausa, opposite the
Portuguese camp, to light many fires there, as if they marked
the bivouacs of a large force, and to show themselves at many
points. Little good came of this to the National Guards, for
Campbell, an active officer, marched at them without delay,
and drove them in helpless rout down the vmley. But Soult
(unlike the unfortunate local levy) profited pcrceptibl)' from
the move, for the noise of firing drew down to the Alduides
the two British generals responsible for the Bastan-Hill and
W. Stcwart. And while they were absent, orr their own ground,
their troops at Mays. were attacked, and suffered many things
for want of a commander.
A second similar demonstration was made in the valley east
of Roneesvalles. Here the local National Guards, backed by
a battalion of the 59th under Colonel Loverdo, crossed the main
chain of the mountains and attacked Morillo's right flank-
guard-the regiment of Leon-at the foundry of Orbaiceta in
the Irati valley. The Spaniards defended themselves stoutly,
and held their ground all day. But the noise of this skinnishing
far to their right rear was decidedly trying to the nerves of
Uyng and l\'lorillo, who for some time could not be certain that
their flank had not been turned by II respectable force. How-
ever, nothing Cllrne of this skirmish, since it grew evident by
the afternoon that the enemy was weak and unable to ·press
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forward. It is barely worth putting on· record that one battalion
detached from the tail of Conroux's division, went up the trough
of the Val Carlos, and watched l\IoriIlo's left-hand brigade
without attempting to close with it.
Having dismissed these feints, concerning which no more
need be said, we may proceed to the real fighting. At about
6 a.m. Vander~aescn's division, at the head of Clauscl's long
column, ncared the hill of Lci9arathcca, where the seven British
and Spanish light companies were cnseonccd in thc rocky slope
commanding the high road. The position had obviously to bc
stormed by frontal attack if there was reason to hurry, for it
could only be turned by very long flanking movements over
the steep slopes on each side of the road. General Barbot,
commanding the leading brigade, deployed the 1st Line and
25th Leger. and attacked with a swarm of tirailleurs the whole
front of the hill. The attack failed completely, the defenders
being under good cover and perfectly steady. The French,
when their first rush had been stopped, threw themselves down
among the stones and gorse, and kept up a useless fire upon
their almost invisible adversaries. Clausel, after three hours
of this profitless bickering, sent in high rage a message to
llarbot, that he wouJd have him eashiered, unless he pulled his
men together and delivered a serious attack 1. Meanwhile the
:French battalions were coming up one after another from the
rear, and accumulating behind the single brigade that was
engaged. Barbot called back his disordered troops, reformed
them in column, put in a fresh battalion, and made a second
and a third attack on the hill; 0.11 naturally failed~the troops
being tired and discouraged. But the mutter was finally sellled
by the divisional general, VUlldcrmacsen, leading off his three
rear battalions 2 across the stccp hill-side to the cast, and turning
the Leil1aratheca by a long detour. At the same time Clause!
1 'l'here is a O1urious and interesting account of all this in the Memoirs
of Lemonnicr-Dclllfosse, llidc..dc·C1llllp to ClllUScl, who WlIlI twice sent to
stir up &rbot, whose conduct he describes in ~eathing terms (pp. 212-14).
Clause] says that the 50th stormed the Leicamt.heca. That it stormed
an Ill>nndoncd pooitioll is ~hown by the llgure or iU losscs. What Ch~oscl
does not tell can be gathered from HynS·s workmanlike disJllltch to Cole,
in S,lpplelnetltary m~pakhe8, viii. pp. 128--9.
• or the 27th ulId 100th Line.
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began to ~hcll the positioll with six guns brought up from the
rear. When Byng saw his outlying force in danger of being cut
offI' he ordered it to r.etire to his main hod)' 011 the Altobiscar.
This it did in good time, and when Clausel again advanced
against the Leic;aratheco. frontally, with the 50th-Line, while
the flanking column drew in on the right Rank, he received only
a few shots from lingeringskirmishers, and occupied the position
with the loss of 9 men killed only.
So long had the turning mo\'cment taken, that by the time
that the French had got back into order again, and CQuld
advance towards Dyug's real fighting ground, it was past
3 o'clock in the afternoon. The Altobiscar position was even
more formidable than that 011 the Lciljaratheca; Clausel
looked at it, felt it, and did not like it: it was impossible to
turn save by a vast detour: this, he says in his dispatch, he was
preparing to do, by sending his rear division (Conroux) to
circumvent the whole crest of Altobiscar and the still higher
summit to the eust of the road, ll. march of many iniIes. But
at 5 o'clock a dense mountain fog rose, the enemies became
invisible to each other, and all movement became impossible.
Byng was left ullattaeked upon his chosen position~though
not destined to stop there, The losses on both sides had been
absurdly small, considering that 17,000 French had faced
6,000 British and Spaniards for eleven hours. But really only
Vandermacsen's division on onc side and the Allied light com-
panies on the other had been engaged. Clausel says that he
had but 160 killed and wounded-among the last General
Vandermaesen himself I. Dyug and MorilIo had 120 casualties-
the former remarks that this was an extraordinarily low figure
considering that the :French had shelled the Lei9amtheca for
some time-but the cover was good 2. There were more
I I CQnfcss that I doubt these figures. Mnrlinien's lists show the 27th
Line with seven offioer-Cl\SIlAlties, the 1st Line with two, tile 25th Uger
with three, tbe 180th with two. l"ourh.,(,ll olliccr-ClIsulIltiCl:l ought to melln
more like 280 th.'m 160 easualtles of all ranks. In the whole Pyrenean
cnmpllign the Freneh army lost. 420 officers to 12,300 men-nearly 30 men
to each omecr. CllIuscl llskll UlI to believe thllt ut HOllCCS\'lllles the pro-
portion was one officer to twelvc men I Yet, of CQursc, such disproportiorl
is flnite posti.ble•
• ,",'hile we have quite a number of good persolllll narrntivCl> or the light
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Spaniards hurt than nritish: their conduct had been exemplary.
Uorillo himself had been there, exposing himself with his usual
reckless courage.
At the other end of the line the fighting 'was much more
serious. It will be remembered that at 6 o'clock Ross was on
the Linduz, with his leading battalion, and a second close
behind: the third had only recently started the climb up from
Espinal by the l\Iendichuri. He sent out Iris light companies
to observe the northern slope of the plateau which he had
occupied, thnt of Brunswiek-Oels being directed along the
wooded spur or crest which forms the western wall of .the
depression of the Val Carlos. Meanwhile the troops listened to
t.he commencement of the long roll of musketry, which told how
ClllW;c! was attacking llyug Oil the other side of that valley.
Three or four hours passed; General Cole rode by on his way
lo visit the Ronccsvallcs front, told Ross tu keep u. gooo look-
out, aud informed him that AIlJ;on's and Stubhs's brigade wcre
coming up via Burguctc, the former to reinforce the Spaniards
at the'foundry of Orbaiccta, the latter to the Ibaneta to support
llyng. Somewhere about 11 o'clock, according to our best eye-
witness, the outlying piequet of thc Brunswick company
detected dust rolling above the beech copses which masked thc
crest-path in front of them, and a littlc later caught intermittent
glimpses of troops pa.<;sing between the trees. It wa.<; doubted
whether they were Frcnch, or somc of MoriUo's troops retiring
from Val Carlos. But about noon, Ross, having becn warned
to look for trouble, wld the llrunswickers to advance and
verify the character of the approaching strangers, while he
himself called up the left wing of the 20th regiment and followed
in support: the rest of the brigade were directed to stand to
their arms on the Linduz. The German light company went
forward some half a mile ou a very up-and-down track, till
they got quite close to the oncoming troops, who appeared to
be in no particular order, a straggling crowd advancing along
on t.he Linduz, I lul.\"c found for the Oght on the Lci~l\rntbeell.nothing but
the oltleial reports ofClauscl,Byng, and Morillo, save the memoirs ofGcorge
L'Estrallgc of the 31st and of Lemonnier-])elaf06Se, who is intereliting hut
obviously inaccurate, sincc he says that the French regiment which curried
the hiU was the 71st. Not only WILS it tile 50th, ILS Clausel specially
mentions, but 71 was a blank number in tlle Freneh Army List.
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the crest, which is here only thirty yards broad. with trees and
hushes on both flanks. When there was no more than eighty
yards between the parties the French dressed tht>ir front, so
as to cover the whole breadth of the ridge, and began to fll'c.
They were the two compagnies d'elite of the 6th Leger, the
leading battalion of Foy's division, at the head of Reille's
column; close behind them the rest of their battalion was
pushing up, as quickly as was possible with men moving on
such 0. uarrow track. The sixty Brunswickcrs, finding them-
selves in front of such a superior force, fell back, firing, on their
supports, pursued by the enemy. General noss, wanting to
gain time for his brigade 011 the Lillduz to deploy, ordered the
leading company of the 20th-No. 8, Captain Tovcy's-lo
chargc with thc bayonct and throw thc Frcnch back. Thcrc
followcd onc of the rarcst things in the Peninsular War, a real
hand-to-hand fight ",ith the white weapon. The French
skirmishers in front gave way into the bushes, clcaring the
front of the company behind them. Then the two parties, each
advancing up one side of a small declivity, met face to face at
the top, with only ten yards between them when they came in
sight of each other. • The French instinctively stepped back
a pace,' says the Brunswick officer who has left us the best
account of this clash, • several of them made a half turn, as if
about to givc way: but their officers, some with appeals, some
with thrcats, and some with curses, kept them to their work.
They stood firm, and their bayonets came down to the charge:
so did those of Tovey's comp...my. For a few seconds the two
sides sut'Veyed each other at a distance of two paces: then one
French company officer sprang forward into the middle of the
British, and began cutting right and left. He was at once
bayoneted, and then the two sides began to fence cautiously
with each other, keeping their line and n9t breaking forward
into the cnemy's ranks: it was more like bayonet drill than
a charge. I do lIot think that more than a dozen mcn fell 011
either side. After a minute the English captain saw that the
French supports were closing in-he shouted' right about face',
and his men trotted back. When our front was clear of them,
our five (four) 1 companies opened fire by platoons, and as the
• Four, not five, because the light company ot the 20th was nbsent with
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distance wo.s only 100 yards we saw heaps of the French fall at
eaeh volley 1.' Tovey's eompany lost 11 killed a.nd 14 wounded
out of about 75 present in this extraordinary adventure, which
had given the three rear compallicii and the Brunswiekers time
to form up aeross the erest and in the bushes on each side of it.
It is astonishing that a man of the 8th Company got away-
clearly the enemy had been too much astonished to pursue as
he might have done 2.
The fight on the path that leads to the Linduz now became
l\ very confused and constricted business, with many casualties
on both sides, since French nnd English were firing at eaeh
other along a sort of avenue and (''Quld hardly miss. Foy's
second battalion, the 1!69th, had now reinforced his first, and
finally the left wing of the 20th, badly thinned, gave way and
fell hack in some disorder to the point where the crest-path
debauches on to the Linduz plateau. Here all was ready for
defence-the right wing of the 20th, with the regimental colours
flying, was waiting ready for the enemy, with the 1/7th in
immediate support and the 1!23rd in reserve. When the
narrow-fronted Freneh colwnn tried to burst out of the deftle,
officers in front, druIDs heating the pM de charge, a long-reserved
volley smote it, and all the leading files went down. There was
a pause before the third of Foy's battalions, the 2!69th, got to
the front and tried a similar attack, which failed with even
the other light companies far to the right: so the wing was only four
collllmuies strong, or three dcdul.:ting 1'ovcy'Slllcn. Wllchhoh; forgets this.
1 Waehhoh:, p. 322.
• Tovey fortunately wrote a narrntivc ofthi!:! little alluir, which may be
found in the llistory of the 20th, p. 408. He su)'s: ' The enemy's light
troops opened so gnllillg a nre that Major-General noss called out for a
COtlll',llllY to go 10 the front. Without wuiting for orders] pushed oui. with
mine, and in clooc order and double-quick cleared away the sldrmishers
from a sort of plateau. They did not ....ait for liS : on reaching its opposite
side we Cllme so suddenly 011 the helld of the ellemy's illflllltry column,
which had just lj:ained 11 footing' on the swnmit of the hill, that the men of
my company absolutely paused in lllltonishment, for we were face to (aoc
with them. The French olliccr called to us to throw down our llrms:
I replied" bayonet away," and roshing all them we turned them bacl'
down the descent. Sueh wUl! the panic Rnd confusion CIIuscd by the sudden
onset, that our smnll party (for such It was compar<:d to the French column)
had time to regain the regiment, but my military readers may rest assured
that it required to be done dcrnble IjWk,'
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greater loss. "For the whole of the rest of the afternoon spas-
modic fighting went on at the Linduz. • The enemy was
visible,' writes onc of Ross's brigade, 'several thousands
strong, on the higher part of the spur; every half-hour or so
he sent another company down to relieve his skirmishers. Hc
always came up in detail and slowly, for there was a tiresome
defile to cross, over a deep cutting in the crest I, where only onc
man abreast could pass. Wc could always let the head of the
attack debauch, and then attack it alld throw it back upon ill;
supports 2,' No attempt was made to turn the Linduz by its
eastern side, among the steep slopes and thickets at the head
of Vat Carlos: all attacks came straight along the spur. ll.cillc
attributes this in his dispatch to the dreadful delays at thc rcar
of his long column, owing to the narrowness of the path. Hc
acknowledges that an attempt should have becn madc to push
on to the Ibaneta, but it was 3.30 beforc J\(aucunc's first
battalion began to arrive to I'oy's assistancc, and 5 before the
rear of his division WllS up. 'By this hour it was too late to
think of turning movements '-<:ven if the fog which stopped
Clausel had not swept down on the Linduz also. As a matter
of fact only Foy's four front regiments--five battalions-were
put into the fight 3. Similarly on the British side the fight was
sustained only by the 20th, relieved, after its cartridges were all
spent, by the 7th and the 23rd.
Reille does not omit to mention that after the first hour of
fight was over, Cole had begun 'to show reserves on the Linduz
which would have made any attack by Foy's division, unsup-
ported, quite hopeless. It will be remembered that the com-
mander of the 4th Division had started Anson's brigade for
Orbaieeta, and.Stubbs's brigade for the Ibancta ridge, when first
the attack on Dyng was reported, and he had gone to the
Altobise&I' himself to watch the progress of affairs on that side.
While he wa.. there Foy's attaek on the Lindllz developed: Cole
, This diteh had been eut by the Spaniards ill 1793 as un outer protection
to their redollbt 011 the Lindll7..
• \\'u.chhob:, p. 3Z.~ .
• The 6th Uger, 69th (2 battalions), 76th, and 36th show casualtics,
the rear regiments (3Dth and 65th) none. Nor doos Maueune's division.
Similarly on the British side none of An$l)ll's or Stu!JUs's Imttalions contri·
bute to the lillt.
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at once rode to the left, to see how Ross was faring, al\o in
consequence sent down-hill to bid Anson abandon his long
march to the extreme right, and to turn up the UoneesvaUes
pass, as Stubbs did also. The British brigade took post on
Ross's right; the Portuguese brignoe on the Ibnnero, watching
the steep path from the Val Carlos. Up this thcre presently
came the 1/57th and the Spanish battalions which had bccn
near them. Thus Cole showed a continuous line from the
Altobisear to the Linduz, held by 11,000 men placed in a most
formidable position not more than three miles long. Nor was
this all·-General Cnmpbell in the Alduides, after scnttering the
National Guards who had tried to delude him in the enrly
morning, had heard the firing at Roneesvalles, nud (though he
had 110 orders) thought it his duty to march with his five
Portuguese battalions toward the sound of battle. Taking the
highland track along,the upper end of the Alduides, he appeared
on Ross's left at 4 o'clock in the afternoon by the so-called path
of Atalosti. He was in a position to outflank any attempts
that Reille might make to turn Ross's position on the western
side.
When the fog fell Soult was ill Il. very unpleasant situation,
Having chosen to attack his enemy with narrow·frouted
columns of immcnse depth, over two constricted routes, he had
been brought to a complete cheek. Clausel had driven in
Byng's outpost, but was stuck in front of the Altobisear : Reille
had failed to move Ross at all, and was blocked in front of the
Linduz, The losses had been negligible, it is true-not much
over 500 in all if the :Marshal is to be believed. But those of the
Allies were still smaller, and the eonfidenec of the men had
been raised by the way iu which they had easily blocked
for some ten hours, and with small loss, an army whose vast
strength they eould estimate by the interminable file of distant
troops erawliug up the roads in the rear I. If the men, however,
, As we h:l.\'C secn alrendy, Clausc! puts his loss nt the Leit;.arathcea at
lOO, to Byng'8 and 1Ilorillo's 1~0. At the other cnd of the line ROSS'1l
brigade IUld lost 216 mell-13U of them in the 20th, 31 in the 7th, 42 in
the 2Srd, 4 in the Brunswick eomrmny. [I know not where Napier got
his strllnge statement thnt this OOlllPUllY lost 42 IlIen: their calltnill,
Waebbolz, reports 2 killed nnd 2 wounded.] l?oy's six front battaliollll bad
lost 10 offloors aud :1(11 lIlell. The total Allied Irn;s WflB about 350, there
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were. cheerful, thcir commander was not. Colc estimated the
French at 30,000 men and more, and quite correctly: he had
himself only 11,000 in line, with 2,000 more of Campbell's
Portuguese in touch on his left.• Picton's 3rd Division, which
lay at Olague on the morn of the 25th, had no doubt sw.rtcd
to close up; but it was a long day's march away, and could not
be at Altobisear or on the Linduz till thc 26th. Anything might
be happcning in thc fog which lay deep on the mountains all
night. Colc determined' that he could not hope to maintain thc
passes against the very great superiority of the force opposed
to him-amounting to from 30,000 to 35,000 men 1 " and that
he must retire by night under cover of the mist. Even if his
views had been less pessimistic, he would yet have been com-
pelled to retreat by the action of Byng, who had fought
heroically nIl the day, but was obsessed by fenTs as the fog
settled dmy]}. He had come to the conclusion that, ns the enemy
had possession of the path along the eastern hills to Orbaiceta,
and had supero.bundant numbers, he would be using the night
to send a huge force in that direction, where only the Spanish
regiment of Lean was on guard. They could not be stopped,
and when down in the valley of the Irati would be able to takc
Roneesvalles from the rear, and to throw the whole defcnding
forcc on to the ncccssity of rctiring by thc I'lcndiehuri and
Atalosti routes, on which retreat would Le slow and dangerous.
. Byng thcrcfore scnt a messuge to Cole that he must nC()ds
retire, and was already beginning to draw oc! his troops, under
cover of his light companies, when he rcceivcd Colc's ordcrs
to the same effcct. The moral responsibility for the retreat lay
equally on both-the technical responsiLility on Colc alonc, as
the superior officer: he migllt, of course, have ordered Byng
back to his old position, which the }~relleh hud left quite
unmolested.
Was Cole's pessimism justified? Wellington thought not:
he wrote to Lord Liverpool ten days later, ' Sir Lowry Cole,
having been a few casualties among Cnmpbell's Portuguese and among tlJl:
Spaniards at Orbniccta. The total French loss was not less than C030.
Both figures are very moderate. Cole estimated the French casualties
ut 2,000 men! Soult wrotc tllllL he hud u!most e:dermillutctl the 20th,
whose tot311088 had been 139.
, Cole to Wellington. SIIPlllemenlllr!1 Dj"IJfltcht8, viii. p. 127.
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whose retreat occasioned the retreat of the whole, retired, not
because he could not hold his position, but because his right
flank was turned. It is a great disadvantage when the officer
commanding in chief is absent. For this reason there is nothing
that 1 dislike so much as these extended operations, which
I cannot direct myselfl: And hc was no doubt thinking of
eole, no less than of Picton, when hc wrote that' all thc beatings
we have given the French have not given our gencrals confidence
in themselves and in the exertions of their troops. They are
really heroes when I am 011 the spot to direct them, but when
I am obliged to quit them they are children.' Cole was au
officer of the first merit in handling troops, as he was to show
at Sorauren two days later; and that he was not destitute of
initiative had been sufHeicntly proved by the advance of the
4th Division at Albucra, where he wo..o;; practically acting with-
out orders 2. But there seems no doubt that the scale of the
operations in the Pyrenees made him nervous: he was respon
sible on the 25th July not for 0. division but for n small army,
Bnd he was well aware of the enemy's superiority in numbers.
His conduct was the more surprising because he had received
before 10 o'clock Wellington's stringent dispatch of the night
of the 24th, telling him to 'maintain the passes in front of
Roncesvalles to the utmost,' and to disregard any wide turning
movements to the east on Soult's part. These orders reached
him at the Lei~aratheca, just as he was witnessing Byng's
successful repulse of Bnrbot's brigade. Possibly the excitement
of the moment prevented him from thoroughly nppreciating
their full meaning, and for the rest of the day he was busy
enough, riding from front to front on the passes. As he wrote
ill his first short aecouut of his doings, ' having had nO sleep for
two nights, and having been on horseback from 4 a.m. till 11
at night, I am somewhat fagged 3.' It is, of course, quite
unfair to criticize a responsible officer in the light of subsequent
events; but llS a matter of f[I.Ct Cole was in no danger-the fog
endured all that night nnd far into the morning of the 26th.
, WeUington to Liverpool, Dispatelltt. x. p. 590.
• See vo!, iV.lIP. 889-00.
I Cole to Murray, Linzoain, July 26th. Wrongly dated July 21th ill
Suppk'menlal'!/ Dispute/jell, viii. p. 124.
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The enemy at Orbaiceta was negligible-one battalion and
a few National Guards: SOlllt sent no more troops on that
wretched road. And if he had done so, after the fog cleared on
the 26th, they would have taken the best part of a day to get
into action. It seems certain that Cole could have held the
passes for another day without any great risk; and if he had
done so, Soult's whole plan of campaign would have been
wrecked. But, of course, the fog 11tight have lifted at midnight:
Soult might have sent two divisions by a night march to Orbai.·
ecta, and a retreat by bad tI"J,Cks like the Atalosti would have
been slow, and also eccentric, since it did not cover the Pampc.
luna road, but would have taken Colc to Eugui and the Col de
Velate. Nevertheless, looking at the words of Wellington's
dispatch of the 24th, it seems that Cole disobeyed orders: he
did mt hold the passes to the utmost, and he did mt disregard
turning movements to the far ea..t.
Both the Linduz and Altobiscar were evacuated in the early
hours of the night of July 25th-6th: the French did not discover
the move till morning, and bydawn the whole of Cole's force was
far on its way down the 11ampeluna road entirely unmolested,
though very weary.
To understand the general situation on the morning of
July20th, we must nowturn baek, to note what had been happen-
ing in theDaRtan during the long hours of Dyng's and 1105s's fight
in thc southern passes. The supplementary part of Soult's plan
had boen to force the Maya defile, and tints to break in the left-
centre of Wellington's line of defence, at the same moment that
his main body turned its extreme right flank, by forcing its way
through the Honcesvnlles gap. D'Erlon's three divisions, for
whom this task had been set aside, had no long detour to execute,
like those of llcille: they were already eonec,ntrated in front
of their objective; their leading section woos at Urdax, only
a few miles from the summit of the lUaya ridge; their most
remote reserves at Espelette, in the valley of' the Nivc, were
within one day's march of the British positions.
'!'he orders issued by Soult to D'Erlon on July 23rd ran as
follows: 'Comte D'Erlon will make his dispositions on the
2,.t,th to attaek the cnemy at dawn on the 25th, to make himself
master of the Vuerto ofl\faya, and to pursue the enemy when he
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shall begin his retreat.... It is to be presumed that the hostile
forces in the Bastan, in the Alduides, and in the passes of
Ispcgui and Maya will draw back the moment that they hear
of[Clauscl's and Rcille's] movement, or else that they will begin
to mUll{Cuvre, so as to lcave their present positions ungnrrisoncd.
Comte D'Erlon will seize thc momcnt to attack them briskly,
and to seize the Maya pass. From thence he will march by
ArisCUTI on Elizondo, and then on the Col dc Vel ate, or possibly
by Derdcris on the pass of Urtiaga, according to the route which
the cncmy may take in his retreat. lie should remember that
he must try to unite as soon as possible with the main body in
the direction here indicated, and to get into communication
with Gencral ReilIe. 'WhatcvCl' may happcn, he must send
strong detaehmcnts to l'uniUc any hostilc columns that may
try to get off to their left [westward], to discover their routes,
worry them, and piek up prisoners.'
These arc very curious orders, as all their directions depend
on the idea that Roncesvalles will be forced 'with ease, and that
on hearing of its being lost all the Allied troops in the centre of
Wellington's line will retire in haste. Soult committed himself
to this hypothcsis in the words' it is to be presumed that the
enemy win defend thc position of Altobisear feebly, because he
will sce that he is being outflanked by Reille's divisions on the
Lindm,:, and threatened at the same time, on his right flank by
the detachment and the National Guards who are demonstrating
in the direction of Orbaiceta.' But what if Uoncesvalles were
held for twelve hours against Clausel, if ReiIJe were completely
blocked aU day on the Linduz, and if the demonstration on
Orbaiceta proved ineffective? In this case the British troops
on the Maya front will not hear of disasters in the south, they
will not retrcat, but stand to fight; and D'ErlOII, far from
having a walk over the pass, as a commenccment to a rapid
pursuit of a flying enemy, will ha\'c a hard day's work before
him.
This is what was to happen. D'Er]on, instead of running
against an enemy who was about to retreat, and pushing him
forward with case, mct with troops determined to hold thcir
position, and found himself let in for one of the bloodiest battles
on a small scale that were fought during the whole war. 'J'hat
626 RONCESVALLES AND MAYA [.JULY 25
he was finally successful, though at a heavy cost, was due
to the mistakes made by the British genertlls in front of
him.
The disposition of the troops which formed Wellington's
centre was as follows. Hill was in charge of the whole sector,
from the Maya Pass to the head of the Alduides valley. His
force consisted of the 2nd Division (minus Byng's brigade,
detached to Roncesvallcs nearly a month back), and of Silveira's
Portuguese division. WiHiam Stewart ~teld the left, with the
three available 2nd Division brigadcs-Cameron's, Pringle's,
and Ashworth's Portuguese. The two British brib'Udcs were in
or about the Mayo. Pass, Ashworth was holding the Ispcgui Pass,
seven miles to the cast, with onc battalion in the defile, and the
others in support on the road from Errazu. Silveira's two
brigades continued the line southward,. Da Costa's watching
the Col de Berderis and other minor passes south of the Ispegui,
while A. Campbcll's was in the Alduidcs, on the slopes above
the village of that name. Silveira himself was with Da Costa.
Campbell, as we have already seen, was in close touch with the
Roneesvalles force, and ultimately joined it.
On the other flank the 2nd Division at Maya had as its nearest
neighbour the 7th Division, which was holding the' Puerto' of
Echalar. Behind lay the Light Division by Vera, and the 6th
Division, now under Pack, since Clinton's health had again
broken down, in reserve at Santesteban.
Now on the early morning of the 25th the first troops stirring
were SouIt's National Guard detachments on the Alduides front,
whieh (as we have already seen) attraeted the notice of Camp-
bell's Portuguese, and surrered for their temerity. Their
activity, most unfortunately, drew the attention of Sir Uowland
Hill in this direction. He rode out from his head-quarters at
Elizondo to visit Campbell, when the demonstration was
reported to him. And he was actually in the Aldnides, at the
extreme southern cnd of his sector, when the ]?rench attacked
in force the Maya passes, at its extreme northern end. This was
a pardonabl~ mishap, since he was on his own business. But it
led to his being absent from the real point of danger. Quite
unpardonable, however, was the fact that William Stewart,
commanding the 21ld Division, abandoned his own troops and
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went out to join Hill in the same direction I, toward the front of
Silveira's brigades, attracted by the news of fighting at early
dawn. He would seem to have left no note of his probable
whereabouts at l\laya, so that he was sought in vain for many
hours, when his troops were attacked. In his absence the com-
mand of his division fell to General Pringle, who had arrived
from England only two days before, to take over the brigade
of which Coloncl O'Callagho.n of the 89th had been in temporary
charge since the opcning oC thc campaign. Pringle knew
neither the troops nor the ground, and being only a brigadier
had no authority to make lIew dispositions, when his command·
ing officer was still technically present, though invisible for thc
moment.
The whole responsibility for what happened on the morning
of the 25th,. therefore, ·fell on Stewart. And he must also be
given the discredit of the vcry inadequate arrangements that
had been made for the defence of the pass. The French at
Urdax werc only four milcs from the crest, and it was known
that they were in strength close behind-their large camps
about Ainhoue, where Abbes dh'ision was eantoncd, were
perfectly visible from the heights 2, and obviously crammed with
men. Considering that he was in close touch with ·the enemy,
Stewart's preca.utions were ludicrously incomplete. The l.faya
position consists of a broad open grassy saddle, between the
high mounta.ins to cast and west-the Aleorrullz peak on
the left and the Arctesque peak on the right. The saddle at
its lowest point is about 2,000 ft. above sea-level-the flanking
heights run up to a thousand feet more. The high rood from
Drdax o.nd Zagaro.murdi climbs the so.ddlc in its middle, runs
westward along its summit for a mile, aod thcn descends by
a broad curve towards Elizondo on the Spanish side. There is
another lesser track whieh Icads up on to the saddle, from
Espelctte; it gets on to the level of the Col at its extreme
eastern cnd, under the Aretcsque hcight ; thence, after running
along the crest for a mile, it meet!'; the high road, crosses it, and
continues along the slopes of the Aleorrunz peak, and ulti·
, Sec dinry or Dr. Henry, who WllS at E1i7.ondo, and notes how all the
!lCnior ol1lccn rode out castwurd (p. 101).
I Bell, vol. i. )l. ]02; Cndell, p. 101.
628 RONCESVALLES AND MAYA [JUI.V 25
mately falls into the by-rood from Santesteban to Zo.garlUuurdi.
This path, useful fOf lateral communications east and west, is
still luto'Wll as the Chemin des AlIglais, from the work which
was spent upon it by 'Wellington's army later in the year, when
the necessity for good tracks along the front was better under-
stood than it seems to have been in July. In contemporary
records it is generally called the Gorospil path.
The west end of the saddle was not inadequately guarded
by Cameron's brigade, which was encamped by battalions 011
.each side of the main chamsee close behind the crest, with
four Portuguese guns, of Da Cunha's battery, mounted on fI.
commanding knoll whence they could sweep the road. But
the east end of the position, under the hill of Aretesque, where
the minor road comes in, was almost entirely neglected. There
was only a picquct of 80 men placed to cover it, on the spot
where the Chemin des ..t1nglais gets to the crest of the position.
Pringle's brigade, which supplied this piequet, was two and Il hlllf
miles to the rellr, in the low ground about the village of Maya-
an hour's mareh away, for the ascent to the picquct was a elimb
uphill by a bad path. The only support immediately available
for the outpost was the four light companies of the brigade l,
which wcrc encampcd on the back-slopc of thc ridge, about
half-way between the hill of Aretcsque and the main 1;Iody of
the brigade.
There was much dead ground in front of the Mayo. position,
where it might be approached by ravines and eomhcs whose
bottom could not be fathomed by the eye. And in particular
the view north-eastward, towards Espclette, was completely
blocked by a high round hill half a mile beyond the outer
sentries of the Aretesque piequet. With the French only four
miles away at Urdax, and seven at Espcletle, it is clear that
prudence would have dietotcd constant reconnaissance of all
the dead ground. Stcwnrt had made no such armngements-
all that we hear is that thc round hill beyond the Aretcsque
piequet was occasionally visited by Portuguese vedeUcs.
Apparently nOlle had gone out on the morning of the 25th.
D'Erlon would appear to have been well aeqUlLinted with
I Onc from eaeh bnttnlion plus the odd company of the a/60th ntt.'1ehed
to cuch 21ll] Division brigade.
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the general disposition of the British line, as he launched his
main attack against the undermanned eastern Hank of the
position, and did not tackle the strongly held ground on the
high road, at its western end, until he was well established on
the crest. Darmagnae's division, froOl Espelcttc, led the main
column, Abbe's division from Ainhoue fell into its rear und
followed: both took the Chemin des Anglais truck, which was
blocked from the view of the Dritish picquet:; by the round hill
alrcarJy mentioned. Maransin':; di\'i:;ion at Urdax, on the high
road, was ordered to mass itself, but to kcep under cover, and
show no signs of movement till the main body had reached and
occupied the eastern cnd of the sllddlc. It was then to assail
Cameron's brigade, advancing up the high road..
Though the morning was bright and clear, no certain signs
of a French attaek were seen till 10 o'clock, so CArefully did the
enemy utilize the' dead ground' in front of him. Suspicious
movements indeed were observed by the outpost of the 71st
011 the high road, who noted slllull bodies of mcn crossing the
sky-line in front of Urdax I, And the piequet of the 34th on the
Arctesque hill reported to !lring!c's brigade~hea.d-quarters that
it had seen a small body of cavalry and a larger force of infantry
tunl the corner of a distant road beyond Ainhoue and disappear
again 2. On both points the enemy had only been visible for a
few minutes. Pringle sent up a staff-onleer 3 to the Aretesque
picquet. who made nothing of the troops that hOO been detected
on that side, but as a mev.sure of precaution ordered up the
four light companies of the brigade to join the picquet on the
crest. Thus there chanced to be 400 men illi!tcad of 80, when
D'Erlon discovered himself lUl hour later. But the five com-
panies were as powerless a guard against the sudden attack of
7,000 men as the Olle company would have been.
At 10.30 D'Erlon had reached the point, not much over half
a mile from the most advanced British sentry, where the head
of his column would be forced to come out into the open and
, See Hope's Military Memoirs, p. 319. Sceptical observers with tele-
scopes said that the objects seen were droves of bullocks.
• See Moyle SheTer (who collllllanded the piC(lUt:,'t), p. 257.
• Major Thorne, assistant quartermaster-general. Moyle Sherer says
that Thome owned that there was a small column on the move, but that he
judged it to be a battulion shirting ita quarters, or a relicl or outposts.
680 RONCESVALLES AND l.IAYA [JULY 2(;
show itself. His dispositions aimed at a sudden surprise-and
effected it. He coUeeted the eight light companies of Darmng-
MC'S division, ordered them to take oH and stack their knap-
sacks, and launched them as a swarm oftirailleuT8 at the position
oC the British on the Arctcsquc knoll (or the Gorospil knoll,
as Darmagnac calls it in his report). The lOth Ugcr followed
them in column, keeping to the tmck, while the skirmishcrs
spread out in a semicircle to envelop the knoll. The remainder
of the division came on as quickly as it could in support.
The French attacked at a pace that surprised their enemies ;
the light companies-they were commanded by Bradbey of
the 28th-were desperately engaged within ten minutes of the
firing of the first shot. Their flanks being turned, they clubbed
together on the higher slopes of the knoll, and around some
rocky outcrops on its summit, and held their own for three-
qua.rters of an hour, repulsing several 3.ttAeks of the voltigeurs
and the 16th Leger with great loss, and suffering heavily them-
selves. Meanwhile the attention of the defenders of the pass
being thus distracted, the succeeding battalions of Darmag-
nae's division hurried up unmolested onc after another on to
the saddle, and began to deploy. Their general threw the
8th Line across the rear of the knoll, blocking the path which
led down to the village of l\fo.ya and the camps of Pringle's
brigade, and drew out in succession the 28th, 51st, and 54th
on the plateau to their right.
Before any succour could arrive 1 the five unlucky companies
on the Gorospil knoll were crushed by the concentric attack-
six unwounded .officers and 140 men were taken prisoners
among the roeks at the summit-the other 260 were nearly all
killed or wounded. Soon after they had succumbed, tardy
reinforcements began to arrh'e-Pringle had started off his
thrcc battalions from the valley to climb the p!loth up to t11c
crest-they arrived at illterv!lols, for their eomps were !lot varying
distances from the point of danger, and each acted for itself.
The Brigadier himself, finding that he was in general command,
• Mr. Fortel:ieue (II~lory of tile Army, Ix. p. 258) thinks that the 3-ith
got up in time to join in their last struggle. But Bell of that regiment says
• wc laboured on, bul nil loo Int.c-n forlorn hopc---our oommdes were
all killed, wounded, or pri~oners. The enemy had full possessiOD of the
ground.' Dell's Rough Nolu, i. p. 103.
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appears to have ridden up the high road and joined Cameron's
brigade at the Maya end of the saddle. From thence he began
to send off detachments of that brigade, to ~-operatefrom the
flank with the up-hill frontal attack which his own battalions
were about to make from the valley.
He found Cameron's brigade under arms, in good order, and
unmolested. The Portuguese guns had begun to fire, but not
at any.cncmy, Cor Maransin was holding back, accortliug la his
ordcrs. Thc shots were signals to give notice to the 7th Division,
Ashworth, and other outlying neighbours, that serious fighting
had opened in the passes. They do not seem to haveeommeneed
tillll o'clock or even later, for Wellington had ridden off from
Lesnca towards St. Sebastian before the cannonade bega.n;
and we know that when he stlll'ted about 11 n.m. no gunfire
from the east had been reported. Cameron had already sent
oH the 50th, the right-hand corps of his brigade, to push along
the watershed of the col, and stop the Frcnch Crorn any Curther
progress toward the high road. This leCt only the 71st and 92nd
under the Rock of l\faya, 011 the culminating point of the posi-
tion, awaiting the approach of l\faransin, which obviously
would not bc long delayed.
The second episode of the fight consisted in a series of' des-
pernte but ill-connected attempts by four British battalions
-the 28th,. 84th, 89th, 50th-to push Da.rmagnac's eight
battalions oH the foothold on the cast end of the col, where they
werc now firmly established. Abbe's division was not yet on
the ground, but was already visible filing up the traek whieh
Darmagllae's had already traversed. The three British
battalions from the valley arrived in succession, and attacked
frontally the mass of French on the crest above them. The
34th came up first and alone. < It was death to go on a.gainst
such a host, but it was the order, and we went on to destruction,
marching up a narrow path with men pumped out and breath-
less. We had no chance. The colonel, always a good mark,
being mounted and Coremost, was first knocked over, very
badly wounded. Seven more officers were wounded. We perse-
vered, pushed 011, made a footing, and kept our ground 1.' But
the French held the crest above, and the 84th was brought to a
, Bell's Iw«gh Notes, I. I). 103.
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complete standstill. The 39th then climbed up the slope, more
to the west, and made a similar unsuccessful push to reach the
sky-line. Meanwhile the 50th, coming from the other side
along the crest, attacked the French right, and drove in the
leading battalion on to the mass, but eould get no farther
forward, and finally fell back. The last episode of this struggle
was a third isolated attack-Prillgle had told Camcron to detach
the right wing of the 92nd from the Maya position, and to send
it on in support of the 50th. Just as the latter'recoiled, this
strong half-battalion-nearly 400 muskets-came on to the
ground on the crest, and at the same moment the 28th, the last
of Pringle's battalions to arrive from the valley, climbed the
slope and came up diagonally Oil the right of the 9211d com-
panies. Pringle himself aligned the two corps and led them
against the solid mass of French. This advance ended in a most
desperate fire-duel at a range of 120 yards, in which the French
had the morc casualties, but thc British line was in the cnd
shot to pieces. Observers from the 28th and Mth speak in the
most moving terms of the extraordinary steadiness of the !l2nd.
• They stood there like a stone wall, overmatched by twenty to
onc, until half their blue bonnets lay beside thosc brave high-
land soldiers. When tllCy retired their dead bodies lay as a
barrier to the advancing foe. 0 but they did fight well that
day! I can sec the line now of their dead and wounded stretched
upon the heather, as the living kept closing up to the centre 1.'
It was only when sixty per cent. of these stubborn soldiers had
fallen that the senior of the two surviving ofHeers with the wing
ordered the rcmnlllit to fa.1l back on the 50th, who had reformed
in their rear. The 28th, who had been engaged (oddly enough I)
with the Freneh 28th, across a dip on the south side of the crest,
were cut oU from the 92nd, and retreated downhill by the way
they had come, towards the village of Maya. So did the 34th,
which had been rallied some way down the slope, below the
point where they had made their unsuccessful attack, and had
been taking long shots' uphill against the French flank. ~ So
also did the 89th, or the greater part of it 2. The progress of
1 Bell, i. p. 104•
• All tliiij is most difficult to follow, our nUlllcrous sources contradicting
each other in matters of detail in the most puuling fashion. For this part
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these spent troops downhill was hastened by D'Erlon's detach-
ing two battalions to push them away. They lapsed out of the
battle, and retreated towards Maya village, leaving Cameron's
brigade alone to maintain the struggle upon the crest-three
battalions against three divisions, for Abbe's men were now
deploying behind Darmagnae's, and l\Iaransin's long-deferred
attack was just beginning to develop.
After the wasted remnant of the right wing of the 92nd had
recoiled, the French began to advance along the Cllemi1~ des
Allglais, pushing the beaten troops before them, but were soon
brought to a stand for a few minutes once more. For Cameron
had detached the right wing of the 7lst from the Mayo. position
to follow np the right wing ofthc 92nd-thc system of dribbling
in small reinforcements was practised all day-leaving only the
two left wings of those regiments to hold the pass against
Maransin, who was still an impending danger only. The newly
arrived half-battalion, drawn up across the path, delivered n.
very telling salvo against the front immediately opposed to
them-the enemy was now in a mixed mass with no trace of
formation, acting like a dense swarm of t·irailleurs-and brought
it to a stop for a moment. But the French, holding back in the
centre, spread out on the wings, and hegan to envelop both
flanks of the 7lst companies, who had to retire perforce-losing
heavily, though not as the 02nd had suffered half an hour
before.1
of the nnrnltive I IHlve used, bc6ide the dispatch of \Yillialll SLcwart, the
books of Moyle Sherer of the 34th, who commanded the Arctcsquc picquct
and wns taken prisoner-Sir George Bell of the same regiment, Cadell of
the 28th, Hope and Sergeant Robemon of the 92mJ, l'nttecsou of the 50th,
the two anonymous diarists' J. So' and the' Scottish Soldier' ofthellst,
beside!! D'Erlon'g and DarilluglU~c'8 origillaI dislmtehcs, lent me by
Mr. I~ortcseue. I take it that eaeh authority may be followed for the
doings of his own oorpB, but is of inferior weight for th06C of other units.
Pnttcrsoll says tllnt the a.Uh wus ut oue time in close touch with the 50th,
Cadell that the 28th and 020d worked together, while Hope says that the
28th was only sren by the 1J2nd right wing lLfler it Ill~d endCl:I its terrible
llrst entry into the fight. l)attcrson says that be saw O'Callaghan of the
30th fighting along with tIle 50th in the third episode of the oomb~t, when,
aeeording to other SOUft'Cs. that regiment Imd already retreated south
tOIVard the valley with the 34th. StcIVart's dispatch only speaks of the 28th
and 34th retiring in tha.t direction, not thc MOth. A conrllsed fight has
left confused memories. 1 cannot. be sure of nil the d(,1.uil~.
, The statement in Napier and succeeding writei'll that the wounded 01
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There was now no chance whatever of checking D'Erlon,
since the only British troops not yet engaged, the left wings of
the 7lst and lJ2nd. were at last feeling the commencement of
Maransin's attack, and there were no reinforcements ~et visible.
Just at this moment, it was perhaps 2 p.m. l , the long-lost
William Stewart at last appeared upon the scene and ussumed
command. The noise of the guns had reached him in the distant
AIduidcs, and drawn him back to his own business, which he
found in a most deplorable conditioll. A glance round the
field showed him that he must give up any hope of holding the
Maya pass, and that his only chance was to fight Ho detaining
battle across the high road, in the hope of receiving help from
the 7th Division, to whom Pringlc had already scnt urgent
demands for succour.
He accordingly issued orders for the two intact half·battalions
on the crest to fall back, and take up a new position below it ;
while the weary troops from the old front took shelter and
re·formed behind them. Darmagnac's regiments were as much
fought out as their opponent.<;, and did not press. l'iIaransin,
who had brought up his troops in two columns, one on the road,
the other up a ravine to his right, on seeing the way left open
to him, did not hurry on, but began to deploy his battalions in
succession 3S they filed up to the saddle of the col. Henee there
was a distinct break in the action-half an hour or even more.
No disaster was suffered by Cameron's brigade-the only
unfortWlatc incident of the moment of recoil being that the
four Portuguese guns were lost. Two had been man·handled
with much toil up a rocky slope, from which it was impossible
to get them down in a hurry. After firing a round or two of
case at the enemy's approaching skirmishers, their gunners
the right wing of the 02nd fonned a bank behind which the French
advance hultcd, and !Stood to receive the fire or the lert wing of that Sllmc
oorpa, whose bullets hit many of its comradcs, comcs from thc narrative
of Norton of the 34th (Napier, V. appendix, p.442), wllo was some way ofi'.
That the troops which came up were the right wing 716t, and not the leR
wing 112nd, SCCIlUl to me I)rovoo by the nllJJlltive of Hope of the l)211d, who
distinctly says that the right wing were relieved by the 71st, and that the
left wing were still bolding the Maya position and under Stewart, who bad
just lloJrivcd, lllong with the left wing of the 715t (MililanJ Memoirs, p. 210).
I Hc himself in hia dispatch only says that it was after 1 p.m.
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pushed them over into a ravine and made orf 1. The other two
were taken while on the move. Wellington attributed the loss
of these four guns, which he much resented (for his army never
lost another ficld gun in action during the whole war), to Stewart,
who had, on his arrival, countermanded an order of Pringle's
which had directed all earlier retreat for them.
The fourth episode of the combat of Mays, though it included
much bloody and obstinate fighting, was not such a desperate
business as the long scrambling fight along the Chemin des
Aflglais. D'Erlon halted Darmagnac's troops, who naturally had
to re·form, for they were in complete disorder, and bad suffered
most severely. He now used l\faransin's division as his striking
force, and when he had got it all deployed attacked Stewart':;
new position. Abbe's division was brought up to act in support.
It was probably well past 3 o'clock when the new fighting began:
the delay had enabled Stewart to rearrange a fightirig line-the
left wings of the 7lst and !l2nd were drown up on each side of
the chaussee, flanked on their left by a company of the latter
regiment on a precipitous knoll, wherc Camcron had placed
thcm before the action began. This company was afterwards
reinforced by another from the 82nd, when that regiment eame
up z. About three hundred yards behind, the right wing of the
715t and the 50th, now rallied, made a second line. When
Maransin developed his attack, the front line delivered its fire,
and fell baek in an orderly fashion behind tJle supports, where
it re·fonned across thc road. The second line repeated this
Illauceuvre. The half-mile of ground given up in these alternate
ret.reats ineluded thc camping lines of the 71st and !l2nd, where
the rows of tents not only broke the enemy's formation, but
tempted individuals aside for loot. 'They were plundering on
I Tul/oh (oomrnumJing 2nd divi~ion batteries) to Dicksoll, ill DkkllOll
Papers, p. 1022. Wellington's een~ure of Stewart may !Je found in Du·
PtlIc/m, x., p. !i88, (lnd his reply to the latter's self·defence in xi. p. 107.
The details lire hard to follow: Wellington suys that J'ringle ordered the guns
to be taken off by the road to Maya-that Stewart directed that they were
to go back, nnd look to 'the rnOUlltuln roud to glizolldo' l~ thdr IJropcr
line of retreat. When it became nCCC8sary for them to retire at all costs,
that ro.'ld was already in the hands of the French. Hut r do \lot know
precisely what Wellington rneunt by the mountnil\-roud to Elizondo. Does
it mean the tra.ck by which the 28th and 34th had retired '!
1 Sec Stewnrt's Report to Hill, Derueta, July 26.
Tt,
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all hands, cutting down the tents, strewing about the officers'
linen, and tearing open their portmanteaux, many of which
contained a company's month's pay. while wc were obliged to
stand at a distance, and view the work oC dcstructioll 1.'
The afternoon was drawing on-it was 4.30 or later before
Maransin's line rc-formed and again advanced: Stewa-rt's front
line again retired, but when the enemy followed it he was
surprised to be met by (L counter-attack. Stewart hnd just
received his first reinforcements-a WC!l.k battalion of the 820d,
the nearest troops of the nh Division, which had long been
watching the fight from afar on the Alcorrunz peak, and had
just received their divisional general's permission to CQme in,
These new-cometS, joining the reserve line, met the Icadillg
Frcnch battalions with a brisk offensive, which drove them in
on their supports. But numbers prevailed, and the fight began
once more to roll downhill. At tills moment atIairs looked
black-Stewart had just been wounded in the leg, but still
retained the command-he was a splendid fighting man if a
careless and tiresome subordinate. Thinking the position hope-
less, and a final retreat necessary, he sent messages to the out-
lying companies of the 82nd and 92nd on the knoll to the left,
who wcre now quite cut off from the rest of the force, to save
themselves by striking across the hills. They h.'\d been isolated
for two hours, had used up all their cartridges, and were
defending themselvcs by the primitive mcthod of pelting the
enemy below with whinstoncs, whieh lay thick on the hillside 2.
But before the messenger, who had to take a vast detour,
could rcach this dcspcrate little party, the last episode of the
combat of 1\laya had begun. It was l\ suflicientJy surprising
end to the day. At about 6 o'clock thcre arrived, marehiJlg
hard along the mountain road which continues the Chemin des
Al1glais wcstward, two battalions under General Darnes from
the 2nd Brigade of the 7th Division 3, which J~ord Dalhousie
had sent rTom Echalar on getting the appeal for help. These
two units-the 1/6th and Bnmswiek-Oels-were only 1,500
, Robertson, pp. 100-10.
• Stcwurt's disput.ch says thut it was the 8211d wIJo fought with stones.
• This was not the brigade to whieh the 82nd belonged, but the reserve
brigade of the 7th Division, short of OtiC of its tlnits, the 3rd })rovisional.
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bayonets, and had done nine miles at a hot pace. But they
were fresh troops, and led by a very thunderbolt of war-Barnes
was the brigadier who a few days later made what Wellington
decla.red to be the most gallant charge that he had seen,
a charge that drew notes of admiration from the most reticent
of pens 1. They came in diagonally from nn unexpected
side road, unseen by the enemy till the moment of contact,
and crashed in upon the leading French battalion 'with such
an impetus that it was trampled down-losing 15 officers in
a minute. The whole of the rest of the British troops present
cheered, and advanced in the wake of Barnes's men--even the
poor wreck of the right wing of the 92nd, headed by its onc
surviving piper. A cowlter·attack on troops who have already
done much, and are taken by surprise in what seems the
moment of success, is often astoundingly effective-as the war
of1914-18 has showed. In this case the result was surprising:
Marrmsin's leading brigade fell back in disorder on his supports,
the latter gave way also, and the whole mass retired uphill, as
far as the camping-ground of Cameron's regiments at the head
of the pass. D'Erlon, wrongly believing that the whole
7th Division had arrived en masse, threw a brigade of Abbe's
division across the crest of the col, behind which the beaten
troops took shelter. He expected to end the day with a defen-
sive action, and even reealled a brigade of Darmagnae's troops,
who had been sent down towards the village of l\Iaya, in pursuit
of Pringle's brigade, and who had just got engaged ncar it with
Ashworth's Portuguese, then retiring by order from the pass
or Ispcgui.
But Stewart would have been mud to press on with six
battalions-three of them mere remnants-against eighteen,
and halted on the summit, content to have blocked the pass,
though the enemy had possession of it, and of ground in front
of it on which he stood deployed. The fIring continued for a
time, and thcn died down as the dusk came on. By 8 o'clock
all was ovcr--if D'Erlon had frankly put in Abbe's strong
division of ten battalions, it is clear that he might yet have
turned the fortune of the day. But he did not: hypnotized
by the idea that he had the whole of the 2nd and 7th Divisions
• Cf. Dispokhu, x. pp. 697-8.
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in front of him, instead of a. mere fragment of each. The battle
was well over when General Hill arrived from the Alduides,
bringing with him unlucky news-he had intercepted and read,
at Elizondo, Cole'sdispatch to FIend-quarters saying that he had
been attacked at Uoncesvo.Ilcs by 85,000 men, and that he was
giving up the pass. Wherefore Hill resolved that he also must
retire, and ordered the weary troops of Stewart and Barnes to
retreat after midnight to Elizondo and cross the upper Bidassoa.
It is scarcely credible that the men who bad fought for ten
hours under such conditions on such rough ground, retained
strength to move another furlong-but the order was obeyed,
though many badly wounded men had to be abandoned, and
though the chaussee was strewn for miles by dead-beat stragglers,
who dropped out and slept till daylight. They were not dis-
turbcd~for D'Erlon made no move till the sun was well up-
he had won the pass and was expecting to have to fight again
at dawn, for the right to emerge from it.
'I'he losses in a fight so honourable to the British battalions,
if so discreditable to British gencxalship, had been immense in
Cnmeron's brigade, heavy in Pringle's, appreciable among
Barnes's men, who only struck ill at the eleventh hour. The
first-named had lost 800 men out of 1,900 present, of whom
843 belonged to the gallant and unlucky 1/92nd. Pringlc's
three battalions had 530 ca~ualties out of 2,000 present, includ-
ing 140 unwoUJlded prisoners taken on the Gorospil knoll from
its light companies. Dames and the 7th Division troops had
won 0. glorious success with 0. loss of only 140 men. The total
list gives just under 1,500 casualties out of 0,000 men engaged-
of whom 349 were prisoners (200 of them wounded). These are
very dificrent figures from the 8,500 total at which D'Edon
stated Stewart's loss~but sufficiently distressing. The enemy
had suffered still more, but from infUlitcly greater nwnbers-
their commander report<.-'(} 1,400 casualties in Darmagntl.c's
division out of 7,000 present, 600 in Maransin's. Abbe was
barely engaged at the eleventh hour: one of his brigadiers
(Rignoux) was hit and only four other officers, with perhaps
lOO men. The ootal reported is therefore about 2,100-no very
formidable proportion out of 20,000 men present. But some
battalions had been badly cut up-the 103rd of Maransin's
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division. which bore the first fury of Dames's attack, had
15 officers killed and wowlded out of 20 present; and the 28th
of Darmagnac's division lost a similar number in sustaining
the attack of the right wing oC the 1/02nd and the British 28th.
Dut this was a two-battalion regiment with 40 officers present.
Nevertheless, D'Erlon's report to Soult sings victory in very
modest terms-be has cnptured the enemy's position and holds
it at the end of the day-the affair had been onc of the most
desperate that he has ever seen-the enemy's loss has been far
grealcr than his own-but there is no blowing of trumpels.
SECTION XXXVIII: CHAl"l'ER IV
SORAUREN. JULY 26--28
THE first dny's fighting in the Pyrcncllll passes could not be
called satisfactory either to Wellington or to Soult. The former
had lost both the defiles in which he had intended to make his
first stand, and had lost them in a very tiresome fashion-he
thought that Maya might have been held at least for twenty·four
hours, if there lmd been a divisional general on the spot to direct
the defence: while Ronccsvallcs had not been forced, but
abandoned by Cole, who could certainly have made a longer
resistance, if only the orders sent to him had been obeyed. It
wa..c;, above all things, necessary to gain time for the concentra-
tion of the army. and a precious day had been Jost--and need
not have been lost.
But Soult can have been no better pleased: time, to him
also, meant everything; amI the orders which he had issucU to
h.is lieutcnants had presupposcd an easy triumph by surprise
in the early morning, with a forward march in the aftcrnoon.
Instead of this he had won by nightfall a bare foothold on the
summit of each p..'\ss, after much fighting of an unsatisfactory
sort. Hc, too, had lost a day; and it was only on the morrow
that he discovered that both at l'tlaya and at llollcesvnlles the
enemy had slipped away in the dal'k, lcaving to him the power
to dcbouch from the dcillcs.
Nevertheless, the Marshal sent on the morning of the 26t~ a
very flamboyant message of victory to his master the Emperor,
who then lay at Mayenee. Both l\faya and lloneesvallcs had
been forced, D'Erlon bad captured five guns and many hundreds
of prisoners at thc fanner pass: he himself hoped to be at
Pampeluna, and to have raised its siege, by the 27th. These
news were sent on from Bayonne by scmaphore to llaris and
the Rhinc, and reached Napoleon on August Ist. At the same
time, and by the same rapid method of transmission, arrj\"ed
General Rey's report of his successful repulse of the assault oC
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July 25th. It is worth while to turn away from solid history
for a moment, in order to sce how the Imperial editor of the
Moniteur utilized this useful material for propaganda. He first
wrote to Clarke the Minister of War: • We can now give the
public some account of affairs in Spain. The Vittoria business
and the King must not be mentioned. Thc first note which
you must put in the lI10niteur should run as follows-" His
l\fajesty has named thc Duke of Dalmatia as his lieutenant-
general commanding his armies in Spain. The Marshal took
up the command on July 12, and made immediate dispositions
for marching against the besiegers of Pampeluna and St. Sebas-
tian." After tlmt put in General Rey's first letter about the
cvents of the 25th-27th. You had bcttcr make some small
additions to the number of prisoncrs and of guns captured, not
for French consumption but to influence European opinion.
As I am printing Ceneral Rey's dispatch in the Frankforl
Journal, and have made somc changes of this sort in it, I send
you a corrected copy so that it may appear in thc Moniteur in
identical terms.'
The Emperor's second letter to his Foreign Minister, the Duke
of Bassano, scnt from Dresden three days later, is even more
amusing. < You had better circulate the news that in conse-
quence of Marsha.l Soult's victory over the English on July 25,
the siege of St. Sebastian ha.s been raised, and 30 siege-guns
and 200 waggons taken. The blockade of Pampeluna was raised
on the 27th: General llilJ, who was in command at that siege,
could not carry oU his wounded, and wo..<; obliged to burn part
of his baggage. Twelve siege-guns (24-pounders) were captured
there. Send this to Prague, Leipzig, and Frankfort 1.'
This' intelligent nnticipation of the future,' for utili7.:\tion in
the armistice-negotiations going on with Austria, could not
have been bettered. Unfortunately there arrived next day
another semaphore message from Soult of the night of the
26th-27th. The Emperor has to warn Cnulaineourt that
yesterday's propaganda will not stand criticism. 'I have
just got another "telegraphic dispatch" sent on by the
• 'Lettrcs de l'Empcrcur Napoleon non illsl!r~ dans la CQ'fTtspondance,
I)ubliees parX. Partl> and Nallcy, 1009,' page :1. It is omusing to find out
what Napoleon III omitted of his uncle's letters.
642 SORAUREN [JULY 2~
Empress from l\layence, giving another communication from
Soult, written 24 hours after the last, in which he said he would
be at Pampeluna on the 27th. The enemy lost many men and
seven guns. But nothing decisive seems to have happened.
I am impatient for morc news, in order to be able to understand
in detail Soult's dispositions, and to form from them a gencm!
ideo. of the situation 1,'
Alas for human ingenuity! Soult's next dispntch, of July 29,
was not to be of the sort that craved for publicity in the
Moniteur, even with the most judicious editing.
But to return from Dresden to Biscay, and from the head-
quarters of the Emperor to those of the' Sepay General' whom
he had at last begun to recognize as capable of' des projcts tres
senses.'
If only Wellington had been at his head-quarters at Lesaca
at 11 o'clock on thc morning of July 25th, and ifWilliam Stewart
had been on the spot at Maya, and had sent early news of
D'Erlon's attack, many things might have happencd differently.
Wellington would have had a long afternoon before him to
concert operations, and would have possessed information to
guide him in drawing up his scheme. Unfortunately hc was
absent-as we have seen-and only received at 6 o'clock a
second-hand report from Lord Dalhousic at Echalar. to the
effect that fighting was going on at l\Iaya, with the unfortunate
addition that D'Erlon had been repulsed-o. most inaccurate
summary of what had happened_ Later on in the evening, not
before 10 p.m., came Cole's first dispatch from Uoncesvallcs,
to say that he and Byng wcre heavily engaged at 1 o'clock with
a large French force, and were holding their own. On these
scanty data Wellington felt that no conclusions could be drawn
-he wrote to Graham that there must be a great mass of
French troops not yet discovered, which would come into
action on some other point on the 26th, and that his policy
would depend on where that force appeared-he could only
account for 30,000 of Soult's mcn so far. lIe did not commit
himself to any definite guess as to the undiscovered part of
the Marshal's plan, but fTOm his other cmrespondence it is clear
that he suspected an attempt to relieve St. Sebastian by an
• 'Lettres de l'Empereur Napolroll non illsl:rees dam! III CDTusporlfmnce,'
p. 18.
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attack on the lower Bidassoa-a very possibl~ solution of the
problem, but not the correct one 1,
Awaiting further developments, Wellington issued no morc
orders on the night of the 25th, save one to the Conde de Abispal,
directing him to send one of his two infantry divisions from in
front of Painpeluna to join PictOll Md Cole, and to keep
the fortress blockaded by the other. The force thus taken
away would be replaced by Cados de Espafw's division, which
was marching up from Burgos, and due to arrive on the 26th.
[0 this dispatch Wellington asked the Conde to direct Mina to
send up his infantry from Saragossa, and told him that he was
intending to order to the front the British heavy rovalry
brigades, now cuntoned along the Ebro. No other movements
were settled that night; but Wellington was aware that during
his abscnce his Quartcrmaster-General, Gcorgc Murray, had
directed Lord Dalhousie to have the 7th Division massed at
Echalar, prepared to move at an hour's notice, and Charles
Alten at Vera to have the Light Division got into a similar
readiness, Either would be able to march off at dawn.
Somewhere late in the night 2 Wellington received more news,
whtch made the situation clearer but more unsatisfactory, The
lrue story of the Mayo. fighting came in from two sourees: Hill
sent a dispatch dated from Elizondo at some hour after 6 p.m"
la say that OIl getting back from the Alduides he had found
Stewart unable to hold the Pass, and had bidden him to retire.
Stewart, who was wounded and unable to write. sent a verbal
message, whieh came in about the same time, reponing that
Hill had directed him to fall back on Eli7,ondo and Beruels.
'I'he oflicers who brought this information stated tlwt the li'rench
were in great forcc, and that the 2nd Division had been much
cut up, No more reports arrived from eole, so that the result
of the Rom:csval!cs fighting remained unknown.
I Wellington's letter lo Grnhnm, giving the fnllle report that D'Erlon
had been repulsed at Mayn, is dated at 10 p.m. The letter to O'Donnell
mllllt be n little later, nil it repeats this error, but adds that a note has
come in from Cole, suying t1U\t he WClli heavily engaged lit noon, JX&.
patchu, x. pp. 5G6--7•
• The dispatch giving this informntion (Dispalches, x, p. 570) is wrongly
dated in tbc Wellington corl'('llponl!cllCC, It shoultl1Jc .July 26th tit 411,111.
Tbe hour of the ~pt of HiD's and Stewart'lI rcport/l ill not given.
644 SORAUREN [JULY 26
Mter what must have been a very short and disturbed night's
rest, Wellington was in the saddle by 4 a.m. on the 26th, and
preparing to ride up the Bastan to visit Hill, and to ascertain
the exact meSSure oC the mishap at l\faya. Before departing
from Lcsaca he gave his first definite orders in view of the
events of the previous day 1. Maya being lost, the nh. Division
must fall back from Echalar to SumbiUa, on the road to San-
tcsteban: the Light Division must retire from Vera to the
west hank of the Bidassoa. and be ready to march either
towards Yanzi or towards Santestcban, as might be necessary.
Longa's Cantabrians were to block the hill road from the Bidassoa
to Oya..rzun. Graham was told to hurry on the embarkation
of the siege-train from St. Sebastian. Hill was to hold on as
long as he could to the position at Irurita, in order to keep touch
with the 6th Division, which was directed to feel towards him,
and to be ready to join him if necessary_ It was to push two
of its three brigades to Legasa, on the road from Santesteban
along the upper Didassoa, which would bring them within
eight miles of Hill's proposed line of defence at Irurita. The
third brigade of the Gth Division was to stand fast at Santeste-
ban, where it would be in touch with Dalhousie, when the latter
should have reached SumbiIla.
All these orders, as is obvious, are concerned only witp. the
measures necessary to stop D'Erlon's advance. None of them
have tilly reference to the action of the other French force at
Roneesvalles. Till news should come up from Cole and Pieton,
it was impossible to realize what was going on at that front, or
whether the enemy was making his main attaek in that direc-
tion. There might be still (as Wellington had guessed three
days back) a violent demonstration towards Pampeluna,
intended to distract a real attempt to relieve St. Sebastian.
And this state of ignorance with regard to the southern
theatre of operations was destined to last till late in the after-
noon. Either Cole and Pieton themselves, or the officers to
whom they entrusted their dispatches, were sadly lacking in
a sense of the value of the prompt delivery of news. Wellington
rode along the Bidassoa for many a mile, till he came on Hill
still holding the position of Irurita, and entirely unmolest.cO
I All in Supplementary DispakMs, viii. pp. 120-1.
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by thc French. Thcre wcre now in Iinc the sadly reduced
remnant of thc,British brigades which had fought at Maya, and
da Costa's and Ashworth's Portuguese, with the three 7th-
Division battalions which had saved Stewart from disastcr. The
total made up about 9,000 bayonets. Hill estimated! D'Erlon's
force at 14,000 men-a miscn1culation, for even after the losses
at Maya there were still 18,000 French in line. The immediate
result of the error, however, was beneficial rather than other-
wise, for Wellington considered that Hill was in no particular
danger, and let him stand, while he himself rode southward
towards the lofty Col de Vclate, to seek for intelligence from the
IJampcluna front in person, sincc his licutenants had vouch-
safed him none. He reached Almandoz, near the crest of the
Pass, in the afternoon, and resolved to establish his he.."d-
quarters there for the night, as it was conveniently central
between the two hnlvcs of-his army.
Soon after his arrival Wellington, being much vexed at
receiving no ncws whatevcr from the south, resolved to scnd
the 6th Division toward Pampeluna by the Col de Velate as
a matter of precaution-they were to march to Olague in the
valley of the Lanz. The 7th ;Division was to elose in, to take
up the ground where the GtiI had. been placed, and cover Hill's
left flank 2. That haste in these movements was not con-
sidered a primary necessity, is shown by the fact that Pack and
Dalhousie were told that they need not mareh till the morning
of the 27th. For the enemy's surprising quiesecncc at the head
of the Maya pass had reassured Wellington as to any danger on
this side. If D'Erlon, indeed, possessed no more than 14,000
men, Hill with the aid of the 7th Division could easily take
care of him. And the Light Division might still be left near
Lesaca, as a reserve for Graham in case any new mass of :Freneh
troops should take the offensive OIl thc Bidassoa.
D'Erlon's conduct on the morning of the 26th wus explicable
to himsclf, though incxplicable to his enemy. He had been
engaged in a most bitter fight, in which he had lost 2,000 men
, Hill to Murray, Suppremernary Disl/aidlis, viii. p. 121.
• The ordera to }'ack and Dalhousie lIlay lJc foulld ill Supplcmen/my
Dispakhu, xix. p. 258-11, dated from Ahnandoz-obviously before CoIc's
diBpawh had COllie lo lll.llld.
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and morc. Two British divisions, so he "'"rote to Soult, were
in front of him-the 2nd and the 7th. For he had taken Bames's
brigade for the whole of Dalhousic's unit-the ellcet of its
desperate charge almost justified him in the hypothesis. These
troops had been forced to a strategic retreat, but by no means
put out of action. They must have been joined, ere now, by
the Portuguese column which Darmagnac had sighted on its
approach to Ariscun. But there were also troops on his right,
of whom he must beware: he knew that Vera and Echalar had
been held in strength, and Graham might send reinforcements
in that direction, and assemble a heavy force on his flank.
Hence he resolved to discover how matters lay by reconnais·
sances, before committing himself to the march down into the
Bastan and then up the Col de Velate which his orders pre-
scribed .
• In my position on the pass of Maya,' he wrote, • 1 had on
my right all the forces which the enemy had in line as far as
St. Sebastian. I had to be prudcnt, in order, not to expose
myself to a check in the Bastan, in which the enemy was
holding the strongest position. I thcrefore dctennincd to
leave Abbe and ~Iaransin in the pass, with orders to send out
reconnaissances towards Santesteban, Echalill'. and Mount
Atehiola. They would profit by the halt to distribute the
hnlf-ration of food which had just come up from Ainhoue.
I sent Dannagnac down the road to Ariseun, with orders to
push a vanguard to Elizondo, and to explore towards the passes
of Ispcgui and Bcrderis, to sce if there were any hostile force
sliU on my left.'
An advance of six miles to Elizondo, and that by a mcre
advanced guard, was all the movement that D'Erlon made this
day. It was not till the afternoon that he learnt, by Abbe's
reconnaissances, that there were still allicd troops on his right
-apparently the Light Division opposite Vera, and the 7th
at Sumbilla--whiJe Darmagnae reported that the eastern
passes were clear, but that Hill was lying across the road beyond
Elizondo in great strength. In the evening D'Erlon heard that
Soult had forced the pass of Roncesvalles, and was about to
advance: this success, he deduced, would make thc cncmy in
front of him give way, in fear that his positions might be tukCil
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from behind. So he thought himself justified in ordering a
general advance for the morning of the 27th-though l\laransin
was still to remain for 0. day at Muya, lest uny allied force
might move up from the west against the pass. Thus it came
that for the whole of July 26th Hill was U1unolested, and Soult's
plan for a rapid concentration round Pampeluna became almost
impossible to carryout. Awhole day had been wasted by D'Erlon,
though he was not without his c."i:tenuo.ting circumstances.
Wellington meanwhile received at Almandoz, probably at
about 8 p.m., the longwexpccted news from the South. They
were, !IS we know, most unsatisfactory: Cole reported from
Linzoain, on the Roneesvalles-Pampcluna road, that he had
been driven out of the pass by an army of as,ooo men or more,
that he had not yet been joined by the 3rd Division, and was
still retreating towards Zubiri, where he understood that Picton
would meet him and take over the command. His view of the
situation was shown by a remark that if he had not been super-
scdC!l, and had been compelled to retreat past Pampelulla, he
supposed that the road towards Vittoria would have been the
right onc to take '. This most exasperating dispatch only
reaehed Wellington that night by mere chance. The officer
bearing it was going to Lesaca, having no knowledge that
Army Head·Quartcrs had left that place: at Lam: he happened
to meet the cavalry brigadier Long, whose squadrons were
keeping up the line of communication between thc two halves
of the Army. Hearing fTom the aide-dc-camp of the sort of
news tha.t the letter contained, Long opened it and made a copy
of it, whieh he sent to Sir Rowland Hill, before permitting the
bearer to go on. UilI received the transcript at Berueta at
6 p.m., and very wisely forwarded it to Wellington at Almanw
doz. The original was earried Oil by Cole's messenger to San-
testeban, and did not reach Wellington that night.
Thanks to Long's and Hill's intelligent action, the Com-
mander-ill-Chief eouJd grasp the whole unpleasant situation at
Bp,m. on the 26th. He sent orders to Picton at once, telling
him that the enemy must at all costs be dewined: that con-
I Thisletter ill S«pplcmetufJry DispaleMs, viii. pp.124-5, ill there wrollgly
dated July 27th (for 26th). Cole, of course, was no longer ut Linzoain on
the 27th.
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sidering the force at his disposal, he ought to be able to check
Soult for some time in front of Zubiri: that he would be joined
at once by onc of O'DOllllcll's divisions fro.m the Pampcluna
blockading force, and shortly by reinforcements coming from
the llastan (the 6th Division). Wellington himself was intend·
ing to ride over to the right wing by the next afternoon. Till
he should arrive, Picton must send reports every few hours 1,
Unfortunately, Cole and Picton had got things into an even
worse stnte than could have been expected. Just as Wellington
wns drafting these orders for an obstinate rearguard u.ction,
they were at 8.30 p.m. preparing to evacuate the Zubiri
position, and setting out 011 a night mnrch for Pampelunu 2.
To explain tillS move we must go hack to the state of affairs
at Uoneesvalles on the very foggy morning of July 26th. Cole,
Dyug, and Morillo had abandoned, as we have already seen 3,
their positipo on Altobiscar and the Linduz under cover of thc
night. and had all fallen into the Pampduna rood, Ross's
brigade desecnding from the hcights by the l\Icndichuri pass,
the othcr thrce brigadcs and l\Iorillo moving by the chaussce
past thc Abbey amI Burguetc. AWion's brigade formed the rear-
guard, not having been engaged on the previous day. Morillo's
outlying battalion at the Foundry of Orbaiceta safely joined in
by a hill path. Campbell's Portuguese retired by the way that
they had come, along the Path of Atalosti, but instead of
returning to the Alduides followed a mule track to Eugul ill
the upper valley of the Arga.
eole's long column, after completing its night march, took a
much-needed rest for Illany hours along the high road near
Viscarret. It saw nothing of the Freudl till the early afternoon,
when an exploring party of ehasseurs ran into the rearguard of
Anson's brigade.
'That had Soult becn doing betwccn curly dawn, whcn his
outposts a5ccrtained that there was no enemy in front of them,
and three o'clock in the afternoon, when his cavalry rediscovered
Cole? To our surprise wc fmd that he had been attempting to
repeat his error of the preceding day-that of sending a whole
, To Picton from AlmandO'f" Sr~ppletllcnlary Dispatchea, xiv. p. 259.
• l'Jcton to Murray, 8.30 p.m., Supplrolefitary Dispukhea, xviii. pp. 121-2.
• see above, p. 622.
1813] REILLE LOST IN THE FOG 649
army corps along a rugged mule track, similar to the one on
which Reille's column had been blocked by Ross's brigade.
His original order on the 25th had been that Reille, after seizing
the Linduz, should turn along the 'crest of the mountains',
occupy the Atalosti defile, and push ever westward till he could
threaten the Col de Velate, the main line of communication
between the two sections of Wellington's army. One would
have supposed that the events of the 25th on the Linduz,
wherc one British brigade had checked for a whole day Reille's
eolumn of 17,000 men in Indian file, would have taught him
the impracticability of such plans. But (as Soult's malevolent
critic, quoted already above, observed) when tbe Marshal had
oncc got his plan drawn up on paper it was like the laws of the
~fedes and Persians, and must not be altered 1.
While Clausel was directed to use the chausde and pursue
Cole along the Pampeluna road past RoneesvalIcs, Burgucte,
£lnd Espinal, Rcille was once more ordered 2 • to follow the
crest of thc mowltains to the right, and to try to take in the
rear the hoslile corps which has been holding the pass of Maya
against Count D'Erlon.' The itinerary seems insane: there
was a mule traek and no more, and Soult proposed to engage
upon it a column of 17,000 men, with a front of one file and a
dCllth of at least six miles, aHowing for the battalion- and
brigade-intervals. '1'he crest was not a flat plateau, but an
interminable series of ups and downs, often steep and stony,
occasionally wooded. Campbell's brigade had traversed part
of it all thc 25th, but to move a bri!:,rade on a fine day is a
differcnt thing from moving an army corps in a fog.
Rcille obeyed orders, though the fog was lying as densely
upon the mountains as on the preceding night. Apparently
Soult had supposed that it would lift at dawn-but it did not
till mid-day. Lamartiniere's division was left to guard the
Linduz and the debauch of the Atll.losti path: Foy's, followed
by Maucune's, tried to keep to the crest, with the most absurd
results. It was supposed to be guided by French-Basque
peasants (smugglers, no doubt) who were reputed to know the
ground. After going no more than a mile or two in the fog,
• Sec above, p. 591.
• These are his OWlI words, ill his Hcport of August 2.
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the guides. at a. confusion of tracks in the middle of 8 wood,
came to a standstill, and talked volubly to Foy in unintelligible
Basque. Whether they had lost their way, or were giving
advice, the General could not quite discover. In despair he
allowed the leading battalion to take the most obvious track.
They had got completely off the Atalosti path, and after two
miles of down-hill marching found themselves on the chaussee
not fsr from Espinal, with the rear of Clausel's corps defil_
ing past them 1. It would still have been possible to stop
the column, for only onc brigade had reached the foot of the
mountain, and Maucune and Lamartiniere were still on the
crest. But Reille took upon himself the responsibility of over·
riding his commander's impracticnble directions. and ordered
Foy to go on, and the rest to follow, and to fall in to the rear
of ClauseJ's impedimcnta. • 11 est fort dangereux dans les
hautes montagncs de s'engnger sans guides et en brouillard,'
as he very truly observed. Justifying himself in a letter of
that night to Soult, he wrote that if it were absolutely neces·
SQry to get on the crest-path again, it could be done by turning
up the Arga valley at Zubiri, and following it to Eugui, from
which there were tracks both to the Col de Velate and to
Irurita.2
Thus ended Soult's impracticable scheme for seizing the Col
de Velate by marching three divisions along a precipitous mule
track. Even if there had been no fog, it is hard to believe that
anything could have come of it, as Campbe1l's Portuguese
would have been found at Eugui well on in the day, and after
Reille's column would have been much fatigucd. Any show of
resistance, even by one brigade, would have checked Foy, and
compelled Rcille to deploy-an interminable affair, as the fight
on the Linduz upon the preceding afternoon had sufficiently
demonstrated. But to try this manITuvre in a dense fog was
insane, and Reille was quit~ right to throw it up.
The whole interest, therefore, of the French operation on
July 26th turns on the doing of Clausel's column. It advanced
very cautiously down the slopes to the Abbey of Uonces·,rallcs,
discovering no trace of the enemy save a few abandoned
, l"oy to Rcille. July 26.
I neille to Soult, July 27.
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wounded. Having reached the upland valley of Burgucte,
Clausel sent out cavalry patrols, and found, after much searching
in the fog, that Cole had gone off with his whole force towards
Espinal. His rearguard was discovered bivouacking along the
road beyond that village. When it sighted the French it
retired towards Viscarret. Clousel then ordered his infantry to
pursue, but they werc far to the rear and it was onlyabout8 p.m.
when Taupin's division came into touch with thc light com-
panies of Anson's brigade, just as they were falling back on the
whole 4th Division, drawn up in a favourable position on
heights behind the Erro river, near the village of Lin7.oain.
The day had at last become clear and fine. The 31st Uger,
leading the French column, exchanged a lively fusillade with
the light companies, while a squadron of chasseurs tried a charge
on their' flank. But both were driven off, and Clausel halted
when he saw Colc waiting for him in order of battle. It was
not till he had brought up and deployed two divisions that hc
ventured to press the Allied front, and nothing serious happened
till after 4 o'clock.
Meanwhile Picton had come up from the rear, ana joined
Cole at Linzoain: the head of his troops had reached Zubiri
only three miles behind. The arrival of the truculent general,
looking even more eccentric than usual, for he was wearing 0.
tall round civilian hat above n. blue undress frock-coat, and was
using a furled wnbrella by way of riding whip, was takc!). by
the 4th-Division soldiers as It. sign of battle 1. 'Here comcs old
Tommy: now, boys, make up your minds for a fight' passed
down the ranks 2. But, oddly enough, this was about the only
day in Sir Thomas's military career when he did not take a fair
risk. He certainly came up in a bellicose mood, for he ordered
Ross's brigade to be ready to move forward when the 3rd
Division should have come up to support it. But after riding
to the front, and holding 0. long talk with Cole, he agreed with
the latter that it would be dangerous to fight on ground which
could be tumed on both flanks, \\ith an enemy who was known
l The tall hat is vouched for by Georgc L'Estrllngc of the 31st, ami
WlIehho);,; from Hoss's brigade, the furled umbrella by Bainbrigge of the
20th, all eye-witnesses, whOlle narratives are among the few detailed
IlClXlUDts or this retteat.
• Word! overheard by Bainbrigge in his own company.
UU2
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to have 85,000 men in hand. Only part of the French were up-
Reille's divisions after their stroll in the fog were far to the rear
behind Clausel-so it would be possible to hold on till night,
and slip away in the dark. Picton wrote to Wellington to
report his decision, and does not seem in his dispatch to have
realized in the least that he was contravening the whole spirit
of his commander's instructions of July 2ard with reference to
the • stopping of the enemy's progress wwards Pampclw18 ill
the event of the passes being given up I.' He merely stated
that he had received these instructions too late to make it
possible for him to reach Roncesvalles, or to join Cole before the
latter had evacuated his positions 2. /is there was no favourable
ground between the Eno river and the immediate vicinity of
Pampeluna, on which a smaller force could make an effectual
stand against a much larger one, he had determined to retire
at once, and proposed to • take up a position at as short a dis-
tance as practicable from Pampeluna '-by which he meant
the heights of San Cristobal, only two or three miles out from
that fortress. He wns thus intending to give up without furlher
fighting ten miles of most difficult hilly country, where the
enemy could be checked for 0. time at every successive ridge-
though, no doubt, all the positions could be turned one after
the other by long flank detours. But the net result was that
Picton gave 50ult a clear road on the 27th, and allowed him to
arrivc in front of Pampeluno. on that day, whereas the least
show of resistance between Zubiri and the debauch into the
plains at Huarte, ~ould have forced the French to deploy and
waste time, and they could not have reached the open country
till the 28th. This is sufficiently proved by the extreme diffi-
culty which Soult found in conducting his maroh, even when he
was not opposed.
• See QUllrt.ermHster-Gcnerlll to Pieton, enclOlling letter for Cole, sent
off from Lcsaen on July 23 (SlIpplcmenulry lJispalchel1, viii. pp. U2-13),
whieh must have reached Picton at Olague on the 24th.
2 TlllIllleemsll. more controvertible plea. Orders went out from Lcsncn on
lhe 23rd, and must have rellehecl Picton not very lute ill lhe day on the
24th. Supposing he had marched from Olugue on the afternoon orthe 24th,
he would have been at Zubiri (only 6 miles off) on that same night, or even
at ViscsTret, And from Zubiri to Roncesvalles is not an e.xcessive day's
march for the 25tll, cspt:ciully whell firing WU.'; to be hcurd ut the front.
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So determined was Picton not to fight on the Erro river, or on
the Arga, that he did not bring up his: own division from Zubiri,
but let it stand, only three miles behind the line 011 which Cole
kept up a mild detaining action during the late R.fternoon hours
of the 26th. Soult attacked with great caution, and more by
way of flank. movements than by frontal pressure. By evening
Cole had drawn back onc mile, and had 168 casunJ.ties, all but
four of them in Anson's brigade I. Those of the French can
hardly have becn more numerous: they seem aU to havc been
in Taupin's division 2.
On the afternoon of the 26th Pieton had nearly 19,000 men
at his disposition 3, Soult had somewhat less, since ReWe's
column was so far to the rear that it could not get up before
dark. 'I'here was no wonder, thereforc, thAt the enemy made
no resolute attack; and it ean only be said that the Marshal
was acting very wisely, for the French force on the ground was
not sufficient to movc the opposing body, until Rcillc should
have eome up; and Cole and Pieton had resolved not to give
way before dark. But when thc fires of the French, shining for
many miles on each side of the rood, showed that they had
settled down for the night. ·Cole drew off his division, and
retired on Zubiri, where he passed through Picton's troops, who
were to take over the rearguard duty, as they were fresh and
well rested. Campbell's Portuguese dropped into the line of
march from Eugui, by orders issued to them that afternoon,
and by 11 p.m. the whole corps was in march for Pampeluua.
Its departure had passed wholly U1Ulotiecd by the enemy. Mean-
while, 'Wellington's aide-de-camp, riding through the uight from
Almandoz," with orders to Picton to maintain the ground which
he was abandoning, can only have met the column when it was
drawing near its destination.
, The remnining four were in the CnlfRllor bnttalion ofStubbs's Portuguese
brigade.
• Unfortunately 0.11 French 1065e8 are given en blac for the six days
July 21lo Augll.':lt 1, nnd thc cUl/unlties of encla duy cunnot be discntunglcd.
Tbe cllIllllllties or MayI' and Roncesvalles can be ascertained, but not those
of the subsequent days.
• Viz. about 6,000 or Colt's division, J),OOO or his own, 1,700 of Hyng's
IJrigade, 2,500 of Cnmpbell's })ortuguese at Eugui, only n rew miles awny,
and IlOtlIcthing under 4,000 of Morillo's Spaniards.
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It was quite early in the morning, though the sun was well up.
when the hend of the retreating column reached the village of
Znbnldicn. where the valley of the Argll begins to open out into
the plain of Pampeluna, between the last Oankinp heights which
constrict it. In front was the very ill-chosen position which
Pieton intended to hold, along a line of hills which arc quite
separate from the main block of the mountains, and stretch
isolated in the lowland for some five miles north-west and south-
east. These arc the hill of Huarte on the right, parted from the
mountains by the valley of the Egues river; the hill of San
Migucl in the centre, on the other side of the high road and of
the Arga river, and on the left the very long ridge of San Crista·
ba1, separated from San Migucl by the U1zama river, which
flows all along its front.
Now these hills are strong posts in themselves, each with a
good glacis of slope in its front; the gaps between them are
stopped by the large villages of Villaba and Huarte, both
susceptible of obstinate defence; and the two flanking hills are
covered in front by river-beds-though fordable ones. But
they are far too close to Pampe1una, which is but one single mile
from San Cristobal: the guns of the fortress actually com-
manded at a range of only 1,200 yards, the sole road of com·
munication along the rear of the position. Cassan's gnrrison of
3,000 men was not large enough to furnish men for any large
sortie--though he made CL vigorous sally against O'Donnell's
blockading division on the 27th, and destroyed some of its
trenches 1. Dut no army should fight with a hostile fortress less
than two miles in its rear, and commanding its line of retreat;
it is surprising that such an old soldier as Picton chose this
ground-presumably he was sedueed by the fine position for
both infantry and guns which it shows looking towards the
enemy's road of arrival.
Apparently Cole had a better eye for ground than Picton, for
as they were riding together between Zabaldica and Hunrte, he
pointed out to his senior the advantage that would be gained
by throwing forward the left wing of the army to a position
much more remote from Pampcluna, the hill of Oricrun or
Sorauren, whieh faces the San Cristobal ridge from the other
• See Belmu, Iv. p. 803.
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side of the UIzama river I. This height is the last roll of the
mountains, but almost separated from their main massif: it is
only joined to the next summit by a high col at its right centre.
For the rest of its length it is separated from its neighbour-
height by II well-marked ravine. Its flanks are guarded by the
beds of the Arga to the right and the Ulzama to the left. It is
well under two miles long, about 1,000 feet high, and cxcept at
the Col has a vcry formidable front of steep slopes, covered with
gorse and scattered bushes. The ....·hole formed a strong and
self-contained position. whose weak point was that it was
rather too much in advance of the Huarte-San ltIiguel heights,
which trend away southward, so that when the army was
drawn out its right was much' refused,' and its left very much
thrown forward. It was also inconvcnient that the access to
thc crest from the rcar was bad, a steep climb by sheep-tracks
from Oricain or Arre, up which all food or munitions would have
to be brought. From the north there was a slightly better path
to the summit froD) Sorauren, leading up to the small pilgrimage
chapel of San Salvador on the left end of the crest. But this
would be of more use to the assailants than to the defenders of
the heights. Between the Col and the river Arga, and close
above the village of Zabaldica, there was a spur or under-
feature of the main position, whieh formed a sort of outwork
or flank protection to it. At the moment when the retreating
army was passing on towards Huartc, this spur was being held
by two Spanish battalions, part of the division whieh O'Donnell,
by Wellington's orders, had detached to reinforce Picton. It
, Nllpier says (v. p. 225), and all subsequent historians have followed him,
that Pielon originally intended to place Cole on a line between Oricaill lmd
Arlctll, i. e. 011 the low back·slope of the ridge. This seems to me almost
incredible, as this ground is all running downhill, completely oommnnclcd
by the mueh loftier crests nOOut the Col. Surcly no onc, according to
the tactical ideas of 1813, would take up a defensive position half-way
down n slope whose summit is abandoned to the en'emy. I can find no
authority save Napier (who was not in the battlc) for tillS curious state-
ment. And I am justified, I think, ill holding that the San l\tiguel hill
was the place where Pieton intended to plllee Cole, by the Ilntlnti\'e mul
sketch-map of Wachholz of Ross's brigade, who places the llnt position
of ·the 4th Division on a well·marked hill immediately to the right of
VilLaba, and close to the ard Division's gTOuml at Huarte. This mW/I
mean San Miguel.
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was perhaps the sight of this small force in a very good position
which suggested to Colc that the right policy was to prolong
his line in C<lntinuation of it, across the Col and as far as the
chapel ahove Sorauren.
Having ~lIowcd Cole to take up his new advanced position,
PictoD drew out the STd Division on the hill to the right of
Bunrte, with its flank eastwards covered by four brigades of
cavalry, which had come up by Wellington's orders from their
cantonments on the Ebro I, Morillo's Spaniards continued the
line westward along the Cerra de San l\Ugucl, as far as Villaba :
from thence the San Cristobal ridge was occupied by the
greater part of the division which O'DonnclI had drawn from
the blockading lines-all, in fact, save the two battalions in
advance on the hill by Zabaldica. Later in the day two bat-
talions more were added from the besieging force, for Carlos
de Espaf1a's division from Castile had arrived, and reJieved part
of the troops which had hitherto been observing Pampeluno.
Dyng's brigade was told off to support the 4th Division, and
took post on the renr of the summit orthe Oricnin hill, halrn mile
behind Cole. 1.'he actual fighting line on the left wns composed
of Anson's brigade on the Col, next to the SpanilU'ds on the
lower spur, of Campbell's Portuguese upon thc central stretch
of the heights (except onc battalion which was sent to support
the Spaniards below) 2, and of Ross's brigade holding the left.
Stubbs's Portuguese were in rear of Campbcll's, except the 7th
Ca'radorcs, which was detached to the front and held the ground
about the chapel of San Salvador. The divisional battery
(Sympher's of the K.G.L.) was placed far down the right side
of the hill, below and behind Dyug's brigade, in a position from
which it could sweep the high road from Zabaldiea to Arlcta.
eole's tactical dispositions were in the complete Wellingtonian
style, with the light companies and e~adores thrown out somc
way down the slope, far in advance of the main force, whose
battalions were drawn back well behind the sky-line, so as to
be invisible till the last moment to enemies storming the hill.
Soult followed up the retreating Allies at such a slow pace that
• R. Hill's, Ponsonby's, the Hu~sar brigade, nnd D'Urbfln's Porluguese,
Falle's brigmle, whieh WU/l observing 011 the side of Aragon, did not arrive
this day. • One or the 4th Line.
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the whole of Picton's troops were settling into their gt'ound
before the enemy came in sight 1.
The slow advance of the F'rcnch was due to the accumulation
of such a large force in a narrow valley provided with only one
road. The Marshal made an attempt to relieve the congestion,
~y ordering that the chausste should be lcft to Clausel and to
the cavalry and impedimenta in his rear, while Reille's divisions
should move on the east oonk of the Arga by local paths between
the villages. The excellent intention of securing room for both
columns to move freely had no good result. Clause! arrived in
front of Zabaldiea by () a.m.2 But Ueille was nowhere in sight.
His report fully cxplains his absence: hc had obcyed orders
by turning up into the hills a mile and a half beyond ~he village
of Erro. • This direction rendered the march of the three
divisions extremely slow and difficult. They found no road,
and had to tramp through brushwood, elimb steep slopes, or to
follow tracks obliterated by recent rain. At last Count Reille
took the decision to abandon the high ground. The 1st
Division (Foy) dropped down to the village of Alzuza on the
e.'{trcme left. The 7th Division (Maueunc) rc-descended into
the vallcy of the Arga, 11 little above Iroz, whcre it bivouacked.
The 9th Division (Lamartiniere) also eame down into the valley
opposite Larrasoana, and kept along the high road to Iroz,'
where it fell in with the rear of Clausel's column late in the day.
The only result of Soult's precaution had been to put Reille out
of the game on the 27th, just as on the 26th.
For the whole of the morning hours, therefore, Soult had only
Clause!'s corps at his disposition, n fnet which accounts for the
unenterprising eharnetcr of his action. But that the 27th was
a very slack day on the French side was not Clausel's fault.
On arriving at Zabaldiea, and discovering that the heights ot
Orieain were held in strength, he did not wait for the Marshal's
orders, but began to form a line of battle parallel to Cole's
front, along the mountain opposite. Halting Conronx's division
on the high road in face of the hill held by the Spaniards, he
pushed Taupin's and Vandermnesen's divisions up the slopes,
l Reille's report of August ht.
• Clausel in his report says that he arrived in time to see the 4th Divillion
el'OS!l the hill or Orieain.
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with cavalry detachments feeling the way in front of them, till
they had lined the whole ridge, and their right was overlooking
Sorauren and the volley of the Ulzama. He then sent down to
a.~k the Marshal's leave to attack, saying that he could see from
the summit behind his line large baggage trains moving away
along the Vittoria road in the plain of llampe!una, and bodies
of troops in motion northward "-the enemy was about to raise
the siege, and was only offering a rearguard action in order kl
cover the retreat of his impedimenta.. If pressed he would give
way at oncc 2.
Soult did not believe this, and very rightly; but being pressed
by repeated messagcs he mounted up to the heights behind
Clauscl's front at ll's.m.: if he had chanced to notice it, he
was just in time to see a solitary horseman ride up the north-
western slope of the hill of Orieain, and to hear the whole of
the Allied troops aligned opposite him burst out into a storm of
tempestuous cheering. Wellington had come upon the ground.
Soult heard the noise, but (as his dispatches show) did not
guess its precise cause. He thought that reinforcements had
just come up for Cole.
The story of Wellington's eventful ride from Almandoz to
Sorauren is a very interesting one. Mueh irritated at receiving
no further news from Picton, he had mounted at sunrise and
riddenovertheCol de Velate, takingwith him onl)' GeorgeMurray,
his Quartermaster-General, his Military Secretary Fitzroy
Somerset, and three or four other officers: the bulk of the head·
quarters staff was to follow at leisure. On arriving at Lanz, the
first village on the south side of the pass, they heard rumours of
Picton's continued retreat, though they do not seem to have
met the aide-de·camp whom he had sent oU on the preceding
night to report it. This news was so unexpected and vexatious
that Wellington halted for a moment, to send back orders to
Hill to the effect that it was conceivable that affairs might go
badly on the Pampeluna front. If so, the whole right or
I Pe~haps Carlos de Espa.f!.o's division, nrriving (rom the south.
• All this (rom the very intel'C!lting narrative of Clausel'! aide-de-camp
Lemonniet Delnfosse (p. 220), who bore the first message to Soult, and Wll!I
(like his chief) lIIuch irriluted by tile Marshal's caution and re(u:;n! to
commit himseU. Clausel had got a completely erroneous notion ot the
enellly's intentions-like Ne)' tit Dussneo.
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SQuthern wing of the army might have to swing back to the
line Yrurzon-'l'olosa. and Hill would have to direct his own two
divisions, and also Dalhousie. and Pack, with all the artillery
and baggage. to fall back westward on Lizaso and Lceumberri,
instead of coming over the Col de Vclatc towards Pampcluna.
The Light Division. too. might have to leave the neighbourhood
of the Rastan. and to retire to Zubieta on the Oyarzun-Lecum-
berri road, in order to keep up t;he touch between the main
anny and Graham's force in front of St. Sebastian. .'I'he latter
general. however. was not to move. unless mutters went very
badly indeed. as the blockade of St. Sebustian must be kept
up till the last possible minute. But previous orders were to
stand, unless and until the Commander-in-Chief should send
'new ones: in particular Pack and the 6th Division were
expected at Olague. and the batteries of Silveira's division and
the Light Division might come on to Lnnz, as there was an
artillery road from Olague by whieh they might be turned orf
eastward if it became necessary 1.
On getting five miles farther down the road. Wellington
halted for another moment at Olague. to leave word that the
6th Division 2. when it arrived. was to hold that place till
further ~otiee, and especially to look out for a possible move-
ment of the French across the hills from Eugui, which must be
blocked at all costs. Pack must turn all wheeled transport,
batteries, con....oys. &c.• arriving from the Col de Velate off the
high road to Pampeiuna, and send them westward by the side
rood 0Iaguc-Li7ASo. at which last-named village everything
must wait for further orders. The closest and most frequent
communication must be kept up with Hill's corps, which would
be wanting to use this same road. Finally. Pack. after resting
his division and giving it its noonday meal. must be ready to
march again at a moment's notice in the afternoon 3.
, Quartermaster-General to Sir R. Hill, Supplemtfltary Dispatches, viii.
pp. 259-00,
• Wellington to Pack, Supp/emtfltary DiIIpatches, viii. p. 122, wrongly
duted 1 o'clock-It should be 10 o'clock. Wellington was nt Soraurcn
by 11.
I Fionl destillntion not given-clearly it might iJc down the high-lOud
to Pampcluna ; but if Picton hnd retrented still further and raised the s;e~,
i~ migh~ be to L;7.as<J, to join Hill nnd the rest.
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Three miles farther dOV;"ll the Toad, at Ostiz, Wellington found
waiting for him Genera,! Long, with some of the squadrons of
his Light Dragoons, who were dispersed all along the lines of
eommunicntion, keeping touch with all divisions. Long gave
the alarming infonuation that Pielon had abandoned the
Linzoain and Zubiri positions during the previous night, and
was now in the immediate neighbourhood of Pampcluna, where
he was intending to fight on the San Cristobal heights. The
French were known to be in pursuit, and a collision might occur
at allY moment-indeed might have occurred already, but 110
ftring had yet been heard.
Ostiz is only fOUT miles from Sorauren and six from ViIlaba;
there was probably time to reach the fighting ground before an
action might commence. Wellington directed his Quarter.
ma.<;ter-Geneml to stop behind, and make preparations for
turning all troops orr the Lanz valley road on to the Lizasoroad.
if he should receive further orders in the next hour--everything
depended on what was going on six miles away. He thcn went
off at racing speed dO'\\'n the C1UJfLSSee. gradually dropping
behind him all his staff except Fitl'.roy Somerset-their horses
could not keep up with his thoroughbred. Turning the corner
half a mile from Somuren, he suddenly came on the whole
panorama of battle. Cole's line was visible on the right·hand
heights stretching away from thc Chapel of San Salvador to
the Col above Zabaldica. On the opposite mountain Taupin's
and Vandcrmaescn's divisions were moving along the crest
towards Sorauren and thc Ulzama valley: cavalry vcdctlcs
wcre pushing ahead of them all over the slopes, looking for
paths or British outposts. They were only a mile away at most.
There was just time, and no more, to join Cole and take over
the direction of affairs. Wellington put on full speed till he
reached Sorauren bridge, and then (with his usual cool-blooded
calculation of risks and moments) dismounted, and wrote a
short order to Murray in pencil, using the cap-stone of the bridge
end as his table. While he was writing the thirteen hurried lincs,
he was much distracted by well-intentioned peasants. wllO
flocked around him with shouts that the French were eOJ;11ing
down into the other cnd of the village. But the dispatch reads
clearly enough. Murray is informed that the high road is
1813J WELLINGTON'S JUDE TO SOHAUREN 661
blocked by the presence of the French at Somuren ; all troops,
thercfore, must turn off on to the side-road Olague-Lizaso, both
Pack and the artillery, and also Hill's corps. The latter must
march at once from the Bastan, and get across the Col de Velate
by nightfall if it could, leaving a rearguard to hold the pass
against any possible pursuit by D'Erlon. The 7th Division
near Santesteban should also come across by the Puerto de
Arroiz to Lizoso. Orders tor the further movements of all
troops would be sent to Lizaso as soon as possible 1.
Fitzroy Somerset dashed out of the village at its northcrn
end with thc completed dispatch, just as the French ehosseurs
eame exploring into its other end. Hc was not sccn, or at least
not pursued, and Murray received the orders, which made
Lizaso the concentration point of all thc central divisions of
the army in half an hour, and set to work to amplify them and
to forward them to their destinations. As Wellington very
truly observed, several hours were gained by sending back
Somerset by the straight road, and in particular the 6th Division
was able to reach Lizaso by dark, and to get a good rest for the
march of the next day to the battle-field 2.
I Wellington described his ride to Larpcnt, his Judge.Advocate General.
a week later, ill the foUowing terse language (Larpent, p. 242): • At one
timc it WU8 rather uhmning, cerluinly. IIl1d a close rUIl thing. When I
came to the bridge of SoraUl'Cn I saw French on the hills on' one side, and
it was clellr thnt we could mnke n stand on the other hill. in our pooition
of the 28th. but J found that we could 1I0t keep Sorolurcu, I1S it was exposed
to their fire and 1I0t to ours. I was obliged to write my orders accordingly
lit Soraureu, to IJc ~cnt buck ill~talltly, For if thcy hoo not u..'Cn dispatched
back directly. by the way I had come, I must have sent thcm four leagues
round, a quarter of an hour la1er. I stopped therefore to write accordingly.
people 6IIying to me ull the time, .. The Freneh ure oollliug!" "The
French arc coming!" I looked pretty sharp after them every now and
then, till I hnd completed my ordcrs, nnd thcn set off. J saw thcm just
IlCllr the onc clld of the village as J went out of it at UIC other cnd. And
then we took up our ground.' Wellington then added. in a confidential
moment, that there need have been no fUli6 or lrouble. if ollly Cvlc had kept
sending the proper information 011 the 26th and 27th. Ifonly his intention
of SQing right back to Pampclulla had been known earlier, the 6th and 7th
Dh'i~ions could ]1(n'C bccn lip on thc 27th, IIlId Hill's corps too. which Imd
been kept at Irurita and Bcrueta for 36 hOUrs, because thc situation in the
south was concealed by Cole's reticence. • We should have stopped the
French much sooner.'
• French critics expressed surprise that Wellington did not tell J'ack
to fall 011 ClaUliel'tJ [Jank and rear. But the 6tb Division, attacking from
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Meanwhile, Wellington, now all alone, rode up the steep
track which rises from Sornuren to the pilgrimage-chapel on
the height above, and was presently among the skirmishing line
of O'Toole's Ca~adores. who were holding that corner of the
front. His familiar but unobtrusive silhoucttc--thc short
frock-coat, smaU plumeless cocked hat fitting down tight over
the great Roman nose, and wiry thoroughbred-was at once
recognized-the Portuguese set up the cry of < Douro,' with
which they were wont to greet him-recalling th~ first victory
in which English and Portuguese co-operated, and also
his first title of nobility: the noise swelled into the hoarse
cheers of the Dritish soldier as it passed up the line towards the
Col. The 4th Division, which had been grumbling bitterly since
it had been on the retreat, suddenly felt the atmosphere change.
• I never CUll forget the joy whieh beamed in every countenance
when his Lordship's presenee became known. It diffused a
feeling of con6dencc throughout all mnks. No more dispiriting
murmurs on the awkwardness of our situation: now we began
to talk of driving the French over the frontier as a matter of
~ursc 1,' Wellington halted in front of Ross's brigade, and
for a long time studied the French movements through a tele·
scope. He casily made out Soult himself, who was conferring
with Clause! and other sta((·officers in a conspicuous group.
Napier says that he observed that the Marshal would have
heard the cheering, and would try to make out what it was
about, before taking any serious step: • that will give time for
the 6th Divi.sion to arrive, and I shall beat him.' There is no
corroboration for this story, though it may be true: Napier
was in England on July 28th, and speaks only from hearsay.
But an eye-witness present on the spot says that General Rass,
as his chief continued to focus the French staff, ventured the
remark.that ' this time Soult certainly meditates an attack,' to
whieh Wellington, with the glass still to his eye, replied, • It
is just probable that I shall attack him 2. And this thought
Olllgne, would hove been out or wueh with the relit or the nnny, and
Wellington did not believe in attllCks by iBolated corp!! ullcombincd wilh
the main army, and ullable to communicate wit.h it. Sce Dumas' Campll~
du ltlllrklllll SO/All, p. H;3.
, BU;llurigge's llarmtive ill Smytll's Hiatory Ilf /M. XXt.h, p. 306.
• Ibid. Bainbrigge was standing close to both.
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seems to be corroborated by a remark which Wellington made
six days after to Judge !.arpent, to the effeet that he should and
could have done more on the 27th 1. The French army was
but half arrived-only Clausc1's three divisions were up, and
Reille was at Il a.m. still miles away. The enemy was tempting
Providence by marching across the Allied front, just as Marmont
bad done at Salamanca a year before.
Whether Soult was stopped from an early attack, by guessing
that the cheers on Cole's front implied the arrival of Wellington,
seems more than doubtful. There is, of course, no trnce of such
an idea in the French dispatchcs~naturallyit would not have
been mentioned. But the onc personal narrative which we
have from a member of the group of Soult's staff-officers whom
Wellington was eyeing, is to the etfect that Clausel was at the
moment trying to persuade the Marshal to attack at once,
though only half his force was 'up, that Soult utterly refused
to do so, spread out his maps, and finally took his lunch and a
nap after it. < Clausel meanwhile leaning against an oak was
literally beating his forehead with rage, muttering" Who could
go to sleep at such a moment" 2,'
What is certain is that Soult's dispatch to Paris says that he
had discovered that Wellington had arrived in tile afternoon,
whieh would seem 19 show that he did not kilow by personal
observation that lie had come up at Il a.m. Hc says, also, that
at the moment of his own arrival the Allies had 30,000 men, in
line, including all the blockading troops from Pampeluna, which
rendered it necessary to make a thorough examination of their
position, and to get up all the divisions 3. To discover the exact
ground on which the enemy intended to fight, it proved neces-
sary to make demonstrations or partial attacks.
Two of these were cxecuted: the spur held by the two
Spanish bat.talions, above Zabaldicll, was so close in to t.he
French position, that it was thought worth while to make an
attempt to occupy it. A regiment of Conroux's division was
sent up from the village to storm it, but was handsomely
repulsed, when near the top of the slope, by a charge in line of
• Larpent, p. 2-103•
• Lcmonnier-Och.rOl>Se, p. 210.
I Soult to Clarkc, July 28.
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these corps (Principe and Pravia of O'Donnell's Andalusian
Rescnre). Clausel's report says that his men' took the hill
but could not keep it,' but many Dritish eye-witnesses on the
slope above say that the summit was never reached. Clause!
estimates the loss of his regiment at 100 men, Soult gives the
more liberal estimate of 200. The repulse showed plainly
enough that the whole hill of Oricain was to form part of the
Allie~' position, and that they intended to fight for every inch
of it.
Late in the afternoon Soult directed Foy, who had now
reached Al7.Uza on the extreme French left, to demonstrate
against the heights of Hunrre, so as to discover the end of the
British linc, and the strength in which it was held. Foy sent
forward two regiments in column down the slope toward the
Egnes river, while showing the rest of his troops on the hill
behind. When the French got within cannon shot, Pieton
brought up the whole ani Division to the crest, and R. Hill's
and Ponsonby's hcavy eavalry showed themselves in front of
the viUah'"C of Gorraiz, covering his flank. Thc divisional battery
fired a few rounds at the columns, which at once swerved and
retired in haste. Foy could report that the Huarte heights were
held in strength, and by all arms.
This was the last incident of the day-shortly afterwards a
heavy thunderstorm swept down from the Pyrenees, darkened
the twilight, and drenched both armies. The same thing had
happened on the eve of Salamanca-and was to happen again
on the eve of Waterloo.
l~ar more important than the trifling skirmishes of the
afternoon were the arrangements for the morrow-orders and
dispatches, which the rival commanders were evolving during
the evening hours. Soult felt himself still blocked in the valley
of the Arga and wanted to deploy-was it possible to get his
long column of guns and cavolry out of the defile-and if so,
how? Was there n possibility of extending to the left beyond
Foy's present position, or to the right beyond Sorauren, the
limit of Clausel's occupation? Or must the Orieaill heights be
captured at all costs before the army could get into a proper
order of battle? Could any immediate help be expected from
D'Erlon, whose tiresome letter of the 26th had come to hand,
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showing that he was no further forward than Elizondo on that
night? He WlLS not doing his best to occupy the cnemy in his
front, and there was a danger that Hill might arrivc at Soraurcn
long before the corps that had been set the task of occupying
his attcntion.
Thcre would appear to have been something like a council of
war at the French head-quarters in the evening, in which
Clausel, Rcillc, Cazan, the Chief of the Staff, and probably
otller officers took part. Clauscl wished to extend the line
northward up the valley of the Ulzama, and to turn the flank
of the whole Oricain position. The objection to this was that
the transport and.guns could not follow over the mule-tracks
which must be used; they were blocked in the Arga valley as
long as the Allies held the heights commanding the main road.
Moreover, reports had come in that British troops were descend-
ing on to SorQUrCll by the Lanz valley road, who would -takc
in flank any attempt .of Clause! to turn the Oricain position.
(This seems to refer to the arrival of the 6th Division at Olague,
but Long's cavalry was also visible up the chaussu.) And an
extension of the French right to the heights westward would
make the whole line of battle very long and weak: how could
Rcille's three divisions take over the whole ground from
Soraurcn to Alzuza? After much discussion Soult decided in
favour of a concentric attack on the whole Oricain position by
five of rus six divisions, while only Foy should remain out on
the left, observing and containing the British {orce on the
Huarte hills. Clausel's three divisions should attack Cole's line
from Sorauren to the Col, two of Reille's divisions should
co-operate, by assailing the Col and the Spaniards' Hill south of
it. Some guns should be got to the front if possible, and Foy
should be lent some eBvalry, who must climb over the hills to
cover his flank. Details would have to be settled on the
morrow, also the transference of troops, who eould not move in
•the da;rk over steep and unknown ground. Yet there was an
uneasy feeling that too much timc had been lost already-Soult
notes H rumour that Wellington had announced the approach
of four more British divisions. Even the arrival of D'Erlon
CQuld not compensate for this, and it did not look as if D'Erlon
was likely to appear early on the 28th.
35(1.6 X X
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'Wellington moved the troops who were on the ground very
little that evening--only relieving the Portuguese battalion
which was in reserve on the hill above Zabaldica by a nritish
regiment of Ansou's hl'igadc--thc 40th Foot-and sending two
of O'Donncll's battalions to Ollocarizqucta, to watch the moun-
tain road west of Soraurcll, by which it was conceivable that
Clausel might try to tum the hill of Oricain. He had got news
that French troops had been seen beyond Sorauren, and did not
want to have them prying too close behind this flank, or observ-
ing the paths by which he intended to bring up his reserves on
that side.
For his main attention that afternoon was devoted to drawing
up the orders for the divisions ooming from the Bastan, which
he had promised to send to l\1urray, in the note that Fitzroy
Somerset bore from the bridge of Sorauren. At 4 o'clock he
sent off the all-important dispatch 1. It will be remembered
that his last orders provided Ior the succcssive arrival at Lizaso
of the 6th and 7th Divisions, of thc whole corps of Hill, and of the
artillery, and divisional baggage trains of all the'troops.
Pack was to start from Lizaso at dawn, and to movc as
rapidly as possible along the country road by Marcalain to
OJIocarizqu~ta, whieh goes along the back of the hills that form
the right bank of the valley of the Ulzama. At the last·named
village (which he would find held by two Spanish battalions) he
would be only five miles from Cole's flank, and in a. position
to strengthen or cover it. A supplementary note 2 warned Pack
that if any French were found anywhere on the way he must
not let himself be turned all; even if it came to leaving the
road and taking to mountain tracks, the 6th Division 1/tust
arrive at its destination. The artillery and the reserve of
infantry ammunition were to follow Pack, unless serious opposi-
tion were offered to him, in which case they must return to
Lil'.tlso, and from thence turn on to Yrurzun.
Dalhollsie ulnd Hill had already had orders to march on
Liznso, the one by the Puerto de Arraiz, the other by the VelfLte.
Doth had a long march, but Wellington hoped that they might
reach Lizaso during the night of the 27th-28th. If the men
• SUppferni!7WlNJ DUipak:/.u, viii. p.123.
• Ibid., p. 124.
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were not over-fatigued, all three divisions should follow Pack
to Olloearizqueta, after being given a suitable time of rest. All
impedimenta likely to hinder rapid marching, and the wounded
from the Maya fight, were to be directed from Lizaso to Yrurzun.
Murray had already, acting on the orders of the Sorauren Bridge
dispatch of 11 a.m., sent the route for Lizaso to Hill and Dal-
housie, adding some preenutions of his own, to the effect thnt
they should leave small rcarguards at the passes, to detnin
D'Erlon if he should come up. Moreover, he had spread out
the 1st Hussars of the K.G.L. along the roads, to keep up touch
between all the divisions on the move, and also between Li7.3s0
and the Light Division, now at Zubieta. The oniy addition
made by Wellington's new orders was the all-important one
that everything of the fighting sort that came to Lizaso was to
Illareh for the main army, but all baggage for Yrurzun.
Of the arrangements thus made, that for Pack worked per-
fectly-he was at Ollocarizqueta with the 6th Division before
10 a.m. on the morning of the 28th. But Hill and Dalhousie
were detained in the passes by the storm of the evening of the
27th, and only reached Lizaso so late on the 28th that they were
of no use in the fighting of that day. As Wellington observed
to Larpent 1, they could both hnve got into the battle of
Sorauren if they had been given So longer march on the 26th, but
ignorance of Cole's and Pieton's retreat had prevented him from
starting them early enough. However, the 6t.h Division alone
suffieed to settle the matter.
The morning of the 28th was fine and bright-the storm of
the preceding night seemed to have cleared the clouds from the
hills, and the eye could range freely over a very wide landscape.
Not only was the battle front of each army visible to the other,
but from the high crest on or behind each position, a good deal
could be mooe out of what was going on in the rear. This was
more thc case with the French line than with the British:
Wellington's usual plan of kceping his main force behind the
sky-line had great efficacy on such lofty ground as tha.t of t.he
heights of Orieain.
Soult spent thc long hours of the July morning in moving his
troops to the positions which had been selected on the previous
, Sce above, p. 6(1}.
xx,
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night. Conroux's division, abandoning Zahaldica, marched over
the hills in the rear of Clausel's other di visions, and occupied
Sorauren village-relieving there some of Taupin\i battalions,
which shifted a little to their left. To replace Couroux at
7.abaldica Lamartinierc came up from Iroz, and deployed onc
brigade (Gauthier's) in frontof theSpaniards' Hill, while the other
(l'ilenne's) remained in reserve beside the Arga, with two regi-
ments across the high road and the third on the slopes east of
the river. Maucune's division, starting up the slopes from the
rear of Iroz, took post on the heights immediately opposite t.he
Col, with jts right touching the left of Vandcrma.escn. Two
regiments were in front line exactly in face of the Col, a third
somewhat farther to the left, keeping touch with Lamartinierc's
brigade ncar Zabaldica. The other brigade (1\1ontfort's) was
placed in reserve farther up the mountain I. Pierre Soult's
light cavalry regiments disentangled themselves from the long
cavalry and artillery column in the rear, and picked their way
up the heights southward till they reached Foy's position, from
which they extended themselves to the left, till they reached as
far as the village of Elcano. Four howitzers were chosen out
of the batteries in the rear, and brought forward to the front of
Zabaldica, a position in which it was hoped that their high-
trajectory fire might reach effectively the Allies on the Col and
the Spanish Hill. These were the only French cnunon used that
day, except some mule-guns employed by Clausel on the side of
Sorauren.
The greater pnrt of these movements were perfectly visible
to Wellington, though someof them were intermittentlyscreened
from sight when the marching columns dipped into dead ground,
or were passing through thickets. They took up so many hours
that hc wrote to Graham at 10.80 that it looked as if Soult was
not inclined to attack. Meanwhile, thc only Britil>h force on
the move was the 6th Division, which bad been marching since
daylight, and arrived about 10 a.m. at Ollocarizqueta. On
getting news of its presence, Wellington ordered it to move by
a country road which comes across a crack in the hills west of
the Ulzama not far from the village of Oricain, and after
reaching that river to keep its Portugucse brigade on the
1 Reports of Maucuoe and Lamartioiere dated August 3rd and 4th.
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western bank, its two British brigades on the eastern, and so
to advance till it should arrive facing Soraurcn, prolonging
Cole's left in the lower ground, and covering him from any
attempt to turn his flank. About noon Pack's leading troops
began to appear-these were Madden's Portuguese on the left
of the division, working along the hillside west of the Ulzamo..
Now the 'zero' hour for the general attack on the whole
Allied front had been fixed by Soult for 1 o'clock, but long before
that hour Clausc1 was informed by an exploring officer, whom
he had sent to the hills on the other side of the U1'1.ama, beyond
his right, that a heavy Dritish column was visible coming from
the direction of Marcalain, obviously to join the British left 1.
Now the French generol had been thinking of turning Cale's
flank on this side, and bad actually got troops some little way
up the Ulzama valley beyond Soraurcn. But hearing of Pack's
approach and of his strength, he determined that he must now
turn his attention to fending off this move against his 0'1.-0
flank, and that the effort would absorb no small portion of his
troops. Conroux's division had been originally intended for
the attack of the north-west corner of the Orieain heights, to
the right (French) of the chapel, while Taupin was to make the
chapel itself his objective; Vandcrmacsen was to strike at the
centre of Cole's position, and l\Iaucune to attack the Col. But
Clausel determined that, in order to make thc general frontal
attack feasible, he must at once stop the forward march of
Pack, and keep him at a distance, while the other divisions
made their great stroke. Accordingly he called in his right wing
detachments, and having concentrated Conroux's strong divi-
sion (7,000 bayonets) he ordered it, at 12.80, to deploy aeross
the valley of the Ulzama below Sorauren llnd advance in two
lines of brigades against the approaching British column. This
movement-probably a nccessary one-brought on the first
clash of battle, half an hour before the appointed time for the
general movement. Clausel at the same moment sent word to
the other divisions to attack at once; but they were not quite
ready, the fixed hour not having yet been reached.
But Conroux pushed up the valley farther than was prudent,
for when he was some half a mile beyond Soraurcll, he found
, Clause!'a report of August 2.
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himself encompassed on three sides-Madden's Portuguese
pushing forward along the hill on the other side of the river,
turned in on his right flank, some of Ross's skirmishers on the
slopes west of the chapel of San Salvo.dor came down and began
to fire upon his left flank, while the main body of the Gth Dh'j-
sion-Stirling's brigade deployed in front line, Lambert's
supporting in (.'Olumn-mct him face to face in the low b'l'Ound.
The concentric fire was too heavy to be stood, and Conroux had
to give back, fighting fiercely, till he had the support of the
village of Somuren at his back: there the battle fltood still, for
Pack had orders to cover Cole's flank, not to attack the enemy'sl,
Meanwhile, the general frontal attack was being delivered by
the other l<rench divisions, starting from the right, as cach got
forward on receiving Clausel's orders to antieipate the fixed
hour and advance at oncc. Hcncc the assault was made in
echelon of briJ:,rades from the right, Taupin's two brigades being a
little ahead of Vandermaesen's, and Vandermaescn's perceptibly
earlier on the hill than the brigade of Maucune which attacked
at the Col. The separate assault by Lamartinicre on the"
Spaniards' Hill is definitely stated by that general to have been
I There is a most curious and diDlcult point in this history of the first
phase of the action. Clausel says, and he is of course a primary authority,
that though CollroUX ....us already deeply engaged with the Gth Division,
• was being fired on from all aides, was suffering severe losses, and had
already had one of his brigadiers disabled' [Sehwitter], he told him that
he must join in the at-tuck' swerving to the left 110 Ill> 10 mount the hill in
the directioo originally assigned to him', which was done and Conroux
immediately repulsed. I eannot see how this was physically possible.
How could Conroux, if n1rendy disadvllntageously engub-ed with the
6th Division, and' flred at from all sides', break off tills light llnd attack
any point of the hill of Oricain? It he had gone away in that direction,
who was tMr~ to hold SmauTll1I against Pw:k's JHlOpk. woo mer~ J/ffJlsins ill
Oil it, and (as ClallMl say!J) only a 1IIUlJkt:l-slwt (mJuy from it? All far sa
I can make out, Conroux must have been 8uffieiently employed in fending
off Pack and maintaining Sorauren, IlO as to cover the "ank of the other
diviliious, for the next hour or two. No other nuthority but Clausel gl\'O'
any hint that Conroux got a .....ay from l'ack and joined in the general
assault. And I am constrained to think that Clausel (strange lIS it Play
seem) ill mnking n misstolement---nnd that when Conroux is said to ha\'e
bcCII ordered to utluck the hill by IIwcrving to the left, he cun only hll.\"c
been keeping oft Pack. I note that Vidal de la Dlache and Mr. Fortescue
try to aceept C1ausel's story. but that General llcatson (Witll Wellington
in tile P1JTetletll.11Jl. 170-2) ignores it.
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;
made at 12 o'c1oek--earlier, apparently, than the others-but
he is contmdicted by Reille, in command qn this front, who says
that it started vera U'1l.e heure. This is much more likely to he
correct.
The assault Oil the hill of Oricain bears a remarkablc likencss
to the battle of llussaco, both being attacks by a series of
brigade columns on a steep hill, with every disadvantage except
numbers to the assailant. Colc's position was singularly like
that of Picton in the battle of 1810, the main differences being
that the hillside was 1I0t quite so steep or quite so high, and was
strewn with clumps of brushwood in its lower slopes, while the
Bussaco ground only shows heather and a little gorse. At the
Portuguese fight the defenders of the hill had some help from
artillery-at the Navarrese fight none. On the other hand, Cole
had a shorter line to defend, and more men to hold it. Reynier
attacked with 18,000 infuntry-Clausel with 20,OOo-including
in each case unengagcd reserve brigades. Pieton held the slopes
of San Antonio de Cantaro with 6,800 men-Cole had about
11,000 at Orieain-the proportional difference therefore between
the attacking and the defending force was much the same 1. By
an odd chance no less than four French regiments climbed both
these deadly hills (17th Leger, 31st Uger, 47th and 70th Line);
but the only officer who has left us his narrative of both fights
does not chance to have compared them, though he was a com-
petent observcr and a Huent writcr 2. Nonc of Cole's regimcnts,
011 thc other hand, had becn cllg-agcd at Bussaeo, though eight
of them wcre present on that field in unattackcd sectors of
Wellington's line.
The direction of the attack of the six French brigades which
mounted the hill of Oricain was such that in their first advance
Taupin's right brigade (Leeamus) attacked Ross j his left
brigade (Bechaud) came in where Ross's and Campbcll's lines
met: both Vandermaesen's were opposed to Campbell's centre
and right; .Maucune's front brigade tackled Anson at the Col,
I I include, in reckoning Picton's force at Dussaeo. his own division and
thc three battalions of Leith's first brigade which brought him help. In
C<Jle's Oricuin llgurcs arc reckoned thc 4th Division. llyllg's brigade,
Campbell's Portuguese, nnd two Spanish regimcnts.
I Lemonnier-I:>elnfol>SC of the 31st Uger_
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and Gauthicr of Lamartiniere's division assailed the 40th and
the Spaniards on the slopes above Zabaldica. The six brigades
made 15,000 bayonets in all-the rcar brigades of ~rallcuneand
Larnartinicre not being counted, for they never closed. Conroux
was paired DU against Pack in the low ground, fighting against
numbers not much inferior to his own.
Lccamus's brigade, starting from a short distance south of
Somurcll, madc for the north-west corner of the hcighLs,-its
four battalion columns screened by their eight cQmpagnu8
d'tlite in a dense swarm I, much thicker than the usual French
skirmishing line. This column, the first up the hill, pUllhcd
before it the light companies of the British 20th and 23rd, and
the 7th Portuguese Ca~adorcs, llond won its way nearly to the
crest, when it was charged by Ross with the whole Fusilier
Brigade and thrown violently down hill. It was not pursued
far, and ultimately rallied, but was for some time out of action.
The Fusiliers had hardly ·resumed their former position and
reformed, when the second Freneh column eame up the hill
a little way to the leCt of the last attaek, aiming at the
Chapel of San Salvador. This was the five battalions of
Bechaud's brigade, which had in front of it the line of the lOth
Ca~adores, supported by Ross's right. hand battalion and the
left battalion of Campbell's Portuguese. This column actually
reached the summit, driving the Ca~adoresbefore it, and estab-
lished itself by the chapel, but was finally thrown down by a
flank attack of Ross's left·hfl.nd battalions, while it was heavily
engaged with the 7th Fusiliers and Campbell's 10th Line in
front. It rallied only a short way down the hill, as there was
no pursuit.
This fight was still in progress when Valldermaesen's two
brigades came up the hill, each in a single column preceded by
a heavy screen of tirailleurs. They came into collision with
Campbell's (.'entrc and left, drove in his Ca~adores 2 and light
, This exceptional UBe of grenadiel'll in the skinniBhing line, I get from
an observation of Dainbrigge of the 2Otll, who expresses his surprise th3t
the troops with whom he wns engaged, though IlCtillg us tiruilleut~, were
not light infuntry, but men in tull beul'llkin CdPJIlike the Guard, • some of
the flnest.looking soldiel'll I ever met' (p. 400).
• The 10th CUl;udores. Cumpbell's light battalion, was a very weak
unit of only 25U bo.yonelJi.
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companies, and forced their way right to the summit, after a
vcry sharp exchange of fire. Cole was obliged to send up
Stubbs's Portuguese to strengthen the line, whieh held for
some time, but finally gave way on its left, where the 10th Line
broke, thus exposing the flank of Hoss's 7th Fusiliers, its next
neighbours along the crest. At the samc time llechaud's
brigade, now rallied, came up the hill for n. second attack on
Ross, whose line, or at least the right-hand part of it, lost
ground and fell baek in some disorder. At the same moment
the French column beyond Vandcrma.esen-Maucllne's front
brigade-was attacking thc Col, 'At that instant,' wrote
Clausel to Soult, ' I had, despite nil the difficulties of the enter-
prise, somc hope of success 1,'
The combat seems to have stood still for a perceptible time-
the French troops had established themselves on a long strip of
the crest, and were slowly pushing back Campbell's left and
Hoss's right, which had suffered severely and were in bad order.
But the enem)' was also in great confusion-the columns and
the skirmishing line had dissolved into irregular crowds. The
men were absolutely exhausted by the stecp elimb which they
had just made; and the blasting volleys which they had received
before reaching the crest had laid Iowa vcr)' large proportion
of the officers, who had led with rcckless courage. There was
no impctus left in their advance, which was slow and irregular.
Thc decision of the fight seems to have started On the very
highest point of the hill, where Maucune's front brigade was
attacking Anson, Here the French never won the crest, and
were thrown back with extreme v·iolence and terrible loss. The
laconic report of the division merely says that' the oo\'ance
was a complete failure: the troops were repulsed at every point,
and returned,to thcir original position with the loss of 600 to
700 mcn and a colonel 2.' The wholc strength of the thrce
attacking battalions had been only 2,200 men, and all the
casualties coming in ten minutes, the column was too hard hit
to rally. Nor did Maucune choose to scnd in his rear brigade,
which was the only intact reserve on the French heights. After
watching this complete failure of the central assault fr.am behind
• Cluuscl's I'Cport of August 2.
I D'Huw of the 34th lAger.
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Anson's line, and noting the demoralization of the enemy,
Wellington took the very bold step of ordering two of Allson's
three battaliollJ> t, the 3/27th and 1/48tl1, to descend from their
own ground, and fall on the flank of Vandcrmaesen's division,
which was advancing slowly and in disorder, pushing back
Campbell's and'Stubbs's Portuguese. He left only the 2nd Pro-
visional (2nd and 2/53rd) to hold the high point from which
M"aucune had just been repulsed. At the same time Dyng's
brigade, hitherto kept in reserve a quarter of a mile back, on the
centre of the hill, was ordered to advance and support Ross.
The diagonal down-hill charge of the B/27th and 1/481h wus
swift and irresistible, when falling on the flank of a disordered
mass. A French observer on the opposite mountain noted and
admired it. 'The enemy's reinforcements, which he launched
against our divisions, charged at a running pace, but with such
order and unity that looking on fTom a distance one might have
thought it was cavalry galloping. Hardly had they repulsed
the troops on their right, when they ran in on the centre, and
after the centre on to the left. . .. Our men eame baek four
times to the assault, but what could three divisions do against
an army perfectly settlcd down into its position, which had only
to receive the shock of troops already half discomfited by
exhaustion and by the obstacles of an inaccessible hillside 2.'
Wellington merely says, ' I ordered the 27th and 48th to charge
first that body of the cncmy which had fIrSt established itsclf
on the heights (Vandermaesen) and next those on the left
(Bcehaud): both attacks succeeded, and the enemy was driven
down with immcnse loss.'
Byng's brigade was in time to give assistance in the last part
of the attack, but was only slightly engaged; its thrce batta-
lions had no more than 70 cusualties among thc~n s, while the
27th and 48th counted 110 less than 389-a sufficient proof of
the sort of resistance which thcy respectively met.
With the general repulse of the French brigades which had
1 The fourth battalion of the brigade, the Ij40th was detaehC!d bf!low
on the Spaniards' Hill.
I Lemonnier-Delarosse, pp. 227-8.
• The BuJrlllOllt only 2 mell, Ule 18,1 PlOvillional (2/318t and 2/66111) only
5-1IO can hardly have been engagcd,-but the Ij57th had 63 casualties.
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established themselves on the crest, the crisis of the battle was
over. But sporadic fighting continued for an hour more, owing
to the gallant obstinacy of the l"'rench officers, who at several
points of the linc rallied their battalions and brought them up
the hill again for partial and obviously futile attacks. As
Wellington had forbidden all pursuit, the enemy had fuU power
to reassemble half-way down the hill and to try his luck again.
But since the men were tired out, and quite understood that if
a general usso.ult by six brigo.des had failed, isolated pushes by
individual regiments were hopeless, there was no conviction in
these later attacks. About four o'clock Soult sent orders that
they must cease, and that all troops must return to their original
positions.
It remains tc! speak of three side-shows of the battle, one of
which was of great interest and some importance. It will be
remembered that when the great auvan<:e took place about
1 a.m., Gauthier's brigade at Zabaldica was told to storm the
spur opposite, now held by the British 40th and the Spanish
battalions Pravia and Prineipe. There was some artillery
preparation here, the howitzers beside the village having been
directed to open a high-trajectory fire on the hill. It had,
however, no effect, and the infantry werc put in cre long.
As to what happened British and Frcnch accounts show a
satisfactory agreement. Gauthier first sent up the 120th, a
strong three-battalion unit, keeping the 122nd (two battalions)
in reserve. 1'he attack was frontal, and in one column-
possibly the presence of Symphcr's battery to the right· renr,
sweeping flU the slopes above the Arga river, prohibited any
flank extension to turn the position.
Reillc, who directcd tills attack in person from Zabaldiea,
says that thc rcgimcnt wcnt up the hill with a very strong sercen
of skirmishcrs (no doubt all the six campagnies d'Ni/e) but in
great disorder, the pace having been pressed too mueh up a very
steep ascent, so that the whole anived at the crest in a mass.
The enemy, who had been waiting behind the sky. line, suddenly
appeared at the critical moment, and opened such a heavy and
effective fire that the 1201h crumpled up and rolled down hill.
The Allies, contented with the re.<;ult of their salvo, did not
pursue, but stepped back behind the crest. Gauthier rallied
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the defeated regiment half-way down the slope, and brought
up the 122nd to nssist: he then repeated the assault over the
same ground, and with better success, for the 120th reached
the crest, and broke up a Portuguese regiment (it was really
two Spanish battalions), and came to a deadly mUSketry contest
with the English regiment posted on the highest ground. There
was a fusillade almost muzzle to muzzle, but the French regi-
ment fuml1y gave way' whether from the disadvantage of the
position or from over-fatigue after twice climbing such steep
slopes '. The 122nd, coming up just too late, then delivered a
similar attack, and suffered a similar repulse. Both regiments
were then rallied half-way down the slope, and kept up from
thence a scattering fire, until Soult's orders camc to withdraw
all the linc, in consequence of the defeat of Clausel's divisions.
This exactly tallies with the narratives of the British officers of
the 40th, who also speak of three attacks, the first easily foiled-
a mere rush of skirmishers-the second very serious, and
rendered almost fatal by the incomprehensible panic of the
Spaniards, who, after behaving very well both on the previous
day and during the first attack, suddenly broke and l:Ied-' all
attempts to rally them being inefrectual '-over thc whole face
of the hill behind. The rout was only stopped by a desperate
charge against the front of the lending French battalion, which
was successful contrary to every ex,pectation and probability.
For the 40th, who had sul/ered considerahle loss in the combat
of Linzoain two days before, hud only 10 officers and 400 men
in line, and were attacking a column of ncarly 2,000 mcn. This
column had been cast down hill, and thc men of the 40th had
barely been reformed-they showed a great wish to pursue and
came baek reluctantly-whcn the third Freneh attack, that of
the 122nd, wns delivered with resolution unci steadiness but
without success. Evcn then the fight was not over, for after
an interval the enemy came up the hill again, in disorder but
with drums beating and eagles carried to the front, the ofJicers
making incredible efforts to push the mcn forward. They did
not, however, get to the crest, but, after rolling up to within
twenty-five yards of it, stood still under the heavy mUSketry
fire, and then fell back, completely' fought out I.'
• The ubov~ llurrntive is reconstructed from Rcillc's two reports (the
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Heille's report declares that Gauthier'li brigade only lost
, 50 killed and several hundred wounded '-say 350 in all-in
tills combat. The British 40th had 129 casualties-the Spanish
battalions on their flanks 192. If a brigade of five battalions
and 3,300 bayonets allowed itself to be stopped by a single
battalion in the last phases of the combat, after surrering a loss
of only one man in nine, there must have been something wrong
with it, beside bad guidance. Onc would suspect that Rcille
is understating casualties in the most reckless fashion.
While this fight was going on by the banks of the Arga, there
was another in progress on the other flank of the hill of Orieaill,
on the banks of the Ulzama. The 6th Division Imd been inter·
mittently cngaged with Conroux's troops during the whole time
of the French assaults on the heights. When it was seen that
Clausel's men were' fought out' and falling back, Paek made
an effort to utilize the moment of the French debacle by cap-
turing Sorauren. He brought up his divisional guns (Bralldreth's
battery) to a position close to thc village, and sent forward thc
light companics of the two British brigades to press in upon its
south side, while Madden's Portuguese, on the other bank of the
river, tried to get into it from the rear on the north side. The
attaek failed, indeed was never pushed home, Sorauren being
too strongly held. The guns had to be drawn back, many horses
aud some gunners having been shot dowll. Paek himself was
severely wOWlded in the head, and Madden's brigade lost
300 men. Wellington sent down from the hill to order the attack
to cease, for even if Sorauren had been taken, the rest of his
front-line troops were in no condition to improve the advantage l .
While this was going on upon the c."Xtreme left, an almost
bloodless demonstration was in progress on thc extreme right,
where Foy, as on the previous day, had been ordered to keep
Pictoll employed. Re showed his infantry in front of Alzuza,
and pushed forward the considerable body of light cavalry
divisional report of Lamartini/lre, howc\'cr, if; useless) and from narmtive6
of Stretton of the 40th in Muxwcll'~ Ptmi1l8UWr Sllelcllcs, and MHIs ill thc
history of the regiment by SmythiCll.
I There is litUe nbout this aD'air in the British narratives. Diarisl.s .....ere
rare in the 6th Division, The only point of interest I found ill them is
the QlentiOll of mule.guns used by the l?relleh.
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which had been lent him to his left Rank by Elcano, till their
skirmishers had got into collision with those of the British
Hussar Brigade, along the river Egucs. There was much
tiraillade ,but few casualties on either side; the 10th Hussars
were driven across the river, but were replaced by the 18th,
who kept the French in check for the rest of the day. Pierre'
Soult showed no intention of closing, and Stapleton Cotton had
been warned by Wellington that his four brigades were intended
for flank-protection not for taking the offensive. The afternoon,
therefore, passed away in noisy but almost harmless bickering
between lines of vcdcttcs. Foy in his report expressed himself
contented with having kept a larger force than his own occupied
all day.
Thus ended tills second Bussaeo, a repetition in its main lines
of the fifl>t, and a justification of the central theory of Welling-
ton's taetieal system. Once more the line, in a well-chosen posi-
tion, and with proper precautions taken, had proved itself able to
defeat the column. The Freneh made a most gallant attempt
to storm a position held by much inferior numbers, but extremely
stroIJ.g. They wcre beaten partly-as all the critics insisted-
by the fact that men who have just scaled a hill of 1,000 feet are
inc....itably exhausted at the moment when they reach its crest,
but much more by the superiority of fire of the line over the
column when matters came to the musketry duel. The l<reneh
generals had learnt one thing at least from previous experience
-they tried to sheathe and screen the column by exceptionally
heavy skirmishing lines, but even so they could not achieve
their purpose. The only risk in Wellington's game was that
the enemy's numbers might be too overwhelming-if, for
example, the 6th Division had not been up in time on July 28th,
and Clausel had been able to put in Conroux's division (7,000
extra bayonets) along with the rest, operating against !loss's
extreme flank, it is not certain that the heights of Oricain could
"have been held. Dut Wellington ani)· offered battle, as he did,
because he was relying on the arrival of the 6th Division. If he
had known on the night of the 27th that it could not possibly
come up in timc, be would probably have accepted the unsatis-
factory alternative policy of which hc speaks in sevcral dis-
patches, that of raising the siege of Pampeluna and falling back
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on Yrurzun. • I hope we should in any case have beaten the
French at last, but it must have been furthcr back ccrtainly,
and probably on the Tolosa road I.'
Soult is said to have felt from the 26th onward-his original
project of (\. surprise followed by a very rapid advance having
failcd-' un£: vi'Titablc conviction de 1W'HCmsite 2.' We could
wen understand thi!:l if he really believed-as he wrote to Clarke
on the evening after the battle-that Wellington had 50,000
men already in line. Dut this was an ex post facto statement,
intended to explain his dcfeat to the Minister; and we may be
justified in thinking that if he had really estimated the hostile
army at any such a figure, hc would ncver havc attacked. His
long delay in bringing on the action may be explained by the
fact that Reille's divisions were not on the field before evening
on the 21th, and that on the 28th it took many hours to re-
arrange the troops on a terrain destitute of any roads, rather
than by a fear of a defeat by superior numbers. It might ho.ve
been supposed on the 27th that he was waiting for the possible
arrival of D'Erlon, but on the morning of the 28th he had
heard overnight from his lieutenant, and knew that he could
not reach the battle-front on that day. In his self-exculpatory
dispatch to Clarke, Soult complains that D'Erlon told him that
he was blocked by British divisions at Irurita, ' but I have no
doubt that these are the same troops which fell upon Gencral
Clauscl's flank tills afternoon 3.' In this he was wrong-D'Erlon
was speaking of Hill's and Dalhousic's divisions, while it was
Pack (whom D'Erlon had never seen) that rendercd a French
success at Sorauren impossible.
The loss of the Allied Army wa-.. 2,652---of whom 1,358 were
British, 1,102 Portuguese, and 192 Spaniards. The heaviest
casualties fell on the 3/27th in Anson's brigade, who first
repulsed Maucune, and then swept away Vandcrmaescn, and
the 1/7th in Ross's brigu.de, the regimcnt whose flank was
exposed by the brcakiug of the loth Portuguese-which corps
, Larpent, p. 221. cr. Nupier, v. p. 226: 'That will give time fur the
6th Division to arrive, and I shall beat him '-words true in thought
but perlmps never sjIOken by Wellington.
I Lapene, p. 80.
I Soult to Clarke, report of the battle.
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also, as was natural, was vcry Imrd hit. But all the front..line
battnliolls, both Brit.ish and })ort.ugucsc, had considerable
losses. Soult (as at Albucra) made a most mendacious under-
statement of his casualties, putting them at ],800 only. As
Clauscl alone had reported about 2,000, Maucune about 700,
and Lamartiniere at least 350, it is certain that tho Marshal's
total loss was over 3,OOO-how much over it is impossible to
say, since the only accessible regimental casualty-lists include
&11 men killed. wounded, or missing between July 25t.h and
August 2nd. But the chances arc that 4,000 would have been
nearer the mark than 8,000 1.
I Se<: statistiCll in Appendix x..XIJ.
SECTION XXXVIII: CHAPTER V
SQULT'S RETREAT, JULY 3O-a1. THE SECOND DA'rl'LE
OF ~OB.AUREN
WUILE the battle of July 28th was being fought, the outlying
divisions of both Sault's and Wellington's armies were at last
beginning to draw in towards the main bodies.
Hill, as wc have already seen, had received the orders written
by Wellington on Sommen bridge at 11 a.m. by the afternoon
of the same day, and had started off at once with his whole
force-the three 2nd Division brigades, Silveira's onc brigade,
and Darnes's three battalions of the 7th Division. His din.'Ctioru;
were to endeavour to cross the Puerto de Vclatc that night, so
as to sleep at Lanz, the first village on the south side of the pass.
He was to leave a detachment at the head of the defile, to check
D'Krlon's probable movement of pursuit. The supplementary
order, issued ut 4 p.m. from the heights of Oricain, directed Hill
to march from the plaee where his corps should encamp 011 the
night of thc 27th (Lullz as was hoped) to Lizaso, abandoning the
high road for thc side road Olague-I~i7.aso,since the former was
known to be cut by the l"reneh at Sorauren. If the men were
not over-fatigued when they rcached LiZil.so, Hill must try to
bring them on farther, to Olloearizqucto. on thc flank of the
Soraurcn position, where the 6th Division would have preceded
them.
Similarly Dalhousie with thc 7th Division (minus the threc
battalions with Hill) was to march that same evening from
Santesteban over the Puerto de Arrai:r. on to Lizaso, to sleep
there and to march on Olloearizqueta, like Hill, on the morning
of the 28th, if the st..'\te of the troops allowed it. All the baggage,
sick, stores, and other impedimcnta from the Baston were u.!so
direeted on Lizaso, but they were to go through it westward
and turn off to Yrurzun, not to follow the fighting force to 0110-
carizqueta.
None of these directions worked out as was desired, the main
hindering cate;c being the fearful thwltlerstorm already rccordl..-d,
which raged during the tWilight hours of the evening of tile
356·6 Y Y
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27th. Hill had started from Irurita, as directed, keeping as a
rearguard Ashworth's Portuguese, who were intended to bold
the Puerto de Vclatc when the re.'>t of the column should have
crossed it. He was nearing the watershed, in the roughest part
of the road, where it has many precipitous slopes on the left
hand, whell the storm came down, completely blotting out the
evening light with a. deluge of rain, and almost sweeping men
off their feet. Onc of Batnes's officers describes the scene as
follows: 'So entangled were wc among carts, horses, vicious
kicking mules, baggage, and broken-dov.'Il artillery, which
lined the road, that we could not extricate ourselves. Some
lighted sticks and candles only added to the confusion, for we
were not able to sec onc yard beyond the lights, owing to the
lhiek haze, whieh seemed to render darkness still more dark.
In this bewildered state many who eould not stand were oblib.ro
from fatigue to sit dowll in the mire: to attempt going on was
impossible, except by climbing over the difIerellt vehicles that
blocked the road. In this miserable plight, I seated myself
against a tree, when weariness caused mc, even amidst this
bustle, mud, and riot, to fall fast asleep 1.' All sorts of disasters
happened: one of Tulloh's 9-pounders went over the precipice
with the shaft animals drawn down with it, when the side of the
roadway crumbled in z. Ross's battery lost another gun in a
similar way, owing to the sudden breaking of a wheel, and many
carts and mules blundered over the edge. The only thing that
could be dOlle.was to stick to the track, sit down, and wait for
daylight, which was fortunately early in July.
When it came, ·the drenched and miserable column picked
itself up from the mire, and straggled down thc defile of the
Vclatc, passing Lanz and turning oU at Olngue towards Lizaso,
as ordered. '.rroops and baggage were coming in all day to this
small and overcrowded mountain village, in very sorry plight._
It was of course quite impossible for them, to move 110 mile
farther on the 28th, and Hill had to write to Wellington that
he could only hopc to move his four brigades 011 the early
morning of the 29th.3
I Nlun~ti.".e or C..ptain G. Wood of lhe l j82nd, pp. 102--3.
• Sce Dicksoll Papers, 'l'ulloh'~ letter, p. 1022.
• Hill to Quartermastcr·Genernl, Supplemmwry Dispatches, viii. I'. 142.
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Lord Dalhousic had fared, as it seems, a little better in
crossing the Puerto de Arraiz; he had a less distance to cover,
but the dispatch from Sorauren bridge only reached him at
71'.01. when the raill was beginning. With laudable perse-
verance hc kept marching all night, and reached Lizaso at
12 1l0(1ll. on the 28th, with all his mcn, except a battalion of
Ca~adorcs left bchind to watch the pass. The condition of the
division was so far better than that of Hill's column, that
Dalhousie "''Tote to Wellington that he could march again in
the late afternoon, after six hours' rest, and would be at or near
QUocarizqueta by dawn on the 29th I, though two successive
night marches would have made the men very weary. This
the division accomplished, mueh to its credit, and reached the
appointed destination complete, for Hill had returned to it the
three battalions which had saved the dny at Mayo. on the 25th.
. Lizaso Oil the afternoon of July 28th wns a dismal sight,
erammcd with the drcnchcd and worn-out'men of seven brigades,
who had just fmished a terrible night march, with large parties
of the Maya wounded, much baggage and transport with terri-
fied muleteers in charge, and a horde of the pcasants of the
Bastan, who had loaded their more precious possessions on
ox+wagons, and started oU to escape the French. It took hours
to sort out the impedimenta and start them on the Yrurwn road.
There was a general feeling of disaster in the air, mainly owing
to physical exhaustion, which even the report of the victory of
Sorauren arriving. in the evening could not exorcise. Rumours
were afloat that Wellington was about to retirc again, despite
of thc successes of the afternoon. However, the day being Hne,
the men were ablc to cook and to dry themselves, and the 7th
Division duly set out for another night march.
It was fortlmatc that the retiring columns were not troubled
by any pursuit either on the 27th or the 28th. 'fhe storm which
had so maltreated Hill's column scems to have kcpt the }~rcneh
from discovering its departure. Darmagnac had moved
forward on the 27th from Elizondo to ground facing Hill's
position at Irurita, but had not attempted to attack it, D'Erlon
having decided that it wus ' trclI J/Jrtc par cllc·mJme, et inatta·
, Dalhousic to QuarlcnnusWr·Gcncml, ibid.
684 SECOND BATTU~ OF SOHAUREN
quahle, ctanl gardee par autallt de troupes.' So badly was touch
kept owing to the rainy evening, that Hill got away unobserved,
and it was only on the following morning that Darmagnac
reported that he had disappeared. This news at last inspired
D'Erlon with a desire to push forward, and on the morning of
the 28th Abbe took over the vanguard, passed Almandoz, and
crossed the VcIatc, with Darmo.gnac following in his rear, while
Maransin-kcpt back so long at l\faya-eamc down in the wake
of the o.ther divisions lo ElizOlldo. The head of Abbe's ilivision
passed the Puerto de Velate, pushing before it Ashworth's
Portuguese, who had been left as a detaining force. Abbe
reported that the pass was full of wrecked baggage, and that
he had seen guns shattered at the foot of precipices. D'Erlon
says that 400 British stragglers were gleaned by the way-no
doubt l\1aya wounded and footsore men. On the night of the
28th Abbe and Darmagnac bivouacked at and about Ll1nz,
Maransin somewhere by Irurita. He left behind one battalion
at Elizondo 1, to piek up and eseort the convoy of food cxpected
from Urda..x and Ainhouc.
The light cavalry 2 who accompanied Abbe duly reported
that Hill had llot followed the great road farthcr than Olaguc,
but had turned orr along the valley of the upper U1zama to
Lizaso; his fires were noted at evening all along the edge of
the woods near that village. One patrol of ehasseurs, pushing
down the main road to Ostiz, sighted a similar exploring party
of lsmcrt's dragoons coming from Sorauren, but could not get
in touch with them, as the dragoons took them for enemies and
decamped. However, the two bodies of l,'rench cavalry met
again and recognized each other at dawn on the 29th, so that
free communication betwecn the two parts of Soult's army was
now estahlished.
D'Erlon has been blamed by evcry critic for his slow advance
between the 26th and the 29th. He was quite aware that it was
slow, and f:rankly stated in his reports that he did not attack
Hill because he could not have turned him out of the position of
Irurita, not having a sufficient superiority of numbers to cancel
Hill'l; advantage of position. This is quite an arguable thesis-
D'Erlon had, deducting Maya losses, some 18,000 men: Hill,
I 28th Ugcr. • 22nd Challscufl>.
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counting in Dalhousie who had been placed on his flank by
Wellington for the purpose of helping him if he were pressed,
had (also deducting Maya losses) four British and three Portu·
gucsc brigades, with a strength of about 14,000, If Cnmeron's
and Pring!e's regiments had been terribly cut up at Maya,
Darmagnac's and :Maransin's had surfered n perceptibly larger
loss, though onc distributed over morc units, D'Erlon wa.s
under t~e impression that Hill had three divisions with him,
having received false information to that errect. If this had
been true, an assault on the position of Irurita would have been
very reckless policy. It was not truc-only two divisions and
one extra Portuguese brigade being in line, Yet still the event
of the combat of llcum..a, only three days later, when D'l~rlon's
three divisions a.ttacked Hill's own foul' brigncles-no other
allied troops being present-and were held in eheck for the
better part of a day, suggests that D'Erlon may have had good
jusliflealion for not taking the oUcnsive on the 26th or 27th,
while the 7th Division was at Hill's disposition. Thc most odd
part of his tactics seems to have been the way in which he kept
Maransin baek at Mayn. and Elizondo so long: this was appa·
rently the result of fear that Gmham might have somethiilg to
say in the contest-an unjustifiable fear as we know now, but
D'Erlon cannot have been so certain as wc arc I The one
criticism on the Freneh general's conduct w.hich does seem to
admit oC no adequate reply, is that in his original orders from
Soult, which laid down the scheme of the whole campaign, he
was certainly directed to get into touch with the main army as
soon as possible, though he was also directed to seize the pass of
Maya and to pursue Hill by Eliv.ondo and the Puerto de Velate.
If he drew the conclusion on the 26th that he could not hope to
dislodge Hill from the Irurita position, it was probably his dllty
to march enstward by the Col de Berderis or the Col d'Ispegui
and join the main body by the Alduidcs. It is more than doubt~
ful whether, considering the character of the country and the
tracks, he could have arrived in time for the battle oC Sorauren
on the 28th. And if Hill had seen him disappcar eastward, he
could have marehed to join Wellington by a shorter and much
better road. amI could certainly have been in touch with his
chief before D'Erlon was in toueh with Soult. Nevertheless, it
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cannot be said that the French general obeyed the order which
told him that' il1lC pcrdra pas de vue qu'il d<rit cll£rclwr d se
rl'Unir le plurol posswle au Te~,.le de l'armee I,' And orders ought
to be obeyed-however difficult they may appear.
At dawn on the 29th, therefore, Soult's troops were in their
position of the preceding day, nnd D'Erlon's leading division
was at Lanz, requiring only a short march to join the main body.
But Wellington was in a better position, since he had already
been joined by the 6Lh Division, and would be joined in a few
hours by the7t.h Division, which, marching all night, had reached
Ollocarizqueta. Hill, with his four original brigades, was at
Lizaso, as near to Wellington 3.<; D'Erlon was to Soult. The
only other troops which could have been drawn in, if Wellington
had so origiMlly intended, were the brigndes of the Light Divi-
sion, for which (as we shall sce) he made another disposition.
But omitting this unit, nnd supposing that the other troops 011
both sides simply mnrched in to join their main bodies on the
29th, it was clear that by night Wellington would have a
numerical equality with his advcr!illry, and this would make
any further attempts to relieve Pampeluna impossible 011 the
part of Soult.
This wa~ the MaN:hal's conviction, and he even overrated the
odds set against him, if (as he said in his dispatch to Clarke) he
estimated his adversary's force on the evcning of the 28th at
liO,OOO men, and thought that several other divisions would
join him ere long. In face of such conditions, what was to be
the next move? Obviously a cautious general would have
decided that his bolt had been shot, and that he had failed. He
had 0. so.fe retreat before him to Roneesvnlles, by a road which
would take all his cavalry and guns; and D'Erlon had an
equally secure retreat either by Elizondo and Maya on a good
road, or by the Alduidcs, if absolute security were preferred to
convenience in marching. Thc country was such that strong
rearguards could have held off any pursuit. And this may have
been the Marshal's first intention, for in his letter to Clarkc,
written on thc evcning after thc battle, before he had any know-
ledge ofD'Erlon's approach, he said that he was sending back his
artillery and dragoons on Ronccsvallcs, since it was impossible
, Soult's gcncral ordcrs or July 23rd.
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to use them in Navarre, nod that he was dispatching them to
the Bidassoa ' wherc he could makc bettcr use of thcm in llew
operations, which he was about to undertake'. He was intend-
ing to remain a short time in his present position with the
infantry, to see what the enemy would do. No news had been
received of D'Erlon sinee the 27th, when hewas still atElh.ondo,
declaring that he could 1I0t move because he was blocked by a
large hostile foree-' the same force, as I believe, which fell on
Clausel's flank to-day.' Further comment the Marshal evidently
judged superfluous 1. 'the column of guns and baggage actually
marched off on thc night of thc 28th-2flth.
But early on the morning of the 2flth D'Erlon's cavalry was
met, and the news arrived that he was at Lanz, and marching
on Ostiz, where he would arrive at mid-day, fl.nd would be only
five miles Crom Soro.uren. This seems to have changed the
~tarshal's outlook on the situation, nnd by the o.fternoon he
had sketched out a wholly diffcrent plan of campaign, aod one
of the utmost hazard. As the critic quoted a fcw pages back
observed, he reeovcred his confidcnce whcn oncc he was twenty-
four hours away from a defeat, and his strategical conceptions
were sometimes risky in the extreme 2.
The new plan involved a complete change of direction.
Hitherto Soult had been aiming at Pumpelunu, and D'Erlon was,
so to speak, his rearguard. Now he avowed anothcr objcctive-
the cutting of thc road between Pampcluna antI Tolosa, with
the purpose of throwing himself between Wellington and Graham
and forcing the latter to ra.ise the siege of St. Sebastian 3. He
had now, as he explained, attracted to the extreme south nearly
the whole of the Anglo-Portugucse divisions: there was practi-
cally a gap between Welliugton, with the troops about to join
him, and the comparutivcly small force left on the Bidassoa.
He would turn thc British left, by using D'El'lon's corps as his
vanguard and cutting in north of Lizaso, making for Hcrnani
or Tolosa, whichever might prove the more easy goal. He hoped
1 Soult to Clulke, from zabaldica, evening of the 28th.
• Sce St. Chamans, quoted llbovc, p. lJoo•
• EXllresse<! I1\OSt elenrly. pcrhllps, ill the Orclers jl;llucd b)' lhe Chid of
the Statl', Gazan, to the Corps-Commanders 011 July 29: 'L'iutention du
Geneml en Chef est de lie porter avce toute I'armec sur la communication
de Pampchmc a St. EstevlIu.'
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that Villattc and the rcscn'cs on the Bidassoa might already be
at Hcrnani, for D'Erlon had passed on to him all untrustworthy
report that an ofrensive had begun in that direction, as his
original orders had directed. The manceuvre would be so
unexpected that he ought to gain fl, full day on Wcllington-
D'Erlon WlIS within striking distance of l-UII, and should be able
to thrust him out of the wuy, before the accumulation of British
troops about Soraurcn, ViIlaha, and Hucrta could come up.
There was obviously onc difficult point in the plan: D'ErlOIl
could get at Hill easily enough. But was it certain that the rest
of the troops, now in such vcry close touch with Wellington's
main body-separated from it on onc front of two miles by
no more than a narrow ravine-would he able to disentangle
themselves without risk, and to follow D'Erlon up the vnlley
of the U1zama? When armies are so near that either can bring
on a general action by advancing half a mile, it is not ensy for
one of them to withdraw, without. exposing at least its rear-
guard or covering troops to the danger of unnihi1tl.tion.
Soult took this risk, whether underrating Wellington's initia-
tive, or overrating the mana:uvring power of his own offieers and
men. It was it. gross tactical error, and he was to PllY dearly for
it on the 30th. In fact, baving obliged his enemy with a second
Bussaco on the 28th, he prcsentctl him with the opportunity of
a second Salamanca two days after. For in its essclI(.'C the wide-
spread battle of the 30th, which extended over ten mik'S from
D'Erlon's attack on Hill near Lizaso to Wellington's counter-
attack on Reille near Sorauren, was, like Salamanca, the ~\Idden
descent of an army in position upon an enemy who has unwisely
committed himself to a march right across its front.
Soult made the most elaborate plans for his man<:cuvrc-
D'Erlon was to move from Ostiz and Lanz against Hill: he
was lent the whole of Trcillard's dragoons. to give him plenty
of cavalry for reconnaissance purposes; Clausel was to maT(lh
'l'aupin's and Vandermaesen's troops behind Conroux, who was
to hold Soraurcn village till they had passed him. Conroux
would then be relieved by l\Iaueune's division from the high
ground opposite the Col, and when it had taken over SoraufCn
fTom him, would follow the rest of Clausel's troops up the high
road. Maueunc's vacant position would be handed over to
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Foy and Lamartinicre. The former was to evacuate Alzuza
and the left bank of the Arga, where he was not needed, as the
column of guns and baggage, with its escort of cavalry, had got
far enough ;},way on the road to Zubiri and Roneesvallcs to be
out of danger. He was then to go up on to the heights where
:\llIucune had been posted during the recent battle, as was also
LlImarlini~rc. The lalter was to leave onc battalion, along with
the corps-cavalry (13th Chasseurs) of Reillc's wing, on the high
rood north of Zabaldiea, as an extra precaution to guard against
any attempt by the enemy to raid the retreating column of
impcdimentn 1.
Finally, some orders impossible to execute were dictated~
viz. that all these movements were to be carried out in the
night, a~d that both Clausel anti Reille were to be careful that
the British should get no idea that any ehange in the position
of the army was taking place; onc general is told that < il
operera son mouvement de maniere cl ce que l'ennemi ne puisse
aUCllllC11le1lt l'apercevoir,' the other that < illlisp03era ses troupes
tl maniCre que !'elmemi ne puisse soup~onner qu'il y a de change·
fIlenl ni de tliminution.' Reille was to hold the line Sorauren-
ZabalrJica for the whole day of the 30th, and then to follow
Clausel with absolute secrecy and silence. Now, unfortunately,
onc cannot move 85,000 men on pathless hillsides aud among
woods and ravines in the dark, without mllny units losing their
way, and mueh noise being made. And when one is in touch
with a watchful encmy nt a distance of half a mile only, one can-
not prevent him from seeing and hearing that changes arc going
on. The orders were impracticable.
Such were Soult's plans for the 80th. Wellington's eounter-
plans do not, on the 20th, show any signs of an assumption of
the offensive' lIS yet, though it was certainly in his mind. They
arc entirely precautionary, all of them being intended to guard
against the next possible move of the opponent. The troops
which had sutrcred severely in the battle werc drawn back into
second line, Byng's and Stubbs's brigades taking over the
ground held by Ross and Campbcll. The 6th Division~now
undcr Pakenham, Pack having been severely wounded on the
previous day----o<.'Cupied the heights north-west of SoraurclI,
, Qrdre tlu 2U J uillet j sce also GaZlIll to Hcillc of ~amc date.
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continuing the line held on the 28th to' the left. Both Cole and
Pu.kcnham were told to get their gUllS up, if possible. And when
Lord Dalhousic came up from Lizaso after his night march,
his division also was placed to prolong the allied left-two
brigades to the Jeft·rear of the 6th Division, hidden behind a
high ridge, the third several miles westward over a hill which
commanded the by-ron.d Ostiz-p,rarcal.'loin-a possible route for
n. French turning movement I,
Originally Wellington had supposed that Hill would reach
Lizaso earlier than Dalhousic, and had intended that the 2nd
Di vision should come down towards l't1arcalain and PampcIun8,
while the 7th remained at Li".aso to protect the junction of roads.
But the storm, which smote Hill worse than it smote Dalhousie,
had settled matters otherwise. It was thc latter, not the former,
who turned up to join hands with the main army. Accepting
the change, Wellington directed Hill to select a good fighting
position by Lizaso, in which he should place the two English
brigades of the 2nd Division and Ashworth, while Da Costa's
Portuguese were to move to l\Iarcnlain 2, close to the reBr
brigade which the 7th Division had left in the neighbourhood.
'J'hus something like a covering line was provided for Blly move
which D'Erlon might make against the British left. Wellington
was fccling very jealous that day of attempts to turn this flank,
and took onc more preCllution whieh (as mattcrs were to turn
out) he was much to regret on the 31st. Orders were sent to
Charles Altcn to move the Light Division from Zubieta towards
the high road that goes from Tolosa to YrUrl.llH via Lccumberri.
In ignorance of the division's exact position, the dispatch
direeted Alten to come down so far as might seem best-¥rurzun
being named as the farthest point which should be taken into
consideration 3. This causcd Altcn to move, by a very toilsome
night march, from Zubieta. where he would have been very
useful later on, to Lecumberri, where (as it chanced) he was not
needed. But this was a hazard of war-it was impossible to
, Quurtcnnastcr-G<,ncmi to Dnlhousic IInd UUJ, Supp/{f/untary Vis·
pale/lla, viii. p. 151 .
• Ibid., Q.M.G. to Hill, I). 152. In this Du Costt,'s brigade is culled the
Condc de AmuTUntc's divisitnl, but Cumpbcll had not yet joincd pa Costa.
• Q.M.G. to Aiten, SlIpplemetltary Diapalchta, viii. PI). Hio-I.
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guess on the 29th the unlikely plaee where Soult's army WIIS
about to be on the 31st. Another move of troops to the Yrur.lun
road was that Fanc's cavalry brigaue, newly arriveu from thc
side of Aragon, was directed to Bcrri6pJano, bchind Pampcluna
on the Vittoria roau, with orders to get into touch with Liz3so,
¥rllrl,lln, and Lecumberri.
Obviously all these arrangements were defensive, and COll-
templated three possible moves on the part of thc cllcmy-
(1) a renewal of the battle of the 28th at and north of Soraurcn,
with which thc 6th and 7th Divisions could deal; (2) an
attempt to turn the allied flank on the short circuit Ostil,-
Marealain; (3) a similar nttcmpt by a larger circuit via Liznso.
whieh would enable the encmy to get on to the ronds I,izaso-
¥rurzun, and Liznso-Lecumbcrri, and so cut the communication
between Wellington and Craham. The third was the correct
reading of Soult's intentions. To foil it Hill was in position at
Lizaso, with the power to call in fll'st Da Costa, then the 7th
Division, and much latcr the Light Division, whose whercabouts
was uneert.'l.in, and whosc m-rival must obviously come very
late. But if the enemy should attack Hill with anything more
than the body of troops which had been secn at Ostiz nnd Lanz
(O'Erlon's corps), WeIJington intended to fall upon their main
corps, so soon as it begun to show signs of dctaehing reinforce-
ments to join the turning or enveloping column.
Soult's mauccuvrc had duly bcgull 011 the night of the 28th-
29th by the retrca~ of the artillery. the wounded, the train and
heavy baggage towards Roneesvalles, under the escort of the
dragoon regiments of Ilierrc Soult's division, whose chasseur
regiments, however, remained with lleille as 'corps cavalry'.
On the news of this move going round, a general impression
jlrevailed that thc wholc army was about to retire by the road
on whieh it had eome up. This seemed all the more Iikcly
~ausc the lastof the rations brought from St. Jean·Pied-du-Port
had been distributctl on the battle-morning, and the troops had
been told on the 29th to make raids for food all all the mountain
villages Oil their flanks and rear. They had fOWldlittlc savc
wine-which was. more a snare than n help. The perspicacious
Foy noted in his diary his impression that Soult's new move
Was not made with allY real hope of relieving St. Sebastian or
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cutting the Allies' communication, it was in essence a retrcat;
but, to save his face, the Marshal was trying to givc it the
appcarance of a strategic lUan<:euvre 1. This was a vcry legiti-
mate deduction-it certainly seemed unlikely that an army
short of food, and almost equally short of munitions, could be
asked to conduct a long campaign in a region where it was
notorious that it could not hope to live by requisitions, and
would find communicntion with its base almost impossible.
It W:lfl true that convoys were coming up behind J)'Erlon-one
was due at Elizondo-but roads were bad and appointments
hard to kcep. There were orders sent to Bnyonne on the 28th
for the start.. of another-but how many days would it.. take
Lefore the army b"'Ot the benefit ?-u week at least. Men and
officers marched oU on the new adventure grumbling and with
stomachs ill-filled.
The result of Soult's orders was to produce two scparate
actions on thc 3oth-one between D'.Erlon and Hill behind
Li7K'\so, in whieh the Fr.cneh gained a tnetieal advantagc of 110
great importance, the othcr on the heights nlong the U1znmn
between Wellington's main body and Clauscl and Reille, in
which the l'rench rcar divisions wcre so routed o.nd dispersed
that Soult had to throw up a1l his ambitious plans, and rush
home for safety as fast as was possible.
The more important action, genemlly called thc Second Battle
of Soraurell, may be denlt with first.
At midnight Clausel's two divisions on the heights, separated
from Cole's position by the great ravine, moved ort, leaving their
Hres burning. By dawn they had safely arrived on the Iligh road
between Soro.urell and Ostiz, and were ready to move 011 towards
D'Erloll when tire third division-Conroux'~shouldhave becn
relieved at Soraurell village by Maueulle. But this had not yet
been accomplishcd, evcn by five ill thc morning: for l\faueune's
troops having woods and pathless slopes to cross, in great part
lost their way, und wcre straggling in small bands over the hills
during the night. They had only two miles to go in many cases,
yet when the light came some of them wcre still far from their
dcstination and in quite unexpcdcd places. Conroux had ?is-
entangled one brigade from Sorauren, while thc othcr was still
1 Foy (Giro<! de l'Ain), p. 2HI.
CLAUSEL ArfACKED AT SORAUREN 693
holding the outposts, nnd lIfaucunc was just beginning to HIe
some of his men behind the barricades and defences, when the
whole of the village received a salvo of shells, which brought
death and confusion everywhere. During the night Pakcnham
and Cole, obeying Wellington's orders, had succeeded in getting
some f:,"UJlS up to the crest of the heights-the Oth Dl\'h;ioll had
hauled six guns up the hill on its left; they were now mounted
in front of Mn.ddcn's Portuguese, only 500 yards from their
mark I, Of the 4th Division battery 2 two guns cmd a howitzer
had been dragged with immense toil to the neighbourhood of
the chapel of San Salvador, overlooking Soraurcn, the other
three gUlls to a point farther cast, opposite the front from
which Vandcrmacscn had attacked on the 28th.
This was apparently the commencement of the nction, but
it soon started on several other points. Fay had evacuated
Alzuza at midnight, but /u"...ing rough country-paths in (L steep
hillside as his only guides in the darkness, had not sueeeedcd in
massing his division ut Iroz till 5 a.m. He thcll mounted the
heights in his immediate front, pushing before him (as he says)
fraetionsof l\Iaucunc'sdivision which had lost their way. His long
column had got as far as the Col and the ground west of it, when
-full daylight now prevailing-be began to be shelled by
guns from the opposite heighb---obviously the other half of
Sympher's battery 3.
Meanwhile Lamartinicrc's division (minus the onc battalion
of t.hc 122nd left to watch the llonccsvalles road) had moved
....cry little in the night, having only drawn itself up from
labaldica to the heights imntcdilltely to the left of the Col,
where it lay in two lines of brigades, the front onc facing the
Spllnil\rds' Hill, the rear one a few hundred yards back. }~oy,
coming from Iroz, had marched past Laumrtinicrc's rear,
covered by him till he got west of the Col. This division wal> not
shelled, as Conroux, l\!aueunc, and Foy hau all been, but noted
with disquiet that Britil>h troops were streaming up from Huartc
, 'l'hCllC guns did not belong to Drandreth'~ batlery, the (livisional
artillery of tile tlth Divisioll,l>lll oddly enough to Cairnes's batlery, whieh
lJeIOlll,.oo to till.: 7t.h. &:c DWl<:un's J1'i~foru of fhe U/J'I.jlJl ArIiU(T!j, ii. p. 100.
I Sympllcr'S, of the K.G.L.
, Foy ill Girod de l'Aill, p. 22U.
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on the Roncesvalles road, with the obvious intention of turning
its left, and getting possession of the main route to l~rance.
Wellington, us it chanced, was in the Illost perfect condition
to take advantage of the mistake which Soult had mudc in
planning to withdraw his troops by a march right across the
front of the allied army in position. The night·mo..'cments
of the French had been heard, and under the idea that they
might portend a new attack, all the divisions had been put
under arms an hour before dawn. The guns, too, were in
position, only waiting for their mark to become visible-it had
been intended to shell the French out of Sorn.uren in any CllSC
that morning. \Vellington had risen early as usual, and was all
the look-out plucc on the Ql'icaill heights which he used as his
post all the 28th and 29th. When the panorama on the oppooitc
IllounWln became visible to him, he had only to send orders Cor
a general frontal attack, Cor whie!.l the troops were perfectly
placed.
Accordingly, the 6th Division attacked Sorauren village at
once, while the troops on the Oricain heights dc.'>cended, a little
later, in two lines-tbe front one formed of Dyng's brigade,
Stubbs's Portuguese, and the 10th and l'rovisional Battalion of
Anson's-while lloss's brigade and Anson's two other battalions
(the troops whicb hr.d taken the worst knceks on the 28th)
formed the rescn"e line. Preceded by their skirmishers, llyng's
battalions made for Sorauren, Colc's marched straight for Fay's
troops on the opposite hills 1. Farther to the right l'ieton hud
diseovercd ulready that there was no longer uny Frcnch force
opposite him, and had got his divisiollltsscmbled for nu advance
along the ROllccsvaUcs road. He would seem to have been
inclined to go a little farther than Wellington thought prudent,
as there was a dispatch sent to hirll at S a.lIl. bidding him to
advancc no farther, until it was certain that uIl was clear on the
left, though he might push forward light troops on the heights
cast of the Argu. river. He did not therefore get into touch with
I That the firing begun ut dawn immediately is stated by Larpent, p. 210.
That the troops were under nrms befol'C d:.ylight is noted by the anonymous
Soldier of Ille !l.2nd, p. HI!). The attack by tile 6th Division 011 SornuI'Cu
was appreeinbly before the descent of Cole alld nyng (rom the heights of
Oricain.
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Lamartini&e on the mountain above Zabaldica for some time
after Foy and l'tIaucune had been attacked.
Meanwhile it was not only to the old fighting-ground of the
28th that the attack was confined. Wcllington ordcred Lord
Dalhousie to cmerge from the shelter of thc hills beyond the
left of the 6th Division, and to assail the troops below him in
the U1zama valley-that is Taupin's and Vandermacsen's
divisions, halted by Clause} some way short of Ostiz, when the
sound of firing began near Sorauren.
The }~rench units which were in the grentest danger were the
thrce divisions of Conroux, Maucunc, and Foy, all suddenly
caught under the artillery firc of an enemy whom they had not
belicved to possess any gUllS in line. Troops marching in
column are very helpless when saluted in this fashion. Foy
writes' we had not been intending to fight, and suddenly we
found ourselves massed under the fire of the enemy's cannon.
Wc were foreed to go up the mountain side to get out of range;
we should have to retreat, and we already saw that wc should
be turned on both flanks by the two valleys on our left and
right. . .. General Reille only sent part of my division up on to
thc high crests after its masses had been well played upon by
an encmy whose artillery fire is most accurate 1.' Now Foy
could, after all, get out of range by going up hill-but ltlaucune
and Conroux were in a.nd about a village which it was their duty
to hold, since they had to cover the retreat of li'oy and Lamarti-
niere across their rear. If Sorauren were lost, lleille's two left
divisions would be driven away from the main army-perhaps
c\'cn cut off. Yct it was n hard business to hold a village under
a c1ose·ronge artillery fire from commanding ground, which
enfiladed it on both sides, when the enemy's infantry intervened.
Pakcnham scnt Madden's Portuguese rowld the village on the
north-where they drove in one regiment: which Conroux had
throwII out as a nank guard 011 the west bank of the Ulzama,
and thcn procccdl.'t1 to push round the rcar of the place. At the
game time lohc left wing of the troops which had descended from
the chapel of San Salvador (Byng's brigade) began to envelop
Soraurcn on the eastern flank. And frontally it was attacked
by the light companies ofLambcrt's brigade oftbc 6th Division,
I Girod dc rAin, p. 221. • -lard Liuc (2 battalions),
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Collroux's first brigade (Rey's) hud succeeded in getting away
to the north of the village before it was completely surrounded,
and, after biekeriogs with Madden's Portuguese and othcr
6th Division troops, finally straggled across the hills to Ostiz.
His other briga.de, however, and all Maueune's division were
very nearly cxtenninated. 'l'hey made an obstinate defence of
Sorauren for nearly two hours, till the place was entirely en·
compassed: Maucune says that he cleared a way for the morc
compromised units by a chargc which retook part of the village,
and then led the whole mass up the hill. 'I'he bulk of them
scraped through, but were intercepted by 4th Division troops ill
the hollow hillside above. Onc whole battalion wus forced to
surrender, und greut part of two othe1'l:i; there were 1,700 UIl'
wounded prisoners taken, of whom 1,100 belonged to Maucune
and 600 to Conroux'g rear brigade 1.
Maueune's division was practically destroyed: having
reported 600 casualties on the 28th, he reported 1,800 more on
the 30th, and as his total strength was only 4,186, it is clear
that only 1,700 men got away. The gcneral and the survivors
rallied in to Foy on the heights above, along with the wrecks of
Conroux's seeond brigade, which lost 1,000 men: the first
brigade, though less hard hit, seems to have had 500 or 600
casualties, and many stragglers. Altogether both divisions
were no longer a real fighting force during the rest of thc
campaign.
Meanwhile, there had been a distinct and separate combat
going on farther up the Ulzama valley. When the fighting ill
llnd about Sorauren bcgan, Clausel had halted Vandermaesen's
and 'l'aupin's division at a defile near the village of Olabc,
knowing that if he <:ontinued on his way towards Ostiz and
Olague Rcillc's wing would be completely eut off from him.
Having seen suspicious movements in the hills on his left, he
sent up two battalions from Vandermaesen's division to hold
the heights immediately beyond the river and cover his flank .
• l'tIaucune's 84th Uger reports 13 officers IInd 531 men prisoners oul of
a strength or 773. Why dOCll Cuptain Villal de 1u DiadIC, usually lIeeuTlIw,
give this w> Muucullc's totul 101>1:1 ill Ilril;UIlCI'li 1 (cf. p. 21n). His other
battalions contribute another 550. Conroux's 55th lInd 58th Line boivc
respectively 282 IInd 3,LM Ilrisoncrs--the olher regimcnts Slllltllcr IJUt
appreciable list!; of cuptun:d. I
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The precaution was wise but insufficient: somewhere about
8.30 n.m, the British 7th Division, having received its orders to
join in the general attack, eumc up from its concealed position
in the rear, and fell upon the covering troops, who were driven
off their stecp position by Inglis's brigade, and thrown down 011
to the main body of Claus~l's troops in the valley. There was
close Bnd bloody fighting in the bottom, ' a small level covered
with smnll bushes of underwood,' but after a time the French
gave way. Vandcrmacscn's men soon got locked in a stationary
fight with Inglis's battalions, but the two other 7th Division
brigades (Le Cor alld Bames) which had not desccnded to the
river and the road, were plying Taupin's column with a steady
fire from the slope of the opposite bank, which made standing
still impossible 1. Having to choose between atta.cking or
retreating, Clausel opted for the easier alternative, and drew oft
In his report to Soult he givcs as his rcason the fact that
Soraurcn had now been lost, that Rcille's troops were streaming
over the hills in disorder, and that it was no use wfl,iting any
longer to cover their retreat, which was not going to be by the
road, but broadcast across the mountains. Accordingly he
disengaged himself as best he could, and retreated up the
clu1.1useefollowed by the 7th Division, which naturally took some
time to get into order. lnglis's brignde followed by the road,
presently supported by Byng's troops, who came up frolU the
side of Sorauren at noon: the other two brigndes kept to the
slopes on the west of the river, turning each position which
Clauscl took up 2. By OIlC o'clock he was back to Etulain, by
dusk at Olaguc, where he was joined by Conroux and the
3,000 men who represented the wreck of his division. Vander-
maesell had been much mauled-and had left behind 300
I Interesting account.!; of this fight may be foulld fn the narratives of
Wood o( the 82nd, Green of the 68th, nnd Wheeler o( the 51Ht.---lLll in
Inglis's brigade. They arc, however, most con(w;oo, none 01 them haviug
mueh notion or how or where they came into the general scheme o( the
fight. All speak o( the at:.eepucss of the ground.
I I cannot make out for certain when Le Cor'a Portuguese joined
Dalhousie on the 30th, coming (rom tile Marenlnin rond, where they had
been placed on the previous evening. Probably not early, I1S they had
64 casunltiCll only (mostly in 2nd Ca~orcs), wbile the other brigades
had 200 apiece. The fact that the losses arc nearly all in the light batta-
lion shows that a skinnishing pursuit was the task 01 Le Cor's men.
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prisoners, while many stmgglcrs from his division, and morc
from both or the brigades of Conrollx, were loose in the hills.
It is doubtCul whether Clausc1 had more than 8,000 men out of
his original 17,000 in hand that evening. The survivors were
not fit for further fighting 1.
Meanwhile, Reille was undergoing equally unpleasant ex-
periences. He had stopped behind to conduct the retreat of
:Foy's and Lmnartiniere's divisions, when the unexpected
cannonade, followed by the advance of the British infantry,
showed that he was not to get away without hard fighting.
When Pakcnham attacked Soraurcll, and Cole a little latcr
crossed the ravine to assail Foy's position, Reillc tried for
some time to maintain himself on the heights, but soon saw
that it was impossible. He sent Maucune permission to
evacuate Sorauren....-.()f which the latter could not avail himself,
for he was pressed on all sides and no longer a free agent. And
having thus endeavoured to divest himself of responsibility
for the fate of his right division, he gave orders for the retreat
of the two others not by any regular route, but straight across
cOtrntry, up hill and down dale. The reason for haste was not
only that Cole was now pressing hard upon Foy's ncw position,
but that Picton was visible marching hard for Zabaldica, wi~h
thc obvious intention of turning Lamartinierc's flank. Thcre
was an ominous want of any frol!taJ attack on this division-
it was clear that Pieton intended to encircle it, while Fay on the
other flank was being driven in by Cole, and there was a chance
of the whole wing being surrounded. Accordingly, at about
10 o'clock by Lamartiniere's reckoning, he began to give way
in echelon of brigades, much hindered after a time by Pieton's
light troops, who had now swerved up into the hills after him,
I Chlusel's report is (perhaps nnbln.lly) very reticent, nml would gi\·e
a reader who had no other ~ourecs to utilize a very inadequate aCCQunt of
the day's work-no one could possibly gather from it that Conroux IllIlt
600 priSOlleI'llund Vlluuennnesell &10, or that the whole corpli WM in great
disorder. l'~or u picture of Conroux'lI divbion l>ClIttcretl over the hills, and
its general storming at the fugitives, see Lcmonnier·Delafolllle, p. 232.
The hours at which events took plaee on ClaulIel's wing are hard to
settle. I follow him in making the artillery begin to pll\Y all Somllren
long before 7, the infantry attack soon after tllat hour, and the lOllS of
Soro1JJeI) aoout 11.
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ami pestered each battalion whcn it turncd to retreat 1. }'oy
reports that his rcar brigadc and part of his collcague's division
wcrc at onc momcnt Ilcurly eut oU, and that he ran some danger
of being taken prisoner. It evidcntly beeame a helter-skelter
business to get away, and the French can have made no serious
resistance, asPieton's three brigades that day had only just
110 casualties between them 2. The retreat was made more
disorderly by the arrival of a drove of some 4,000 fugitives of
Conroux's and Maucune's divisions, accompanicd by the latter
gcneral himself, who had escaped over the hills from Sorauren,
and ran in for shelter on Foy's rear.
At about one o'clock Rcille's divisions, having outdistanced
their pursuers by their rapidity, halted in considerable disarray
in a valley by the village of Esain 3, where .Reille tried to restore
order, and to settle a practicable itinerary, with the object of
rejoining Clausel. -l?or reasons which he does not specify, he
marched himself by a road down the valley, which would Icad
him to Olaguc, but told Fay lo take a parallcl track farther up
the slope which should Luke him to Lan:.l, higher in the same
valley. The partition was obviously made in a vcry haphazard
fashion, for while the bulk of LamfU'tinicrc's division, and the
poor remnant of Maucunc's which preserved any order, accom-
panied the eorps·eommander, Foy found that he was being
followed by two stray battalions of Gauthier's brigade of Lamar-
tini~re,and by a great mass of stragglers, laTgelyConroux's men,
but partly also Maucune's and Lamartiniere's.
Reille got to Olague at dusk and joined Clausel, but brought
with him a mere wreck of his corps, probably not 6,000 men.
For Foy never appeared-and never wns to appear again during
the campaign. He explained, not in the most satisfactory way,
that part of his traek lay through woods, where the sellSe of
direction is lost, that be was worried by the reappearance of
British light troops, who had to be driven off repeatedly, and
thut the stragglers smothered his marching columns and led
I So LamarLillit:~, who admits that UIC~ was • un pen de dbonln:'
but oonfessCll much less than Foy, r6r whose account sce Girod de rAin,
p.22t.
I l'ieton's division loot 89 in Brisbane's brigade, 20 among Power's
PortuguClle, Done in Colville's brigade.
• So Foy. Reille thinks that it was Sanasibar, 3 miles farther cast.
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them astray. Anyhow, he found himself ut dusk ut Iragui in
the upper valley of the Arga, instead of at Lanz in the upper
valley of the Ulzama-Imving marched ten miles instead of the
five that would have taken him from Esain to Lanz. l'icton's
light troops were still in touch with him, Bnd he resolved that
it was hopeless to try to struggle over mountains in the dark.
Dropping into the pass that leads from Zubiri to the Alduidcs
(the Puerto de Urtiaga), he marched for some hours morc,
bivouacked, and next morning descended into French territory'.
He sento£l the stragg1crs to St. Jcan-Picd-de-l'ort-they sacked
all the mountain villages on thcirway2-and took his own division
at leisure down the Vo.! de llaigorry to Cambo-h:wing lost only
550 men out of his 6,000 in the whole campaign. Some critics
whispered that, seeing disaster behind him, it a 8U trap Men tirer
son epingle du jeu, and had saved his division, regardless of what
might happen to colleagues-just as on the eve of Yittoria he
had refused to join Jourdan, and had managed a safe retreat
for himscU. That it was not absolutely impossible to gel; away
to the Bastan was shown by the fact that the two stray batta·
lions of Lamartiniere's division whieh had followed Foy in error,
branched off from him at Tragui and got to Almandoz, Elizondo,
and the pass of Maya. Another lost party-the battalion and
cavalry regiment which Lamartinierc had lcft to cover the
Roneesvalles road 3-turned off at Zubiri and followed Fay's
route by the Alduides and Baigorry. Reille's' main body'
was a poor remnant by the night of the 30th, after all these
deductions had come to pass.
It must not be supposed that the operations of Pakcnham,
Dalhousie, Cole, and Pieton during the morning of the 30th
were left to the personlll initiative of these oIHeers. Welling-
ton's ordcrs for the first move had been made on thc spur of
the moment, as the position of thc French became visible at
dawn. But after the capture of Sorauren, probably between
9 and 10 a.m., he issued a defmitc progra.mme for the remainder
of the day's operations.
I Giro<.! de l'Ain, p. 223.
• Sec Vidal de la Dlache, p. 280, for complaints by the French mai,e! of
ll.trocitics cornmittcd .
• Sce ul.>ovc, p. 681.
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Pieton was to pursue the enemy who had gone oft north-
eastward (Lama.rtiniere) toward the Roncesvalles rond. He was
given two squadrons of hussars, and told to take his divisional
battery with him.
Cole was to act on the massif between the Arga and the
U1zama, keeping touch with Pieton on one flank and Pnkcnham
on the other: if the enemy in his front (Foy and the wrecks
of Maueune) made a strong stand, he was not to lose men by
violent frontal o.ttacks, but to wait for the effect of Pieton's
turning movement, ' which 'will alarm the enemy for his Hank.'
Up the main road Ostiz-Olague there were to march Byng's
brigade, the 6th Division, and O'Donllcll's troops from the
San Cristobal position (some six battalions). The 6th Division
was to take its divisional battery with it.
Dalhousie should operate on the east bank ot' the Ulzama,
keeping touch 'with Byng and Pakenham-he would be in
a position to turn all positions which the French (Taupin and
Vandermaesen) might take up, if they tried to hold back the
main column on the high road. Like Cole, he was not to
attempt anything {.'Ostly or hazardous.
Finally, and here later news caused a complete alteration
or the programme, Hill was to 'point a movement' from
Lizaso on Olague and Lanz, if the situation of the enemy made
it possible. Attacked himself by the superior numbers of
D'Erlon's corps, Hill was (of course) unable to do anything of
the kind. Wellington seems to ha.ve suspected that he might
be too weak for his task, and in the general rearrangement of
the army sent him not only Campbell's Portuguese briga.de
(which properly belonged to the division of Silveira, who was
ill person with Hill but only with onc brigade, Da Costa's), but
also the Spanish battalions whieh O'Donnell had dctachcd to
Ollocarizqueta on the 27th 1, and Hnully Morillo's division.
These 7,000 men were started from their positions before noon,
but did not arrive in time to help Hill 2. A separate supple-
mentary order went orr to Charles Altcn to tell him that the
1 See above, p. (\(14 •
• All thill ill Q.M.G. to Hill, &c., in SupplemtflwnJ Dispald4e:J, viii.
pp. 154-5, where it ill stnpidl~' printcd ofter Uic cvcning onlcn; given at
9 p.ra.
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Light Division would not be wanted at Lceumbcrri, and should
return to Zubieta.
The whole of this series oforders is purely offensive in charae·
ter, and, as is easily seen, presupposes first that a large section
of the French army is retiring on the Roneesvallcs road, but
secondly that the main body is about to go back by Lanz, the
Col de Vc1ate, Eliwndo, and Maya. Hcnee the heaviness of
the column directed on the cMussee: if Wellington had
dreamed that Soult was intending to send nothing back by the
lloneesvalles road, and had started a vigorous' attack on Hill
that morning, the orders given would have been dirfercnt.
Meanwhile, during the hours which saw the destruction of
Clause1's and Reille's divisions, Soult himself was urging on
D'Erlon's corps to overwhelm Hill, and hoping for the early
arrival of Clausel's to lend assistance. Reille he bad left behind
as a containing force, and did not expcct to sce for another
twenty-four hours. Soult informs us that he left Zabaldica
and the left wing so early that he had no reason to expect the
trouble which was about to break out behind him. He noticed
Maueune's division beginning to file into Sorauren, and passed
Clausel in march on Ostiz, before the British guns opened,
Le. before 6 o'clock in the morning. But they must have been
sounding up the valley before he reached D'Erlon on the heights
by Etuloin: he resolved to pay no attention to the ominous
noise, being entirely absorbed ill the operation which he had
in hand.
D'Erlon was already in movcment, by the valley of the
Ulzama, and had just been joined by the cavalry, which had
come up from the Arga valley by cross roads in the rear 1. It
was, of course, no use to him ill the sort of engagement 011 which
he was launched. The Marshal instructed him to push on and
hurry matters, as there were reports from deserters that three
hostile divisions were on their way to reinforce the British force
at Lizaso. Accordingly D'Erlon, having discovered his enemy's
position with some little difficulty, for it lay all along the edge
of woods, delivered his attaek as soon as his troops wcre up.
• ~lIlt says by way of Zubiri, Eugui, ami L:,l!1Il;, which seems a vast
circllit-thi~ nmrcll must lrurely huve 1Jee" mude UIl the prel.'t.'<liug evening:
In the dark it would hardly have beell possible.
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Hill, on news of the Freneh advance reaching him, had eva-
cuated Lizaso, which lies in a hole, and had drawn up his four
brigades along a wooded ridge half a mile to the south, with the
village of Gorron in fTont of his left wing, and that of Arostegui
behind his right wing. The Portuguese brigade of Ashworth
formed his centre: on the right was onc regiment ofDa Costa's
brigade which had been called up from the l\Iarcalain rand, on
the left the other and the remains of Cameron's brigade, which
had suffered so heavily at Mayo.: Fitzgerald of the 5/60th was
in command, the brigadier having been wounded 011 the 25th.
Pringle's brigade (under O'Callaghan that day, for Pringle was
acting as di vision-commander vice William Stewart wounded
at Maya) was in reserve-apparently distributed by battalions
along the rear of the line. Thc edge of the w(,ods was lined
with R heavy skirmishing line of light companies, and the
Ca~ador battalion of Ashworth's brigade. Altogether there
were under 9,000 men in line.
D'ETlon determined to demonstrate against Hill's front with
Darmagnae's division, who were to hold the Portuguese closely
engaged, but not to attack seriously. Meanwhile Abbe w~ to
assail the Allied left, and also to turn it by climbing the high
hills beyond its extreme flank, in the direction of the village of
Beunza. He had ample force to do this, having the strongest
division in Soult's army-S,OOO bayonets-and the only one
which had not yet been seriously engaged during the campaign.
Maransin followed Abbe in support. The arrangements being
scientific, nnd the force put in action more than double Hill's,
success seemed certa.in.
It was secured; but not so easily as D'Erlon had hoped.
Darmagno.c, so Soult says, engaged himself much more deeply
than had been intended. Finding only Portuguese in his front,
he made a fierce attc'mpt to break through, and was handsomely
repulsed. Meanwhile Abbe, groping among the wooded slopes
to rmd the flank of Fitzgerald's brigade, missed it at first, and
attacking the 50th and 92nd frontally, saw his leading battalions
thrown back. But he put in morc, farthe~ out to the right, and
though the British brigade threw back its flank en potence, and
tried to hold on, it was completely turned, and would have been
cut off, but for a ficn:c charge by the 34th, who came up from
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the reserve and held the enemy in check long enough for the
rest to retire-with the loss of only 86 prisoners (two oC them
oHicers). The retreat of the left 'wing compelled the Portuguese
in the centre to give hack also-they had to make their way
across a valley and stream closely pursued, but behaved most
steadily. and lost less than might have been expected-though
some 180 were cut oU aud captured. The right wing pivoted,
in its withdrawal, 011 an isolated hill held by Du Costa's.2nd Line,
which was gallantly maintained to the cnd of the day. The
centre and left lost more than a mile of ground, but werc in
good enough order to take up a new position, selected by Hill
on a height in front of the village ofYguarns, where they repulsed
with loss a final attack made by one of Darmagnac's regiments
which ·pursued too fiercely 1. D'Erlon was reforming his troops,
much scattered in the woods, when at 4 p.m. there arrived from
Marcalain the head of Campbcll's Portuguese brigade, foDowed
by Morillo's and O'Donnell's Spaniards. Their approach was
observed, and no further attacks wcre made by the French.
D'Erlon winds lip his account of the day by observing, quite
correctly, that he had driven Hill out of his position, inflicted
mueh loss on him, and got possession of the road to Yrurzufl.
So he had-the Allies had lost 156 British and about 900 Portu-
guese, of whom 170 were prisoners. 'fhe French casualties must
have been about 800 in all, if we may make a rough calculation
from the fact that they lost 89 officers-ID in Abbe's division,
29 in Darmngnac's 2.
But it is not to win results such as these thnt 18,000 men
attack 8,000, nnd fight them for seven hours 3. And what was
the usc of sueh n Ulcticol success, whell meanwhile SouIt's main
I 75th Line. DarmagIluc &'l.ys in his report that its colonel att.'l.cked
the second position without orders. l\Iurtinien's lists show thn.t it lost
16 omccrs-----preSlIlllubly thercrore over 300 meJl.
• Sce casualty tables in Appendix. Marunsin had no losses, baling
never been enguged. Hill made an astounding blunder in estimating his
totullollS ..t 400 in his report to Wcllington. Ninc British unu 361'ortugucoo
officcrs were hit;......exnetly the same number as the French officer-casualties.
• Hill had Fihgerald's and O'Callllgllan's British brigades-2,600
deducting Muyu losSCl;, Du Coslll'S brignde 2,300, Ashworth's 2,800, IiIlO
some squadrons of Long's light drngoon~bout 8,000 in all. D'Erloll
hmi, also dCllncting 2,000 Mnyu losscs, over ]8,000 illfnntry in Ilis three
divisions-not to speak of the cavalry division ju.rl arrived.
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body bad been beaten and scattered to the winds, so that Reille
and Clauscl were bringing up 14,000 demoralized soldiers,
instead of30,000 confident ones, to join the victorious D'Erlou ?
TILis unpleasant fuct stared Soult in the face, when he rode
back to Olague to receive the reports of his two lieutenants. It
was useless to think of further attempts on the '1'010580 road, or
molestation of Craham. D'Erlon's three dh,isions were now
his only intact force, capable of engaging in an action with eon-
fidellce: the rest wcre not only reduced to a wreck in number,
but were' spent troops' from the point of view of morale. The
only tiling to be done was to retreat as fast as possible, using
the one solid body of combatants to cover the retreat of the
rest. All that Soult afterwards wrote to Paris about his move-
ments of .July 31 being the logical continuation of his design of
July 30-' de me rapprocher de la frontiere pour y prendre de!:
subsistanees, avcc I'espoir de joindre la reserve:: du Ge.neral
VilIatte \' was of course mere insincerity. He changed his
whole plan, and fled in haste, merely because he was forced to
do so. ~
One strange resolve, however, he made on the evening of
July so. The safest and shortest way home was by the Puerto
de Velate, Elh'.ondo, and Mayo.; and Clausel's and Reille's
troops at Olaguc and Lanz were well placed for taking this
route. This was not the case with D'Erlon's men at Lizaso and
the newly won villages in front of it. Instead of bidding the
routed corps hurry straight on, and bringing D'Erlon down to
cover them, the Marshal dirceted Reille !UId Clauscl to leave
the great road, to cut across by Olaguc to Lizaso, and to get
behind D'Erlon, who would hold on till they were past bis rear.
All would then take the route of the Puerto de Arraiz and go
by Santesteban. This was a much more dangerous line of
retreat; so much so that the choice excites surprise. SQlllt
told Clarke that his reason for taking the risk was that D'Erlon
had got so fa.r west that there was no time to move him buck
to the Velate road-which seems nn unconvincing argument.
For Clausel and Reillc had to transfer themselves to the Puerto
de Arraiz road, whieh would take just as much time; and
D'Erlon couhl not retreat till they had cleared his rear. The
• Soult to Clarkc, August 2.
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real explanation would seem to be that Soult thought "that the
British column on the Vclate road, being victorious, would
start sooner and pursue more vigorously than Hill's troops, who
had just been detented. It Rci~e and ClauscJ. were Pressed
without delay, their divisions would go to pieces: D'Er!on, on
the other hund, cou.!d be relietl upon to stand his ground as
long us was nccdrul. U this W!l•.'l Soult's idcn, his pre;cience was
justil1cd.
SECTION XXXVIII: CHAPTER VI
SQULT'S RETREAT, JULY 3I-AUG. 3
WHEN Sault's orders of the evening of July 29th had Uccn
issued, there was no longer any pretence kept up that the Army
was executing a voluntary strategical movement, planmilsrig
as the German of 1918 would have expressed the idea, and not
absconding under pressure of the enemy.
At 1 o'clock midnight Clauscl's and Rcillc's ha.rasscd
troops at Olague and Lnnz wcnt of[ ns fnst ns their tired legs
would enrry them, and leaving countless stragglers behind.
D'Erlon could not retire till the morning, when he sent off
Do.nnagnnc and l\Inransin to follow the rest of the army,
retaining AbM's division us his rearguard. which held the
heights north of Lizaso Cor some time after their comrades had
gone.
Wellington's orders issued at nightfall! were such as suited
Soult fairly well, for thc British general had not foreseen that
whieh was unlikely, and he had been deceived to some extent
by the reports which had come in. The deductions which hc
drew from what he had ascertained wcre that a large body of
th.e enemy had retreated eastward, and would fall into the
Roncesvalles road, but thnt the main force would follow thc
Velate-Elizondo chaussee. That $oult would lead nil thnt
survived to him of his army over the Puerto de Arrniz passcs,
to Snntesteban, had not struck him as a likely contingency.
Hence his detailed orders ovcrnight wcre inappropriate to the
facts whieh appcurcd next morning. He directed Picton to
pursue whatever was before him on the Ronccsvallcs road-
thinking that Foy and Lamartinicrc would escape in that
direction; hut lest they should have gone off by Eugui and
the Col de Urtiaga he directed Pakenham to take the 6th Divi-
sion from Olague, when it should have reached that place,
across the hills to Eugui, from whence he could join Picton
• Supplementary Di8patchcs, viii. pp. 152-{l.
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if necessary. Campbcll's Portuguese were to turn off in the
same direction and make for Eugui and the Alduides. Unfor-
tunately, Picton wa,.c; thus set to pursue nothing, while Paken·
ham was twelve hours behind Foy, and never likely to catch him.
The main pUl'Suit was to be urged on the chausste leading
by Olague and Lan? to Elizondo, whither it was supposed that
Soult would have taken the bulk of his n.rmy. From Ostiz and
the neighbourhood Dyug and Cole were to march in this direc-
tion, conducted by Wellington himself, while from the other
side Hi1I was to lead thither his own four brigades, and the
Spanish reinforcements which had rcached him at the cnd of
the combat of BCUll7Al.
Only Dulhousie and the 7th Division were directed to take
the route of the Puerto de Arrniz, and tins not with the object
of pursuing: the main French army, but rather as a Oanking
movement to favour the operation allotted to Hill. And
Dalhousie, unfortunately, was not well placed for the march
allotted to him, sinee he was near Ostiz, aud had to get to his
destination by a cross march via Lizaso.
A separate note for Charles Alten, written at the same time
as the rest of the orders, but not sent out till the following
morning, directed the Light Division to march back to Zubicta.,
where it would be able to communicate with the column that
went by the })uerto de Arraiz, i. e. that of Dalhousic I, and be
well placed for flank operations against the retreating enemy.
The net result of all this was to send over half the available
troops-Pieton, Pakenham, Campbell, Byng, and Cole-on
roads where no enemy would be found. And Hill's force would
have suffered the same fate, if it had not been in such close
toueh with D'Erlon that it could not help following, when its
enemy's route became evident. Unfortunately-as Soult had per·
haps c,'l.lculated-HiIl had troops whose Tanks had been terribly
thinned, and who wcre tired out by an unsuccessful action
fought on the preceding afternoon.
The day's work was unsatisfactory. Picton, of course, found
out atZubiri that everything that had been on the Roncesvalles
I Supp/(mtntary JJispo.tcllt3, viii. p. 154, written lit Ostiz, :10th July,
many hours after the preceding note to AJtcn, also written on the 30th but
trorn Villabllo.. It is endorsed by G. lUurr.:Jy, Li7.a50, 11 n.m., :nrt July.
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road-the small detachment already spoken 01' \ and a mass
of stragglers-had turned up toward Eugui and the Alduides
on the preceding night. And Cole discovered that Foy had
passed the Pucrto de Urtiaga a whole march ahead of him.
Wellington, with the column on the great chaussee, pressed
rapidly aeross the Vclate and reached Iruritn, with the exas-
perating result that he discovered that only 500 to 1,000 Freneh
had passed that way 2. On the othcr hand, he had news from
the west that an immense mass of the enemy had gone by the
Puerto de Arraiz, with Hill and Dalhousie after them. There
were doubts whether the pursuing force was not dangerously
small-at any rate, it would have to be cautious. And it was
tiresome that the position of the Light Division was still
unknown-it might (or lnight not) have a chance of fallil1g on
the flank of Soult's long column, either at Santesteban or at
Sumbilla. Wellington's own troops had marched far and fast
from Ostiz to Irurita, but there was in the evening enough
energy left in Dyng's brigade for a short push farther. News
came in that a great convoy of food (Tom St. Jean de Luz had
just reached ElizOlldo, where it had halted under the protection
of the regimcnt which D'Erlon hoo left there on the 27th. By
u forced mareh in the evening Byng's flank companies surprised
und captured the whole-ll good supply of brclld, biscuit, llnd
brandy-the escort making off without resistance. The
brigadier had the heads of the brandy casks stove in, before
the weary troops could get llt them, • it was II sight to sec the
disappointed soldiers lying down 011 their faces and lapping up
the liquor with their hands 3.'
All this, of course, was unimportant. The real interest of
the doinf,'S of July 31st lay 011 the road from Lizaso to the Puerto
de Arraiz. Hill, as was natural, was late in discovering that
the whole of the French army had passed across his front, since
Abbe's division still lay at eight in the morning in battle-order
blocking his way. Buthavinggot the newsofthedecisive success
won by his chief on the preceding day, Hill had to attack the
hitherto victorious enemy in front of him, knowing that the
'One battalion and onc cavalry regiment, &CC abovc, p. 681.
• Wellington to Q.M.G., 1ruritn, a I).m .
• Narrative of L'Estrange of tilC 31st, p. 121.
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general situation was such that they could not possibly stand.
His advallce was not made till 10 8.01.-0. sufficient proof of the
difficulty of resuming the offensive with tired and beaten troops.
When once, however, it began, the 2nd Division showed that if
its numbers were wastetl, its fightin~ power was still strong.
And the delay in ib; attack allowed oC the arrival of the 7th
Di.... ision, who were able to co-operate in a way that would have
been impossible if the fighting had started at daybreak.
On the other hand, the hours between dawn and 10 a.m.,
during which his retreat was unmolested, were invaluable to
Soult, whose army was jammed in the passes in a most danger-
ous fashion. He hlld taken the lead himself, with the two
cavalry divisions and the baggage, ordering lleille, whose
troops were the most demoralized of all, to follow, with Clausel
in his rear-D'Erlon stopping behind as rearguard to hold baek
the enemy. Now cavalry moves slowly in an uphill elimb on
a narrow road; while worn-out mules and pack-horses go much
slower still, and are always breaking down and obstructing the
route. The result was a complete block in the defiles: when
Heille heard firing commencing in the reor, he grew so anxious
that he ordered his infantry to push on anyhow, and thrust
their way through the baggage by force 1. 'fhis naturally made
matters still worse. Clausel found a better plan: the Puerto
de Arraiz gives its name to what is rcall)' not a single path, but
three parallel ones of various merit, all crossing the same dip
in the mai.n crest of the Pyr~nees within a short distance of
each other. They eome together again ou the north side of the
watershed near the village of DOlma Maria, whence some
writers call the whole group' the Donna Maria passes.' Clausel
leaving the best and most obvious track to the others, crossed
by thc most eastern of the three, the Puerto de Arrai:t proper,
while the cavalry, Reille, and D'Erloll took the western route
which is locally known as the Puerto de Eradi, and comes down
more directly on to Santesteban.
When Hill's attack began to develop from Lizaso, D'Erlon
ordered Abbe's division to give ground, before it was too closely
pressed, but halted it (OT a stand again, on heights by the Venta
I In his report. liS he explains, • ie m'oceupui de dcblo.ycr la route, qui
ctait clloolllbrl:c d'Cquipag.."Ii et de '-'Uvaleric.'
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de Urroz, six miles farther north, at the foot of the passes.
Darmagnac and l\laransin were visible higher up the crest,
where they were wniting till the road should be clear in front
of them. It WllS now nearly two o'clock, Bnd Dalbousie's
division was nearing the front, Gnd was visible closing towards
Hill's right. Undoubtedly the proper game Wl1S to awnit its
arrival, and use it to turn Abbe's Oank. But lUll directed his
leading troops to prevent thc enemy from withdrawing, and
the vanguard was this day in charge of the reckless William
Stewart, who despite his Mayo. wound had come hack to his
troops, and appea.rcd with his damaged leg strapped to his
saddle in a roll of cushions. He ordered Fitzgerald's brigade
to attack at onee frontally: this was really wicked; the three
battalions had lost nearly half their numbers at Mayo., and
150 men more at Beul1za on the preceding afternoon. They
were a mere wreck-under 1,000 bayonets: the position 0Ppo-
sire them was n steep wooded hill, held by the most intact
division of the whole French army, over 7,000 strong. The
attack was delivered with great courage, but was hopeless from
the first, and repelled with loss 1. Stewart then repeated it,
throwing in Pringle's brigaae as it came up from the rear, to
support Fitzgerald's, ana turning on two guns, which had been
brought up with much difficulty, to shell the woods beside the
road. A second attack was thus dcliverca with equal want of
success. But Dalhousie's troops having now comc up on the
right 2, a third push was slIccessful, and Abbe went back, and
retired behind Darmagnae, who now took over the rearguard.
The hours gained in this combat had suffiecd to clear the road,'
and on the further advance of the British, D'Erlon's corps gave
back rapidly but in good order, and was in full retrcat down the
northern watershed when a dense fog came 011, and caused Hill
to halt his troops. Stewart's first wholly unne(.'cssary fronte'll
attack had resulted in the loss of the acting·brigadier, Fitz-
gerald, wounded and a prisoner a, and of nearly 200 casualties
1 D'Erlon iR his report of August, a says that' the majority of Um ell(!lny'~
soldiers were drunk,' an involuntary tribute to their wild pluck.
I The 7th Division hail a steep scrnmble and a tough fight; sce the
diary of Green of the 08th, p. 162.
• A fact mentioned only by D'Erlon and by Rigaud's history of the
5j60lh, I<'itzgcrald's corps.
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among his three weak battalions-91 in the 92nd Highlanders
alone, who having put 750 men in line at !\Iaya on the 25th
came out of action all the 31st with only 250 surviving. The
7th Division had 117 casualties distributed between six English
and Portuguese units-and the total loss in the combat was
387, including a score of prisoners, That Stcwart himself was
again wounded and sent to the rear, after only twelve hours at
the front, was a testimonial to his courage, but a very fortUllate
event for the 2nd Division. The French cannot have lost much
over 200 men '.
Having tlms cleared the passes, Hill thought it was his duty
to carry out \Vcllington's original order!> of the preceding night~,
by closing in towards the main body on the Maya chaussce; he
did so by taking a hill track called the Puerto de Sangre. whieh
rllns [ram Arrai." to Almando.". Of course this was a grave
mistakc, as troops were wanted rather on the 5antcsteban than
on the Elizondoroad. Hill must not be too much blamed, as Wel·
Iington might have sent him new orders to keep to the direction
ofthe enemy's retreat, and did not. The danger involved in this
move was that only the 7th Division was lcft to pursue Smut's
main body, and the force in the upper Bastrm was unnecessarily
increased. Thc rcsponsibility rcsts with Wellington', who, even
artcr rcaching Iruritn in the afternoon and fmding practically
no traces of encmy in the Bastnn, could not believe that the
French had gone off en mat/se by the passes to Santcstcban. He
would make no sweeping clll:mges in his plan till he got full
information. 'I shall make the troops dine, and sec what is to
be done in the evening' was his mcssage to MUrflly3. The
evening brought Hill's news, and by dawn Wellington was much
more clear about the situation-' as far as I can judge the
enemy have six divisions between Doiia Maria and St. Estevan.
There MC three divisions ecrtainly about Eugui and Rouccs-
1 So 1 deduce rrolll there lJeiJlg precisely 10 officer-CllSuulties in AblJi:'s
regiments, aceording to Martinien's lists.
• Hill alld the Qlmrtcnnaster-Gcncml, Gcorgc Murrny, had settled at
11 a.m. UULt Wellington's originlll onlcr was ollly' momenturil)' suspended'
alld not cancelled, by the necessity for driving ill • the columll of the enemy
now retiring by the DOl\na Mnria rond.' SI~PJlleme'ltary DispaUher, viii.
p. 163.
* Supplementary Dispatches, viii. p. 159.
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vanes 1.' The distribution of the French was evcn still mis-
judged-there were troops representing eight dh'isions, not six,
in thc Central'Bastan \'alley. And only one division, Foy's, had
passed enstward; though so many lost detachments and bands
of stragglers had followed it, that an impression of much larger
numbers had been produced.
Despite of Wellington's misconceptions, Soult's position at
Santestcban that evening was most uncomfortable. His
cavalry scouts had brought him ncws that there was a heavy
British column on his right flank, at Elizondo in the Upper
Bastan (Cole and Byng). His rearguard had been fiercely
attacked by another column (Dalhousie and Hill). There were
large possibilities of the arrival of other foes from the north and
west, if Graham had not becn kept employed by VilIatte, And
it was growing most ob\'ious that the story which D'Erlon had
reported, to the effect that the Reserve Division had crossed
the Bidassoa, and was advancing, could not be true. For cavalry
patrols pushing down the river towards Vera could not find
any signs of friendly troops, and had been tired on by Spanish
outposts-Lollga's men. When Soult next wrote to Paris he
spoke out with much bitterness on the criminal torpidity of
VilIatte, who might at least, without risking anything, have
oc<:upied Vera and the gorge of the Bidassoa, and have tried to
get into touch with the army in the field. It lDust be remem-
bered that down to thc 30th all Soult's communications with
his bascs at Bayonnc and St. Jean-Pied-du-Port had been either
by l\faya or by Roncesva.lles. He had thrown up the lattcr line
when he marched north; the formcr was now closed to him by
the reported arrival of a large hostile force at Elizondo. The
only way home wns by the road down the Bidassoa by Sumbilla
to Eehalar j and now it turned out that therc was no certainty
that this road might not have been blocked by detachments
from Graham's army. The situation was anything but hopeful,
and a complete disaster was by no mcans outside the ooullds of
possibility. Onc thing was certain-the army must get out of
the Santcsteban cuI-de-sac as soon as possible, and by the only
road that was not known to be intercepted. But prompt flight
I Wellington to O'Donnell. lru~ita 6 a.m., on the 1st August. SIl1J1,le-
mtllWf,lf DilJl'alchu, viii. p. 1(13.
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was rendered difficult by the presence at head-quarters of two
divisions of quite useless cavalry, a convoy of many thousands
of wounded, and the baggage of eight divisions.
At evening on the 31st the Marshal had been so much dis-
turbed by the news of the presence of the British at Eliwndo,
from whence they could descend on Sllntestcban by following
the road along the Bidassoa, that he had thrown out the whole
of Rcille's surviving infantry (perhaps 6,000 men) to cover the
road by the river against any attack. But the enemy did 1I0t
move that night-Wellington was resting his men and waiting
for news. Dalhousic had halted on the heights by the Puerto
de Arraiz when the fog came down at 5 p.m., and did not follow
D'Erlon down to the valley.
Hence Soult had the power to arrange for a Ilitting before
dawn, on the only possible route-a gorge twelve miles long
where the road follows the rocky bed of the Bidassoa in all its
curves, with the water on its left and steep wooded hills on its
right. The line of march was headed by onc infantry battalion
of Reillc's corps to clear the way I, then came Treillard's
dragoons 2, six regiments, taking up an intolerable length of
road, then the remains of L..'l.martinicre's division 3, then the
wounded followed by the baggage train, then the handful of
men that represented the wrecked division of Maucune, th~~
(apparently) Pierre $oult's cavalry 4. D'Erlon's corps wus to
folloy,'-in the order Abbe, l\Iaransin, Darmagnac, followed by
another mass of baggage. Clauscl's wing was directed to bring
up the rev.r, with the task of holding back any pursuit either
from the direction of Elizondo or that of the Donnu .Maria
passes. It was certain that there was danger from both sidcs-
so the start was made carly-at 2.30, long ere dawn. Rcillc was
, 1/120lh Line of Lamartilli~re"
I Who were picked up by Reille some miles north of Sanlesleb.'m, having
been sent lorward on lhe Sumbillu rond overnight, in ehllorb'C of the convoy
of wounded. Scc Rcille's Report .
• Reduced to five battalions, since it had detaehed Olle regiment to the
head of the column, and was short of two uattalions whieh had escaped by
Allllando~, and one whieh had (ll;Wped by Zubiri und Eugui following 1"0)".
Sce above, pp. G99-700•
• '.rhe chasseur regiments only-the dragoons having escorled the
urtillcry to Roneesvnlle8. Plllee in the eolumll lIot 'luit.c <,.'Crtllill-bul !iCC
the narrative of J...cmonnier·lklufossc for I'. 5oult', presence.
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directed to le.ad the column along the river us far as the bifur-
cation of the routes to Vera and to Echalar, where he was to
take the latter, and turn off from the Bidassoa: for the last
stage into France was to be made over the Puerto de Echalar
and not over the more westerly Puerto de Vera. Apparcntly
D'Erlon was ordcrcd to branch off at Sumbilla with his infantry
a.lone, and to take a separate mountain-track to Eehalar, which
few maps mark. This is, at any rate, Soult's statement; but
as D'Erlon makes no mention of such directions, and did not
actually go that way (though Clause! did), the order matters
little to the historian.
The unpleo.sant possibilities of the situation of the French on
the night of July 31st-August 1st seem to have been more
clearly discerned by Soult than by Wellington-as was natural,
since the Marshal kncw mueh better the exact state of his own
army. There was a positive danger that it might be enveloped
from all sides on the following day. But Wellington does not
seem to have contemplated so great an operation, though he
had a clear notion that the enemy might be much incommoded
and harassed if all went well. He had hopes that something
might be done by means of the Light Division-whose position
was still, most unluckily, a matter of doubt. He had written
on the preceding afternoon to Charles Alten to say that if he
had got back to Zubietn, he ought to be told that a large body
of the encmy was marching by the DOlUm Maria passes: • it
is very desirable that you should endeavour to head them at
St. Estcvan. If you should find that you' cannot head them
there, you might at Sumbilla, or you might cut in upon their
column of march: they arc in the greatest disorder. The head
of our troops is here at Irurita, and others arc following the
enemy by Doi'ia Maria. Communicate this to Sir Thomas
Graham, via Goizueta 1.' It is quite clear that there is no idea
of encirclement in this order, but only one of molestation. And
it is equally obvious that Wellington had no idea of using any
of Graham's forces to block the gorge of the Bidassoa. His
message to that general on the SIst is, • we are going to act
immediately against a column which is retiring by the Doiia
Maria road. We have plenty of troops in the proper direction,
• To Alren, 12 noon, from neUf Almandoz. Dispatrhcs, x. p. 574.
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and if we can overtake the column, I hope its rear will suffer
considerably 1.' Graham is asked for no help; a.nd, what is
more curious, Wellington in his Inst preceding letter had told
him that he attached no importance to keeping possession of
Vera, at the actual gorge of the Bidassoa. 'I have a. letter
from General Giron, expressing apprehensions of the conse-
quences to his position of losing Vera. The fact is, that Vera is
no object to anybody. The heights arc important for the
communication with Lesaca by the valley of the llidMsoa, and
the heights on the other side open the diboucht into France.
But the loss of both would not alCect the position of Irnn, if
the passages through the rocky heights on the right of Irnn
arc well guarded, for which Longa is a.llottcd: and that is what
it is most important to take care of.' This, it is true, was
writtcn on thc BOth, bcfore Wellington had asccrtaincd that
any French force was to retire by Santcsteban. But it coincides
completely with Graham's contemporary letter to his corn·
mander, expressing exactly the same opinion. ,'General Giron
seems anxious, on hearing of Soult's being repulsed, to under-
take an offensive operation against the Puerto de Vera, whieh
I could not encourage, being persuaded that his troops would
not succeed, against so strong a post, and that his failure would
be ...·ery prejudicial.'
In fact it is clear that Graham and Wellington both dis·
couraged the idea of sending a considerable force to the gorge
of the Bidassoa, which a du.y lutcr would have proved of
incalculable importance. A single division placed on the cross·
roads to Vcra and Echalar by the bridge of Yanzi would ha\'e
eut Soult's only line of retreat. His infantry, no doubt, or
grcat part of it, could huve eseuped ovcr the mountains, but
the whole of his cavalry and train, and no doubt many infantry
also, must have becn captured. To make matters casy for the
enemy, Soult had placed at the head of his interminable column
uscless drugoons, and the snmllcst and most demoralized of his
corps of infantry. Neither ReiIle's wasted divisions nor
Trcillard's cavalry could have cut their way through 5,000
• Du,pn!dU:6, x. p. 573•
• Grnhalll to WclJillgwn, July 30, 5 ".111. SUPl'leml;lllanJ DU1!l(lldru,
viii. p. ]56.
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steady troops at the mouth of the defile. And D'Erlon could
not bavegot up-the road in front of him for miles being blocked
with baggage and helpless horsemen, and his rear harassed by
vigorous pursuit.
Unfortunately, however, when Longa complained that he
was too weak on the heights opposite Vera, and reported that
the French werc turning back, and that his post at the bridge
of Yanzi would bc attacked, no more was done to strenbrthen
him than the moving of one brigade of Barcena's division to
the heights by Lesaca, from which a single battalion was sent
down to the Yanzi position. Yet this solital'y unit had no
smo.lI effect on the events of August l,caused a Panic among the
enemy, and delayed SouJt's march for hours. What would
ho.ve happened if Graham and Ciron had sent down a solid
force (e.g. onc British and onc or two Spanish brigades) it is
impossible to say with accuracy, but the results must have been
tremendous.
There can be no doubt that the legend according to which
Wellington'schemed for the complete encirclement of Soult's
army on the ]st of August, though early and well supported, is
inaccurate. The form which it takes in Napier 1, Lnrpent, and
Stanhope's ConveTsatiollS with the Duke of WeUil1gtOll, is that on
the evening ot' the 31 st arrangements were being made for a
concentric attack on Soult, but that thcy werc foiled, under
Wcllington1s own cyes, by a party of marauding British
solrJiers, who strayed near the French camp, and were taken
prisoners. Their appearance from the Elizondo side betrayed,
it is alleged, to Soult that he was outllankcd, and caused him
to march in the night instead of at dawn-by which time he
would have been surrounded. Unfortunately for the legend, we
have Soult's own contemporary dispatch of August 2 to prove
that thc news of the presence of the nritish at Elizondo wa.'>
brought him by n cavalry patrol, which reached the village just
as it and the convoy in it were captured by Dyng's brigade.
They got away, but could not tcll him whether the convoy-escort
, Napier (v. p. 243) and !:itanllope (pp. 71-2) both say that they had the
unecdote from the Duke himselr-but wrote many years after 1813. llut
L:lrpent's absolutely contempomry diary also Ims the tale (p. 218) written
down 011 August 3, only two duyll after the sUl'l>OSCli evellt.
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had, or had not, escaped. Moreover, much earlier in the day,
Reille had warned the Marshal that the British were coming up
in force on the Vclntc-Elizondo road-so the whole story falls
through.
Wellington's limited ambitions of August 1 arc made clear
by his dispatch written at 6 in the morning, which says that
he is sending the 4th Division on to Santestcban • with the
intention of aiding Dalhousie's advance, and to endeavour to
cut some of them off.' It is true that he adds, • I sent in tripli-
cate to the Light Division at Zubietu yesterday, to desire that
General Alten should move toward St. Estevan. and at all
events get hold of Sumbilla if he could. But I have heard
nothing of him 1.' He was therefore not relying on certain help
from the Light Division, or from Graham or from Longa,
though advices of the situation werc scnt to all thrcc. Of the
troops under his own hand he only sent the 4th Division to join
the hunt. Cole was directed to push the French on the north
bank of the Bidassoa, while Dalhousie was pressing them on
the south bank. Dyng wns told to remain stationary, till Hill's'
column should come up from Almrmdoz, 'when 1 shall know
better how things are situated on 0.11 sides, and how far Sir
Rowland has advunced.'
The 4th Division, starting early despitc of its long march on
the preceding day, was attacking the Freneh rear by seven
o'clock in the morning-7th Division diarics wou1d seem to
show that Dalhousie WllS much latcr in closing. Wc have,
oddly cnough, no good account of the fight that cnsucd from
any British source 2.; but Clauscl's narrative enables us to
undcrstand pretty well what happened. At dawn Vander-
macsen's division had been left as rcarb'Uard on the hill facing
Santesteban on the north side of the Bidassoa, with Taupin's
in support, while Conroux's was trying to make its way towards
Sumbilla, but found the path blocked by D'Erlon's baggage in
front. Wherefore Clauscl directed his brigudiers to gi\'c up any
idea of keeping to the road, and to march along the slopes above
it, so long as w9.:s possible. 'Vhen the British appeared, they
I \Vellington to O'Donncll. SIlPIJlt:me1llary D;Jpalcllt.~, viii. p. 1G3.
I Some good diarists bad becn wounded at Soraurcn, and fail us after
the 211th .July.
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attacked with long lines of skirmishers, keeping to the \lillside
and attempting to turn Valldermaeseu's llank OIl the high
ground. The French, therefore, also extended themselves uphill,
but reached the crest only after the enemy had just crowned it.
'On this ground, where no regular deployment could take place,
the side which had got to the top first had every advantage.'
Vandermaesen's battalions evidently broke up, us we are told
that they got into trouble, • continuing a retrograde movement
high up the mountain among horrid precipices,' and were only
rallied on two of Taupiu's regiments above the gorge of the
defile between Santesteban and SumbiIJa, where Clausel had
to halt perforce, because there was a complete block in front of
him-Darmagnnc's division of D'Erlon'scorps was halted there
from absolute inability to proceed, owing to trouble iu front.
The French narrative then describes an hour of incoherent
fighting on the slopes above Sumbilla, in which Darmagn.ac's
troops on the road below were also engaged. It ended with
the retreat of all Clausel's three divisions across the hills, eaeh
taking its own way by foot-tracks up a different spur of the
Atchiola range, and arriving in suceession in the upland valley
of Echalar by separate routes. The British did not follow, but
stuck to Darmagnac and the baggage-train down in the road,
whom tbey continued to press and persecute. All this reads
like 0. serious fight and ll. deliberate retreat-but the critical
historian must remark that to all t\ppeurances Clause! is glozing
over a complete debandade and a disorderly flight across the
mountains-for that there was no real resistance is shown by the
casualty list of the pursuing British. The 4th Division brigades,
English and Portuguese. lost that day precisely three men killed
and three offieers and 42 men wounded among their twelve
battalions-i. e. there can have bcen no attempt at a stand at
any time in the morning-and from the first moment, when
Vandermacsen's flank was turned, the enemy must have con·
tinued to make off over inaccessible ground as hard as he could
go. If he had tried to hold the pursuers back, the· 4th Division
would have shown more than 48 killed and wounded. The
7th Division had no casualties at :lll, so evidently did not get
to the front in time to do more than pick up stragglers and
baggage. The same impression of mere Hight is produced by
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the Freneh lists of officers killcd and hurt-six in Yunder-
macsen's division, one in Conroux's, none in Taupill's-this
should, on the usual proportion between the ranks, repre-
sent perhaps 150 or 160 as the total loss of Clallsel's corps I.
Obviously then, we are facing the record of a flight not of a
fight; and the conduct of these s:une divisions on the following
morning, when attacked by Barnes's brigade-of which, more
in its proper place-sufficiently explains the happcnings of
August 1st.
So much for the chronicle of the rearguard. That of the
vanguard is mueh more interesting. Reille, as has been before
mentioned, was in charge of the advance, which consisted of
one battalion of the 120th Regiment, followed by 'l'reillard's
dragoon division, the baggage of the corps, and the main
convoy of wounded; the rest of the infantry was separated
by a couple of miles of impedimenta from the leading battalion.
There was no trouble, though progress was very slow, until, late
in the morning, the head of the column arrived near the bridge
of Yanzi, where a by-path, leading down from tl1at village and
from Lcsaca, crosses the Bitlassoa. The bridgc of Yam·j was,
as has been mentioned above-the extreme right point or. the
long observation line which Longa's Spaniards had been holding
since July 25th. The village above it, on the west bank, a mile
uphill, was occupied by n battalion of B~Hccna's division of the
Galician Army, lent to Longa on the preceding day-the 2nd
Hegiment of Asturias 2. But there were two companics of
Longa's own on outlying picket at the bridge, which had been
, One of the French officen; killed on August I, Hutnnt of UIC 50th, is
registered a~ • tul: en defendant fuigle.' Now with sue!J obsurdly smllll
casualty lists as those shown above, the eagle can ont)· have been in danger
if the regiment WAS' on the nm.'
• I had immense dilllculty in identifying Ulls butt!llion, which belonged
to Bllrcena's division, as \\'ellington mentions in his Ictter to Lord Lh"Cr-
pool of August 4 (Dispalchts, lC. p. 598). Dut Wellington cnlls it there
u cn'l~ldore battulion, which it WII8 110t, but Ull old line iJuUulioll. 'I'1Ie
trouble was IIlSt to liml the composition of Barcena's division in July 1813,
and then ta hunt In Spanish regimental histories (those of tile Condc
de Clonard) for a claim by any or those corps to have b«n at the bridge
or Yum;i on AIl!,'llst 1. Alone I1mong nil tllC regimen!.. Asturius makes
thb claim-but the Corps-historian says Ilat one word about its merilorious
ICrvice---cvidently unknown to him.
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barricaded but not broken. The road from Santesteban bifur-
cates a short distance upstream from the bridge, the left·hand
branch following the bank of the Bidassoa to Vera, the right-
hand one diverging inland and uphill to Echalar. The route
of the French was not across the bridge, since they were not
going to Lesaca or Yanzi, nor past it, sinee they were not going
to Vera; they had to turn ore eastward at the cross-roads,
almost opposite the bridge but ll. little south of it, uud to follow
the minor road which leads up to Echalar along the south bank.
of the Sari stream, on which that village stands. When Reille's
battolion at the head of the marching column came to the cross
roads, it was fired UpOIl by the Spanish post at the bridge. TIlls
created some confusion: the critic CUll only ask with wonder
wby Reillc, who had six cavalry regiments under his orders,
had not sent out vedcttes along the roads far ahead, and become
aware long before of the obstruction in his front: evidently,
however, he had not. After the first shots were fired, there was
a general stoppage all down the column. The battalion at its
head could sce that the Spaniards were very few, and prepared
to dislodge them. Meanwhile the dragoons had 4altcd and
mallY of them, at plriecs where thc river wus lcvel with the road,
walkcd their horses into the strcum, to let them drink. Sud-
denly there came a violent explosion of musketry from the
front-the bridge was being attacked and forced. But to those
far down the rood, who could not see the bridge, it sounded :loS
if the enemy WllS nssniling and driving in the solim:ry battalion
on whieh the s:lofcty of the whole army depended for the
moment. A great purt of the dragoons shouted' right about
turn,' and galloped backward up the pass without having
received nny order 1, till they plunged into Genernl Ueille and
his stuff, moving at thc head of Lamartillicre's division, and
Ilearly rode them dowll. The eolulllll of infantry blocking thc
road stopped the further progress of the foremost fugitives, who
got jammed in a mass by the impetus of squadrons pressing
, ReiJle snYll in his report tlmt the order' hull,' issued lit the IJenu of
the column, was repeated down the column of dragoons nnd turned in tile
noi!lC and confusion into 'demi Wur'. \Vhereupon tlle !'Cnr regiments
thought the column wus cut off, !lnd glllloped buck ill Jlunie. • Unite' ;s
not very like' dcmi tour '-but there \\119 no doubt I.OOut the punic.
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bchind thcm. Rcillc could not make out the cause of the panic,
• but filed the 2nd Lcgcr out of the road and sent them past thc
dragoons by a footpath on the slope, by which they got to thc
bridge. It was found that the Spaniard!> had been driven from
it, and forced to retire up the west bank of the river, the way
to Echolar being clear. 'fhereupon thc battalion of the 12oth,
followed by the 2nd Uger, turned up the rond, nnd after them
the leading regiments of dragoons. Thc ofHecrs in charge at
tb~ front forgot that their enemies might return, and left no onc
to guard the bridge. Hence, whcn Rcille came up in person a
little later, he was vexed to find that the Spaniards had re-
appeared on the rocky farther bank of the river half a mile
above the bridge, and were firing across the ravine at the
passing cavalry, causing much confusion and some loss. Unable
to cross thc river, which had precipitous banks at this point, he
ordered that the next infantry which arrived-the 2nd battalion
of the 120th-should deploy on the slopes nbove the road, and
keep down the enemy's fire by continuous volleys. He also
directed another battalion to cross thc bridge, and work up-
stream till they should come on the flank of the Spaniards, and
then to drive them away. This was done, and the rest of the
dragoons, Lamllrtiniere's infantry, and the head of the column
of baggage filed past the cross-roads and went on towards
Echalar-with Reille himself in their company. He had left
a battalion at the Yanzi bridge, with orders to hold the pass,
but had little expectation of seeing it molested again, taking
thc enemy for a mere party of guerrilleros.
But worse was now to comc. 'rhe Spanish companies which
had been drivcn orf were now reinforced by the main body of
thc regiment of Asturias, which, coming down from Yanzi
village, made a vigorous attack on the bridge, swept back the
French batt:l.lion which was holding it 1, and began firing into
the baggage train which was passing the cross roads at that
moment. The bulk of it turncd back in confusion, and rushed
up the deftle, soon causing a complete block among the convoy
of wounded and the division of l\faucune, which was the next
combatant unit in the line of march. The Spaniards held the
I Wc tCRm frolll Lamurtini/lre's report that it was onc of the 118t"
regiment.
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bridge for more than two hours, during which complete anarchy
prevailed on the road as far as Sumbilla, where D'Erlon's rear-
guard, the division of Darmagnae, was now engaged in skirmish-
ing with the British 4th Division. The real difficulty was that
owing to the bad arrangement of the order of march, it took an
inordinate time to bring fresh troops from the rear up to the
hend of the column; while Reille, now safely anived at Eehalar
Ilnd busy in nrranging his troops in position there, does not.
seem to hD.vC thought for a moment of what might be going on
behind him I. l\Iauewle's division (a mere wreck) came up at
last, thrusting the baggage and wounded aside: its general
collteSI\CS that 'it fought feebly with the Sprmiards at the
hridge--its loss was not more than 30 men. The division was
so weak, its men so short of cartridges, that it was necessary
to wait for one of Count D'Erlon's divisions to come up, before
the road could be cleared 2.' Hc does not add-but his corps-
commander 3 gives us the fact-that' thc nh Division ended
by quitting the road and throwing itself into the mountains in
order to avoid the enemy's fire,' i. e. it went over the hills in
disorder, and :lnived at Echalar as a mob rather than a formed
body. Abbe's troops, at the head of D'Erlon's column, at last
got up, after a desperate scramble through the mass of baggage,
wounded, and (appurently) cavalry also, for some C?f Pierre
Soult's regiments seem to have been marching after llIaucune.
'Jammed between the river, whose right bank is very steep, and
thc mountain, whose slopes (Ire wooded and impracticable, the
soldiers shoved the train aside, upsetting much into the rh'er,
and turning the disorder of the movement to pront by pillaging
nil that they could lay their hands upon 4.' At last Abbe got
four or five battalions disentangled 6 and formed them to attack
the bridge, whieh was carried by the 64th Regiment after a
struggle which did the Asturians much credit-the Frcneh
1 He deelnres in Ilis report Umt he never hellrd of the trouble llJltil
nig!lU,.lI. • Report of ~L'lueune, dnted August :I •.
• Report of Reille.
• Report of the Right Wing......--dlltcd thllt night, August 1.
• D'Erlon complains that he found no French troops whatever facing
the bridge-i. e. the 118th and Maucune had dis..'lppcared long before his
front iJuUulion got 1111. 'rile Imtlllliolls cngllged were t.he 6th l.l!gcI uml
63rd and 64th Line--whose olllccr·cusuolties for t1Ult duy were t killt.. l
and IS wounded.
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units engaged showed 11 loss of 9 o[tieers, probably therefore of
some 200 men 1. Leaving a couple of battalions to guard the
bridge and the knoll beyond it, Abbe hurried the rest of his
division towards Echalar, the baggage following as it could,
mixed with the troops that were coming up from the rear. Thus
the greater part of D'Erlon's corps got through; but there was
still one more episode to come in this day of alarms and excur-
sions. Darmagnac's division, o.t the rear of all, had rcaehed the
cross-roads, and had relieved Abbe's battalions at the bridge by
a covering force of its own, when l.l. new and furious fire of
musketry suddenly broke out from the slopes above, and a
swarm of green-coated skirmishers rushed down the heights,
carried the knoll and the bridge below it, and opened fire on
the passing troops-Darmagnac's rear brigade-and the mass
of baggage which wa." mixed with it. This marked the arrival-
when it was too late-of the much tried British Light Division,
whose unfortunate adventures of the last three days it is
necessary to explain.
It will be remembered that Wellington had sent orders to
Charles Altcn, on the 20th July, that he should move from
Zubieta to such a point on the Tolosl\-Yrunwl road as might
scem lK--st-possibly Lecumberri. This dispatch travelled fast,
and Alten marched that samc night to Saldias-a short stage
but fatiguing, as marches in the dark are prone to be. Next day
-the 30th-the Light Division madc an e:\l,remely long and
exhausting march by vile mountain roo.ds to Lecumberri,
hearing all day incessant cannonading and musketry fire to their
left-this was the noise of the second battle of SOtaurcn and
thc combat of Bcun:rK'lo. Unfortunntely Alten was in touch
neither with Hill nor with Hend-Quarters, and though he
reached ~umbcrri at dark on the 30th, got no news of what
had happened till late on the afternoon of thc 31st, when one
or\Vellington's nides-de-camp rode in, ' more dead than alive
from excessive fatigue 2,' bearing the order issued late on the
, The best u(.'(.'(lunt of nil Ulis is in Grahnm's report, SuppICfI'Cf.tary
Di!1patclICs, xl .... p. 261.
• All these murches ·nre mainly detailed from the excellent narrati ...e of
Qu:ulermll6ler Surt.ees of ti,e aj\lfith, (lll- 223-6, lSupplcmcnted by thnl
of Captain Cooke of the 1/4.3rd.
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80th for the return of the division to Zubieta. He brought
the news of Soult's defeat-but Wellington and cvery onc else
had supposed that thc French would go back by the Puerto
de Velate, and Alten's orders were merely to get into communica-
tion with the 7th Division, sent on the side-operation by thc
Puerto de Arraiz, which was at the time of the issue of the order
thoughtcomparativelysubsidiaryl. The Light Division marched
that evening to Leyza--eight or nine miles on a mountain roa.d
-not n bad achievement for the dark hours, but critics (wise
after the event) whispered that Altcn might have got to Saldias,
eight miles farther, if he had chosen to push the mcn. It, at
any rate, made a mighty difference to the fate of the campaign
that Wellington's ne),:t orders, those issued from Almandoz at
noon on the 31st, found the Light Division not near Zubicta
but at Leyza, when they were handed in during the small hours
before dawn on the 1st.
This dispatch, as will be remembered, told Altcn that Soult
had retired by thc Puerto de Arraiz aud Santcstcban, and was
obviously going home through the gorge of the Bidassoa, by
Vera and Echalar. He was directed to 'head oll' the enemy at
Santestcban, if that were possible, ifnot at Sumbilla seven miles
farther north-or at least to 'cut in upon their column of
march' somewhere 2. All this would have been quite possible,
if Wellington had not on the 29th sent thc Light Division on
thc unlucky southward march from Zubietll. to Lccumbcrri.
TJlis misdirection was at the root of all subsequent misadven-
ture. Wc may add that it would still have been possible, if the
dispatch sent off in the early morning of the 31st to bid the
division come back to Zubicta, had contained any indication
that the enemy was retiring by Santcstcban, or that haste was
necessary. But it had only directed Alten to 'put his division
in movcmentfor Zubieta,' but to keep up his touch with Lccum-
berri, and told bim that Dalhousie would be marching by the
passcs of Donna Maria 3. The Almandoz note, which con-
tained the really importnnt general information and detailed
• Sce above, p. 700. • See above, p. 707•
• Sce aboYe, p. 710. It W3!l written ut Ostiz on the !light of
the 30th, but only sent off by G. lIIurray from Lizasso on the morning
of the 31st. . I
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orders, wandered about for many hours in the sabretaehe of
nn nide-de-cnmp who could not know where Alten was, and
found him aftcr many hours of groping in the night nt Lcyza,
and not at Zubicta. From the latter place, only six miles from
Santesteban, the operation directed by Wellington would have
becn possiblc to execute in good tim{.'-frolll Leyzu (on the
other sidc of a difficult pass, and many miles farther away) it
was lIot. This simple fact settled the fate of thc Light Division
on August l.
Alten put his men under arms at dawn 011 that morning, and
marched, as ordcred, for Santesteban via Zubicta; 'having
passed the latter plaee and got to Elgorriaga, four miles farther
on, he received the news that the enemy had left Santesteban
early, and could not be headed off there. Wellington's alterna-
tive scheme dictated an attempt to break into Soult's line of
march at SumbiIla, so the Light Division was put in motion by
the very bad country road over the mountain of Santa erU1,
from Elgorriaga to Aranaz and Yanzi. The mcn had already
gonc a fuU day's journey, and were mueh fatigued. They hBd
(it will be remembered) executed n night mareh from Lecum-
berri to Leyza only twelve hours bnck. The Santa Cruz path
was heart-breaking-offieers had to dismount and walk up
to spare their horses: the men went bent double under their
knapsacks: the day was one of blazing August sunshine: the
traek was over big stones embedded in ~eep shule---one sufferer
eompured his progress to striding from·one stepping-stone to
another 1.
On reaching the erest of the Santa Cruz mountain, opposite
Sumbilla, at four in the afternoon, the Light Division a.t last ca.me
in sight of the enemy-a dense and disorderly column hurrying
along the road from Sumbilla northward. pressed by thc nh
Division, the bickering fire of whose skirmishcrs could be seen
round the tail of the rearguard. They were separated from the
observer's point of view by the canon of the Bidassoa. here very
deep and precipitous-the Santa Cruz mountain is over
3,000 feet high. It would have taken mueh time to scramble
down the steep path to SumbiJla, and the enemy was alreadY
past that village. Alten, therefore, resolved to push for the
, Sce Cookc, i. p. 315.
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bridge of Yanzi, seven miles farther on, with the hope of cutting
ott at least the rearguard of the FTeneh.
But this se\'en miles was too much for men already in the
last stages of fatigue from over-marching and want of food.
• When the cry was set up .. the enemy," the worn soldiers raised
their bent heads covered with dust and sweat: we had nearly
reached the summit of the tremendous mountain, but nature
was quite exhausted. Many men had lagged behind, having
accomplished thirty miles over rocky roads interspersed with
loose stones. Many fell heavily on the naked rock, frothing ut
the mouth, black in the face, and struggling in their last agonies.
Others, unable to drag onc leg after the other, leancd on the
muzzles of their fircJocks, muttering ill disconoolate accents
that" they had never fallen out before" '.'
This was a heart-breaking sight for the divisional commander,
who could see both the opportunity still oUercd him, and the
impossibility of taking full advantage of it. After a short .halt
the troops, or such of them as could still keep up, were started
art again to shuflle down the shaty track on the north side of
the mountain. At the foot of it, by a brook near the village of
Aranaz, the 2nd llrigade was told to halt and fall out--it was
a trifle more exhausted than the 1st Brigade, because it had
endured more of the dust, and more of the delay from casual
stoppages and accidents, which always happens in the rear of
a long column. Alum carried the survhrors-the 1st /lnd 8rd
battalions Rifle Brigu.de, 1/43rd, and 1st C~ldorcs-(.s fnr as
Yanzi, and then turned them down the road to the Bidassoa,
which is s(.Teellcd by woods. The French were taken wholly
by surprise: the Rine baltalions carried the knoll above the
bridge, and the bridge itself, without much difficulty. The
48rd and Cacadores spread themselves out 011 the slope to their
right and opened fire on the hurrying mass below them.
• At twiligbt,' wrote a captain of the 48rd whose narrative
was quoted by Napicr, but is well worth quoting again, 'wc
overlooked the enemy within a stone's throw, and from the
summit of ll. precipice: the river separated us: but the French
werc wedged in a narrow road, with rock::,: enclosing them on
onc side amI the river on the other. Sueh confusion took place
• Coolie, i. pp. 315-16.
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among them as is impossible to describe. The wounded were
thrown down in the rush and trampled upon: the cavalry drew
their swords and endeavoured to charge up the pass to Echalar1,
the only opening on their right flank. But the infantry beat
them back, and several of them, horse and man, were precipi.
tated into the river. Others fired up vertically at us, while
the wounded called out for qunrter, and pointed to the
numerous soldiers borne on the shoulders of their comrades
on stretchers composed of the branches of trees, to which were
looped great-coats clotted with gore, or blood-stained sheets
taken from houses to carry their wounded--on whom we did
not fire 2.'
The officer commanding in the French rear fmally got out a
battalion behind a stone wall, whose fire somewhat covered the
defiling mass. All the bolder spirits ran the gauntlet through
the zone of fire and escaped Ill' the road to Eehalar 3 • The
weak, the wounded, and the worn-out surrendered to the
leading troops of the 4th Division, who now closed in on them.
About ],000 prisoners were made, largely soldiers of the train
and other non-combatants, but including stragglers from nearly
every division in Soult's army. There was no pursuit-the
Light Division troops could not have stirred a step: the
4th Division were almost as wenry after a long day's hunt.
The casualties of both had been absurdly small-3 officers and
45 men in Cole's regiments, 1 officer and 15 men in A1ten's. The
Spanish battalion engaged in the afternoon must, of course, have
lost on a very different scale during its highly creditable opera-
tions; but its casualties have, unluckily, not been recorded.
The French may have had 500 killed and wounded, and 1,000
prisoners-but this was the least part of their loss-the really
important thing was that thousands of men were scattered in
the hills, and did not rally to their eagles for many days. That
night Soult's army was not only a demoralized, but a much
depleted force.
'Wellington was, not unnaturally, dissatisfied with the day's
work. 'Many events,' he wrote to Graham, ' turned out for us
• Some, therefore, of P. Soult's ehaS/;euTS must have been with the
renrguard.
1 Cooke, i.I'. 317'. I Surtccs, I'. 226.
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unfortwmtely on the 1st instant, eaeh of which ought to have
been in our favour: we should have done the enemy ll. great
deal more misehief than wc did during his passage down this
valley t.' For onc of these things, Alten's late arrival, he was
himself mainly responsible 2: for the others-1.onga's and
Darcena's strange failure to detaeh more troops to help the
regiment of Asturias at Yanzi 3, and D3J.housic's late arrival
witb. the 7th Division-which never got into action or lost a
man-he was not.
It must be confessed, however, that Wellington's intentions
on August 1st are a little dimcult to follow. One would have
supposed that he would have deyoted his main attention to a
direct attempt to smash up Soult's main body-but he never
allotted more than the 4th, 7th, and Light Divisions to that
task-while he had obviously another idca in his head, dealing
with a larger scheme for the destruction of the enemy. At
9.30, when he had occupied Santesteban, he sent orders to
Byng, then at Elizondo, to bid him to march at once on the
Pass of Maya, and to throw an a<h-anced party into Urdllx, on
the French side of the defile. At the same time Hill, at Irurita,
is desired to follow Byng, occupy Eliwndo, and-if his troops
can bear the strain-advance even to the Pass of l\Iaya. Should
this prove possible, Byng, when relieved by Hill, should descend
into France as far as Ainhoue on the Nivellc. The 2nd Division,
and the Portuguese division attached to it, would follow him
next morning. Hopes arc expressed in the dispatch that
Pakcnham and the 6th Divisioll-Iast heard or at Eugui Oil the
31st-would be in 11 position to combine their operations with
those of Hi11 4•
This descent into the valley of the Nivclle from the Mays pass
must surely have been imagined with the idea of encircling the
1 Dispau:ht8, x. p. lilll.
• I'roulibly ul~o we Illust 11I....1 the rcspouJiibility for Hill ll11d the 2nd
Division being at EHzODdo tbis day, owing to the false mareh which they
had made-on Wellington's orders-from the Puerto de Armiz to the
Velate rood.
• Wellington in Dispatchu, xl. p. 7, blames Barccna for this-one would
have 8uppolled th..'lt Graham and Giron were still more responsible, as
they were in higher command.
• Ordel1J for Q.i\I.G. from Santcstcoon, 0.300..111. SlfIJplelm!llwry His·
paUha, viii. p. 164.
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whole French m'my at; Echalar, for Aill..houc was well in Soult's
rear, and troops placed there could cut him off from the direct
road to Bayonne. On the same evening Wellington was
dictating a dispatch to Graham telling him that he hoped to be
at Mays next morning, and beyond the frontier: Graham was
therefore to prepare to cross the Didassoa and attack Villatte
with his and Giron's full force, i!,cluding cavalry and guns,
leaving St. Sebastian blocknded by the necessary minimum
detachment 1. J\Ico.nwhilc Altcll. Dalhousic, and Calc were to
mass in front of the enemy's position at Echalar. The only
possible meaning that can be drawn from these orders, whell
read together, is that 'Wellington had now developed the
complete encircling scheme for Soult's destruction, which he
had not thought out on .July 31.
But the scheme was never put into execution. On August 2
Dyng was halted at :r.Jaya, Graham received no order to pass
the Bidassoa, and all that was done was to execute an attaek
on Echalar-attended with complete success, it is true, but
only resulting in pushing Soult back towards the Nivelle, where
there was no intercepting force waiting to waylay him. Some·
where between B p.m. on the 1st and dawn on the 2nd Welling-
ton, for reasons which he did not avow to his staff or his most
trusted lieutenants, gave up the greater game, which had in it
immense possibilities: for Soult had no longer an army that
could fight-as events at Echalar were to prove n few hours
later. :ronnor causes for this great piece of self-restraint can
be cited. One was that Hill and Pakenham turned out not
to be within easy supporting distance of Byng, so that the
dash into Soult's relll' could not be executed with a sufficicnt
force. If this operation were not carried out, Graham's became
useless. Certainly a reflection on the extremely depleted con-
dition of the 2nd Division, whieh had suffered such heavy losses
at Maya, Deunza, and the Vcnta de Urroz, helped to detcr
'¥ellington from using tins exhausted force for his main stroke.
Writing to GroJmffi two days later, he mentioned its condition
as a cause of delay, along with a generul dearth of musket
ammunition ami shoes. Dut the main reason, as we sha1J see
I \Vcllillgl.on to Grlllllllll, 8 p.m., from Sllote;lebau. DiJpaldltJ, x.
p.514.
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later, lay rather in the higher spheres of European politics, and
thc explanation was reserved for the Minister of War in London
alone. Next morning no gencral attack was delivered: Welling-
ton did not go to Maya, but mcrcly joined the 4th and Light
Divisions on the Bidassoa. The great schemc was stillborn,
and never took shape.
Soult had gathered the wrecks of his army on the range of
mountains behind Eehalar, where thc Spanish-French boundary
linc runs. The cavalry had been at once pM:kcd off to the
rear. Thc infantry took up a position. Clausel's three
divisions were in thc ccntre-Vandermacscn holding the villuge
with a company, and with his muin body--ccrtainly not 2,000
mcn that day-across the road on the slope above. Conrou.x's
division was on Vandcrmacsell's right: Taupin's, in reserve to
both the others, on the erest where the frontier runs. Rcillc's
corps-still more depleted than Clausel's, continued the line
westward-Lamartinierc's division ncxt to Conroux's, as far as
the Peak of Ivantelly: l\Iaueunc's-the most dilapidated unit
in a dilapidated army-holding the ground beyond the Ivantelly,
with a flank-guard out on its right watching thc road from Vcra
to Sarre. D'Erlon's divisions-still by far the most intact units
of the whole command, were on Clausel's left, prolonging the
line enstward and holding 0. commanding position on the
mountain side as far as thc Peaks of Salaberry and Atchuria.
It is doubtful whether the Marshal had 25,000 men in line that
clay in his eight divisions-not because the remainder were 0.11
casualties or prisoners, but lx:cause the long retreat, with its
incessant scrambling ovcr mountain sides, had led to the
defection of many voluntary and still more involuntary
stragglers. The former were scattered over the country for
miles on every side, seeking for food and for' a day off '-the
latter had dropped behind from sheer exhaustion: there had
becn no regular distribution of rations since July 29th, and the
first convoy of relief had. been captured by Byng at Elizondo
011 the 31st.
Wellington had only 12,000 men available in front of a very
formidablc position-hills 1,500 or 1,800 feet high, with the
peaks which formed the flank protection rising to 2,100 or
2,300. Under ordinary circumstances an attack would have
3D2
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been insane. Moreover, his troops were almost as wayworn as
those of Soult: the Light and ...th Divisions had received no
rations since the 30th, and the latter had lost a good third of
its strength in the very heavy fighting in which it had taken the
ehief part between the 25th and the 80th. But their spirits
were high, they had the strongest confidence in their power to
win, and they were convinced that the enemy was' on the run'
-in which idea they were perfectly right.
The plan of attack was that the 4th and nh Divisions should
assail the enemy's centre, on eaeh side of the village of Eehalar,
while the Light Division turned his western flank. This
involved long preliminary marching for Alten's men, despite
of their awful fatigues of the preceding day. They had to
trudge from the bridge of Yanzi and Aranaz to Vera, where
they turned uphill on to the heights of Santa Barbara, a series
of successive slopes by which they ascended towards the Veak
of Ivantelly and Reil1e's flank. Just as they began to deploy
they got the first regular meal that they had seen for two days:
, The soldiers were so weak that they could hardly stnnd; how-
ever, our excellent commissary had managed to overtake us, and
hastily served out half a pound of biscuit to each individual,
which the men devoured in the act of priming and loading just
as they moved off to the Bttack I,' The morning was dull and
misty-a great contrast to the blazing smlshine of the preceding
day, and it was hard to get any complete view of the position-
e10uds werc drifting along the hills and obscuring parts of the
landscape for many minutcs at a time. This chance put
Wellington himself ill serious danger for a moment--pushing
forward farther than be kncw, with a half-company of the
43ro to cover him, he got among thc }~rench outpost.'>, and was
only savcd by the vigilancc of his escort from being cut oIC-
he galloped back undcr a shower of balls-any onc of which
might have caused a serious complication i.n the British com-
mand-it is impossible to guess what Beresford would have
made of the end of the campaign of 1818.
While the Light Division wns developing the flank attnck,
the front attack was already being delivercd-somewhat sooner
than Wellington expected or intended. The plan had been for
I Cookc, i. 810.
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the 4th Division to operate against the Freneh right-the 7th
against their eentre and left centre. Cole, however, was delayed
in getting forward by the immcnse block of Frcnch debris along
thc narrow defile from Sumbilla to the bridge of Yanzi. 'For
two miles there were scattered along the road papers, old rug~,
blankets, pack-saddles, old bridles Md girths, private let~rs,
hundreds of empty and broken boxes, quantities of entrenching
tools, French clothes, dead mules, dead soldiers, dead peasants,
furriers' tools, boots and linen, the boxes of M. le General
Baron de St. POll and other ofHcers, the Held hospital of thc
2nd Division (Darmagnne's), and all sorts of things worth
picking up-which caused stoppage and cOllfusioll 2.'
Now the 7th Division did not follow the spoil-strewn river
road, but cut ucross from Sumbilla towards Echalar, over the
same hill-tracks which Clauscl's divisions had taken on the
preceding afternoon, whcn they eseapcd from the pursuit of
Cale's skirmishcrs. Hence it chanced that they arrived in front
of Eehalar on a rout.c where the enemy was keeping no good
watch, long before thc 4th Division came up from the bridge
of Yanzi and the Vera cross-roads. 'fhe mists on the hills had
kept them screened-as Clausel complains in his report. Lord
Dalhousie now carried out a most dangerous manrellvre-n
frontal attack on an cnemy in position by a series of brigades
arriving at long intervals-without any co-operation having
been sought or obtained from the troops known to be on his left.
• Bravery and success,' as a Light-Division neighbour observed,
'certainly far exceeded judgement or utility 3.' What led the
commander of the 7th Division to this astounding escapade was
the obvious unpreparedness of the enemy_ "Ve caught them,'
he wrote, • cooking above, and plundering below in the village.
I thought it best to be at them instantly, and I really believe
Barncs's brigade was among them before their packs were
well 011 4.'
The leading troops, and the only ones which really got into
action, were the three battalions (1/6th, 3rd Provisional G, and
, A brigadier in Mllrllnsin's division.
• Lllrpellt'~ lliury, 1'. 21.... • Harry Smith, i. p. 111l. .
• Dlllhousie to Cllirnes in DU:kson P(Jpen, cd. Lcslic, p. WOO.
l 2f24th llud 2j!i8th.
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Brunswick-Ods) of Barnes's brigade-led by that same fighting
general who had stopped the rout at :Maya with two of these
same battalions. Barnes got his line formed, and attacked
uphill against the front of Conroux's division, long before
Inglis's brigade was ready to follow, or J~ecor's Portuguese had
evcf1. got down from the hill path into the narrow valley of the
Sari stream. With such speed and VigOUT was the assault
delivered, under a frontal fire from Conroux's men, and n Hank
tire from Vanderffiacscu's on the right, that Inglis's brigndc,
which was niming at the village of Echalar, never had the chnnce
of getting near its enemy. The o.dvancing line suffered severely
as it climbed-nco.r1y 800 casualties-but when it came against
the front of Conroux. and delivered its first volley, the enemy
simply melted away I, As Clausel writes in apology, ' the resis-
tance ought to have been greater, and in the ordinary state of
the army, that is to say when a better spirit prev8iled, it would
never have been possible for the enemy to establish himself in
this fashion ron a section of the main chain of the PYTcnees.
This day the morale of the troops was bad 2.' It must be
remembered that Conroux's was the division which had surferoo
so heavily in the village of Sorauren both on the 28th and the
30th of July. Several of its battalions were skeletons-all
mueh thinned. Still there must have been 3,000 men yet
present out of the original 7,OOO-and they turned and fled
before the uphill attack of ],800 or less. Nor was this the end
of the disaster. Clausel tried to hurry Vandermnesen's division
to the succour of Conroux's. nut the manreuvre failed: the
}~reneh General says that Conroux's flying troops ran in upon
Vandermn.esen's, that confusion followed, and that he was
obliged to let the whole mass roll baek to seck shelter WiUl
Taupin's'division in the reservc line 2.
At thifl moment the leading brigade of the 4th Division, that
of ]loss, at last appeared on Dalhousic's left, and began to
I Wellington thought this the most desperate and gallant charge he
had ever seen. Dispatches, x. p. 51n •
• Report of Clausel, August 2. • Les troupes relcvCes lI'ayllnt pu, ullllgrl:
Ics erforb; des ~n~muxConroux et Rey, s'arreter sur la JlOllition indiqut!e,
et .'etant jctres sur eellell qui repoussaicllt l'llttaquc de la direction d'~chabr,
il s'ensuivit un peu de confusion, et on Cut obliJ(~ de lcslllis.'ler aller jusqu'A
I'hauteur de III division Tuupin.'
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skirmish with Lamartiniere's line I: demonstrations began-
probably by Leeor's Portuguese-against thefrontof fI.[aransin2,
D'Erlon's right-hand division. But these were of no importan,ce
in comparison with the effect. of the turning of Ueille's end of
the line by the Light Division. This was almost ns startling in
cITee!; as Barnes's dealings with the Freneh centre. Having
reached the front on the heights of Santa Barbara, below the
Peak of hantelly, Altcn brushed aside Maueune's feeble
skirmishing line, and let loose five companies of the Rifle Brigade
supported by four of the 48rd against the dominating peak of
the [vantelly, the most promincnt feature of the French position.
Clouds swept down along the hills at this moment, and the
supporting oompanies lost sight of the front line. • An invisible
firing commenced, and it was impossible to a.scertain which
party was getting the better of the tight: the combatants were
literally contending in the clouds 3.' But when the 48rd eame
up, they found that the rifle companies had dislodged the
2nd Legcr, Lmnartinicre's "ank regiment, from the precipitous
crest, llnd were in full possession of it. As they lost only 1 offieer
and 26 mcn in taking a most formidable peak, it is clear that
the enemy's resistance must have been very incrreetive 4.
All was now confusion on the }'reneh right wing-ReilIe
speaks of himself as wandering about in a fog with threc
battalions of Lflmartinierc's, and meeting no one save the
brigadier i\[ontforl, who was bringing up a mere 200 men to try to
rcinforcethe troops on the Ivantelly. The soldiers were profiting
by the mist to go ore to the rear, nnd couid not be kept together.
• On se timilla faiblcment, et no~ troupes se retircrent sur la
I Ross's brigade had n few ensunltics in cach bnUalion-{}7 in all.
I • Devant ladivisiotl Mafansinje n'ai vu que des tirnillcllrn,' says Clausel.
From the sequcncc of brigudes in the 7th Division, 1 think these llIust
have been Lecor's people.
• Cooke. L p. :t20. Both he and Surtees mention that the evicted French
battalion was the 2nd ~er-ll r"ct not to lJc found ill the reports of
Lnnmrtinil!rc or of ReiUe•
• The total French loss was probably not very great-as happens when
troops give at 0000, aOtlare not pursuL"<J. Conroux'lI division only records
5 olncer-cusunltiC!l, V>lnderlllllCSCIl's 8-wllich should lncan a total
casualty list of 300 or so. Dut it is astonishing to lind Reille rcportillg
U'ut Jllllueune lost only ahout 20 llIen; if $0, the flank-guard cunnot haxe
stood at all.
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route de Sane.' With his centre smashed in, and his right
dispersed, Soult could do nothing but retire. The remains
of Clausel's and Rcillc's divisions fell bock on the road to Sarre.
J")'Erlon, who had never been attacked, could not use this
route, but made his way along the crest of the mountains to
Zagaramurdi, Urdax, and Ainhoue. What would have been his
fate if he had found there not thcpicquct which (by Wellington's
order) Byng had thrown forward to Urdax, but the whole of
Ryng's and Hill's troops blocking his retreat-as would ha\"c
been the case if the great scheme drawn up on the night of
August 1 had been carried out? But the Pass of Maya had not
been utilized that day, and D'Erlon had only to drive away
50 men.
There was no pursuit: if there hOO been it would seem that
the whole French army would have broken up, for it had shown
itself this day no longer able to fight. • The spirit not only of
the men but of the officers,' wrote Reille next morning, ' has
been very bad during these last days. The absolute want of
food must be the excuse for tins state of thinb"S,' The (,'olldition
of the army was deplorabk--l'IIaueulle's division showed less
than 1,000 men lmlding together. Thc 1st Line of Vander·
maesen's had precisely 27 men with the eagle-yet had lost
only 4 offleers and 193 men in action-where were the remaining
.wO? Other units could show a few hundred men but absolutely
or practically no officers-the 55th Line of Conroux had lost
every onc of]3 officers, the 51st Line of Darmagnac 12 out of 17,
the 34th Leger of Maueune 30 out of 35 j these were exceptionally
hard cases, but in all the divisions save those of Fay and Abbe
(the least engaged during the short campaign), the proportion
was appalling. For the infantry of the whole army it was
420 casualties among 1,318 officers present. Soult wrote to
Clarke on the last day of the campaign: • I deceived myself in
the strangest way when I told your Excellency that the troops
had their morale intact, and would do their duty. I mistook the
sentiment of shame for their recent disaster (Vittoria) for that
of steadfastness. When tested, they started with onc furious
rush, but showed no power of resistall(,'e. . .. Since I first
entered the servk-c I have sccn nothing like this. It reminded
me of the behaviour of the levy en 11lw>se of ]792. The spirit of
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these troops must be terribly broken to have permitted them
to behave in this fashion. One general told me that he had
overheard men remarking, when we were neal' Pmnpeluna, that
they had better not fight too hard, becn.use it would be prefer-
able to get baek to the frontier rather than to be led orr into
the middle of Spain 1.' These were cruel and spiteful words-
the army had fought with excellent courage, till aftcr July 30th
it had convinced itself that the Marshal had got wrong with all
his calculations, that the game was up-that they were being
taken on n wild goosc chal'c without rationfl in the most del'olate
and rocky region of Europe. But by August 2 Soult was not
far out in his stntement---on that day the grenter part of his
army was it spent fore.e. If Wellington had resolved to pursue
with vigour, he could have pushed it as far o.s he pleo.sed.
Perhaps the great encircling scheme with which his mind dallied
for n few hours on the night of August 1 might have resulted ill
its surrender or complete dispersion,
This was not to be. On August;) Wcllinb1ton halted, and
commenced to rearrange hi!i troops on much the same principles,
alld in mueh thc same positions, that he had selceted before. He
wrote to Graham next day that hc was perfectly well aware of
the objection to taking up a defensive positiOlI in the Pyrenees,
but that nn advance was too risky 2. ]t was not so much the
prospect of the wastage of his troops, even in successful opera·
tion, that deterred him, though this was the point on wh.ieh he
insisted in his letter to Graham, but the general political situa.-
tion of Europe. The cternal Armistice of )llasswitz was still
holding up operations in Germa.ny: it was still possible that
the Allied Sovereigns might make a selfish peace with Napoleon,
and permit the Emperor to expand Soult's army ad illjinitum
with sudden reinforcements. What would then become of the
Anglo-Portuguese host, even if it had won its ·way not only to
Bllyonne but to llordefiln:? All this he had considered, and
wrote to the Secretary for War in Whitehall that' ns for the
immediate inVlll'ion of France, from what [ have seen of the
sta.te of negotiations in thc North of Europc, ] have determined
to consider it only in reference to the convenience of my own
I $QuIt to Clarke, August 2, and August G,
• DiI4paJc1ICII, X. p. 51H.
738 SOULT'S RETREAT TO FRANCE (Aoo. 2
operations. . .. If peo.cc should be made by the Powers of the
North, I must necessarily withdraw into Spain.' No advance,
however tempting the opportunity, should be made until he was
certain that war had recommenced in Saxony 1. Meanwhile,
, Soult will not feel any inclination to renew his expeditions-
on this side at least.'
So the army settled down to hold once morc the line of the
Pyrenees, and to resume the siege of St. Sebastian. On
August S the Head-quarters were once more at Lesnca, as they
had been on July 25-how many things had happened in the
interval! Hill and the 2nd Division, now rejoined by the long-
missing brigade of Byng, as also Silvciro's Portuguese, were in
the Maya passes once more. The 8ed Division was holding the
Ronccsvallcs defiles, the 4th and 7th were at Echalar, the 6th
in the Alduidcs (replacing Campbell's Portuguese in that remote
valley) j the Light Division lay on the heights opposite Vera.
MoriJIo's Division was in the Bastan behind Hill, the part of
the Army of Reserve of Andalusia which O'Donncll had carried
to the front, when he left the rest before Pampeluna, was at the
moment near the bridge of Yam..i. The remainder of that army
and Carlos de Espai\a wcre continuing the blockade of Pampe·
lunlL.
The tot.allosses of the Allies during the nine days' , Campaign
of the Pyrenees' had amounted to slightly over 0,400 offieers
and men for the English and Portuguese 2. The Spanish loss
could not add over 000 more-at Sorauren it was 192 j Morillo's
casualties at Altobisear, and those of the regiment of Asturias
at Yanzi bridge .are the only unknown quantities, and call
hardly have reached 400. The distribution among divisions and
corps was. odd-the 8Td and Light Division had practically
negligible casun.lties: the former under 120, the latter Wlder 50.
The main stress fell on the 2nd ond 4th Divisions, thc former
with 2,000 British and 850 Portuguese cBsuolties, the latter
with 1,400 and 800 respectively. But it must be remembered
• Ibid., x. p. 011. August 7.
• 8,440 to be exact. or which 4,708 were British land 1,732 Portuguese.
The lutter flgure i~ wurked uut frQm the dewikd PortUgUl'SC returns in
Appendix N(t. XXI, and is perceptibly lower than WellingtOll'S original
Clltillllltc (tr 2,:rotl: stragglers no doubt had been rejuining.
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that the 2nd Division had (including Dyng) four brigades,
the 4th Division only three. Every unit in both was severely
tried; the most terrible return was that of the 1/92nd with its
26 ollieers and 445 men killed, wowlded, and missing. But this
was a strong battnlion of 750 bayonets, and I am not sure that
the 284 casualties of the 20th and the 296 casualties of the
3/27th, both in the 4th Division, do not represent almost as
great a proportional loss, as these were both much smaller
corps.
The 6th Division was engaged on two days only, at the two
battles of Sorauren, and had the apprefliable number of 1j,50
British and 370 Portuguese casualties. The 7th Division fought
on three days-at 8CCOnd Sorauren, at the Combat of the Venm
de Urroz, and nt Eehalnr, und three of its battalions also saved
the day at Maya-with n loss in all of 750 British but only
(10 Portuguese. Lastly, we must name the two Portugucse
brigades of Silveira's division, of which Cnmpbell's fought at
Soraurcll, Da Costa's at BCWlza, with a loss to the forlller of
350 and to the latter of 280 men. The general fact emerges
that thc 2nd and 4th Divisions lost between them 4,350 mcn
out of the total 7,000-no other division had so many as 1,000
casualties.
The official list of French losses is not quite complete, as it
includes only the infantry and cavalry units-but sueh casualties
as may have been sunered by thc general stan, the artillery
(very little engaged) sappers, and train can have added com-
paratively little to the total, though a good many men of the
train were taken at Yanzi on August 1. The figures given
work out to 12,563-1,308 killed, 8,545 wounded, and 2,7]0
prisoners. The last-named total should probably be brought
up to 3,000 in order to include individuals of the non·combamnt
corps captured in the retreat. The divisions suffered in very
unequal measure: Foy and Abbe got off very lightly, because
the one was practically not engaged at first Sornuren, nor the
latter at Maya-they lost respectively only 550 and 750 men.
Vandermaescn's and Maueune's Divisions....--eaeh a small unit
of only 4,000 men, had the crushing losses of 1,480 and ],850
respectively, and were dissolved when the campaign was over,
and re.fornll..'l1 to a large extent with battalions drawll from the
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Bayollnc reserve. Darmagnne llnd COnIOUX each lost well over
2,000 mcn out of 7,OOo-thcir divisions having been t.crribly
cut up, the onc at Mays the other at Soraurcn. Maransin and
TauIJin each return over 1,000 men lost out of 6,000; Lamarti-
nicre just under ],000 out of7,000. The cavalry, barely engaged
and quite useless, had only G7 casualties to report..
llut to get at Soull's righting strength on the ItLst day of the
retrent, it is not sufficient merely to deduct the 12,568 casuolties
from the 59,000 which took the field in NavaITc. 'fhe eight
divisions colleeted on the 2nd August were short not only of
their own casualties, but of Foy's division, which had gOlle off
on an eccentric linc of retreat, as had several smaller detach-
ments 1. But the great deficit was that of at least 8,000 or
10,000 stmgglers, who rejoined at their leisure during the next
ten days. The cavalry and artillery had all gone to the rear,
and it is doubtful if the last stand at Echalar was made with
so many as 25,000 weary infantry. If the Marshal had been
fneed with an opponent who hoo no political arnere pensec to
hold him back, he would have been doomed to absolute destruc-
tion. Only a wreck of his amlY would have escaped, and
Wellington might have drivCJl the remnants as far as he plcnsed
-even to the gates of Bordeaux.
But the British General had made his' great refusal' on the
night of August 1st-2nd, and had resolved that the tempting
scheme for invading France, which had flitted before his eyes
for a few evening hours, must be postponed. He would risk
nothing till he should get cc:rtain information that the war had
begun again in Germany. And as the news of the rupture of
the Armistice did not reach him till September 3nl, he was
condemncd to anothcr month of waiting. He turncd back to
his old policy of J Wlc--St. Sebastian and Pampcluna must be
reduced. When they should have falleu, it would be time enough
to sce whether the general European situation hud made the
invnsion of Franee a feasible enterprise.
, e. g. the troop!! on the ROIICC!:lvll.llc8 row.!, the two llnttllliolls of
Lamartinierc which followed Foy, and Maransin's 28th Ugcr from EH-
zondo-at least 2,500 in all.
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I
BRITISH LOSSES AT THI~ SmGE OF BURGOS
SEP'l'EMBER 2o-0C'l'OBER 21, 1812
Sept. 20th, storlll or tile HOfnwork of Sl. !IIiclmel. Tollll Cl\liuultiCl'l 421
(of whom the 42nd lost 2 officers and 3S men killed, 5 olliccl'll and
100$ men wounded = 204 j the 79th lost 5 men killed, 2 officcn and
82 'mCll wounded = 3D j the PorluguCI:IC lost 3 officers Ilnd ]7 men
killed, 5 officers and 88 men wounded = 113; the other 67 cllsualties
were divided IImong the remaining battalions of the 1st Dh·ision).
Sept. 21st, casualties 42 j Sept. 22nd, 39; Sept. 23, 158 (of which 76 in
the Guards Brigade and 44 in the K.G.L. brigade of the 1I;t Divi5ion,
nnd 20 among the Portuguese).
Sept. 24th, casualties 3D ; Sept. 25th,38 ; Sept. 26th, 32 j sept. 27th, 53;
Sept. 28th,20 j Sept. 2mb, D; Sept. 30th, 20; Oct. 1st, 11 j Oct. 2nd, 211;
Oet.3rd, Dj Oct. 4th, 16; CM.5th,224(orthcsc224. which rcaUy belong
to the storm of the outer enceinte on the evening of Oct. 4th, the
2f24tb lllld 68 C>lsul.lties. no other bnttnlioll Illore t1mn 15).
Det. 6th, casualties (French sortie of night of 5th) 142; Oct. nb, 33;
Oct. 8th(2nd French sortie in which Illll ill the K.G.Th Brigadewere kiU(.'d
or wounded), 184; Oct. 9th. 18 ; Oct. 10th. 61 ; Oct. I1t1., 24; Oct.l2th,
17; Oct. 13th, 0 ; Oct. 14th, II ; Oet. 15th, 18 ; Oct. 16th, 12; Oct. 17th.
18 ; Oct. 18th, 48 ; Oct. 19th (the last assault). 170 (of whom 85 in the
Guards Brigade and 84 in the K.GL. Brigade of the 1st Division).
Det. 20th. 47; Det. 21st. O.
GENI>RAL TOTAL: 24. officers land 485 men killed
68 ., "1,445,, wounded
42 .. missiug = 2,064
II
THE FRENCH AID-lIES IN SPAIN: OCTOBER 15, 1812
[l<'rom tile return in the ATChives Nalumales, Paris.]
I. ARMY OF THE SOUTH. MARSHAL SOULT
Officers. Mell.
1st Division, Conroux: Vth 'Uger, 24th, Wth Line (each
3 lmttll.): 3 battalions Marine Troops .
2nd Division, Darrois' : 8th Line,16th Uger, 51st, 54th
Line (each:l baUs.)
, Cassagne succeeded Barrois shortly after.
203
201
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3rd Division, Villatte: 27th Ugcr, 63rd, {l4t.h, {15th Line
(each 3 batts.) .
4th Division, I..cvnl: a2nd,.wrd Liuc (4 batts. Clleh),
55th, 58th Line (3 batts. each)
5th Division, D'Er!on' : 12th J.egcr (4 bnttll.), 45th Line
(3 hatts.), 28th Uger, 88th Line (2 butts. each)
6th Division, Daricau: 21st User, lOOth Line (3 balts.
cuch), 64th, l03rd Line (2 IJutta. each) .
Cavalry Division, Perreymond : 2nd Hussars, 5th, 10th,
21st, 27th Ch(l.lll;Curs, 7th Lancei'll (ill 0.11, 20 squad.)
Cavalry Division, Digeon: 2nd, 4th, 14th, 17tli, 26th,
21th DrlIgoons (in nil, 20 lKJuadrons)
Cavlllry Division, Pierre Boult: 5th, 12th, 16th, 21st
Drngooll5 (14 &quadrons)
Artillery, and ArtillClry Train and Park
Engineers und Suppel'!l
Gendarmerie and tquipagcs Militaires
f:tlll-Mujor
Total present
Grass total of Army including 64 olJiccn and 1,004 men
detached, untl 60 officcrs and 6,:ma lI'1en in h001,itlll :
11. ARMY OF THE CENTRE
The King's French Guards: no figures given, but about
D:mnagnae's Division: 28th and 75th Line (3 batbl.
each), 2nd NlI&;uU lIud BBdcn (2 butts. Cll.ch),
Frankfort (1 batt.)
PlIlombini's Division: 4th !lnd 6tli Hulian Line (2 ootts.
each), 2nd ltaliulI Ugcr (3 batts.), Dragoons of
Napoleon and two batteries
CUSllplllueios' Spllnish Division (0 batts., a S(lutulrons) .
Treillard's Cavalty Division: 13th, 18th, 10th, 22nd
Dragoons, \\'estphnlian chcoo«.t ligeTl;, Nassau
c/uURlcurll •
Artillcry, Engineers, and Train
Vllrious detachments
Torol present
Gross total of Army, including bat-Major 55 officcn,
32 officen and 055 mcn detached, and 14 officcrs
und ] ,000 mcn sick, is
O/fWer9. Mtn.
20D 5,888
'"
7,70",
2112 5,016
187 4,308
,.. 2,349
,., 2,1l56
I2l ],712
122 3,511
17 851
,
'112
:U3
1,816 45,393
1,040 53,590
2,500
""
5,039
M2 3,050
,., 1,268
". ],67912 50'
12 403
640 14,530
74' 17,075
After D'ErIOll was removed to command the Army ot the Centre,
this division was ut different times under Hemond and SemNc.
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Ill. AHMY OF PORTUGAL. GENERAL SOUHAM
Officer,. Men.
1st Division, Foy; 6th Ugcr (I OOtt.), 3Dth, 69th, 76th
Line (2 battll. each) . 151
2nd Division, Clausel : 25th Ugcr, 27th, 50th, 51)th Linc
(2 batts. each) • 130
Srd Division, Tuupin [lute FcreYJ, 81st Ugcr, 26t1l, 70th
Line (2 batts. each), 47th Line (3 bath;.) 184
4th Division, Sarrut: 2ud !lud 4th Ugcr, 86th Linc
(2 batts. each) . 130
5th Division, Maueune: 16th, Mih, 82nd, 86th Line
(2 batts. each) . 165
6th Division,Pinoteau [late Bfenier] : 17th Uger, 65th
Line (2 1J1I.tt!l. each), 22nd Line (1 b8tt.) 87
7th Division, Bonte [late Thomi~resJ: 1st and 62nd Line
(2 bntts. each), 10lst Line (1 butt.) 109
8th Division, Clmuyel [late llollllet]: 118tb, 11Dth,
12mh Line (2 batts. each), 122nd Line (3 batts.). ISO
(Each infuntry divi~ion includes ia artillery and train.)
Cavalry Divisi()ll, Curto: 3rd Hussars, 13th, 14th, 22nd,
26th, 28th CllllSSCUI'li . 115
Cavalry Dh':isioll, Boyer: 6th, llth, 15th, 25th Dragoonll 70
Horse Artillery and train attached to cavalry 5
Artillery Hescr\'e uud J'urk 37
Engineers 7
C'-.elldumlerie and K'luipnges Militaires 33
Attached to the Army or Portugal-
Cavalry Brigade, Merlin, of the Anny or the North,
ht Hussurs, 8hi; Chusscul'll 53
Infantry Brigade, Ausscnac, dctached from the
B.'lyonne Reserve: 8rd nud 105th Line (2 butts.
each), 64th, lOOth, 10<lrd (I butt. each) 110
3,41)2
4,506
6,004
4,600
5,007
2,730
2,425
2,048
1,303
202
1,822
274
1,102
60<1
3,308
Totnl pl"Cficnt
Gross totnl of AmlY with 150 OffiCCIli nnd 4,57·J mcn
dctached, and 53 officcnl and 11,1l<l mcn in bospiwl :
1,506 4,j,860
1,769 59,547
~
61,31(1
IV. ARMY OF ARAGON AND VALBNCIA. MARSHAL SUCHgT
lst Division, l'tIusnier: 1st Ugcr (3 batts.), 114lh Line
(21mttll.), 121stLillc (3 uutts.), NCllpolitl.Ul.i:l (2Uutb.)
2nd Division, Harispc: 7th, 44th, 116lh Linc (2 batts.
=h)
ani Division, Huocrt: 14th, 16th Line (2 ho.tts. each),
ll7th Line (3 batts.) .
180 5,403
ll» 4,on
151:1 4,817
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Officers. Mtn.
Cavalry Division, Boll5l>ard: 14th Cuirassiers, 20lth Dra-
goons,4th Hussnrs, 1st Neapolitan ChMSCIII'6
Artillery and train .
Engineers
Gendarmerie and EqUipages Militaircs
01
21
11
6
1,831
858
411
52!)
147 4,393
151 3,758
130 8,719
1,088 30,980
1,193 39,UH
Total prel;cnt
Groos total ofAnny. including 131 officcl'll Ilnd 3,884 men
detached, and 24 officers and 4,287 men in hospital:
TROOPS ATTACHED TO TOt!: AR~lY OF ARAGON
Reille's Division: 10th Line (4 batts.), 8Jst (3 hatts.),
9th ms of HllSGIH''8, nrtillery .
Scvcroli's Division: 1st Italian Line and 18t Italian
Uger (2 batts. each), 5th Uger (French) (1 batt.),
lI!1d Italiun Ill,tillcry •
Drigade from Catalonia: 3rd Uger, lIth, 20th Line
(2 butts. each), 1st Italinn ChAAlicurs
V. ARMY OF THE NORTH. GENERAL CAl<'FARELLI
388 12,197
lOO 3,D76
37 1,625
45 l,644
264 D,431
43 1,342
-1,151 36,465
1.1D2 41,&U
Division Abbe: 5th Uger (3 batt8.), 10th Uger, ani,
52nd, I05th Line (2 butts. clIeh), ~Oth DrllgoonJ:l, IInd
artillery
Division Vlllldernllle!lCn: 34th LCger (1 b.'\ll.), 34th,
40th Line (3 batts. each), 113th, 130th Line (2 batts.
oocli), 4th Suisse (1 balt.), 6 batailrons de marche
= IS ffilttaliollS in all
Brigade Dumoustier: " batts. Young Guard, and 2 of
Nationnl GUllrdS
Cavalry Brigade LnIerri~rc: L..'\neers of Berg (2 squad-
rons), 15th Chasseurs (:I squadronJ:l), Gendarmerie
(6 ~Iuadron~)
Government of Navarre (garrison of Pampcluna) detach-
ments
Government of BiJ:lCllY, nil r/gimenls ck marchc and
detachments
Govenuucnt of Castile (garrison of Santaiiu) detachments
Total present
Gross tOlal of Anny, including 41 officers {lnd 5,176 men
in hospital, is
210 6,878
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VI. AR!lfY OF CATALONIA. GENERAL DECAEN
Offl-Ch$. Mm.
]23 3,502
137 3,491
"
1,553
185 6,180
"'''
3.o-W
03 1,451
70 1,039
"
2,088
55 4,194
0" 28.514
1,125 a.~.028
112 7,072
1,078
All COlIsisting of detneilments or rigirrnmls de 11l(Jrcl.e
Adding 13" detached nnd 600 in hospital, gross total is:
Total Army of Spain, therefore, on October 15 amounts to :
7,516 omcers, 200.814 men present with the colours
326 11,520 .. detached
230" 35,414" in hO!lpital.
GI::NJ::IlAI, GROSS ·fOO'A'. = 8,185 olliccm and 253,748 mCIl.
Division Quesnel (at Puyerda). l02nd Line (2 hatts.).
116th Line (1 batt.). Ilnd detaehments .
Division Lamarque: 60th und 79th Line (3 hatts. each).
Regiment of Wurzburg, and detachments
Brigade Petit: 67tll Line (a batts.), 32nd Uger (1 balt.)
Division Mauricc lIIntbieu (Bnrcclona): 115th Line
(<1 batts.), 18th Uger (2 hatts.), 1st of Nassau
(2 hatts.), und detuchments
Garrisons of Figueras, &e.: 60th. 80th Line, and :l2nd
Leger (I Imtt. cnch), lllld detachments .
Gamson of'l'arragona (Bcrtolctti): 20th Line (l!Jatt.),
7th Italian Line (1 batt.) .
Gnrrison of I.cdda (Hcnriod): "2nd I.inc (3 bllUS.),
and detachments
Brigade Espert ("ying column): i;tll T,ine (a bIlUs.).
23rd Uger (2 bntts.) .. ...
Artillery, Sappers, Gendarmes, Equipages ~Illit"lires,&e.
VII. BAYONNE RESERVE
Total pl'e3Cnt. under arms •
Gross total of Army, including 101 etat-Major, 26ofilcc\'ll
and 369 men detached. and ...J. officers and 6,045 men
in hospital, is
III
STRENGTH OF WELLL.'/GTON'S ARMY DURING AND
AFTER THE BURGOS RETREAT
The subjoined statistics show the marching strength of the Anglo-
Portuguese di\'isions or Wellington'8 urmy ut WIC oommencement or the
!:Iurgos Retreat (Oct. 23) and somc da~'8 after its termination (Nov. 29).
There had been, immediately after the army reached Ciudad Rodrigo,
certain tmnsrcrcnccs or ullita from 01lC division to another, whicll arc duly
noted. The figures give only mnk and file; to get the fighting strellgth
one-eigllth should be added to cover officers, sergeants, and drummen.
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1st Cavalry Division
2nd Cavalry Division
Ist Division
Present
,mderllrm8.
Oct. 23.
2,827
1,947
:l,1l70
Preunt
under lIrma.
Nav.29.
2,009 (2nd Hussars K.G.L.
Ims joined.)
J,625 (2nd Hussars K.G.L.
has left.)
4,002 (1st & ::lrd bnttaliOlls
First Guards have
joined, but Stirling's
brigade hlls been
transferred to the
6th Division.)
2nd Division
3rd Division
4th Division
5th Division
6th Division
7th Division
Light Division
Hamilton's Portuguese Division
Pnek's Portuguese Brign.de
Bradford's Portuguese Brigade .
Artillery, Train, Staff Corps, &c.
7,915
4,229
4,487
a,638
3,380
4,298
11,428
4,719
1,681
1,645
48,124
2,500
(l,59]
3,860 (2/87th from Cadi"
has joined.)
3,861 (J 182nd has joined.)
3,732 (2/47th from Cadiz
1In." joined.)
5,228 (The division has!Jeen
joined by Stirling's
brigade nnd nloo by
the l/!llst.)
3,358
11,77(, (2 companies a/95th
nnd the 20th Portu-
guese have joined.)
4,070
1,105
'81
45,00.'1
2,300
The (all in numbers wouM h:l.\'e been much greater hut ror the joining
ofSkerret's force from ClIdi'l(3/1st Guanls, 2/47th, 2/87th, 20th Portuguese,
and two companies 3/95th) and oUhe 1/1st Guards and 1/91st from Eng-
lrmd, and the 1/82nd fmm Gihrnltar-in all, nearly 0,000 men.
U mny he worth while to gi\'e here the swlisties of the Spanish troops
which were acting with Wellington's and Hill'l:I armies during this period.
They were by their Oetober morning states:
, Oth ArlTlY' or Gnlieinns (Suntoeildes):
1st Di\'ision (Barcena) 0,810 (5 of the 15 b..'lU:,lions of this
division were not at the front.)
2nd Division (ClIbrera)
3rd Division (Losada)
Cavalry Brigade (Figuelmonde)
4,749
4,213
J,3!Jll (I'i of the {) squadrons of this
IJrigmJc were not at the iron!.)
BRIT1SH LOSSES IN THE nURGOS RETREAT H1
5th Army (EstrcruadurallS aud Castiliun):
Morillo's Division. 2,371
Cadoo de Espui'ia's Division 3,800
Pennc Villemur's cavalry 992
Julian Satlehe'J.'s eavulry 1,Jiitl
(Acting with Hill's Corps.)
(uitlo.)
(ditto.)
(Acting with Main Anny.
Total Spanish troops . 25,450
IV
LOSSES IN THE BURGOS RETREAT
The ClIsualties in action ootwcen October 23rd and November 19th are
e.'lsily nsccrtainable, and quite modemte. But the lOllS in • missing', by
the capture of stragglers, marauders, and footsore men, was mueh higher
than is generally known. I believe that the lInnexed table, from the
morning stulc of Nuvember 20th, is now published tor the tlrat time. It
gives only the ra"k and flit missing, but these are almost the whole list:
officcl"S nnd sergeants did not titrngglc or drop oohilld like the privates.
I believe that the total of officers missing was 25, of sergeants 56 British
and 20 Portuguese: we have also to add 43 British anel 32 Portuguese
drummers, &0., to the gcncrallist, which rUllS us follows:
LJrilisJl. PQTlIlgutNc. j'utal.
ht Cavalry Division 102 192
2nd
" "
JO> • IOD1st Division Infantry 283 283
2,.
"
802 200 562
'01
"
184 230 41'~
4th 308 13 327
5th
"
45" 85. m
6th
" "
DO 7. 170
7th
" "
857 ,., 600
Light 92 16' 25$
Portnguese. Hamilton's Division 221 221
"
Pack's Brigade 293 233
"
BrndCord's Briguuc .,. 514
Total 2,368 2,3740 4,752
The abnormally high totals of the 5th Division and 7th Division are to
he aeooullled for ill different wuys. The Conner had 150 prisonenl taken
in action on the day ot the eombat of Villa :\Iuriel (October 25); the latter
contained the two battalions that always gave 11 high percentllge of descrters,
the foreign regimenls of BrUllswick-OeIs "nd Clla:#IeUf'1J Brita7IT1iquel/. It
will be noted that the 2nd Division has also a high totld, but liS it had
nearly double the numbers of any other division (7,500 men to nn averoge
4,000 for the others) it did 1I0t lose out of projlortioll tu its strength. It will
be noted that the Portuguese lost more heavily in relation to their totul
nwnbers than the British-their' missing' were about the same as those
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of the HritiylL, but limy ouly Imd ulxlOt 20,000 rank lIod me ill the field lIS
against about 30,000 British. This excessive loss in missing was due entirely
to tlle fnet that the cold nnd rain ot the last ten dnys of the retrea.t told
much more heavily upon them. They were not so weU clothed or fed 11.9
the British, and fell behind from exhaustion. Bradford'fi brigade, though
never seriously in nction, 1061 500 men out of 1,600 by the I'OIldsidc,
much the heaviest percentage in the WllOlc army.
The losses in killed noel wounded as opposed to ' missing' l;eeffi to make
up the following moderate figures, to which the heavy flghting IIbout
Venta del Pow and Villa Muriel during the first days of the retreat made
mucll the heaviest l.'Qntribution.
Killed: 9 olllcers, IS!} men. Wounded: 54 ol1lccrs, 691) men-i. e.
the total of 051. This does not, of course, include the prisollCs taken
ILt Venta del Po~o or Villa Muricl, who are CQUllW,J among the' missing'
reckoned in the prefixed table. The losses in killed and wowlded at AIM
de Tormes and Slln Mufto'l. are less Umn might haye been e"ll'Ceted; thORe
ill the other skirmishCli ut V.~lh.dolid,Tordesillns, &c., l]uiw negligilJle.
V
'I'l-U~ CAMPAIGN OF CASTALLA: AJ'RIL lBW
Sir .lohn MurrllY rclKlrts his army to bAYC consisted of the. following
elements :
Infantry: British, Germnn, Anglo-Itnlian,CnIAbrese 8,274 officers and men
Sicilinll ' Estero ' Regiment 1,136 " "
Whittingham's Spanish Division (6 batta.) :l,901 " "
Roehe's SpAnish Division (5 hatts.) ,~,OlO""
Cavalry: British, Spnnish, and Sicilian 886 "
Art.ilIery, &C. 500"
18,7J6
The units appear to have been brigaded as follows :
AdvunceGullrd, GenernJ Adll.lll: 2j27tJ.1, 1st Italian Levy, Clll"brese Free
Corps, RiDe Companies of 3rd and 8th K.G.L.
.1. r.Iaekenzie's Division: lj27th, 4th and 6th Line K.G.I.., Sicilian Eatero
Regiment (2 batts.).
Clinton's Division: 1j10th,lj58th,1j81st, De Uoll.DiIlon, 2nd Italian Levy.
Cavalry: 20th Light Dragoon (2 squadrons), Foreign Hussars (1 troop),
1st Sicilian Cavalry, four Spanisllsqundrons '.
Whittillglmm's Spnllillrds: Conlova, MlIllorcll, GUlIl!alnjarll, 2nd of Burgos,
5th GrelludiC1'll, 2nd of Murein.
Roehe's Spaniards: Volunteers of Aragon, Alicn.nte, Chinchilla, Volunteer.;
of V"lencia, Cnllllrius.
Artillery: British compullies of Holcombe, Thomp90D, \\'iItiHII1.'>On and
Lacy; Portuguese eompan~' of Cox, one Sicilian eompany (three of
Ulcse eomp.'lnies were holding the forts of Alieante).
Attached to Whittingham. Regiments or Olivenza and Almanza.
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VI
SUCHET'S ARMY AT CASTALLA, APRIL 13, 1813
[R£TuJlS' OP APRIL L]
OlJi«r'. Men. Total.
1st Division, Geucral Robed (Cor Musnkr, ab&eot]:
1st Uger (2 batts.) as 1,443 1,481
114tb Ligne (2 ootta.) .. 1,4D8 I ....
121st Ligoe (2 batts.) :w 1,252 1,286
SnI Uger (2 battll.) 1 I' ,., 783
124 4,900 5,084
2nd Division, General Hllrispe :
7th LIgne (2 balts.) 31 1,= 1,321,)
44th Ligne (2 hntb.) 20 1,160 1,186
116tll L1KlIe (2 bulb.) .. 1,= 1,537
lJ'2 S,OW 4,052
Ord DivWon, General Habert :
14th Ligne (2 battll.) 42 1,189 1,231
1/16th Ugnc I 21 614 035
1/117th Ligne • 27 829 .,.
90 2,632 2,722
Cavalry, General Doussard :
1'wo Ik(Wldro1lll 40th Hussars . 21 <08 m
13tb Cuirauien 25 523 0..
2-ith Dragoons (2 flquadroDB) 20 ." 44'
66 1,358 1,'24
Artillery: Cour batteries .
"
21'" 282
TOTAL 876 13,192 IS,5G8
, llrd Uger. properly belonging to Lall'ULnlue', brigade from CntalOllill,
was short of four companies Id'" in gt\lTisoDll•
• The lICCOnd battalions 01 theae corps were left bchiud, along with the
11th W\d 20th I.igne, two squadrons of 4th HlI5Sartl, one of 24th Dragooru;,
the a/6th Ugcr, nod some 250 Italian Light UOl'llC. to hold down the king"
dom of Valenelu.
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BrAR A.c'm CASTALLA LOSSES, APRIL 12-18, 1813
Kilkd. WQll1lded. Missing. Toml.
Djft- DJ!. DJ!-
UTS. Men. =•. Men. =.. Men.
Sl.'l.ff 1 2 3
Adam'lI Brigade:
2/27th Foot 18 , '0 , 112
]8t 1t.'l.linn Levy 28
"
.. 28 103
Calabrcse Free Corps
"
, .,
"Rine Companiell 3rd & 8th K.G.L. 1 7 2 23 ,
"'Mllekcnzie'lI Division:
l/21th. Foot , 18 20
4th Line KG.L•. 3 , 12
6th Line K.G.L.. , 5 ,
Sicilian' Estcro ' RcginlCnt 1 •
,
Clinton'lI Division:
1/58th Foot , 5 ,
De Roll·Dillon • 20 • "'Whittingham's Spn.uish Division:
ConlOVII, MlIlIorCll, Guadallljaro.,
2nd Burgos, 5th Grenadiers,
2nd of lI-lurcill , , 73 • 18a '0320th I.ight Orngoons , I
Siciliau Cllvalry 1 I
n.A. and drivers 5 5
PortuguCl;e Artillery
"
,
TOTAl. • 141
"
.68 42 671
VJII
WELLINGTON'S ARMY IN 'l'llli Vl1'1'ORIA CAMPAIGN
870
1,238
81'3'.
1,005
03'
.<2
7'0/(11.
!l28
1,177
,"0
37'
"'
"'20
42
OjJicrr3. Mc/!.
R. Hill's Brignrll': 1st & 2nd T,m.. G,,,,nl~, Horsc
GUllrds
Ponsonby's Hrigude: 5th Drngoon Guards, ani &-
4th Dragoons
G. Anson's Brigtule: 12th & 16th LighL Urugouns .
Lollg'S llrigadc: 13th Light Dragoons.
V. Alten's Brigade: 14th Light Dragoons, 1st
HusS.'l.rs KG.L. . 41/ 91llJ
Bock'l! Brigade: 1st & 2"0 DrugOOllS K.G.L. 3S 504
Fanc's Brigade: ard Drngoon Guards, 1st DrngoollS 42 800
, In j>ortugucsc Units olUccrs uud mcn are given together.
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Grollt'~ Brigade: 10th, 15th, 18lh HUSSo'II'lI ,
D'Url.lau's Portuguese Brigade: 1st, 11th,
Cavalry
6th l'ortuguesc (;nvlllry (Campbcll)
OjJicers•
..
12th
.Men.
1,5(11
l.I8ll
208
Total.
1,ti2'.I,
'85
208
Cavalry Totul 7,ooa 8,317
2,057
2,408
2,334
1'
672l 4,tl54
2,993
7,8lG
7,437
2,50Sl
2,156
1
2,460J
2,796l
1,926J
2,....
3,062'
2,18"I
1,901 r 0,725
2,:172,
1st Division, Gcncnll IIoward ' ;
Stopronl'~ Brj!lude: 1st Coldstrellm, l6t Scots
G\lard~, onc company 5/60t!1 56
Halkctt'l; Brigadr. : 1Gt, 2nu, 51h T,inc K.G.L., ]st
& 2nd Light K.G.L. . 138
2nd Division, Sir Rowland Hill :
Cadogan's Brigade: 1/50tll, 1/71st, 1/92t1d, onc
company 5/Goth 120
B::,'og's Btil,'Uue: 1/3rd, l/i'i7th, 1st P,OY. Batt.',
oue company 5/60th 131
O'Callllgllllu'l> Brigade: 1/28th, 2/34th, 1/119th,
onc company 5/00tll 122
Ashworth's Portugul:SC: (lth & 18th Line, 6th
Ca~dores
:lrd Division, Gcncrol Sir 'l'hollUls Pictoll :
Brisbane's Brigade: 1/45th, 74th, 1/88tl1, three
eompilllics 5/60lh 125
Colville's Brigade: ] /5th, 2/83l'd, 2/87th, 94th. 120
Power's Portuguese Hrjh'U(le: 9th & 21st Line,
11th Cuyudurcs
4th Division, General Sir G. Lowry Cole :
W. Anson's Brigade: . a/27th, 1/40tl1, 1/48th,
2nd PlOv. Batt.', onc oompnny 5/f,oth 139
Skcrrct's Brigude, 1/7th, 20th, 1/,~3rt1,onc COlll-
pany Brunswick 12:J
Stubbs'6 POrtUguC8C Brjgudl': 11th & 2<!rd Line,
7th Cao;:adorcs .
5th Divi~ion, CCllcrnl Oswuld [for Gcucrnl Leith):
Hay'S Brigdde: 3/lst, 1/9th, 1/aSt", onc com·
pany Brunswick J09
Hobin:lQn's Brigade: lj4th, 2/4.71h, 2/5001, OIlC
C()mpany Brunswick 100
Spry's Portugue6e Brigade: ilrrl & 15th Line, 8th
C;'O;:l\dorcs
• Thc other Gunrds' Drig.'dc, 1st and 3rU b'lttll. oC 1st Guardll, wtl.i left at
Oporto lIud did not rejoin till AugU6t,
• 2/31l1t and 2/(lGlh.
• 2nd and 2/53rd.
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2,291
2,392
7,347
7,287
'....
Total.
2,722
a35
"""
"'"0
Ill'
2,392
780
2.327}
2,288
2,475
2'49'.1)
2,7fltl
2,im'7
2''''''}2,397
2,oi31
1,970\
1,l:l00
1,945
os
63
37
.,
2I
23
100
17
116
OJftcen. Men.
6th Division, General PI'kenham [ror General C1inton):
Stirling's Brigade: 1/.2nd, 1/19tb, l/Oht, ODe
oonlpany ~l6Oth 121
J-liOOc's Brigade: 1/11tb, 1/32Ild, 1/34Jth, 1/6Ist 130
Madden', PortUguellC Brigade: 8th &, 12th Line,
DUI Ql~on:s
7th Division, General Lord Dalhousic :
Bamu', Brigade: 1/6t.h, llrd Prov. Batt.', nine
eompanies Brunswick-Oels
Grant's Brigade: 51st, 68th, 1/82nd, ChaMeUnJ
Britnnniques .
Lcoor', Portuguc:5e Brigade: 7th '" 19th Line,
2nd Ca~ores
Light Divi5ioll, Gencral CharlCll A1ten :
Kcmpt', Brigadc: 1/43rd, 1st &; 3rd/O~tb
"nndelcur', Brigade: 1/52nd,2/U6th
!JOrtUguCliC 17th Line, 1st &; 3rt! Ca~dorCll
Silveira's Portuglle5e Divi5ion :
Da Costa', Brigade: 2nd &, 14th Line
A. CnmJlOcIl'~ Brigade: 4th & IOLh Line, 10th
Ca~dorCll
Pllck', Portuguese Brigade, lSt & l(1th Line, 4th
Caljadores .
Bra.dlord's PortuguCliC Brigade: 13th &; 24UI Line,
6th Cti\'adores
n.H.A. and Drivers .
Field ArI ilIery, Train, Ammunition oolumn, &e.
K.G.L. Artillery
Portuguese Artillery .
Ellgioocl'll and SIlppers
Std Corps
Wagon Train
BriWII. """,,-. Total.
Total Ca'-"Ulry 7,424 093 8,31'1'
.. 1st Divisiou ..... .....
.. 2nd Oivi,ion 7,772 3._ 10,834
.. 3rt! Divisioll 4,977 2,460 '1',487
.. 4th Division 4,974 2,8402 '1',818
.. 5th Division '1,358 2.= 6,7'25
.. 6th Division 4,872 2,"75 'l",80~7
.. 7th Division 4,850 2,437 7,287
.. Light Divisioll 3,53il l,il4t1 G,484
.. Silveim', Division 5,287 5,287
.. l'ack's and Bradford's Brigades 4,68il 4,680
.. Artillery and Traill 3,077 33' 4,:107
Ellgincers, StafT Corps, &e, 802 0"
5:!,484 28,70'.1 81,270
, 2/24.th and 2/l;8th.
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~Thi5 i~, 1 believe, the first complete return of Wellington's army in the
Vittorin campaign ever published. My predecessors in Peninsular history
sought in vain for the' morning stutes' whieh should havc accompanied
Wellington's dispatches to Lord Bathurst, nlldwhich are mentioned in
those dispatches. In previous years, down to December 1812, they are
generaUy found annexed to the covering letter, in the bound voiumesat the
Reconl OfUcc. I should have fared no better than othl:r Sl:l:kcrs, but for
the admirable knowledge of the contents of the Office possessed by Mr.
Leonanl AtkinsoD. He remembered that there existl:d some Sl:parnte
packages of ' morning states " which had been divoreed from the rest of
Wellington's tiend..illgli, and lIot bound up with them. When sought, they
turned out to be the missing figures of 1813, tied up unbound between two
covers of cardOOnrd. Mr. AtkillSOU'1i happy wscovery enables me to give
the prefixed statistics, which pc:rmit UlI to know Wellington'se~ strength
just WI the campaign of Vittori" ViM starting.
IX
SPANISH TROOPS UNDER WELLINGTON'S COMMAND
JUNE-JULY 1818
Morillo'", Divillioll .
Losada's Galician Division (6 batts.)
P. Barcen,,'s Galicilln Division (7 lmttli.)
l'orlier's Aaturiall Division (3 batts.)
Longa's Division (5 batts.)
Penile Villemur's Cavalry (7 rcgts.)
Julian Sanehez's Cavalry (2 regts.)
Artillery
I.
STATES 0.1<' JUNE 1
f'OURTH ARMY (GENERAL GLHON)
OjJu;et's. Men.
172 4,379 .
295 5,500
235 4,008
124 2,284
130 3,000
194 2,4034
90 1,200
2Q "'"
. 'L'Qlal.
4,551
5,855
5,143
2,...
3,130
2,628
1,290
240
Total of June 1 1,263 24,165 25,425
n. LBFT IN CASTILE, REJOINED ON .JULY 28
Chrl06 de F.l>pailtl's division of 4th Anny (5 battli.) 175 3,167
Ill. JOL.~ED ON J ULY 1(;
TUE' AIt:-l:Y OF HES),:ItV),: OF Al"DAI.USIA ' (COl'm),: 0),: AllISPAT.)
Echevarri's Division (7 bathl.) . 237 6,380
Crengh'lI Division (7 butts.) :na ",Itn
C. G. Barcena's Cavalry Brigade (2 regts.) :.19 789
Artillery 10 274
3,342
6,017
6,45482.
284
Total of Inter arrivals 7a.~ 10,701 17,525
The CkoeralTotal of the Spanish troops which adually joined Wellington
between May 20 and ,July 28 was therefore 40,292. This does not include
Milia's irreguJu1'8 OI""r"til1g ill Aragoll and I~BSll:rn N"varre.
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X
'fHE FRENCH ARMY A'f VITIORLI
ARMY OF THE SOln'H. RETuas or MAy 29, 18l3.
(From Paris Archives, ~nL me by i\lr. FOrtescue.)
OIJiun. Mm. TOfal.
63 2,;5)6
43 2,056
3 163
1st Division, Leval :
Brigade Mocquery: 9th U£er, 24lh Line
Bripdc MOf'gBD: 88th Line, D6Lb LiJ"ICl •
Divisional battery aDd train
Divisional Total 109
2nd Divi~ion, Cassngoe: lent to AmlY of Lbe Centre.
3rd Division, VUlatte :
Brigade Rignoux: 27th i.eger, U3n1 Line 89
Brigude LClfol: 94th Line, 95th Line 50
Divisional battery and train 4.
2,539
3.....
170
2,579
2.009
168
.....
2,576
3,113
]82
Divisional Total
4th Division, Conroux:
Brigade Hey: 82nd and 48rd Line
Brigade Schwitter: 55th and 58th Line
Div:lsionaJ battery and train
Divisional Total
5th Division, brigade Maransin only:
12th Uger, 45th Line .
6th Division, Dnricau :
Brigade St. Pol: 21st Lqcr, lOOt.h Line
Brigade Remond; 28th Uger, 103rd Line
Divisional battery and train
us 5,781
"
8,59]
.7 2,670
• 18'
129 6._
SS 2,869
'"
2,658
.. 2,039
3 287
5,874
3,669
2,717
'68
6,589
2,1127
2,711
2,984
...
Total
TOTAL 'l INl'A"'......V DIVISIONS
Cavalry :
Pierre &lult's Division:
2nd HlIlI8lU"J, 5th, 10th, 211t ChasseuR
One battery fl.A. and train
'l'illy's Division:
2nd, 40th, Uth. 11th, 26th, 27th Dl'lIgoons
Digt.'Oll'a Division:
11th, 12tll, 16tb, 21st Dragoons
One battery H.A. and train
Towl C>lvalry
101 ..... 5,Q$
.90 25,679 20,159
7. 1,4.28 '....
• 1t15 ".
68 1,&101 1,91!1l
~, 1,612 1,6112
3 17' 177
249 6,2:'.'0 1I,oIlY.l
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Artillery Reserve: two uattcrk'S ant! truiu
Artillery Park: two companies Field Artillery,
ouc company pontoniers, artificers, train
Engineers: two companies sappers, two miners,
and tnli'n
Gendarmerie
Wagon train
Total auxiliary troolls
£tat·?!1ajor of the Army and the divisions
GENERAL TOTAL 01,> AllMY OF THE SOUTH •
OjflcU8, Men.
5 365
17 0116
II OlIJ
4 101
, 63
39 1,8~
115
89S :33,143
Tolal.
370
713
630
105
..
1,,,",,
'IG
34,636
ARMY 0.10' 'rHE CENTRE AT VITTORM
R:eTt.1RN OP MAY 20 FOR CASSAGNl!:'S D1VISlON; 01' I'IIAY 1 ONLY FOR
nu: RJ;;ST, J;;XCEl'T FOR Tu:£ ROYAL GUA1U>:'! AND Sl'.u«A.llD9, AS
SEE ~OTE.
18t Division, Darmagnac :
Brigade Cbasstl: 28th & 75th Line 35 1,759 1,794
BriKooe Neuenstcln: 2nd NQl;I;au, 4th Baden,
Frank!ort 101 2,577 ~,671J
Divisional Total 136 4,336 4.,472
2nd Division, Ca/;sugne :
Brigade Braun : 16th Ll!gcr, 8th Line i as 5,114- 5,200Brigade B10ndeau : 518t Line, 54th I.ine .,
:J.'otal Infantry 231 9,4.50 9,68J
Cavalry:
Tre.iUa[d's Division: 13th, 18th, 19th, 22ud
Dragooll9 .. '94 1,038
A\')"8 Light Cavalry: 27th Chasseurs, Nassau
ChasfICUI'9 22 452 474
Total Cnvalry 66 ],·WO 1,512
Artille[y (3 batteries) and traill 13 ..., 501
Engineer.; (I comp'l1ly llappers) , 1211
'"'Wagon train, &e. 3 ]95 198
Tom! Auxiliary Arrll~ 2S 812 880
The King'lI Spnnish Army' ,
Royal Guards, General Guy:
Grenadiers, tirailleUni, voltlgeurs of the Guanl 80 2,300 2,380
HUSl!ars and Lancers of the Guard 25 400 425
, These figures are estimated from what was still surviving of each unit
when Soult rcorganivM thc unny in Jllly HI. 'rile Royal GllardB infantry
had then 2,019 mell, the lillCl cuvulry 64 om"e,.,. nnd 500 men, the line
156
0flIO:T8. Men.
Line:
Regiments of Castile, Toledo, &yal Etrangtr
Cavalry: ]st & 2nd Chasseurs, HUtiSIU'S of
Guudalajam
Artillel')': one battery
'0
'0
a
2,000
000
00
Total.
2,070
670
DB
'rotal King's Army
'l'O'l'AL Alul~ ov THE CENTRE
ARMY 0.11' PORTUGAL
248 5,890 5,lJ38
603 ]7,098 17,691
40,656
2,496
3,666
173
No RETUll..'l AVAI4<\.llr.J:: ....'!'EIl. '1'llAN MAy 1.
4th Division, Sarrut :
Brigade Fl'irion: 2nd Uger, 36th Line, .'.1".
Brigade MCllne: 4th lAger, 65th Line ......
Divisional field battery and train
6th Division, Lamartini~re:
Brigade Galltbier: ll8th Line, llUth Line 71
Brigade Menne: l201h Line, 122nd Line 102
Divisional field battery and train 3
,",02
2,567
3,966
176
Total Infantry Divisions 322 11,191 11,513
Cavalry:
Division Mettnet :
Brigade Curto: Wtll & 22nd Chasseurs 39 860'1 DO'!
Brigade f 3rd HUS8l\n1, 14th & :.l6th
Chasseurs 42 857 890
Division Boyer :
'Utll, 11th, 16th, 25th Drngoons 67 1,4M' 1,471
Total Cavalry
Reserve Artillery :
One EI.A., four field batteries
Qne company Pontoniers, troin, llrUOcers, &C.
Engineen: two companies sappers
Gendarmerie
\Vagon train, mule train, &e,
11 370
10 763
5 100
" 169
35 ~08
3,472
390
'"195
17'
""
Total auxiliary arms 66 2,380 2,455
GIi:Nl':llAL T01'AL Olf Au~n~ 01' l'OI<TUGAL 536 16,004 17,440
Allowing for wastage May 1 to June 21, there may probably have beel1
14,000 of 1111 lirms at Vittoria-!J.lly 9,600 infantry, 2,800 cavalry, 1,700
Iluxiliary Ilnus.
infantry 1,168, though it had lost over 300 men at Vittoria Ilud n much
greater number frOlll desertion. I take it that to allow 300 extra men at
the b.'lttle for the Gunrd infantry, 100 more for the Lille eavnlry, and 800
more for the Line infantry call1lot lte fur out.
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Adding the totals of the three armies as above, wc should get 2,082
officers and 68,231 men. But deductions of course must be made:
(1) For decreUlle from May 1 to Juue 21 in the Armies of Portugal
and the Centre, and from May 29 to June 21 in the Army of the South
by normal wUllLnge, aud in the two former by drafts sent back to France
in May.
(2) For casualtierl in nction since the campaign opened.
The lutter would not be lnrge, only Digeon'8 Oragooniol o.nd Villatte's llnd
$alTUt's infantry divisions having been seriously engaged during the
retreat. The Burgos explosion cost VilIattc over 100 men. We need not
aUow morc than 1,500 as an ample estimate for casualties in action.
The normal wastllge, Ilnd the deduction for drnftll !!Cnt to France in
i\lay are more difllcult to culculatc, but I think wc shall not be far out in
taking 8,000 as an outside allowance for the latter-which affects only the
Armies of Portugul and tbc Centre, since we have 1\ May 29th Return for
Gaum's Anny, which of course sent nothing away after that date. And
in healthy months, such liS May and carly.June, the deficit from extra sick
would not be lurge-indc(:u 119 many mcn may have rejoined as oonVIl'
lescents as went into h08pit...l, since (except Villatte at Salamanca) the
troopiol blld Ilevcr 1)(:cl1 J1tel;SC.\ or overlUurchOO. It would be generous to
allow 5,000 for' wastage'.
If so, the French bad 6:J,OOO men at Vittoria, but deducting non-
combatants (tnun, Ilrtificcrs, &c.) there would be 9,000 horse, over 46,000
men in the infantry divisions, and about 1,300 gunners with the field and
horse batteries not included in the infantry divisions, also 1,000 sappers.
'J.'his makes ovcr (07,000 fighting men actually avallablc. There must also
be a small addition for stray units of the Army of the North known to
have becn presellt-lIot less than 500 nor more thlln 1,000. All Ilttemp.tll
to bring down the French foree present to 45,000 men (Victoires et Con-
quelts, vu!. xxii) or 89,000 infantry and 8,000 horse (Jourcl::m) or • barely
SO,OOO men' (Pieard) are inadmissible.
XI
URI'l'ISH AND POllTUGUESE LOSSES AT VITTORIA
1. llHI'J.'ISH LOSSES
Killtd.
OJfi-
ceTB. Men.
Wounded.
Offi-
ctrB. Men.
MiMing.
Oifi- 2'oral.
cers. A1en.
1st Division, General Howard :
Stopford's fIst Coldstrellm Guards, I
Brigade I If3rd Cnanls. f No casualties.
HlIlkett's llst'2nd'5th LincK.G.L. - 1 1
Brigade 1st Light K.GL. . - I 7 1)
2nd Light K.G.l~. . 4=---_,--=3C9 -"""
Divisional Total 0 1 417 54
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Kilkd. Wounded. lHuking.
OJll. OJli- OJJi- 7'0101.
url. Men. (eT". Men. cerl, ".fen.
2nd Division, Gellcn,l Sir W. Stcwurt:
Cndognn's {lj50th Foot 27 7 70 1041/718t Foot. 3 41 12 2GO Sce below' 310
Brigade lfU2uU Foot 4
"
20
BYllg's f/3rd Foot. .- 8 7 OG no1/57thFoot. .- 5 2 21
"Brigade !:it PtQvi~ionul".BI,tt.- 8 2 85 40
, , ·1/28thFoot. 12 17 171
'"o C~naghan s 12/8oith Foot.
"
3 03 71'BrJ~ndC 1f3!lth Foot. 20 8 181 215
DivmionuJ Towl 3 130
"
!)l3 1,110
3rel Divil>ioll, GCllernl Sir Thomas PictOll :j'/<5th Foot. . , 4 60
"Brisbane's 74th Foot . . 13 4 00 88
Brigade 1/88Lh :Foot. . :m 5 187 215
5/60th Foot (a comp.) 2 2 47 51f/5th Foot 2 22 0 'OG 103Colvillc's 2/831'd Foot 2 18 4 50
"Brigade 2/87th Foot 1 04 12 177 244
94th Foot 0 0 50 07
Divisional Total 3 1<1 .. 782 972
4th Division, General Sir Lowry Colc :
r27th Foot . 7 3 32 42
W. Anson's 1/40th Foot . 5 3 04 42
Brigade Ij48th l<'oot . 1 18 19
2nd Provisional' 4 0
"Skerrett's f/7til Foot 2 2 ,
Brigade 20th Foot 3 1 4
1/2ard Foot 1 3 4
Divisional Total 23 • 96 125
I';th Di\;sion, General Oswa!d :
Hay's r/1st Foot
8 7 96 111
l/9tb .FooL 0
"
o·
_0
Brigade 1/88th Foot , 7 8
. 'f/4tb Foot ,. • 72 91Ro1.l~n80n s 2/47U. Foot 2
"
, 88 H2
Brigade 2/591;b Foot
"
8 130
'"Divisional Total , 88 26 4" <9'
• Aoout 4.0 prisoners of the 1j7ht are lost among the general total or
223 • missing and stmgglers ': these were the only aetual prisoners lost in
the hattle. See p. 416 or this volume.
• i. c. 2/3ht ulId 2/66th.
• i. c. 2nd and 2/53rd.
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Killed. Wounded. Mi3Ring.
Offi- Offi- °Bi· '£010/.
UT8. Mm. eeTS..Men. cers. Mell.
7th Division, Geneml Lord DlIlhousie :
Bames's Brigllde No casualties.r" Foot . I 10 21 32Grant's 68th oot 2 23 0 01 125
Brigade 1/82nd Foot. . I 5 3 22 31
Chaucllrs Brilatmiqucs - 20 2 109 140
Light Company Brunswick-Qc1s I 1 5 6
Divisionall'otal 5
"'
14 248 :134
Light Division, General Charles .'\!tCll :
Kempt's f/4J.lrd Foot 2 2 27 SI1/95th ll.illes 4 4
"'
45Brigade 3/95th Rifles 1 7 IG 24
Vllllde1eur's {1/52Jld Foot , 3 1
"
23
Brigade 2jl)5th miles 1 , 0
Divisiom~1 Total 2 ,. 8 lOO 132
CAVALRY.
R. Hill's Brigade (Household Cnvlllry) No clIslIllltics.
Ponsonby's Brigade . 2 2
G. Anson's fl2th Light Dragoons 1 3 8 12
Brigade l lOth Light Dragoons 7 1 1:1 21
Long's Brigade . 1 1
V. Alten's Brigade No ClISulllties.
Bock's Brigade. I 1
FlIne's {3rt! Dragoon Guards. 3 1 4 ,
Brigade 1st Ro)"1I1 Dragoons. 1 1
{10th HUSSllrlil 0 10 16Grant's 15th Hussars 10 2 47 59Brigade 18th Hussars 1 10 2 21 34
Total Cavalry 2 40 6 107 155
Royal Horse Artillery 4 1 35 40
Field Artillery 0
"
2S
K.C.L. Artillery 2 5 7
Royal Engineers 1 1
Generlll Staff , 8
G&NEll.AT. TOTAL Sl 4" 102 2,7040 3,475
N.B.-In addition we luwe, undistributed under corps, 228 rank and tllc
missing, of whom all except about 40 or the Ij7Jst were stragglers, not
prisoners.
I BrUllswick-0c111 Head-QUllrte!,>; were in the 7th Division,l.>utl'ompanies
were distributed all around the Anny. These casualties partly belong
to outlying companics, not to Head-Quarters.
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H. PORTUGUESE LOSSES
Killed. Wounded. Missing.
01ft. Offi- Off· ~ Total.
UTS. Men. ceTS. lUen. cers. Men.
Ashworth's {Gth Line . 1 I. 1 12
Brigade 18th Line . 1 1
(2nd Division) 6th Cl\";l\<Jore~ , 1 , ,
Power's rth Line . ,
'"
0 157 212
Brigade 21st Line . , 55 , US 0 187
(3rd Division) 11th Cn~dnrt'~ , 2 , 12
Stubbs's {UthLiIlC. 36 0 100 1 153
Brigade :mrd Line. 2. 3 35 1,8
(4th Division) 7th ~f1dores , .< 21 35
Spry's {3fd Line . 2 3 • 13Brigade 15th Line . 6
"
19 :111
(5th Division) 8th Cao;adorcs 13 2 o· ..",
LeCQr's Brigade } 7th Line 6 6(7th Division)
fst C~dores . 2 2 •T..ight 3rd Ca~dores 1 1Division 17th Liuc . , 1 20 28
Silveira's .fDII. CO!lta's Brigade No cusuldtics.
Division lA. Campbell's Brigade 2 7 I.
Puck's rst Line. . 3 316th Line . 10 2
'<
"Brigade 4th C~dol'e!J . 16 , 18 35
Bradford's faUI Line . 1 '6 1724th Line .
"
3 ·3Brigade 5th Ca~dores . • 5 2 11
Cavalry : in 6th Regiment. 2 2
Artillery No casualties.
Tobll Ptlrtugucsc Lwses
"
2&1 .... fi92
"
921
Ill. SPANISH LOSSES
All ill Morillo's and Longa's I 4 85 I. ."
'"Divisions . . .
TOTAl, ALLrED LOSSES
BflITISII
,. .., 192 2,749 223 3,675
POflTUGUP.SK • ''18 .... 592
.., 921
SI'A/<i191] 4
"
10 453 ...02
Total a:l
"'"
248 a,7l» 2(;(1 5,11,8
FRENCH LOSSES AT VITTORIA 761
XII
FRENCH LOSSES AT VITTORIA, JUNE 21
[From the Omcinl Returns, lent me by Mr. Fort.cscue.]
ARMY OF THE SOUTH
Killed. WOIwded. Prisollers. ' Disparus.'
Offi- Off" Offi· Offi- Tolal.
cers. Mt». url!. iUm. UTS. ~lell. an. 1lIen.
Lcvn!'g Division ., OS l7 ~!)5 4 1'la 108 75.
Villatte's Division 43 2 212 22 291
Conroux's Division • 74 27 712 4 2G!i 1,081
Muronsin's Brigude 3 80 21 51U 4 G3 GS1
Dnricau's Division 3 80 20 389 1 40 280 833
Pierre Soult'R Cavalry 3 3 ,
Digcou's Dragoons IS 11 60 1 3 102
TilIy's Dragoons 2 10 1 3 25
Artillery 2 20 :l{l(l HlO
"'"J':ngincel'll, &c. 1 2 2 23 28
Total IS 420 1012,074 15 001 301 4,300
ARMY o..~ THE CEN'1'1lli
Dnrmagnnc's Division
Cassagne's Division
Trei11l1rd's Drngoons .
Avy's CIUlSSCUI'lI
Artillery: no Returns
Engineers .
Cllsapalacios' Spaniards
Totnl
Ri/red.
°Dl-
UTS•.Mw.
[) 1.10
•
•
? ?
5 20
'Prisoners or
Wounded. f/,issitlg.'
OJll- OJfi. Tolal.
urs. JUtl/. ars. Metl.
:m 414 :~ 701 1,346
6 70 178 263
1 17 50 80
l3 in!>.
? ? ? ? ?
• 4
12 21 300 358
a 1,380 2,108
ARMY Ol~ rOR'I'DGAL
812
586
07
105
,
4 224
1 116
2\1
, ,
2
"'
20 505
7 70 30 :162
IS 8 <l2
, H' , '0
? , , ,
'"
]55 72 OS,
SlIrrut's Division
Lamartinillre's Division
Mermct's Light Cnvalry
Bo)'cr's Drugoons
Artillcry, Enginccl'8, &c.
'l'otal 5 369 1,600
GEsf:n,u. TOTAT, 01' TilE 'fllnF.I'.
ARlttJES . 42 11-1. 226 4,188 28 2,801 8,008
No return (as Wlual) from
356·6
King Josepb's TIoyal Guards, who bad.
2D
762 APPENDICES
however, as .\lartinicn's lists show, 11 officers killed and wounded, prob-
ably therefore 150 to 200 cl\llunltics in mnk Ilnd file. Al!1O 110 retum~
from Artillery of Annies of the Centre nnd Porlugul, from whom Martinicn
sbows l) officer-casualties, or from the fractions of the Army of the North
presenl (8rd Line, &c.) ; lhe last SllOW a officer·ca...uallies in Martinien. Tt
is obvious that the official total is scvcnd hundreds too SITlllll.
XJn
SIn JOHN MURRA..Y'S AIDfY ON TUE TARRAGONA
EXPEDITION: JUNE ]Rlfi
Advnnoed Gunnl Brig-lIde. Colonel Adalll :
2j27th, Calabrese ~'rce Corps, 1st Anglo-ltalian Levy, one company Rifles
of De Roll.
1st Division. Gencrnl WiIliam Clinton. Brigadicrs Honslfldt. aml
Hn\·ilalld·Smilh:
1/58th, 2/67th, 4th I.ine Battllliol\ K.G,I", Siciliall ''':Stern' regiment
(2 balts.).
2nd Division. Gcncral.Tohn Mackenzie. Brigndiers "'arren nnd Prevost:
1/IOlh, 1/27t.b, l/8ht., De RolI.Dillon, 2nd ltnlinll l..cvy.
Whittinglmm's Spanish Infantry :
Gundlllajllm, CordOVll, 2nd of Murcill, ,'Iallorcll, "th Grenadiers.
Cavalry:
Two squadrons 20th Light Dnlgoolls, two squndrons Brunswick HusStlI'll,
onc troop J"orelgn Huss.'lr8.
Artillery:
'l'wo Brit.ish and onc Portuguese i''ield Ulltlcrics; onc company British
and one Portuguese attached to Uattering Train.
S'l'A'l'IS1'ICS OF ABOVE. .TUNE 4, 1In:1
8,040
1,041
4,624
764 [726 horses]
767
77o
07
228
:17
[No regimcntnl totals uvailable.]
JnfHntry: 0JJt£eTs. Men.
British,GenllanLegion, DeRoll-Dl1lon, 1st and
2nd balts. Anglo-Italian Le,'y. Cnlabrese
Free Corps.
Sicilian ~Atero Regiment
Wllittinghnm's Spnnish Tnrllnlry.
Cavalry
Artillery
Engineers and Staff Corps
Total 739 la,811!
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XIV
SU'CHET'S ARMY AT THE TIl\fE OF SIR JOHN l\mRRAV'S
TARRAGONA EXPEDITION
I. THE ARMY OF VALENCIA, MORNING STATE OF.TUNE 10, 1813
OjficiT!l. Men, To/al,
1st. Division, Gcncral "'lwmicr [at Pcrello ncar
T0rt0911]: 1st Legcr (2 batts.), 114tll Line
(3 batt.s.), 1216t Line (2 bat.tR.)
2nd Division, GCllcrnlHarispc [at Xath'al: 7th,
~Uh, 116th Line (2 batts, each)
:lrd Division, GCllcnl1 .Habcrt (at AlcinL]: 14th,
16th, 117th Linc (2 batts. each)
a/5th LegeI'
Brigade detached trom Catalonia, Geneml La·
marque: 3rd UgCI', 11th Line (2 batt/l, each),
20th I.lne (2 butt.s.)', 1st Italian ChllSSeU1'9
(1 squadron)
Cavalry, Geneml BOllssarcl: 4th HUSSllnc (4 squ~·
drolls). 12th CuirflSSicrs (4 squadrons), 24th
Dragoon! (3 lIquadrons), Neapolitan Chasseun
(2 squadrons)
Cavalry from the Army ofthc Centrc: 1 squadron
Westphalian Chasseurs.
Artillery and Artilluy TInin
Sallpers
Gendarmerie, £quipagcs Militairell, &c.
Italian Division Sevcroli (at Blli'\ol]: 1st Lignc
and 1st Ugcr (2 bath, cuch), and divisional
artillery
'fohil
fl7 :l,fl67
118 4.002
18 fiOl
8D a,24.0
84. 1,895
11 163
20 l,.,201
, 800
9 fiBl
57 2,008
611 22,187
+,1(1,')
4,064
4,120
1110
3,329
1,079
m
1,221
,7<
800
2,065
22,798
11. GARRISONS OF ARAGON (GENERAl. PARIS)
10th Ligne (2 hatts.), 8irt Ligne (3 batts.), 8th
Neapolitan!; 87 a,30'2 3,S89
12t.h Hussal'!l (3 squadrons) to 870 396
Artillery G 2~ 251
Gcndarmerie (6 oolllllllllil's) 28 1,1OJj 1,11111
C}IQSStIITl du Muntagllts . 215 658 684.
SpAnish trooP! 7 151 la8
Total 180 5,831 6,011
Pallncticr's "ying column, which tried to rclic\'c 'fnl'Tllgona. consisted
of a/5th U~f, and two battalioWl each of 20th Line and aId Ugcr, with
. the Westphalian cbll.6l'ieurs: a little under 8,000 men.
, D 2
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Ill. THE ARMY OF CATALONIA. MORNING STATE OF JUNE 16
OjJicers, Men. TGlal.
nivision of Cerdngne, General Qucsnel: l02nd
Line (2 batts.), H3rd Line (4 batts.), and details
Division of Upper Catalonia, General Lamarque :
3:2nd f..egcr nml OOth J.ille (l lmtt. each), Urd
Provisional Regiment, lIud dl-1:uils
ArrondisscmentorGerona, General Nogues: 60th
Line (2 b.'1tt£.), 11i1th Line (I hatL), IlIld details
Bcunnann's Brigade: 115tb Line (2 butts.), 23rd
Uger (2 hatts.), and details
Petit's Brigade: 28nl I.igne (I hatt.), 67t.h Line
(2 Ull.tts.), Wurzburg (1 lmtt.), nud dl-1:lIils
Arrondissemeut of Barcelona, General Maurice
Mathieu: 5t.h Line(2 butts.), 70th Line(2 bnUs.),
18th Ugcr (2 butts.), 1st of Nassau (2 batts.),
2IJth Chasseurs (I squndron), llnd details.
GlIrrison of Lcrida, General Henriot: 4211d Line
(2 batts.), and details "
Garrison of Tarragonn: 20t.h Line (I hll.tt.), 7t.h
Italian Line (1 batt.), and details
Gendannerie (0 companies)
Artillery and Train
Sappers and Miners
113 2,061
lIO 2,459
100 2,1)04
{i2 2,400
87 1,972
162 0,857
39 1,404
00 1,450
33 1,015
17 1,JI,2
5 186
3,074
2,519
3,064
2,462
2,059
7,019
1,#.'1
1,516
1,0.18
1,109
Iln
Total 788 2·~,82(1
N,B.-The Cavalry (29th Ch:l!lSeurs, lInd an odd squadron orIst Hussars)
was distributed in tr<xlj">S nnd hulf·troolls (Ill round the brigndffl, the only
solid bodies being one squadron with Heummnll's brigade, and one lit
Darcelona. 'fhe total number of sabres was 67"0 only.
xv
SPANISH ARMIES ON THE EAST COAST:
JUNE 1, ]813
202 4,3:";7 4,5li9
309 5,124 5,433
272 5,497 5,769
783 l4,D78 lfi,761Total
FmST ARMY (Gencrnl COpo.sS).
hit Division (F.roles): [; batls. [lud 2 st"]llndrons
2nd Division ( '1 ): 7" batts. and 2 squlldrons
Garrisons: 5 batts. and details
SPANISH ARMIES ON TIlE EAST COAST 76::;
0jJiaT8. Mm. 'i'wal.
SECOND AB.Hy (General Ew:o).
1st Division (Mijal'C:l): 6 bllUs. 230
2nd Division (Villaeampa) : 4. baits., 2 squadrolls 200
3rd Division (Sanlfield): 5 batts., 2 squadrons 206
4th Divisioll (Roche), 5 IJuU.l>. 19t1
5th Division (theEmpeeiIlRdo): 4. batls.,2 squadrons 135
6th Division (Duran): "harts., 3 squadrons WO
Cu.vulry Hrigude: 2 regiments 61
Artillery 'U
Engineel'8 and Sappel'l> 31
'1'otal 1,311
'1'lUilU Au!>o;, (Duquc DJ::J..l'AllQUI::).
ht Division (Prince of Anglona): 8 batls. 210
2nd Division (AllU'quis de IllS CuevWl) : 7 batts.. 187
3rd Division (Cruz Murgeon): 7 hatts. 118
Cuvalry Brigude (SUrtemcs) 42
Artillery, &e. . 21
4,125
4,355
a,178
4,237
4,113
5,204
953
HI
228
2U,:W·:!o
4,U32
3,438
2,656
0114
323
4,355
4,564
5,as·,
4,486
4,2-l.8
5,46:.l
1,014
782
259
ao,l105
5,H2
3,625
2,7741
706
....
Total 578 12,OIU 12,501
XVI
THE AIDIY OF SPAIN AS REORGill'lIZED BY SOULT ,
JULY una
N.H.-NumcrIlIs up~ndcd to u regimcnt'li uamc givc thc nWllber of
battalions in it, wben they exeeed one.
1st Division. FoY.
Hrigllde I<'ririoll: 6th Ugcr. Late Foy'lI Division Army oC }
69th Lillc (2). Ditto. [Portugal.
70th Lillc. Ditto.
Brigade Hcrlicr: 30th Linc (2). Lute :SUtrut'li Vivo A. oC J'.
39th Line•. Late Foy's Div. A. of P.
65UI Linc (2). Lute Sarrut'ti Dh'. A. of P.
0.Dicull
una mell
present.
5,92'J
2nd Division. DAR..\IAGN,\C.
Brigade Chasse : IGth UgCt. Late Darmugnac's Div. Army of }
8th Linc. Ditto. [the Centre.
28UI Linc (2). Late CUliSUgIlC'lI Div. A. of C. G,DGl
Brigade Gruutdct: 51st Line. Ditto.
54lh Line. Ditto.
75th Lillc (2). Ditto.
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7,056
OjJict,rs
fmdmtn
3rd Division. ABBE. pruent.
Brigade RignOllX: 27th ~er. Late VilIatle'lj Div. Army of f
63rd Line. Ditto. [the South.
64th Line> (2). LategarrisonofVittoriaA,ofN. 8,0;10
Brigade Rl!molld: 5th Ugcr (2). Late Abbe'" Di\'. A. of N.
94th Line (2). Late Villatte's Div. A. ot S. '
95th Line. Dit.to.
4th Division. CoNBOUX.
Brigade Hey: 12thUger (2). Lute MarulIllln's Btigu.de A.of5.
32nd Line (2). Late Conroux's Div. A. of S. }
>lard Line (2). Ditto.
Brigade Schwitter : 45th Line. Late Maransin's Brigade A. of S.
55th Line, Lnte Conro\lX'1l Div. A. of S.
58th Line. Ditto.
5,IH16
4,181
4,186
5,981
5th Division. VANDERMAE.!lJ::X.
Brigade Barbot: 25th L~ex. Late Barbot's Dh', A. of P. '
1st Line. Late garrison of Burgos. A. of N.' f
27th Line. Late Barbal's Di\'. A. oC P.
Brigade Rouget: 50th Line. Ditto.
59th Line. Ditto.
130th Line (2). Late Vandermaesen's Div, A.
[ofN,
6th Division. I'tlABANSIN.
Brigade St. Pol: 21st Uger. Late Daricau's Div. A. of S. f
24th Line, Lute Levul's Div. A. of S.
96th Line, Ditto.
Brigade Mocquery: 28th Uger. Late Daricau's Div. A. of S.
10bt Line (2). Ditto.
l03rd Line. Ditto,
7th Division. MAUClrnlo:,
Brigadc Piooteau: 17th Uger, Late Maucunc's Div. A. of I'.
15th Line (2). Ditto. }
66th Line. Ditto.
Brigade Montfort: 34th !£ger. Lute Vandemluescn's Div.
[A,ofN.
82nd Line. Late ltlauculle's Div. A. of P,
80th Line. Ditto.
8th Division. 'rAVI'IN.
Brigade &!chaud : 9th Uger (2). Late Leval'5 Div. A. of S. l
26th Line. Lute 'l'uupill's Di\'. A. of P.
41th Line (2). Ditto.
Brigade Lc(.'amus : 31st Uger. Ditto. I
70th Line (2). Ditto.
88th Line. Lute Lcval's Div. A. of S.
Butorigillally an A. of S. regimcnt, transferred to A. of N. ill January,
1 Originally an A. of P. rcgiment, buttr8nsfcrred to A. of N. in J,mUUl')'
1813.
SOULT'S AR1.rv IN JULY 1813 767
7,127
D,102
2,000
I,MD
1,108
2,011.1
DOO
6'"
OJ}icUI
and fIIt'f1
9th Division. LAMARTINI~R1~. prt$crll.
Brigade Mellnc: 2nd [.cger. Lute Sarrut's Div. A. of P. }
118th Line (2). Late LlImaftini~re'sDi.... A.
1l9th Line (2). Ditto. [otP.
Brigade Gauthier: 120th Line (3). Ditto.
122nd Line (2). Ditto.
Reserve (General Vn.w.TTE).
Brigadiers: '.l'houvenot. IInd Boivin.
(1) 1/4th UgCf. Late Sarrut's Division A. of }'.
1 & 2/10th Uger. Late Abbe's Division A. of N.
a/31st Ugcr. Late gu.rrison of Vittorill A. of N.
1(3rd Line. Late AbM's Division A. of N.
2(84th Line. Late Vandennaesen's Division A. of N.
1 & a(4Oth Line. Late Vallderm.acsen's Division A. of N.
1(101st Line. Late garrison of Vittoria A. of N.
1 & 2(H15th Line. Late AbM's Division A. of N..
4J114th Line (detachment). Old BayoDlle Reserve
4 & 5j115th Line. Old Bayouue Reserve
4(llOth Line. Old Bayonne Reserve
4Jll1th Line. Old Bayonne Reserve
8/118th Line. Old Bayonne Reserve
8Jl19U. Line. Late BiIlcuy garriSOIlll
Total: 17 battaliollll.
(2) Foreign troops :
Neuenstein's German -Brigade, 4th Badell, 2nd NII89l.iU (2),
Frankfort .
St. Puul's Italian Brignde \o!nd L~ger, 4th and 6th Line.
Casupalacios' Spanish Brigade--Castile, Toledo, Ro)"..\l
:€tranger
King Joseph's GlUlrd (General Guy). 3 regimenl.s
(3) Gendarmes d pied of tile 4th and 5th Legions
National Guards .
Total of Reserve . 17,254
'l'his total, as is obvious, mueh exceeds the 12,05" given as the total of
the Reserve by the tables which Soult sent toPuris on .Tuly 10 as repre·
lICutiug his available troops. These tublcs olllit the followiug l"rcneh bat-
talions which were all undoubtedly on the }'yrenean frontier in July l813
as they formed parts of the armies of the North f1ud Portugal or of the old
Bayonne Reserve in the returns of IIlay, and are ,Ill found agnin present
in the returns of September-l(8rd Line, 2(84th Line, 1 & 2(4Oth Line,
1 & 2(105th Line, 4/116I.h Line, 4/lJ7th, 2/1Olh Ligne: i. e. 8t battalion!!,
which easily aeconnt for the 4,600 men short in SQuIt's total. After the
battles of the Pyrenees, in which lIiaueune's and Vandermaesen's divisions
were 1lO cut up that llIey hud to be rc-formed with new unil.l>, the following
battalions, whose existence is concealed by &lult in his July table, were
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drafted in to thcm-l & 3/4Oth Line into Vllndennucscn's division, l/3Id,
1 & 2/l05th, 2jlotll UgCI', into Mauculle's. Obviously then, they were
avuiluble, though olllitted. The 4/II(lth lllld 4/1 17th (a frugment of four
companies) caJue into the fighting divisiolls later, but IUuSt IHlve lIcen
somewhere behind the Bidll88o..'L ul1 the time (having belonged to the old
Bayonne Hcserve).
OfficeI'll and
men prtsent.
13th,15th,
Cavalry :
Acting us CorjJs-cuvulry with the field urmy :
22nd Chasseurs
P. Soult's Division: 5th and 12th Dragoons, :.lud Hussars,
5th, 10tll, 21st Chasseurs, Nassuu Chnsseurs, Spanish
Cavalr)'
Treillurd's Di\'ision: 4th, Htll, Wth, 17th, :nst, 26th
Dragoons
"".
a,Il8l
2,3S3
'i'otal ca\'lllry 1,147
This makes the total available for service in the field:
Iuflllltry 7:2,6M
Cavalry. 7,147
Totul 71l,811
while Soult only gave himself credit for 61l,S'}3, including the Reserve, for
his field urlllY.
In addition, there were half-trained conscripts at llayonne 5,595.
GalTisons of Sun Sebastian 3,185, &mtona 1,465, Pampeluna 3,550
::: 8,200. Also sick 14,074, und dctnchctl 2,110.
Finally, 'Troupes non comprises duns les organizations,' or 'troUpell
. bors ligne,' i. c. artillery, -:ngineers, sappers, ge.ndarmerie ti che\'ul, truin,
equipages milituircs, .xc. ::: 9,000. Gross total about 122,367.
XVII
BRITISH LOSSES AT ~IAYA, .JULY 25, 1813
KilWi. lVoumled. Missing.
OD" 001- Offi- :.l'okll,
CCT8. Men. ura. lUel/. r.ers. AIen.
2nd Di\'bion Staff 2 2
CamerOll's Brigade:
1/50th }<'oot
"
21 10 158 2 55 ~~9
l/7Ist Foot ,
'"
4 120 1 53 IQ'
Ij92ad Foot '. 34 19 208 22
""Pringle's Brigade:
1/28th Foot 1 • • 112 1 31 1502j34th Foot 1 21 4 34 • '2 !O.1/3{1th Foot 2 10 7 III 2 54 186
'1'wo companies 5/00tb, attached
to above brigades 2 5 11 2,'; 44
lllUTlsn LOSSES IN THE PYRENEES 769
Kitkd. Wournted. M~l1illS.
off".. OJJi- OJfi- Total.
ceTl1. Men. ceTlI. Men. UTII. A-fen.
7th Dh-ision troops,:
1/6th 2 2 17 21
1/82nd . 8 • 67 79
Brunswiek·,Uch; 8 2 15 16 41
'fotul of the three brigades 11 1113 61 023 18 637 J,488
BlUTISH LOSSES AT RONCESVALLES
20
31
136
'2
4
-JULY 28
20
..
8 105
4 32
22
6
"6
1
1
J-:VIII
BIUTISH LOSSES AT SORAUREN ,
N.B.-Only those of ROSI;'s IInd Cumpbcll's brigades lire llvuilable in
detail, those of Byng's brigade are uowhere found. but are knowu to have
been slight-under lOO in nil. It is most curious that not one officer·
casualty llppears to have occurred either in the 1/3rd or ill the J6t Pro-
visional Battalion, Byug's only units engaged at RoncesvaUes.
ROSS'6 Brigade:
Ij7th Foot
20th Foot
lf23rd Foot
I company Brunswick-Gels
Portuguese. Brigade (A. Campbcll) :
11th Line )
2Srd l,ine
7th C8~dorcs
2nd Division:jl/Sro 1'001 . . 2 2llyng's 1/57th I·oot., 2 2 59 (j3Brigade 1l>t Provisional Hatt. } _ I 4. 5
(2/31st &; 2/66111) • --;:----;:--:;:---------.;0
Brigudc Total 2 8 115 70
Srd Division: 110 lo&scs.
4th Division (Colc) :
{3/27th Foot. . 2
"
• 11)5 7 2541/4tlth F'oot, . 1
'"
4 JU5 ".Anson's 1/48th 1"oot ,2 10 , ,•. 11 135Brigade
2nd Provisional.Batt.) _
1 1 16 2Q(2nd &; 2/53n1) Jf/7th Fool . . 1 46 ,. 150 1 217
Ross's Ij'.!Oth Foot, . 1 23 6 7. 108
Brigade 1/23rd I'oot, , 2 16 4 " "1 company nrwu;- }
wick-Gels 1 2 1 5
Divi~iollal Total 0 157 41 722 1
"
•••
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Killed. W,*,lIkd. Mining.
OJ!l- OIJi- OJ!l- T""'.
«rl. Ale", ar•. iUm. CC" Mm.
6th Dtvision (Pack) :ft42nd Foot .
"
19 .,
SUdlng', l/79th Foot . 4 I 00
'"Brigade 1/911t Foot. . J2 6 92 , 112
1 compuny .i/60tb I 4 ,
1'11110 Foot
, 4 42 al
Lumbert'lii 1j3::!od Foot ,
""
2<.
Brigade 1/36th Foot , 16
"l/Olst Foot 2 2
"
62
------Divis.ioll~1Totul
"
to 284 , 329
Artillery 6 ,
Gt:1lI:m1 Starr , 2 •
Total Brilwh 11 186 62 1,077
"
1,358
Total PortUguClie
"
HIO
"
8.. .. 1,102
G~,"mLoU. TOTAL ,. 846 107 2,084
"
....
XIX
BRITISH LOSSES AT SECOND SORAUREN, JULY 80
2nd Di~ion:r'''' "·001 . . 1 " 25 00Dyng's l/i>7tll!fool. 2 ,
'"
31
Brigudc lilt Provisiollal DKtt. } ,
-. ..(2/31llt &; 2/66th) 6 .-
Brigade Total • 10 D 110 131
3n1 Division (l"ictoD) :
rt"tO Font - . 1 7 8Brisbane', a/60th (4 compltniCli) , I 28 SI
Brigade 7..1th Foot . . 6 • 38 ..l/88th Foot.. . I I
--- ----Brigade Total 8 0 74 ..
Colville', Brigade: no CAlluallies.
4th Division (Cole) :{"J'.17thFOOL .
Anson's Ij40th Foot . 6 7
Bripue IjoJoSth Fool. -
2nd Provbional Batt.
(2nd k 2j5Srd) } - , 6
. Urigad4: Tollll . 12 13
BRITISH LOSSES AT SECOND SOUAUllliN 771
KiUecl. Wounded. Mi3:ri:ng,
OjJi. OjJi. OfJI- 7.'orol.
ccrs. Me1I, et:T1l. Men. cm;, Mm.
RoSll's Brigade: no casualtiC!l.
6th Division (Pakcllhum) :
{l/102nd Foot 1 7 •Stirllng's If7Uth Foot , 17 18
Brigade 1/91s1. }<'oot , , 7 •
j'/llth Foot 2 2Q , 23
Lambert's 1/32nd Foot
" •
2. 33
Brigade l/3Uth Foot 0 , ,. 2.
l/Ub1. }'oot , 2 10 13
Divisional Total 15 0 168 , 130
7th Division (Dalhousie) :f/OU' "oot . , 5 , 7
Barnca's 3td ProvUlional Eau'l 1 2 a
Brigade (2/24th & 2/58th)
Erunswick·Qcls }
(9 companiCll)
, ,
"
'7
'1"''''001 . . 2 22 24Inglis's 08th Foot . . , a • 18 28Brigade 1/82ud Foot. . • 7 7. .2CIUllISeurllBritwwlquu 1 12
"
,.
•
'"Divisional Total • 2Q 20 14' "
211
Artillery , • •
GJ::NEIlAL BalTlsll '!'OTAL , 02 .2 44' 20 583
Portuguese total unnsccrta.inablc; the casualties of 2nd &lrauren and
Bcunz.a, fought on the same day, being lumped together in the return
at 1,120. But at :lud SOnLureu thcy wcre fu.irly light: from the fad thl:l.t.
Stubbs's Portugue;e brigade had 0 officer-easualtie; this day, Le(,or'6 4,
and Madden'"" 3, it llIight be guessed that the' other llmk~ 'Cll6ulIltiCl:/muy
have been about 800 in aU.
CmlBAT OF BEUN:tA. ,JULY:w
l"itzgclllld'"" (lute Cameron'g) Brigu.de:
l/50th 8 2 ,. 2
"
30
1/7ht •
, 28 la 50
1/0211d . •
, 211 1 37
Pringle's Brigade:
1/28UI
2/Mth 1 , 15
"
8'
1/39th
"
3
General Stuff , ,
Cavalry (14th Ligh.t Dragooua and
1st Hus.",'1'lS K.G.L.) 1 2 2 ,
'1'otal 1 25 , 33 ,
""
Hi';'
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YOr(,UguClOC losiSCll heavy. Al;hwort!l's brigade Iwd 12 ollicer'CWIull\Ues,
Da Costa's 18; this at the usual rate should mean aoout 600 casualties of
all ranks.
XX
BRITISH CASUALTIES IN ~lIl\OR ENGAGEMENTS,
JULY :!l-AUGUST 2, 1813
COMBAT 01,' VENTA DJ:: unnoz (Ok DONNA MARIA). .ruLY 81
Kil~d. IYr.l1t1lded. iUi.l3illg.
°Di· O.Di- UOi· To/al.
eers..M~n. cers. IUell. cers. Men.
2nd Division, Staff . 1 • 1 • 2
Fitzllcnlld's {1/5mh Fool. 0 26 14 46
Brigade 1/710;1 Foot . 2 1 ;H, 37
Ij92nd Foot. 12 0
"
4 91
Pringlc's Itl8th Foot 1 1 2
Brigade { 2/84111 Foot 1 I. 2 10
Ij'J9th Foot 4 4
7th Divisioll :rot Foot . , 40 6 51Jnlllis's 68th 1"oot . .- 5 25 30
Brigade Ij82nd }<'oot .- 3 a
ChusseuTs Britallniqu« - 9 1 15 a aa
Total 41 • 9 230 1 34 315
COMBAT OF EClIALAR. AUGUST 2
General Staff . 1
4th Division:
{l/7th Foot 4 4RClI>l:I'li 20th Foot 1 3 26 30
Brigade 1/23nf Foot 3 3
7th Division:
Barnes's f/6th 1"oot . . 12
"
119 a 138
Brigade 3rd l)rovisionalllatt. " •
115 2 141
Brunswick-Oels . I 4 1 2 t4
Light Division:
1f'18rd 1 1
1/95th 1 t
"
12
3/95th 1 13 I·'
'1'otal 2 30 21 208 1 388
, General William Stewart. commanding the Division.
I Colonel Fib;hooera1d, a/60th, comlllt\ndi"K 11 Brigade,
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PORTUGUESE LOSSES IN THE BATTLES OF THE
PYRENEES
Killfd. lI'mwded. Milllling.
°D;- OfJi- ODi- 'rolnl.
('I'rll. Ai"ll. cer.'. 111j'''. r.erll. Mw.
Dn Costa's nri~l\dt, ;
2nd Line .. ~5
" "
21 'lOO} AllatDeun7.l1,
14th Line. 2a t, :lH
'"
84 July 30.
A. Cumpbell's Brignde,
40th Line 2 2·~ 7 78 3 114} Almost all at
10th Line. 2
"
7 111; 13 213 two bnttles
lOth Caljadores 3 3 J2 10 28 ot Sorouren.
Ashworth's Brigade (2nd Division) :
6th Line 29 5
"
8 105. l AllatBcun'l~I,
18th Line.
"
4 82 l2 lnOJJI30
6t.h Ca~dores 1 13 1 37 10 62 u Y .
Leoor's Brigade (7tll Division),
7th Line 4 4} Almost all at
lllth Line. 2 2 2nd Sorau·
2nd Cas:ador<'ll 1 12 J .... 58 ren,.luly&}.
Ml\dden'll Brigitde (OU, Division) :
8th Line 3 3}At the two
]2th Line. 2 511 , 208 4 269 battles of
9th Ca~dores 15 3 80 104 Sornurell.
Power's Brignde (ard Division) :
9th Line 2
"
21st Line , , l;} All fit 2ml
11th Cu~ores J , 6 Sornurcn.
Stllbbs'A Brigade (·tth Division) ,
llth Liue . J 34 1 105 142} At the two
2ilrd Line. J 17 6 26 50 battles of
7th Co.~lore!l 2 47 ;; 67 121 Somuren.
Total 16 480 60 1,000 107 1,7a2
No Artiltery lO!lSell So'we those at the combat of Jlnya, whieh were
nbout 15. No Cllvalry losses lit ull, tllOugll D'Ur1)11n's hrigade was in
the field at Sornuren.
N.B,-It will be noted that these losses ate aJlJlreciably lower than
those stated in \Vcllington's general return. The figures: given above nre
from Beresford'll correeted returns at Lisbon.
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FRENCH LOSSES IN THE CA..MPAIGN OF THE
PYRENEES
[From 5oult's Official Return, lent me by Mr. Fortcscuc.]
Killtd. Wounded. Prisoners.
OJJl- Offi· Offi· Total.
Ctnl. MI:II. cera. Men. =•. Men.
I. RF.1T.l,J'.'S 'Vn::o :
1st. Division (.f'oy)
"
78
"
301$
"
555
7th Division (Maucune) .. lB" '7 500 25 1,102 1,857
9th Divi8ion (Lnmartinil':!re) I. 7. 1<, U57
"
21" "SI
Totul Rcille's Wing 30 :l4(1
"
1,550 28 1,387 3,3Q3
n. D'EI\I,o:o/'8 ' CENTRE' :
2nd Division {Darmngnac} l~ >0,
"'
1,925 1 30 2,225
3rd Division (AbM) .
"
130 .. ,lOO 1 ,. 750
6th Division (l'IIaransin) 11 105
'"
783 12" 1,059
Total D'Erlon's •Centre' ., 42. 12• 3,268 2 185 4,O:W
TIl. CLAUSEI,'S Wnm ,
4th Divil.ion (Conroux) 16 Ha
"
1,432 12 747 2,887
5th Division (Vanderma.esen) 16 158 '0 978 2 '01 1,480
8th Division (Taupin)
"
121S :18 1,007 2. 1,262
Total Clause!'!> Wing
"
42' 108 3,417 14 1,07'~ 5,009
lV. Ca""'''' 12 2 3;l 1 10 67
G":Sto:ltAl. TOT...... 01/ AlUllY t01 J.207 277 8,268
'"
2,66512,563
No Ilgures for Artillery, gnginoor1l, 'l'min, or other auxiliary setvioes,
or for General Staff. l'iIartlnien's lists supply 4 ensualties of gcnera.Js
(Conroux, Schwitter, Rignoux, Meunier), and 12 of staff officers. There
must hllve been appreciable eBsualties in the other .<;entices, especially men
captured from the Train at the Yanzi dlsllster.
Soult's figures are always unreliable (as witnesll Albuera). The details
above contain some 'mom! impossibilities '-e. g. the Return givCl'l
63m Line of Abbe's Division 193 casualties, nol including o-nt> 0!fti:f/1. But
i\l.o.ninien's lists supply one officer-casualty at Maya, two at Deunza, two
at Ynn~.i. Similarly 58th Line of Conroux Ims in the OmO;1l.1 Return
473 casualties, including only 5 officers-l wounded and 4 prlsonertl.
A reference to iUartinien 8ho1'l'S 2 officel'll killed (one the colonel I) and
5 wounded-lUlding the 4 prisoncrtl we get 11 offux:r·casunltiCll to 473 men:
quite Il. possible percentage, which Suult's is not.
Captain Vidal de la B1ache (i. p. 280) gives a easlUllty list differing
lilightly from the above. It runs: Foy .'>56, Ma\ICUne 2,457, T.amartini~re
981, Darmagnnc 2,225, Abbe 253 [q\\itc impossible], Mnmnsin 1,059,
Conroux '2,:187, Vandermaescn 1,480, Taupin 1,202, Cavalry 72; total
12,071.
INDEX
Abbe, gellcrlll. governor of Navllrre.
failll to relieve 'Cutrallll., 262;
joinell by Barhot, 263; by Tau.
pin, 264; at l\laya, 629; at
Dcunta, 703; at Venta de Urro;o;,
710; lit Yanzi, 723.
Abovillc, Augusw Gll.briel, gencm],
his explosion tit Burgos, 858.
Adum, -Frederick, oolonel, nt com-
lmt of Biar, 287-90 ; at Cu.~tlllla,
291-7 ; protests against abandon-
ment of the siege of Tarrllgolln,
511.
AlavlI, Migut], general, wounded at
Villa Muricl, &I.
Alba de Tormes, oombatof, 122~1 ;
uercllded by lllnjor .Jose ~lirnl1dll.
125.
Albcyda, combat of, 282.
;".leoy, combat of, 282.
Alieante, Maltlllnd at, 4, 162 ; Mac-
kenzie commands Anglo-Spunish
army Ht, 58, 10S; Bcntinek's
proposal to withdraw troops (rom,
220; Murrny nt, 275; Beutlnck
brings buck cxpeditionnry foroo
to, 521.
I\lten, Chllrlcl;, major-gcllcnd com-
manding Ligbt Division. lelt in
command at :\Iadrid, 4; in thc
Dastan, r..w; moves the Light
Division to Lecumberri, 690;
ordered to haNUls SOlllt'll retreat,
715-2010; at VlIlI'l.i, 721 ; lit Ivnn-
wily, 785.
Altcll, Victor. l1Iujor-gclICI'llI, 011
retrent from Madrid, 98, 119.180,
135, 144; pursucs Villattc, 317,
at Vittoria, 395. 419; in thc
Vittoria pursuit, 458.
Altobiscar, combnt 01. Set Ronces-
valles.
Alvare1., Pedro, colonel, his defenec
of Castro-Urdiale~,272-3.
AnSOll, George, IIlnjor-j,>eneral, his
brigade on the Doum. 9-10, 15 ;
011 retreat rrom Burgos, 68; ut
Venta del Pozo. 71-6.
Anson, Willhl.ln, major.general, at
Vittoria. 419; at Sorauren. 656,
673; at second Soraul'Cn, 694.
Aranjucz. evacuated by Hill, 97•.
Arincz. village of, in battlc or
Vittoria, taken by Picton, 418-21.
Artificers, Royal Militarv, COll-
vcrted into ROYIII Sappers and
JIiners, 26; at siege of Burgas, 50.
A8l1worth, Charles, brlgadier.gencr.
ai, at Vittoria. 419; in thc Bast·
an, 530; at Maya, 626; atcombat
of BcIlI1'1.II, 70S.
Astorgn, lOll!! siege of, tt-I 2 ; SlIr·
rendel'8 to Custufios, 1] ; Foy ut,
11.
Ausscnac, gencral, joins Souhnm,
54; opemtions of llis brigade,
116tlole; in Biscay, 207.
Avy, Antoine, general, at Vittoria,
ana, ,n1, 428.
Bnbihl r'\Ic"te, combat or, 3111.
llalagucr, fort, besicgt.'d by Murray,
491; InIl of, 499.
na1la.steros, Franciseo, gencral,
Wellington's orders to. G8. 511 : hill
attempted Cfmp d'l/Q.t, 60,61, 66,
178. lU8; cxited by the Cartes,
62; Wellington's commenl.8 on,
300.
nllrbot, gelleml, hili troops defeated
lit combat of Lurin. 263 ; checked
at RODCCSVa.lIclI, 615.
narllcs. Edward. major-general,,,
his gallant counter·attack at
)Iaya, 637; at second Soraurcn,
1;{17; charge of his brigade at
EchflllU',7811.
Hfllllllrst, H('nry, 1~llrl, Secretary
for War. corre~poudenCt:ur Wel·
lington with. 12, 25, 28, 64, 112,
117, 164110te, 197, 211, 214, 217,
219. 220. 225-6; establishes
Bcrcsford's claims to seniority
ovcr Graham and Cotton, 230;
Wellington sends plan of cam-
pai'::-D for 1818 to, 801-4: Welliug-
ton's remarks "ner Vittoria, 458,
4.68; suggests Wellington's trollS-
ler to Germany, 508.
BaYIlS, skinnisb on the, 370.
Dehoi.lie, bridge of, broken by l<'oy,
48'.
Bcjar, l'oy's failure at, 240-1.
Bcntinek, Lord Frederick. at siege
of Tarragona. 507. 511.
Dentinck, Lord 'YiIllam, sends
troops to Alicantc, 164; proposes
to withdraw tbem,t222-3; sends
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a raiding force to Tuscany, 223 ;
recalls troops from A1icnnte to
Sicily, 284; arrives to t.."ke corn·
mAnd at Bulaguer, 520; hill
dispatches to Wellington und
Bathurst, 521.
Beresford, Sir William, marshal,
his management of army in
Portugal, 210; Wellington's
choice of, as successor to himself,
228; Duke or York's decision
lIguinst hi~ cluims, 229; Lord
Bllthunit estllblishes his right to
seniority, 200; receives Welling-
ton's plan of campaign for 1813,
303.
Bertoletti, general, commands at
Tarragona, 492; defends the
town against lllurray, 4!lB-!>14.
Beun?.;}, combat of, 708, 70'~;
cllsualties at, 739.
Biar, combllt of, 288-00.
Bi1l.ouo, tl\ken IInu lost by the
Splluiards, 254; ugain llttucked,
254; relieved by Palombini, 261 ;
again attacked by Spnniards, 267.
Bloye, captain (R.N.), at Castro-
Urdiales, 211-2, 273.
Bock, Eberhard, general, on retreat
from Bnrgos, 69; at combat of
Vcnta del Pozo, 71--4; brings his
brigade to join Grnham, 32:l;
Cl'Ofisell thc E~ln, 3S0 ; at Vittoria,
396, 4~7.
Bourbon, the Cnrdilllll, appointed
head of Spanillh Regency, 205-7.
...Boyer, gcno.:ral, lltcomhat ot Venta
del Pow, 72-4 ; ordered to rctUnl
to France, 246; his raid across
the Esla, 327; at Vittoria, 404,
436; summoned to join Napo-
leon, ;,81.
Brrl.llford, Henry,brigadier-general,
lIurrerillgs of his brigade on retreat
to Rodrigo, 154; at Vittoria, 1.l96,
424, 487; at combat or Vi1lurel,l,
474, 475; at comlmt of '1'olosn,
478; at St. Sebastiun, 567, 571.
Brisbane, Tbomll9, major-gencral,
bls brigadc at Vittoria, 413, 418,
421-
Durgos, dClicription of, 21--4; siege
of, 11-51; relieved by Sollham,
68; \Vellington's comments on,
299; opcratiOl1ll round, in June,
18lS, (l4{l--(}3; abandoned by King
Joseph, 357.
Burl!0yne, .Johu, mnjor IR.E.),
senior engilleer ut BlIrgos, 18 n.,
28 71., 1.l0 11., 41 n.; his observlI-
tions, 44-5, 47, 4U-51 ; his notes
011 sicge of St. Se\.lustillll, 5Ta, 578.
Byng, John, major-general, lit
Vittoda, 400, 419; at Ronte$.
valles, 557, 011; retires, 622--8 ;
at Sorfluren, 656, 678; at second
SOraUl'ell, 6U4.
Cadiz, \YellillgLon I\t, 201--6.
Cadogall, Hon. Heury, colonel, at
Vittoria,400 ; delltll of, 401.
Carrarelli, Louis Marie, general,
conpnands Army ot the North, 2 ;
strengthens Burgos, 23 ; joins SOIl-
hflm lit Briviesc,.", 4S-a4; in
pursllitof WelJington, 85 ; returns
to Burgos, ]] 1 ; opposed by the
Gucrrif]eros, 166; his failure to
restore order in BillCllY, 191-3,
252-8; superseded by Clausc1,
193; returns to France, 217,
262.
Cameron, John, colonel, succeeds
to Cadoglm's brigade at Vittorio.,
4]7,419,420; ;n IlUrsuit of the
French, 4:19; in the Bnstlln, 53U ;
lit Muyu, 542, 626, 683, 634.
Call1pbcll,Archiltald,mlljor-gcnerol,
at RonL'Csvalles, joins HoBS, 621 ;
at Soraurcn, 656; at Beun7.fl,
704.
Campbcll, eolin, captain, his
account of storm of St. Scb,."sti,."n,
580,581, ;';82.
Cfllnpbell, James, genernl, nt Ali.
eantc, 162; supersedes Clinton,
165,275; superseded by l\lurray,
275.
Carvu}ul, S(Jlluish minister of war,
WcliLngtoll'S letter to, 198-200.
Casapalll,eios, general, commanding
Franco.Spaniards at Vittoria,
394--426; under Soult, 595.
Cassagne, gencral, at Vittoria, 398,
'102, 414, 429; his division in the
Bn.st:ln, 5lJ4.
CflSSllll, general, governor of Pflm-
pehlll!', 52S.
CRst"Un, \.InUle of, 291-t1.
CaStllil.OS, J!'rnneisco Xuvier, gener-
al. oommanda Army of Gnlicia,
joins Wellington before Burgos,
15-16; on retreat, 64, 156; winter
quarters of, 184; WellinlttOn's
approval of, 199; appointed cap-
t:un-general in Galicia, Cnstifc,
and Estrcmndura, 305; deposed
by neftency, 523.
Castro-Urdiales, fortified by the
Spanillrtl.'l, 200; Clausel lit., 20!l ;
siege and storm of, 271-3.
Chinchilla, siege of, 03; taken by
French, 60.
Ciudad Rodrigo, Wellington's re·
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D" Cotita, generul, his o!Jcrotions in
the BllStUII, 537; ut Mllya, 626; at
Beunz.a., 704..
Dalhous:ie, Georgc, Earl of, licut.-
general, insubordinate action of,
J52; comlnallds 7th Division at
Vittoria, 409, 422; his responsi.
bility for errors, 449 j blockades
Pampeluna, 539; marches to
J,i1.l1so, 683; at sccond SOJauren.
61.15; .'It "entu de Urro:r., 7J1 ;
nt Echalar, 7~8.
Daricau, gener!ll, in pursuit of
Wellington,149 j marches townrd
Vulencu., 280; witlHlruws (rorn
7.,ulllorn, 327; lJUrsul.~ lJy Wd-
Iingtoll, a31; ut Vittoria, 393,
"".Darmagnac, general, at Vittoria,
393,413,417,428; ·at combat of
Araqull, 461; at Maya, 629; at
\VeUington censures his rctrcut,
622, 623 j at (:olnbut of Lin~oain,
651; ut SOflluren, 656; ...t sel.oolld
Sornurcn, 694.
Colville, Hon. Charles, major-gene-
rol, at Vittoria, 411, 417, 429,
435.
Conroux, general, at Vittoria, 401 ;
alarmist reports of, 538, ,.40 ; at
Sornuren, 663, (J(J8; in 6econd
oottle of Sornuren, 61.12--6; ut
SumbiJla, 719 ; at Edmlur, 734.
Constantill, Foy defeats Silveiro.
at, 11.
Capons, Fmnciseo, captain-general
of Catalonia, commands 1st Army
in Catalonia, 308; co-operates
with rtIurray, 49, 504 j Murray's
pledge to join him in derending
the Gaya, 507; abandoned by
It!urruy, ;513·; threutens !\1uth,eu's
force, ;518.
Cortes, intrigues in the Spanish,
202-3.
Cotton,Sir Stapleton, lieut.-general,
at oombat of Venta del Pozo, 70-
4 j iu command at combat of Villa-
drigo, 76; Wellillgton's estimate
of, 229; his ambitions liS to the
eOIlUllllnd ill the Peninsula, 22\)-
30.
Croker, Johll 'Vibon, reoords \Vel-
Iington's plan for driving the
lo"'reneh out of the Pcnillllula, 359-
60, 454,lOlt.
Curto, Jean.Baptistc, general, pur-
sues \Vellington from Burgos, 69,
71; lItcombntorVenwdeIPo:w,
71--4; at Vittoria, 426, ""'10.
trent on, 158; winter quarters
at, 180.
Clllrke, Hcnri, due de Fcltrc.
French minister of war, appoints
Massl:na to command Army of
Portugal, 33; orders withdrawal
from Madrid, 243; reealls troops
to I"raooo, 248, 249; his orders
to Clausel, 259; forwards King
Joseph's complaints to Russill,
88; lectures the king 011 hi~
strategy, 243, 248, 249; Ius views
on the Northern insurrection,
252; urges the king to send
troops to Biscay and Navarre,
259-60; his mISconceptions of
\Vellington's strength and designs,
245,251 ; hisillstructiollS to King
Josel)h ulter his retrellt into
France, 646.
Clalliicl, Bcrtrand, gencml. com-
mands Army of Portugal, 2;
reorganizes his army, G-8; ad-
vances to Valladolid, 8-9 ;
retre4tll northward, ]4, 15, 17;
superseded by Souham, 8a; in
operntions roulld Snltunnncn, 124-
42; supen;edes enlTarelli wil-h
Army of the North, 198, 258, 262 ;
his failure to ~ubdue tile NorUl,
259, 270 j his pursuit of Mina,
268, 269, 334; ordered to join
King Joseph, 386; fails to reach
Vittoria before the battle, 454;
evade~ "'ellington's pun;uit, 400-
»; reaelle~ Sarllgossn, 4(15 j arrjve~
in France, ...no, 527 ; appointed to
colllmand of the left wing under
Soult, 594; ut RoncesVI.lIes, 6J 5 ;
ut Soraureu, 657,663,665-77; in
second' battle of Soruuren, 692-7 ;
retreat, 707; at Sumbilla, 718;
at Eehalar, 734.
Clinton, HeD9·, general eonunand-
ing 6th DiVision, 2; joined by
Wellington, 13; at BllJgos, 42;
\Vellillgton's disliUtisr,~etion with,
52; rellUUH'.Jl OOlllnlllnd of 6til
Division, ufter Vittoriu, 462;
pun;ues Clausel, 463, 464.
Clinton, WilIiam, major-general,
takes oommand at Alieante, 164 j
superseded by CampbelI, 165,
275 j at battle of Castalla, 291-7 ;
at TatTllgona., 492, 561:1 ; thwarted
by Murray, r.oO-lO.
Collier, Sir G<!orb"t, calltain (RN.),
bloekade~ St. Seb".sti(l.n, 567;
lands Ul~val guns, 560.
Cole, Sir Lowry, nUljor-breneral, re-
treuts fro'" Madrid, 102 j at nOli-
cesvalles, 585, 60·1., 611, 61'1', 620 ;
356.8 3 E
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Irurita, 683, 684; at Beunzs,
70S; at Venta de UlTOZ, 711 j
at Sumbilla, 719.
Decaen. Charles, general, COffi-
mu.nds French Army or Catalonia,
308 ; prepares to withstand
Murrar. 502-4,; his ineffective
operatIOns, 517.
Denla. abortive expedition to,
168, 164.
D'Erlon, .Jean Daptiste Drouet,
COlllte, in pursuit of Hill from
Madrid, IX); supersedes Soullam
in command of Army of Portugal,
129 j his operations on the
Tormes, 132; briIlgll Amty 01 the
Centre to Valladolid, 339; at Vit.
tolia. 401, 418 j abandoned by
Gallan, 0131 j retires, 433 j disonler-
Iy retreat of, 439 j ~treats by the
Col de Velate, 621 ; in the Bastan,
630; ordered to join Rcille on the
Nivelle. 534,: IlJlj)ointed to com-
mand Centre of Army under
Soult, 594 j ordered to force the
pass of ~laya. 624; captures the
position, 624-39; at Irurita, 683,
684; his delays, 685; attacks
Bill, 702; at combat of Beumm.
708; retreats to France. 7BO.
Desprez, colonel, sent by King
Joseph to Russia, 88; his report
of the Moocow retreat, 241, 242.
Diekson. Alexander. CQlonel (R.A.),
at Vittoria, 419, 428; at St.
Sebastian, 565.
Digeon, Alexandre, general. pur-
suing Wellington's army, 144 ; on
the :&Ia, 8:'.7, 328; abandons
7..nmora, 380; punued by "'el-
liugwll, 381; at Vittorill., 3US,
404, 420; covers Reille's retreat.
"",.
Donkin, Rufaoc, major_general,
Q.M.G. to Murray, 292-5; bis
misleading dispatch, 508; plans
re-cmbarkation from Tarragona,
509; remonstrates with Murray,
511.
Douglas, Sir [Joward, colonel, 11,
14; sends guns for tile siege of
Burgos, 39, 41110te.
Dubrewn, general, f{Overnor of
BurgOll, successful defence of, 2l:1_
61 ; relieved by SoUhlllll. 68.
Dumn, Jose, brigadier-gencml, 255.
280-1.
D·Urban, Benjamin, major-geneml,
views on the siege 01 Burgos, 51 ;
on retreat from Madrid, 98. 110,
130, 132, 156, 159; brings his
Portuguese brigade to join Gra-
barn, 324-6; erossCll the £Sla,
330; at Vittorin., 304, 419.
ELoro, eros.sed by Wellington. 302,
363; operntions on, 364.
EC}Ia.!ar, combat of, 732; casual-
ties at, 739.
Elio, Francisco, ~ncral,command-
ing in ValenCia, 66; combines
witll Hill, 95, 98-110; retires to
Alicnnte, 162-4; h.is army in
Murcin, 2'11; on the Xucnr, 283,
286 ; his Illismanagement at Vii_
leua, 281. 288 ; co-operates with
Murray, 298, 488, 502.
Empecinado. tllc (Juan Martin),
bflgadicr-gcncml.l00, 109 ; occu-
pies i\ladrid, 110 ; in East Castile,
255, 256, 281.
Erskine, Sir WiUiam, gencml, at
combat of Ocmla, 93; his suicide,
315.
E~la. passage of the, 329.
Espana, CarJos dc, gencral. 98,
100.112.184. 305. 315, 656.
Fane, Henry, major·general, pur-
sues Villatte, 317; at Vittoria,
8940.
Ferdinand, King of Sicily. his
abortive coup (/'jj(Il. 284-6.
Fletcller, Sir Richard, colonel RE.,
directs siege of St. Sebastiau. 565.
5'18.
Forjaz, Migncl, secretary 01 state
in Portugal, \Vellington's corre-
spondence with, 208.
Foy, lIIaximilien. general, his raid
on Zamora, 10-11 ; joins Clausel.
12; in pursuit of Wellington
after Burgos, '18, 88. 84; at Sala-
mnnca, 141-2; his views on the
ellmpaign, 168; on Wellington,
174,180; at Avilu, 187; abortive
cffort to surprise Bejar, 240 ; opera-
tions in Biscay, 271-4. 33'1, 365 ;
reccivcs ordcrs to join King
Joseph, 3'18; decides against
joining the army at Vittoria, 470 ;
harassed by Lonp, "'12; at
combat of 1'010811., 47'1-82; re-
gnrri!lOlls St. Sebastian, 484;
rlll1~ back on the Bidassou, 486 ;
burns .Bchobic bridge, 48'1; 011
the Lindu7;, 619, 649; at Sorau-
rllll, 664; at second Sornuren.
693; retreats into France, 699-
700.
Fmile, the (Agostin Ncbot), guer-
rillero chief, 280.
Freire, Manuel, gencml. opposes
Soult's advance on Madrid. 93 ;
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drives Fay from 'l'olosa, 477-82 j
besieges St. Sebastian, 504-86.
Grant, Colquhoun, colonel, at com-
bat of Morales, 331 ; at Vittoria,
::105, 'US, 411), 4..'15; nearly call-
tures Kinj:t ,Toserh, 441.
Grunt, William, bri!'tadier ill 7th
Division, ut ViUOnLl, 422-3.
Gucrnicll., comoot.s 01, 266.
Gucrrillcl'Ol>, tile, activity of, 189,
190 j Napoleon's failure to esti-
mate importance of, 257; their
operations in the 8)lring of 1813,
258-78.
GlJin~ret, captain, his exploit at
1'ordesillali, 83, 84.
ordered to join Ballasteros, 100 ;
with Elio and the Emp,ccinado,
]011 j in Andalusia, ](12, 165, 307;
succeeds Clllltmlos in command
of the 4th Army, 524.
Frcnl:tlu, Wellington ut, ] 94-213.
Fucntcrrnbiu, castle of, l>eizetl and
burned by .Mina'~ bands, 263.
Gaudin, colonel, defeated by Mina
at combat of Ledn, 263.
Gauthier, general, at combat of
Villn Muriel, 70 j at Sorauren,
675.
GuZ1.Ul, COUlItel:lll, l;llllt by Welling-
ton to France "fter Vittoriu;
445.
Gazan, Honod, general, succeeds Ho.lkett, Colin, brig"dier COIlI-
Soult, 247; orders Leval to munwng K.G.L., on retreat from
evacuate Madrid, 339; with Burgoo, (ID, 83; nt Vittoria, 425.
Army of the South at Arminion, I1allowell, Benjamin, admiral,
370; at Vittoria, 3UO; defence bombards 'farragona, 4\)6, 4\)8;
of his action, 402, 4]7 j hi6 retreat protests against Murray's re-
(rom Gomeclul, 4ao-l ; retire.s by embarkation, 509, 512; ef{eet!l
the PllS~ of Roncesvllllcs, 523; the embarkation, 514; dissuades
ordered to take eommnnd in the Murray from another attack on
Bastan, 534; retreats before Tnrrogona, 516; hails Bcntinck's
Hill, 536; abandons Maya, :>43 ; arrival, 520 j his dispatch to
chief ot the staff to Snult, 594.; Wellington, 321-
in the Pyrenean caIUl!algn, 665. Harispc, Jcan hlidore, general,
Giron, Pedro Agostm, general, defeats Spaniards at combat of
nephew or CnstanOli, commands Yccla, 286-1; at battle of CIUI-
4th Army, SOU j his operations talla, 292; left by Suchetio corn-
in Biscay, 368, 381; marehes to Il1Dnd in Valencia, 500.
Vittoria, 381, 31)6; sent in pur- Harrisoll, .John B., coloncl, deten!1s
suit of I<'rcneh, 4.54; returns to Bejar a~inst Foy, 240_1.
guard Vittoria, 4.71 ; joins LoIIglI, Hay', ~ltll, cllp~in, hill notes on
473. at combat of 'folosa, 479 ; VlttOflll campaIgn, 386, 364;
superseded in command of 4th exchanged 011 eve of Vittoria, 397,
Army by the Regency, 524; at 416.
Irun,557. lUll, Robcrt, major-~cneral, corn-
Gomrn, William, captain, his eriti- mandlng cavalry bngade at Vit-
eisffi on siege of St. Sebmitian, tona, 805. 410; in pursuit ot
583, 584. Gazan, 439; guards town of
Gordon, .Jall\e.~ \\'i11oughby, co10- Vittoria, 441, 455.
nd, Q.M.G., errol'!:i of, 13.5--H, ]46, Hill, Sir RowJand, Iieutelllmt-
180; his treacllcroulI (lOUuuet JtCncral, warns Wellington of King
while on \\'cllington'slltarr, 224-6; Joseph's advauce 011 Madrid, 66,
dismissed, 226. 67, 93; his retreat from Madrid,
Grahsm, Sir Thomas, gcneral, 96-110, 118; in operations round
resigns his claims ot seniority Salamanca, 113-42; on retreat
over Beresford, 230; moves to Rodrigo, ]37-53; his orders
across the Douro, 303; operations for 1813, 303; operations of rus
of his column, 322-113; ID opera- column, 314--18; halts at Sala_
Uons round Burgos, 854-62; at mnnca, 3] D; takes command ot
combat of Osma, 314; at Vit- southern wing ot Wellington'"
toria, 305; his nt.tl\ek 011 Reille, army, 320; forces Rcille to with-
405; on the Upper Zmlorru, .;1.24- dmw before him, 866-1; at
35; discussion uf lUll tnctit's ut Vittoriu, 3115; blocklldes Pampe-
Vitwria, 447-8 j in (lumuit of lunll, 521; in the Bustan, 5110 ;
French in BillCuy, 456; attack" drives out Gazan, 530; absent
Maucunc. 414: lI.ttuckll IlIld from the comlmt or Mays, 585,
358.8 3E2
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626 ; abandons the pass oC MaY1Lt
638; marches to Liu.so, 681-2 ;
attacked by D'Erlon at Bcun·,.a,
702-5 ; in pursuit of 801l1t, 708-0;
re-occupies pllSll of IIlayll, 7118.
Hucbra, oomb8~of the, 140.
Inglis, WiIliam, major-general, his
brigade at .second Soraurcn, 6rl7.
Jones, .John, colonel (R.E.), notes
on siege of llurgos, 25,28 n., 35 n.,
41 n., 49, 50 n., 171 'i.; Bnd on
St. Sebnstillll, 566.
JOIlcph Nupuloon Bonupllrte. King
of Spain, ad\'anccsQIl Madrid, 66 ;
loined by Soult and BlIchet, 87 ;lis quarrel with Sou1t, 88, 89; in
pursuit of Hill, 99, 108; before
Salamanca, 124; his accusations
against Soult, BO; returns to
Salamanca, 141; marches 011
Madrid, 155; Nnpoleon's criti_
cismo!, 169 ; his return wllfudrid,
184-6 i receives IiCWl> of Napo-
leon's retreat from RWlsia, 239-
40; abandOllS Madrid. 247;
at Valladolid, 335; summons
Clausel to join him. 356; aban_
dons nur~s, 357; lit Miranda,
366; retires on Vittoria, 377 j
reconlloitres the position with
JourUt\ll, 397; ordeN retrcut,
433; escapes from British caval-
ry, 441; at Salvaticrra, 451: at
Pampeluna, 462; fixes his head-
quartcN at St. Jean de Luz, 532 ;
orders concentration at St. Jean-
Pied-du-Port, 5401; superseded
by Soult. 550; his f1ll1, 5(;7;
retires to Mortcfontlline, 652 j
appreeiation of, 552-6.
Jourdall, Jcun Baptiste, marsllal,
with King JOflCph, 87; iu pursuit
of Hill from Madrid, 106, 108; in
operations round Salamanca, 124-
39; !'(lturns to Salamanca, 141 ;
returns to Madrid, 186; ordCI'll
concentration of forces to oppose
Wellington, 337-9; at Bur~,
854-8 ; misconception of Wellfng_
ton's movements. 372-3, 387-8,
398; his dispositions at Vittoria,
401-7; comment on Ga7,an's dis-
obedience, 431 ; orders retreat on
Pampeluna. 433; his remllrks on
the battle. 452; estrangement
from King Joseph, 532; dis-
graced by Napoleon. 556; lu.ter
hiswry 01, 556.
Kempt. JlI.mes, roll/·or-general, at
combat 01 San Mi lan, 375; his
pllSsage 01 the zadorra, 407-8;
at Vittoria. 418.
La Hermandlu.I, stormcd by Vnn-
deleur, 423.
LamllrtiJli~re, general, joins King
Joseph, 355, 365 j at Vittoria,
404. 435; abandons Vera, 544 ;
on the Lillduz, 0,19 ; at Sorauren,
668; at second Soraurcn, 693;
~t Yan"i, 722; at F.chalar, 73/1.
Lameth. general. at Santoi'i~, 2lJlJ,
271.
Ltupent, Fraueis, appointed Judge_
Advocate General. witl\ the army,
238; reporb> Wellington's plalls
for cncircling Soult, 717.
Lcrin, combat of, 263.
Lcval, Jean Franc;:ois, general,
evacuates Madrid, 340; at Vlt-
torill, 303, 401, 4H1, 420; in the
Bastun, 535, 539.
Linduz, ddem:e of tllC, by Huss'~
brigade, 618.
Linwain, combat 01, 653.
Liverpool, Robert, Earl 01, prime
minister. his relations with ""el-
lington, 214-16; wellingtoll'8
correspondenee with, 300; he
sug,.,>ests transferring \Vellington
to Germany, 538-61.
Long, Hobert, mlljor-general, in
operlltions round Snlnllluncn.13fi ;
informs Wellington ul Soult's
movements, 647.
Lon~, Franeisco, colonel, his
activity in the North, 253, 254;
surprises Palombini at 1'oza, 261 ;
escapes (rom Sarrut, 214. on the
Ebro, 370; brings his division up
before Vittoria, 381, 387. 896; in
the attnek on Reille, 405, 424;
seizes DurMa, 427; sent to
Biscay in pursuit 01 Maueune,
454,471; harasses }<·oy·s retreat,
472, 475; at combat 01 Tolosa,
478-80; captures garrison 01
Passages, 486 j at Yanzi, 720-4.
i\Iaekenzie, John, general, corn-
mll.nding at Alicante, 58. 163;
sllpetI;Cded by Clinton, 164,275;
lit battle of Castlilh•• 291-7; at
'farrngona, 492; protests IIgt1inst
Murray'8 abandonment of siege,
511; his advance on.l.Valdellos,
515.
i\Iaekenzie. Mr.. British secret
agent. offera Russian troops lor
the Peninsula, 220, 221.
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Madrid, evacuated by Hm. 106;
occupied by. KinS Joscph, 108;
evacuated by hIm, 109, 110;
occupied again for the winter,
186; King Joser.b leaves it, 218,
2·...7; the FrcllC I abandon it for
the last time, 340.
I\laitJand, HOll. T., lllajor-gencral,
commanding at. Alicunte, 4, 163,
275.
MUfBllsin, Jean Pierre. general, ut
Vittoria. 392; at l\1ayu• .542, 629 ;
at Beum.a, 703; at Vcnta de
Urroz, 711 ; at Echalar, 735.
Marmont, Auguste. marshal, Duke
of Raguan, Napoleon's criticism
of, 169 j e~timatc of, 172-8; his
remarks on the War of Spllin, 257.
IUll~na, Andre. marshal, Prilloo
of Essliug. abortive appointment
of, to oolllllland in Spain, 33.
Mathicu, Mauricc. general, gover-
lIor of Bal'Cclona, demonstrates
agatnst Murmy. 503-5; relieves
Tarragona, 517.
Maucune, general, attacks Welling-
ton before Burgos, 64, 65; enters
Burgos, 68; in Jlursuit of Wel-
lington, 70-0; repulsed at com-
bat' ot Villa MUrLcl, 79-82; in
operations round Salamanca, 130;
at combat ot San lUillan, 375;
escorts a convoy from Vittoria,
386; resists Graham's advance,
475 ; attacks the heights of
Somuren, 671; his division
routed at second Sorauren, 602 ;
ut Yunzi, 723; {lud at Echalur,
735.
Mays, first combat of, 542, 585;
second combat of, 617-39.
Medioo, El, guerriIlero leader, at
Toledo, 97.
lUelville, Robert, Lord, fails to
supply help for blockade of St.
Seoa.stian, 567-8.
Mendi:w.bel, Gabriel, general com-
ffiundillg Seventh Spanish Army,
253; opposes Chwscl, 262; ut
Ca9tro-Urdiales, 265; acts in
conjum.otiOIl with Grabam near
To109a, 478, 481; at siege ot St.
Sebastian, 523, 566.
Mennet,. JuJien, general, at Vit-
toria, 404, 427.
Mijsres, Francisco, ,:,:eneral, de-
feated at combat of 'Yecla, 28tl.
Mina, F. Espo7, y, his operatiolUl
round Pampcluna, M; holds
Navarre, 191, 255; Napoleon's
remarks Oil, 259; 0ppOlIes Abbi:,
262; defeats Darbot at combat
of Lcrin, 268; defeu.red and dis_
persed by Clausel, 269; threatens
Clausel's retreat, 461, 463.
Mirandll, .J09C, major, defends
Alba dc l'ormes, 125-32.
Morales, combat of, 331-
jl,Jorillo, Pablo, general, 98, 112,
119, 18', 18", 305-11, 815; at
Vittorill, 894, 400, 419, 420; ill
pursuit or the French, 480;
blodmdes PalllpClulIa, 527; at
Ronecsvallcs, 611, 6J.&; sent to
839lst Hill, 704.
Murray, Sir George, general, re-
9tored to Wellington as Q.~I.G.,
22{1; his advice 8S to pursuit of
Clausel, 455; dispatches orders
before Sorauren, 667.
Murray, Sir John, gener",l, super_
IICdCli Campbcll at Alicunte, 275;
his campaign against Suchct, 281-
98 ; winll battle of Castalla,
293--6; hill failure to earry out
WeUington's plans, 311; his
orders from Wellin~n, 488;
embarlcl, 490; 1lis half-hearted
attllek on Tarrogona, 498--4; his
miserable hesitatiolls, 505-9; re-
cmbarks troops, 511; abandons
Copons, 513; his futile advance
on ValdellOll, 515; superseded by
Bentinek, 520; his explanations
to Wellington, 511 ; court-martial
on, in 1814, 521, 561.
Nnpier, \ViIliam, oolonel, histGrilUl,
his comments on CI",usel's retrcut,
18 and note, 40 n.; on siege of
Burgos, 49, 77; on WeUington's
retreat to Rodrigo, 133, 145 n.,
149 n.; on Wellington's earn-
paign of 1812, 170 ; '"his eritieism
of Jourdan at Vittoria, 889;
reports ,vellington's account ot
his sehemc for eneirding Sonlt,
717.
Napoleo1l, E,nperor, nominates
Reille to conuuund lIrmy of Por-
t.ugal, 38; receives news of
JOllCph's quarrel with Suult, 89 ;
his dissatisfaction with conduct of
the War in Spain, 168-9, 218 ; his
disastrous retreat from RUSllia,
185, 215, 239, 241; supersedes
Caffarelli by Clausel, 103; his
delusions regarding the war in
Spain, 250, 2('11; his victories at
Dauh.en and T..iit'l.en, :355, 800;
1I1Ibter ut Foy's re-crossing the
Bidll8110U, 487; receives the news
of Vitto~ia,!547; his appreeiation
of Wellington'!> schemes on the
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Pyrencan frontier, 557: his pe.r-
VCnriOIUI ofSoult'.diliPlltchea, 640,
641.
O'Callagban, Hon. n. W., colonel,
at Vittorill, 401, 419; at Mnya.
542: at Beunu. 703.Ocans. combat 01, 93.
O'Donnell. Emique. Condede Abis·
pal, succeeds Ballastero. In com-
mand of Army of Andalusia, 63,
307 ; takes the fom 01 Panoorbo,
528; blockades Pnmpehma, 528 ;
marches to join Hill, 70"'.
O'Dooaju, Juan, genernl, Spanish
mini"!.er of wur, 205: Welling-
ton's censures on, 347.
Omr,tcda,Clnilrtiall. oolollcl K.G.L.,
at rolOlla. 480.
Osma, combat 01, 373-4.
Oswald, John. major-general. his
insubordinatMm on the Durgos
retreat, 150-2; at Vitroria, 42+-
8, 437; at St. Sebnslian. 567,
571,578,583.
Pack, Denis. major. general,
man:he» on Durgos., 3, 17; at
liege of Btug<MI. 26, 47, 48; re·
treah from Burgos, 67; in
operations round Salamanca,134;
at Vittoria, 396, 424, "l!7; at
combat of Villnreal, 0107:'5 i. at corn-
bnt of Tolosa. 478; nt :)omuren,
666, 677.
PaWCt, Si.. Edward, gCIlCtld,lOCnt to
Spain as sceond-in-eommand, 53 ;
attacks Maueunc, 65, GG; taken
prisone.. on Salamanca retreat,
14.1.
l'akcnham, Sir FAhmn:l, major-
gcncml, offers W~lillgton siege·
guns for ButgO', 40; take. corn·
Dland of the 6th Division, ldt at
~ledina de POII'\&I', 370; opposed
to Clause! at yittoria, <6a9 ; .upe....
&eded b)' Clinton, 462; rcpJaOCl
Pnck.689.
Palencia. stormed by Foy, 78-81.
Pnlombini, ~neral. operations of
his Italian divillion in Castile. 260,
261; and in Biscay, 265-7; at
Santofia, 265; at Gucnticn, 266;
at .Iege of Castro-Urdiales, 271,
27<.
Fampeluna, King Joscph at, 462 ;
siege or, 528-9.
Paneorbo, forts of, reduced by
O'Donnell, 528.
Pllnnetier. geneml, attempu to
relic\oe 'Thrmgonll, SOl, 514-15.
Pari., general. defendJI Saragoua.
4.68; evacuates it,.599.
Patque. "l'he Duque del, SUOCICMOr
or Hallnsleros, oonunanding Anny
or Andalusia. 63. 301, 311; 00-
ope.ration with Munay. 489, W2;
attaeks OD the Xucar, 515.
P...~. harbour, anival of
WeIliD~n·.si~ tmin at. 569.
Pastor, 1::1, guenlllero chief. 254,
266,207,305.
Pellew. Sir F,dward, admiml, makes
naval dcmonstrntion ofT the coast
of the Aml'unJam. 608; bringl:l
Bcnti"ck to take oomltlllnd ut
llalllgUl,lr, 520.
Pcnnll VlJJcmur. Conde, cavalry
sencral 98. 119, 132.
Picton. Sir Tholl1lUl, lieut.•general,
at Vittoria, 409; croue. the
zadorm 1\'ith the Std Division,
411; at Ari.ii.ez, 418; joins Cole
at Lin_in. 651; at 1It0000d
bat.tle or Sorauren, 8118; pUI'llUCS
Foy, 698-9.
l)lbliwit.l, Annistice of. 360; iu
etrcct on Wellington'. polity, 525,
737. •
Ponsonby, HOD. William, major-
fCCneral. brings his bri~ade to Join
Gmhnm, 323; Ilt Vittorin., ml!l,
419.
l)opluLlll, Sir Home, cornmotlore,
scnds lllllmunition to Wclli nglon ut
BurgOll. 89; OlfClli guDS. 4.0; hil:l
opcrlltions 011 coast of Biscuy, 54,
55,51,58 n., 176, 117, 253-4.
Porller, Juan Diaz, s:;eneral, heads
AlIturian insurgenu, 254; at
cornlNlt or Tolosa, 478.
PoUl de hl Std. combat. or. 261.
PrevOllt, William, colonel. lICIlt. to
take tile Col de Balaguar. 491,
500; rejoins }lunay, 514, 515.
Pringk. William Henry. major·
~Deral, at Villa Murid. 8G-l ; at
Maya,620; at combat of Bcunu,
703.
Provi&ional Battaliollll, oontrover·
.y concerning. 232-3.
Puente Largo, combat of. 102-6.
RamJlay. Nonnan, CQlltnin It.A.,
unjust trcntmcllt of. 456-8.
RC81:llcy uf Portugal, dcalillgll or,
With Wellington. l!07-8, 2011.
Hegcney of Spain, dCalU11C'l uf,with
Wellington. 201-4; displaced,
205; itll suceessors, 205.
Regent, the. Gcorge, l'rince of
Wales, creates Wcllington field·
manllaJ, 442.
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Regcnt of Portugal, Prince John,
206-7.
fuille, Honore Charle~, gencral,
commanding Army of Portugal,
his failure to cope witb the guer-
rilleros, 100; send~ Bo:yer acr06~
the &In, <127; his position before
Burgo~, 854; retrents l.Jefore Hill,
356, 857, 367; ut combat of
Osma, 373, 374; at Vittoria, 393,
404, 435, hig orderly retreat,
436-9, 451; sent to WIard tllC
frontier of France, 459; ab.·\lI-
don~ the bridge of Bellobie. 481 ;
appointed to command the right
willS oC the ILrlllY under Soult.
594; cJlcckcd 011 the Lilllluz,
617-21, 649; ut Surnurcn, 665,
675; at llCoolld Soraurell, 695;
retreat, 698; at combat of Yallzi,
72Q-4; at Ivantelly, 735.
Rcy, EmanueJ, general, at Yittoria,
"'()~; governor of St. Sebastian,
4lla, 507: his gallant defence,
570,574,586.
Robinson, Frcderick, major-gen.
eral, at Vittorill., 406.
Hoche, l'hilip K., general, eom·
mands Spanish division at A1i.
cante, 275; at battle of Castalla,
201.
Roncal, combat of, 260.
Roncesvalles, combat of, 008-20.
Ros~, Rol.Jert, mlljor-genel'ld, ut
RoneesvallCli, 613; at Somuren,
656, 662; at ~eeolld Somurell,
604; ut Echlllur, 784.
Rouget, general, defends Bilbao,
267; at combat of '1'010sa, 48I.
Salamanca, operations round, 111-
42; recovcred by the Allied Army,
317.
Sanehcz, ,Tulius, in retreat from
Durgos, 67, 68, 09; at Ciudn.d
Rodrigo, HiS ; o~>emtiolls hI
ClI.Stile, 80S, 315; III llUrsuit of
Freuch, 304.
SlIn Miguel, hOfUwork of,ntBurgos,
IItormcd, 27; blowlI up by Wel·
lington, 48; again destroyed by
the French, 355.
San Millan, combat of, 375.
San MUDOZ, combat of, 149.
Santocild«, Jose Maria, general,
commanding Galician army 011
tlle Douro, 6; evacuates Valla-
dol id, 9; joins in pursuit of
CllLusel, 16.
Sl'Intofi'l, relieved by Palombilli,
265.
Sl'Irrut, genernl, 210; joins King
Joseph before Vittoria, 865;
killed at Vittoria, 404, 425.
Scovell, George, major, Welling-
ton's cypher-secretary, appointed
to command Staff Corps Cavalry,
2,37.
Silviem, Frnneisco, Collde de Ama-
rante, drivcn from Zamorn. by
Foy, 11; takelt comllllLnd of the
J'urtuguesc.1ndcpendent Diviltion,
314; at VittorJa, 395, 419; in
the &stan, 527, 536; at the
combat of Bcunr.a, 626.
Skerrett, John D., major.general,
joins Bi1l with Ilis column, 95;
evacuates Amnjller., 91; at com-
bat of P"ente Lnrga, 102-5; at
Vitturill, 410.
Smith, Churle~, mlljor, engineer at
St. Scbnatinn, 565, 569, 578.
Somcl'!l-Cocks, Captain the Hon.
Jobn, storms San Migllcl, '1:1, 28 ;
killed at Durgos, 38.
Somerset, Lord F·it.zroy, carries
'Wellington's message from Sarau-
Ten, 660.
Sorllurell, first battle of, 6!5ol--80 ;
second bllttle of, 61)2-706; casual.
tics at, 738, 739.
Souham, Joseph, general, super-
sedes Clauscl in command of
Army of Portugal, 33; receives
reinforcements, 540, 55; advflllces
to relieve BurWJs, 64.-8; enters
Hurgos, 68; his pursuit of Wel.
lington, 68-85; joins Soult, 121 ;
superseded by Drouet, 121).
Soult, Nicolas, Jean de Dieu, lIlar-
shal, dukc of Dalmatia, evacuates
Andalusia, 2, 56; advances on
Madrid, 66; his quarrel with
King .Toscph, 87-0; in p\lr~uitof
Hill, OD-121; unites with Army
or Portugal and Army of the
Centre, 121; ineffective attack
on Alba de Torlllc~, 122, ] 23 ;
opcrationll round SlIlaJIIlLllc3,124-
39; I{ing Jo~eph'lI accusations
against, 140; hi~ pursuit of Wel-
lington, 140--51; turns back on
the Huebra, 151; Napoleon'llesti·
mate of, 169; at Toledo, 187;
recalled to France, 217, 243;
fiuperscdCll Jo~eph, 550, 581; hi~
IJl'OClamntiOIl to the troop~, 588;
charneter and career of, 589-91 ;
reorgani~,es the army, 591-8;
~eizes Mayn and ROllcesvaJles,
620; histeport to Napoleoll, 64Q;
tcpulsed 11t SorUIII"CIl, 663--80;
retreat, 681-105; his t!isoourugl;!-
mcnt, 736-7.
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Soult, Pierre, genecnl, in pursuit of
Hill, 105-8; crosses UlC 'l'ofmes,
131; King Joscph's strictures 011,
140; at Vittona, 393, 428 j at
Sorouren, 668.
Spry, William, brigadier-general,
at St. Sebastian, 578, 586.
St. SebastiuII. Hey governor or,
483; Foy's nttempt to reinCorce it,
484; blockade of, 485; siege of,
562-86 ; natural features of, 562 ;
aborth-c storm of, 575-82; its
siege abandoned. 586, 606.
Staff Corps Cavalry, formation of
the, 287.
Stapteton Cotton, BU Cotton.
Stewart, Sir Willi8m.liellt.'I.~neral,
his diwbedience during theretreat
from Sll.lamanca, 150-2; Welling-
ton's complaints Ilgainst, 226, 227;
absent at the time of the attack
on Maya, 626, 627; returns to
take command, 634 j at combat
of VeDta de Urroz, 711.
Stuart. Sir Charles, British minister
member of Regency of Portugal,
209 ; Wellillgton'~ correspon-
dence with, 21I, 221,
Stubbs, Georgc, colonel, command-
ing Portuguese brigade. at Vlt-
toria. 414. 419; atSoraurell, 656;
at second Soraureu, 094.
SlIchet, Louis Gabriel, (lllke of
Albufem, mar&h.1.I, advances on
l\llldrid. 66; Ilis qunrrels with
King Joscph Rnd Soult, 88, 89;
gathering of Spanish und British
armies against, 16~; precari_
ous position of, 219-81 ; his cam-
paign against Murray, 281-98.
488-600; defeated at battle of
Cnstnlla, 292-309; marches to
relieve Tarrngon(l,. 501; finds his
advance blocked byFortBll.laguer,
515; withdraws ucross the Ebro.
516.
Sumbilla, combat of, 718. 719.
Tarragona, defences of, 493; siege
of, 49B; relieved by Mathieu,
511.
Thaekerny. Frederick, major,senior
engineer at siege of Tarragona,
4117; protests against l\1urray's
abandonment of the siege, Sll.
'l'houvellot, gcncrol, governor of
Vittoriu, 378, 470.
'J.'icbus, cotnbat of. 262.
Tolosa, COmbl\t of, 477-1Il.
'l'omkillllOn, WiUiuDl (.~lptuiu 16th
Light Dragoons, lli~ diary of
events on the Douro, 6 n., 14 n.,
15 n., 16 'J., 18 11., 28 n., 88,1. ; on
Reille's retreat, 488.
'l'ordeijillns, exploit of Captain
Guillgrct at, 88.
Toro, .French !;8rrisoll of, relicved
by Foy, 10; Junction of Wclling-
toll and Rill at, 331-3.
Torquemada, riotous scenes at, 77.
Torrtns, Henry, colonel, military
seeretn.ry to Duke of York, Wel_
lington's correspondence with,224.
'l'ovcy, Gcorgc, Cllptain, bll)'onct
charge of his company on the
Linduz, 618.
Trcillard, Jean Paul. general, at
Vittoria, 428; at Sorauten, 688.
Vnenni, Camillo, historian, with
l'alombini, 264-8; his account of
'l'arragona, 496.
Valdcmoro. riotolUl scenes at, 102,
105.
Valladolid. occupicd by Clausel, 9 ;
his eviction by Wellington, 14;
abandoned by Wellinl;!ton, 84;
King Joscph makes it hl8 Cllllital,
247; evueuuted by the French,
344.
Vandclcur, J. Ormsby, major-
general. at combat of San Millan.
315; at Vittoria, 412; storms
La Hermandad, 423.
Vandermaesen, general, at fionces-
,miles, 615; at Sorauren, 668 ; at
second Sorauren, 695 ; ut combat
of SumIJilIa, 718; at Echahu. 734.
Vcnta del Pow, combat of, 71-4.
Vent\!. dc Urroz. combat of, 711 •
casualties at, 739.
Vera,' abandoned by LamartinH~rc.
544.
ViIlacampa, Pedro, general. acts
under EHo, 280, 281, 298.
Villndrigo, combat of, 70.
ViJlarrlUlcu., combat of, 415.
Villa Muriel, combut of, 79-82.
Villarcal. combat of. 473.
Villattc, general, driven from SaJa-
manca, 316-19 ; at Vittoria, 393,
402 ; attacks Morillo and the 71st,
415; retirement of, 416, 429;
Soult's complaints of, 718; corn·
mands Bayonne reserve, 595 ; his
torpor, 602, 718.
Vi1lena, castle of, CllIJitulnt.es to
Suehct, 287, 288.
Vittoria, battle of, 384-450; re_
trtat of the Prcnch from, 4083-50.
Wachholz, Ludwig, captain, notes
of,432 ; on combat of the Linduz,
018-19.
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'Valdron, John, captain, exploit of,
at Castalla, 295.
Wellesley, Hon. Henry. ambassa-
dor to Spain, his correspondence
wilh Wellingl.on, ]00-7,525; his
dealings with the Regency of
Sjlllin, 205.
Wellesley, Rielmrd, marquis, re·
signs from }'ereevul Cabinet, 214.
Wellington, Arthur Wcllcslcy, Mar-
quia of, marches to Burgos, 3;
crosses the Douro, 12-13; his
pursuit or Clausel, 16-20 j siege
of Burgos. 21-!>1; his instruc-
tiOllS to Hill, 57; rctrentll from
Burgos, 0(J.-..86 j ordcl'll Hill to
retire from Madrid, 09; I,;s
\'CrnlIJt1S for rctrcut. 111: operu-
tions round Salamanca, 111-37 ;
rctrc.ats on Ciudad Rodrigu. 137-
sa j ,his strictures 011 officei'll com·
mantling divisions !lud brigades.
15n4H; criticism of his cam-
paigns of 1812, 170-6; at j·'ren-
edll, lU4; made Gcnemlissimo of
Spunish armies, 106-204; at
Cadi?, 201; 011 Portugucse flnllllCC,
21]-'3; ILis relations with White-
lmll, 214-24; with thc Dukc of
Yorl:, 223--4; intrigucs of GQrdon
against,2Z4-6; his plan for cam-
paign of 1813, 299-805; plan for
'rar~~naexpedition, 808; leaves
HiIll III command of Southcrn
Army, 320; joins Gmhllm, 320 ;
occupies 1'oro, 331-3; his plan
for tnlllsrcrrillg British base to
the BllY of Biscay, 348-9; for
driving thc French out of the
Peninsula, 359; his operations
on the Ebro, 364--82; plan of
attack at Vittoria, 1194; his
derogatory remarks on his army,
452, 453; nmrehes for Nrwarre,
455; severity towards Norman
Hamsny, 456-8; p"rslCll Clau~cl
in vain, "61; his orders for
Mufray's expedition to'l'nrmgona,
488 ; dissatlsfo.ction with 1I1urrny,
521; influence of Armistice of
Pliisswit... on his IJlans, 525-6 ; in
the Bal,1;un, 537-4.3; ill eorre·
slJOndcnOll with Hathurst Illld
Livcrpool, rejccts their suggestiun
of transfer to Gcrmany, 558, 501 ;
controvcr.'JY with Mclvillc, 567-8 ;
~oes to St. Sebastian, 585; his
dispositions for thc defcnce of the
Pyrenccs, 60:'1-6; concentrates
ngninst Soult, 64.1, 65tl; his ridc
to Soruuren, 658--{\2; prcpnreslo
attack Soult,6{1,,; ut !lCcowl SOTim-
Tell, 6{14-101; pursuit of Soult,
707-40; renounce.'J advance into
France, 137-40.
Whittin,:rham, Sir Samrord, gellc-
ral, hiB Spanish division, 163, 276;
lit combat of Albeyda., 282; at
bnttle of Cnstullll, 21.li1, 204; 1n
thc 'l'urmgonu ""pe,lition, 402.
Wimpftcll, LOWll, Ilcllcrnl, S~mish
chief or the lltaff to Wcllington,
201.
Xixona, plot to betray, 270.
Yan~";, combat of, 720-4.
Yccla, combat of, 28B-7.
York, Fredcriek, Duke of, his rcl:l_
tions with Wellington, 2211;
O[I[lOSCS Bcresrord's e1rl.ims to
seniority, 2'28, 221'); disapproves
or Provisional Bnttnliolls, 232-4..
Yrurl;ulI, CQlIlbut of, 4061.
Zadorrll, the river, its importance
in battle of Vittoria, 384; crossed
by l{cmpt, 407; by PiCtoll, 411 ;
Reille's deCcllce along, 435.
Zamora, l~rcneh garrison of, re·
lieved by Foy, 11 ; occupied hy
Daricau, 327; occupied by
Grulmm, 3aO.
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